ML19308C576
| ML19308C576 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1979 |
| From: | Parler W, Woodruff R NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280606 | |
| Download: ML19308C576 (28) | |
Text
4Ocr N UCLE AR REG UL ATO RY COMMISSION O
IN THE MATTER OF:
THREE MILE ISLAND INTERVIEW OF ROGER W. WOODRUFF l
O Place - Bethesda, Maryland Date - Thursday, 9 August 1979 Pages 1 - 27 e< M e L A A H@e g
, qD 0' T Y g
T.e:hene:
(202) 317 3700 ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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UNITED' STATES OF AMERICA 1
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
_._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x l
4' In'the Matter of:
5 THREE MILE ISLAND 6
- - - - - - - -~- - - - - - -X 7-INTERVIEW OF ROGER W. WOODROFF 8
9 Room 401 Arlington Road Building 10 6935 Arlington Road Bethesda, Maryland 11 Thursday, 9 August 1979 12 11:00 a.m.
13 BEFORE:
14 WILLIAM PARLER FPED HEBDON 15 16 17 18 L
19
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" _R _O _C _E _E _D _I _N _G _S 2
MR. HEBDON:
Sam, do we have something?
- XXX Whereupon,
"\\_/
4 ROGER W. WOODRUFF 5
. as. called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, was w
I l
6 examined and testified as follows:
7 EXAMINATION 8
BY MR. HEBDON:
9 G
Have you read and do you understand the witness 10 notification form that has been provided to you?
II A
Yes.
12 G
Do you have any questions concerning that form?
()
13 A
No.
i 14 G
Would you please state your name.
I i
15 A
Roger W. Woodruff.
16 O
What is your current occupation?
l f
17 A
I am engineer with the. Office of Inspection and 18 Enforcement.
19 G
What is your current position?
f I
20 A
Senior reactor inspections specialist.
21 O
What was your position on March 30, 1978?
(~s A) 22 A.
- The same.
.s.
23
'O How many people ~ reported to you?
i 24 A.-
None.
Am FWwe! Reporwrs, lm.
I 6
25 0
-To whom did you report?
pv2 -
3 1
1 A
Ed Jordan.'
2 O
And what was his position?
1 i
3 A
Assistant director for technical programs, Office of i
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kJ 4' Inspection and Enforcement.
l 1
l 5
0 Would you describe your employment history, including!
l 6
positions held in the NRC?
l l
7 A
Going back how far?
i l
8 G
Going back until you graduated from college.
l 9
A I was first employed by the General Electric Company l 10 at the Hanford atomic products operation in Richland, Washington!.
11 I was employed there.'for 3-1/2 years.
Initially, I was on a 12 rotational assignment at two of the operating reactors.
For a j
i
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13 few months subsequent to that, I was an engineering assistant inl l
l 14 the..teoretical physics unit.
15 My second employer was the United States Navy.- I was I
16 in the Bureau of Ships,.and I was assigned to private yard 17 doing new construction and, for a few months, to a yeard doing. !
i 18 repair work.
I was in the Navy for three years.
l
[
19 Subsequent to that, I was employed by Atomics Inter-
)
20 national in Canoga Park, California.
I was there for 10 years,i i
21 all of that time at the sodium _ reactor, an experiment.
During (m~') ~ 22 that_ time I held positions as senior research engineer, senior -i I
'P ysicist, supervisor of the experimental unit, and supervisor
-l-h 23 t
24 of operations.
l cwFewsI Remnm, Inc.
25 Subsequent to that I was' employed by the Atomic i
PW 4
1 Energy-Commission.
I worked for six years in what is now the 2
-Division of Operating' Reactors.
3 i
3 I left that position to join the Office of Inspection' c.
C)',
l 4
and Enforcement.
I have been with Inspection and Enforcement l
5 ifor four years.
6 0
Okay.
What is your educational background?
7 A
I have a bachelor of science degree in engineering 8
physics _from the University of Toledo; one year of graduate 9
school at the University.of California.
10 0
What area?
In what area?
II A.
Physics.
j 12 g
Prior to March 28, 1979, prior to the TMI accident, 13 what knowledge did you have concerning the incident that I
Id occurred at TMI on March 29, 1978?
'15 A
I think you are probably referring to an incident oni i
16 March 29, 1978.
I I7 G
Yes.
t.
I 18 A
We received, as a result of that incident, a requestip I9
-to do a review of the adequacy of the design approach with l
20 regard'to the power-operated relief valve.
