ML19308C599
| ML19308C599 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1979 |
| From: | Helfman S, Vollmer R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280628 | |
| Download: ML19308C599 (53) | |
Text
.
- o TIE PP2SI2NT'S CO!CiISSION CN ACCIEN* AT TEP23 MIS ISIAliD 1
IN THE MATTER OF:
TESTDONY OF RICHARD VOLI2CR l
f PUCE: Bethesda, Maryland DATE:
Thursdayg July 26, 1979 1 - 51 PAG ES.
(
Columbia Reporting Company OFFICIAL REPORTERS 300 SEVENTH STREET S.W.
WAsccTON. D.C. 20024 TELEPHONE 554 9050 8001280 Mg
s 4
[
_C O N _T E N.T S WIOTESS DIRECT CROSS REDIRE'JT RECROSS Richard E. Vollmer 3
49 E _X H _I _B _I T
_S.
DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NO.
FOR IDENTIFICATION 1
30 6
u C2 E
E E
E EaCo l
l 1
l l
i 1
[
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND
_______________x Deposition of:
RICHARD VOLLMER
-______________x Hearing Room 542 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland Thursday, July 26, 1979 el" The above-entitled Matter convened for hearing, E
E pursuant 'o notice, at 1:25 p.m.
~
t
!I(
?
E PRESENT:
(5 g
On behalf of the President's Commission on Accident g
at Three Mile Island:
u BY:
STAN M. H N MAN, Esquire Associate Chief Counsel and BY:
GARY M. SIDELL, Esquire Associate Chief Counsel 2100 M Street, Northwe_st Washington, D. C.
20037 Theodore Taylor, Member of President's Commission Robert English, Member of President's Commission On behalf of the Witness; BY:
MARK E. CHOPKO, Esquire i
BY:
MARIANE MOE, Esquire l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(
Office of the General Counsel
(
l
l
\\
j 2-3 l
1
- e
(
P,,3 g g i 1 g 1 E g E MR. M F.%N:
On the record.
Would you please raise your right hand?
Thereupon,-
RICHARD H. VOLLMER was called as a witness, and after having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION N
BY MR. HELFMAN:
oz g
Q Would you please state your full name for the record?
2 g
A Richard Henry Vollmer.
E Q
Have you ever had your deposition taken before?
Eao A
Yes.
O I think I would like to briefly go through some of the characteristics of a deposition so you are aware of what we are doing today.
The testimony you are about to give will be sworn and will have the same force and effect if the testimony had been given in a court of law.
,(.
The testimony will be reduced to a transcript by l
l the court reporter, and you will be provided with a copy and
.,.,' ('
afforded the opportunity to make any changes which you feel i
~
are'necessary.
However, you should be aware that we would I
4 4
have the opportunity to comment on any changes that you make.
(..
Should the changes you make be substantial, it could reflect adversely on your credibility.
So it is important that you ask for clarifications of any questions that you are asked which you do not fully understand before you an..ver them.
For the benefit of the court reporter, it is necessarr that audible answers be given, since the court reporter can't record gestures, nods of the head, and so forth.
8 Since the court report can't take down two people e
talking at once, you should allow me to fini'sh.my. question m
I before you begin your answer, even if you anticipate what my s
}
g a
question is going to be.
And I will try to remember not to E
y ask questions until you have completed your answer.
Do you have any questions?
A No.
That is fine.
Q Did you bring a resume with you?
A No, I didn't.
Q Were you asked to?
A Not that I recall.
(
I can make one available.
Q Do you have one that is already made up?
A I believe-se. My secretary has one.
(
Q Shall we request your secretary to obtain a copy
4
- a 5
(
now?
A Fine.
MR. HELFMAN:
Off the record.
1 (Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.)
MR. HELFMAN:
Back on the record.
BY MR. HELFMAN:
Q While we are waiting for your resume, perhaps you should state for the record what your title is at the NRC and briefly describe what your duties are.
e A
My current title is Director, TMI Support Task Group,* and also Acting Assistant Director of the Systematic
'I s.
E E
Evaluation Program.
E y
My duties, in relation to Three Mile Island, are the technical and management responsibilities for the licensing effort that involves monitoring the current Three Mile Island operations; review and the preparation of evaluation reports of plant activities by Metropolitan Edison; and that also includes Three Mile Island 1 at the current time.
~
L The Systematic Evaluatian Program, which is the other part of my responsibility, is a carry-over from my
(,
previous position, and basically is a comprehensive review of the older operating plants for safety.
L i
l 6
l 1
)
i 1
Q What was your title at the time of the Three Mile
.r Island incident in March of this year?
A My title at that time was Assistant Director for Systems and Projects, and that included the Reactor Systems branches, Blant Systemi Branch, and several project branches, including the Systematic Evaluation Program.
Q Would you describe your background as basically being an engineering background or a physics background?
d A
I am a physicist, and have roughly, from 1952 to uo g
1965 or so, engaged primary in physics. activities.
Since m
,()
g 1965 my a,ctivities have been more in the safety arena and
- (
m j
more perhaps broadened into an engineering. aspect.
Eg Q
Did you become involved in.the NRC. participation u
in the Three Mile Island incident of March of,this year?
% F 4k A
Yes, I became involved at roughly 8tl5 on March 99th, when I was called into Mr. Stello's office, who was in communication with the incident center.
We were receiving the first reports of the accident.
Q Mr. Stello was here in Bethesda at this time?
g A
Mr. Stallo was right down the hall in the opposite corner from me.
I worked directly for Mr. Stallo at that time.
Following that, I spent the day with my staff here
<N in these quarters trying to review and understand; thm
7 situation that was going on at the time.
[
MR. ELFMAN:
Off the record.
(Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.)
MR.ELFMAN :
Back on the record.
BY MR. HELFMAN:
2.7th Q
on March 49th, when you were working in your offices with your staff, what were your responsibilities?
A The responsibilities at that time were primary 6
response to queries from the people at the incident center; o
E and again trying to understand and piepe together the E
(I 2
information that we were receiving primary from the incident E
/
center, as well as calls from Babcock and Wilcox.
