ML19309E078
| ML19309E078 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1980 |
| From: | Goodwin C PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309E077 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004180362 | |
| Download: ML19309E078 (5) | |
Text
.
O PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY EUGENE WATER & ELECTRIC BOARD AND PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT Operating License NPF-1 Docket 50-344 License Change Application 59 This License Change Application is submitted in support of Licensee's request to modify Facility Operating License NPF-1 Condition 2.C.(8) such that one fire protection system modification (Item 3.1.12 of the NRC Safety Evaluation Report of March 22, 1978) need not be completed prior to Plant startup after Cycle 3 refueling in 1980 and change Technical Specification (Appendix A of FOL NPF-1) 6.2.2.a to reflect the minimum shift crew necessary for safe shutdown.
PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY By N
C. Goodwin, Jr.//
Assistant Vice President Thermal Plant Operation and Maintenance Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of April 1980.
de nrj Notary Public of 0 % 6n g e 7'- I /[ M My Commission Expires:
8004180 %
4mg6.1B5
=.
LCA 59 i
Page 1 of 3 LICENSE CHANGE APPLICATION 1.
Modify Paragraph 2.C(8) of the Trojan Operating License to read (new words are shown in italics):
"The Licensee may proceed with, and is required to com-plete, the modifications identified in Paragraph 3.1 through 3. 7. 7 7 and 3. 7. 73 through 3.1.18 of the NRC's Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report on the Trojan Nuclear Plant dated March 22, 1978.
These modifications shall be completed by the end of the second refueling outage of the Trojan facility and prior to return to operation for Cycle 3.
In addition, the Licensee shall submit the additional information identified in Table 3.2 of this Safety Evaluation Report in accordance with the schedule contained therein. In lieu of performing the modification identified in Paragraph 3. 7. 72, an automatic i
fire suppression system will be installed in the cable spreading room and required control room cabinets to prevent cable spreading room and control room cabinet fires from affecting safe shutdown capability.
The cable spreading room fire suppression system will be complete by November 7, 1980 and the suppression system for the control room cabinets will be installed by startup of Cycle 4.
In the event these dates for submittal cannot l
be met, the Licensee shall submit a report-explaining i
the circumstances together with a revised shedule."
l 2.
Modify Technical Specification 6.2.2.a, Appendix A to FOL NPF-1, to read as follows (new words are shown in italics):
a)
"Each on duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Table 6.2-1.
i The minimum shift crew necessary for safe shutdown is fi ve. "
b) Modify Table 6.2-1 to reflect 3 nonlicensed operators i
for Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.
j REASON FOR CHANGE 1.
It has been determined that a preventive-type system, as opposed to a mitigative-type system, is in order for fire protection in the Trojan cable spreading room.
The NRC-preferred method of providing fire protection for this area is through use of a zoned, automatic
^
fire suppression system (Branch Appendix A to Branch Technical Position 9.5.1).
2.
By letter of March 25, 1980, the NRC requested a change to Technical Specification 6.2.2.f that identifies the specific number of operators excluded from the fire brigade in order to safely shutdown the Plant.
In lieu of modifying Technical Specification 6.2.2.f, Technical l
Specification 6.2.2.a and Table 6.2-1 have been changed.
i l
LCA 59 Page 2 of 3 SAFETY EVALUATION This License Change Application (LCA) has been reviewed, evaluated and determined to not constitute an unreviewed safety question.
No new accidents are created and the probability and consequences of accidents previously considered remained unchanged or are reduced.
No environmental effects or impact result from this LCA.
Electrical control cables of both redundant divisions are located in the cable spreading room (CSR).
There is a remote possibility that should a fire occur in this area, if not promptly suppressed, both redundant safety divisions could be affected due to heat generation.
Additionally, the vertical arrangement of some cable trays could increase the burning rate and flame propagation.
Loss of various cables could result in loss of control of safe shutdown equipment.
Since the current sprinkler system is actuated by fusible elements rated at 165'F, a cable fire could smolder and burn for an extended period of time before the temperature of the sprinkler head reaches 165'F.
Also, because of the vertical distance from the lower cable trays in the CSR to the existing sprinkler system, a fire of considerable size could develop before system actuation.
To adequately protect the safe shutdown cables in the CSR, a zoned deluge system actuated by smoke detectors will be provided.
Spray heads will be s
located at intermediate levels throughout the area.
This type of protector is fast-acting and, once activated, is of sufficient capacity to extinguish the largest potential fire.
By their design, the cables will remain functional during any inadvertent system actuation.
Other components that could be affected by inadvertent system actuation will be adequately protected against wetting or flooding.
Sufficient drainage will be provided such that safe shutdown equipment located in adjacent rooms will not be affected by system actuation.
Certain control room cabinets also contain redundant safe shutdown compo-nents. A fire in one of these cabinets could cause the loss of control of certain safe shutdown equipment. Fire detectors are already being installed in individual control room cabinets with redundant components.
i In addition, an automatic fire suppression system will be provided to limit the extent of a possible fire to a single safety train. Actuation of the system will also isolate the ventilation systems for the panels to allow sufficient suppressant soak time.
The material to be used as the extinguishant will not be detrimental to electrical circuitry, and dis-charge of the system will have no effect on control room habitability.
Since potential fires will be suppressed, that is, prevented from damaging safe shutdown control circuitry, an unreviewed safety question ~does not exist.
I t
LCA 59 Page 3 of 3 SCHEDULE CONSIDERATIONS Acceptability of-this License Change Application must be known as soon as possible in order to determine if installation of the remote shutdown capability (Item 3.1.12 of the NRC SER dated March 22, 1978) should proceed. A License Amendment needs to be issued prior to June 15, 1980 to allow Plant startup on July 1, 1980 (current schedule).
AMENDMENT CLASS This license change has been determined to be a Class III Amendment in accordance with the criteria of 10 CFR 70.22.
This change involves a single issue with specific NRC positions already existing and met by this amendment.
This change has been deemed to not involve a signifi-cant saftey hazard. A fee of $4,000 will be submitted for this license change.
SML/4mg6.1B10