ML19308C804
| ML19308C804 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane, Midland |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1970 |
| From: | Hendrie J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Seaborg G US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19308C802 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8002070538 | |
| Download: ML19308C804 (6) | |
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS g:
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY. COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON. D.C. 20545 June 18, 1970
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Honornie Glenn T. Seaborg Chairman
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Washington, D. C.
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Subject:
REPORT ON MIDIAND PIANI UNITS 1 Ei 2
,u R.d; Dear Dr.
Seaborg:
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During its 122nd meeting, June 11-13, 1970, the Advisory Committee on,
c hy-Re:tetor Safeguards completed its review of the application by the Consumers N..
fS2 Power Company. for a permit to construct the Midland Plant Units 1 and 2.
Or During this review, the project also was considered at Subcommittee meetings
..1 held on January 22, 1969, at the plant site, on April 24, 1970, a t Chicago.'
Illinois, on February 4, 1969, March 24, 1970, and June 10, 1970; at
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Washington, D. C. and at the ACRS meetings of February 6,1969, April 9, and trf Tn the course of these meetings, the May 8,1970, in Washington, D. C.
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Committee had the benefit of discussions with representatives and consultants P
of the Consumers Power Company, Babcock and Wilcox Company, Bechtel Corporation,
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Dow Chemical Company, and the AEC Regulatory Staff. The Committee also had
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the benefit of the documents listed.
The Midland Plant. site is on the, south bank of the Tittabawassee River The ciain adjacent to the southern city limits of Midland, Michigan.
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industrial complex of the Dow Chemical Company lies within the city limits directly across the river ^ from the site and provides an area of controlled
- access about.two miles wide between the reactor site and the Midland busi-
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4 ness and residential" districts. The exclusion area of the plant site has' y.' hi a radius of 0.31 miles and includes a small segment of the Dow plant; no 4
Dow ehiploye.es are permanently assigned in this segment, and the applicant N, /
has the right to remove any persons from this segment if conditions warrant.
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-The 1,ow population zone has a radius of 1.0 miles and contains 38 permanent R$
residents and about 2,000 industrial workers," mainly employees of Dow f,;
Chemical Company. The number of permanent residents with(n five miles of j 'j.?
the plant site was estimated to be 41,000 in 19',8, mainly in the city of L p)
Midland and its environs.
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- ' Hon 6cablo Clenn T. Scaborg June 18, 1970
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gg The applicant has established criteria for, and has begun the formulation f.6
? of a comprehensive emergency evacuation plan..This plan is being coordinated i j' with the well-established plan of the Dow Chemical Company for emcrgency J
evaauation of the Midland chemical plant and portions of the City of Misland f : '..
in case of major emergencies at the chemical plant.
Close coordination with appropriate municipal and state authoritics is also being established,
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The Midland units will cach include a t$o-loop pressurized water reactor t 'i designed for initial core' power icvels up to 2452 MWt.
The nuclear steam supply systems and the emergency core cooling systens of these units are
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essentially identical with those for the previously reviewed Oconec Units 1, 2 and 3 and Rancho Seco Unit 1 (ACRS. reports of July 11, 1967 and July 19, d,.
1968,respectively). The combined electrical output of the two units will,
be 1300 MW.
In addition, 4,050,000 lbs per hour of secondary steam will be
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exported to the adjacent Dow plant to supply thermal energy for chemical.
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processing operations.
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The prestressed, post-tensioned concrete reactor containment buildings are
,y' similar to those approved for the Oconec Units 1, 2 and 3. -The design will include penetrations, which can be pressurized, and isolation valve seal
_.iE water systems,to reduce leakage. Channels will b'e welded over the scam E
welds of the containment liner plates to permit leak testing of the scam f.4 welds.
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$.E Cooling water for the Midland reactors is supplied from a diked pond with a Q.i
/l capacity of 12,600 acre-fect. Make-up water is taken from the Tittabawassee E,3 -
River. The cooling water supply is sufficient for 100 days of full power operation without make-up during periods of low river flow.
In the unlikely
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' event of a gross leak through the dikes of the cooling pond, a suppicmental y.
source of water will be available. The supplemental source is provided within-gl the main pond by excavating a 24 acre area to 'a depth of six feet below the
{E bottom of the main. pond.- This source can supply shut-down cooling capability for 30 days without make-up.