I We were not involved in direct communications with g
a the plant, cf course, at that time, because those lines were all tied up with the incident center.
Around 7:00 or so that evening, I communicated with Mr. Stallo, and we decided it would be good to send a team up to the site.
And I selected six other people --
two systems people, two electrical and instrumentation people,
{
and two radiation specialists -- and we made arrangements to leave early the next morning.
(
Q In fact, this team that you assembled, went to the site on the 30th?
o g
i f
A On the 29th, Thursday, the 29th.
We left roughly at 8:00 o' clock, and were at the site somewhere around 11:30 in the morning.
Q So you accompanied them?
A Yes.
Q When you were here in your offices with.your staff, what types of questions were you responsible for trying to get answers to?
Were you concerned, for example, with N
the condition of the core, with radiation emissions?
What E
was your primary focus?
o
[)-
Si A
My primary focus was systems oriented.
We were m
(
5 trying to establish ways in which the licensee could E
y establish conditions that would allow him to start the reactor coolant pumps, for example.
.t.
We did have some problems that we were working on that were associated with radioactivity releases, trying to relate some of the radiation levels: measured off.. site to what might actually'been teleased at the plant.
Most of these calculations, if you will, were done rather roughly,
.(
en the spur of the moment.
But, again, we were trying to respond primary to questions from the incident center.
'(
Q And you were trying to provide information to here, in Bethesda?
9 A
- Yes, f
Q Do you have off site radiation readings as early as i
the 29th of March?
A Yes, we did.
As a matter of fact, when I arrived on the 29th, a part of my staff immediately checked in with the inspection and enforcement team that was on the site to try to understand what measurements they were making at the time, and what g
the levels that they were seeing off site. And the general cr j
consensus at that time was that the off site levels were l
certainly indicative that there were releas'es from the 3
e l
facility of a substantial nature, but not of an imminent threat I
e to the public health and safety.
That was at least our judgment.
Q Do you recall what the readings. ware'that,you were l
getting,at that time?
A Some of the higher readings were 2 to 10 MR, again depending on location and how close into the plant they were taken.
But my best recollection, and' I have not gone back
,(
and looked at the records of the readings, that even at the
\\
i near in locations, near in,off site locations, the maximum
(
readings were on the order of 10 MR.
Q Were you getting readings beyond the plant perimeter?
l 1
i
10 A
ch, yes.
Many of the readings that I am discussing here were those taken beyond the plant perimeter,although there were also measurements taken on the island, itself. But I was more concerned with down wind readings that might be indicative of public exposure.
Q Did you have catallurgi::1 information at that time indicative of wind directions and so forth, velocity?
A Yes.
The inspection, enforcement team that did the d
survey were in ecmmunication with Capital City Airport.
<s oa g
We did have communications with the control room, both
(
Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms, so the wind direction was known.
-~
h Generally, the survey teams were concentrating on l
down wind directions, although there wasn't mech wind that day.
It was very, very still.
Q With respect to the emergency procedures that you were attempting to devise, was this being done in your offices without the benefit of Met-Ed's construction plans or plant designs?
1
(
A We had the safety analysis report; we had the licensee's description and design; and we had people that
(
were pretty knowledgeable about the system.
l l
But, as I recall, we did lack some of the real
11
,e N'
detailedtypeofinformation,suchastheP[ID,whichwould have provided us with much better knowledge of specific actions that can be taken to try to establish a pressure in i
i the reactor systems that might be able to start the pumps and v
things of that nature.
O Were you provided with such more details plans when you arrived at the site?
A When we arrived at the site we did not have that
- d information, as I recall, until perhaps Saturday or Sunday, E;
when we received some of the more detailed process
=
I go
[_
instrumentation descriptions.
u
..J
\\
<5 When we arrived at the site we just sort of carried 5
y along with what we had.
Q Was this information requested upon your arrival from Met-Ed?
4 A
When I arrived at the site, we were able to use the l
Met-Ed information, and I don't recall exactly when we requeste d the additional detailed information from them.
We were using their information, which, for our purposes, was fairly
(
satisfactory.
And the reason it was, let me point out, that when
{
I got on site, the communications that existed between my group and the plant site, or Bethesda, werevvery' limited.
l a-
12 5
Because what few phenes were available at the observation j
f center, where we spent most of our time, or at the mo/tel,
,7 where I had set up a meeting room, it was not easy to communicate, certainly, with the control room.
And when I was on the site, I had to go to Eiddletown to make a phone call back to my office, because the phone communications
- wtne there were so neeh.
There were so few open, so tied up, that communications were not too good.
The people back in d
Bethesda knew much more at that time than we did, even though E
p we were there.
g Q
Despite satisfactory _ communications, you felt you had sufficient information from Met-Ed to do your y
calculations?
A I would say the communications were unsatisfactory.
But we did get informati'on from Met-Ed.
The Met-Ed people i
were using the observation center as their information headquarters, and I think we were kept fully i.: formed of what was going on.
The questions we asked, we were given responsible i(
answers to.
I think, during Thursday, however, the core l,
conditions and so on appeared to be fairly stable.
That l
i
(_
was before some of the Friday morning releases that occurred, that was before we really knew the significance of the hydrogen l
l
13 And again, all the information that we needed was bubble.
made available to us.
Our primary mission at that point in time was directed toward looking back at what had happened, and trying to establish that we wouldn't get into another bad situation in the next few days, and we tried to look forward to what the future might bring, in terms of core conditions and so on.
Q Are you saying inadequate or insufficient communications from the control room did not deprive you c;o of information which you needed to deal with the problems ez i:
a:
0 at hand?
N(;
E A
I think for the focus that we were taking at that m
E time,'we had enough information, because we had current 8
information.
We did not have the staff to make a broad -- to even I
undertake a broad, evaluation.what happened.
We were ju.st trying te,s.iece togkther the sequence, the scenario what happened so we could better understand what might happen in i
the next few days or the next few weeks.
And to that extent, the information that was made available to us was sufficient.
k i
If I were trying to do any type of detailed f
evaluation, or if I had been up there Wednesda7. morning i
and was t f ng to understand what was going on in the core, "i
- .~.
a,..
l
14 in those early hours, the information would have been totally insufficient.
