ML19308C584

Deposition of LC Rogers (Met Ed) on 791011 in Middletown,Pa. Pp 1-66

ML19308C584
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	10/11/1979
From:	Frampton G, Rogers L METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280614
Download: ML19308C584 (67)

Text

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NUCLEAR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION O

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. l IN.THE MATTER OF:

THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITIONS DEPOSITION OF LELAND C.

ROGERS s

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-Middletown, Pennsylvania Date -

Thursday, ll-October 3979 Pages 1 - 66

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-Inithe' Matter'of:

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THREE MILE ISLAND

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~9-DEPOSITION OF LELAND C.' ROGERS.

10 Trailer 203 v-Three Mile Island Nuclear Facility ~

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BEFORE:-

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GEORGS T..FRAMPTON, JR.

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'RON HAYNES.

,g 17-PRESENT: - GEORGE.L... EDGAR, representing Mr.' Rogers.

.18-JOHN G. MULLIN,~repre'senting' Babcock & Wilcox.

19 '

ALSO PRESENT:

CARLA'D'ARISTA, NRC staff.

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20, ELIZABETH OLMSTED,gBabcock &"Wilcox staff

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MR. FPNiPTON:.This'is the deposition of

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3-Mr..Leland Rogers, being conducted'by the U. S. Nuclear 4

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Regulatory Commission Special1 Inquiry Grouo on the Three.

5 Mile Island Accident at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, 6

on October 11, 1979.

7 Whereupon, 8

LELAND C. POGERS 9

was called as a' witness, and having been first duly sworn, 10-was exanined and testified as follows:

11 BY MR.' HAYNES:

12 Q

Please state your full name for the record.

13 A

Leland C.

Rogers.

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14 (Rogers Deposition Exhibit 23 IS 3

was marked for identification.)

'16 BY MR. FPR'PTON :

17

-Q Mr. Rogcrs, you previously received a letter ' from 18 us, have you not, that describes in. general terms the 19 purpose of our. group and the ground-rules concerning this 20

' deposition, including the fact that the transcript of the

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21 deposition may. eventually become-public information?

22' jcs AL Yes, that's the letter that you sent he a cony of, V

23

John, and this'isran: excerpt from it.

,24 (Indicating.)

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E MR. EDGAR:

He's seen a copy or a fascimile.

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And}I'llUsh'ow?you:whatwe've. marked!asExhibit23'-

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o.;this;date; -:is that 'the~ resume that' you providedius' in :

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.w conn'ectiongdith this; deposition?'

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(' Counsel 5 handing document to witne'ss.)

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=Mr. Rogers, as I mentioned to you,before'we

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1. 11 r st'artied,: we do have the benefit of the transcript -of the

, depositionith'at you gave at some lencith. on June 29 of.this 112i 9

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13 year'to staff' members of the? President's Commission and r

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a transcript-of an interview with you.by NRC'I"&.E investiga-s

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tors on May 4, We will,Etherefore,.try not~--toDrepeat a lot of this-16-materiai just for the'sak'e 'of saying that we didJit,l but

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to focus on.particular questions' and' concerns that'we'have.

n Have you had an opportunity to 5eview a finalsor an 9

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LofficialLtranscript of'your IL& E interview on May 4?f

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.Yes.

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I'mada no correctio'ns or changes to itor-li

.A 2-lsubmittedlany.. 'It:-was-essentially correct thelway;"

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',4' TQ iCould.y.ou describe.briefly what training you've

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.S' Lhad'on B1&..W nuclear systems and whether'you went through-

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.any operator' training or training' that is like -operator-7

' training'for B'& W plants.

.. A.

Training specifically,for B &~W plants?- I have-

'not'had a'y,.. formal' training, such as a' simulator.

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-The only exposure would havesto be the. manuals and

~11 systems descriptions, and so on, that B & W puts out for the

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Yoil haven't gone through any formal training

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NO, sir.

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lAnd therefore I. guess I'm correct in assuming

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that yoix, haven ' t' received

• any operator licenses --

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That.'s correct..

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-- for B & W plants?

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20 Prior'to March 28th,..did you haveany knowledge'or any-J21 discussions-about th.e plant characteristics in a design

- such a's this Tone that' might ' be - ex pe cted to occur when 12 y q-hI

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(.you-hsdraismall break _in the' steam space at the. top.of the-m

.D 247 pressurizer?'

25 iIs that any issueithat-you.can ever. recall discussing

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11 Jor.considering'or: reviewing in'anyrway?

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J2 A-lio, not.that I can recollect,:no.

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33 As:you. stated.that,-it's a little bit-broad in. scope.

4-I'm not too sure that you're specific enough:in your question, L5-

'buti as.far as'-

,when you did-finally mentio. the small break 6:

in..the'. pressurizer orla;1ine connected to-the' pressurizer a

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none that I can really recollect that.I've had any review of,.

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Q Specifically, what I was -- what I was asking about was whetiher you had ever h'ad an occasion to consider how the

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-system would respond in the case of a small break or loss

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of coolant from the top'of the pressurizer; what you would 13-expect'to see in that situ'ation.

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_A' No, no.-

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You've been here on the site since about: October 16 1972;.is that right?:

A Yes.

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And you've worked here both in connection with the z

ig' Unit 1 startup'and-then' operations and then also in.

Lconnection with' Unit 27 20 B

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Direc.ing my; questions to Unit 2,-wa,s there ever j'

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J23 an occasion' m n you expressed anycconcern orally'or'in l

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' parator.; qualifications or operator confidence -

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-of the Met ~Ed operators inLUnit'27 2

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'You're asking if I ever expressed any concern for 3'-

'their-competence.or capabilities?

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Q Or lack thereof.

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or lack thereof; I don't believe -- as I'm trying.

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to' remember row that I ever stated anything like that or --

7' my experience is the operators were really very good people, 8-

'I c.ounted on that as a plus.-

9 MR. FRAMPTON:

Off the record.

10 (Discussion off the record.)

11 MR. FRAMPTON:

Back'on the record.

While we were df the record you supplied me with a 13 "m

typewritten memorandum or account of 32 pages, of which

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you apparently are the author, called " Statement of the

' Post-trip Involvement in the TMI March 28, 1979 Plant 16 Tra'nsient."

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. We'would like to obtain either this copy or a photocopy s

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.of it.for our files.

IU Is there any problem with that?

20~

MR. EDGAR:

?b problem with doing it.

We'd like 21

'to keep'o'ur logistics in order, and we will produce it to 22 p

you.

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23 MR. FRAMPTON:

Okay, thank you very much.

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24 BY MR..FRAMPTON:

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' discussing.

2 Along the same lines, do you recall ever expressing any

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concern totyour own management' relating to the adequacy of as 4

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-;the control room --. control-room design or layout.in Unit 2?

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Ho, none that I can recall.

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Do you recall expressing any concern, either orally I

or'in writing, to.your own management relating to any

'8

. propensity of.the systan in Unit 2 to actuate safety systems 8

'on a feedwater trip?

10

-(Pause.)

A No.

Again, I can't' recall at'any time that I did II 12 -

that, no. -

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Would you say that Unit 2 did have a problem to --

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to cause activation of high pressure injection in the -- in 15 the case of a complete loss of feedwater?

Is that -- would 16-that be a fair characterization?

17 A

Well, let me put it this way:

there have been 18 a given number of plant transients during the startup progra n 19'

-where the secondary plant systems had given us. plant,

20 transients and associated reactor trips.

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_But as an evaluation of that, I would not have 22-considered it to be.a-limiting condition of'the plant, nor

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-would I have considered it to be out of the ordinary.

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would be-the kind of' situation that any second plant 73

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< expect 1to' actuate'a: plant trip..

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'Okay, perhaps?I; asked my questionfin a-clumsy J/

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6 iWhat!I was'-- what'I~was~g'etting-;at:was to try.to find-7, - Loutifrom you'whether an-event of a loss ~of.feedwater, secondarv is)

s'ide' event, causing'a reactor trip, whether in Unit'2 one

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r expected' ordinarily to see the. system pressure ~ fall below 9 --

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10 the high pressure' injection set point.

11 Was.that something'that customarily-happened?!-

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It would be'an' expected event, Lyes; it-'had already:

occurred several times.. One'would expect to see it at any-

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p/z l time you hhd a' complete loss of feedwater,-especially at N

15 high-power; that you would get a high pressure injection

-16 actuation,fye's.

17 Q

, Okay, the question I want to ask you,then,is 18.

.whether'you recall 2 discuss. tag-prior to March 28th with anyone

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.19 thatifeature nr that characteristics of t;he system in~ terms 20:

of whether it mighti be a problem or cause: for concern or

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21; something that one would not"like-to see happen?

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.Yes.

Well,--I.did have several-conversations along-3;fN Jn.wf l-23 the line that:each time wo had a-high. pressure injection-V

g actuation, because of the'other logics of;the systems-

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associatedL with it' -- which brought in so~dium hydroxide :-- I' Y

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'concidered it to.ba'at the. wrong timo.

2 But that was not something we had much control over.

It

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3' was a GPU-Burns-and Roe. logic result.

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.B-&.W startup management, and B &.W on-site personnel had

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5 all expressed concern with;the' fact that each time high pressur e: injection actuated we would have ~ some sodium

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. hydroxide' injection into the reactor coolant-system,.which 7

'8, l is an undesirable chara'cteristic.

It was fine for a building spay actuation, which would be 9

10; Ethe' ultimate result of rapid loss of coolant pressure, like 33 -.

a LOCA event.

And as an end result, it would be the proper thing to havc-y_

happn,butwe[eltit'cameintooearly.

And as just a 13 small high pressure. injection actuation would result in g

sodium hydroxide injection, that's undesirable..

,3 16 -

S, yes, I'd expressed concerns in that area.

But that' could have been corrected with logic changes and 17 interlock changes in the Burns and Roe-GPU system -- paperwork 18

' system.-

O Do you.know or-have you heard from anybody that.

there was any eccasion prior to March-28 on'which any operator throttled or delayed auxiliary feedwater in an

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(.j attempt to prevent the amount-of system shrinkage in the.

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At-Three Mile Island 2?

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fAL L None :.that11: recalls.

2 i oes your answer suggest that this isLsomething

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might have heard might'be a procedure-employed elsewhere?

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A-110, J no ; ' I was'trying to clarify --?did you~mean that.this~may have been suggested at Three Mile-Island?-

-I_did not know-of-that, and I never-heard of it being.

suggested anywhere else,<either,-that-I.can recall'.

O Would'that be an undesirable-operating action for

.any, reason?.

Not putting feedwater-into the system?

It would'be'

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00 o' clock in the morning; is 16 s.

-that right?.

17 A

That's correct.

18-Q And during that conference call were you the one 19 that initiated the question about whether the block valve.

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of-the pressurizer relief-valve was closed?-

21 A-Yes.

I brought that up.

T22

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What' responsedid you get?

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The immediate' response was that Mr. Connor.'did not

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!And you didn't;1 earn in'that telephone'. conversation

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Do~you think.that would have:made.a differenceJin 15 n

your. views about what actions ought to-be taken later on in

. 16 theiday, had you:known that that-valve ha'd-been the source of. loss of. inventory from the' primary coolant system?

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?A-I_ don't know.

I would say that is speculation.

C-i 19-11can,only, state that :.was' a piece of information that:I did not:know.

21 LWhat,I may:.haveEdonejotherwise would'only be speculationL p: j..

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Did you make'any;assumptiion;during'.the morning

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I'm really referring'to any time during the

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morning.

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.Even'after you.were out at the plant?

7-A I must state at this point that since I didn't 8

know how long the valve was open, I had no concept'of how 9

much. energy had actually. passed through that system.

