ML19308D744
| ML19308D744 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 08/07/1974 |
| From: | Rodgers J FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | Moore V US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003120913 | |
| Download: ML19308D744 (8) | |
Text
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A AFC DIST2..,UTION TCR PAvT 50 DOCHET 1%TERIta
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(TEtiPORARY FORM)
CONTROL NO:
8218 FILE:
FRC4:
DATE OF DOC DATE REC'D LTR TWX RPT OTIER Florida Power Corporation St. Petersburg, Fla.
33733 J. T. Rodgers 8-7-74 8-9-74 X
TO:
SENT LOCAL PDR X
Mr. Moore 1 signed CLASS UNCLASS PROP INFO INPUT MO CYS REC'D l DCCKET NO:
XXXX 1
50-302 DESCRIPTION:
ENCLCSURES:
Ltr re 7-29-74 ACRS subcomittee hearing....furt ish-ing info re issues for which the staff's review is not complete concerning the SER for the Crystal River Unit # 3
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8 August 7,1974 Power i
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Mr. Voss A. Moore E
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In Re:
Florida Power Corporation
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Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant Docket No. 50-302
Dear Mr. Moore:
On July 29, 1974 an ACRS subcommittee hearing was held in Washington, D.C. concerning Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant.
During the course of the hearin a list of nineteen (19) g, Mr. Bart Buckley of the AEC staff identified issues for which the staff's review is not complete. These issues were identified in the staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for Crystal River Unit 3 dated July 5,1974.
It was further enumerated, at the hearing, that the staff's SER was based on our Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and its subsequent Amendments 12 through 39 inclusive. Amendment No. 40 to FSAR, filed with the Commission by Florida Power Corporation on July 3,1974, contained our response to many of the nineteen issues referred to above.
Due to the untimely occurrence of these events, it is our intent in this letter to provide you with a brief summary of the status of each of these nineteen issues with regard to information transmittals to staff and current design and construction status.
We feel that these issues are not unresolved or outstanding in the sense of conflict or disagree-ment. We see them as unreviewed items. The time duration between the submittal of Amendment No. 40 and the issuance of the Staff's SER was simply not sufficient to complete this review.
Following is an item by item discussion which indicate the current status of each:
Item #1 Verification of atmospheric diffusion estimates and meteoro-logical data collection system conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.23 - Based on present estimates the new meteorological system will be operational and gathering data (at the tower only) during the week of December 2,1974.
The system will utilize permanent sensors and identical recorders to those intended fee control h om use. Our estimate for having the system operational irr the control room is March 3,1975.
b.),h General Office 32o1 Tn<y-founn street sou:n. P O. Box 14042. St Peterscu g. Florica 33733 813-866-5151 r
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Based on the above schedule, it should be possible to have 4 months of representative data prior to fuel loading, which is presently scheduled for April,1975.
One complete year's data would be available in December,1975.
Item #2 Compliance with the New ECCS Criteria - This issue is covered in the Babcock & Wilcox Topical Report, BAW 10,0091, dated August 5,1974 and is further addressed in our letter to Mr. A. Giambusso, Deputy Director for Reactor Projects, dated August 6, 1974. A proposed FSAR page revision is attached listing the applicable B&W Topical Reports related to ECCS.
In addition, all revisions to the Technical Specifications, I
(Section 15.0 of the FSAR) concerning this issue, will be completed by November,1974.
Item #3 Provisions for redundant and independent indication systems for each core flooding tank isolation valve - The information regarding this issue was submitted to the staff in Amendment No. 32 to the FSAR on October 1,1973 and is contained on page j
6-5, Section 6.1.2.1.3 of the FSAR.
Item #4 Steam line break isolation system - The steam line break i
isolation issue was discussed in Amendment No. 32 to the FSAR, (10/1/73) on pages14-18c and 14-18d, and in Amendment No. 40, (7/3/74) on pages 10-3,10-3a, and 14-53b of the FSAR.
De-tailed design drawings relating to this item were sent to the AEC in preliminary form on May 28, 1974, and were officially retransmitted on July 19, 1974.