We would have needed somebody in the control room, or somebody with good access to a broad spectrum of data.
Q Weren't you attempting to devise emergency procedures based on the condition of the core at that time?
A That really came a little bit later.
Again, we were trying to project, as I said, into d
what might happen in the next few days based on our ez; understanding at that time.
en
..(
g As I said, our understanding at that time, on
's E
Thursday, was they had gotten stable coolant conditions, Eao appeared apparently so, even though there were temperatures in the system, and pressures were sometimes difficult to control.
And they had difficult times with the pressurizer and the makeup tank, obviously, because they had a substantial amount of hydrogen gas that was being evolved.
But, I think in-terms of core conditions, they had established flow, they had established heat rejection through
,(
the "A" steam generator.
Our main focus at that time was
~~
to try to understand what had happened and whether or not
(
the systems'that had not failed were capable of continuing on safe cool-down of the plant.
15 We didn't really look retrospectively at conditions that the core had gone through.
We were trying to take the information, factually, as best we knew, from a systems standpoint, and try to understand if we had adequate core-ic cooling, and if the decay heat removal system, or things of that nature, would be appropriate to bring into play.
O And it was unnec ssary to have adequate. communications e
from the control room in order to piece together this information?
.ou j
A The ecmmunications with the control room were.through j
o Met-Ed staff, and the information that they had there, i' ;
E g
and again, I think, for the purposes we were trying to do, m3 3
on Thursday, I would say that that was adequate.
8 Q
Were you attempting to piece together a general scenario of what had occurred?
Was that your primary focus rather than a specific detailed approach?
A Yes, a general scenario, what systems came into play; and the sequence of the accident, how they contributed to the accident; if the system could not be relied on for future cool-down or shut doen, what additional systems k
might be necessary to be called on.
Q With an idea to developing procedures for further handling of the plant?
l
O A
Broadly speaking, that is correct.
O Were you, and your team, responsible for devising such procedures?
A Yes, we were. But the formal procedural effort did not really occur until Friday, when a substantially-increased staff was brought on.
Mr. Denton came up, and then we :, split into a twenty-four hour operation.
One of the major efforts in that twenty-four hour 6
operation was to help the licensee in their procedural effort, ve y
both as a m6nitor of the procedures, and actually, in some eo
(~
g cases, helping them prepare them.
p
=
Q By the time Mr. Denton arrived, was it clear to 3g you that there had.been core damage?
o A
I'think it was clear, certainly, then.
But even clear on Wednesday, that there had been core damage, because of the radiation levels that were reported back from the plant, from the off site environs.
My own personal judgment was, I think, in looking back, that we had ruptured a high fraction, or all of the fuel rods, releasing a great many of the gaseous fis. sign.-products from the fission gas plenum.
I don't think I personally felt that the core damage had been significant, as it obviously s
was, until we became aware of the hydrogen, the amount of
17 hydrogen that had been generated.
Q When was that?
Was that prior to Mr. Denton's arrival at the site?
A I would say no.
First of all, we did not know, until Friday, a..
containment pressure spike had occurred, which would then obviously be indicative of burning of a substanti&1 amount of hydrogen gas.
And Friday also, it became clear that because there were so much difficulty in controlling 6u-o the pressure in the makeup tank, there must be an awful lot z
G 2
of hydrogen gas evolving, because the makeup tank is basically
'{
E g
a degaser, which strips the gas, and you do get your gaseous 1
2 3
release.
g So I guess, until these facts.came together, that there was an awful lot of hydrogen generation, would I have concluded that the core damage was as extensive as it was.
Although, again, I did feel that substantial fission process had occurred.
But that could have occurred just by failure cou-u n w uj.,
resulting from either lack of cooling or ::c; vary.
U 0
Did you. reach the conclusion, either on Wednesday or Thursday, there was a great likelihood that the core had become uncovered?
.(
A Yes.
And I guess the conclusion that the core had l
I
O 18 been, uncovered was clear on Wednesay, on Wednesday morning, I guess, when it was also clear that the temperatures in the hot leg above the core were higher than the saturation temperatures of the liquid.
And the only way this can occur is if the staem above the core had been super-heated, which would mean that the core would have had to be uncovered O
Do you recall if anyone else at the incident center reached a similar conclusion, and expressed such a g
conclusion?
Mr. Stello, for example?
C j
A Mr. Stello certainly did, but I don't know if he 8
[.
g reached that conclusion on Wednesday or when.
I certainly
(,,
a<g knop, from people who were there, that he was yelling into 33 the phone that the operator should understand clearly that
)
u the core is uncovered, because the temperatures were too-high.
And, again, I don't really remember when I was made aware of that story.
Q Were you involved in briefing Mr. Denton when he arrived at the scene?
A Yes, I was the lead NRC person at the site when
(
Mr. Denton arrived, and I did brief him and give him as up-to-date status as I could, where we stood as far as the core,
(
and where we stood, as far as relases were concerned.
O Did you brief him on the conditien of the core?
i
19 Q
No, I don't think we discussed any specifics of core conditions at that time.-
Again, as I said, at that time, I don't -- when he got there, I am just trying to recall if I was aware of the pres'sure spike in the containment.
Certainly he was made aware, back here, Friday morning, I believe, that that was the case.
1 Q
But you were aware by then of the presence of j
y super-heated steam?
e A
I was aware of that, yes, Wednesday, early afternoon 8
)
Q Which indicated to you that,the core had become i
E
' \\../
4 E
uncovered?
E o
A But whether or not the core temperatures had got to o
such a degree as to ox%dize large masses or amounts of rirconium, I don't think I personally appreciated that at that time.
Q In your briefing of Mr.Denton, did you discuss the presence of super-heated steam and the conclusion that the core had been uncovered?
,(
A No, I felt my briefing *ith'Tr.?Denton was'.the factual status of the way things stood at that time...
I know he had been involved in the incident center for the previous k.
couple of days.
And my briefing of him at that time was not
anything but a factual recitation as best I knew exactly and what problems seemed where things stood at that moment, to exist at that moment.-- the problem of the releases and the problems of being able to maintain the makeup tank pressure in a stable condition.
