ML19308C594
| ML19308C594 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/11/1979 |
| From: | Folsom F, Fred Miller METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280623 | |
| Download: ML19308C594 (61) | |
Text
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~ N U CLE AR REG U L ATO RY COMMI'SSIO N
'I
[O; lN THE MATTER OF:
THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL DEPOSITION DEPOSITION OF:
FREDERICK.R. MILLER 10 Place - Bethesda, Maryland Pages 1 - 60 Date -
11 October 1979 y,
a r.i. phon.:
(202)347 3700 4
ACE -FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
. OfficialReporters O
444 North Capitol Stree 1 280 Washington, O/,20001
- e NATIONWIDE COVERAGE. DAILY e
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D' o
.: MADELON UNITED-STATES OF. AMERICA-
" NUCLEAR. REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
_ +.
-- ^ ;
- f 4
u-In:the matter'.of:
IS
- THREE MILE ISLAND-P C M. DEPOSITION 6
- +
8 DEPOSITION OF:
FREDERICK-R. MILLER 9
Room 405 10 Arlington Road Building-6935 Arlington Road ji Bethesda, Maryland 11 October 1979 1:30 p.m.
13
--BEFORE:
jg FRED G. FOLSOM, ESQ.
j 15 ESQ.
FRED HEBDON, MTIAS F. TRAVIESO-DIAZ,-ESQ'.
16 C. RANDOLPH LIGHT, ESQ.
17 18
. li C.
20 21 1
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24 4.inon....w.
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'E R" E 1 E_ E.1 @,.
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. Witness Examination 1
.u)
-Frederick?R. Miller -
3
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Insert number'one follows page.3..
7-Ir. sert number two follows page 21
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8 9
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'12 13
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-14 15 16 17 18' 19 p l
20 i 21 22 l-23 24 A
el Reporters, Inc.
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- P, R, O, C, E_ E,. D, I_ N_ G_ S_ ;
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'2 MR.. [HEBDON :
Would(you' raise your right hand,
.please?!
f)I l4
.y Whereupon, 5
FREDERICK-R. MILLER-
'6 was7 called as a witness,.and, having'_been first: duly sworn, 7
was' examined'and testified as follows:
8 EXAMINATION BY -MR' HEBDON:
O Would1you'please state-your full name-for the.
11
- record?
12 A
Frederick R. Miller.
13 Q
Okay.
- {^y
-/
ja MR. HEBDON:. -For the. record,;I.have here a letter 15 to Mr.. Miller? dated October 5,11979, from Mitchell Rogovin,
~
- 16 director of the NRC TMI Special Inquiry Group.
17 BY MR. HEBDON:-
-18 Q
Have'you read this document in full?
19,
l A
Yes.
20 MR. HEBDON:
I'd like to'have this document
-included in thefrecord-as Insert one.
('] -
-(The document referred to follows:)
w 23 24
- A 3 deporters,'Inc.
25 s
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- October 5,.1979
- (A.
)
._ in G.eply Refer to:'
iiTFTM 791005-02
.O
- Mr. Fred '!! iller -
U toledo' Edison Co.
Edison Plaza
~
300 Madison Avenue Toledo.1 Ohio _43652
Dear Mr. Miller:
. I an writing to confim that:your deposition under oath in connection with the ~ accident at Three !!ile ' Island is scheduled for October 11, 1979'at 1:30 p.m.uin the Arlington. Road offices. This vill also confirm my request for-
-you-to have your. resume and any documents'in your possession or control regarding THI-2,-the accident _or. precursor events which you have reason to ~
believe may not be_in official MRC files, including any diary or personal vorking file.-
~
The deposition vill be conducted by.nembers of the liRC's Special Inquiry Group on Three "ile Island. -This. Croup-is being directed independently'of the3",C by' the' lav firm of Rogovin, Stern -and Hure.
It: includes both "RC personnelluho have-been detailed to.the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and at torneys./ Through a delegation of authority fron the NRC under
-- [,~ )
- Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act o.
954, as amended, the Special fInquiry Gtoup.has a broad' mandate-to inquire'into the causes of the accident at Three Mile Island, to identify major proble= areas and to make reco=menda-tions for change. At the' conclusion of its investigation, the Group will
)
issue a detalled public report setting forth its findings and reco:cendations.
Unless you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in the depo-sition is voluntary and there vill be~ no effect on you if you ~ decline to answer sone or all'of the questions asked you. However, the Special Inquiry
)
has;been given the' power. to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under i
~
cath,;or to appear'and produce documents, or both, at any designated place.
Any; person deposed may have en attorney present or any other person he vishes accccpany him.at the deposition as his representative. You should realize
- that.uhile we vill try to respect any requests for confidentiality in connec-tion with the publication of our report, we can make no guarantees. Names of J vitnesses and the information they provide may eventually become public,
_ nasmuch as the. entire record of'the Special Inquiry Group's investigation,
F vill be made available'to the NRC for whatever uses-it may deem appropriate.1
- Initime, this informaticn may be made available to the public voluntarily, or 4' ' ^j -
becone available to:the-public through the Freedom of-Infornation Act.
.Morcover, other departments and agencies of governnent may request access to
~
this information pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974.
The information may q
A
~ also be nade availabic in. whole 'or in part to connittees or subcon=1ttees of
-I the U.S. Congress.
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,_7 (lire; Fred Miller?
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'Octob r 5, 1979-f.
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l If!you~have testified previously with respect'to the Three M11cLIsland acel-
-dent,-it would be-useful if you could review any transcripts of,your previous-i
. statement (s) prior to the deposition.
f~y
' N-,/
Thanh-you-for your cooperation.
Cincerely, Mitchell Roaovin, Director URC/TMI Special' Inquiry Group
~
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lbl BY MR.-HEBDON:-
2' O
Do you understand the information set.forth in l'%
3
~(_)
this' letter, including the general nature of the NRC TMI 4
Special Inquiry,.your right to-have an' attorney present here 5
.today as your representative, and the fact that-the informa-6 tion you provide.here may eventually become public?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
Are you represented by counsel here today?
9 A
Yes.
10 MR. HEBDON:
Would you identify yourself, please?
.11 MR. TRAVIESO-DIAZ:
My name is Matias F.
12 Travieso-Diaz, and I'm counsel for Toledo Edison Company.
-.('3/
13 MR. LIGHT:
My name is Randy Light and I also am 14 counsel for Toledo Edison Company today.
15 BY MR. HEBDON:
16 Q
You should be aware that the testimony you give-17 has the same force and effect as if you were testifying in a 18 court of law.-
My questions and your responses are being taken
.19 down'and they will,later be transcribed.
20 You will be given the opportunity to look at that 21
. r'3, transcript and-make changes as you deem necessary.
However
\\/
to'the extent that your subsequent changes are significant,
'23 j'N-these changes may be viewed as affecting your credibility.
So A.l
- 24 Please be.as complete'and accurate as you can in responding l Ae.-r.o r. n. porters, inc.
25 toimyLquestions now.
a r
sed 5
[$v $2 If you at anyJpoint during the deposition do not d
L 2
understand a question, please feel freeLto stop and1we.will' 7 s-
- 'v_)
.try to clarify.the question for you.
~
-4 Do'you have any questions.before we. proceed?.
i~
5
- No.
A-6 k
.O ay.
Q
~
What'is your current position?
~8 A~
I am plant nuclear systems ~ engineer for.the Toledo 9
cEdison Company.. This position ~is'in=the' Power Engineering
~
~
10
~ Division.
11 Q
Okay.
12 For whom do you work?
13 A
I work for Gene Novak, the director of the Power 14 Engineering Division.
15 Q-What was your position in September of.19777
~16 A
The same.
'17
-Q The same.-
I8 Would you describe your. educational background?
19.
As
~Im a graduate electrical engineer of 1949 from 20 the-University..of' Toledo.
( --
-21
- Q
.And;you'~have a B.S. degree, is that correct?
-22 h
'A Yes,..a-Bachelor of Science degree.
- . 23 3
G
- Q.
And.do.you have any advanced degrees?
A/
24'
'/
~
A:
No.
h F M R e,W.
'25 JQb Okay'..
6 llhpb'3 Would you describe your employment history, briefly describe it,'inclu' ding positions that you've held at Toledo
' f~;x,)..
- 3 Edison?
.A' I started with' Toledo Edison in 1949.
I've. worked f
~5 in the substation engineering, administrative systems.' In 6
fl968 I started in our Power _ Engineering as nuclear fuels 7
cagineer.
8 In I believe 1976 I began as plant nuclear systems
'9 engineer.
10
.Q Approximately how many people work for you?
11 A
Five.
12 Q
Five?
b"N -
13 A
Yes.
14 Q
Okay.
l I'd like to ask you.some questions concerning an incident that occurred at. Davis-Besse on September 24th, 1977.
17 And I'm particularly interested in your perceptions and under-l 18 standing of that. incident prior to the accident at TMI.
19 Specifically, prior to March 28, 1979, what 0
knowlbdge.did you have concerning an incident that occurred 21 at Davis-Besse on September 24th,-19777
[)i
'22 A
I was made aware of it on September 24th,
'77, 223 t'l zwhen--it occurred.
ov Q-Could you. describe your invC vement with that inci-
- Aco-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 dent?
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.A When it was reported we had the incident, it was 2
my job to -- along with many other people -- to'try to' analyze 7 ')
3
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it to determine what had happened in the event.
One of my 4
responsibilities was the design of the auxiliary feedwater 5
system at Davis-Besse and the safety features actuation systems.
6 And one of the problems was to determine if it had 7
operated properly and whether or not it'had performed properly, 8
both the safety features actuation system and the auxiliary 9
feedwater system.
10 Q
How did you initially become aware of the incident?
11 A
I can't remember exactly.
It was either a report 12
(^/}
to Gene Novak or the project engineer, and he notified me of it.
s_
13 Q
Okay.
14 And as I understand it, then, it was normal for 15 you to be informed of such an incident?
16 A
Very normal.
17 Q
_Okay.
18 Now you mentioned that you became involved with'the 19 incident on the day that it occurred, Were you in the control 20 room during the incident?