21 g
Was that.the first notification that you had received ps V
22-concerning that particular' incident?
l 23 A.
It mayf or may not have been.
I don't recall.
l G
Would ycu normally have been informed of that inci-f 24 4
-F.o.,.i n.oonen. inc.
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g*e dent, cepnrate from the meno that you received?
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5 i
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A-We normally receivo a daily report from.each of the
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regions,l which describes ' iacidents that. have occurred.
I often 3
review that: report, but not always.
f~s I
4 0
You don't-recall. receiving any information or review-5 ing a report concerning that particular incident?
6 A
I do not.
~
7
.G
'Did you receive a memorandum dated March 31, 1978,
~
8
'in'which Dan Sternberg raised concerns about the design of the
-9 electromatic relief valve?
Is that the memo to which you were 10 just-referring?
11 A
Yes.
12 O
For the record, is this the memo (handing document 13 to witnes's) ? '
Id A
Yes, it is.
15 HEBDON:
For the record, this is a memo from MR.
i 16 Dan'Sternberg, acting chief-of RP section 1,-to Karl Seyfrit, l'
t 1
'AD, technical programs, dated March 31, 1978.
l
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I8 BY MR. HEBDON:
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=0 What did you understand to be Mr. Sternberg's.
~ 20 j concerns? -
2I A
Mr. Sternberg's concern, as stated.in-the memorandum, 22 is s.~follows:
"It is requested.that the adeqacy of-the design 0
4:
.(
- 3 ! approach (ths'. -is, valve f ailing to open on loss.'of control power) be. reviewed:on an excedited basis for B&W facilities in i
%,,.r.o m i s m n m.ine; j
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- general and Threc
- Mile. Island in particular."
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g Did you prepare a reaponse dated May 3, 1978?
j 2
^ A I did.
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3 g
Is this the response?
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-4 A
It is.
e 5
MR. HEBDON:
For the record, this is a memorandum 6
from K. V. Seyfrit,to E. J. Bruner, dated May 3, 1978.
The 7
subject is the Three Mile Island Unit 2 pressurizer relief 8
valve.
9 BY MR. HEBDON :
10 g
Is this memo a part of the normal function of your i
/
11 job?
12 A
Yes.
. ()
13 0
Did you feel that the valve. described in the memo i
14 should be safety-related?
15 A
Could you provide for me a definition from the regu-i 16 lations or regulatory guides, of safety-related equipment?
17 g
Well, 'let me ask it the other way around.
What is 3
i 18
.your understanding of what constitutes safety-related equipment?
19 A'
That equipment which supports safety systems.
20~
g-Based on your understanding, then, of what consti-a 21
.tutes a safety-related system, did you feel that the valve l
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22
- should be safety-related?
-23 A
No, i
'O IWhy not?
'24 4
Ace.Federet Coporters, Inc.
25 A
Because there ~are safety ' valves on the pressurizcr.
1' 1
A
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7 1
O What was done as a result of Mr. Sternberg's memo?
1 2
A.
The FSAR was reviewed to determine whether or not --
3 g
may I correct that, please?
The FSAR was reviewed to determine
'd the status of the application for license.
5 g-What specifically did you review in the FSAR?
6 A.
Section 7.4.1.6.
Pressurizer controls.
Specifically, 7
electromatic relief valve control.'
8 G
What did that section of the FSAR tell you?
9 A.
It says the following: " Redundancy is accomplished byl 10 providing manual control of the pressurizer relief isolation II valve located upstream of the electromatic relief valve.
In 12 the event that the relief valve were to fail in the open posi-i],
13 tion, pressure relief could be controlled by cycling (open and Id closed) the relief isolation valve.
15 "If it became necessary to evacuate the control room,;
16 manual control of the relief isolation valve can be assumed I
17 from the local station outside the control room."
'IO O
Did you review any other sections of the FSAR before I9 preparing your response?
70 A.
I reviewed figure 5.1-3.
21 O
What did that tell you?
22 A.
_It shows the location of the electromatic relief 23 valve, the isolation valve, the pres'surizer, and other equip-24 ment.
AceJederet Reporters, Inc.
25
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G; Other than just showing you the location-of those
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y.
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il valves andjthose: components in the system, did it tell'you any.i[
2 thing' else?
l
~3 A
It shows the electromatic valve is normally closed.
la 7-.,
4
'O Okay.
Did you review any other sections of the PSARIj i
5
- A No.
Not that I recall.
6 g-Did you contact anyone in NRR?
I 7
A No.