Q Did you inform him of the presence of the super-heated steam as a factual matter?
A I don't believe so.
or the temperature differential which leads you to g
Q o
the conclusion there was super-heated steam?
Cz E
f.
C A
No, I didn't.
l T E
j At that time, the reactor coolant pump had been a
,on for a day and-a-half, and adequate cooling was being g
u achieved.
So that particular difference did not exist :at the time.
As I said, I attempted to explain to him the situatio n of the core, and the core parameters that existed when he got there.
Q Ead the core become uncovered prior to his arrival, would that have resulted in core damage?
(
A I don't understand the question.
Q Does uncovery of the core produce core damage?
(
A Not necessarily.
,----y
,-7-y y
w
--we-w w
-wy-
-m+-w--yem
--w
21 Q
Under what circumstances could you have an uncovered j
i l
core without core damage?
A Well, if the core was, if the reactor had been shut down for a period of time, for example, a week, and the core i
was uncovered for 15 minutes sor something like that, I wouldn't expect there would be any su' stantial core damage, l
e
\\
maybe none.
There are a given set of circumstances related to d
the heat developed in the core, and the length of time it is uoa uncovered by which you wouldn't get the core damage.
And
~
e
(
[
if you uncover the core earlier in an accient,for a substantial r
e peJiod of time, then you would get core damage.
Ig So, how long the core is without cooling, how fast u
it will heat up, and what temperatures it will achieve, and the oxidization of the zirconium gives you core damage.
Q You were aware that TMI-2 had not been shut down for a week prior to this incident?
A Yes.
(Mr. Sidell left the room)
!(
Ote. English arrived at the depositior Q
And given that circumstance, wouldn't core uncovering 1
({
indicate core damage?
A Yes.
i
\\
22 Even if the core was later flooded or cooled, would O
there not be core damage?
A Yes.
Q That would be a fact concerning the condition of the core which existed at the time Mr. Denton arrived.
A Oh, I see what you mean.
Q You do agree?
A Yes, I agree..
d I would say I assumed Mr. Denton knew there had e2 been core damage.
I felt that was a fact that was known by
- c
(
o 7.
everybody, since the releases were significant.
c When I said I gave him the status as best I could 2m o
of the plant conditions, I was referring to systems u
descriptions, flows, temperatures, and so on.
I did not, as I recall, go into any detail what I thought the condition
-o of the core was at that time.
Q Would it be accurate to state that prior to your 1
leaving Bethesda, it was commonly understood that there was super-heated steam in the core, and that this likely k
indicated some core uncovering?
A I would say so, yes, to the best of my knowledge.,
(_
that the people in the incident center did know that.
Q At the time you received more detailed plans frem
1 23 Met-Ed, did you have any difficulty devising emergency procedures for reliance on those plans?
A well, certainly !!et-Ed was in control of the operation, and we were briefed on what was going on, and what they planned on doing.
We did not get into the procedural details until probably Friday night or Saturday, at which time they mounted an effort to prepare procedures, contingency and 8
emergency procedures, to cope with thecsituation as it E
g existed.
And these procedures, of course, changed sometimes
(
C daily, sometimes weekly, because the conditions cf the systems
's l
also changed.
3C For example, one of the procedures very early on was ways of getting rid of the hydrogen bubble, as an example of a. procedure that originated because of the situation.
Q In devising emergency procedures, are you concerned with such mundane operations as turning on pumps, turning off pumps?
A Exactly, turning on pumps, every valve, which valve
-(
was important to the operations, what position they were in.
Yes, that is why the very details were needed when we got k
into the procedure effort, details that were not needed when we were considering the system aspect.
i
4 24 O
When you refer to details, are you referring to location of valves and location of switches, location of pipes?
A Location, in the sense of where they are in the system, but not location where they physically are, although that was important in some cases.
We didn't concern ourselves with which switches had to be turned on the control console.
The plant people needed to provide that type of intelligence.
(Ms. Moe left the room)
N Q
-Did you find that the plans that were provided you e
2 g
by Met-Ed were fully up to date and accurately reflected
(
2 the current design of the plant-and the location of important g
E pieces of equipment?
E h
A No, there were many occasions when our input was needed to correct a lack of understanding of the systems as they existed, and the equipment, as it existed,for the preparation of these procedures.
I believe, to clarify and be fair about it, that the people who may not have been familiar with the plant, that specific plant, were called into the procedure writing k
effort, and they may not have been as knowledgeable about it as the plant operation staff, itself, who were fighting fires, k
so to speak, of their own.
Q Were you provided with plans, physical plans, like l
l e
25 blueprints?
Well, there, basically -- basically, blueprints of A
how the system was connected together, where the valves led to, where the pumps were 1ccated, the length of pipe and so forth, that was provided.
N Q
By' Met-Ed?
A Yes.
Q Were those plans or blueprints an accurate representatier. of the configuration of the plant at the time?
eue E
A As had been reported by the people on the procedure
-e
- x g
effort, there was ddfi6iencies,in the blueprints, that they E
j were not up to date, or deficiences--or the terminology, 2
3 as built, that may have been the original design, or the final.
8 design, but as changes were made in the field, in the plant, they were not necessarily reflected at all times on those blueprints, if you will.
Q Is it a requirement of the NRC that the licensee keep these plans up to date so as to reflect the changes?
A I would say that to comply with the regulatory l[
guide, 1.33, which is the operational quality assurance program l
that clearly the licensee should have kept those up toc date
(
and reflect actual conditions.
Q Did it appear to you then that Met-Ed had violated
26
[
the guide to which you refer in not keeping their plans up l
to date?
Would that be an accurate conclusion?
1 A
I would have to assume that since I didn't know what they had in the process --
MR. CHOPKO:
Let me interject one thing.
We
$~
are referring to the Re Guide.
The Re/ Guide is not requirements.
Off the record.
y (Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.)
o MR. HELFMAN:
Back on the record.
e
(-
o fs-b BY' MR.HELFMAN :
a 3
Q With respect to the responsibility for these emergency procOdures, were the procedures devised by NRC ou people, you and your people, team, or were they devised by
. Ifet-Ed?