I knew 10 that some had, enough to cause a rupture disk failure and 3,

release.of activity to the building.

12

.i But from that point in time 'there was no correlation nor 13 9.h

. evaluation of that information to come up with any' conclusions, 34, no, especially noe that day.

,g Q.

What I'm trying to ask you is whether -- had you 3g known that the valve had bee, opened for 2-1/2 hours, would 37

.that have substantially increased the amount of coolant that 18 jg-you-were assuing was the ballpark estimate for what might i

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'have-been lost?

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It would have.to have some input in the way.I figured things out, sure.

ND I.had no idea of the inventory we-had pass through and

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1 10 That it was that much?.

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'JI think~the' conclusion or"one of the conclusions

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'that:was: reached:ddring':that conference' call' was a decision

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toL try to restart one of tihe; reactor coolant pumps; is'that -

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do you recall-that?

6 A:

Yes..

7-Q' Andfdo you remember.whether that conclusion was.

communicated' to the' people who were iri.~ the ~ control room, '

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Mr..Kunder or other_ people?

9 10-A Yes.- As I remember, we had1all-decided that the

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.best: thing to.do was to try to' restore system pressure and restart th'e reactor cooling pumps as a minimum of one, get 12 4

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at least one beoing..M'

' - 13 :

'Q:

Do you remember whether that was communicated 34,

'15-as an' instruction really from Mr. Miiler to the people,at 4 '

. the plalit?.

16-

-At I think it was left that Mr'. Connor should attempt-j7

'18 toi do t'1at.

^ It's difficult for me -to interpret what you mean by 39

" instruction'," because you're'in a conference situation, and 20

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a bottom line is~ reached, and it's. agreed that's the

-21 process you'should attempt.Jto work-for.

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?Iniyour mind, there wasn't*any question that was

whSt they;were going to try-to do?

j. 2p A

No,:no.'-

l: 2i.

5

_Lp s

444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001

'.(202)'347-3700 r

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15 4

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10 WYoidid' n' t -learn anyth'ing in that convercation:

,j V

7 9i

-[

.about whetherJhigh pressureJinjection.had.been.on, throttled,

.. m k-[.

~j

'or substantially throttled?

3

. '. r.

. 4-

A.

I. had rio knowledge that it-had-been throttled, and s

.would/not have ask'ed.'

~

5 L 6; A couple of' hours after the trip, high' pressure 4

Jinjection would not beisomething-that you would be-

.necessarily_ interested in finding out, assuming.that the

.s plarit was not-losing water from a certain. given ~ time on, g.-

g a few minutes.after the trip occurred, when the' rupture disk V

.went.

g.-

s My mind wouldn'.t have felt-it was necessary to figure

.anything~like that out, since I had no idea that we had lost 13 so'much inventory.

~

j.

.O You knew the reactor coolant pumps were both off, ti,p;.

right?

A Yes.-

17

(

Q; And was there any discussion:of whether natural L18 circulation had been achieved?'

A I don't-recall that as a point; it may have, but I: don't: recall that.

21.

O:

Was there.any discussion or was there any concern I Ir W '

oniyour part as-t.oTwhere the-decay heat was going;- what A_./

423

was the Aeats ' sync?:

l

'24-4;.

f:%

~

j; A-JI';11-say".that.I'wouldn.'t.have attempted-to figure 26:

u cOce3edera( cAeporten, Sac 444 NORTH CAPITot.. STREET.

' WASHINGTON, D.C. ' 2OOOl b(202) 347 3700

16 iddpl6

. 'i thnt-out at-tho tima,--knowing that the control' room opsrators 2-were proceeding.along their own; post-trip-type'of y

i :

~ operations.

.3 I wouldn't have ;needed' to think that I had, to ask that 4.

s j

v 5

question.

-Q Uc11, normal post-trip operations wouldn't have 6

re'sulted in-the main pumps being:off, would.they --

7 A

TRt's true.

8,

'O

-- in this situation?

9 A

That's true.

The concern was that the pumps were 10 off and we should get them back on.-

But by that assumption 3,

j you don't.come in with questions whether or not there is a heat sync available'. '

q3 Qp

're's always the atmospheric. release available; there's g

always the main steam turbine bypass valve available to 5

16-l circulat' ion flow.

17 i

Unless-I had some inkling that was not occurring, that

-l 18 1

19--

wou.14 not'have entered my mind as a concern at the time.

l

.1

.C.

-I'm not.quite-sure I. understand your answer.

Are i

20 j

.you 'saying you would.have assumed they could get. natural circulation?

22

- (m.J-A'

.I~would have assumed it was working.

m.

23 Q-

-That there was natural, circulation going on?

[J A'

-Yes.

25 s.

1 c0cc-9ederal cRejrorten Dnc.-

344 NONTH CAPITOL STREET

' WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001-(102) 347 3700

17 dh$p17 0

I~think you'crrived in the control-room cbout 3-2 7.:30 that morning, something like that?

.c

.It was son.e time between 7:00 and 7:30, yes..

A-

_ 3 O

And do you remember asking Mr. Zewe,if the 4

l

)

reactor coolant pumps had been started?

5.

A Yes.

6 g

lQ And did you get any response from him as to what Y

Y "9

^"

Y 8-successful?

g A

Yes.

10 Q

What did he say?

Bill told'me that he had been able to try and A

i they had'tried all.four of the pumps, and it was the last

P

.one-that they tried that they finally got to run; he had AM 14-had trouble with getting them to start.

Only one of them did 15 start.

16 And he said they had only run it for a few minutes and 17 then it tripped back off again.

Q Do you remember him telling you anything about.his

. conclusions as to why the pump would.not show very much or 20 any liquid flow?'

21 A

No.

I'think, as I recall now, Bill mentioned it

' 22 -

' (']

ran' pretty lwell for a few minutes.

And then they got the

~

'V

23 -

loss"of flow indication again, and the motor current went i 24

-(LJ

~ '..

down~ to about 100 amps and then it tripped off.

25-

. cAce. 'dederal cReporteu, Dnc 444 NORTH CAPITOL. STREET Q 3[7 3700

o 4

'18 yd pl8? '

.i Q:

JI think chortly thereafter you made a tolophons-v.

!2

. call on.which you reached Mr. Spangler in Lynchburg; is

/_

u ?

3

that :right? '

-4

'A.

$Yes, I.made two.tries at'thati.before I finallr-M~ 'g.

6-

.gotjthrough.

8

-Q;

~Okay.

And I thinkyou-talked in previous. interviews

~

t 1

3 7

about the substance of that, so I won't go into that with-

-' :g you.

g J Around 8:00 o' clock yott and.a number of: other people

~

J10 were summoned by Mr. Miller, Gary Miller,.to go into the

,)

shift superviser's; office.- Was it --

g

.A

.,I don't~know if we did or not; we did on all the-12; Test of n om.whenever.we had a caucus, but I'm not sure 33 -

h-whether we did on that one.

34.

,Q You formed,a little group to discuss what the status f the plant was and what'you should be doing?

16 A

.Yes..

0 Was dere any discussion then --

this was the 18

~first time ~ you were getting - together with people that.

were'more or less making the decisions.there.

Was there 20 i

any. discussion then of the question of,whether high pr' essure -

' injection was on, whether.it cught to be on,.that-you can

-22 V.

J crecall?.

.23 1

~

. A' ' ~

I-don't recall. that ilt occurred at that time, no.

o,

. 24.

.~

-l "i

-25;

'~

MR.. EDGAR:'tThe' question is the~then present state-r-

7,

Cf0TfCTS, CC" C CZQ OCe C

' 444 NORTH CAPITOL. STREET s

-: WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001 (202) 347-3700

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_MR. FRAMPTON:

(_\\.

._ Right.

3 :(,/.

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3-BY'MR.'FRAMPTON:

I 4

~Q

- $nf

.Did you have{any' assumption as to whether it was 5

= on?_.

~

1 A

No.

6

- 7 0

.I'know thic'is a long time ago, but what can you-8 tell us from your own memory about that. discussion?-

~

g A

Well,MILthink-this is pointed out in my other, to -

interviews..~At the time we were agreeing that it should be ---

i, we should.have another attempt at starting the reactor coolani.

jj 12'.

Pump so that all'of the people that were in there were 3

. satisfied that whet the operators had been reporting, what 13 pd_

jf., they had seen-before, that we-had all -- we were able to getlthat same information-and than work on it.

.15.

S 'it was agreed to~try to dart.another reactor coolant

. 16" pump at'that-time.

37 18.

MR. FRAMPTON:. 'Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)L jg s

BY MR. FRAMPTON:

.20 Q

Was there any discussion of natural circulation l

21 l_

at..that time by that group?

22

( A. ~

> Hot that I recall.

That_was a very short

23 _

l

?

1 discussion period, which we arrived very quickly at:

.24 ;

_ }'e t ' s a

Stryjto getianother. pump'on-decision.-

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Andithen thnt.was tried.

Everybody observhd' whitt 4y 7

9 I"g,;atLleast with the' indications we had'available

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72

p

?to us atithat time.= Solit was~a rather short,discussi'on

~

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?perio'd.-

s

^

yn -;

4

(

Q-

.Well,i did you,have-any knowledge.or assumptio'n

~

1

. 62 at.~ thati time about 'whether - there was natural' circulation --

~

what the: strategy had been over the'past hour or so for 7 -1

'trying to.. cool the core?'

8,

?

'.A-No.

I think at that point in time, myself,-I'was

.stil'l-in the basic:information gathering. Phases. -

10 And I.hadn't --

I:hadn't arrived at too many conclusions.

11 at'that point.

I still wasn't sure what we had'in the 12

^

~

hot ' leg. reactor coolant loops and arrived at that conclusion after our next-attempted pump run.

k_

-So I would say at this' time I wasn't concerned with-15

'b i

.tr'ying.to evaluate everything_about the plant.

16'

~

I~-was still getting as much in as I could.

.17-Did.you urge th~at the attempt -- the strategy ought-Q-

- 18. -

'toLbe.to!get-the pump started if at all possible?

~

jg

.A Yes.

'20

.0

'Was there any. discussion.among'the people in the

21?

. caucus that-in Lany':way. reflected :an awareness that; as long -

-22

' (('

a'sthe - main - pumps -were :not startedI there wasn't any effective 1

, v. -

. 23 5

~

4 mechanism tojtake; heat;away;from:,the core?.

a.t

.;24 ::

, I' i,

Was that'--

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. lI! don't";rechil{cnyconvarantionstothato? fact, s

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I(ge[t[heimpression[fromyour.previousinterviews-

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thatLit is'your recollectionitbat~as a result of that

[4; a.c~

<5 Jgroup:,Lgetting together,'itiwas' decided"to try.to. start-J

[

,y_

a;

~M la reactor coolantipump.and! that :it"was ~ only ':af ter: you -

j, 1;

failedfto start an'y of.~the pumps and!you observed steam"

~

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there ;instead( ofiliquid,'.'that can-attempt was made --.a 4

. ~

fd$ cision lwas;.then made to tryl.to repressurize for..the~

n jg.

purpose of collapsing th'e st'eam bubbles.

~Islthat.a: fair'. characterization of the.way the' decision-

.1'i ymaking1 proceeded,<as you' recall it?

Or do:I have it wrong?

12

.-J n '.Y u may have slipped a little bit..in there in that-i

13-

" ' A;

'[

w'e-dec'ided to start a pump as.an effort -- and one was run.

~

s You stated weididn't get= any started, but we did'. stiart a i

115,

. t-16(

' ~

-And the indications that I'saw ---and the-rest of the' 17.