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The applicant will conduct an on-site meteorological monitoring program to 2
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verify the applicability of the meteorological models used for accident 3.',.9, evaluation and routine release limits as well as to determine any meteoro-
[jh logical effect of the cooling pond. This program should be completed during construction.
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M Midland is the first duel purpose reactor plant to be licensed for construc-M tion.,' The export steam originates from the secondary side of the steam
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(.4 generators and may contain traces of radioactive Icakage from the primary Z,t system. The dcmineralised condensate from 60 to 75 percent of the export _
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steam is returned by Dow to the feed water supply of the reactor plant.
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The condensate from the remaining steam is either chemically contaminated d$$
or cannot practically be returned to the nuclear plant.
It is collected in
-1 the Dow waste treatment system for dilution and processing with other streams
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before eventual discharge to the river.~ Thus, the unreturned partion of the d '?.
condensate represents an effluent from,the reactor plant to which the require-
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, ments of 10 CFR Part 20 must apply.
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Honorable Glenn T. Scaborg June 18, 1970
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This matter may be considered in two' parts:
(1) the steps taken by the
~ applicant to ensure that any, radioactivity in the export steam is within
- the limits set by 10 CFR Part 20 and as low as practicabic and (2) the,
1 measures taken by the Dow Chemical Company to ensure that the export steam can be used in chemicci operations without product contamination and that y f;,
the unreturned steam condensate is propgrly managed for safe disposal.
q In connection with item (1), the applicant proposes to monitor and control 4
3 radioactivity in the export' steam. A representative, continuous sample
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of the export steam will be condensed for monitoring and laboratory analysis.
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The gaama activity of this flowing sample will be continuously monitored
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by on-line analyzers and an alarm actuated if the activity exceeds an j
appropriate limiting value.
Ihe alarm will serve to indicate any change in the integrity of the steam generators or fuel cladding.
Samples of p],
gj this condensate stream will be analyzed at, appropriate, intervals by sensi,tive low-Icvel beta counting for determination of gross beta activity and
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conct.ntration of selected radionuclides. The applicant agrees to limit, by maintaining high integrity of the steam generators and fuel cladding, s;;
the yearly average gross beta activity in the export steam to'one-tenth or 3?
less of the limits specified by 10 CFR Part 20 for the selected radionuclides.
The' yearly average will include any periods of short doration when the
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concentrations
- may approach but not exceed the 10 CFR Part 20 limits. The H'.;
applicant states that in his judgment it is practical to operate the plant
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within these limits.
If these limits are exceeded, corrective measures will be taken in the plant or the delivery of export steam to Dow will be f
terminated. He also' agrees to demonstrate the analytical equipment and I,:
procedures in development programs to be carried forward and completed N
during construction 'f the Midland Plant.
In connection with item (2),
o Dow has stated that they will apply for a 10 CFR Part 30 thterials License
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to receive, pos'sess, and use the export (secondary) steam as a source of f, _
thermal and mechanical energy. No export steam or condensate will be intentict.111y intrqduced into any product.
Isolation of the export steam M
from contact with products will be accomplished by the use of heat exchange
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devices which will provide suitable physical barriers.
Programs will be
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by analyses, monitors, and other means; for repair of leaks when detected;
((f,:p and for approp'riate administrative control of the programs.
.n Lr; bg Dow has stated that accumulation of' radioactivity from the export steam pd and release of radioactive materials in the effluent will be in accordance e ij with 10 CFR Part 20. The unreturned condensate will represent less than
([j 107. of the total liquid effluent disposed of th' rough the Dow waste treat-Ur ment, plant and the annual average concentration in the total effluent is I d.
expected to be less than 17. of the 10 CFR Part 20 limits, c
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The Committee bclieves that the criteria proposed by the applicant and
.,..y Dow for the control of radioactivity in the export steam are necessary,
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and adequate. The detailed procedures for implementation should 'bc l i developed during construction in a manner satisfactory to the Regulatory y,j Staff. The Committee wishes to be kept, informed.
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- U Je Hon'orablo Glenn T. Seaborg..