A Are you referring to the initial drafts cf those procedures?
Q Yes.
I A
Primarily by Met-Ed, and its consultants, or i
lk
<homever they brought on site tc io that.
Q Were the NRC rules to sign off on the procedures
(,,,
before they were implemented?
Did you have an approval capacity:
A Yes, we did.
27 Q
Did you find it was necessary to make er implement many changes that.were proposed'by Met'Ed?
A Eow do you characterize many?
Q Substantial, numerous.
A I think some procedures needed to be changed in what I would characterize as a substantive way, and other procedures only required clarification.
Q Did you have to intervene often in those proposed 6
procedures before you would sign off on them?
C j
A The process involved, in many cases, a close working c
(-
- g relationship.
The initial drafters of the procedures would
-g.)
E 43 send these to their technir ' review staff, and ourselves 3y at the same time, and also to their plant operation review U
committee.
And in many cases, we were common with that effort, and it was a round table discussion.
So at that point in tf.me it would be difficult to charad:3rd:e it as interven': ion.
I think our comments, l
l I
as well as their comments, weite considered, discussed, and I
either incorporated or rejected as not-being necessary.
.(.
Q So NRC then participated in the formulation of the initial plans, procedures?
A In some cases we even helped with the initial plans.
Some of our operating licensing branch people were assisting, me l
23 because of their detailed knowledge of the plant and the j
operational knowledge of the control room, were even assisting in the preparation of the procedures.
It wasn't the usual, regulatory operation, where 1
they prepared their documents and met all their approvals, and then submit it for our review.
Because of the timeliness and the urgency of the situation, it was a step by step review process with them.
0 With respect to the blueprint inaccuraci.s to which 6
u j
we have referred,.de you recall if any.of these inaccuracies E
1
(
o impeded or substantially affected the development of emergency w.i ew procedures?
=
1 E
A I don't.think I can really respond to that.
I am aoo sure the fact that they were not accurate, at least that somebody had to point out the inaccuracies had made some l
minor time impact, but whether that was substantial or not, I wasn't close enough to the operation to tell.
i Q
Can you recall any examination of inaccuracies that required obtaining further information that should
,(
have been contained on the blueprint.
A No, I can't._
I can only respond as I am now, to what the people on the site reported back to me.
Q Are you familiar with Thomas Novak?
29 A
Yes.
Q Was he on your staff, Reactor Systems Branch?
A No.
Tom was, as I recall, brought up primary for --
let me correct that.
Yes, earlier on he was involved in the procedure operation, yes.
Q Prior to TMI-2 did he report to you?
A No.
Q But during the TMI incident he did at some point?
8 A
He was on the other shift.
ez i:
Q Prior to TMI -
m C
o r3 I
A.
He was on Mr. Stello's shift, as a matter of factac m
s
.e 43 Q
Prior to TMI-2 incident, did you have the opportunity
$ao to see the memorandum that was prepared by Sandy Israel and signed by Thomas Novak', entitled " Loop Seals in Pressurizer Surge Line."
jad. f0 A
O Have you seen it since?
A I have seen it since, along with a bunch of other stuff, and gave it somewhat a cursory reading, I am afraid.
h I have been more involved in the' day to day operations rather
~
than looking back in my capacity as TMI-2 Support Director.
fL Q
Do you recall what the memorandum was concerned with?
A As I recall, if it is the memorandum you are referring
30 e
to, it was concerned with the likelihood of incorrect pressuriz er level instrumentation following certain transients.
Would it be correct to say that such a scenario Q
was part of the events at TMI-27 A
That is correct.
MRs CHOPKO:
For the. purpose of this deposition, I would like to identify the memorandum referred to in direct as the memorandum from Tom Novak to RSB members, b
dated January 10, 1978.
c A
MR. EELFMAN-It would be hoted for the record 2
(.
8 that the memorandum has been marked as Exhibit No. 3 i
m
-t g
~
to the deposition of Sandy Israel of 7/26/79.
2 S
0 Off the record.
(Whereupon a discussion was held off the record.)
MP, HELFMAN:
Back on the record.
' "We received Mr. Vollmer's resume.
i would like to have it marked.as Deposition Exhibit No. 1 to this deposition.
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit 1 L
was marked for identificatien.)
BY MR. HELFMAN:
I Q
Does this resume accurately reflect your educational professional, employment background?
~
l
31 i
A Yes, it-does.
Q Could you please describe for the record your understanding of the present condition of the core at i
Three Mile Island?
A Well, my present understanding of the core condition would be based on the facts as I know them, which would be a substantial amount of cladding oxidization has taken place l
in the top half of the reactor core.
8 My fudgment is that the core, its' elf, has not E
under gone a significant slumping or c$ving in, in the center -
(,
p g
Q Has there been some?
E A
I suppose so.
But let me go on.
El a-for.a number of. reasons.
First of all, our primary coolant samples have not indicated the presence of c o n t r o.' red material, nor have they indicated the presence of a significant amount of fuel, itself.
And so, my only
(
conception of the status of the core is that there has been, as I said, a significant amount of cladding oxidization, and i
splitting and spalling of the cladding.
(
But my own view is, for a large part, the core remains in a fairly upright condition.
i' The other thing that leads me to believe that, a significant amount of the in-core thermacouples have
_. ~. _ _.. _.. _., _ _
32 been reading with accuracy and reliability since the accident.
I So these facts would lead me to conclude that certainly, the release of fission prodne".s, generation of hydrogen, would point to a substantial overall destruction of the clidding, on' a good portion of the core.
But I don't think it has fallen down into a debris pile in the middle.
That is only my own judgment, based on the facts as I see them.
l g
Q Have you heard any differing views on that within l
e E
the NRC?
E
. C..- og A
I scanned a couple of memos.
Ycu can look at my
,,a board there and see the inverted cone and the core there.
$g I don't know anybody who has suggested there is a deep u
depression in the core, that it had sunk down.
But, again, perhaps I have not seen or heard all of the pecple who are looking at the problem.
I have not been in contact with some of the people in the Division of Systems Safety,who I think are looking or trying to evaluate what they think the core looks like now.
