ML19309B760

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Recommends Issuance of License to Export Reactor & Associated Components to Philippines.Proposed Export Would Not Be Inimical to Us Common Defense & Security.No Further Action Required on SECY-79-100
ML19309B760
Person / Time
Site: 05000574
Issue date: 03/14/1980
From: James Shea
NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP)
To:
Shared Package
ML19309B761 List:
References
TASK-CA, TASK-SE SECY-80-142, NUDOCS 8004070148
Download: ML19309B760 (6)


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March 14,.1980_

SECY-80-142 COMMISSIONER ACTION For:

The Comissioners From:

James R. Shea, Director j

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Office of International Programs Thru:

Executive Director for Operations

Subject:

PROPOSED LICENSES TO EXPORT A REACTOR AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS TO THE PHILIPPINES (XR-120, XCOM-0013)

Purpose:

Comission review of proposed issuance of subject licenses to Westinghouse Electric Corporation.

Discussion:

In November 1976. Westinghouse filed an application for a license to export a nuclear power reactor to the Philippines.

This pressurized water nuclear steam supply system would be incorporated into an electric power generation facility to be owned and operated by the Philippine National Power Corporation.

The reactor, with a design power level of 620 megawatts (electric), would be located at a facility under construction at Napot Point, (Morong), Bataan Peninsula, 45 miles west of Manila on the island of Luzon in the Philippines.

The export is valued at approx,imately 118 million dollars.

A favorable Executive Branch judgment on XR-120 was originally submitted to the Commission by memorandum dated December 12, 1977. We were subsequently requested by the Executive Branch to defer action on XR-120 pending further Executive Branch review and provision of additional information. On September 28, 1979 NRC received the final favorable Executive Branch judgment on the reactor export application.

This was forwarded to the Coninission in SECY-79-557. The Comission also has under review a proposed export by Westinghouse of components (XCOM-0013) intended for use in the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP-1)

(seeSECY-79-100andsubsequentpapers).

Since the components covered by XCOM-0013 are also covered by the facility license XR-120, only one license, XR-120, need be considered.* Therefore, the discussion and findings apply to both the components and the reactor.

Contact:

H. B. Schechter, IP (49-28155)

  • SECY'. NOTE: Since the two licenses

. R. Peterson, IP (49-28155) covered by this paper, no furt

. Lee, IP (49-28155) is required on SECY-79-100 800407

2 2

i Discussion:-

Shipments of equipment and components are scheduled to begin (Continued) as soon as possible'upon issuance of the license and are expected to continue until 1985 (this includes a two-year warranty period).

Initial fueling of this reactor would be scheduled for 1981.

The fuel utilizes low enriched uranium provided under the terms of.a long-term fixed comitment contract between the 4

. National Power Corporation and the U.S. Department of: Energy.

Export license application XSNM-1471 for the initial core and three reloads was filed by Westinghouse on February 27, 1979.

Executive Branch views on XSNM-1471 were received on October 18, 1979(seeSECY-79-166).

IP will send a separate paper to the Comission on XSNM-1471.

Applications XR-120 and XCOM-0013 were consolidated in the proceedings-on procedural and jurisdictional issues called for by the Comission Order of October 19, 1979, in response to a Petition for Leave to Intervene and Request for Hearing on issues related to the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant.

The NRC Staff response to the Comission Order was filed on November 19, 1979.

At its January 29, 1980, meeting the Comission decided that the Commission would consider health, safety and environmental effects of exported facilities only

i.

on U.S. territory and the global comons and by order dated February 8, 1980, requested views on (1) the health, safety or environmental effects the proposed exports would have on the global comons or U.S. territory, and (2) the relationship of i

these effects to the comon defense and security of the United States. The staff filed a submission in response on February 29.

In response to our request for views on the proposed exports, l

the Executive Branch has (1) determined that the proposed-exports meet the criteria of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as i

amended, and that issuance of the proposed licenses would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States; (2) confirmed that the equipment and material will be subject to the terms and conditions of the US-Philippine o

Agreement for Cooperation; and (3) noted that the Philippines i

has adhered to the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the United States.

It is IP's view that the five applicable criteria in Section 127

~

of the Atomic Energy Act have been met for the proposed facility export (XR-120)3 Specifically:

3 Discussion:

--The Government of the Philippines is a party to the NPT and has accepted IAEA safeguards for all,its nuclear installations under its NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA. We are informed by the Executive Branch that a facility attachment for the reactor has not yet been completed in. view of the early stage of construction of the reactor. The staff believes that criterion (1) of Section 127 is met.

--As a party to the NPT, the Government of the Philippines is connitted not to develop or use nuclear explosive devices for any purpose.

This, of course, applies to materials, facilities, sensitive technology, and special nuclear materials used in and produced through the use thereof. Therefore, the staff believes that criterion (2) of Section 127 is met.

--With respect to the physical security program in the Philippines, the Executive Branch has concluded that the U.S. has assurance that the Philippines is committed to providing adequate physical security for its nuclear programs, including a level of protection compatible with that recommended in IAEA Publication INFCIRC/225/Rev.1.