21 A
No.
(')
%j Q
Okay.
(~';
Now the incident occurred, as I understand it,
- 24
~
4.p m n n.n, ine, fairly late on a Saturday. night.
Now were you involved with 25
.it that_ evening, Lor was it later, on Sunday or some time Monday s.
8' jl)pb5 before you actually started working.on it?
2 A
I was called in, I believe, the following day to f'x 3
... (_)
actually get involved with the review of what had happenad.
4 Q
Okay.
5 So it was fairly shortly after the incident occurred?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
Okay.
Would you describe to us what sort of an analysis
^
9 you performed, what did you do, who did you talk to?
10 A
The first thing that my people did was to review I
11 the computer print-outs, and I personally was involved in that, 12 to try to determine the sequence of events'and what initiated r~
(_N) 13 1
the entire event.
And. we went tnrough the log from the 14 ccmputer that is the event recorder, that describes everything 15 that happens each second.
We went through the sequence of 16 events recorder.
We went through our reactimeter data, which 17 fortunately was running and we had detailed analog data 18 recorded, and various recorder charts that were taken during 19 i
the day.
20 Q
Did you talk to any of the operators?
l 21
.r~g A
I did not personally talk to the operators,-although
-(_/
i 22 therelwere operators in the room when we_were reviewing what.
f~y had happened during the-event.
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24 O
_But neither you nor none of the people in your
- A.r.o.rw n.pon.n, Inc.
group specifically interviewed'the operators to see what they
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_saw,:what problems they had, what they~ understood, that' sort
- ofLthing?-
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,No,.I_' don't believe_that any of.my people did.that.
- 4 Would'it have been normal' practice to interview
'O
- operators after Jan ' incident 'such as -this?
'6 A.
Normally :the people -_ wh'o. would be talking..to the; 7
operators interviewing ^them would have been'the station-st'aff,
^8 and'I-s' ort of get my_:information from;those people.
.Q' Did you talk with any of those peopl'e?
10 A.
.Oh,.yes,'a lot of the station-staff people,_ manage-i?
11 ment people at the station.
12 0
Did they indicate.to you that they.had, talked to 13 any of the operators?
14 A
Oh, yes.
15 Q
So they indicated to you-that they had interviewed 16 the_ operators to learn whatever it was that they knew of the incident?
~
18 A
Yes.
T 19 Q
When you refer :to' the station staf f, would Terry 20
~
Murray have been one of the. people that:you talked to?
~
~
21 N
A-Lyes.
- Q 22
'Q'-
Okay.
~
23 f
'Because as ILunderstand it, he was in'the' control 3
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- g m m n e w ix.
Lroomiduring the' incident.
125
.MR. FOLSOM: ;_Which. brings me to:my-question ~.
L. l
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10 l
hb7' BY MR..FOLSOM:
~2 0-Could you give me-just a little' picture of,what the
/',N'( 1-station staff'is. comprised of?
3 4
A' There is ; a group of ' people that - do the ' technical 5
analysis of the station's operation.
There is the operations 6
engineer -- Terry Murray himself.-- instrument and. control group:at'the1 plant that were interested, and they.were talking 8
to the operators.
9 Another person that was.in the meeting was a man
' 10 you talked to yesterday, Mike Deriban.
He was considered 11 part of the: station staff except he was a foreman at the time.
12 And I talked to Mike about what had happened.
BY MR. HEBDON:
0 14 Q
So you did' talk to Mr. Dariban in some detail 15 l
about the accident?
16 A
Yes.
17
-That's fine.
Thank you.
MR..FOLSOM:
18 BY MR. -HEBDON:
19 Q-Did-you talk with or meet with any representatives
~20
~
of B&W7 p
' 21 A
Yes.
e+ % ).
~Do;you recall who you talked to?
Q-l!3 V^%
A-Fred Faist was the man who was on the site at:the
~
~
24
' ~ -
f Ace-Federes neoorters, Inc.
1 time.
25
~ Do.you, recall what concerns he raised?
- Q-
~.
11 I
hb8 -;
A
.I don't believe I can remember specific ones that 2
he raised 'at this ' time.-
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~ 3 Q
Okay.-
4 Did you talk with or meet with any representatives of the NRC7 0
A I can't' remember ^whether Tom Tambling, our site 7
~ inspector, was there during~the initial meetings we had on 8
this or not.
Q Okay.
10 Do you recall any concerns that he raised at any 11 time during the. events following the inciaent?
12 A
.Yes, there were concerns raised by Tom and other
- 13 people after'the accident.
14 Q
'Okay.
15 Could you describe what you understood those 16 concerns to be?
17 A'
Well,~let's see.
We had found a number of problems
- 18 and;they came up with some other things that they were concern-19 ed about.
One was whether or not we shut off the high pressure 20 injection pumps:prpperly --
~fS
- 21 Q
Excuse me,.what do you mean by " properly"?
22 A
- Whether or not our operators were following pro-23
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cedures and whether or not the procedures were correct.
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- Aes Federal Reporters, Inc.
- 25 A-That concern didn't come-up in the-first couple of R.
12 hb9'
~ days; - that 'came out 'of later: investigatior.s.
2 Q
A couple ~of days later or. weeks later?
I'~)x 3
A-It'would be weeks later, I.think.
m 4
Q Okay.
5 What other-concerns do you recall?
6 A
Well, they.had'the same concerns we did.
We had
~
7 a-failure of one auxiliary feed pump, why the PORV stuck open, 8
what caused the whole event?
There was a concern that came up 9
much later on the clearing of high pressure injection alarms, 10 the timing between the clearing of alarms on one line, on one 11 pump.
12 O
ion one injection path?
13 A
Yes, from one of the pumps..There are two parallel 14 paths-from one pump, and-there was a time difference between 15 the-clearing of alarms on that one path.
16 Q
And you said you felt'that that particular concern was raised much later?
18
~
A-It didn't register with me as a concern at that
~ 19 time.- We were more concerned with the three principles.
They 20 may have'-brought it up, but it just didn't register with me as 21 7~3 being a concern on their part at that time.
.L)
-22 O
Do you-recall when it did register with you as a 23
[}
-concern?
b
,34 A
Not exactly.
But it~was maybe a month after the p.F m n e i g
.25 event when 1they started-asking questions about things that we
[
13 b10-I didn't. consider ~too seriour.
2
~
JDo you recall'any other. concerns.that were--raised L l
Q
.~Q],~
.by'anyone?-
3
.4 A
Not now.
5
~
Okay.
.Q 6
BY MR. FOLSOM:
7.
.Q You said that you made a particular effort to 8
analyze the.' initiating. event for this episode. -What'was your 9
' conclusion?
10 A-The initiating event _was a failure of a circuit
'II
.b'oard in what we call our steam and feedwater rupture control:
12 7
system.
It has'an acronym of'SFRCS.
13 This caused a half-trip'of one of the channels of Id this'sys*
- which isolated ~one of the start-up control valves
.IS
~on one of the steam generators.
This caused a-loss of feed-
~
,16
. water becaiuse' we' were at a very low power _ level, nine percent 17 power:at~the time.
18
- When weflost feedwater to that steam generator 19
, eventually-we got. low level trip, a full' trip of the SFRCS, 20
.and!this resul'ted-in demand.for auxiliary feedwater to start.-
2I But.the_ initiating event we're very certain was a L.
_22 failure Of-a printed.1 circuit board in our SFRCS system.
23
-Q Was this aLfailure'due to' human error-or-mechanical-r 4
AJ --
24 imperfection? -
~
- Ac.Fesersi n porters. Inc.
'25' g:
..Well,?I.yguess'I would call it electric component in
a
'I, 4
14 bil.
th'e printed ~ circuit board that failed; so it's not a human-2 error.
- A-
'3 g,r Q
Yes,. printed circuit being-something that's fixed --
.4
-A That's right.
5
-Q And'it's'either all-error-or something missing?
'6 A
Squipment, it was equipment' failure.-
7 Q
Okay.
8 BY MR. HEBDON:
9 Q
Okay.. Now you mentioned that one of the concerns
'10 was associated with this issue of whether the operator secured 11 1 high pressure injection correctly.
12 Do you recall who raised that concern?
13 A
The-first person.that I knew of that raised it that 14 I talked to was a man from Region III by the name of John 15 Streeter.
16 O
Okay..
17 Do you recall discussing'that issue with a Mr.
.18 James Cresswell of Region III?
19 A'
Yes.
20 Q:
Okay.
21
("]
Would-you describe that di.scussion?
'22 A
John:Streeter.is the man that I remember discussing 723 f("'S tit-with the most.
.The' question came~up, and we had the:same V
wpm no, jm
. question, taking the:circumstancesLthat re_had, power 425 engineering questions,:whetherJor not we.should have shut off
15
(
Ib12 high' pressure-injection-or-not.. We realized that the operator-3 d'd what his procedures told him, but we began to question the i
~
procedures when we.saw what had happened.
~4 Davis-Besse is'different from other B&W plants
'S in that-our high' pressure injection pumps'have a low head.
6
'Their shut-off head is about 1680 pounds compared to others that are-about-3000' pounds.
And we began to realize that 8
there's.really no-need for the operator to shut off high 9
pressure injection because he can't overpressurize the reactor.
10 coolant system with our pumps.
~ 11 But our proceduresLwere prepared generically.
A 12
[}
draft procedure was prepared generically by B&W and our actual 13 operating procedures used the draft procedures prepared by B&W.
. 14 But when we began to think about the thing after this event, 15 we just said 'Why do we turn.the pumps off'.
And Mr. Streeter l
16 l
and Mr. Cresswell both questioned us as to why we turn them 17 off, and we said 'We really don't see any point in turing them 18 off'.
19 Q
Do you recall if you had identified the concern j
'20 I
withi'n the Toledo Edison organization before it was discussed 21
{
with yob by Mr. Streeter or Mr. Cresswell?
22 i
A I,think within Power Engineering we discussed it, i
23 i
LWe hadn't talked with the site about it at that time I don't l
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214 l
believe.
AwFWwd Reorurs, W.