.k Q
How often are you updated on the condition of the core?
ly A
Daily, at least.
When you say " condition of the core", I should i
33 clarify that:
Condition of the plant parameters.
I don't think anybody is up to date on the condition of the core.
All I can say is we are updated on the temperatures and the pressures, activity releases, if there were, things of that nature, and the progress on construction and the progress on what they are going to do with the contaminated water, things like that.
MR. HELFMAN:Off the record.
^
6 (Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.)
e MR. HELFMAN:
Back on the record.
8g BY MR. HELFMAN:
m ii; Q
Are you familiar with -- I am probably going to E
' mispronounce this -- Picklesimer's memo of June 20th?
ou A
No.
Q Do you conclude frcm the anelysis of the core samples i
that control rods are intact?
(
l A
I don't conclude that they are in the same physical condition that they were, but I do believe that if they had melted or melted away or vaporized, that we would have seen k.
something in our primary cooling system regarding the radioactivity from the centrol rods, themselves.
I guess
(
they are there, somehow.
In what sort of shape, I am not sure.
34 Q
Are the present efforts to maintain the core in its condition, assuming there is ame protection from control rods?
A No.
The first week of the accident, I can't recall exactly when, we initiated a fairly priority analysis effort to establish at what boron concentration in the reactor coolant.
would be necessary to assure core suberiticality if the control rods were absent and the core pellets were to rearrange themselves in a more active configuration.
J gu 1
E We established that level,which is 3,000 parts per Eo million boron and carefully assured ourselves since that time
(
g that the core did have that concentration in it.
We have a
' been proceeding on that basis.
8 Q
If you were to have a slump of the pellets to l
the bottom of the core, would you have sufficient flow to insure boration of this material?
l A
The boration is dependent on two things:
one is the level of make up -- that is, the boren level of the makeup l
level, and in fact, how much leakage you have from the core, and whether the leakage is in a liquid state or a vapor state.
,,(
If your leakage from the reactor through the pressurizer was all in the vapor state, then you would concentrate the boron 1
w.
in the core.
And indeed, there were times during the accident
35 or the aftermath of the accident when we put in lower concentration than the 3,000 parts per million, because it was clear we were getting too high a concentration in the core, and we wanted to maintain it around 3,000.
The solubility au these temperatures is far in excess of what the core actually has, or the coolant has, in terms of boron.
So it is my belief, by the addition of the prescribed amounts of boric acid. in the makeup, and our weekly monitoring of the level of baron in the coolant, we can have 8
E reasonable assurance that it is distributed around the system.
Ee We have done things to try to convince ourselves, o
({
y or assuzaourselves, that that is indeed the case.
iii Q
Is there a possibility that the pellets could -
8 slump to the bottom?
A I imagine that is a possibility, yes, depending on the core description.
I would suspect, if they got into sa pile at the bottom, the; e would be much less than currently.
Q If the pellets were to slump to the bottom enmasse, could there be a flow problem created, which would impede or present sufficient boration of the pellets?
k I don't know if I am being clear.
Do you u.7derstand the question?
ll l
(.
i A
Yes.
l 4
l
36 Well, as long as the moderator -- that is that 3,000 parts per million.
If you did have an alter-geometry, and most geometries would be less reactive from a criticality standpoint than the one the actual fuel. rods are designed in, it is my belief, based on the ana)ysis that was done, that the core would remain suberitical in all types of consideration, if we kept the 3,000 PPM.
Whether there is flow there or not, I don't know how you would extract the boron out of the water, because ez; the solubility is very high at these temperatures.
If you
(~.; g can somehow filter it out, then I guess you can hypothetize 4.
E some sort of recriticality situation.
Eao Q
What you are saying, so long as the pile of material is surrounded by boreted solution, it is unnecessary to have flow of barated mat'erial through the pile should there be a slump?
A What I said, as long as the water that is through the system has the boron in it at that level, whether there is a slump or not, that the core will remain suberitical.
.(
If somehow you could assume that the water inside the slumped mass became unborated, then I would hypothesi e or you could achieve scme condition, perhaps recriticality.
But again, I don't know how you extract the boren out of the water.
v
'"-v
-ww'9 w
37 Q
But in the event of a slump, would you still have adequate flow to insure that the material in the slu=p was adequately borated?
A Whatever is in there, is in there.
WF.ather you have flow through or not.
Whatever is in there is borated water.
If you could tell me how the water in there becomes unborated, than I could go on further with your suppositio[.
d Q
Let me ask it this way:
If there was a slump, it czp would not prevent flow of berated coolant?
In other words, eo El there would continue to be borated coolant flow through the J
g slumped material?
3 o
A We have to separate S' low from boron.
Now, the flow through the core right now is about at o
i arateofabout[footaminute.
It takes about a minute for the water-to gora foot; That?.is a pretty low flow.
If you slump down the core, I am sure that you would impede the flow even more.
So you could stop the flow in the core, perhaps, and the water that resides in the core is still
.(,
there, and is still borated, and that water which exists there would, in my view, maintain the core suberitical.
Q Is it possible that the point could be reached with regard to the borated coolant, that you would begin to get
38 W
p keipitate?
p A
I believe at these temperatures that the p/pcipitate would occur in something like 7-to 8,000 parts per million.
We have, in recognition, however, that boron sometimes nV ppycipitates when you don't expect it to, we have made an effort to try to hold the boron level at the 3,000 parts per million, rather than let it go higher and higher, because of a potential problem with restricting core flow as well as g
restricting.our sample' lines that we take our pressure c2; measurements from, and our core coolant samples from.
C' So, as I indicated before, there were times when a
~,
<g we put low boration water in to try to maintain it at 3,000 B
d parts per million, because in the process of ?evaporationi-we u
were concentraing some boron.
Q Eave you had any indication of boron percipitate?
A' We have, in some cases, have low flow through "the sample lines, which may be because of our low pressure and the long length of the sample lines, or it may be because lib of boron o kcipitate in the sample lines.
It is not really i
.(
clear.
I don't think we have any direct evidence of line i.
clogging at this point in time, or something like that, which would indicate boren p cipitate.
