ML19309B201
| ML19309B201 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/07/1979 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309B198 | List: |
| References | |
| ACRS-1671, NUDOCS 8004030264 | |
| Download: ML19309B201 (20) | |
Text
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pqqaja-1 ISSUE DATE: 11/07/79
,y OF THE ACRS AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON H{1l'11 THREE MILE ISLAND 2 ACCIDENT IMPLICATIONS SEPTEMBER 5,1979 O
The TMI-2 Accident Implications Ad Hoc Subcomittee met on Sept The main purpose of the meeting was to at 1717 H St., NW, Washington, DC.
discuss with the NRC Staff regarding their recommendations as a resu the TMI-2 accident, and with representatives of Babcock and Wilcox abo actions they have taken and propose to take.
21, 1979.
Notice of the meeting was published in the Federal Register on August Copies of the notice, meeting attendees, and schedule are inclu A complete set of handouts and viewgraphs ments 1, 2, and 3. respectively.
The is kept in the ACRS Office, while selected handouts are attached.
No written Designated Feoeral Employee for the meeting was R. K. Major.
statements or requests for time to make oral comments were received fr members of the public.
EXECUTIVE SESSION _
Dr. Okrent, Subcommittee Chaiman, convened the meeting at 8:30 a duced the ACRS members and consultants who were present and ind R. Major was the Designated Federal Employee.
NRC STAFF PRESENTATION _ - (8:35 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.)
D. Crutchfield, Systematic Evaluation Program Branch _
This Mr. Crutchfield discussed the NRC Systematic Evaluation Program (
development of topic list (done), detailed program consists of three phases:
review of a limited number of plants, and consideration of review of a Old plants generally do not meet current criteria and operating facilities.
i the SEP attempts to determine to what extent they do not meet the crit Infomation used in the SEP review is acquired from plant documents Not all areas are being reviewed; for visits, and directly from the licensees.
example, fire protection and safeguards are not included in the SEP.
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The scheduled completion of review of these selected plants is 1982.
Dr. Okrent was concerned about the long time it will take to perform the j
Mr. Crutchfield said that l
review and identify possible safety concerns.
so far, no immediate safety concern has been identified and that the com-I pletion date is dictated by limited manpower resources.
Dr. Okrent asked if it is proper for the NRC Staff to do the licensee's j
l the licensees should have the responsibility of assessing the ade-t job; l
quacy of the safety of their plants, and the Staff should review such He asked Mr. Crutchfield to discuss the SEP with the full assessments.
ACRS in the next monthly meeting.
1 R. Tedesco, lessons Learned Task Force i
Mr. Tedesco briefed the Subcommittee on the long-term recommendations that his Task Force would make. Because of the emphasis placed on the short-Based term recommendations, the long-term ones are not yet well-developed.
I on the improvement of safety afforded by the short-term recommendations (which have been reviewed by the ACRS), the Staff has decided to resume l
liccr. sing reviews. (This decision is described in a letter from H. Denton to the Commission, dated August 20, 1979. A copy of this letter was given However, as a l
to the Subcoamitttee and is being kept in the ACRS Office.)23, 1979, the Staff l
result of discussions at the Kemeny Commission on August l
decision may be changed by the NRC Connissioners.
l Dr. Okrent was concerned that the Staff does not plan to do studies on safety f
improvements, beyond what is currently being done, for future reactors.
Mr. Tedesco said that the lack of such actions is purely a question of limited f
resources, and the Staff's long-term recommendations may indeed result in l
l Mr. Levine. Director of Research, added that the Staff design improvements.
did look at a large number of suggestions on how to improve saf'aty, and
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these sugge'stions could result in further research or design changes.
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j Sept. 5,1979 TMI-2 Accident Implications W. Minners In the Staff's long-term recommendations, four major areas will be considered:
I design-basis accidents, system design requirements, the licensing process, Mr. Minners discussed and the licensee role with regard to operations.
design-basis accidents.
The NRC defense-in-depth concept is tabulated (Attachment 4), but numbers The table shows that the Staff used in the table are for illustration only."nomal operation", " transient",
breaks events up into classes, these are:
" mitigated accidents", " partially mitigated accidents", and " unmitigated These events are in order of increasing radiological conse-accioents".
