ML19309D050
| ML19309D050 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1980 |
| From: | Reyes L, Tambling T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309D044 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-346-80-01, 50-346-80-1, NUDOCS 8004100022 | |
| Download: ML19309D050 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000346/1980001
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U.S. NUCI. EAR REGULATORY C0!#11SS10N
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-346/80-01
Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3
Licensee:
Toledo Edison Company
Edison Plaza,
300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, Ohio 43652
Facility Name:
Davis-Besse 1
Inspection At: Oak !! arbor, Oli
inspection Conducted: January 2-4, 7-11, 14-18, 21-25, 29-31,
February 1, 1980
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Inspector:
L. A. Reyes
hRO-So
R FIA) M F w
Approved By:
T. N. Tambling, Acting
2- to -80
Chief, Reactor Projects
Section 2-2
Inspection Summary
inspection on January 2-4, 7-11, 14-18, 21-25, 29-31, February 1, 1980
(Report No. 50-346/80-01)
Areas inspected:
A routine, unannounced inspection of follow up on
previous inspection findings, plant operations, physical protection
(security organization, physical barriers, access control,' communica-
tions), follow up of licensee event reports, follow up of IE Bulletins,
follow up of IE Circulars and General Station Training. The inspection
involved 185 inspector-hours onsite by the Resident Inspector.
Results: Of the ten areas inspected no items of. noncompliance or devi-
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ations were found in nine areas; one item of apparent noncompliance was
identified in the other area (deficiency-improper switch lineup in the
Control Room Emergency Ventilation System-Paragraph 3).
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
T. Hurray, Station Superintendent
- B.
Beyer, Assistant Station Superintendent
- P. Carr, Maintenance Engineer
S. Quennoz, Technical Engineer
- D.
Miller, Operations Engineer
D. Briden, Chemist and liealth Physicist
J. Ilickey, Training Supervisor
L. Simon, Operations Supervisor
C. Daft, Operations QA Manager
G. Grime, Nuclear Security Manager
- D.
Ilof fman, Administrative Coordinator
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- Denotes those present at the exit interview on February 1, 1980.
The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees, including
members of the technical, operations, maintenance, I&C, training and
health physics staff.
2.
Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-346/79-28-02). The inspector reviewed
the revised procedure, " Steam Generator Tube Leak," EP1202.57 and
determined that appropriate evidence has been included to; 1) deter-
mine under what conditions to activate the Emergency Plan, 2) to
minimize releases during cooldown, 3) to establish radiation monitor-
ing requirements, 4) to establish the frequency of grab samples and
5) to quantify release rate from various turbine building paths and
safety valves.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-346/79-29-01). The flow sensing lines
were backfilled to insure no gases were trapped in the tubing or in
the gentile internals. The loop 2 flow gentile tube was examined by
a B&W technical representative with the aid of a boroscope but no
obvious defects were noted.
An accurate secondary system heat
balance was performed and the following flow information was acquired:
Dates
Power Level
Indicated Flow
Actual Flow
%
GPM
GPM
1/8/80
72.77
400,189
406,832
1/10/80
99.83
398,500
402,268
Minimum flow requirements by TS for 4-reactor coolant pump operation
is 396,880 GPM.
The procedure for filling and venting the RCS, SP1103.02, was
revised to provide instructions to backfill the flow sensing lines
every time the RCS has been drained to prevent the entrapment _of
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gases in the tubing or gentile internals.
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3.
Plant Operations
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The inspector reviewed the plant operations including examinations
of control room log books, locked valve log book, shift foreman log
book, containment purge log, special operating orders, monthly
activity log, and jumper and lif ted wire logs for the month of
January. The inspector observed plant operations during six off-
shifts during the month of January.
The inspector also made visual
observations of the routine surveillance and functional tests in
progress during the period. This review was conducted to verify
that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements
established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and Admini-
strative Procedures.
The inspector conducted a tour of the reactor building and turbine
building throughout the period and noted that the monitoring instru-
mentation was recorded as required, radiation controls were properly
established, fluid leaks and pipe vibrations were minimal, seismic
restraint oil levels appeared adequate, equipment caution and hold
cards agreed with control room records, plant housekeeping condi-
tions/ cleanliness were adequate, and fire hazards were minimal.
The
inspector observed shif t turnovers to verify that plant and compon-
ent status and problem areas were being turned over to relieving
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shift personnel.
Technical Specification 4.7.7.1
Table 3.7.3 list the safety related snubbers for which the sur-
veillance requirements of TS 4.7.7.1 have to be implemented. Addi-
tional hydraulic snubbers have been identified to be safety related
but are not included in Table 3.7.3.
The licensee has submitted
Facility Change Request 80-013 to include the additional hydraulic
snubbers in the Technical Specifications.
In the interim a list of
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these snubbers has been distributed to all holders of Techinical
Specifications with instructions to treat them as T.S. items.
Project Manager has been notified of these discrepancies.
Technical Specification 4.7.1.2.a
Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 requires the steam generator auxiliary
feedwater systems to be operable in Modes 1, 2 and 3.
Technical Specification 4.7.1.2.a delineates part of the surveillance require-
ments to verify the operability of the pumps.
These requirements
are completed while the Unit is in Mode 4 in order to be able to
proceed to Mode 3.
While in Mode 4 the steam supply pressure avail-
able does not meet the 800 psig requirements of the Technical Speci-
fications. The licensee has submitted Facility Change Request
80-011 to request a change to the Techincal Specifications to clarify
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the surveillance requirements.
In the interim the licensee is
continuing to perform the surveillance requirements before proceeding
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to Mode 3 with the steam supply available (approximately 235 psig)
and then the test is repeated in Mode 3 as soon as a steam supply
pressure of 800 psig is available.
