ML19309C337
| ML19309C337 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1980 |
| From: | Utley E CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NO-80-518, NUDOCS 8004080472 | |
| Download: ML19309C337 (4) | |
Text
__ __________-_
l April 1, 1980 FILE: NG-3514(B)
Serial No.: NO-80-518 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTENTION:
Mr. T. A.
Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324 LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 FIRE PROTECTION
Dear Mr. Ippolito:
1 On March 5-6, 1980, mambers of your staff met with representatives of Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant l
(BSEP) to review several fire protection issues, j
At the March 6, 1980 exit meeting, NRC reviewed their findings as i
follows:
1 (1) Based on observations and discussions with CP&L, NRC was satisfied with the adequacy of fire protection provided for redundant safe shutdown cabling that is separated by greater than 5 feet horizontally.
This conclusion was reached after completing a plant tour which empha-sized Reactor Buildings (El. 20' and 50'), Diesel Generator Building basement, and Service Water Intake Structure basement. Item B.2.2 of the April 6, 1979 Supplement No. 1 of the BSEP Fire Protection SER can now be resolved.
(2) NRC staff investigated existing non-labeled fire door frames at BSEP. NRC's site investigation plus CP&L's February 25, 1980 letter of justification allowed the staff to conclude that the existing BSEP fire door frames are adequate.
(3) CP&L installed a non-position indicating valve in the fire loop piping because a post indicator valve would have created an obstruction I
at its location in a high traffic area near railroad tracks in the Turbine Building. NRC concluded that this valve was acceptable because inadvertent closing is very unlikely (it is located in a pit below a steel floorplate and requires a special wrench to operate) and because there is an 8" diameter section of fire loop piping which bypasses the valve.
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a004080'71
i
. April 1, 1980 i
c (4) During their tour, NRC identified two areas where redundant cabling separated by less than 5 feet horizontally appeared to have inadequate fire protection. As requested by NRC, CP&L is providing an attachment to this letter describing our proposed corrective actions for these areas.
An additional supplement to the BSEP Fire Protection SER to be prepared by NRC should include the four items described above.
[
Please contact my staff if you have any questions or if you need additional information.
l Yours very truly, j
d M* O j(,
E. E. Utley Executive Vice President Power Supply & Customer Services JAM /t1 i
Attachment cc: Messrs. H. George D. Notley
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o Brunswick Steam Electric viant Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Cabic Secaration Concerns
- 1. Backcround:
A tour of the plant with representatives of NRR and UE6C was mad the request of ;nR to close out e at Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Reportthe final open it2m addressed in the BSEP (SER).
During this
- tour, two specific cases were identified where less than five fe t separation existed between cables and equipment of opposite divisio e
and insufficient fire protection had been provided.
ns two cases has been completed and the appropriate corre tiA study of these determined.
These actions are detailed below.
c ve action
- 11. _ Case 1:
A.
_ Location:
Service Water Building, 4' elevation, north wall.
B.
_ Problem:
(Division 2) are routed over a Division 1 cable trayTwo con fire involving the Division 1 tray could result Thus, a in a loss of power to the Division 2 pump as well as the Division 1 pump Due to the need for maintaining 1dbc water to the vital servi water pumps, suitable corrective action is required.
ce C.
_Co rrec t ive Ac t ion:
CP&L will provide 1-1/2 hour rated thermal f rom a fire involving the opposite division cable tray e
additional actions are recommended based on che following con-No siderations:
1.
Minimal fire loading is maintained in the area.
2.
Sprinkler protection is provided for the area.
3.
Area fire detection is installed.
4.
Unit Nos.
to assure a backup water supply in the event both Unit pumps become inoperable.
- o. 1 III. _ Case 2:
A.
Location:
Unit No. 1 Reactor Building, 20' elevation, southwest corner.
B.
_ Problem:
(1-E11-F063D) is located immediately over and adjacentT division cable trays.
Additionally, to opposite valve operator run parallel to the opposite division trays withthe conduits I
l III. Case 2:
(Cont'd) less than 2 fe.
separation.
A fire involving these cable trays could, therefore, result in the inability to provide service water to either of the RIIR heat exchangera. The ability to cool down the reactor would be lost if both valves were inoperable.
C.
Corrective Action: CP&L will take the following actions to provide a satisfactory degree of fire protection:
1.
- 4ith regard to the exposed conduits, thernal insulation with a rating of 1-1/2 hours will be installed fron the valve operator to the point at which a separation of five feet from the cable trays is achieved.
This resolution is considered to be satis-factory due to the following:
Minimal fire loading is maintained in the area.
a.
b.
Area fire detection is provided.
Adjacent staging and laydown area is fully sprinklered.
c.
2.
To provide protection of the exposed valve operator, a local automatic sprinkler will be installed.
This approach is con-sidered to be satisfactory based on the following:
All cable trays in the vicinity are coated for a distance a.
of at least five feet on either side of the valve operator.
b.
Clearances and obstructions in the area preclude the installation of fire barriers.
Area fire detection nrovides for early notification of c.
incipient fires.
d.
Minimal fire loading is maintained in the vicinity of the valve operator (the valve is located over the primary access / egress path for the building).
IV. Schedule:
A detailed scheduled has not been developed at thi s tir. e.
!!owever,
all required modifications will be completed prior to October 1, 19eo.
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