Item #5 Auxiliary feedwater system instrument conformance with IEEE Std. 279-196.
This issue was addressed in Amendment No. 32 to the FSAR (10/1/73) on page 14-18d and in Amendment 40 (7/3/74) on pages 7-29, 10-3, 10-3a, and 14-18d.
Detailed design drawings relating to this system were sent in preliminary form to the AEC on May 28, 1974, and were officially retransmitted July 19, 1974.
Item #6 Instrumentation required to follow coarse of an accident -
This issue was addressed in Amendment No. 40 (7/3/74) on page 7-56, Table 7-8 of the FSAR.
-Item #7 Residual heat removal (RHR) system valve interlock provisions with regard to diverse principles to prevent opening and for automatic closure of RHR valves - The residual heat removal system valve interlock issue was addressed in Amendment No. 32 to the FSAR (10/1/73) on 37 (2/4/74)pages 9-15 and 9-16, and again in Amendment No.
on pages 9-16 and 9-60.
Detailed design drawings relating to this item were given to the AEC in April 1974 and are being retransmitted officially on August 7, 1974.
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Item #8 Conformance with criteria of minimum separation between redun-dant safety-related cables - This issue was addressed in Amendment No. 40 (7/3/74) on page 8-7d, section 8.2.2.12.C.9.
The design is complete on this issue and barriers will be added as part of the normal sequence of work.
No schedule problems are anticipated.
Item #9 Potential flooding of switchgear room as a result of failure of firewater piping - This issue was addressed in Amendment No. 40 (7/3/74) to the FSAR on p) ages 9-341 and 9-341a, Section Gilbert Assiciates (GAI 9.8.7.
will submit bills of materials by August 15, 1974 for FPC purchase.
Item #10 Verification that battery room ventilation system will preclude accumulation of explosive hydrogen mixtures - The calculations concerning this issue have been performed and the results have been added to the FSAR in Amendment flo. 40 (7/3/74) in Section 8.2.2.6.
Additional design modifications related to this topic are:
~
a)
The common door between the battery rooms wil1 be eli-minated and filled with concrete.
b)
The common exhaust duct will be removed from within the battery rooms.
The construction drawings for this have been issued.
Item #11 Conformance of 230 kv switchyard breakers control power separa-1 tion with GDC 17 - This issue was addressed in Amendment No. 40 (7/3/74) on page 8-11, Section 8.2.3.3.d.
1 Item #12 Justification for use of manual switches for disconnecting power to each group of control rods - Standard practice in buss bar distribution is to put maintenance service disconnect switches between overhead buss bars that have several loads connected to it.
The main purpose is for tne safety of per-sonnel working on individual loads connected to it.
This buss bar system is isolated from the final trip device by a power transformer and thus serves no function in discon-necting the power from the CRDM's during a required reactor trip.
Each group receives power from two AC breakers.
If one of the service load disconnect switches is opened, the control rod group will not drop,.since they are still receiving power from the other power source.
i The sole. function of these service load disconnect switches is for maintenance purposes and protection of service personnel.
l
a Item #13 Conformance of feeder breaker connecting 4160/480 V trans-former with emergency busses with Class IE requirements -
Information concerning this issue was added to the FSAR in Amendment No. 40 (7/3/74) in Section 8.2.2.5.
The elementary diagram has been transmitted to the AEC for review on July 19, 1974.
Item #14 Verification that diesel generators similar to those used in this plant have been qualified for use in J,ther Nuclear facili-ties -This issue was addressed in Amendmer t No. 40 (7/3/74) on page 8-9 of Section 8.2.3.1.
Item #15 Modification of 480V tie breakers to assure independence of redundant emergency busses - This issue will be addressed in Amendment No. 42. A proposed FSAR page revision is attached indicating the planned modification.
The elementary diagrams have been transmitted to the AEC for review on August 5, 1974.
Item #16 Conformance of redundant d-c systems with GDC 17 and IEEE Std. 308-1969 - This issue was addressed in Amendment No. 40 (7/3/74) in Section 8.2.2.6, Page 8-5 of the FSAR.