Despite the fact he could quences and decreasing frequency per year.
tabulate these events, Mr. Minners thought that some of these events have For example, the safe not been systematically thought out by the Staff.
shutdown earthquake does not have an associated dose criterion nor a Currently, the Staff does not regulate on " safety goals" frequency criterion.
This is illustrated by events defined but on " systems acceptance criteria".
as " transients", where reactor pressure cannot go above 110% of code design pressure; the pressure limit is the " acceptance criterion".
The TMI-2 incident can be classified as " benign catastrophe", having serious onsite but low offsite consequences, fitting between " transients" and " mitigated accidents"., The Staff should pay more attention to this type of event.
Mr. Minners proposed that the defense-in-depth philosophy be explicitly Then NRC should define the echelons of included in the NRC regulations.
protection for each type of events listed in Attachment 4, adding contain-With these ment, siting, and emergency planning as additional echelons.
echelons clearly defined, NRC can proceed to prescribe safety goals for For example, instead of allowing applicants to each of these echelons.
use ESFs to reduce the size of the exclusion areas, the siting safety goal would prescribe a minimum distance between the plant and the site The original intent of Part 100, according to Mr. Minners.
boundary.
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TMI-2 Accid:nt I plications Sept. 5,1979 was to ensure some distance between the reactor and nearby population j
so that if all fails, there is still the physical separation which cannot f
A task force under the leadership of D. Muller is considering new fail.
siting criteria.
The defense-in-depth policy is not clearly articulated in the Comission's regulations and policies. Dr. Okrent pointed out that the " maximum credible accident (MCA)" approach to safety may have been useful but the Staff seems The to regard it as the approach and not as part of a broader approach.
MCA approach tends to hide some of.the significant features of the accident and makes it difficult for people to recognize when real accidents are happening.
The Subcommittee observed that there is a continuing reluctance of the Staff l
l to think if they can mitigate accidents that go beyond degraded conditions.
l At this point, Mr. Milsted of the Staff gave a short presentation on H I
2 generation inside containment. The assumed event is a partially mitigated LOCA (due to degraded ECCS). The Staff's parametric calculations assumed l
100% Zr/H O reaction in the minimum possible time, and radioactivity level 2
This calculation shows that given in TID-14844 (" core-melt" source tenn).
level will reach 4%, the lower flammability for all containment types, the H2 limit, when less than 40% reaction has occurred. In the BWR Mark I and II
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i containments, the 4% level is reached when only 2% of the reaction has occurred.
The Staff recognized that these calculations are preliminary and conservative.
but admitted H generation is a problem. Mr. Tedesco would recommend that an 2
Possible solutions are:
ad hoc group be formed to deal with this question.
inerting containment during operation, inerting post-accident containment, burn. The Subcommittee pointed out or design containment to tolerate H2 that the Staff has not made much progress so far in this area.
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TMI-2 ccident Irplicaticns Sept. 5,1979 Charles Long Mr. Long discussed systems design requirements, the second area in the long-term recommendations.
In this area, a nisnber of recomendations may be made. Two were covered in l
I The two recom-the meeting while two others are described in the handout.
mendations discussed are:
(1) Safety System Unavailability I
Use of fault tree analysis methods to selected systems. Eventually, the Staff would have some quantitative criteria against which systems reliability will be judged.
Combine fault tree methods with the single failure criterion to detemine system unavailability. This I
1s considered to be an improvement over the current deteministic licensing criteria.
Factor into the fault tree analyscs operator action, inaction and error. The Staff has frequently noticed that plant procedures do not necessarily match up with the Staff-reviewed safety analysis. The licensee would be responsible for matching up his procedures with the safety review, while the Staff would audit the licensee's efforts in this regard.
The single failure criterion will continue to be used, though the Staff agrees that it is not neces:
sarili sufficient. Event at TMI-2, the Staff con-sidered the criterion adequate, assuming operator errors are not considered " failures".
I (2) Classification of Systems Important.to Safety i
The Staff would use relative reliability analysis J
methods to detemine the importance of systems to each other.
Use these methods to develop a classifiestion of systems that are important to safe plant operation, but may not be required to meet all " safety grade" i
criteria.
Evaluate advisability 'of upgrading additional fluid j
. systems such as the electromatic release system and the letdown system.
Require failure mode and effects analyses be con-ducted on "non-safety" system to identify potential interactions with " safety" systems.