It is difficult - to be m.
39 certain that we don't have it somewhere.
Q If you were to discovery notably more boron Ak pftcipitate, what would be the procedure?
I think if we discovered notable amounts of boren i
A phfcipitateorthoughtwewerehavingproblemsofthatnature, we would do two things, or I would suggest doing two things:
One, closing down on the heat rejection in the steam generator, so we raise the average temperature level of the water so the baron becomes more soluble in it; and perhaps we j*
Ak E
would inject, if we thought we were getting a pptcipitate in 5
(;,
the recritical ty,we would inject a higher concentration of i
o
')
E boric acid.
We could operate the core at a much higher e2
~
3 temperature than it is now, just by closing out hest rejection.
8 I am not sure we can get real hot, because basically the heat generation is so low now.
you..have a loss, a systems loss-- but'.I am sure we can get up 100 degrees or 200 degrees.
Q Would I be correct in assuming the plant is now in a condition that can be referred to as solid?
k A
That is correct.
- 's Q
Why was that done?
l A
The plant was made solid for two reasons:
- One, l,
the monitoring of leakage out of the primary system is done k
40 by trying to balance -- not balance, but understand where the level in the pressurizer is., and the level in the makeup tank.
Now, since the pressurizer level instrumentation is no longer available, it was felt that it was important to be sure that the makeup could be at all times known, how much leakage out of the primary system, through valves and pumps, there is leakage.
The way you have a good handle on that, to make the primary system solid, except at one point, the makeup tank, where you have a good level measurement.
So if you o
j know -- if you keep the system solid, from that makeup tank, E
([
if you are starting to leak faster than you were, we would
' '.. e enew we are losing two, four-tenths of a gallon per minute.
m!
2.
If something should happen, if it increases, we 8
fould know it quickly, because we know the makeup tank level.
The other, reason that we felt it was good to go Bolid is that the operators did not feel ccmfortable operating ith a gas space above the liquid space, because they didn't w
I now where the pressurizer level was.
They were uncomfortable perating that way.
They felt good with operating at. a solid c
i
- (
level.
Q Did they feel pressurizer level indication was an t
mreliable indicator?
A The reason we went into natural circulation when we
41 did, was because the last pressurizer level instrument showed signs of becoming unreliable.
That was the point when we went in and deliberately switched frem coolant pump and went into natural circulation.
And that last instrument has long last died.
Q What type of instrumentation to you presently have at the plant?
A The instruments that we presently have on the plant 6
are pressure instrumentation and temperature instrumentation.
ue j
We have a number of in-core thermocouples,which are still
(,
=!
reading reliably.
We have pressurizer temperature instrumentatic m
l and reactor coolant inlet and outlet instrumentation.
We And the pressure, as I said, the pressure g
have that.
u instruments, which were added after the accident.
And they are, basically, outside in the auxiliary, building, so they are not expected to fail.
l There eis an adequate mnount of instrumentation still existing.
As a matterrof fact, theoretically, we could at this point in time, if worse got to worse, we could only l.-
i
'(
operata with our-in-core thermocouples.
Q If you were to have the plant go criuical again, L
what system do you have available to you to control that at the present time?
47 only the addition of borated water, and increasing A
the temperature of the system.
Could you give some kind of an estimate as to the Q
likelihood of such an event, of the plant going critical again at this time?
A Well, my own opinion is that.it is a very low probability because, I believe, that we can maintain the C
3,00 PPM boren. And I think the extra safety factor that we A
.Co have in there is twofold: One, if the core configuration 2
5 changes to a more densified core and less moderation, I think S
W
.)
E that tends to some criticality; and secondly, it is my 4
5 g
opinion that particularly at the bottom of the core probably the control rods are there in some shape, in some form.
I think that also exists.
Q Is there any present indication that there has been l
actual fuel melting?
A ell, I think, as I said before, our primary coolant samples have sh:wn very low amounts of transuranics, W.
in the order of a few parts per_si'lirn.
I am not a reactor lk l
systems che istr., but people that I talked to would say m
l those valves.would be indicative of a very low or non-existing
' 'q melting of the fuel, and would be indicative, since there has been much cladding, fail &re of particulation and dusting of I
1 43 pellets.
..i Q
You mentioned earlier that one of your concerns in the present management of the situaticiis what to do with waste material.
Are you including in that the water that has spilled into the containment building?
A Yes.
e 4:e Q
Has there been some decision as to what is going to d
be done with that waste?
C l
A As yet, the licensee has not*made his plans or
(
8 A.
Proposals known to the Commission on what he is going to do s
a with that waste.
E o
Q Is that primarily the licensee's responsibility?
u A
Yes, it is.
Q Has there been some discussion within the NRC as to what type of proposal would be approved?
Is that unclear?
I A
Yes.
Q Let me ask it this way:
It would be correct ~to assume, would it not, that this waste material would have to be transported frem the site to some dump site?
(
A As solid material, yes; not as liquid however.
Q The determination has already been made that it
44 would not be transported in a liquid state?
A cur regulations would not allow that.
Q In what state would it be transported?
A
'Only in the solid state.
Q How would this material be converted. into a solid state?
A It can be converted. in one of two ways:
One, the contaminated water could be put through an evaporator, which would give you distilled water out one end, simply 8
g speaking,-and a concentrated liqueur of high." radioactive 9conten E
t
(
{
at the bottom of the evaporator.
This material could be put i
w in solid mat::tx, cement, for example, and put in a solid 5
f form that way.
8 Another way of handling it, and the way a current facility has been built at the site to handle the auxiliary building vaste, was to put that water through a system of
\\
filters and demineralizer, which would capture the radioactive material on the filter substance or the resins of the domineralizer, which would then be dewatered by vacuum
{
nnd either shipped in that dry form or further solidified ay putting them in cement, or something like that.
l Again, the water that is the end product of either l
l process would have to be at a level of radioactivity such
45 t
that it could be disposed of in a way that is yet to be l'
determined.
The reason it is yet to be determined is because the NP.C is currently being sued for various things having to do with the water disposal, and we are taking a:.htop by step approach in trying to meet the neede Of the decontamination of the facility.