The construction drawings have been issued to the field.
Item #17 Modifications to alternate power sources to assure independence of two of the redundant 120 v vital a-c busses - This issue was discussed in Amendment No. 40 (7/3/74) of the FSAR on page 8-6, Section 8.2.2.7.
The construction drawings have been issued to the field.
Item #18 Verification that the auxiliary feedwater system meets the single failure criteria coincident with failure of a high energy line break - A single failure analysis of the Emergency Feedwater System has been ctmpleted.
Design modifications to assure that system can accomodate any active component failure without loss of function have been documented in Sections 7.0 and 10.0 of the FSAR in Amendment No. 40 (7/3/74).
Additional modifications to the Feedwater System, not covered in Item #5 & #18 above, are presented below with their status:
a)
S-I Piping - Layout drawings released for construction.
Piping support design, including seismic analysis, to be finished by 10/1/74.
Seismic analysis for upgraded piping to be finished by September 15, 1974.
b)
New Valves - Requirement outlines for control valves and motor operators are complete.
The valve list has been modified to show motor operators to be added.
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Item #19_ Review and evaluation of operator requalification program for conformance with Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 55 - This issue is being addressed in a separate letter to Mr. A. Schwencer dated 31, 1974.
August 7,1974, in direct response to his letter of July Based on the above status summaries, we feel that following the comple of the staff's review of the information submitted via detailed drawings and Amendment No. 40 and the remaining inform without difficulty.
If further discussion of the above information is required, please feel free to contact us.
Very truly yours, J. T. Roogers Asst. Vice President JTR/mcm3/9
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(PROPOSED REVISION TO BE INCLUDED IN AMENLMENT NO.h2)
B&W Topical
.Date Submitted Report No.
to DOL Title BAW-10,055 June 1973 Fuel Densification Report (Non-proprietar/
Rev. 1 version of BAW-10,054 BAW-10,056 March 1973 Radiation Embrittlement Sensitivity of Reac-tor Pressure Vessel Steels BAW-10,06h May 1973 Multinode Analysis of Core Flooding Line Break for B&W's 2568-MWt Internals Vent Valve Plants BAW-10,078 September 1973 Operational Parameters for B&W Rodded Plants (Proprietar/)
BAW-1398 Cetober 1973 Crfstal River Unit 3 Fuel Densification Re-port (Non-proprietar/ version of BAW-1397)
HAW-10,091 August 1974 B&W's ECCS Evaluation Model Report with Specific Application to 177 FA Clasc Plants with Lovered Loop Arrangement BAW-10092 July 1974 CRAFT 2-Fortran Program for Digital Simulation of a }hiltinode Reactor Plant During Loss of Coolant.
i BAW-10093 July 197h REF20D-Description of Model for Multinode Core Reflood Analysis.
BAW-10094 July 197h Babcock & Wilcox Revisions to THETA 1-B, A Computer Code for Nuclear Reactor Code Ther=al L
Analysis - IN-1kh5 BAW-10095 August 1974 Babcock & Wilcox Revisiens to CONTD!PT -
Computer Program for Predicting Coritainment Pressure - Temperature Response to a Loss-of-Coolant Accident.
1-39b-
4 (Proposed R:; vision to ba included in Am:ndm:nt No. h2)
The h80V plant euxiliary bus, a bus utilized to supply power to the non-class IE distributien system, is supplied frcs the 4160V engineered safeguards bus 33 through a class IE circuit breaker and energized during normal operations. Upon detection of an engineered safeguards condition coincident with loss of off-site power the feeder breaker for the bus is automatically tripped and prevented from closure by the use of engineered safeguard =atrices and undervoltage relay contacts to preclude inadvertent emergency diesel generator 3B overload.
Breaker closure is prevented until both the engineered safeguards signal is manually reset and voltage to the bus is restored.
Modifications vill be made to the control circuits for 480V tie breakers to provide automatic tripping of the tie breakers upon loss of off-site power or detection of an accident condition coincident with loss of off-site power.
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