ML19309A095
| ML19309A095 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/1980 |
| From: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Arnold R METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003250329 | |
| Download: ML19309A095 (1) | |
Text
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- o, UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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REGION I O
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631 PARK AVENUE b+
KING oF PRUS$1A, PENNSYLVANIA 19406
- * * * *,o March 14, 1980 Docket Nos. 50-289 50-320 Metropolitan Edison Company ATTN:
Mr. R. C. Arnold Senior Vice President 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Gentlemen:
The enc hsed IE Information Notice No. 80-11, " Generic Problems with ASCO Vehes in Nuclear Applications Including Fire Protection Systems," is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter.
It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities.
No specific action or written response is requested at this time.
If further NRC evaluations so indicate, an IE Circular, Bulletin, or Generic Letter will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions.
If you have questions regarding the matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, f
!N "
Boyce H. Grier Director
Enclosures:
1.
IE Information Notice No. 80-11 with Attachments 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices CONTACT:
S. D. Ebneter cc w/encis(215-337-5283)
J. G. Herbein, Vice President Nuclear Operations E. G. Wallace, Licensing Manager R. J. Toole, Manager, THI-1 W. E. Potts, Radiological Controls Manager, TMI-1 R. W. Heward, Radiological Controls Manager, IMI-2 J. J. Colitz, Plant Engineering Manager, TMI-1 J. J. Barton, Manager Site Operations, TMI-2 l
B. Elam, Plant Engineering Manager, TMI-2 L. W. Harding, Supervisor of-Licensing l
R. F. Wilson, Director, THI-2 I. R. Finfrock, Jr.
R. W. Conrad J. B. Lieberman, Esquire G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Ms. Mary V. Southard, Chairperson, Citizens for a Safe Environment 300225C 3p
o ENCLOSURE 1 SSINS No. 6870 Accession No.:
UNITED STATES 7912190684 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT g,4 ;) j{_,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 IE Information Notice No. 80-11 Date:
March 14, 1980 Page 1 of 2 GENERIC PROBLEMS WITH ASCO VALVES IN NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS INCLUDING FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS Description of Circumstances: is a Recall Notice from The Viking Corporation, dated July 16, 1979 that identifies ASCO valves used in certain Viking fire protection equipment that could fail.
Licensees should review their fire protection system components to determine if the equipment identified in the Viking Recall Notice is in their facility.
If tne identified equipment is installed in the fire protection system, then the modifications specified in the Recall Notice should be made and tested for proper operation.
The requirements of the technical specifications or any other licensee commitment should be complied with when a fire protection system is disabled.
South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station) reported to the NRC on October 24, 1979, a potential significant deficiency regarding the effects of oil on elastomeric materials used in ASCO NP-1 solenoid valves.
Specifically, these valves utilize an ethylene propylene elastomer which expands or swells when brought into contact with oils, possibly causing l
valve failure.
For this reason, ASCO specifies these NP-1 solenoid valves for use in " oil free instrument air" systems.
Although instruaent air systems are " oil free" by design, installation instruc-tions may spec'fy the use of thread lubricants utilizing an oil base.
- Thus, the potential axists for traces of this lubricant from threaded connections in the air syste.J, in addition to traces of oil from the air compressors theoselves, to come into contact with the elastomers in the solenoid valves.
Degraded elastomers can cause the solenoid valve to fail by sticking, swelling closed flow paths, or rupturing causing leakage across the seat or to atmosphere.
Failure of the solenoid to function properly on an active valve could prevent a system from performing its required safety function.
Some ASCO NP-1 solenoid valves are equipped with tags which state:
"Important -
this valve is equipped with ethylene propylene elastomers which can be attacked by oils and greases.
To be used for oil-free instrument quality air.
Clean pipe threads of cutting oils." Care should be taken to use approved thread lubricants which do not contain oil for the installation of these valves.
IE Information Notice No. 80-11 Date:
March 14, 1980 Page 2 of 2 ASCO offers viton elastomers as an option for their NP-1 solenoid valves.
The viton elastomers are not affected by oil or grease.
Replacement kits of viton elastomers are available for the NP-1 solenoid valves from ASCO.
It is recom-mended that ethylene propylene elastomers found in Class IE qualified ASCO NP-1 solenoid valves be replaced with the viton kits.
In addition, enclosed is a letter from EG&G (Attachment 2) dated December 26, 1979 that provides the results of an LER review of failure of solenoid valves.
This Information Notico provided information about a potential safety concern.
No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate Regional Office.
Attachmentr:
1.