This Executive Branch conclusion is based on site visits conducted in 1975 and 1976 by teams of U.S. Government experts, and on discussions held at that time with officials of the Philippines National Power Corporation regarding particular arrangements for protecting the Westinghouse power reactor covered by this license application.

During these discussions the National Power Corporation demonstrated a keen appreciation of the importance of physical security for their plant during the construction phase as well as its subsequent operation.

The staff concludes that the specific written assurances relating to physical security protection obtained from the Philippines Government are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 110.43(c) for a facility using Category III nuclear material.

Accordingly, the staff believes that criterion'(3) of Section 127 is met.

As an item of further interest with respect to physical security considerations, the staff has received recently a communication (Appendix A) from one of the Philippine intervenor groups (Mr. Nicky Perlas of the Philippine Movement for Environmental Protection) alleging that the continued repression in the Philippines mrkes*for a highly unstable environment for nuclear power plants, and' that at some point in time the people (presumably the New

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- Discussion:

People's Army, NPA) may take matters into their own hands.

(Continued)

Mr. Perlas then alludes to the potential ramifications such a course of events could have on the physical security of the nuclear plant.

Mr. Perlas' letter was taken into account in the preparation of the NMSS technical review.

The US-Philippines Agreement for Cooperation stipulates that U.S. approval is required for any retransfer of US-supplied material, including equipment and devices, and l

special nuclear material produced through the use of US-i supplied material. Thus, it is the staff view that criterion (4)oftheNNPAismet.

-- With regard to reprocessing, the US-Philippines Agreement stipulates that US-supplied material may be reprocessed and irradiated fuel containing US-supplied fuel material

.may be altered only in facilities acceptable to the U.S.

Therefore, the staff believes that criterion (5) of the NNPA is met.

.NMSS Technical NMSS has no information regarding the Philippine National Review:

Power Corporation physical security plan' for protection of the reactor. The Philippines is scheduled for a revisit by j

an NRC/ DOE physical security review team in mid-1980.

Further, NMSS has no information regarding a direct threat by indigenous groups to the reactor facility.

NMSS has no information on the state system of accounting and control in the Philippines, or how the IAEA plans to implement safeguards for the subsequent export of nuclear material.

I

-Health and The staff and several others submitted comments in response Safety to the Commission's order of February 8.

In its comments, the staff reported on an analysis by NRR of the potential health, safety and environmental consequences of a core

- meltdown accident for the global comons and US territory.

1 A core meltdown, with immediate containment failure, was evaluated in this case because of the staff's belief that it represents' a' reasonable upper limit of possible radiological consequences attributable to the exported reactor and its associated fuel.

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5 Health and The NRR analysis indicates that, in the event that this Safety accident occurred (however unlikely this is), certain Aspects:

adverse effects on the environment of the global commons (Continued) could not be ruled out.

However, IP is unable to identify a resulting scenario that would have consequences serious enough to lead to a judgment that the export would be inimical to the public health and safety or the common defense and security of the U.S.

With respect to the nuclear waste management issue, raised in other submissions, NMSS notes that the NRC is conducting a generic rulemaking proceeding to reassess the Comission's degree of confidence that waste can and will be safely disposed of.

This proceeding is also being conducted to determine when such disposal will be available and whether such waste can be safely stored until then.

The Commission initiated this rulemaking proceeding in response to a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia l

Circuit in Minnesota vs. NRC, 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir.1979) and to fulfill a previous Comission comitment to reassess from time to time its confidence regarding safe waste disposal.

IP notes that the Comission has not suspended domestic reactor licensing actions pending resolution of the domestic waste management issue.

IP also notes that in the global context, various countries and groups are studying spent fuel and waste management on a national or regional basis.

IP believes that the incremental health, safety and environmental effects of the waste arising from this reactor are minor compared to those of all of the waste being generated worldwide, plus that which already exists, and that these incremental effects would not be such as to result in an impact inimical to the U.S. common defense and security.

We, therefore, believe this export should not be delayed for further analysis of waste disposal.

==

Conclusion:==

After considering the various health, safety and environmental factors discussed by the staff and others in their submissions in response to the February 8 order, and the nonproliferation factors discussed earlier, IP believes that the proposed export would not be inimical to the U.S. comon defense and security and that no reason exists to delay issuance of the proposed export license to Westinghouse Corporation.

6 Recommenda-That the Commission authorize the staff to issue export tion:

license XR-120 to Westinghouse Corporation.

  • Coordination:

ELD has no legal objection.

NMSS comments are as stated.

NRR provided the assessment of the potential consequences of a core meltdown accident described above.

L h

Ja s/ R. Shea, Director 0 ff'ce of International Programs Enclosure Appendix A - Letter from Nicky Perlas to James Shea dated 1/27/80 Comissioners' comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Monday, March 24, 1980.

Comission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Comissioners NLT March 20, 1980, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.

If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and coment, the Comissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when coments may be expected.

1 DISTRIBUTION Comissioners Comission Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operations ACRS Secretariat

  • SECY NOTE: OGC has advised SECY that a formal order (to be prepared by OGC and related to the Comission's current action on SECY-80-208) should be issued by the Comission on the merits of the license applications prior to the implementation of any decision on this paper.