June 18, 1970
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To minimize the likelihood of subsidence at the site,
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4 mile from the center of the reactoe plant.Dow have_ agreed t the applicant and
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-a No new wells w.ill be drilled The Committee believes these arrangements are sa M 9,
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A large volume of liquid chlorine is maintained in a refrigerated stor j.{6' d,
j vessel about one mile from the Midland plant control room.
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is continuing his study of the consequences of a major accide t ?
The applicant of chlorine from this vessel.
n a. release i}. g design of the control room the objective of finding a practical meth
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below the eight hour threshold limiting value (TLV) of
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serious conceivabic chlorine accident.
most The Cor.inittee believes that adequate air purification facilities should be provided in the control M'p;f 5"^
TLV of 1 ppm so that operatore can worroom ventil' tion system to a
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during an extended chlorine emergency.k without respiratory equipment 4p,p This matter should be resolved during construction in a manner satisfactory to the Regulatory Staff
[fl' The reactor vessel cavity will be designed to withstand mechanical f O, js and pressure transients comparable to those considered in the desig Qy orces the Zion and Indian Point-3 plants.
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The applicant has stated that he will provide addit io 7
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nce obtained
.i cb established at present. core cooling system is capable of limiting core tem emergency o
C-the further analysis dergonstrates that such changes areHe will also m s matter should be r'esolved during construction in a manner satisfa t required. This the Regulatory Staff.
g The Committee wishes ~to be kept informed.
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/Ihe safety injection system for the Midland plant' is actu t d' b~
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these two,the reactor is tripped only by the low reacto ae y either 3
However, of Jy The Committee believes that provision also should be made to t pressure signal.
G, reactor by the high containment pressure, signal.
rip the 4M The applicant pland to develop more detailed criteria for th of protection and emergency power systems together with appropriat e installation
- s procedures to maintain the physical and cicetrical independence of the G
e redundant portions of these systems.
criteria and procedures should be reviewed and approved by the Sta N.
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to actual installation.
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c *.,; y Honorable Glenn T. Seabors June 18, 1970 l
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, The applicant considers the possibility of molting and subsequent 4
disintegration of a portio'n of a fuct assembly because of flow starvation, gross enrichment error, or from other causes to be remote. However, the (J
resulting effects in terms of local high temperature or pressure and
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possible initiation of failure in adjacent fuel elements are not well.
known. Appropriate studids should be made to show that such an incident
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will not Icad to unacceptable conditions.
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The Committee believes that consideration should be given to the utili
[fj,l zation of instrumentation for prompt detection of gross failure of a a.
fuel element.
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The Committee has commented in previous reports on the ilevelopm'ent of I
J systems to control the buildt.p of hydrogen in the containment which f
might follow in the unlikely event of a major accident. The applicant y '9 proposes to make use of a technique of purging through filters after a U,
suitable time delay subsequent to the accident. However, the Committee 2
recommends that the primary protection in this regard should utilize a hydrogen control method which keeps the hydrogen concentration within Q
safe limits by means other than purging. The capability for purging
'i should also be provided. The hydrogen control system and provisions.
7 for containment atmosphere mixing and sampling should have redundancy and instrumentation suitable for an engineered safety feature. The g
Committee wishes to be kept informed of the resolution of this matter.
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The Cocunittee recommends that the applicant accelerate the study of means
'd; of preventing common failure modes from negating scram action and of design features to make tolerabic the consequences of failure to scram during. anticipated transients. The applicant stated that the engineering design would maintain flexibility with regard to relief capacity of the This primary system and to a diverse means of reducing reactivity.
matter should be resolved in a manner satisfactory to the Regulatory y R.
Staff during const'ruction. The Committee wishes to be kept informed.
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Other problems related to large water reactors have been identified pj by the Regulatory Staf f and the ACRS and cited in previous ACRS reports.
3 The Committee believns that resolution of these items should apply M
equally to the Midland Plant Units 1 & 2.
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4 The Committee believes that the'above items can be resolved during con-F 77 struction and that, if due consideration is given to these items, the c,
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.lionorabic G1 con T. Scaborg r,_
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li nucicar units proposed ' for the Midland Plant can be constructed with
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reasonabic assurance' that they can be operated without undue risk to 8
',4 the health and safety of the public.
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' Joseph M. llendrie
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References
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- 1) Amendments 1 - 12 to License Application a'..&.(
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