- 25 Do you recall when.you talked with.Mr. Streeter and i
Q.
i J
il lmm m
16 llhpbl3'
- Mr. Cresswell, did it appear to you that they.had also develop-2 ed'that particular concern on their own?
~
~
A
-I believe they had.
4
.Q
.So.then would it be fair to say that your people
-5 working independently and Mr. Cresswell and Mr. Streeter work-6 ing separately developed'that same concern without. initially 7
talking with each:other, and then later realized that you each 8
shared that concern?
9 A
I think that's a fair assessment.
10 Q
Okay.
11 Now what happened as far as this consideration of 12
{
changing the procedure?
13 A
After we had talked with Mr. Cresswell and Mr.
14 Streeter both about the subject, we recommended to our site 15 that'they not' shut the HPI pumps off.
j Q
Okay.
17 WhenLyou say you recommended that to the site, 18 what sort of a format or forum would that recommendation have 19' u
.been in?.
20
-A I can't remember right now.
I may have it in_my 1
21 files;.aftelephone call or a memorandum, but I can't recall 22 exactly what format it.would.be.
23
. ('i 0-
'Could you check your files when you-get back and 24 f Ace. Federal Reporters, Inc.
see if you do have any memorandum or. notes on a phone call 25 that might: indicate.when and what you recommended?
i a
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'17 l
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- I have-the file here with me.-
j A~-
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- 2
!Okay.
J~
3 D
Could you;take-a: moment now-andLcheck it,'if y'ou 4
. f
~would?'
5 MR.-lFOLSOM:-. Let's go'off.the record.
~
'6 l(Discussion-off the record.)-
MR. HEBDON:'
Ok'ay, let'k goback on theLrecord.
,i
.8 BY MR. HEBDON:
)
~9 Q
.You've been looking'through your files, and-we have here 'a copy of -a form that's' erititled The Toledo Edison 11
~
i' Company, Telephone Call Documentation, and the originator is 12
. John Streeter, and the called made to'is Terry Murray.
- And,
.~
13 1et's:see,-the date is September. 13, 1978.
'14
.Could you describe your' understanding of what'.this
< -15 phoneicall was all-about?
~16
.A Well,-previous to this -- and I can't remember
- 7 n
h'ow.much previous'-- but John and I had been talking about this and we:had come to the conclusion that we felc that the pumps 19
.should have.been left on in.that event.
20 L
.Q-Okay.
21 Now let'me-just'back up a little bit.
When you 22
~
Jsay:thatLyou'had previously.been talking.to Mr. Streeter --
~
~
~23 D
okay, I'm:;sorry; never mind..
t
! ; O',
i 1
-24
~
iGolahead..
j bFm neh
- 25
'.All:right.
JA;
'x e.
18 llpbl5-
-We had in Power Engineering _had alsoltalked to-2
- Terry about. leaving the pumps.on and this document here is p)-
documentation 1of,a phone' call from Mr. John Streeter to Terry 3
A 4
MurrayLdiscussing the sane subject.
S Q:
Okay.
6 Now about the -fourth or fif th line down here there
~
7' is a comment that "My reply" -- and "My" would have referred to Mr. Murray'since he's'the one who prepared this.
9 "My reply toLJohn to the first question 10 was that I felt that the action taken during 11 the event was proper and correct."
12 Now had you discussed that particular aspect of it
) g
'is with him?
14 A
At the' time that the operator did this, the 1S operator did what he was told.to do, and Terry felt the u
16 operator did what was-the proper and correct thing to do, to d
17 cturn the pumps off when the pressurizer level started going up is in--the pressurizer.
But'as a result of our analysis and B&W's 19
\\
analysis as to what was really happening, we began to realize j
20 their procedures were not correct.
21
~
fy Q:
.Why did-you feel.the procedure was not correct?
- .(f 22 A-Because the procedure told the operator to turn.the 23 i
- l('N
,. pumps off without looking1at whether or not the reactor coolant d
$24 h Ace-F.e.r.: ri. port.rs. ne. system was.subcooled.or not.-
~
. 2S Okay.
~
.<~
d I
19
/
'~' b l 6 1
BY MR'. FOLSOM:
- u; 2
+
. hen you say "their procedures", you mean'the plant W
0
. ~'T 3
-(g :
-procedures?
c..
4 A
The plant's procedures at the ' timen told' the
'O
-operator 'if.your temperatures are' going up and your pressurizer 6
level is going up. and the HPI is running, turn the HPI off'.
I
~
Now these procedures were formulated perhaps with
-Q 8
the suggestions from B&W, but by Toledo Edison, is that correct?
9 A.
The-procedures were written by Toledo Edison 0
Company.specifically for our equipment, but they were-based 11
.upon draft procedures prepared by B&W.
12 Q
Okay.
Thank you.
MR. HEBDON:
Okay..
BY-MR. HEBDON:
15
'O Now I'm trying to get some time frames straight in 16 my mind here.
4'
'7 Had you talked with anyone concerning the possibil-18 ity of changing the procedure-before Mr. Streeter or Mr.
-19
-Cresswell or any of the people from I&E talked with you about 0
their concern about securing the high pressure-injection?
21
- .l,q g
'Yes, this is almost a year after our. event,'and we-
%.);
. 22 had! discussed this with-~-- Terry was very reluctant.to be.
23
( ^s.
changing his procedures:without the draft procedures from B&W 1
-24 being' changed, but finally.we. agreed that we were going to y,m % %
25
-change them regardless of.whether the draft procedures get i
l 20 H
l e
1
'a( x lbl7 changed from B&W because of our. difference in our head of our 2
Lhigh pressure injection pumps.
Y^)
3
- (_,-
Q Now had you. decided to make'that change-before 4
Mr. Streeter and Mr. Cresswell raised their concern.or after?'
5 A'
'I guess -- well,-the final decision was made on 6
9/18/78.
7 0
Well, that would obviously be after Mr. Streeter 8
had ra'ised his concern.
A That's correct.
10 Q
Had you initially made any decision as to whether 11 or not you'd change the-procedure?
12 A
In Power *.igineering we had-made a decision to 3
recommend it, but we hadn't convinced Terry to change the 14 procedure at that time.
'5
'Q Had.you made that recommendation before.Mr.
-16
'Streeter and Mr. Cresswell talked to you, or do you recall?
17 A
I think. it was after we talked that we made the 18 recommendation..
19 Q
Okay.
20 You mentioned that Mr.-Murray was reluctant to
-21 je"y change;the' pro'cedure until B&W changed the draft procedure.
~22
- Did you? initiate any requests to'B&W for them to consider 23 7'f'6 changing the draft-procedure?
.x 3
I can'It remember right now whether we had or not.
A g
,4,,
~
I-don'tzthink'we did,:but'I'can't' remember.
i 21~
ja
}'
(,jbl8 Q
Well, if Mr. Murray_was so. reluctant to change 2
the procedure without having B&W change'their draft procedure
/~N 3
._,1
.first, it would seem to follow,'then,.that the next step would 4
- be to reque':,t B&W to change their draft. procedure.
5 A~
- I just can't remember whether we did request'that
~
6 of B&W or not.
7 0
Okay.
8 Would-you have requested _that in a memo or would-it 9
have just been a' phone call?'
10 A
It may have initially been in a phone call or it 11 could have been in a tetter.
I just don't remember if we did 12 even do such a thing.
13 Q
Okay.
14 MR. FOLSOM:
At this point I'd like to insert this 15 document.as~ insert number two in the record.
16 (The document referred to follows:)
17 18 19 20 21
--p& '
22
_23
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'24
' Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
.~
25 l
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Tt'E TOLEDO EDtSOfJ CO.V.PANY w
j = : TELE; HONE CALL DOCUMdNTATION of p'k F L(
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CoWAhhoMhkthT1 RCVTLLo.l t 6
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,gStreeter COMP AN Y/OR CTNt,Z A T to
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'b((.6 To,ledo Ed lon!.! &_L)._.I_LLI_fIlllI CALt. MADE To: i
-.T rry Murray U _. l._
e l_lj_l t j _U l l (U l l.L O.LL gM l l p _f._ l iTIIlllI!lll H
I I l '1 III1I i coNr : Esce cAlt. PAf5T'ed3 4 4r I:ric d I.I I l
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A S T Af ton / UNIT DATE vt Divis-Besse-Unit #1 Scotember 13
,78 1700
'N.
5,
.SU.fECT:
Operation of liigh Pressure injection During September 24, 1977 Event
~ John had previously. talked to. Fred Miller on the subject of Operator turning off ilPI part way into this event. John's basic question to cc was would I agree that different action would
- bb required in the future on the part of the Operator specifically should they be instructed n:,t to turn off liPI untf1 auch later in the event when actual conditions of the system had b;ca verified.
If I did agree, what steps had been performed to get this inferr ation to th7 ' operators. My reply to John to the first question was that I w a that the action taken
.O JWing that event was proper and correct.
I had been present in the Control Room at the tim;. There was no question in my mind that the Operator did act prop _erly bv turning off th: 11PI Pumps at the time he had. John then pointed out that they we79 not trying to point fing rs about the action that was taken on the September 24th Event. They were only trving t; point out that there may be a lesson that can be Icarned from t'nat.
liis basic point nbout lesson-to be learned is that knowing what we know about that event, the Se.ptember 24th Ev:nt, 1 caving the liPI Pumps on would have actually helped our recovery.
If we were to have similar instance where liPI is required, we should look at the pros and c_o_n_s of leavine llPI run until the actual plant conditions have been evaluated.
For instance, had we left ths-pump run'on the 9/24 Event could there have been any probicas from that. The~shultff d on the pump is low-enough we could not have overpre_s_s_urized the systen. There definite _1v
-would have been some gains by 1 caving it on.
With'this information_per.hmis_we need to chnnge procedures to require the liPI Pumps to be left on__1r.lil_Et.abic_conditinns nro'ecenbliche*
.I-greed with John that we would ' evaluate the situation,nd tde whaterni-,ctina is i m' i e - e 1 c Piss To; J., S. Grant, L. E. Roe, J. G. Evans, E. C. Novak, Cb R.',Domec]c, J. D. Lenardson, JEC, Buck, Section !! cads. M. J. nerivan. W.
p_
c nn, DATE
- P, EP AME D BY -7WDcA,u __
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ELEPl!ONE CALO DOCUNENTAriON 6
shr6Strceter;to Terry !larray,
y hp?^-%r ;-13,f 1978,1700 hour0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br />sj tgi_[.