1 s

peo'ple there with me -- there was general agreement - '.and

'~

i...

.;18 ;

- 1'9.

I. don _'t think anybody-opposed:that -- that we-had steam in

q. ;.

our. loops,fastfar.as the-reactor coolant pump,goes.- And

.yo r

~

.there's7not.much purpose:initrying' to-'

run-creactor' coolant

.n..

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pumps until;weigettwater.-in there.

o 722

--: -=.

9

. tat about that t'imevit was decided to-retire to the shifti

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MI4 1

?supervi'ser'sfoffice'and-sit down.andcreally have~aDbrain M

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..7 isession.-

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Ni moro d$cisions waroLmido after:ths pump run was

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Tacccmplisheduntil(after,another'sitdownmeetingwas

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-:3' sheld.

~'.

Y lQ-

Okay. - I et's. talk.about th'at second; sit down,

g. ;

~

~

5,

meeting..

g

-s a

A-okay.

Q LWhat do you recall about the substance'of the

~

7 conversation at that' caucus?.

-8 A'

Well,~by that time _we had all agreed or at least

.g-in our :own minds had accepted the fact that we were in 10 -

-steam phase in the hot' legs and that our.b3st attempt was to

jj T

try to get them back to a' water phase.

12

,c,3

?-

c. _ n._,.

And thenidiscussions led to what are the actions available

13-

-to.us, what can~we do to'get'them back in a water phase.

.g.

And as far as length of. time.and all the information that 15 s

16.

'was discussed there, I-don't really have that available

.for recall.

j7 But a result of that particular meeting was to

~:18

repressurize..

g,

,Q "And ;then I think the: information: that!s' available

~

~from'Lthe. instruments ~shows that about 8:30 or 8:45 in the.

1 morning: there wasian attempt made to: put more' water' linto the fsystem<andL getitthe pressure Jup tio abo' ti 2100 d-2200: psi; is u

that right??

/-

wu-

.24;

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'Ai J Yes. :

.; 25

['

g 444 NOPtTH CAPITot. STREET

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[ [ --

j (aoa) 347 37oo -

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Andithan for coma period'of timo,'tho:.blockivalvo:

f was'used'tocycleSthatLpressureto.. keep?infinLahihh ban'd?i Al Yes;

.; n.

'4 Q

At"the time ~that'the; group got together.on.the'-

second occasion:in theishift"superviser's office,.was.there-

^

'6

'any. discussion o'f_the indicated' hot' leg temperatures and:

.whether you knew accurately what those temperaturea.'in fact

'[

r.

-were?

^

9:

A-Discussions,.-yes.

Whether or not we knew-

~

/ accurately -- that_is, I'think at this point key. -None of usLwere.. acceptable to the fa'ct.that-they were all accurate 12 indicat' ions.:n ',

V 13

.-iE

- We all pretty much' agreed thati'we did-have information 14 1

thats' told..u's-tha't these - RTDs 'are indicating correctly in the

.15 s.

4 3

steam phase,~specifically, the hot'. leg-RTDs.-

The-cold' leg RTDs seemed to be_ indicating what one' c17 wouk~d expect:with high pressure injection water' going-into' 18' ths. cold leg lines.

19 -

~

Wefwt i

l't at all sure that the RTDs were actually~ going

- gn.

i to.give.us~an-accurate indicationcof the. temperature.'.So'it' s '

-21

- wasf not 'iccepted. that We knew enough :to call them, accurate s

b 522 1 p{7 eindicationsfand'th'erefore-that;that:was'-there,Ewhether or u

, 231

.u

n'ot (that really isitrue. :.

hy:[

[Qj Well,\\.maybe,fyou can. explain that..a'little more-:to 1s 2

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'444 NORTH car.'TOL. STREET

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24 d:p24

_1 me'in c wcy thtt a non-technical'p:rson would understcnd it.

2 A

Okay.

(

-'\\

3'

.Q I think by.that time there were some instruments on_.the wires to t$ry to get level meters or some other 4-

%)

5 kind'oflinstrument to-get a reading of what-the wires

~

showed the RTD correlation would be; is that right?

6 A

Yes.

7 8

O And.those were showing something somewhat over 7_00 -- 720 degrees?

9 A

Those were showing up a resistence which equated 10 out on calibration curves ~to over 700 degrees.

3, The question was, of course:

is that RTD functioning 12 Pr Perly i'n a steam phase?

That's.what the resistence is, 13 d

but is that'an accurate indication of what the steam

~

.g temperature is?.

nr s,.

ques on was raised --

16 0

Why would an RTD designed to give you an accurate 37 indication of water temperature at fairly high pressure'no_t 18 19

. give you_a fairly ballpark indication of steam phase temperature?

,A-You're asking me to._ evaluate the question that.was 21

. raised in that meeting.

And all'I'm saying is that the p

i. f ~

question-was brought up in there: do we know'that the RTD'is

-an. accurate indication:in a steam phase, when indeed ip's

_]m' -).

normally designed to be operated in a water' phase?

-25 cAce 9edera{ cReporters, Onc.

+

444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON, D.C.

2000t

'(202) 347-3700

25 dhp251 4

So;tha que tion wac thara,'which mado one think wa 2

weren't really sure we.had that information available.

Was 3

'it really'a good. indication.

O Could'one' deduce-if there were steam bubbles in the 4

1 /.

.)

,5 system and the RTD was in fact measuring.or attempting to m asure steam temperature -- could'one deduce, at least, that 6

the steam temperature was quite high, at least 500 or.600 7

deg es?

8

- A' one could deduce just about anything, I guess, yus.

g But I see what you're saying.

-10 O

I chose the word " deduce" because I'm asking whether that is an inevitable engineering conclusion.

I don't know the' answer.

The first thing most people would say is:

"Is it A

calibrat ed for that phase?"

The question obviously could come up:

there may be a different calibration standard-in steam than in water, and that. might give you then a different resulting temperature, if you had a different phase of operations.

So it.would be a question that nobody would have had 20 information available to answer at that point in time,. which 21-would just-throw in a factor that you weren't sure that was 22.

f. w^)

telling-you-the_true temperatures of what you were reading on 23 the' millivolt bridge for.resistence.

f

-(]

Q.

Let.me jump ahead for.a minute and then come back.

v 25 c:fice-9ecl era { cAejrotten, Snc.

444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.

20001 (202) 347 3700 '

26 d:p25;

.Tha h:t-1cg tcmp:rcturoc-cro tha'indicctions of whnt th9 1

hot leg temperature might be; - tey stayed very high for a

~

2 j

l good part.of the day, up until 5:00 or 6:00 in the aftern'on 3

or afterwards; isn't that right?

(~i 4

• \\_/-

~A No,.not accurately; when we got what we felt was

~

.5 water back~in the A-loop, which was somewhere around 2:00 6

o' clock in the afternoo1, the'RTD came back down on-scale, 7

and indicated.what'we expected the temperature wasi. what 8

we had actually expected that that was what the temperature

~

9 was.

.10 We saw a dramatic change take place in that RTD indicatior 11 where it appeared like we had water back in that A-loop.

12 The in'ication on the B-loop at that time was staying high, d

~13 yr3 and that pretty well corresponded with what the est of V

14 the instrumentation was telling us:

we still had steam in

-15

^ ' '

the B-loop.

16 Q

Okay..Let's talk about the B-loop for a minute.

17 Hindsight, of course, is a wonderful thing, and I know it's 18 hard to separate out what you may-think now from what people

' 19 -

were saying to themselves in the control room on March 28th.

20 But is there any way that that steam -- that steam bubbles 21 could ha'veLremained in t'

^.ot leg at temperatures anywhere 22

^y, near that temperature throughout the day without continuing g

a 1

23 generation of the heat by the core, as a result of some. /

24 boiling?

! ;I x

25-3

.pg11,.if you assume that-you have limited or next

' c/lce. 9eileta{ cAeportcu, !]nc 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET

. W ASHIN GTON. D.C. 20000 (202) 347 3700

,.-o

-27 p

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1 to no h: t removtl espibilityi c::p;cially Lon' tho B-loop wharo i

2l we'.had' bottled up the steam generator -- we had no.

.s.

,~. ' '

^>

3; atmospheric ~ dump capability-taking place at all during the

.l.

4' day.on the.B side.

~

.(-

t J

i 5

We had no'. indication-of any natural circulation because f the' steam' condition..-You wouldn't expect to find'it

--6 7

anyway.

8

-It would be -fairly easy to say -that the temperatures.coulc.

_I g

-stay V very high;once~they had become created in there;

~10' _-

it would. stay there with no capability of removing it, except the ambient' loss at that $1me were ---

_;7 0

-8"811 ~~

- 12

,r, A.

small heat ransfer capability,,yes.

33 h

The ambient' losses would be a very slow change in 34 i

"E 15-f.i 1

Q S

it would be possible,'as far as you can see, to

'16 have a continuing condition of super heat or at least g7 right at saturation'in the loops and still be satisfactorily

.),,

i cooling the core?

39

.'A-"

Especially because of the geographic layout of.

the loops;'.it's a. natural trap.

- 21 MR.-EDGAR: ' Wait.a minute; ~ we're getting.the 22 question:and'the-answer put together.

j

Can wo-have the ciuestion read back?

~

424 :

^ V, d MR'.aFRAMPTON:

Can you-do that?

I25, p

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~ LTHE WITNESS:..

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Yes..

E2

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a

%2:

9 l BY -'MR. 7 FRAMPTON : -

',;. 4

>Q' Was'there anyidiscussion'in'that'second ca'ucus--

y w

a.

's.

(meeting.orLanytimelduring the day.asx to'why.;the RTDsron l6 ; - the1. hot! lag mightEnotjbe'more a less accurate?

. 7_

. :Thi's isdan'. instrument-that measures" temperature, does

~

tit n t?q 4 8 D'

g

.A Yes..'OnlyTas~Ifrelated..

1oj 0

Based on'the-effect ofLthe resistence of the

.materialionthe-instrument-itse1f, why wouldn't it measure

~

~

temperature

~

.g -

n whatever more~or.less accurately?- Was there y

ti; t.

'r-'

.' 13 T

r.

'A As I stated before, the --' question was raised whether'the' calibration was as-good for steam an it is 15 '

--for water?

Are'we'actually reading the same.temperaturelas

~

what'it' indicates on the-resistence calibration curve?'

17 s

I1 don't recall that any.further discussion went on-during-

.18 the: day of whether. or 'not those were telling-us the true

indication of temperature or-not..

20 '

I lsSlieve as.the day progressed, it was quite: evident

~

to<most.Leveryone-there that.that.c perature indication was 22..

.w

['y -

23.

pretty:lclose'(to whatL he-ter.c in the(loops were t

1 v.

4.

v,4

= 24 ' ' rea'lly at'.

~

+-

- ~..

~

'-I don't'believe wetbcchered with discussing.whether'or.

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[: m;>[ - Od 7.J51 fQ1 MDo::youLremember/at}thatItime'a-seNond caucus' a.

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meeting,3whetherryou jadjgotten anylinformat'ionsaliout!ther

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JA EI; thinklthat :that. meeting was; wherelwe, first - got

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itemperatureLindications off of the in-core:thermocouples-(13-1 - - o e>

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(seemecL to be another? area of ~ the information -- the. informatic'nt 21; Jwasi confusingnin j that ~it ' covered lsuch a' broad, area.-

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i hey ~.aretreallyftellingJus'the>true temperaturefindicatiion?

