ML19309C115

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Evaluation of SEP Topic XV-20 Comparing Facility W/ Current Licensing Criteria.Responses Will Be Made If as- Built Facility Differs from Licensing Basis
ML19309C115
Person / Time
Site: Yankee Rowe
Issue date: 03/07/1980
From: Ziemann D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Kay J
YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO.
References
TASK-15-20, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8004080185
Download: ML19309C115 (6)


Text

_

~*'

)k

/

'o UNITED STATES 8

~,,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

'{ -

I WASHINGTON, D. C. 20655 9,

[

March 7, 1980

+....

Docket No. 50-29 Mr. James A, K;;

Senior Engineer-Licensing Yankee Atomic Electric Conpany 25 Research Drive Westborough, Massachusetts 01581

Dear Mr. Kay:

j RE:

SEP TOPIC XV RADI0 LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FUEL DAMAGING ACCIDENTS (INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT)

YANKEE R0WE ATOMIC POWER STATION Enclosed is a copy of our evaluation of Systematic Evaluation Program Topic XV Radiological Consequences of Fuel Damaging Accidents i

(Inside and Outside Containment). This assessment compares your facility, as described in Docket No. 50-29 with the criteria currently used by the. regulatory staff for licensing new facilities. Please inform us if your as-built facility differs from the licensing basis e

assumed in our assessment.

We have discussed this assessment with your-staff and believe the facts concerning your plant are correct. Therefore, our review of this topic is complete and this evaluation.will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility unless you identify changes needed to reflect the as-built conditions at your facility. This topic assess-ment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.

Sincerely, W %>

g b Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:

Completed SEP Topic XV-20 cc w/ enclosure:

See next page g

8004080 g g E

e Mr. James A. Kay March 7, 1980 1

l cc w/ enclosure:

Mr. Janes E. Tribble, President Yankee Atomic Electric Company 25 Research Drive Westborough, Massachusetts 01581 Greenfield Connunity College 1 College Drive Greenfield, Massach'usetts 01301 Chai rman Board of Selectmen Town of Rowe Rowe, Massachusetts 01367 Energy Facilities Siting Council 14th Floor One Ashburton Place Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Director, Technical Assessment Division Office of Radiation Programs (AW-459)

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Crystal Mall #2 Arlington, Virginia 20460 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region I Office ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR JFK Federal Building Boston, Massachusetts 02203 K M C, Inc.

ATTN: Richard E. Schaffstall 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.

Suite 1050 Washington, D. C.

20006 t

--e v

COMPLETE - March 7,1980:

YANKEE ROWE XV-20 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FUEL DAMAGING ACCIDENTS (IN8 JOE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT The safety objective of this topic is to assure that the offsite doses resulting from fuel damaging accidents during fuel handling are well within the guideline value of 10 CFR Part 100.

The design basis fuel ha'ndling accident is postulated to damage one fuel assembly during fuel handling operations either inside the Spent Fuel Building i

or inside containment. The postulated consequences are given in Table XV-1.

The assumptions and input parameters used in calculating the potential consequences are given in Table XV-2.

The analysis was performed following the assumptions and procedures indicated

' in SRP 15.7.4 and Regulatory Guide 1.25. The acceptance criteria of. SRP -- - -___._._..

specify that the doses should be " appropriately within the guidelines" of 10 CFR Part 100. " Appropriately within the guidelines" has been defined by the staff as a thyroid dose less than 100 rem. This is based on the probability of these accidents relative to the probability of other accidents which are evaluated against the Part 100 exposure guidelines. Whole body doses were considered but they are not controlling due to the decay of the short-lived radioisotopes prior to fuel handling.

The potential radiological consequences in the Spent Fuel Pit Building were calculated giving no credit for isolation of this building even though isolation is required to meet Technical Specification 3.9.12.

However, compliance with this Technical Specification will reduce the consequences.

P y.

7 m-

+

-=

w-__._-

2-On the basis of the results as given in Table XV-1, we conclude that the radiological consequences are appropriately within the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100.

References:

1.

Hulman to Knighton, October 4,1979, Meteorology Evaluation For Fuel Handling Accident Inside Containment.

2.

Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Supporting Amendment No. 51 to License No. DPR-3, dated October 6,1978.

4

= p e -e

  • whme
  • =esme> = e* m. - e e - e o

O e

O

i TABLE XV-1 CALCULATED DOSES FOR FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENTS Doses,(Rem)

Thyroid Whole Body Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) l 2-Hour Doses:

Spent Fuel Pit Building 24 0.1 Accident Inside Containment 24 0.1

    • -==.me 9

O

~

TABLE XV-2 i

ASSUMPTIONS USED FOR THE FUEL H' DLING ACCIDENT Power Level 618,Mwt Operating Time 3 years Peaking Factor 1.65 Number of Fuel Assemblies Damaged 1

Number of Fuel Assemblies in Core 76 Shutdown Time Before. Start of Refueling 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> Activity Release From Pool Regulatory Guide 1.25 Containment Isolation (for Inside Containment Case)

Puff release assumed with no isolation or effluent filtration 0-2 hr, X/Q Yalue, Exclusion Area Boundary (ground level release) 1.9 x 10~4sec/m3 9

4 I

h e

- + -. ~ +.