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TMI-2 Accident Implications Sept. 5, 1979 Incorporate the review of emergency procedures with l
relation to systems into the licensing review.
Include environmental qualification of systems and components important to safety in the licensing I
process.
Develop a separate SAR section to evaluate " safety"
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and "non-safety" systems.
EPRI PRESENTATION (12:30 p.m. - 2:20 p.m.)
Dr. E. Zebroski j
Dr. Zebroski heads the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) within EPRI.
The EPRI has two main kinds of activities: safety analysis, and plant f
and equipment reliability. Due to the industry's continued efforts in i
improving reliability, the average capacity factor of nuclear plants has increased by almost 12% and continues increasing. The key to such improve-ment is the analysis of precursor events, and there is much economic incentive
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to improvement. When enough events have been an&lyzed, one gains the foresight that some specific equipment may fail. Based on the foresight, a utility may take remedial measures of either prevention or mitigation, or even fundamental j
redesign without having to wait for the event to occur. The TMI-2 event has illustrated clearly the merits of prevention.
NSAC collects data and information on "significant events", which include LERs, j
any outage report and anything that involves actual or potential equipment damage or radiation release. Although NSAC's emphasis is on reliability and f
not safety, Dr. Zebroski believes a serious event which could cause major outage always has safety overtones. NSAC uses the collected information to develop event trends, frequency-intensity plots, and frequency-time plots.
Any concerns raised by NSAC is telephoned to a designated contact at each utility. In addition, NSAC briefs utilities daily on an electronic newspaper system called " Notepad". The Subcommittee asked if NSAC would noti'y NRC of any concern.. Dr. Zebroski answered that the affected utility has the responsibili,ty of communicating with the NRC; the NSAC follow-up letter to the utility renders the concern formal, and the letter is in the public record. The early phone call provides time, for the utility to take remedial actions immediately before any publicity takes place. Dr. Okrent raked if i
n TMI-2 Accident Implications Sept. 5,1979 l
EPRI has notified utilities of anything which the utilities infomed the l
Dr. Zebroski could not recall specific examples, but pointed out NRC of.
that the EPRI is concerned only with generic matters. The EPRI, being a f
research organization, does not have the depth of knowledge of local events f
and "get in the line of fire between the licensee and the licensing agency."
He further said that a concern may emerge as somebody's idea, and the idea may take some time to fully develop as a concern, at which time utilities will be advised. When the idea is evolving and being reviewed, the utili-I ties are not infomed of it.
The NSAC is not obliged to protect anybody if it finds a legitimate concern which needs to be communicated. Furthemore, if a factual issue gets into an adversary climate before the facts are assembled, there will be inhibition to the free flow of inform: tion.
DISCUSSION WITH BABC0CK & WILCOX Mr. MacMillan Mr. MacMillan discussed actions taken and actions that should have been taken by B&W after the THI-2 incident.
After the Davis-Besse depressurization event, an event similar t,o that at TMI-2, t
B&W evaluated the major components of the plant and found out there was no Such finding was documented in a transmittal from S&W to Toledo Edison.
damage.
B&W then examined " cross contract applicability" and detemined that since Davis-Besse alone uses the Crosby valves while all other plants use Dresser The valves, other plants would not be subject to the same kind of problem.
Mr. MacMillan Crosby and Dresser valves stuck open due to different mechanisms.
said in hindsight, B&W would like to have looked at the broader implications of the Davis-Besse transient and resolve such issues in a timely fashion.
Mr. Michelson pointed out that had the Davis-Besse transient occurred with an older core, the larger decay heat output would have rendered much graver consequences.
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TMI-2 Ac'cident I plicatiens 5:pt. 5,1979 The President's Commission on TMI-2 came to B&W and discovered the Dunn memo, which led to a number of others which dealt with pressurizer water level. Dr. Okrent asked if B&W has a mechanism by which internal memos containing possible safety concerns are reviewed. Mr. MacMillan answered that the organization unit to whom the authors belong should review all such memos to determine if the issues raised are real concerns. Dr. Okrent pointed out that other industries have allegedly suppressed information on dangerous chemicals; Mr. MacMillan said he resented being canpared to such chemical firms, and that there is no effort or pressure inside B&W to sup-press safety concerns. He admitted that some concerns may not have been expeditiously addressed and resolved.