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p And?I-don't think anybody tried to evaluato it much' 2f s beyond~ that..-

"A 3: -Q twas.it your sense that the-high numbers were disbelieved or was;the. question of..their accuracy,.xt sort 4 i' of tossed'out? 5 A 'I beliLve that's the tone ~of.it. 6 -Q TheJlatter? 7 A Is.that really an accurate indication'~of what 8 the temperature may'be in.there? -g It wasn't -- it wasn't much more than.that, I would -10 think,yjust questions. ~Q 'If those temperatures, the'high temperatures 112. .t, were anywhere near accurate, is there any other conclusion-L that you could draw, other than you had or recently had had steam-blanketing or steam bubbles in the core? Were.there other explanations for such a high temperature? A I'm not sure that anyone would have immediately come to .:enclusion that we had had a loss of water level.in the 19 core area'with that inclination. 20 Maybe someone would, but they did not bring it up; it 21. would be more.or-less of a high temperdure indication, if it 22 n' ' ') ; was to:be believed. 23 It--would not'necessarily automatically follow -24 _(( intuitively to-everyone that we.had lost water level in the ~ 'y

25

. cOce-9edera{ cAepotten, $nc - /44 NORTH CAPITOL STREET ' WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005 '(202) 347-3700

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M U Let$meisayithat[from:theJthrusttoftpracticallylev<;yt.hing n yy. a g- +; g, - n Q }Y " s u , Gli .c 3 ) Fati that'_ ~ point?initime thatieverything ;beyond Jthat was ' tolget(t hei 9, ,y .. _n n w gf,' 'g& ~ _ ^ [_ _ 33 ' ' ^ l g;f -gF 7S , plant intola fstable! condition: an_ di.notytoo muchE,to: gof b'ack i

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= ~ g l$ndicationsjso/that?we 'know NhereiweLare,fand that was. I 1 j -t ,c w, - (( [ '

• 8; four major-lt5rustrthroughout the'dayi s

. j ~ l,; 7,s /Q: TI/gues's'myiguestioniwas1 directed to.'whetherfthat: 2.10 : 5informat1on,JtemperatureainformationJif?b'elieved,3wouldiput, W g- <i L.- ~ ,11~ more. urgency:on1.the need(to makeisure that the core. was. v. 7 m ac

covered - or? at ~1ea..st=--1not.only' covered -- but liquid-was

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~ 'actually coming. irr' contact with the fuel, elements.; 13. ~,. . 3# I. j. ,1 2 - 14 1 3 - A' _'That'wasipartLof~our actions;' we-were' reaching

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conclu'sions, athlea'st,ythatA as;I' understood'it, that we 15 t + 2 ,.u, were keeping wateriin"the system with the direction ~from y o .,g Mr.JMiller. ~such that'; HPI; would not be secured. withoutf' myl .17; ,3- . knowledge., ~ 1 1 .181 ig.. .o

• 6

^^ ^ Qi ' 1You crecallhthat[ instruction?l D:; + _.19 - 1 4 ,x , A1 l I do.: j = 20 : m-m 't 7,9 y 7

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<DoLyoulknow;why thatinstruction was delivered? t i 21-. ? -2W O a \\ m, "Aj -;No. Itiwas:merely'aistatement'that:Mr.' Miller w ;, ~ ~ -y ., so 22; (( madeTan'dnorone(disagreed (with;it.- r # . 1,23, ?-v S Q T'. JTh"at;wasias a:resultLof.-.or during the second ..,3 ~ ,&, M t x $ U e . fi ~ ~ 241 .~ l ~ '[ $,[f "caucius ! meetingf you ' think? m ~ pys; ~ y -- l 5 * /._ - _r .p ; _; _ _ bY O Y YQ Yf . i W h v;f

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I A es',4 --;I9feellthat was theitime~I= heard that. O1 ~ -id;p3D jdge g1

?And;-itLwa~s'a' result.of that discussio'?that'it-Q M2:

~ n s 3-Twasidecided',.to:get;the pressure.up and_-put=more' water'into - [' gY, 14-

theasystsm?.

~ (A"

Yes - '

? 6i Q ' D.id you sknow. during that norning that Mr. :. Schaedel 472 had: tried; to get --into.' the plant- - tried' to get -on.the-u '8 " island?-- 19 - A Oh,EI-didn't know.he tried"anything otherLthan.to- ~

10 go to -the visitor's center.

I think that'was what. happened 4

11.

-with him. ~ -12 Q~ I thinkfyou called him late in the morning at-his a +. 1 -. 213 house? ~ '.14 A - Ye s. -' 15 'Q- . What c'used you to do that?' a i. '16

^A :

I had~had messages passed on to me that he was 17._ over at the visitor's' center, standing by for-information-M ~ 18 ; 'or' directions that-I had for-him. .19 -And?I.believe,'as much as I can recall, that I asked the C 20 in'dividual.who was talking to.me then to pass back on to 20 .Mr. Schaedelito'go ahead and take a muster of.B & W people ~ '22' -and send them'onL-home. ( (23^ And1Iftalkedito him later'at home. I wante'd'to get my-1

- 24 i

. Poop e'out;of. nilling;around in.the' parking' lot out at the l ~ '7 / C. 225 Lvisitor's center:and have some place where I could.get in 1 c0ce. Jedeta( cAeporten, $nc ' .' ; ~ / 444 NORTH CAPITOL. STREET 7 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001-s (#0* ## "r

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~ - e ,d p33: fi' Jtouch Nith thon.c >( d ? a ..- 3 b '%' l[ E2 i At.:.that (time, ifI/ expected Ito. havej to_ (call'a them b'ac[lateri j [f

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u a 1 '. - J 3:; ".onain;the,dayfforcontinued;supportLtolthe(utility. i u.~ = ,- [n;M/ ' ~ cy. -QE 'During:Lthatiday,lMr.pSchaedelyserved1more:or.less

'I M 1

's . i.. '~ ~ i 4 S fas afconduit foriinformationnetween youiand~Lynchburg?? s. Yes.1 EA? z. - 3 61 s m 7.Q., Wa.t ithat(anf arrangement' that you. consciously- ...s 371 u ' s-7 8'. 1 established'forLthat1 purpose?-; s r _[ l~ . as :he tsupposed to stiayf there an ;be.on(call from both - W g}

10 iparties',TorswasJthat-just a natural.-cons 2quence.of:the~

33 developing' situation?

\\A

Well, asjI stated. earlier,-I expec't'ed'we:would:be.

c -112 s-

-13 calling peopleiinto.the plant earlier-'- 11ater on during:

je 'the day to suppor'tToperations; ~ 7 h' I expected ~if Greg were:at home near his phone I could m reach -h'im'., at' any - tilme,. and-it would. be much more convenient : . g trying tofgetLin touch 1with him there than at'the visitor's - 17;- enter,'wh'ich-is almostian impossible; situation-there.

18; qg -

Conscious effort -- I-think we a'll,neeEng a communications network, because it'was.the most' obvious-convenient way.to make-things happen.- -I.could call-him fairly easily,iand. ' w

then,-he.inkturn could pass'on information, as required, 22' fy

_.-either(to my.other people or tolthe Lynchburg, office.. c Af

23,

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Had Mr. Spangler askediyou,in your earlier-

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.m \\ I $,. ' e itelephoneconversationtofreport}in>or' check'backwithhim l ~ 25. l; ^~ t A - hcg * = { TQ ffOthttj[ l C. - i+ e ] I444 NONTH CAPITCt. STREET ^' I WASH'INGTON. O.C. ' 20061 ' ] t.bkW l _'

• 1(102) 347 3700 -

i .c -. 1 34 idip34; -p .on any periodic basis?- IA - No. : . e.) - 4 V' 3; Q Did-you have any" discussion about' communication ~ f(~} with.him?- ^ 74 w L A-5 .I told him we would be getting:back to him later on when we knew more. Q: 7 -Would there'have been'-any problem.during the morning and afternoon ~in you. calling him directly if you needed to or wanted'to? g 'A Well, I.had a difficult time just getting him at 7:45, so yes; 'during the-day-as events evolved, the communications'in and out of the control-room were really: 12 s ~ limited with what we had available. 13 < f 3.-. V Q Did you have a specific problem making long 14 distance calls that'wouldhave made it easier for you to" call Schaedel than for you to call Spangler? ~ 16 A Oh, yes, definitely; the-only way I could use the Met Ed. phone for long distance calls was to go through teir WATS line connection. 19 20-- That by.itself meant-I either-had-to have all the numbers memorized.or find a book'that had all those numbers available, - 21 if-I could get through to~the WATS line system., 22 A--.- Whereas,. local; calls, I could just pick it up and dial

.23 out.on itLand get a local c'all;througN immediately.

24 p). ( .Q It' appears from the plant data that a decision was 25 . cAce-9edera( cReporters, Dnc. 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON, J.C. 2000l' i' us una

.35

dgp35.

i .madh about ll:30^in tho' morning to-blow the system-down ~ L2 -

and try and.go1onidecay heat.

!Y

3' Do you recall whether you discussed that'at all with 3.m f

- 4 .Mr.--SchaedelLin'your first phone conversation with-him? O ) -%4 5 HadEthat. decision been made'or that evolution started

6

. when you talkedLto him?: 3. Do you know?: '8 lA I couldn't correlate that phone conversation g 'with those events-right now. I'm not sure I could say.that at all. 10 3j May I go back to what'you just said? m 0 8"#8* 12 ,s 13. A ' Y ur question about the decision to blow down the r T,)s system and go to decay heat,-which is not defined as a 34 s direction.when that decision'was made to depressurize. / 'What was the purpose of that decision, and what ,g. was the. goal of-it? g lA The -- in one of th e meetings, the question was 18 raised by someone that potentially we may not be delivering 3g our water'-- high1 pressure' injection water to the core area.. 21 And-I'm not at all. convinced that that was a general .22 3 agreement.. It was a question and because of that. question, 23 then,;some resulting action was taken to verify that thht s 24 . x.. x/ )

question was right-or wrong

did we actually have: water in. s 25 O' cAce-9edeta[ cAejrottezs, $nc 4 444 NORTH CAPITot. STREET ' WASHINGTON, D.C. 2000t-(202) 347-3700

, ' a<- s %

36 4

} 9 T df36s_ - fit _ithb(coro aren? d ~ p;. N ' ~ 2- --And1the'nliti was developed: ;howIdo we get information E l s 4 Q. to-provertha'tLweI ave? water.in the core' area?J;And$that's ~ h f3 / '4:

when1we decided 4tocdepressurize:as a.gr'oup decision.-

xb The core' flood-tank's would then act as essentially- ~ >5 .c : a.Jsurge tank. volume?on the reactor vessel and ensure that -6 }

7-the; core ~ area-washcovered with water.

J q ..7 4-8; That.was the: conscious -- conscious direction we were-( l ~ g '- . heading at that time. ) i I ~

• las - ther e any discussion.'that.the~ strategy of 10:

0 ~ l Pressurizing high and cycling the' pressure,-keeping lit high, 11 ,-was:or was not working -- _ 7 A Tes .. j 3 y, [0. -- to' collapse the -- A Yes.: 'It hadn'.t worked. That was therfirst. 15

indication it hadn't worked.

We hadn't gotten water' phases ? 16 - back in't.o.the hot' legs. And-at the meeting that we 37

were cal' ling at that point'in time as to. develop a'new planu-

'18 of action,-.that'is<when it-was. decided t,o depressurize. 19- .0 - tut 1 n oug u you h st said a'lso eat the-20, primary -- or one'_of the primary motivations for-depressurization?was a, concern about core voiding or. core , ]Q; r uncovery-and a-desire to-confirm that the core-was covered? l v ,g - J A'. Yes,-_it was; Sit:was a specific direction to .24-i ~ confirm that the-core had'been covered. TQf $Cf0tl Cts; hnC. CC C ,,5 444 NORTH C APITOL STREET i ' h.; WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006 [ (202) 347 3700.