{
8 0
Did you contact anyone anywhere.else?
l 9
A Yes.
Specifically, Sternberg, Lazarus, and Haverkamp.
10 g
.What did you learn from those contacts?
'll A-That the electromatic relief valve can be left i
12 closed, per' plant procedures.
L/~j 13 G
Could you explain' that a little bit more fully?
-. (/
~
~ld What do you' mean by "can be lef t closed"?
i
- 15
.A It's. permitted, under the s' a tion. procedures.
c 16 g:
It's normally closed; isn't that correct?
i 17 !
The figure indicates that it's normally closed, but A,
18
'it's used in fact to control pressure on occasion and, there-l
~19 fore would on occasion-beLnormally open.
I so,.from time 1 o time, when it's required to func-j
-20
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t' 21 tion, tit does.open?.
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i 22 A'
Correct..
4-s_^
23 g'
Did yo u get.any other informstien from your contacts 24 withithoseipeople?-
w soeret neuorwn, Inc.
e 25 gy
.That the occurrence'resulted from n' test of 1
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1 electrical equipment.
l 2
g Did that have any particular significance?
l 3
A I don't believe so.
j f
4 g
All right.
Did you consider the possibility of send !
I l
5 ing Mr. Sternberg's memo or your response to NRR7 l
6 A
No.
I considered it.
I considered it, and I rejected 7
it because it was previously reviewed by NRR.
8 g
All right.
Do you think that section 47116 implies 9
that the PORV was assumed to fail open as part of the safe shut-10 down analysis?
j 11 A
I have not read the safe shutdown analysis to which l
12 you refer.
l I
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l 13 0
Well, section 74, which is the section from which 14 that particular subsectioncomes,isthesafeshutdownsection.l 15 A
I didn't look beyond this area.
16 g
The particular section that you looked at, 74116, 17 do you feel that that section implies that the PORV is assumed 18 to fail open?
j l
19 A
It cleErly says taht in the event that the valve i
20 were to fail open, that the line could be isolated.
i i
21 0
Do you read from that an implication that there was i 22 a conscious decision to have the valve fail open as opposed to 23 fail shut?
24 A
There may have been.
I wouldn't know.
Ace Federd Reporters, Inc, 25 g
If you had reached that conclusion that the valve i
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ipv9-10 I
was supposed to f ai.1 open, what significance would.you.have' 2
assigned to that fact?
3 A.
If the valvo were to fail open, then control of V
i 4
pressure 'can be maintained with the isolation valve.
If it
.5 fails closed, control'of pressure by relief through that line, 6
of course, cannot be maintained.
7 0
.If that's an assumption innthe safe shutdown analy-8 sis, then what significance would the fact that the valve ist 9
suppsoed to' fail open have to you?
l 10 l
A None.
I II G
Did,you know that the licensee changed the PORV to 12 fail-shut on loss of power?
13 l
O)
(
A Yes, I am aware of that.
Id G
Were you aware of that at the time you prepared your i *t memo?-
I 6
A.
No.
I7 0
When did you'become aware of that?
f 18 A.
I can't tell you~specifically.
I became aware of it 19 in reviewing a document dated June 27, 1978; when it crossed 20
.my' desk.
I don't know.
i l
i 2I
.O From whom and to' whom is that document?
.I
- V 22
~
A..
That document is from J.
G..Herbein, vice president l
23 of Metropolitan Edison Company, to Boyce-Grier,. director of 1
'24
. Regio' n.1.
kee-Feder;t Reporters,'ine.
l 25
-g And when you. reviewed that document at some time
'i
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t:M9*>
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4 :after.:it was written, you became aware-that ths utility proposed; 2
- to'have the PORV fail shut on loss of power?
3.
' A..
Yes.
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1, -.
Did^you find any conflict between that proposal and
'4 g
' l 5
.the words that you had read.in section 74116?
I i
ip A
It was outside the scope of my review.
i I
7 4
What was outside the scope of-your review?
8 A
The scope of my review was defined in the letter and 9'
a memorandum from Sternberg to Sey12it.
l 10 O
But in-the course of reviewing the' document from Met i
II Ed, that didn't raise any concerns in your mind with respect to i 12 -what you'had' read in the FSAR as a result of reviewing the memo I 1
s
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12
'that Sternberg had_ written?
I
%./ -
l 14 A
- Are you aware that there is an LER on PWRs generated 15 every working hour?
16 4
Yes, I can believe~that.
17 A
All right.
No.
I didn't take any follow-up action i
la on'it.
j u
19 G
All right.