The Michelson report on small breaks was sent by TVA to B&W in April,1978.
It was reviewed later in that year and analyses were done, but no document was published on such.
i In the past, B&W has focused on the consequences of off-normal conditions, but in the future, it will emphasize prevention of such transients. A Transient Follow Program has been started'. Its purpose is to gather data i
on and evaluate unusual transients. In addition, there will be periodic f
management review of safety issues.
DISCUSSION WITH NRC STAFF The Subcommittee questioned what is the most effective way to call the Staff's attention to issues. The Staff recommended more formal communcation in the form of a letter from the full ACRS to an appropriate organization head. Many questions are raised in subcommittee meetings and full ACRS meetings, and the I
only way for the Staff to recognize concerns the ACRS wants to pursue is through formal letters.
The Ebersole question on Pebble Springs was regarded by the Staff as one not communicated formally; the Staff has assigned higher priorities to other
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TMI-2 Accident Implications Sept. 5,1979 DISCUSSION WITH TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Mr. D. Patterson J
TVA has formed a new nuclear safety staff, independent of its design, con-struction and operating organizations, to evaluate issues such as the small break LOCA. In the past, TVA has proposed and insisted on design changes for safety reasons, and have been successful. For example, TVA's auxiliary feedwater systems are all safety-grade and automatically initiated. Another l
l examples is all TVA pressurizer heaters are supplied with emergency power.
These examples indicated TVA's successful working relationship with nuclear vendors.
l When asked if TVA would notify the NRC if technically significant questions have been presented to a vendor, Mr. Patterson said that it is difficult to decide if an issue has safety concern and should be called to NRC's attention.
I In conclusion, he suggested that reliability analysis, probability analysis, and fault tree analysis are valuable tools in identifying real safety issues, f
and that experienced systems engineers sh'ould be assigned to evaluate opera-tion data in order to make sense out of it.
l DISCUSSION WITH NRC STAFF R. Martin Mr. Martin headed the operational aspect of the I&E investigation team. The
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basic charter of the team was rather narrow -- to evaluate the actions of the licensee against his regulatory requirements. In this sense, it was just l
a standared I&E investigation of an incident and the time covered started from i
the moment of feedwater trip to when one RC pump was restarted (~16 hours post-accident).
j Team findings are provided in NUREG-0600. Prior to the accident, all things l
were normal except for one limited' condition of operation (LCO) in effect, and reactor systen leakage exceeding Technical Specification requirements.
The Staff training and retraining were in accordance with comitments made j
in the FSAR and Technical Specifications.
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Sept. 5.,1979 TMI-2 Accid:nt I;plications
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During the course of the accident, the.two most significant actions were the throttling of the HP injection flow and the failure to isolate the f
stuck open EMOV. There was little offsite technical support, and later l
offsite support (includia RC) had very little real impact on the cor-i rective actions.
A. Gibson l
Mr. Gibson was the leader of the radiological investigative team of the accident. His team had reviewed the licensee's training in the emergency plan and found that in general it was adequate. They did find that less l
l than 50% of the portable radiation monitoring units were operational, and some other equipment deficiencies.
f f
The team found that the operators did not initially realize they were in an l
emergency, and before the radiation alarms went off, they were not in an emergency mode of thinking. The operators did pull out the right procedure but did not pursue it far enough; if ?. hey had, the incident would not have occurred the way it did. Mr. Michelson s,tated that plants should have pro-One cannot f
cedures that give the proper symptoms for all situations.
Mr. Jordan j
blame an operator if he does not have the needed procedures.
of NRC commented that it is not possible, nor has the Staff required, for licensees to develop procedures for every set of circumstances he might l
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encounter.
Mr. Z. Rosztoczy l
Bulletins75-05C and 79-06C were issued recently to all three PWR vendors.
i These bulletins were written as the result of about three months' worth of Calculations show that for certain break sizes, peak Staff evaluations.
clad temperatures (PCT) of greater than 2200'F can be reached. (Results of these calculations are provided as Attachment 5). For these breaks, if i
l the RC pumps are tripped some time.after the break, consequences could be worse than if the pumps are tripped immediately. This is because prolonged operation of the RC pumps increases mass loss through the break for these break sizes.
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TMI'-2 ccident Imp Sept. 5, 1979 The indications are that the operator has about 3-10 minutes, depending on l
plant design, to initiate reactor trip.