-37: xd;p37 .i. 20 'And~then.I.think chortly.after there was . j. 2. an. observation:that:the. level'in.the core flood tanks had I r ' ^ ' , 3; dropped slightly at or about the point at which the 'g pressure differential would come-into play; is that right? Ljsq)- 15 'A. Yes. - 6J Q- . Was there'ever-any discussion about'the -- w'hether th't was an accurate indication that the core had indeed a g-been: covered? .8

g A.

Yes. Q What do you recall about that? 10 -A-It was -- it was accepted by ele group discussion 33 that when we got down to a reactor coolant system pressure .12-r slightly less than the core ~ flood tank loading pressure, near 13 /"5 () that if we had a large volume displacement of water from g. the core flood tanks, then we would agree that the core had 15 e core area. ~16 What we expected to see-and what we did see at the time 7 was that there would be a small displacement of water as 18 the pressures equalized, indicating that the core area,was g -flooded. 20 And when that occurred, everyone in the control room was apparently satisfied that the water - the core area had been 22 ' l _,\\. (jr in a' water phase,.and we had just merely displaced a small 23 amount through the core flood discharge lines, as the. 4") pressure equalized; 25 c/lce 9ec!cra( cAeporten, $nc 444 NCRTH CAPITot. STFIEET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20003 (202) 3474 700

38-Jdhp381: M'Sc. 33 L.s. P ~ -And we floated theJcore flood tanks on;thel system,. .(.v[ then,'forfa period).of: time,(accepting,'iffyou will,Jthat w

2

.3: the?Jcore' flood tanks-were-' acting'as a surge tank on'the- ,I( 4 qcore area. ..v = 5' .O ~IitakeEit-there was.no discussion. then, of whether gas might prevent;the surge;of' water from the 7; floo'd tanks-intothe core?- 8' A1 .No,Eno., .9- ~ -Q Was._there'any -- .10 A .If:there was consideration-that'we had steam ~ in the core area,Lthe core flood tank water would have ,.,,y_ -w condense"d-the ' steam'and we would have gone-to a water 113 phase condition. ~~ 14 When we.-didn't see th'at indica' tion occur, we were 15 pretty satisfied in our own minds that the core area was in .16-ca water! phase. l7 ?Q Do.you.remenber any consideration at all as to -- 18' or.'any attention paid as to whether-the core' flood tank lines may have been isolated at any time? '20

A;

.No. Before'this action-was taken, we_ assured-the _21: core flood' tank' water operator valves were open. 22 - 07 Do you remember who did that? -u L23 .. g :

No,~Ibdieveitwasjustprobablypartof.thei 24 y4

.to;makeisure'the lineup was. correct ~if we're going to go ()? 25 .ito thisitype of operation,_make sure the lineup is'such that c0ce-9ecl eta [ cAcportcu, $nc.. . 444 NORTH C APITol. ST'tEET WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 347-3700

39 ' 1 d:039, Jit will: occur'for us.- ,4 '2 i That was verified and.done. 3-Q- But yoidon't-recall who~actually-did that? 'i 41 '( )' 'A 'No, sir. 5 _Q From the point at which you got the-pressure down- '6 to the core-flood tank set point -- if that's the right 7 word -- throughout the afternoon, up-until 4:00 or 5:00 p.m., 8.- ~ what was the strategy for trying-to get the plant stable? 9 . Were you'trying to-get it down a little further in order 10 to start ~the decay heat removal system? Or was the-pressure being maintained there at 400.to 500 12 psi?'; 13 jJ The pressure was being maintained with high w A k 14-pressure injection still going on. 15 And at that time we had a heat sync in that we were 16 discharging through the A atmospheric relief valve to 17' the atmosphere. We were pulling heat out of the A steam 18 generator in that fashion. 19 We wre hoping-to fill -- or regain water phase in "the 20 legs of-the plant. 21 'And time-wise I'm not sure, but it was some.ime after 22 7"3-we were on the core flood tank float condition'; wr saw 1 \\ ) 23 indications that we ure returning to water phase in the 24 hot-leg on the A side. 25 ' And that -- when we got that, we felt tha t we had been c0cc. ]cdcta[ CAeportets, $nc. 444 NOMTH C APITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001-(202) 347-3700

-40 1 y djp40' _i. Jcucc:ssful inftryingL.to.get ourselves'backito a~ condition 4 ~ . dithe plant that we:hadLindication-on our RTDs and we- ~' o 2 fi -3

wouldfthen~get a natural circulation cooling effect-on that.

~ ,,7, -;4 -A side ~,_if:we had water in that;A hot leg.- "V 5 LSince we :had the atomosphere dump available -to us, we - 16 - had'a:way of releasing'that. heat 11n natural-~ circulation. P ase, and it-seemed tofbe an achievablejgoal. And we saw h -.7-l8 results we-were hoping to-see. g-We felt we were moving in the right direction. Q Okay. Let me pick up_on-a couple of-things'that-10_ 'youLscid: do you remember tha the atmospheric steam dumps ~ were closed.early in the afternoon? 12 A Yes. We only had one open. The B side was 13 p) isolated because the'B generator;was isolated. (_ 34 S we nly had the A side blowing. 15 16 And do yoq recall that those were closed? Q A Yes. 37 Q And do you recall.whether there was any unhappiness 18 in the control-room about that? 19 A V ry mu h; there was a lot of unhappiness since ~ 20 that was our only heat sync; the only one we had available that we couldfcontrol was through the atmospheric relief. p. Tj 1) And what'do you recall about the decision to close the-A side steam-pumps?- / I.n,') - A LWe felt that that was a' wrong decision and it was ..- 25 ' -4 }. cAce-9ecl era { cRef ctiets, $nc. i .344 NORTH CAPITot. STREET WASHINGTON. O.C. 20000 ~ (202) 347-3700 -

,[ W w 4 13 w y fL-dhp4 I

goi.ngito" inhibit'anySfurtherDoparations that-ws

sero trying v 9

) to do do; recover'the plant-to a stable'conditidn. ~ /2 + >\\ f. +~ r-

Whose'decisioniwa~s

it, according to your.

4 gy w )9^ ' 1 ' understanding?' .,y, e. .SL

A'-

Asiwe understood'ittin the: control room,-it.was ~ X ~

6 -

being passed over'from;the-visitor's; center, and we interpreted .7 : it'-- rightfully orfwrongfully --Lthat it was. coming from the '8 -l state as a'; direction.- -Everyone/in.the. control. room for many <1'ys1afterwards a g; i10; . felt.~ that;itE was directions from %e state agencies --to stop -jp -.the"steamingito atmosphere.. a, 4 ~

12.

Q. Was there any_ concern among anyone in the-control .,.,.q . room;that'any activity might be'being re.' eased in that I().. .13 steamb ~-.V : _j4_ A; Yes.. And there were steps ~being taken to at 15 ea p, as..best you could,_-check that you'wcre not releasing. 6 16 -any acWhy. 3 7.. 3, And we-had.; people dationed - "we"J.n this case,. all the jg - _ people here,.not me myself.--_but the station HP monitoring

was taking-place up on the roof of the turbine building.

20 _adjacentito'thatLsteam pump._ g 'And we were getting no indication of any activity at 22 , l% ~ that point. -We. felt very confident that we were not 4 -23;- 4 -24 ] --discharging'any activity through-that path.- ,4 ,Q. .!Did anyone suggest to-you.at"the time.that.that ' c:Occ-9edeta( cAeportess, !lnc. 444 NORTH CAPtTot. STftEET. ..i WASHINGTON.' O.C. 20001

.42 1p4'2T 1 d:ciaionihad b5en made by M3t Ed management because of this

2

. concern;ab'out releases and.on'their'own accord, not ' %.l .3 -pursuant:to any state-pressure? fy ! 4: A No. :As I said earlier, we perceived.it was.being , L) ~ .5 . directed by~~some_ state agency. And that was:the only . commu nicatiion or thought that went' on in the control room J ~ .6 - i : at thati' time'..

7T

-'8. 0; How did~you conceive that the core was being cooled:after the dumps were closed up? g A We were continuing high pressure. injection into 10 33 the system, and then after the A-loop had become water phase, as we.were satisfied with the indications that we 12 had, we could see the effects of raising steam generator m. 13 water. level being an additional heat sync for a short period 'i4 U 15 ~ We were at.that time also attempting to get vacuum up. 16. in the main condensor being supplied by steam from the y auxiliary boilers-rin Unit.1. -18 And it was hoped at that point In ti,me to-get enough jg-vacuum in the condensor-to put the main turbine bypass dump valves on and-we would be able to continue-in that fashion. Q. That wasn't achieved, was it, until late in the _g-V afternoon or early evening? -23 -A-That's true. I'm not sure of the time, but it 24 was'sometime later in-the-afternoon.that we got the AJ-25 cAce-9edeta[ CAejroriet.1,' $ne, 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20000 (202) 347 3700

43 id;p43.1 ~L iccpsbility of-dunping;with tha main condensor.again, yes. 1 42 -Q- .Sofyou'go.t'about;five hours in there?- ~ r ( t 3 A - You've got some period of -time whe2e the onlf ^ ^ ' 4 hest removal we:had would b'e the increase.in the inventory -/ T. ~ >; Jor-a period 5- ?in.:the-steam generator level,Jsecondary. side. of. time that-would-remove some heat. We continued the-6- high pressure injection' venting out of the pressurizier -- 7 8 .O Did you<think that that was.-- -A in the: reactor building. g 0 I?m sorry. 10 ^ A. The reactor building then became our heat sync 33 3 L12 f r that period-of time. Q Did you think~that that was your most significant 13 - method of-heat removal, feeding high pressure injection in - 34 and then whatever energy you were-losing;through the 15-pressurizer. relief valve through the reactor containment 16 building?. 37 A It was the only one available. We didn't have 18 a choice at that time. 39 O Yes. What I'm-asking is: how did you think energy was leaving-the system -- A Constrained. Very constrained. We didn't have ) -any-heat synes available, other than the high pressur 23. e linjection and'through the venting. T( /.,:l'. 'O Did anybody think there was-any meaningful natural t _25-cAce 9edera[ cAepotters, Snc 444 NCRTH CAPITot. STREET WASHINOTON. D.C. 20001 (202) 347 3700

n ~. .m .,4 4 ' / (d::p44:

1' Tcirculation>that

.wouldntransfer' heat from'.the vessel overo q

^ 2.i .~into'the? steam generator? '3 T ' N o.- You~-could~- you(could, perceive.very quickly fl

4-

. by looking.at.your?RTDs'and7youristeam;-pressure'and makeup ~ ~ ~ ~ %J L' heat and everything else that we weren't really removing 5 .G. .muchLheat into_.the steam generator. 7- !Q-Why :was i the - pressur e . maintained up above 400 8 Psi? -Was'there.some-reluctan'ce on trying to go on decay heat removal ~---residual heat removal?- 9 10 A There wasn't'any easy.way to get to decay heat removal'.at that point initime until we'could get water in 33 4-our,B leg. '- l 12 ..r - J13' There was the suggestion that the decay heat pumps h.- might.be able ' to b'e put on and we could use the borated 34 ~ water storage t'ank as-a suction source of supply of water ,g or e decay heat sy nem.. 16' But that wasl recognized as: a very limited type operation, g. ~It;..would'be much more-desirable to get the B loop filled jg 19 aW and.senhaHy get de & cay heat system-4 operation in'a normal fashion,-taking the suction from the g ' B loop and; discharging back into'the cold leg again. Of course,.it had to be recognized -- and it's not ' :n k/ clearly identified in some-of the. interviews, and so on -- that no o'ne. wanted.to-get to the -- to try to go to decay 24- '[J _

heat-until we

had circulation capabilities.

x

25..