90m th'at evaluaiion; LIf(in fact, we agree to change'our procedures,"we will' follow up 7'.
- ith1 instructions:.t.o the operators explaining; to them 'why this is. to be done.. I' indicated s.
- r.
io John 11! hat-I would try 'to have this resolved'and call him back -on Friday..;,
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BYIMR. HEBDON:
>2
. Q _
[Ok'ay._ Now.on'the second.page of this document,
-.F
)(.,
.whichDisitype'd, there is'a handwEitten' note on'here;'and.it
~
4
- says:
5
.o..
"TDM:and I~ discussed this on 9/18."
,6
.Now who is TDM?
2 7
. A Terry D. Murray. :
8
-Q.
. 01(ay.
Now who wrote.this note?
Is this your not'e?
A That's Chuck Domeck, our project engineer for 11 Davis-Besse Unit 1, 12 Q
Okay.
Now I'think there is also'a' sentence which seems
~to read:
-15
" SRB-reviewed the. matter on Fri,ay, 9/15."
16
'Who is SRB?
'17' A
Station Review Board.
-18 Q
.Okay.
s g
"They decided.to change procedure-to read I20 thatLHPI-pumps should-stay.on, unless it was clear lthatthere was.' leakage'through pressurizer relief I
-.22 valves,.et; cetera."
.-- 23
-Now'I don't think I followed'the condition about l
.24 l m4,,,,,; s,
tleakage-through the~pressurizercrelief valve.. Could'you' explain 4-
~
25 1 :
ri
-that?:
I v
~
s 4
.+,
23 llbb2 A
I' guess I don't understand what Chuck is saying
~
2 there.either, because the procedures told them to leave HPI
~~T 3
J-pump on regardless of pressurizer level.
4 Q
Okay.
5 Now this memo was written in September of '78.
6 What transpired after that?
7 A
The procedure was revised formally.
8 Q
Ik) you know when the procedure was actually changed?
9 A
No, I don't.
10 Q
Okay.
11 Was it within a.few days after this or weeks or 12
-( i
-months, or do you have any feel for that?
13 A
If the Station Review Board h~ad reviewed-it on the 14 15th, it would have been revised within a week or so, or a 15 temporary. modification made to the procedure which in effect 16 revises-the procedure.
17 Q
Now do you have a copy of that temporary modifica-18 tion?
19 A
No, not with me.
.20
-Q' Could you check your files when you get back to the 21
'{
site'and see if a temporary modification.was issued to that
- 22
' procedure?
-23 fl A.
.Yes.
(_/
24 Q
'Because we have a copy of a revision to the proce-w.pw.i non.,,, ine, 25
-dure that. indicates.that that particular section was changed L
^"
a 24 L
I
(
hb3-with revision three,Lbut'that wasn't until some time quite a 4
2
' bit after-the first of the year.
'A lThe first of what year?.
-4 Q
'1979.
It'would'have been somewhere in February of 1979.,
6 A
I.can check to see when the temporary modification-
-7 would have been made which would apply to'the procedure.
Q Would.it have been normal to use a temporary 9
modification to-change it, and then at some later date use an 10 actual-revision-to the procedure?
11 A
Yes.
12
/~N Q-IF that the normal way of doing things?
-O 13 A-Yes.
14 Q
Okay.
15 A
It would be incorporated when~they make a major 16 modification to a procedure.
!17 Q
So it would be like a minor change which they-then 18 collect, and.when they have enough of them they make a major 19 revision.
'20 A
Yes.
21 LQ-
-Okay.
'-22
,I'd like'to ask you some questions about the actual 23 nincident itself and the scenario.
.I have on the wall here~for
{"}
24
. reference purposes a graf-that was prepared by Mr. Leon Engle ww n fw,
.25 ofLthe;NRC Staff using'some reactimeter data.
9 25
- b'4 l
If you'll take.a moment to look at it, you'll see 2
that pressurizer' level was' plotted, along_with reactor system:
3
-temperature and the reactor-system pressurc.
And.'they're
-El'otted overitime.
The scale onsthere is minute's at.the bottom, 5
.You might wint to'use that as a reference as we talk about 6
these things.
7 When you did your analysis _of this' incident, did 8
you realize that' steam formed.in the reactor coolant system
)
during the transient?
.)
i 10 A
Yes.
I'm not sure I'm the one that came up with it; it may have been B&W on the site that came up with it.
I 12 know that Mike realized it.
That's why the pressurizer level
. went up.
Mike Deriban, who was the shift > foreman, realized it l
when he shut off the block valve.
15 I~think I was the originator.of the thought that
)
that's what happened;.but we did realize that we had steam in 1
17 the reactor coolant system.
-18 Q
.By " Mike" you mean Mike Deriban?
10
'A Yes, Mike Deriban.
20
- Q And.did~you realize that he; realized that during
.the actual transient, or is this some time afterwards?
~
22 A
'He realized it during the. transient.
23
-Q Okay.
l
'24 What significance did you assign to the fact that
'25 steam formed in the reactor coolant system?
l N
.i 26 llbb5 A
We realized that the pressure had decayed down 2
to the saturation pressure of the reactor coolant system, and
(^i' 3
S_,/ :
that.ws would have voids forning in the reactor coolant 4
system with the pumps in operation.
5 One of-the things.that we had B&W check was as to 6
whether it could have caused any damage to the fuel,.whether 7
it could have caused any damage to the reactor coolant pumps 8
where the voids would have been formed as a result of this 9
voiding, and those were our primary concerns about getting down 10 to saturation conditions in the primary coolant system.
11 Q
Okay.
12 Now you mentioned that Mr. Deriban indicated that
- {
13 he realized that the voiding in the reactor coolant system 14 caused the pressurizer level to increase,:'s that true?
u 15 A
Yes.
16 Q
Okay.
17 What significance did you assign to that fact?
18 A
Well, firsc of all, we thought it was really sharp 19 thinking in the time frame and under the conditions that they I
20 were to come up with it, to determine what to do to terminate
- ('T ~
' 21 the transient.
He was-able to close the block valve on the L J:
22 1
23
(']
_ stuck open.
He closed the block valve and it became re-h /-
24
! Am-Federal Reporters, Inc.
pressurized, the primary Coolant system.
25 Q
- Now
- you say ' that -you felt it was very good I
27 l
i
, b6;
- detective work on his part to be able
- to' figure that out.
Did:
2 you feel that any changes needed co'be made to'make it less
~
('T 3
~
- (_.)
difficult to' figure'that out?
'A Yes, we=did make some changes.
5 Q
What changesidid you make?
6 Al We put an indication'on the pilot operated relief t
valve that would indicate the position of-the solenoid valve 8
t on the pilot operated relief valve.
9
'This switch that we added to the solenoid deter-1 l
10 mined if the solenoid was stuct in the open position or whether 11 the solenoid was closed in the de-energized position.
And it 12
[
gave the operator a more positive indication of whether or not 13
.the solenoid was stuck.open or closed on the pilot operated 14 relief valve.
15 12 What indication did he have prior to that?
16 A
Well, I thought that we had an indication that' the 17
. solenoid was energized prior to that, but Mike says no.
Mike 18 said no yesterday, so-I guess we had no indication of the posi-19 tion of the valve other than the discharge temperature on the 20 piping.
'21 We.did have a temperature element on the discharge
]}
' 22
. piping that.wouldfgive~a high temperature alarm on the computer' i
23 L - ('N if the. pilot : operated relief' valve was open.
o
- %.) :
24
- Ac -F.6.r
- n. pori.e., inc.
.Q-
- Would'it-be possible to verify from older drawings 25
'of the plant l design whether'.or not there was indication on the
+
28
['/kb7
. solenoid?
x-A
-Yes, there would be.
.f Q
Could you do.that for us'and let us knowLat some 4
' future date?
5
. A Yes.
6
' O.
.Okay.
Now this limit ~ switch, as I understand.it --
~
0 THE WITNESS:
Can we go off the record?
(Discussion off the record.)
10 MR. : HEBDON:
Let's go back on the record.
11 BY MR. HEBDON:
12 Q.
Now you mentioned that you put a limit switch on the pilot valve.
14 A
Yes.
15 Q
Why didn't you put the. limit switch on the actual
~16 t-valve itself?
'17 A
The actual valve itself is totally enclosed within
-18 othe case of the. pilot operated. relief valve and-there in no 19
' physical means of putting ~ a position switch on the main valve.
20
- The main valve is steam operated and the steam
~
21 rs is put into the. operating piston by-the pilot ~ operated valve.
~
22
- Okay.
- Q 23
~?%
- So then-the stem on the pilot part.of the valve 4 ' d.)
124 mi h
extends outside of the casing, and that's.why you were able to
- 25
'put-a switch.on'it?
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29 1
- 3
.<m A-Yes.
lq, b 8 2
Q Okay.
T'x 3
(_)
In the course of analyzing this incident what consideration'did you give to what the operators saw and-how 5
they interpreted'that information?
j 6
A' We felt that he should be -looking at in the future 7
not only the level of the pressurizer but the temperature of the -- the hot leg temperature and the pressures on the hot 8
leg to determi'ne whether or not the primary coolant system was 10 at saturation conditions or whether it was subcooled.
11 Q
Did you do anything to bring that to the attention of the operators?
be' '
A I believe that was factored into our procedures 14 to tell him when to. terminate high pressure injection if and 15 when he did it.
16 Q
Now is this the same change that we were talking 17 about earlier, or is this an additional change?
18 A
I can'.t remember.
I know that this information --
19 we added'the 50 degrees subcooled as a result of -- after 20 TMI-2.
We did not have any 50 degree criteria in our 21 procedures, prior.to that.
yd' -
e 22 I_ can't remember whether we had the temperature
- e's and pressure information prior to that.or not.
I'd have to-k,_ I
- 24 eCk.
Am-Federal Reporuts, Inc.