These new bulletins revise infomation contained in previous bulletins, j
t The short-term actions called for are:
f Trip all operating RC pumps upon reactor trip and HPI initiation (Provide 2 licensed operators in the control room at all times during operation to accomplish this action and other immediate l
and follow-up actions).
Perform and submit a t eport of LOCA analyses for a range of i
l small break sizes and time lapses between reactor trip and pump trip. Determine the peak clad temperature for each parameter l
pair.
Develop new guidelines for operator action for both LOCA and non-LOCA transients, that take into account impact of RC pump trip requirements. For B&W plants, also include requirements 1
to fill OTSGS to higher level.
Revise emergency procedures and train all licensed reactor operators on developed guidelines.
Provide analyses and develop guidelines and procedures related to inadequate core cooling and define conditions under which a restart of the RC pump system should be attempted.
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The one long-term action is l
Propose a design which will assure automatic tripping of the I
operating RC pump system under all circumstances in which this action may be needed.
Mr. J. Milhoan The Lessons Learned Task Force has considered *he area of plant operation
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and means of reducing human errers. Five broad areas have been evaluated l
and Task Force recomendations are:
Human factor -- The Staff would work with an IEEE group to
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write a standard on control room design, taking into i
account displays and panti layout, use of direct rather than derived infomation, habitability, communication ade-i quacy, etc.: Reg. Guide 1.47 (specify conditions for by-passing inoperable status) may be expanded in scope and application.
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TMI-2 Accident Implications Sept. 5, 1979
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Operational evaluation program -- The Staff sees a need l
for the, utilities to have a program for evaluation of operating experience. For such to be effective, re-sources will have to be committed, and the program must have free and ready access to information. The i
NSAC (see under Zebroski) and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations are examples of such.
Personnel -- Reg. Guide 1.8, " Personnel Selection and Training," is out for public comment. The Staff is i
now working on training requirements for non-licensed l
personnel (instrument and control technicians, auxiliary operators and maintenance personnel).
Audits and Inspections -- The Staff would like to see a review of the audit program (done by the utility) from l
the standpoint of identifying which operating activi-ties require recurring audits.
l Emergency procedures -- There is need for research with l
respect to guidelines for writing these, how these should be written, taking into account human factors.
The Lessons Learned long-tenn recommendations would be published in October.
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(Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned at 8:20 p.m.)
NOTE: For additional details, a complete transcript of the meeting is available in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H St., NW, Washington, DC 20555, or from Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.,
North Capitol Street, NW, Washington, DC.
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l Federal Register / Vol!44. No. tes / Tuesday. August 21. 1979 / Notices 49027 i
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wparations began or threatened to at the address shown below.not later the Director. OIRee of Trade Adjustment begin and the subdivision of the Brm than August 31.1979.
Assistance. Bureau of International l
involved.
Interested persons are invited to Labor Affairs. U.S. Department of Labor.
Pursuant to 29 CFR 90.13. the submit written cammants u Lg the 200 Constitution Avenue NW.,
. ashington, D.C 20210.
W petitioners or any other persons showing subject matter of the investigations to l
a substantialinterest in the subject the Director. OfRce of Trade Adjustment signed at Washington. D.C. this 14th day of matter of the investigations may request Assistance, at the address shown below. Aesuet is7s.
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a public hearing.yovided such request not later than August 31.1979.
Hasold A.Bratt.
is filed in writing with the Director.
The petitions nied in this case are Acting Duecsw. Ofice af node Adjustment Offica of Trade Adjustment Assistance, available for inspection at the OfBee of Assistance.
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ya on.m.anen re.d wwm se aml seassa coesestwo.a Pension and Welfare Benefit Programe Persons desiring to address the NUCt. EAR REGUI.ATORY Council should notify Edward F.
COMMISSION Advloory CouncN on Employ" Lysczek. Executive Secretary of the welfare and Penelon Benefit Plans; Advisory Council. in care of the above Advisory Committee on Reactor M"#89 address or by cr.lling (202) 523-4753.
Safeguards Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Pursuant to Section 512 of the Signed at Washington. D.C., this 15th day the Three MNe ledand. Unit 2 Accident; Employee Retirement Income Security of Augustis7s.