7 ~: >:.=.: ..: n ~ c0cc-9e<leraf cReporters, Dnc-444 NOptTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. ~ 20001 0202) 347-3700 -

n, ,..,n. u , :... w &L a: 45 y ? s.. dqp.45) ', 1J 3 01 !In?other;words',Lt!he:same problems that were 4 ~. p r. ft N .;g M 12 Perceived:with starting-th'e main reactor. coolant pumps- ~3l twould giveiyou problems %withodecay. heat? ~ u .l lF( Y 4'-

A' iYes..

.l 1 ~ 3f -n - ~ ~ Q-I And that.,was' the ' consideration that was: expressed 5t i orfbvious?.: ~ 6: ) A~ Yes.' As werel:-- we:had a plant condition now:where: -8: iwe were;atllow pressure'and the temperature significantly ~ reduced.' If-.we could not or were.not able to : at least start g; ~ L '01 reactorJcoolant-pumps,-

1. had-the backup capability of going 1

to. decay-heat, ifithe temperatures wereJ1ow enough to'get 3 g. the valves openLand if the pressures were low enough to'get. ~ c '13 the.-.put the. decay heat system on within the limits-of the ~ decay heat' system. s- ,34 - 'O ' I'm sorry. What are the temperature limitations-16 A The decay heat system is not designed to.be .g t'8 Perated above'350' pounds pressure, and you should'be down -around less.than=300 degrees,-.normally, on temperature g -before you even' attempt.to put it on. Normally, we would 20-Lgo atlot' lower than that. ^ ?:. 22. It was,an option that was available to us at some point [k1 i - b in' time further downstream. .It was'not available to us at l-

23

'that'; time r I .' 24 = --g. ~ V -Q Wel1,-it' appears there was a. pretty ~1ong period,.thet, - 25. cAce.federa[ cRepcticu, Sac 444 NORTH CAPITot. STREET - [ WASHINGTON. D.C. ' 20001 (102) 347 3700 1

u ~ 2. n ! 46 J I ~ [dsp46 during the; afternoon-when.you thave a system ;-- when you have ,r( T

2 -

a4 situation'in which the pressure is way down;'it's being ' w/ 3~ maintained'wayJdown and'you;have -- you'have a lotfof voids, j~s ii ); 4 a lot!of steam? Le 5' '! A. Yes. ~ 6 Q In the< system. What was the -- what were you 7 hoping;to~try to do to collapse that steam? Just add high

8 pressure injection. water?

~ e. '9- ~A' zTo continue to add high pressure' injection as to you' could; maintaining the prestre low. But aftier the time 11. we. lost our heat sync; in the A-atmosphere relief we were 12 severely constrained in order to get enough energy removed + 13 : from the B loop to get it back-to a water' phase, i ~ 14 Q Did.you feel stymied? Is that a fair word? 15 'A!'

Yes, sirr 16 Q

And I guess what.you're saying is -- correct me if 17: I'm wrong -- that you had limitations between -- you wanted the 18 high pressure injection flow on the one-side, and the core

19 flooding pressure at the other.

! 20 You wanted to keep adding cold or high pressure injection I 21 water to' cool,'but if.you added too~much the pressure would '22 90:up.above the'-place where you could assure that the system .t'") . 23 ' was.being'-- the core:was being floated on the flood tanks. J. ~ 24 A We.had reached a condition where the' injection ~ "' - 25, flow rate was,'as I recall, around 500, gallons per minute, lc:Occ-9ecl eta [ cAepciters, Anc 444 NORTH CAPIT01. STREET - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001 I' frnal sa7.97no

ly) -ss x,- wq:,+% n ;!~ l; ~ V ^ [.g;z g g y ~

43 J.,

• ~

+ 4 .c s f i.~. _.

• L1.

nainta'ininc[ systemipressure atior;about theo core 7floodb-tank? Cdtp47c <; 4 wy - v s q - [I@ psessure'~ w.1I.thi the ; pressurizer? relief block valve Tand :: the ismallt ~ .py m, M? 33? one-inch [ventiline oni:thelpressurizer,-b6th,?open.- z.;; s. ~ ~ f4 }[Wejweresablelto maintain ourtsystem?at'that pressure withi ( I f L5; 'little or..no difference. - 'Q-I think,.there'wasnt' any3 s' peculation;amongl:the: !.6 st-7 people:wholwere1 caucusing ^during-theLafternoon as to whetherL Si you'still:might1have had.c, ore uncovery; that_.is,fyou'were -: g. convinced that;th'e'corefwas:. covered? m 10 A1 No. At that-{ time, wefwere all relatively at ease ~ _11_ that the core was~in'a water phase,:yes. TheLfloating of the 12; cores flood tanks as-the surge volume ;on -the core 'and then ~ j3: getting back.into a' water phase. a.. x ( n '.1 i4-We were thoroughly convinced,rI don't believe anybody ~ --_15 L hadJa question that the core was-not inswater phase.-

18 :

Q' I think you'have:been asked in.previo,us interviews- - ~ about ~ the pressure spike in the reacitor building and said: that-7 .;+ 1 ,g 18L you{actually heardzit'; and heard-someone suggest that itfmay-L19; have!been a-:ventil'1'ation damper. j. This' satisfied you personally.--is that correct? w Hs D JA[

Yes.

It(seemed' reasonable at the time, 4 a l.

21

{ T L a/

• 22

-:Qs And you-didtnot know at the time that:there had

e

[? ':. been?sa'fetyfactuationfand;sprayJcoming outTas'a result of this-A> .23 1 atf the~' time?J - J. - r... - 24 .i f (A No.- J -.,, + -,. .25, , r $4 lY ~I I Ace-9edera[cAeporten, Snc 3 ' ', -Q c

444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET.

m.)

' WASHINGTON. D.C.320009-(202) 3M-3100 a w; ...x..

~ ^ ~~ .g / '( j, }l', ' ). ~ 48 71-I.dsp48) ~ 1You'did'n'telearn-that until-- (Q: ~ s i2l (A: [The129th., ~ !3. ' g'. -Do you-recall when Gary Miller and-George Kunder! ~ .) 1.- 3 4 ; werit off to ~ the Statehouse ' at aboutf 2 5 00; 2:15-a.m.?- ~ ~ p,:. 55-

A

- Yes. 16-Q . Did -.that: raise any concern 1on your' part about

1. 7

~ people::who ought: to. be trying to 'further ' stabilize the situatic n ~

83 having to.take off?

. 9.. lA.- 'It seemed'to?be an exercise that was not meant ~ -10 t'o help us._at'all. That's an opinion. 1

11 ;

'We had obviously.h'ad enough qualifi'ed people in the g. 12; control room; butJIL wasn' t concerned with my own' safety, ~ or _ ~~ ^ = 13, - anyone-else's at that point;in time.- L ' - It's just that to take someone out who is a key individual 15 in the' organization that we had eatablished there that day 16~ didn't seem like it was designed-to accomplish'anything t'oward our end results -- total plant stability. 17 18 - . Q - Do you recall asking through Mr..Schaedel or some 19-other route for B' & W psople. in Lynchburg to work out some 20 L kind of.a-' number for high pressure injection flow? lA .I asked.for someone to calculate what our decay ~

21 22 heat:: generation rate;--.to shut-down_the core:-- from being

~ ' l237 shut'down from 0400,until the tine that they were running.the' J-2C nuzdbers1withthe :amountlof burn Luplon the core.

-- m.

t Xd Y25-Lyes', Ifasked how'much decay. heat' generation' heat,we should c0cc3cdera( cRepotieu, Snc . 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20000' - (aoa) 347.a700

m-y 3> n,

e

49 y

. =, 1 ' Mdip49 ' .71: expelct'.. at-igh 4 2f Q' WhAt;you we'reIasking-~.was;how manyigallons-per ~ V;

c f3! minutelof_- water;.ought

to ke'ep' going in :there - to deal 1with that

.I s ~ r n-u . lf{~^. 4i amount?-- ' ~ .5' -AT i That's theLanswer.I'got, yes.. 7 ..u ~ 61 -Q' ' :But?you did not.ask for that in terms of -- D

7:

.A IfdidLnotTaski for: itlin terms of. how' much high ~ Es" pressure.injec. tion l. flow rate I need. 'I. asked for it -in terms W: 9. of de' cay; heat [ generation rate. 510( Q lAnd:you got back - ' strike that; 'let me start again'. 11 Do.you remember what time you pose'd'this question and to ,12L whom? - Was this 9 :00 sin. the morning,. or 2:00.in the: afternoon? +- s [13 -A No,-'I don't recall what time.it was. l 7 T.- 9

14-

'Q Wa's it through Mr. Schaedel? ~ 15 -A' Yes.' '161 Q, And.do you remember whenthat response came -back 'to 17.- YO # '18~ A-No, not;in time; not tirre related, no.-- ig -Q -Did it come back from'Mr. Schaedel? 2 ~ [ x ' 20.- A Yes,.it camelback through_Mr. Schaedel,.andsthrough a pathLI wasn'.t aware of at the time. It also.came bacIc through; ~ y 21; D

k2 Uniti one Controloroom to' be relaye ' 'to Uniti-two control room

[ in the MetMEd' system'. 23 : 24; ,I.wasn't(aware ofitheTorigin ofs that:atithe time. (; 7 9 [' k [ 'Q( Butidid)you get'that.. message.through thattroute?- J251 ( y' - s ~

CffCfi, ll ~

~ CC* C T RCe - 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET _p lN/' WASHINGTO N ' O.C. -. 20001 'e '(202).347-s700 '

c m l ~ Nj 50 Ld3p50. 1

A It wasn't directed to me; It was-directed.to-the-1

.. (] 2 MetiEd operations oeople. Itgot mine through Schaedel,:.which s_; .j .3 .I passed'on to the Met 1Ed people,<which at':the point in! time [ 4-that I received;it;JI didn't feel;it was necessary information, S-because thel 400 gallons per minute flow rate'that they-6 ' suggested they make sure we had we ' were already - at 500, at that '7 point'in time. 8 8 1 knew for aEfact that we were injecting 350 gpm'in -9 one injection. loop; and;150 in the other. So, it was a 10 ' piece of.information that was passed on to~me that did not-11-change where we were or what-we were going to do for that 12 Period of. time. ( ~ fq '13 Q Did that message come back to you'in the form of i 1-. Q/~ ' 14 -- a specific recommendation; that is, you should maintain at 15 least - '- 16 A A minimum. 17 ' Q A munimum. 18 ~A Yes, minimum of high pressure injection flow rate ig. has got to be 400 gpm; yes. 0 W s there any other part of that message -- any othe r 20 recommendation or suggestion or requirement that came back -21 to you as a result' of your request? 22; .- ( '[ ' 23 'AL .Nothing I can specifically recall, no. Would you like to take a short br/ MR.-EDGAR: eak? -24 n(') ' MR. FRAMPTON: Yes. I was,just thinking we ought 25 c;0ce-9etl eta [ cRetrorters, Dnc. -) 444 NORTH CAPITot. STREET . W ASHINGTON. D.C. 20001 1 h

51 l to take a'few minutes.. ..d551 . 2 W --(Brief -recess. ). Q )' 3 -

BY'MR. FRAMPTON:

T4

Q Mr. Rogers, do you recall havin'g a telephone - o T-

+ e 5 conversation with Bob. Arnold and Dick Wilson from GPU around 6 about 2:30 in the afternoon on the 28th? 2 7-A Yes. I.had a conversation with Bob Arnold and- -- 8, if Wilson'was there, I don't recall that I ever spoke to him - 9 at'Lall. 'I.know I spoke to Bob. 11 Q= What do you remember about your converst, tion with -12 Mr. Arnold?'- 4 ~ ' 13 ' . A' Well, also I don't know abcut the time. I know that .. m. 14 it was during the period of time that Gary was off site. So, - ^ ~~ '15 it's in~that time frame somewhere. 4 -16 Q That would be between 2:00 and 4:30? 17 - A .Yes.- Somewhere in that tirae period. 18 Q . hat do you recall'was sufi during that conversation? W 19 A One specific item.that I can remember is that 20 - Bob was concerned with.getting system pressure back up to 21 normal conditions.and getting the reactor coolant pump running. 22 My only response to Bob was that we had tried system ) 23 pressure-being~high for a period of' time in the morning. As j 24-a g'roup, we'hadiall felt that we didn't achieve any success 2'5 - towards.getting rid ~of the steam voids. .. cAce-9edera[ cAejrotten, $nc. 444 NORTH CAPITOL. STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001 -(202) 347 3700 -

52- [dsp5.2) 1W:idid'not unntsto runireactor coolant' pumps-until we 1 j$ 2 .were satisfied the system.was essentially' water; so we wouldn't ~ V> 3 have'any problem with'the' seal's on-the reactor coolant pumps

4-which was a normal --/for that period-of? time;-a concern in

~ 5: thati we.wouldL not do. anything : deliberately. to the reactor s 6 coolant pump; operation. 7-If-it was suspected?that there might.be seal damage '8 resultingifro'm anything we'might do.- That's.!the only l9= conversation -- the things'I can remember with Bob at thatt 110 time. .l 11-Q Do you remember whether he expressed any. concern, ~ 12-aslto whether the core was covered or had been covereci 13 during.that phone. call? N I don't. remember. k/. 14J .A. 'I don't remember.that. i c 15 Q But you remember he was' urging you, or interested 16 in getting' system pressure.back up again?, -17; A. I think I' remember that. More specifically the 18_. conversation, the-majority of the time was about reactor 19 coolant pump operations. 20: I'm sure along with that we discussed pressure. I did that'several-times during the day with'other people. 21 QD Was the -burden of his_ call from 'what you can 22 f1 i) remember about itr to express concerns or was he calling 23, l _ injmore to get Information from.other control room or both? .4. N .~ 25' ' A .At the time - --at the: time,-I. perceived he was c;0ce-9edera[ cAeportet.1, $nc. - 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET - ' WASHINGTO N. D.C. 20003 (202) 347-3700

LS i 5 ~ -'5 3 e u ey & -dip 53; it' (u'stitAlkingitoome.to'getTinformation;aboutwhatIwewereJ f a "2-doing/and what;were tihe LconditionsEat the. plant.' ['%E l . ~ - 31 jQ .DotyoufrenemberLany' discussion of hot leg M'~$):- ~~ ~. 4.' temperatures?- l:%. 15j. (A

Not spe'cifically;; only that:theyfwere~~- ;the

-J .[6i hot legsiwere fin-a.-steam phase.condit' ion.. InIthat.way,_yes; but 1 noth.specificft'emperatures I:can recall.- ,7

g fQ.

-Do;you recall?whetherihe knew.already thatithe. hotJleg-temperatures were high;and: steam -- 9-110'. lA I' don'tiknow that. -Q Do you recall-discussing ~with him, or his asking you g 12i aboutsin-core' temperatures? 1-A No. '13 ];\\ :Q: Do yo'u recall any requests'being made, at any time, during the day by GPU people or B~& W people, or NRC people

15.

for.in-core thermocouple readouts?. .l A' Not to:me, no. 'I don't recall hearing any 17-- 0 18 19 A-No.-

20 Q

You don't'recalli any request to'you or anyone-else thatlyou observed or'had heard ~about? K, s 22: k)i > A' _ .'I} don't.. recall that,'no. , ' 27 - L Q..; Was' there 'any.furthre - discussion during 'the _ day, ~

24

</.h. ~ ':, if ', 25. after'the':second' caucus:meetingfin the morning about the-33 -l i ~+: Cfofhtfl RCe 1 CC C y n . 444 NortTH CAPITeL STREET . WASHINGTON. D.C.' 20000 1

-'~

':(202) 347-3700 - ,.I

5 '54 1: in-d p54. rastharcocouple temsprature?.'Did'that come.up again.in 2 discussion among the. group-of people who were meetin-with- ~ 7

( T,

.\\#

3 Gary Miller, periodically?

{ I ' don' tb remember them as -'a - specific point being ,l'gi J4 ~ . A. ,2.q y. 5 brought up, no. They may well have been; I-just don't remember

6 them - 'any-conversation along that line, no.

7-10 In-your; conversations with Mr. Schaedel, did he 8 ask you forfany specific ~ plant perameter or status information .g-that was being; requested of you from Lynchburg -through him? A More than likely, but I. don't recall. Right now, [10 jj, I don't recall-.those kinds of things; I'm sure'that he did.'- I 12-Being that he was acting as a pass through system, I'm almost - 13 ; 100 percent sure he-was asking me questions that he would r~ (h) then relay on to Lynchburg. 34 Q-Do you recall discussing-hot'le'g temepratures.with 15-him at any. time? (Pause. )' .g A. No, I don't know.. g . Q' Do you assume that you probably did, but you can't recall? 20' A.- Right. . Apparently the people who had gathered together in 22-LYnchburg did not get hot-leg temperatures until 1:00 or 1:30[in-the afternoon.- I'm not stating that as a fact,J'.m w(j_ v - Justigiving'you an impre'ssion which may be wrong. Do-you 25? cAce-federal cReporters, Dna 444_ NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20004 (202) 347-3700 -

~ ) Ab ', s ~ 1 .L J y 55: + ' ddp55i [:ft? i know why;lthats would be?- ~ g2 9 7

2L hIs'therefanyJr'easonwhy'you~wouldnothavecon~veyed~that

~ 'U informat'ionit'o?Mr.lSchaedel in the-morning Ohen you. talked to U .G. ' : 3) f q/y ?4 ' him. A A,

No reason-'. why I would not, Lno. - As IJsaid before,

._ 5 _ .A. q s h 6; I'm--sure.we talked more-specific numbers'in-temperatures and -7' pressures and"everything else;. but it's not a memory thing.

1T on't r'ememberithemratTthis. time; when and how much.

8J d 9: Q-Did you.ever; relate-to Mr. Schaedel for transmission + to Lyncliburg any specific questions or concerns that-you had 10 11 that you-thought.needed a response--from'Lynchburg other.than. I 12 the decay hhat that'we've.already' discussed? 13 Specifically, I need to include'the questions'of whether. youeverconveyed-Nothem,"Look,wehavethisporblem.- ~ ~ What-14 its: suggestions do you have for us? What. strategy to take with 516_ respect-to'the plant as a whole?" 17J ~A-cNo, I: don't-believe I asked for much more'than that- - 18 : decay heat generation _ rate.as a specific piece'of information. ~ l'9 ' from.them during~the course of':the day. ' 20 '. 0-Did you ever conveysto Mr."Schaedel the sense of 4 2i beingLstymied that we-talked aboutt before, during'th'e. afternoon ~ ~. - as.al dilemma?: 1 22 D NJ ' 23 ' [ .A. '.Oh, I'm-sure' that I conveyed either with. feeling. or, ..I !24; Probably,3with words that. we had lost 'the capability to steam;

; f~y -

the. atmosphere., u- /25 .1 ~ '~, CCk C CtGf hey 0tleti, $nC. {,.. _' . 444 NORTH CAPITOL. STREET

2.,. '[

~ ' WASHINGTON. D.C.~ 20005 '(202) 347-3700: .]

\\ -l -56 l' We wanted to get' the heat removal processes going, but we ?d:p56

2

'didn't have' condenser available to.us at the time. I'm sure 3 ,5j 3 IJconveyed that.in conversations, yes. j'~'; 4 t .g-Did you yourself consider that that was a 'v] 5 situation in'which it would have been useful to have some 6 kind-of input or new ideas from your management people, or 7 engineering staff types down in Lynchburg?' 8 _A -Not presupposing, but I believe I felt very confider t 9-that we had available resources in the control room area that 4 10: were handling potential avenues open to us; and that we were-11 pursuing them., +t 1,2 I probably felt very confident in that regard that we 13 didn't -- we didnt' have anything obvious or available to us. O. k[ 14-There wasn't anything settled because there just weren't that 15 many avenues open to us. 16' There wasn'c too many other thngs we dould do. 17; Q Well, am I right'in thinking that your view was 18 ' that basically, you were already doing.everything you could 19 do under the circumstances? 20 .A .I think that's fair, yes. ~ . 21 ' O Did you learn at any time.during the afternoon of 22' !! arch 28th that anyone had -- anyone from t.he NRC headquarters V: in Washeington or Behhesda had made any recomn.endation as 23 24 to what' strategy,ought to'be employed to get the plant to a 7s '. V 25 stable condition; either directly'into.the Unit 2 control 3- ' c0ce-9edera[ cAeporters, Snc 444 NCHTH CAPITOL STREET ~ WASHINGTON. D.C.' 20001 ~ (202) 347 3700

57 s ' dip 57 room, or 61'rectly.through the Unit 1, or' Met Id management? ~ i 2 , w. A 'No, I'have no knowledge of that.. The only contact "k-) 3 I had in the NRC was the people that'were in'the control room j' 1 area'from some point of time in the morning lon. v) 5 7.have no knowledge of what informaiton they:may have been 4 6 getting or passing on. They were always available in any 7-one of our caucuses,-and asia generalization, I would say that 8 they_would be asked by Mr. Miller, "Do you agree with our. D' assumptions, do you agree with our plan of action?" 10 In most cases, most of the time the response was, "That's 11 p j^ okay.",p , I don't recall them ever inputting anything into our 13 neetings. I'm just saying I don't recall that. If they "J. 14-input it in any other point in time in prior conversations, I'n 15 not aware of it. 16 - Q' So, you don't recall any occasions at which the 17 NRC inspectors who were in the control room of Unit 2 made 18-specific recommendations was just suggestions that were 19 contrary to what you were'doing? 20 A No, sir. 21 'Q: Do you' remember they made any specific recommendations .22 or suggestions at all? Or were they basically;there as ..~: 23 passive' observers?'