-25 Q.
-Okay.
If you'would,-I'd appreciate it.
30-j l{g;b9 In'the course'of reviewing this event you noted s
4
~ hat the operator secured the high pressure injection at.about t
f %-
- 3
- (,T foursa'ndia' half minutes into the transient.
Now if you'll' 4
the graf'welhage on the-wall.here, one of the para-
. notice - cx1 meters.is pressurizer level.
You can see that it's. going up 6
at about>fourfand a half minutes'into the transient, and then
.7 when'they secure high pressure injection it turns and goes' back down.
Then at about six minutes into the event it turns 9
and goes back up again-very sharply.
10 Was it your conclusion.that the operators had 1 1..
secured the high pressure injection correctly?
. 12 A
It was my conclusion.they did what their-procedures 13 told ~them to do.
Our own thoughts after we had a chance to 14
- analyze what had happened, as I said earlier, we felt the
- 15 procedures needed to be modified.
16 Q
Okay.
17 Now it. appears that by September, or at least some 18 time in that time frame of 1978, almost a year later, the
- 19 procedure hadn't been changed.
- 20
.A That's correct.
21
" (~Y-QL
-Was there-some reason why it hadn't been changed?
~'
22 A
LI guess we just hadn't:been pursuing it as hard i-
- 23 as we should have in Power Engineering.
It just didn't get l ; ('y.
~ 24
- '~'
~
Changedfinnthat time frame.
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
' 25 Q
Sci would it be fair to say, then, that it didn't
- .gs 3 11 llhpb10
.get ' changed' until af ter the: people. from'I&E Region III raised
'2
.it.as a concern?
.,k )~
A That's correct.
e 4
Qi How much of: the impetus -to getting it changed was 5
a result of the concern.about whether -- about the operator 6
securing high pressure injection, and how much of it was a
~
7 concern-about simply ~ resolving something that hadLbeen raised 8
by one:of the. regional l inspectors?
9 A-
..I think the procedt.e was changed because both 10 Power Engineering and the inspectors wanted it changed.
11 Q
Okay.
12 A
Because we had both talked to Terry Murray and j
y 13 his staff about cc:>nging the procedures.
14
.Q Okay.
15 Who would have actually' initiated the change?-
16 A
I' don't know the man that'was responsible for the 17 procedure, but it would have had to have been initiated at the 18 station and reviewed by the Station Review Board before the 19 Lprocedure would have been changed.
20 Q
.So this.would_be someone.in Terry Murray's organ-21
(~N.
ization?
%-):
A Yes.
23
- - (^')
-Q Now'as.I understand it, you don'.t recall receiving N4 24
' a. Copy Lof.the temporary.: change mcdification?
Am Federal Reporters, Inc.
25
. I don' t. remember whether it: was a copy of a
- A
3,
~ ^ -
J
'j-
.y 2
L(m.jbll:
. temporary ? mod that :came through,' or whether the change was 'on 2
~
a major' modification to the procedure'.
-O 3
L) -
.O
' Okay.:
'But you do rememberLthat you received some sort of 1
5 a reference o'n it?--
6 A-
"Yes,:we receive ~ copies'of(all procedures and_their.
changes in Power Engineering.
8
.Q Okay.
Including the temporary modifications?
A Yes.
.11
.Q Okay.
.12 Did.you give any; consideration a's to whether-this
~
13
. particular: event may have had any generic implications?
'14 A
Yes.
15
~Q What did[you decide?
A_
-I'm trying.to second-guess what B&W should have done.- But at the time we felt'that -- we had no knowledge of any other PORVs sticking open'in the industry.
We have a 19
' Crosby valve at Toledo Edison. company.
We are the only B&W 20 plant ~that has a; Crosby valve..
1
'21
.The reason-that we felt that our valve stuck.open 22 is because.~we had an auxiliary relay left out'of the circuit-
~
l 23 Lwhich: allowed-thenvalve to cycle very rapidly, and I?.think
- (24 Amm ne, w
~itLcycledLnine times ~before it finally stuck open.
^25 J-It wa.Cobvious.to:us that if.somebody should have
l 1
33
\\
J/~
'1 (N;b12:
- one'of'these valvesistick'open that their present procedures -
+2 weren't. correct, although'we were the'only. people'that had_ low
("% '
-3 So weTreally didn't have to-do anything-with-q
(_/
' head HPI pumps.
4 shutting l the pmnps off, where-the other plants could.over -
]
\\
'O pressurize'thei'r primary' coolant system with the'high head-6 HPI pumps.
So we were different from the rest of~the people.
l But we< felt:that the whole event was something that our. operator 9
just wasn't prepared'to handle prior to the time.-
l 10 Q
Did you have an'y reason to_believe that the 11 operators at any of the other plants might.be any better prepar-12
(~h ed to handle that transient?
' \\_)
A-Our operators have the same training as they.did 14 on the simulator at Lynchburg.
15 Q
Did you give any consideration to recommending to 16 anyone that_ training ~of operators in this area be enhanced?
~17 A
_ Training is not Power Engineering's responsibility, 18 and I guess that we never gave that any consideration.
~
19 Q
Did you give any consideration to recommending to 20 your own-training people that~the training of your. operators
-l 1
121 be. enhanced in this area?
-(]}.
22 A
~ILthink you'd better talk to the people at j
5 L23
' Davis-Besse about that.
,I don't know whether they did get
-(};
24
~
Especial training.or not.
b
- %.Fm n.pon., inc.
[
'Q:
Did-you make any recommehdations with respect to
-l I
7 J
134
[v]'bl3
, training?-
.2 A-Na, Ih Ql Do.youfhave'any-feel for.why you didn't make such-4 ga r' commendation?
~ e
!5 A
'There's.just too many other things that we're.
6
' involved with and responsible'for.
7
-Q.
Okay.
~8 BY MR. FOLSOM:
9 Q
It occurred to me to ask::
n 10 Was he'there:
You had a B&W. site rep on the' site.
-;y during the incident?
A-I don't know'whether he was there on that Saturday i
13
' night or not, -but he was certainly there all the -following 14 week' analyzing the result of it.-
There were many people from 15 B&WLthere:the following: week.
16 Q
Did he.give any input into this question of what 17 the. operator should hav7 done with HPI?
18
'A
.I can't-remember.
19 Q
You don't remember any of the. discussion?
20 A
I have.nothing in my files that would indicate 21
- that hei gave.us-anything.
That sort of input wouldn't come
(
.22 Ldirectly to Power-Engineering.
It'would come to the Davis-Besse r
23 u
Operations --people..
Mr non.n,,.
Q:
Well, was he a party to the analysis:that you per-
~
25
~
- formed?.
_(
I I
w, o
w y
e
35 lllpbl4 '
A Yes, definitely..
2
~
Do'you recallLit ever being mentioned to him that
~
.Q N) it was the view of Power. Engineering that HPI should not-have 4
been secured?
^5 A
Not offhand I can't remember.
6 O
Is it your best guess that he was aware of how you 7
felt by some means or other?
8 A
Well, I guess I'm trying to put the thing in 9
perspective as to what our. concerns were at the: time.
We 10 had three concerns as a result of this event that kept all of 11 our attention for maybe a month after the event.
12 f, s The first one was, as I mentioned before, what-4 A'J 13 initiated it; why the auxiliary feedwater. system failed;3.and 14 the third item that we were concerned with -- and I can't think 15 of it right now.
The termination of the HPI was just one of 16 those things that -- it wasn't a major concern of ours at'the
'17 time.
18 I-think after we had a chance to recover from it --
19 and we had another significant event in November of '77 and
_20 our attention wastall gathered on it and the problems that came 21
(
-up with-it.
It was some time before we really got back to this 22 >
termination of high pressure injection.
-23 So it was not a major concern as to whether they did-fy 24
! A.r.o.r.i n. port.r, ine.
'or didn't terminate it during the immediate analysis after the
- 25
..SoEI can't answer your-question because it wasn't-event'.
~
l
36 O
[a'ibl5 ::
.'I significan't. at ' the time ~.
2
'c2 Q-lTo put it;another way:
rs~
'3
.( ):
The B&W-representative agreed with your ~ assessment of what.was significant at that time?
5 We were concerned as to whether we'had any g
.Yes. -
6 damage-to the unit as a result of this rapid depressurization.
7 We were-concerned'why the PORV stuck open, and....
8 Q
Do you-know whether the changes in your operating 9
procedure were automatically shipped to.B&W, or-were they not?
10 A
Their site representative would'have had them.
11 Now whether or not he turned them in to B&W,I don't know.
BY MR. HEBDON:
13 Q
But he-did receive a copy of all of the procedures?
14 A
They're available to him at the site.
Our site 15 representative is just like an employee out at the site.
16 They're all available to-him.
I7' O
They're available to him, but are they actually 18 sent to him?- Is he included on the distribution of the changes?
19 A
.I don't know.
Terry Murray would know.
20 Q
Okay.
21
'Were you able - to determine why the. relay in the PORV
{)3 x
22
. control circuit was missing?
23 q
A No.
\\.J '
.g
~
Q Do you have-any theories?
l %.,
25 i
A This was a couch relay, a small relay that looks 4
/
37 llhpbl6 llike'an.old. metal clap tube, a plug-in socket.
We have 2
- 1iterally thousands.of them in Davis-Besse.
At the time the L
i'%
-3J 4, f station was designed they were the only seismically qualified 4
- relay that was readily available.
5 Wherever there was an application that required 16 auxiliary relays thatt had to be seismically qualified and
-7 safety grade, and in order to standardize - we used them in 8
all _ non-safety applications where it was applicable, we used-
~
9 the same relay.
10 I believe in our supplement to our LER we responded 11 where we'd gone around through the site and reviewed to see.if 12 there were any others missing.
We found a few others that
}
)
13 were missing.inLthe station.
But'there are just literally 14 thousands of thc there.
I believe that we reported that this 15 circuit had been tested over a year prior tx) this event.
It's M
not a safety system.
It does not require periodic testing'.
17 It could have been-taken out any time during that prior year's 18 time.
19 Q
!ki would it-be fair to say, then, that you feel 20 dhat somebody took it out to use it somewhere else?