So we are doing an environmental and safety assessment of cleaning up the water, and then make an y
assessment what to do with the clean water.
It would have to o
j meet ours and EPA's requirements when it is cleaned up.
f a
h.
The local citizens are very adamant not having it a
4 3
put in the Susquehanna no matter how clean it is.
8 Q
Is that one of the possible alternatives, to clean v
it up and put it in the Susquehanna River?
A If there hadn't been an accident, that water would normally be in the Susquehanna at the type of level that we are going to make them clean it up anyway.
But because of the concern'and the suits and so on, the, licensee is going to have to look at alternative ways of getting rid of that
.b clean water -- sell it to other facilities, truck it away i
and dump it in the ocean, whatever.
Q Earlier you referred to two forms in which the
~.
radioactive waste could take prior to transporting it to a
46 dump site.
You referred to using a vacuum to dewaterize the wasta.
Would that produce a powder,o clay-like material, l
or a liquid waste?
A It would produce a sort of sand-like material resin, which are dry and would pour out on the table, but not flow, like a liquid.
And the radioactive materials are not easily detached from that just by pouring it out or opening up 6
the container that they are in.
They are faily well captured oz
~
by that.
('-
g Q
So by dewaterized, do you mean it would be dry?'
g A
It would be dry, yes.
And the reason for that, you 3
would not want to ship the material if it was in liquid form, o
because if there was some sort of accident or leak.you wouldn't want it going out in the transportation process or the burial process.
Q The other form that you referred to would produce-a radioactive liqueur, and that obviously would be a liquid waste.
b-A But that, as I indicated, would have to be solidified by mixing it with cement or something for the shipment.
Either way, whatever way it is shipped, would have to be'in
~
~'
a solid, liquid-free form.
That is a very strict requirement.
47 Q
Are either of these two forms safer in terms of the release of radioactivity into the environment during transportation?
A I don't think there is any significant degree between them.
This material would have to be shipped, in addition to being in solid form, would have to be shipped in a type "B" cast, which means it would be in a high integrity cast that would be tested to survive significant accidents, y
fires, things like that, that might occur during the o
j transportation route.
r 8
So, I suppose, if you dilluted the materiil'in many Q.
m<
g tons of concrete and shipped it that way, there are some Eg additional margins of safety, but it is not easy to identify.
o Q
Is one of these methods of shipment-substantially less expensive than the other?
A Well, I think the more you have to mix the resin material with additional matrix, let's say cement, the more volume you create, so the larger the shipments have to be.
The estimate I gave to the Commission yesterday or the day before was that solidification of the resins would likely double, it is our estimate, the amount of the shipment.
l Q
What magnitude are we talking about?
How many truck leads are we talking about?
ss l
[
l
e, e
e 48 A
For the water in the auxiliary building now, which is roughly 300,000 gallons, we would anticipate 50 to 100 truck loads or double that, if it was additionally solidified, if you will.
MR. HELFMAN:
Let's go off the record.
(Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.
MR. HELFMAN:
Back on the record.
BS MR. HELFMAN:
6 Q
There are a couple of additional questions.
The u
e E
first one is this:
Considering the borated water, could the r
5
[.
'Og reactorts fuel take any configuration, either by itself or a
j as a result of recover operations, that could conceivable ao g
again become critical?
u A
As I indicated, to the best of my knowledge, the core configuration was'.lookedaatlin their most critical state, and the value of boron that would be necessary to maintain suberiticality was established for that state, without control rods.
Q And the configuratiers that were considered were the present configuration and a slump?
- x..
A No, the configurations considered were putting the rods at a more optimum spacing from a reactivity standpoint, and presuming that the slump could not achieve anything more
49 optimum, than the optimum spacing that you could define from DI
~
~'
uJie
__. w y.
..w...
MR. HELFMAN:
Off the record.
(Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.)
MR. HELFMAN:
Back on the record.
Mr. Chopko, from the Office of General Counsel of NRC, do you have any additional questions.
MR. CHOPKO:
I would like to ask one question, noting, for the record, that although I am from the
,ou g
Office of General Counsel, I am designated counsel for Mr. Vollmer.
m.,
g CROSS EXAMINATION E2g 37 MR. CHOPKO:
o u
O Mr. Vollmer, at one point early on in direct examination you were asked if Met-Ed did not comply with a regulatory guide concerning keeping its blueprints and other plans for the TMI plant in actual conformance with what was Andyounotedthatthat:.wasaviolationoftherejf there.
guide; is that correct?
A I believe these were the words.
Q Firstofall,isared de a requirement on a g
licensee?
(
A A red guide is not a regulation; it is a regulatory
50 practice or a regulatory good practice, which the licensee attests that he will comply with when he goes through the licensing process.
Since I don't have direct knowledge if he has attested to the specifics of this regulatory guide, or if he has suggested to the staff some other way of meeting that requirement that wasn't precisely in the regulatory guide, each way would be acceptable.
8 The word " violation" was not the correct legal l
ez; terminology to use, but I think if the licensee had adopted m
b that guide in substance or in principal, he should have z
E available to plant personnel at least one copy which represents E
o the plant system and the electrical systems in there current a
configuration.
O So they were not, for want of a better term, in compliance with the guidance in this particular regulatory guide?
A That would be my judgment.
l t
Q I just wanted to make that one point clear.
Thank 3
you.
MR. EELFMAN:
No additional questions.
That concludes the deposition.
I should inform you that it is our practice to adjourn the deposition-rather than
l 51 If there is reason to conuinue it to a future terminate it.
date, the present deposition would be simply continued.
THE WITNESS:
Fine.
MR. HELFMAN:
That concludes the deposition to date.
(Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m.,
the deposition of A Djea Asso RICHARD H. VOLLMER was a ourned.)
du O2 5C
~
2 e
E au l
l 1
i l
.s I
b r
1 1
O
-- -~
)
CERTIFICATE I certify that I have read this transcript and corrected any errors in the transcription that I have been able to identify, except for unimportant' punctuation errors.
l ?f A/hy.
WAAf Date:
/
(R1 chard H. Voilmer)
O Ir o
e
-E w
-~