Viking Corporation Recall Notice 2.
EG&G Letter,
Dearien to Tiller dated December 26,
1979
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Attachment.NE.1,.tp. 'IE Information Notice No. 80-11 J>.. e 1111 \\AING U.*lT EAIX1N j
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4 I1.%IING MlO t.1.'.5A. 9 tia tilli'l K KNI (felfd 9 l'i.0~,01 e-July 16, 1979 RECAI.t. NOTICE Viking Model B-2 Magnetic Bvoass and Firecy* ele Trim Box We have been informed by the manufacturer that the following listed solenoid valves may contain a black teflon coated core which could cause improper valve operation under certain water and heat conditions.
Such f ailure could result in the sprink-ter system not operating or, once having operated, not being capable of being. reset.
Solenoid valves in cuestion are as follows:
"ASC0" Automatic Switch Co., with the following specifications:
Cataloo No, Voltage Serial _ No.
Tilt 82iOB34 120/60 19913E J
TNT 8210B34 12b/60 70440E THT8210834 120/60 59284E
'l THT8210634E 120/60 79329E THT8210834 120/60 97504E TFTX8210834E 120/60 28508H TNT 8210834E 120/60 42536H 2
8211834 24/60 28510H i
THT8210B34E 12/DC 79328E THT8210B34 24/DC 13912E 2
THT821083h 24/DC 50445E THT8210834 24/DC 56556E THT8210834' 24/DC 59285E THT8210834E 24/DC 79327E l
+
THTS210834E 24/DC 82928E THTS210834E 24/DC 91819E TNT 821083ht 24/DC 16871H
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TNT 8210834E 24/DC 18391H 4
8211834 24/DC 28511H TNT 8210834E 125/DC 79330E i
Inese valves may have been used on the following items of Viking equipment:
The Model 8-2" Magnetic Bypass and the Firecycle V5tve Trim Box shipped from Viking from January 1977 through-Hay 1979, including those modified as a result of the Viking January 20, 1978 Recall g
Notice.
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Attachment No.1 to IE Information Notice No. 80-1 In 1977 the manufacturer received some taflon coated cores that may not have been l
processed proper 1y.
It has now become apparent that under certain water and heat.
conditions, the teflon coating may blister and flake off and this m y cause the valve to stick in either the open or closed position.
In May, 1979 the manu-Facturer changed to a non-coated core which he believes will correct the problem.
Viking became aware of the pr'oblem as the result of reports f rom the field Indi-cating failures of devices during routine testing.
A check with the manufacturer indicated that the above described changes had taken place.
I Viking feels very strongly that the presence of potentially defective solenoid valves in the fleid constitutes an extremely dangerous situation and recommends to all owners of the above listed equipment that they Immediately inspect the equipment to determine if the suspect solenoids are employed.
Al,L VIKING INSTALLERS ARE REQUESTED TO INFORM ANY OWlERS WITH WH0H THEY HAY BE AC00AINTED OF THIS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATictt AND TO OFFER THEIR SE TO SUCH OWNERS.
If suspect solenoid valves are found, the system s' uld immediately be tested in accordance with the owner's instructions and a Modification Kit should be ordered directly from ASCO at the following address:
Automatic Switch Company 56-A Hanover Rd.
Florham Park, New Jersey 07932 Attn:
Mike Colaneri Asst. Hgr., Service Dept.
Telephone (201) 966-2314 l
ORDER ASCO KIT NO.
214-997 (For AC or DC Service)
Order one klt for each Magnetic Bypass to be modifled and twcr kits for each Fire-cycle System.
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The Modi.fication Kit will consist of:
Core and sufficient parts with specific in.
structions for repair of Magnetic Bypass and Firecycle Trim Box.
in order to effect the modificiation, it will be necessary to take the, system out' t
of service, shut off the powe:, disconnect the solenoid leads and disassemble the coil.
There is no disassembly of piping.. It is estimated that modifications t,o j
the solenoid valve itself can be accompli.shed in approximately 20 minutes.
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The Modification X1t'will be furnished without charge by ASCO.
The modifications should be made as soon as oossible_ and the replaced parts returned to ASCO by January 1, 1980. Any questions,should be referred to ASCO.,
Owners should be reminded of the extreme importance of conducting maintenance and tests in accordance with Viking s instructions.
All of the above noted failures were 8
determined by such activities. Proper testing and maintenance are particularly im-portant when electro-mechanical components are involved, Such components sheuld be exercised frequently, An emergency system is no better than.the care it receives.
