ML19309E440
| ML19309E440 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1980 |
| From: | Crews E SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-79-164-001 NUDOCS 8004220049 | |
| Download: ML19309E440 (5) | |
Text
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ATTAGED IS A PART 21 REPORT FF04 IE Fall UNIT - R071359CAI PART 21 ID2iTIFICATION iD.
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'Mr. James P. O'Reilly Office of Inspection and Enforcement United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Region II 101 Marietta Street, N. W.
Suite 3J00 Atlanta, GA 30303 Subj ect: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 1
Reportable Significant Deficiency Bergen-Patterson Mechanical Shock Arrestor Assemblies Nuclear Engineering File:
3.1051
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
On March 4, 1980, Mr. Jack Skolds of NRC Region II was notified orally of a reportable significant deficiency.
Bergen-Patterson Pipe Support Corporation (B-P) has previously identified these potential problems with mechanical shock arrestor assemblies to the NRC.
Immediately upon our notification from Southwest Fabricating and Welding Company, with confirming letters from B-P and upon receipt of the IEC, Supplement A, inspections were begun by SCE&G.
Initially it did not appear that the design of any of the shock arrestors would be affected by the deficiency as reported by B-P.
Continuing investigation has now identified one shock arrestor of the B-P design'which could possibly cause a subetanti.a3 safety bazard defined by 10CFR21.
We are reporting this as a significant deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e).
Detailed information is found in Attachment I.
l Since corrective actun has been eter=ined and is in progress,
.j J SCE&G considers this the fi0al report on this item.
If any questions arise, please let us know.
ery uly yours, E. H.
rews, Jr.
'p FBB:rm Enclosure mo o
q-
Mr. James P. O'Reilly Page 2 March 10, 1980 CC: Division of Inspection and Enforcement Washington, DC Messrs:
H. T. Babb D. R. Moore H. Radin V. C. Summer M. B. Whitaker, Jr.
~
- 0. S. Bradham A. A. Smith M. Eddins J. Skolds C. Steck- (SFP' W. F. Eceksted (B-P)
NPCF/Dixon File em A
e M
l
ATTACHMENT I 1.
Name of Reporting Individual Fred B. Brabham - P. O. Box 764, Columbia, SC 29218 2.
Identification of Basic Component Mechanical Shock Arrestor Assemblies as supplied by Bergen-Patterson Pipe Support Corporation.
~
4 3.
Identification of Firm Supplying Component Bergen-Petterson Pipe Support Corporation 48 Winnisquam Avenue Laconia, NH 03246 4.
Nature of Defect and Descriptior, of Substantial Safety Hazard Bergen-Patterson (B-P), through Southwest Fabricating and Welding Company, and NRC IEC 79-25 (to include Supplement A) has identified three (3) potential problems (A, B, & C below) with B-P Part No.
2540 Strut Assembly used in conjunction with Pacific Scientific Mechanical Shock Arrestors.
A.
~In tiie larger sizes (15, 30 ana 120), an installation interference between the mechanical arrestors and rear brackets has been encountered.
This problem was addressed to B-P thru Nonconformance Notices, and was resolved by B-P with no substantial reduction of the designed load of these rear brackets.
B.
Two larger sizes (50 and 120) are af fected by the' following problem:
If the threaded portion of the B-P strut extension.which mates with the Pacific Scientific Shock Arrestor is' improperly installed, due tc improper installation instruction:, it etuld exert pressure on the rear dust cover of the snubber.
Any distortion of the dust cover might allow foreign material to enter the snubber, potentially restricting free movement.
Extreme distortion can exert pressure on the internal mechanism J
creating resistance to free movement.
Restriction to the designed free movement of the snubbers could possibly lead to failure of the design function, as identified by B-P.
These i
specified snubbers are located in the Turbine BuildinE, and failure would not cause a system interaction which would j
result in a substantial safety hazard.
D lD D MYM ooM d J]UX L
C.