Impucadons Re Nuclear Powerplant Act of1974 (ERISA) 29 U.S.C 1142, a Isa D.14aeff Design; Meeting meeting of the Advisory Council on Administmrer ofArnsion and Welfare Benefit
'II ACRS Ad h SuWHu on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit progmms.
the Bree Mile Island. Unit 2 Accident-P!
will be h Id at 9:
""N"" "'d HM* *" '"I implications Re Nuclear Power Plant Th day. September 6.1 the Design, will hold a muting on 85 8'8 88 # # 85 8 Federal Ballroom North. Quality Inn-September 5.1979 in Room 1066.1717 H Capitol Hill.415 New Juney Avenue.
- h "I N.W., Washington, D.C (AppseeuenIse.D 7s41 In accordance with the pmcedes The purpose of the meeting is to outlined in the Federal Register on discuss the items listed below and to Proposed Class Esemption for Certain Ockbe 4.1978d43 FR 45926), wal w invite public comment on any aspect of Transactions involving Bank Codective written statements may be presented by the administration of ERISA.
Investment Funds members of the public. recordings will
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of the meeting wnen a transcript is being
- 2. Council Work Group Reports:
In FR Doc.79-22992 appearing at page kept, and quotions may be uked only,
Collective Bargaining. Communications, 44290 in the issue for July 27.1979, make by members of the Subcommittu.its Investment and Fiduciary. Legislation, the following corrections:
consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring Portability. Prohibited Transactions.,
On page 44295,in the Rrst column.In to make oral statements should notify Reporting. Disclosure, and the first full paragraph, in the second the Designated Federal Emp ee as far Recordkeeping. Seasonal industries.
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He amenda for subject meeting shall submitting 30 copies on or before in the second full paragraph. In the be as foBows.
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Federal Register / Vol 44. No.163 / Tuesday. August 21, 1979 / Nttices j
19028 i
Wedneeday. September s. left-ase am.
HIUsboroesh Street. De Chesaboro Reasa.
7.19N (with the exceptian of I
t ntil the Conclus6ea of Bummees Raleigh. North Carohna.
Underwriter)(File No.412-3810) i Public Hearings: 10 o0 aan.-1100 noon. The pursuant to Section 11 of the Act The Subcommittee may meet in Executtve Capital State of North Carolina. Raleigh.
approving attain offers of'exhange.
Session. with any of its consultants who may and persuant 2 Seche 6(c) h Act be present. to explore and exchange ther Op Bu nee o 12s5 pm-4 30 pm.
prelinunary opin oss regarding matters which Holiday Inn. 320 Hillstnrowgh Street. The granting exemptions from the provisions should be considered dunng the meeting and Chambers Roorn. Relegh. North Carolina.
of Sections 28(a) and 27(c)(2) i to formulate a report and recommendation to
Purpose:
A regular echsJuled segunal (Investment Company Act Release No.
i the full Committee.
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At the conclusion of the Executive Session.
AOntemsted pena are refemd to the Subcommittee wdl discuss with De agenda for the meeting will the Application.and Amendments representatives of the NRC Staff. the nuclear include the following: Public hearings on thereto, on file with the Commission for industry, various utt!1 ties, and their education, employment, health, and a statament of the representations consultants. state and local officials, and welfare.De Committee wi!! focus on contained theren whch are summarized i
othrt interested persons, the implications of strategies, programs and meetings in below.
ths Three Mile Island. Unit 2 Accident.
Mr regular mWinga TW wW also In addition. It may be necessary for the be discussions on nm committee
%e Separate Account was Subcommittee to hold one or more closed FM W M M M business.
involving propnetary information. I have A portion of the above meeting willbe individual and group periodic premium i
sessions for the purpose of expknns matters determined. in accordance with Sobsecnon closed under the authority of section deferted and s,ing!e premium immediate l
variable annuity contracts ( Contracts )
10(d) of Pub.1.92-443 that, should such 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee designed for use in connection with j
i sessions be required. It is necessary to close Act-Exemptions 2 and 6 of the these sessions to protect proprietary Government in the Sunshine Act. During retirement plans, which may or may not mformauon is U.S.C. 552b(c)(41).
Its closed sassion the Committee wdl qualify for Federal tax advantages. De i
O t ac s a c y
ng of Further information regarding topics discuss personnel and Committee d
to be discussed. whether the meeting management.
effective registration statement tmder I
has been cancelled or rescheduled, the sarita Schotta, the Securities Act of1933 the latest l
i Chairman's ruling on requests for the Executive Director.