21 A.
Conceivably, yes.
7"')1
'- m.
gy Q
Do you have any theories as to where it might have y-
- gone?
'~'
_gg A
It could have.gone any one of a thousand places in-Ac, F.ders n. pore. m
'2:
the station.
L
L38 -
~
1: x.
r Qbl7 "Q'
-Okay..
L2
' A '-
'OrLmore.-
4~
~
iBY'MR..FOLSOM:
-4
'O Just as an aside,-and notlto be facetious,_but'
-5
.did any~ heads get knocked forinot having this relay inEthere?
6 fA When we'did:the survey'we only found a handful that uwereimissing.
'It's'hard to put any. blame on it.: Construction-8 people were on the site up until April of.'77, in fact they 9
were there after April of77 after we got our operating
'10 license.
So we have no idea who took'it.
11 Q
Was it, as-a' precaution, disseminated to the 12
<1 personnel'on the site about --
13 A
I think'you should ask Terry Murray.
I don't'know.
~
14 BY MR. HEBDON:
15 Q
Now you mentioned earlier that there was another-16 incident _in November of'1977.
Would you describe your involve-17 ment with that particular incident?
18 In November, 1977, we were preparing to do some A-i 19' tests.
The unit was at 40% power.
They-had a special patch l
-20 pane 11for our reactimeter.thct they had prepared e.t the L
21-When:they plugged the patch panel into the reacti-
- station.
meter 1 they shorted.out some signals that also went to the b
integrated' control system.
The. reactor was at 40% power.
The high pressure
~
w Federd n ponen, Inc.
25
'tripslonithe reactor.protectionisystem were set at 50% at the l
39l X
' time.- When they plugged'the panel in, the: unit 0_ mand was llhpbl8)
This-signalisazeroto125%s.'~Na1.
'It's a-2
~
- shorted out.
-v'$
3 (j.
-10 to +10' volt: signal.
When they shorted it out it went to 4
center-scale,'which said the power should have been~at-62.5%
'5 power.
6 The reactor was at 40% Lawer and it started ramp-
/
in'g up to 62;5%.
When it hit 50, the reactor-tripped..
8 When the reactor trips it trips the turbine.
The 9
operator,at the present time his. procedure told him that he 10 should trip the generator.
There was an error in the procedure.
11 He should have waited for 30 seconds.
The generator would have 12 y3 been automatically tripped by the-control scheme.
When it hit-
\\_/
13 the house power would have been transferred automatically over 14 to the start-up systems.
The operator, nine seconds after the turbine 16
~
tripped, tripped the two 345 kv breakers on the generator.
17 This meant the unit, with all the house power, was coasting 18 down.- The turbine had already been tripped.
There was no 19 transfer of the house power when he manually opened up-the 20 two 345 kv breakers-The house power was on the auxiliary 21 transformer that was fed off from the generator leads.
(g
-22 21 seconds after he tripped the 345 kv breakers 23
("'y the generator-was automatically tripped, and when it was.
u j :
24 Ace-Federal Reporters [Inc.
tripped.the house power went dead.
We had a total loss of L
~25 JLC power in the station, which called for both diesel b
1 1
40-A
~; -
j.
t{,)bl9 generators to start..
The diesel generators came started.
'One of them came:upito speed and tripped out on overspeed.
L /"'l 3
'i
.The other!one can e ' up to speed. and auxiliary feedw tcr was -
.j ;
4 initiated because we'd_ lost our'four. reactor coolant pumps.
S 5
'nd'we proceeded on natural circulation on one steam generator A
6 from that time on.
7 Q:
Do you-recall if during that' transient there was 8
any problem with pressurizer level indication?
9 A
- Yes, 10 0
What was the problem?
l 1:
A We had a cooldown transient because we put in 12
(~y approximately 90 inches of cold water into one steam generator.
13 This cold water going into the one steam generator caused the 14 primary coolant system to cool down and it contracted and we 15 lost indication on the pressurizer.
1 16 Q
Okay.
17 Was'it a particular concern?
l18 A'
It wasn't a major concern to us at the. time 19
.because the indication came back on scale after the transient 20 had occurred.
- 21 j' p Here again, we had other more serious problems we 22 felt resulting:
number one, to get'the procedures corrected 23
{^}
so the operators wouldn't touch this; why did the diesel fail;
-M 24 At first.we. thought that we had
-what caused the whole thing?-
u.,..,
non,,( %,
25 a : rod that: dropped in the core and it was causing the power I
41
- 4 jlhhb20l lbecause we got some erroneous-information on rod position 2
1 when.the short developed.-
f/^v 3
()
iWe.were concerned about losing pressurizer level' indication because it was'a major concern.
We were trying to (5
determine why we'd lost indication and what should be done to
~
prevent it in the future.
7 Q
Did you consider that loss of indication.tx) be a 8
violation'of.the. general design criteria?
'9 A
It was a violation of number 13.
10 Q.
So you did feel it was a violation of General 11.
Design Criteria.137 12 A
From the-standpoint of having indication to follow
]
13 the course of an accident, yes.
14 0
Losing just pressurizer level indication alone, l
15 not the other indication that was lost.during the transient?
j 16 A.
Well, pressurizer level indication went offscale, but-it came back anscale.
And we don't feel it's desirable 18 to-lose indication.
We don't feel that it's of safety 19 significance if.you lose it,-but it is not desirable and 20 we feel it doesn't meet Design Criteria 13.
21
-(].
Q-Well, isn't failure to meet a general design j
-22
- criteria a safety concern?
23 A'
You're.asking me if I agree to a general design
[~'),:
24 Ace-Federd Reponers, Inc.
Criteria?.
25
~
. No,' I'm asking just by ' definition is the failure Q
s
..u.
t
~
I42;
^
1 b21-
- .to' meet;a general design criteria a'. safety: concern,'whether
^
Lyoul agree"withfthe design 1 criteria or1.not is it a_ safety I
concern if'youl don't meet'a design criteria?
4 Ac I guess?I don't.quite: understand what_you're saying,
- Q.
Well, settingLaside--any discussion _about1whether or 6
not_the: design criteria ~is valid, if someone were to tell you
-7 that a'certain activity. violated a design ~ criteria,-one of.the 8
general design criteria-in the' regulations, it would-seem to
~ 9~
'me that by definition that's a safety concern.
A We felt that pressurizer. level indication is not 11 of significance.
If you have a loss of coolant accident it's 12 not of significance.
13 The only time'it's of significance is if you're 14 trying-to maintain natural. circulation when you don't have a 15 break in the primary system during the long term cooldown.
16 Now if you take a strict definition of Design 17 Criteria 13, you have a dip in the pressurizer level and it 18 goes down below,-there is some concern whether or not you j
-19 meet ~Gentral Design Criteria 13; whether or.not there's a 20 safety s.gnificance'to not meeting it, I guess I'm not prepar-
-(] -
.ed to answer that.
~
Q~
Well, then, would it be fair to say that you feel 23
-(
>that it's.possible to have a-failure to. comply with the
[: 1N' L24 NFe.inponersfine.
general. deisign criteria that's not_ a: safety concern?
.25 A'
Yes.
i 4
1
o
- =
j43-lllpb22'
~ (L
~Okay.
Do'you recall any discussions.with anyone at the.
a
.o?
e I&E Region III office co'ncerning this problem of pressurizer.
4 level?.
A Yes, many people.
6 Q
'Would:you describe that discussion, that involve-ment?-
8 A
We had discussions with Mr. Streeter, Mr. Cresswell,
-9 I believe that Mr. Tambling talked tofus-about.it, about how
.10 low the level went during this transient'and why did we lose-
~
11 the level.
-.12
<s' We had an analysis prepared by.B&W which has been 13 turned over to the NRC as to how low the level went, why did 14 we lose it, indication.
.Our analysis showed that we did not 15 lose the level in the pressurizer, we only lost the indication.
16 It took us some time to get this analysis from B&W.
That was j-satisfactory to ourselves and the NRC.
18 Q
Why did it.take some time?
.19 A
Well, B&W felt that it was.of no significance.
~
Dha had.a tough time convincing them that we really needed a
- 21
. detailed analysis of the thing.
22 Q
Okay.
23
(~'y So you did finally get an analysis?
_N_/
24 A-
-Yes.
w.pe, n n.,,, (ne, 25 Q-
- Was..that analysis related to_the specific incident e
w
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~
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~1 b23ih othat~;hadLoccurredsin November,=orewasfit{a worstlcaseltype:
C
~
2 analysis?.;
~-
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"3-
+^
Thei! analysis was(prepared _toi show! how ' low the TAT 4
pressurizer)leve1 wouldlgofasLa functionTof"the minimum E
T-average'temperaturefinJthe~primaryfcoolantasystem..Asla-y.
s
-result,4 ifKwernow.knowlthat.ourfT-av,erage temperature?could-
~
^
-7
~
.;go s so' manyfdegreesubelow the L 550 that we : expect ;i't to ' drop -to:
~
8 ifteria= reactor' trip, we.can predict, then,.how' low the level
~
would:goton our pressurizer.
~
'10 Here:againh Davis-Besse.has.a specific probl'em'
' II-
~
Our pressurizer' level indica-:
--that all-B&W plants' don't'have.
e 12
- tion rangeJis1320 inches.
I'believe some.of~the' other plants
'13 have-a:400 inch range between the taps on the pressurizer..We
~
'14 losejindication at'a higher-T temperature than-the.other ay, J
.S 15 plants do.-
a 16
.So weewere seeing. these loss of;pressurizerilevel:
.~' 17-s
" indications when~some of-the_other. plants possibly:wouldn't.
~
WS're?also a. raised: loop plant-and the heat transfer on our plant [is somewhatubetterJin the primary system-response to
^'
_ ~ ! 20
- secondary conditions, a little faster than the others.
2j
~
- Q:
- So you;' determined, then, if1Tave. wen't below 550.-
- 222 3
Edegrees;you wouldJlose, pressurizer:-level indication?:
t..
W....,
123
[ b wa'sia: function of--how far below 550'that 7
V f
- A
. N o,. i
- ps
- ?