An additional problem, as identified by B-P 'nd NRC IEC 79-25, a
Supplement A, involved the 2540-120 Shock Arrestor Strut Assemblies which fail to meet the designed load of 120,000 lbs.
Through B-P testing, these assemblies have a maximum acceptable load of only 112,000 lbs.
SCE&G's investigation revealed that only one (1) of the three to be used at V. C. Summer Station would be loaded in excess of 112,000 lbs. (MSH-058), and'could, therefore, possibly affect the ability of the plant to safely shutdown.
5.
Dates Information of Defects were Obtained January 2, 1980 - NRC IEC No. 79-25 February 4,1980 - NRC IEC No. 79-25, Supplement A January 7,1980 - Southwest Fabricating and k'elding Conpany to GAI, dated January 3, 1920, with attached B-P letters:
B-P's letters to Southwest, CCN:
2S63/32/0099, CCN:
2537/32/0100 and CCN:
2537/32/0101, all dated December 28, 1979.
September 25,1978 - NCN 505 (SIH-209){
March 7,1979 - NCN 650 (FL'H-119)
April 18, 1979 - NC.N 716 (RHH-loS /
adcressing rear bracket interferences July 19, 1979 - NCN 901 (MSH-102)'
July 19,1979 - NCN 902 (MSH-092)
July 19,1979 - NCN 903 (MSH-058)
July 21, 1979 - NCN 906 (MSH-095)
August 14, 1979 - NCN 940 (RHH-282)
October 18, 1979 - NCN 1062 (Generic for all dust cover interferences) 6.
Number and Location of Defects Referenced Problem A Three (3) Shock Arrestor Assemblies are on the Reactor Coolant System (RCH-057, -066, -082) and are installed in Non-Safety sections of the system in the Reactor Building.
' Two (2)' Shock Arrestor Assemblies are on the Safety Related Component Cooling System (CCH-025, -143) and are located in the Auxiliary Building.
Two (2) Shock Arrestor Assemblies are on the Safety Related Reactor Building Spray System (SPH-OSS, -089) and are located in the Auxiliary Building.
9 M e M MIL b-
T.
One (1) Shock Arrestor Assembly is on the Safety Related Safety Injection System (SIH-209) and is located in the Reactor Building.
One (1) Shock Arrestor Assembly is on the Safety Related Feedwater System (Fn'H-119) and is located in the Reactor Building.
Two (2) Shock Arrestor Assemblies are on the Safety Related Residual Heat Removal System (RHH-185, -282) and are located in the Reactor Building.
One (1) Shock Arrestor Assembly is on the Safety Related Main Steam System (MSH-095) and is located in the Intermediate Building.
Reference Problem B Four (4) Shock Arrestor Assemblies are on the Non-Safety Reheat Steam System (RSH-019, -025, -031, -033) and are located in the Turbine Building.
Reference Problem C Three (3) Shock Arrestor Assemblies of this size (120) are to be used and all are on the Safety Related Main Steam System.
Two of the Assemblies (MFH-092 & MSH-102) ar? Iocated in the Intermediate Building and one assembly (MSH-058) is located in the Auxiliary Building on Main Steam Loop A.
7.
Corrective Action Referenced Problem A The larger size assemblies (120) are in the process of beint replaced i
by B-P.
The smaller sizes have been modified.
Referenced Prob'lem B Each identified assembly has been visually examined to determine if any distortion of the rear dust cover is evident.
In addition, i
cach unit has been manually stroked throughout its entire range of t ravel to verify free movements.
B-P has now supplied parts to prevent distortion.
Referenced Problem C The Main Steam System for the three (3) assemblies have been 4
analyzed and has been determined that only one (1) assembly could-be overloaded (MSH-058).
The bracket of the asse6bly,-which is the overloaded component, will be re-designed and supplied by B-P.
j 8.
Advice l
None D'P]D "]D N Y
U sJu WLd d i
.