Post. Effective Amendment to which was I
i opportunity to present oral statements August 15.1979.
declared effective on Aptil 30.1979 (File
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I and the time alloted therefor can be fra D= s.mano rno.m aos -1 No. 2-53626). The Separate Account
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obtained by a prepaid telephone call to sumo coca este.23.as presently consists of six Account l
the Designated Federal Employee for Divisions whichinvest respectively.in F
this meeting. Mr. Richard K. Major.
the shares of Wellington Fund. Inc.,
i (telephone 202/634-1414) between 8.15 SECURITIES ANO EXCHANGE Windsor Fund. Inc Qualified Dividend a.m. and 5.00 p.m EDT.
COMMISSION Portfolio. Inc Wellesley Income Fand, t
Background information concerning Inc W.L Morgan Growth Fund.Inc.
(
l this nuclear station can be found in IRet. No.10431; $12-4234]
and Westminster Bond Fund.Inc.
I I
documents on file and available for
( Fund Participants"). Applicants public inspection at the NRC Public Federal Ufe insurance Co. (Mutust), et propose to create two new Accour !
l Document Room.1717 H Street. N.W.,
aL; Application Divisions or " Series", which would s
Washington. DC 20555 and at the August 14.19*9.
Invest in the shares of Whitehall Money I
Government Publications Section. State Notice is hereby given that Federal Market Trust and Qualified Dividend i
Library of Pennsylvania. Education Ufe Insurance Company (Mutual)
Portfolio II. Inc respectively, l
Duildmg. Commonwealth and Walnut
( Federal ufe"), a mutuallife htsurance
(" Additional Fund Participants").
}
Street. Harnsburg. PA l'/126' corr,pany organized under the laws of The Fund Partietpants and Additional Dated. August 15.19~9.
the State of Illinois. FederalI.ife Fund Participants are members of the l
l John C. Ho)la.
Variable Annoity Account A(" Separate Vanguard Group ofInvestment Adnsory Committee Manosement Officar.
Account"), a separate account of Companies, and each is diversified.
Federal ufe registered as a unit open-end management investment i
fu om 3.unn n.a.m.e mes -1 investment trust under the Investment company registered under the Act.Each i
a m iacooe - e Company of 1940 ("Act") and FED has a currently effective registration Mutual Financial Services. Inc.
statament under the Securitaes Act of
(" Underwriter") 3703 W.1.ake Avenue.
1933.
THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY Glenview II 80025. the principal Applicant FED Mutual Financial COMMITTEE FOR WOMEN underwriter of the Separate Account.
Services. Inc. a registered broker.deaier.
(hereinafter collectively referred to as acts as the principal underwriter of the
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" Applicants"), filed an Application on Contracts issued by the Separate Pursuant to the provisions of the November 25.1977, and Amendmenta Account. Wellington Management Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub.
thereto dated February 24.1978 and July Company (" Wellington") serves as L 92-463 as amended), notice is hereby 6.1979 pursuant to Section 11 of the Act investment adviser to each of the above given of a meeting of the President's for an Order approving certain offers of Fund Participants and Additional Fund I
Advisory Committee for Women.
exchange. pursuant to Section 6(c) of the Participants.
Act for an amended Order of exemption Under all of the Contracts, the Owner Date. Time. and Place: September 13.1979.
from the provisions of Section 28(a) and of aninvididual Contract or a 1oso a,m.-5.00 pan.
Pubhc Heannss: The Capitol State of North 27(c)(2), and for additional exemptions Cartificate Holder under a Group i
I-Carolina. Raletsh. North Carchna 27811..
under Section 22(d). De original Order Contract (hereinafter referred to es l
Closed Business Session: September 14.1979.