,. 24 we;wouldslose. pre'ssurizerfleveliindication.
j
~,25 l l
. ;Do youcrecallLhow[far:below it1had to go?;
EQ:
L
'1 e
f, 2
m
~v-
45 M
llpb24 (A:
To lose' indication?-
~
'2
- Q.
Yes.
/^p'
..;. 3 As
_A
-Not right' offhand, no.
3 m
~
4
.Do you recall if-ther'e:wascany effort'made to Q-Idetermine'how likely it was for Tave.to:go below the point at 6
which-you'd lose the' pressurizer. level' indication?
17 We knew that we would lose pressurizer ievel indica-A 8
-tion if we put 90 inches of water in the secondary side.of the.
We also knew that we could lose pressurizer
-10 level indication if we did not maintain the proper pressure
.11 on the secondary side of the steam generators.
12 We also realized that if we were on main feedwater 13 and we didn' t properly control the flow of main feedwater 14 we could lose the control of pressurizer level indication.
4 15 Q.
Now did this analysis include a determination of m
16 the temperature at which you actually emptied the pressurizer?
17 A
I would have to look at the analysis to determine 18 that.
-19 Q
Okay.
- 20 Do you know if the concerns that I&E Region III 21
~5.
-had raised were eventually resolved?
J 22 A
Yes.
. f'[
Q Approximately when were those concerns resolved?
[
b'
[
24 A
'Well, I would have to say that they.were resolved-
%.Fm nonerifine.
25 There was an investigation that was
,within the Region III.
wn;,
.46:
e gb251
- conductideby; Region,III. independent of.our people or the 12
- people,-the insp.ectors. Land this was made I believe'last
~
.^)
~3
(
January or February in which there was a meeting in Lynchburg,
,4
-Virginia.-^I was not a. party'to.lthat meeting.-
5
.But~the=. investigators-met with B&W and all of the 6
- 177. assembly fuel plants atlthat time. 'And I believe the
- Region wrote at the time: -- 'said that' they did..not feel it.
8
~
~
was-o.f any. safety-significance, at least the results of the 9
-inspection, so~they didn't feel it.was of any safety signifi-
!10 s
cance to the problem.
11 I understand recently because of some allegations.
12 fy
.that were made by Mr. Cresswell to the Commissioners and to b
13 ACRS-that Denny Ross has opened it up again as an~open issue
-14 and there's going lto have to be some more analysis done on it.
15 I attended a meeting about two weeks ago with 16 him-when he said he thought it had become an open issue again,
-17
- the' size of-the pressurizers and the. loss of pressurizer.
'18 level' indication that-had been occurring on B&W^ plants.
19
.0 Okay.
.20 MR. HEBDON:-JForithe record, what I have here is 21 an exit interview dated. September 8, 1978, concerning an NRC
^p 122
- Office of-Inspection and Enforcement inspection that was held
~ '23
-during the. period of' September: 6t$h to the 8th,1978.
E(Handing document.Ito the witness.)
%.Fe. n.poners, inc.
j BY-MR.~ HEBDON:
^
[
'47J e
,e c
a t
"1
.Have'you ever seen'this. document?
{/"s b26i
, 1Q..
.2 (Th~e.~ witness - reviewing -docuraent. ) -
A iYess I-remember:this-very well.
4 Q:
lOkay..
L5 Wasothis: document prepared by. Toledo Edison?
- 6 AL No 17 "Q~
Do you-know who did prepare"it?
8 A.
I'm.not sure.who did prepare this spe'cific one.
9 I guess I can't say whether it was prepared by ToledofEdison
-.10 or not.
11 Q1 Does.this appear to.be the type of document..that
-12
. Toledo 1 Edison would prepare asia result of an exit intervicw?;
'{}
-13 F
A I'm not sure whether it was prepared by us'or the 14 NRC.
115
-Q Okay.
'16 The particular area that I'm interested in is a 17 statement in here'that-is attributed to you, that:
18 "B&W:has been contacted to see if the
-19 specific: event offthe stuck open electromatic 20
-relief valve'has been analyzed."
21
/ $L Do -you. recall: making such.a statement?
> V'
- 22 A'
'Yes.
~
lf p
';23 Q-
- Do;youirecalli requestingLor asking B&W if.such an
~'i 124 o
[4 p.e.res neporiers, inc.
- analysis-had been performed?
- 25
. Yes...
.AL eg e
-.m
y 48:
1 bi7)
(Q Why did'you make that:1 request?
- A EI-wanted to'make sure'[that;it fell within-their-5 topical report'for small-bheaks that was-referenced in our.
- s
. FSAR..
'S T Q::
?Was this:a result of the' September'24, 1977,.
'~
incident?--
A
-Yes.
8 Q'
Who;did you ask at B&W?
Do you recall.who you 9
talked to?
10
?A No.
j j-Q-
Who would you normally have referred such'a ques-12
' tion to?
13 A'
At-that time it would probably have'been our projec t 14^
engineer.
15 Q
Who was that?-
16 A
If.we had prepared a letter, it would have been Al' 17
-Lazar.
We would.have talked to Tom Fairburn, -as' a project 18 I'm not sure when.the engineer, and then Ray Luken.came in.
19 i
- transition ~between.the two'would'have occurred, j
20 Q-okay.
' 21 Q
Would-sucha' request.have been'in a letter or d#
.J
~
would'it..have.been, appropriate _to just call him on:the phone?.
23 i
. ]:
A TheLanswer~I:got was on the phone.
rX/
- gg
- Q :-
.Okay.
Ac F. seres neoorws, Inc.
- 25
!Do you recall ^- -
4
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~
~
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-So:it wasiprobably,in a.pho'ne' call.
i-jb28;
.7
'2
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?"
(Ql - iso' then you believe~ t;hef request was -in ca' phone -calli
=
a..
A:
(I L belie ~ve : itf.was..
~
'4 i
.Wo.uld:yo'u have'notieslof either thefrequesttor the L Q L,
.5 Tresponse?J 6
No, I.:ddn't; AE i; w 7
QL Lokay.;
IWhat'.w'as the~ response?
A It fell within the" spectrum'of.-breaks in the topical
- 10.
report.
11
-Q DoLyoutrecall'-,the question asks:whether'or not 112 (the specific eventiof-a stuck open electrimatic relief: valve
'13
~
.had been-analyzed.. Did they indicate'that such an event.had 14
.been. analyzed?
15 A
No, they'did-'not indicate'to me at that time that
'16
-they'd ever analyzed a-stuck open.PORV.
'17
-Q Had you asked them that?'
~
-18 I had asked them if this break size had been cover-A
-19.
.ed-by the-spectrum.of; events that-was' analyzed:infour FSAR,
~
m 20
. whichlincluded theLtopical. report.-
- 21 f.;]
(Q -
Add theylindicated that it had?
I
- 22
~
H Yespthe-si.ze had been-' analyzed, but not the loca ~
g
-f-A ur.
- 23
~1 tion'.-
~
p-
,1 24-
~
lQs 1.Didi.they?feelLthat there was any problem'with the
~
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, -?
> location _?!
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I-did not:get:that:from them.. 'We felt-it was
'2 Lbecause it.'gav'e erroneous?information to theJoperator.
k,)
BYJMR. FOLSOM:
4
~
.Q-
.Did.you express that1to B&W?-
5 I don't know whether'I'did or not. But I:know that
'A 6
the' site people fel't the 'same way, that this ~ was a specific location for the-break.
-8 BY-MR. HEBDON:
19
.That had given an erroneous indication?
Q
-10 A
Yes.
11 Q
Do you recall if'anyone expressed that concern to 12
-B&W?
13 A
I don't' remember who would have..
14' Q
Now the comment seems to indicate that B&W had i
. 15 been contacted about-whether that specific event had been l
~16 Is that a true-statement?
)
analyzed.
11 7 A
We. asked them if they'd ever analyzed a stuck open 18
_ pilot-operated relief valve.
19 0
Okay.
' 20 So.you did ask them that?
-21 f) -
, A' Yes.
d -
22~
Q:
Okay.
23
, L("y,
And what;did they say in response?
I'r~5 i 24
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-A:
They said no,;they had never analyzed that specific-25'
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<' ally,'butDtheEbreak size, as.far as the reactor. coolant system.
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en.
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'and whether or/not you would maintain?-- the-high pressure-K2
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injection; system 1 lcould~ handle it~had been analyzed by-a vi
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break of:similar -- or_maybe one" smaller 1and.one bigger,.so
~
a
- 4
.it'.would have.been;.scoped in;their analysis.
-Q Did_you' indicate'to-them that you felt-that'such 6
an analysis should be performed?
AL Not at:that. time, no.
8 Q
Did you at any[ time?
.9 A'
- The analysis'was performed after TMI-2.
.10 0
Okay.
il But prior to TMI-27 12
- (1).
^
Q-
=Why.did-you feel that it did need to be performed?
14 A'
I~ guess we believed B&W that everything was safe 4
15 as far as whether or not high pressure injection would keep
-16 the: core covered or not for such a break siz,.
e
-17 Q
Okay.
What caused you to make this request?
.19 I wanted to know if they had such-an analysis for-
.A
~
20 any plant.
, - (T..
121
-Q
._Okay.
- '%J
.g3 So it was just for your owniinformation?
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- 23
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A-ryes, for our own benefit,1to find out if they had
' :244
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made such an analysis.
- A pm n., n.n, ine, 25 lQ.
Now you mentioned that you were concerned about the-J-
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- I Ebreak location.
v 2'
.Did they at any< subsequent' time indicate to you
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that they had considered that' break location from: the top of i
4 the-pressurizer?-
-A-They had not considered:it, I don't believe, aus-a 6
specific-break at that time.- They-had not considered'it:for 7
their-training because their simulator couldn't simulate such-8
-an event even.
9 Q
-Did you make it clear to them that you felt that 10 such:a break.might provide erroneous indication?
11
'A Oh, I'm sure that they realized that.
They-were in
'f S the meetings in which we discussed the fact that itigave td erroneous indications.
14 Q
Now when were these' meetings?
15 4
A Over.the week following the event.