24 A

I would classify it as.a passive contribution, if .p. J 25 thatifits. x cAce-]etl eta [ cAeposteis, $nc. 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C.' 20004 ' (202) 347-3700

58-fdsp58 0 You made some strong comments in.a previous . (~'$ interview about the negative impact'of NRC people later on. 'RJ A Later on, yes. 'Q ~ Was there any negative impact, in yom. view,.from 5 the people who were in~the control room on Wednesday? ~ 6 No, sir. 3 7 'Did anybody seek any' specific help or advice-from Q 8 those NRC people, other th'an to encourage then to say.whatever U they might want to-say? 10-A In meetings, Miller encouraged them to offer 11 whatever ' input they had;.beyond that I have no knolwdge, no. 12-g Now, I think at some point, you learned that !!et 13 Ed Management at the observation center had expressed the [*[T. w-14 desire or instruction to the control room to repressurize the 15 system, late in the afternoon. 1 1C Is;that right? 17 'A Yes. 18 Q As far as you know, was that the impetus fc,r the l l 19 decision in the control room to go ahead an repressurige and 1 20 make efforts to restart a reactor coolant pump? - 21 A Yes. 4 - 22 .Q-Did you ever learn that B &'W people in Lynchburg 23 had made any recommendation to repressurize the system? 24. A~ I didn't during that' time, no. yq 'd 25 .Q During Wednesday? . cAce-9edeza[ CAcyotten, $nc 444 NORTH CAPITot. STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001 (101) 347 3700

t' 59 1 A' .During Wednesday'I was not'avare of-it. Let me d:p59 2 say-that'as we started' pressurizing,'at some time during..that s . v) - 1 .3 pressure'escallation sequence,;I linked'up with Lynchburg and l 4' told them that,we were repressurizing; so it may be an ~ 15 afterthought,fhere,.-that maybe they.would have recommended 6 that to me at that time. .7 But we were already'in the process, and I was not aware 8 that they had recommended that sort.of action prior.to that. ~ 9 0 When you did establish telephone contact directly 10 with Lynchburg, did'anyone tell you in' substance, "Yes. that ~11 is what we have been trying-to get_you to do;".or "Yes,'that 12 is what we want you.to_-do."? 13 .A I don't recall that that came out that way, no. p t. I

• -J 14 Q

Did anybody express any reluctance to that course

15 of action whom you.to talked to at Lynchburg?

~ 16 A~ 'For repressurization? 17 O YG8 ~ -18 A No. ig Q Why_did you establish a direct telephone contact with them? Had-you gotten a specific request to do that; or 20 21-did-you'think'that would be a good-idea from your point of j view?. 22 4 A. Well, after the repressurization action was started, - 23 24; the' conversations between !! iller and fir. Irvine and mysdlf; 'y_.f Mr.~.LIrvine'at the Visistor's Center; it was generally agreed. 25 ~ cOce.$cdeta( cAeporten, $nd

f. [

444 NORTH CAPITOt. STREEY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20000 I'f~ (202) 347 3700

s .I 60 1 1-between us, at-least,?an-attempt to start a reactor coolant 'dsp60 r. ~. ^ .2: pump was probably.a ' better course of. action, rather than just ~ s LL ~ 3 repressurizing and sitting there. l '4-I felt very confident at that point in time that.we were ~ '% ).

S in a condition where-we could probably see some good results 6

from. attempting to. start a pump, 7 -Jack agreed, and Miller agreed;'so I'm not sure, now, how s 8 the direct' ion came; whether it was~from Jack or from Miller. 9 I suppose it was Jack. 10 He said, "Get Lynchburg on on board with you before you 11 do that."- That was.the reason I directly connected ~with Lynchburg at thitt time.- 12 13' -Q Thst was with-respect to the mechanics of startino ~ ,.[ \\ 51 the punp in the.' conditions under which a pump ought to be 14 started? 15 A Yes.' .- 16 Q And then you did have conversations with Lynchburg 17 about those specific matters?. 18 39 - A That is correct'. Q . Were they on board,when the pump was finally 20 started?- 21 A~ Yes., 22: Q Do you.think that in' retrospect, had you. belie.ved ~ .23 r" fully-believed the instrument ' readings which you had, such 7-24 as hot Icgl temperatures, and in-core thermocouple readings, c25 r cAce-9et! eta [ cAepoz!eu, !]nc 444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20009-(202) 347 3700

_61 ld'dp'61' youLwould:have forced a very different impression or opinion 'l -j of:what wasthappening'in the primary system?- 2 i -.q v.- 3 .A-No.- 4-Q So, tou: don' t think' that' a failure to '-- any - failure 5 to believe instruments, that may have been manifested in 6 fact, had a substantial impact on. the assessment-of what was * ~7. happening? 8 A No. I think we correctly evaluated'the condition' ' 9' of the~ plant in that the~ reactor coolant system was essentially 10 vapor bound; and whether or not we knew the magnitude of ~ 11 absolute temperatures really didn't change the situation any. 12-We still had the same goals in mind to get rid of the 13 steam vapor and to get back to water; and to be able'to get 14 natural circulation or reactor coolant pump flow or any other ~J 15 kind of force flow that.we had available to us. 16 So the course of action would not have.been any different 17-if we had arrived at the conclusions that all those things 18 were accurate-in the beginning; the temperature indications 19 ~specifically. -20 0 Well, do you think if you had arrived at the conclusion that the core was partially uncovered at 8:00 or 21 8:30-inithe. morning, that wouid have dictated a different 8 22-strategy than the one that you,_in fact,-pursued; or that was 23 in fact pursued.by,the licensee?.. / - 24 p V A My evaluation at that point in time, if-I had 25 c0ce 9edera( cAepotten, Sac d44 NONTH CAPITOL. STREET WASHINGTON, D.C., 20001 (202) 347-3700 i

62 dsp62-1 correctly determined that we had.a low waterlevel in the ' / ~ ^y 2 core-area,ztho';only; thing available would have been to: ensure 'wJ ' 3 high pressure injection! flow, wh'ich-I. felt-had been done by L4 Mr. Miller when he'.said, " Keep it on. We'.re not going to-5 turn.it off.- Nobody will. turn it'off unless, I, Mr.' Miller 6 tell you." -7' In other words, I found no fault with that even.-in-8- retrospect. The only thing that you could evaluate on that O. was the amount of flow, and that co'uld have been a contributing ~ '10 factor here, of' course. it. But since'I don't have that available-to mc standing in the back of'the control room, you have to get up to the' cont ~rol 12 7-13 panel to read what the flow is; unless somebody tells you what l 14 ' the. flow is,~you don't really have any idea. -15 Except that the high pressure injection flow is on'is a 16-conclusion, but it's not quantity of conclusion. 17 0 Well,'if there was a possibility of vapor binding 18 or steam bubbles-in the core'and that condition continued, .10' you'd be likely to br;< 'some melting, wouldn't you, eventually? A Yes, but like I'said, if I -- if I accept that the. 20 high pressure injection flow is going on in the system an'd-21 22, didn' t -investigate how much. flow it was; I would make an assumption' that we were delivering enough to keep the core cover 2d.. ~ 123 I guess my conclusion in the morning and probably all- -( \\,. 24' s 1

25.

throughout the day. was' that, we never. really were in a - condition - c0cc. ]cdera[ cAepotlets, $nc. 444 NORTH CAPITCL STREET - WASHINGTON D.C. 20001 (202) 34 13700 w

g ~ 63 4 /d p63; 1-while(I;was there that the core was uncovered; that we weren't 2; givin ~g lit. enough co'oling... 3- .Our only problem'was that vapor lock in the' high pressure -- 4_ i. 4~ I'm'sorry, sin the hot: legs. That was precluding us'from '5 having.-a'lliheat removal operations-in tho' plant. 6 Q -Let me go to the observation you made about the 4-7 number of!NRC-people on site, and the effect of those people. 8 At wh'at point'in-the sequence of events do you think that the NRld' presence really became a hindrance or a problem of 9' 10-some kind to efficient ~ operations?. 11 A 'Well, from the relative position that I am -- that 12. I'm at speaking only from being in the plant and seeing the. ' ~ ^ oper'tions.of the plant.being attempted; the difficulty of 13 a 7_, 5-L '14 controlling the plant and the other things that were happening J 15 during.the next couple of days.' ~ 16 As cach day went by, it was obvious that there were too 17, many people around. .I may-have been one of those too many

18 '

people, now granted, but I will say that in the case.of l 19' myself:and people that were working for me; we were working-j 20_ .there~in a contributing fashion; assisting the utility-21 - people in performing whatever. functions they were attempting. 22 ; .There;were many, many cases; there was a large number of W - 23 people;. observers:and maybe some other classification, I don't L24 know whatito call them at this. point in time, specifically g ~ $.fI fromIthe NRC and.the agencies like.that that were seriously . 25-cAce-9edeta( cRenc~'*ts, Snc. 444 NOMTH CAP, WASHINGTCN, D.L. f% 4 (202) 347-3700

g_ =-. .:. w 64 id:p64 1 inhibiting the operators by asking them questions all~the-x] (

2, time when.it really'didn't need to,be known by.that person,-

3-as_I perceived:it., 4 It didn't. help.-that'~ guy give any advice'to the plant at-5 all. He was merely another person'around the control room 6. area that wasn't needed. 7 Q-There came.a time on Friday night or Saturday,. 8 probably, ' when NRC -- the nature of the NRC-rol'e in decision 4

9 making at'the plant apparently changed.

NRC people formally to or informally became part of the concurrence. chain and had ^ 11 a role in saying yes or.no decisions.with respect to plant H ~' ~ ~ 12' status.y ' g-, Did you become aware of that at some point? ] 13 i N/ t 14 A' 'Yes. Yes. It was a process that developed and your t'iming may be. absolutely correct; Friday or Saturday. 15 16 Q' What is your recollection of the time? 17-A Around in that' period of time, it was decided by 18 Met Ed GPU management that-any action to be taken.would be -19 written ~up-in. procedural form and.there would be a formal approval of that particular action.taken by any review 20_ t 21 processes that'were designated. L22- .In this particular' case, BE& W and NRC were to be people thatLmust have function in'reviewL of.thatiaction before it 23- / could be. started. W( /' 125 Now, I.had,las B.& W's contribution to-this, I had two-2(. ~ c:Oce-]cdeza[cRejrorlet1, $nc. . 444 NORTH CAPITOL. STREET ' WASHINGTON D.C. ' 20001 h

p r ,q 65 __ dip 65L L1' people' on watch in:the..controlLroom;.and they_were providing j ( ) 2 that particular.. function.-

x. -

a -3 I had other -pe.ople.who working as data collectors and data runners, if you will, back to my office which I had l 1 ~ ~ e 4 5\\ set'up in the processing-center as a temporary. office at'that 6 time;l feeding information:back to Lynchburg via telecopy and 7 ' telephone. 8 As :the function -of plant operations was required or decide 9 upon,a porcedure was. written and the review process took

10 place.

11 As I said, I'had two. people on watch in the control 12 room providing that.. I think we did,an adequate job in

r'(

13 providing - that function. N2) 14 At the same time, there was a multitude of NRC people providing this same function and I' don't think it was is necessary and I don't think it helped-the opearation any by 16 having as many people directly interfacing with the utility-17 18 People and.the rest of_the operations people at~that time.- . tg _ .Q Do you think that'the d'ecision to have NRC ~ participation in that decisionmaking itself -- that decision 20 2L itself, : served as a hindrance - o'r was it the number of NRC '22 : People that participated?; A No,Jno, absolutely the contribution that the'NRC . 23 / People had was not only a' good contribution; I think it.was 24 3'~ r e 'v'~' required, but.I think the way it was -- 125'. !cAce 9edera{ cAejioricu, $nc. 444' NCRTH CAPITOL STREET - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20001 u. 1 m j

%i 66 dsp6'6. 11 10; Handled?- ?,

2--

A. The way it was put into effeet was beyond requiremer ts.

V

.And as I; understand ~it, you're talking about, ~ -3 .Q. Primar5.ly,-the number of NRC people'in and around the' control 4 S' room itself?- 6 A .Yes, direct interface became a problem by the 7 number. 8 Okay, I don't think_we have any-MR. FRAMPTON: 3 further questions. Mr. Rogers, thank you very nuch. We to appreciate your time and your candor. Thank you. 11 _(Whereupon, at 1: 38' p.m., the deposition was adjourned. )- l-4 8 ~ r

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13 '!, 14 c, 1 ~- 15 16 17 i -18 i 19 20 i 21' 4 t 22 23 - 24-id N 25. ' ~ AAce-Oedeta[c.Reporteu, Daa 444 NOftTH CAPITOL. STREET WASHINGTON. D.C. 20003 (202) 347-3700

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