which is sought to be amended was individual Participants) may allocate all
{-
l 8 00 a.m.-e.30 a.m.: Holiday Inn. 320 issued to the Applicanta herein on April or a portion of his Net Purchase ti I
1 l
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-,7
I ATTENDANCE LIST ACRS AD H0C SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON TMI-2 ACCIDENT IMPLICATIONS i
WASHINGTON, DC SEPTEMBER 5,1979 NRC STAFF ACRS D. Okrent, Chaiman D. Hoatson I
M. Carbon C. Long R. Tedesco W. Kerr W. Mathis R. Cudlin M. Plesset J. Milhoan I. Catton, ACRS Consultant J. Voglewede W. Lipinski, ACRS Consultant W. Minners
.j C. Michelson, ACRS Consultant R. Vollmer T. Theofanous, ACRS Consultant H. Krug R. Major, Designated Federal Employee P. Stoddart i
P. Tam, ACRS Staff J. Conran C. Hofmayer J. Shapaker BABCOCK & WILCOX G. Holahan W. Milstead J. MacMillan J. Olshinski l
L. Beratan H. Roy J. Taylor E. Womack BECHTEL POWER CORP.
i C. Parks J. Mullin B. Montgomery i
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM l
C. Brinkman F. Stetson i
W. Burchill P. Higgins A. Bivens t
SMUD ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INST.
J. Mattimoe R. Leyse E. Zebroski l
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY STAFC0 D. Lambert D. Patterson i
R. Neve J. Hutton A. Ankrum l
i ATTACMENT 2
s, i
2-CONSUMERS POWER CO.
FRAMATOME T. Sullivan J. Amroune i
DUKE POWER CO.
MCGRAW-HILL W. Owen R. Adamson S. Wynhopp i
NUS GILBERT ASSOCIATES D. Jaffe H. Yocom i
TOKYO ELECTRIC SCS H. Hamada D. drowe i
EDISON ELECTRIC INST.
NUTECH S. Kraft T. Martin D. Burnham KEPCO MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC i
K. Ota M. Meltzer, Ace-Federal J. Brentner, Ace-Federal J. Gianelli, U.S. Senate H. Meyers. House Int. Comm.
i E. Olmsted. Sullivan & Cronwell M. Simpson, USS-TMI D. Law D. Davis J. Burnam, Congressman's M. Edwards Office I. Mosely C. Webb J. Leburnam Boston Globe l
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- REVISED Ltl3cht)
TENTATIVE SCHEDULE AD H0C SUBCOM.".ITTEE MEETING ON THREE MILE ISLAND 2 ACCIDENT IMPLICATIONS WASHINGTON, DC SEPTEMBER 5, 1979
(
~
APPROXIMATE TIME l
STATUS REPORT ON SEP (SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM);
8:30 a.m.
where it stands, major areas of concern LONG-TERM LESSONS LEARNED TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS 8:45 a.m.
INCLUDING:
discussion of hydrogen questions in detail future application of Class 9 events to licensing actions - reference, Board Question on Salem Spent Fuel Pool how to address possible improvements involving i
design changes for future reactors Examples:
a.
more reliable feedwater system b.
more reliable shutdown heat removal system c.
other
- BREAK ********
10 minutes 10:30 a.m.
LONG-TERM LESSONS LEARNED TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS (CONT'D) 10:40 a.m.
12:30 p.m. - 1:30 p.m.
- LUNCH ********
HOW TO GET SAFETY QUESTIONS ON THE TABLE?
2 1/2 hrs.
1:30 p.m.
f 1.
B&W actions on internal memoranda on Davis-Besse (September 24,1977) incident (J. MacMillan) 2.
TVA experience in raising questions with B&W (D.Patterson)
AMac.Lrent 3
1%E(v1 SED
,813 oho 2
APPR0XIMATE l
TIME i
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3.
NRC experience in their first handling of Michelson's
~
report - Questions and Answers Session (0IA) l 4.
How to get safety called to the attention of all parties concerned l
AIF, EEI (E. Zebroski, Nuclear Safety Analysis Center-EPRI) j 4
- BREAK ********
10 minutes DISCUSSION OF NUREG-0600, " Investigation into the March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island Accident by the Office of Inspection and Enforciment 45 minutes 4:00 p.m.
BRIEFING ON BULLETINS79-05C and 79-06C 45 minutes 4:45 p.m.
DISCUSSION AND STATUS OF NRC REPORT ON AUXILIARY FEEDWATER 45 minutes 5:30 p.m.
SPECIFIC ISSUES:
6:15 p.m.
a.
Rancho Seco Transient (March 20,1978) b.
Overfilling of Steam Generators c.
Air Systems d.
others ADDITIONAL TIME FOR LESSONS LEARNED (if required) l ADJ0URNMENT 7:30 p.m.
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