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Control _ Room Emergeng Ventilation System
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On January 24, 1780, while conducting a tour of the auxiliary building
the _ inspector fcund switch HA5261A in cabinet CDEllC in the local
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position.
The .nspector also found two additional local / remote
switches in the local position.
These two additional switches are
used as spares at the present time.
Switch HA5261A removes control
power irom the Control Room EVS #1 intake valve when in the locJ1
position.
This switch lineup would have prevented the operat. ion of
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the Control Room EVS #1 in the make-up mode from the Control Room.
This is an item of noncompliance of the deficiency level.
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The inspector noticed that at the time the swi'ch misalignment was
identified there were several construction a.tivities being per-
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formed by contractor personnel. The swite:ies identified by the
inspector are not spring loaded so an intdvertent contact by a
person or equipment could have resulted in the misalignment. The
licensee is in the process of removing 1he handles of all local /re-
mote switches until the switches are replaced with spring loaded
switches.
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No additional noncompliances or deviations were identified.
4.
l ysical Protection - Security Organization
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The inspector veritied by observation and personnel interview (once
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during each operating shift) that at least one full time member of
the security organization who has the authority to direct the physical
security activities of the security organization was onsite at all
times; verified by observation that the security organization was
properly manned for all shifts; and verified by observation that
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members of the security organization were capable of performing
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their assigned tasks.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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5.
Physical Protection - Physical Harriers
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The inspector verified that certain aspects of the physical barriers
and isolation zones conformed to regulatory requirements and commit-
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ments in the physical security plan (PSP); that gates in the protect.-
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ed area were closed and locked if not attended; that doors in vital
area barriers were closed and locked if not attended; and that
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isolation zones were ?rce of visual obstructions and objects that
could aid an intruder in penetrating'the protected area.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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6.
Physical Protection - Access Cont.rol (Identification, Authorization,
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higinguScarch,andEscortingl
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The inspector verified that all persons and packages were identified
and authorization checked prior to entry into the protected area'
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(PA), all vehicles were properly authorized prior to entry into a
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PA, all persons authorized in the PA were issued and displayed
identification badges, records of access authorized conformed to the
PSP, and all personnel in vital areas were authorized access; verified
that all persons, packages, and vehicles were searched in accordance
to regulatory requirements, the PSP, and security procedures; verified
that persons authorized escorted access were accompanied by an
escort when within a PA or vitalarea; verified that vehicles authorized
escorted access were accompanied by an escort when within the PA;
luul verified by review of the-licensee's authorization document that
the escort observed above was authorized to perform the escort
function.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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7.
Physical Protection - Communications
The inspector verified by observation (during each operating shift)
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that communications checks were conducted satisfactorily at the
beginning of and at other prescribed time (s) during the security
personnel work shift and that all fixed and roving posts, and each
member of the response team successfully communicate from their
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remote location; and verified that equipment was operated consistent
with requirements in the PSP and security procedures.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Review and Followup on Licensee Event Reports
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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel,
and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to
determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled,-immediate
corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent
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recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifi-
cations.
LERs 79-28, -84, -90, -95, -96, -97,~-107, -109, -110,
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-111, -113, -116, -117, -118, -119, -120, -121, -122.
LERs80-001 and 80-002
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The licensee reported that as a result of an inadvertent Safety
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Feature Actuation System (SFAS), Level 2 (high pressure injection)
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during plant heatup (Mode 3), the three operating reactor coolant
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pumps were manually tripped per emergency' procedure as required by
Bulletin 79-05c. Tripping of reactor coolant pumps is contrary to
the current technical specifications which have not been amended to
reflect new requirements. After verifying the reactor coolant
system was stable and no leaks existed the pumps were restarted.
The inadvertent SFAS trip was due to the failure of the operator to
reset the low pressure bistable prior to the auto reset of the low
pressure block. The' trip occurred as system pressure increased from
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1600 to 1750 psig. No water was injected into the primary system as
system pressure was greater than the shut off head of the high
pressure injection pumps.
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During the SFAS actuation demineralized water valve DW6831B did not
indicate closed and its safety actuation monitor.(SAM) light was not
indicating properly. The valve was declared inoperable and an
investigation was initiated. The licensee determined the position
indication switch for DW6831B was out-of adjustment. The licensec
repaired the indication. switch before the unit proceeded to Mode 2.
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Procedures PP1102.02 and EP1202.06 were revised to include addition-
al guidance on the 1650 psig SFAS trip.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
IE Bulletin Followup
for the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the
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written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin,
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that the written response included the information required to be
reported, that the written' response included adequate corrective
action commitments based on information presented in the bulletin
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and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded
copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management
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representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written-
response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the
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licensee was as described in the written response.
IE Bulletins 79-25 and 79-26,
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
IE Circular Followup
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For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the
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Circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for
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applicability was performed, and that if the circular were applicable
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to the facility, appropriate corrective actions-were taken or were
scheduled to be taken.
IE Circulars 79-23 and 79-24.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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General Station Training
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The inspector verified by direct questioning of two new, two existing,
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and two temporary employees that administrative controls and procedures,
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radiological health and safety, industrial safety, controlled access
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and security procedures, emergency plan, and quality _ assurance
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training were provided as required by-the-licensee's technical.
specifications; verified by direct-questioning of two craftsmen and
two-technicians that on-the-job training, formal technical training
commensurate with job classification, and fire fighting training
were provided; and verified by direct questioning of one female
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employee that' female employees are-provided instructions concerning
. prenatal radiation exposure.
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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12.
Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph
1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection
February 1,1980 and smnmarized the scope and findings of the inspec-
tion activities.
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