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Attachment No. 2 to fE'Information Notice No. 80-1
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. um.m py December 26, 1979 i
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I Mr. R. E. Tiller. Director Reactor Operations and Prograns Division Idaho Operations Office - DOE Idaho Falls ID 83401 SOLEHOID VALVE FAILURES REPORTED Ifl LICENSEE EVENTS REPORTS -
JAD.258 79 Ref:
D. G. Eisenhut Ltr to All Pressurized Water Reactors dated Septenber 21,1979
Dear Mr. Tiller:
EGaG is in the process of surtsnarizing and evaluating' Licensee Event Reports (LERs) under contract to the Probabilistic Analysis Staff of imC. Having received a copy of the above referenced letter.
. EG&G felt that some of the infomation gleaned from the LERs may be of value to NRC in investigating the naNre and frequency of solenoid valve failures.
In evaluating Licensee Event Reports (LERs) on valves and valve operators we have encountered many failures of solenoid valves which control the air supply to air operated valves.
Fifty fall-ures of solenoid valves in air supply systems appear in 41 LERs.
Thenty-three of the 50 failures occurred in ten sets of two or three failures. Each set of multiple failures was discovered in one plant on a single date. nie considered these sets to be pos-
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sible common cause failures because each set exhibited a connon failuro mechanism.
i Fifteen of the 50 failures were reported by one plant. Zion 1.
All of Zion's failures resulted from the same failure mechanism.
foreign material contamination. Twelve of Zion's 15 failures wem multiplo failures; that is, they appeared in sets of failures as discussed above. The femaining 35 failures were reported by 20 different plants; one reported five failures and the rest reported v
three or less.
In evaluating these solenoid valves. it appears that generic prob-1ams may exist in the use of solenoid valves for contal,1ing air
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Attachment No'. 2 to IE Information Notico No.: 80,11 R. E. Tiller Deceraber 26, 1979 JAU-2Sd-79 Page 2 supply systems. The major problem appean to be the incompatibility of the solenoid valves with foreign material, specifically oil, which can be present in the air supply system.
Forty percent of the sole-notd valvo failures were reported as being caused by oil or other l
foreign saterial in the air supply system. Another to be the environment in which the solenoid resides.problan appears Eighteen per-cent of the failures were reported as being caused by high tempera-ture and humidity resulting in electrical failure of the solenoid.
We hopo that this information will be useful.
If you should have any questions, please contact C. F. Miller at (FTS) 583-9673, or N. D. Cox at(FTS)583-9605.
Very truly yours, O@kud % sed by J. A.
Dearten,
Kanager Code Assessnent and Applications Progree NDCatn cct W. E. Yesely, NRC-PAS D. G. Eisenhut, NRC-DOR R. W. Kiehn. EG&G Idaho e
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ENCLOSURE 2 IE Information Notice No. 80-11 Date:
March 14, 1980 Page 1 of 1 RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Subject Date Issued to Notice No.
Issued 79-36 Computer Code Defect in 12/31/79 All Power Reactor Faci-Stress Analysis of Piping lities with an Operating Elbow License (OL) or Construc-tion Permit (CP) 79-37 Cracking in Low Presssure 12/31/79 All Power Reactor Faci-Turbine Discs lities with an OL or CP 80-01 Fuel Handling Events 1/4/80 All Power Reactor Faci-lities with an OL or CP 80-02 8X8R Water Rod Lower 1/25/80 All BWR Facilities with End Plug Wear an OL or CP 80-03 Main Turbine Electro-1/31/80 All Power Reactor Faci-hydraulic Control System lities with an OL or CP 80-04 BWR Fuel Exposure in Excess 2/4/80 All BWR Facilities with of Limits an OL or CP 80-05 Chloride Contamination of 2/8/80 All Power Reactor Faci-Safety Related Piping and lities with an OL or CP Components and applicants for a CP 80-06 Notification of Signif-2/27/80 All Power Reactor Faci-icant Events lities with an OL and applicant for OL 80-07 Pump Fatigue Cracking 2/29/80 All Power Reactor Faci-lities with an OL or CP 80-08 The States Company Sliding 3/7/80 All Power Reactor Faci-Link Electrical Terminal lities with an OL or CP Block 80-09 Possible Occupational Health 3/7/80 All Power Reactor Faci-Hazard Associated with Closed lities with an OL or CP Cooling Systems for Operating Power Plants i
80-10 Partial Loss of Non-Nuclear 3/7/80 All Power Reactor Faci-Instrument System Power Sup-lities with an OL or CP ply During Operation l