16 Q
Can you specifically recall that during-those meet-17 ings there was discussion of the fact that there were erroneous indications because.of this. break location?
19 A-That's'right.
That's why we see the pressurizer 20 J evelfgoing up when'the level -- we start getting voiding in 1
~21
~
A the reactor.. coolant system.
\\. )
'0 Did:.they indicate to-you that they felt that any 23 corrective action needed to be taken.as a result of that
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erroneous indication?'
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'A:
-I'can'_t remember.B&W making any recommendations at
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.this. time --
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2 Q
Okay z"
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- (_f A:
--Labout.this erroneous indication.
4
- 've,got some more general questions that I'd like
,0
.I
'to.ask you, particularly;with. respect.to plant-procedures'and 6
. technical ~ specifications.- And~I'd like to preface:all of these questions with the statement Ehat they are based on your under-j 7
standing and your knowledge.and are not' intended to be a request j
9 forLan official companyaposition'or any of that sort of thing.
10'
~
To your knowledge, who in Toledo Edison is respon-
~11-sible for preparing plant procedures?
12 A
The station staff.
13 Q
Okay.
14 Is your group involved with that activity?
15 A
We receive copies of all station procedures.
16 There is no formal requirement that Power Engineering review 17 these procedures.
We do review the ones that we f:re specifica11:7 18 interested in, and we do give them comments where we see items 19
-that should-be changed.
20 Q
Okay.
21
- ('N :
BY MR. FOLSOM:
>~..)
37 Q
How do you-determine which ones yod're interested 23 in?
t.
24
.A The' project engineer receives these procedures, and
- 4.is.e n.pon.,,, ine,
- 25 t weJhave.what we call an information action file stamp that goes
-54 hb33~-
on1each procedure, this. sort'_of a sticker.that goes'onJthe 2
fprocedure.-
- TN 3
(_).
[(Indicating.)
The project engineer willisay 'This is ausafety-5 featdre actuation system,;give it to Fred Miller to: review'.
6 We mightLhave'another-one'on a demineralizer and they'll give
- 7
-it to one'of the'other^ engineers, another section' head in the-8 department..
.9 And when we -receive it then I might assign it to 10 one of my fellows to look at and review.. We primarily look 11-We don't go through for the revisions in the procedures now.
f-
.12 it.every time we receive a revision to the procedure, we don't-13 rereview the whole procedure, we just review the revisions 14 that.were made to the procedure.
15 During the events that occurred this spring at 16 TMI-2, why, we were-getting draft procedures from B&W and we 11 7 did review those before they were turned over to the site 18 because they were generic procedures that we were reviewing
- 19 that sometimes didn't apply to Davis-Besse-because of our 20 differences..
21
%e So we do review the draft procedures that come from
- (J--
22 B&W.and we do review the operating procedures.
But we're not f~NL
~23 in:the-direct chain 1of responsibility on their review.
A_.l 24
. Ace. Fed.res H.porm ;ine, BY MR. HEBDON:
fQ To your1 knowledge,-kho in Toledo Edison is
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responsible J forf 'p'reparingl techn'ical' specification ~s? :
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A.
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+3 Q) fHow'dolyou incorpor. e operational information 4
Tinto theDtechnicalispecificationa?
LA A[technicall. specification;rightlnow,fof coursei--
~
i6 ithe.only thingjwe?reJdoing(withithem right1now-is' revising x
- 7^
technical. specifications.- If weihave 4 request for'a change-
- 8
.-.to-a' technical? specification.thatj.would'come from Davis-Besse,
'9
?
they would request'a changeiin a-technical specification, they 10' would: prepare.:what we call aifacility-change request.
j 11 This. document would be prepared by the station-
.12 M.
-requesting a. specific change to the technical specif'ications.-
~!
_ 13
-This. technical specification change'would then be reviewed'--
l i
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. -14
~
or the facility change-request which.would include the request.
.fo'r aLtech spec change would be reviewed by the-Station Review.
15 f
16 cBoardiand transmitted'down to Power Engineering and Constructios. 4,
~ 7.
1 We would prepare a-safety analysis of this requestL 18-
~
'forTaltechnical specification change either.using B&W's j
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19
' assistance.or our architect-engineer, Bechtel, to give us
' 20
- assistancetin preparing the. safety evaluation or we.would 1
, prepare it'.ourselves.
22
- The"completeLpackage would.be.then presented to the
..~
123 fy
'companyinuclear review' board.for their. review and approval.
4 MO, l 24'
=After?thatlis prepared, then we;would submit'it to'the NRC I
n oonm, seis.
5 w
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.as'aTformal:requestifor a technical. specification. change'.
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A
~
,Q:
Now is there any formal; mechanism for' including gb35!
2 experience from 7perational events in that tech. spec revision z
3
' process?
d A
Yes.. For example,.on the November. event one of 5
p_
our f'ixes to take care of'the November '77 event was-to change-6 L.the operation of the auxiliary feedwater system. ' Prior to that 1
7 time we had maintained-120-inches'of water in-the steam 8
generator,and:.the auxiliary feedwater. operating experience l
9
' indicated that we didn't want so much water in it.
10 In the fall of 1978 we did a natural circulation 11' test on Davis-Besse and found we only needed 35 inches of water
~
12 j A30
.to get adequate. natural cifculation.
This was factored into 13 the design of a dual level set point on our auxiliary feed-
'I#
water system, so that under' normal conditions we would maintain 15 35 inches with auxiliary feedwater and therefore we wouldn't 16 have to put nearly so much water in the steam _ generators.
Under I7 the conditions of a small break when we had.an SFAS initiated 8
we would need to. meet our small break-analysis 120 inches of
.j9 water.
So we designed this.
O This design was submitted to the NRC.
It's not a.
21
-technical specification, but.that sort of thing is done.
bJ
- 22 O
.okay, h
To what extent was this done with the September 24, d.)
124 1977, incident?
Were there.any tech spec changes identified
%.F e m a.conm,ine.
25 as a. result of that. incident?
n 57-
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- [,,$36 -; *
- Al
.Right. offhand I can't think of any. ;There may have
-2 beenLone that resulted'from it.later onLor as a result, but I
~
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can't think of any right=now.
-: 4 There were;somefreguests..on the.Novemberfevent, 5
but notothe September event.
-. Q --
Now wh'o.would actually. review the event and prepare 7
the. request?-
8 A:
LThe request for a techDspec_ change 1could come either.
-9
- from Power 1 Engineering orffrom'the Davis-Besse staff.
'10 0-Who-reviews:the transient, though, to determine if 11 any changes need to be made?
' 12 A
Both groups would.
- {
' 13
~Q Is that a specific function, or is that.just some--
.14 thing that they do in the course of doing-their review?
Is
'15 there a procedure somewhere'that has an item in it that says 16
'when you review transients, determine if changes in tech specs 17 are required'?
4 18 A
LThere is no such procedure that I. am aware of that
~ 19 says you will do that, but that's part of our job in Power 20
. Engineering, and mine lspecifically to review the transient to 21
'}p seenif any change has got to be'made either in. equipment or
,.s
. tech. specs;to. handle-the transient better.
~
'23
-Q'
- Okay.
24 m.,mno4%
. Who1is; responsible for seeing that the tech specs 25 areiconsistentiwith.thecoperating procedures?
.i
(
58-1 llgpb37 A.
'Once the tech' specs are issued, the facility change 2
request then would be submitted to the station ~ superintendent
- (>~x,);
and the: station staff, with the' amendment to the tech specs as 3
4 the work package.
Before that facility change request can be
~5 closed out, it is-the responsibility of the station super-6 intendent and his staff to make sure that-all of their procedures
.are revised.toLmeetLthe new tech spec requirements.
8 Q
Okay.
9 How about the other way around?
How abcut if they
-10 want to change the procedure?
Is there any way to check that 11 the change is consistent with the tech spee?
12 A
That's why the Station Review Board reviews all
'13 changed procedures prior to the time they can be implemented 14 to make sure that they're.not violating the tech specs when 15 they make these procedural changes.
16 Q
So then theJStation Review Board would be responsible 17 for. ensuring that the changes in the procedures are consistent 18 with the tech specs?
19 A
That's correct.
20 Q
Okay.
21
)~51 Whofinv.' Toledo Edison reviews the actual procedures-lkl>
yy to.see that they are. consistent with the~ proposed procedures
'23
~
ethat.are submitted'by L&W, the draft procedures?
p(>'
24 A
<Thdt would be;the-Station Review Board.
w.Fm nm, w.
Q So thel Station Review Board' sou d then review the
"~
59 4
s l/'kb38.'
. procedure also:against.the draft B&W'. procedure?
.V
'2 A
That's~ corrects Q
'Okay.
4
'A-
-Informally Power Engineering would.do it, but not'-
5 formally.
6 Q
All.right.
' Do 'you know of. any ' other precursor ~ events that are 8
relevant to the accident at,TMI?
'9 A
'I'm aware that there was a stuck open PORV at one of the'Oconee units, but I.didn't become aware of that until 11 long after our event.
'12 Q
tokay.
13 Any others?
14 A
'There was a recent one at North Anna where the 15 PORV got stuck open, but that's all that I'm aware of.
16
.Q' Okay.
Do you. have any additional information that you believe might be relevant to our inquiry into. the ' events 2 19 surrounding the accident.at TMI?
-20 A
Not at.this time, I guess, fs
.Q Have.we failed to: elicit any information in areas 22
'you~believe to be important?
~ 3, A
.I guess:not.. You've asked a lot of; questions.
JQ
.Okay.
- A p.s.r.
- n coner., Inc.
25
^
.BY;MR. FOLSOM:
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60 I
llhpb39 Q
Do you have any general' comment to make that your experience at Davis-Besse might shed some light on with regard 7^^;
3 (j
to the TMIJinvestigation?
A
.No, I don't believe so.
BY MR. HEBDON:
6 Q
Do you have anything else to add?
7 A
No.
O MR. HEBDON:..Okay.
That completes the interview.
Thank you very much.
10 (Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m.,
the deposition 11 in the above-entitled catter was concluded.)
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 lO m/
-23 x.d.
34
' Ace-FeEh Reporters, Inc.
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