So, you didn't make that connection.
1
.20 A
No.
l l
i t-21 G-
-Which would not be that surprising, considering the
.J(A 5
- )
22 number of LERs that '.you see; is that what you're saying?
h 23 Y "A
Yes.-
I
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4 24
-O
- Okay, If, for the seke of discussion, you had made
~
14c.r.o.r.i a. porters, iric.
25 ! that connection, would thur have raised any concerns.in your L
1 4
- g?
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pvil-12
'l' l mind?
2 A
No.
3 0
.If, for example, now, looking at what the utility
~~
4 proposed?-
5 A
No, because of the safety valves on the system.
6
.There are other means of controlling pressure, as surely you
'7 know, including -- which are the sprays and the heaters in the 8
pressurizer.
In addition, there is letdown from the primary 9
system, which is vented from the -- you know, which can remove 10 excess coolant and provide additional. coolant if it's necessary.'
II G-What analysis of the-change that was proposed by the I
12 utility was done by the' staff?
G 13-ls,)
A I don't know.- Icantellyouwhatourprocedureis,j ifyouwishtoknowthat.
Id i
15 0
All right.
What analysis sh'ould have been done by I0 the staff?
i Itshouldhavebeen'analyzedunder5059oftheregu-l I7 A
l-lations and reviewed by the inspector, f
I6 G.
Ih> you know if that was done?
U t
20 A.
No, I don't.
2I
- XXX-BY MR. PARLER
A Whoshouldhaveconductedtheanalysisunderthe505h l_)
22 O
23 procedure?
NRR or I&E7 f
2#
A The licensee.
Am FWere4 Rmorters, im.
23 G'
The-licensee?
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. 13 t-m 11 Ai
[Yes,: sir.-
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22 10 And who :would :have revievn' that_ analysis?
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- g;-
- Th'e'. inspector.
^O,:
"4 i
XXX-BY MR. "HEBDON :
._ 5
- G.
Did you realizeiat the time that you prepared your 6
- response that:there wa's no direct indication of PORV position?
c.
7 A.
No,?I did not.
~
- 8 G
Did you become aware at some point after that that.
9
.t ere was no direct' indication?
h 11 0 g,
-I becama aware of that after the-incident on March.
l 1
~
Il-28,D1979..
12
.g so,-you didn't become aware of that until after the
.13
~TMI accident?
q Id
.A.
That's' correct.
I-
-15
.g._
'Did you consider informing.other utilities of the.
l s
fi 16 problems of PORV'failing to open on' loss:of power?l L.
=
17 A, -
I considered.it, yes, and rejected as not-safety-18 signifidant.
f
-[
j 19 4:
If you had decided-to notify the.other. utilities,
~
J20 whatlwould'have'been the mechanism?-
(21,
. A..
An IE bulletin. or an IE circular.
l
[ 22 JG l ButJyou': decide'dnot to: do that?
~
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23
- A. '
That'sicorrect.D lLet mel say} that?I decided not to.
-f_.24 propose thatto9my: management.; It's=not my decision,Jofs e
~
- course,
.g 4.p.e.r# noon.n,ync.
- (
-25 to t do;. tha t. - Bulletins'and? circulars are issued by the. director-G
4:;.
(PV13 p-14 i
v-1 1
?6f'the/ Division of. Reactor: Operations Inspection-at IE, i
2 0
Who would.that-have been at IE at the time 5 i
A.-
. Norman Moseley -- sorry -- probably Harry Thornberg.!
3 l __. - -.
1 4
0 Were there any 'other aspects of the March 29, 1978 l
l 5
incident at TMI that are relevant to the March.28, 1979 inci-
{
6 dent at TMI?
.end#3-'
7
' A.
Not to my knowledge.
-- 8
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iin et is your gene-al perception of the relationship 2
between IE headquarters and IE regions?
3 A
Not as good as it ought to oe.
4 0
What kind of proolems do you see?
5 A
May we go off the record for a moment?
6 (Discussion off the record.)
/
Md. HEBD0d: Let's go cack on the record.
6 SY MR. HESDON:
9 0
dould you care to discuss any specifics associated 10 With it?
J!
A Tn is is an area of opinion and I wculd prefer not 12 to comment in tnis area.
13 0
Hov ef f ec tively does tne current IE/.iRH rel ationsnip 14 f acilitate the f eedocck of operational experience into the 15 licensing process?
15 A
r.3 neve on my le vel a good re cport viith WRR.
17 0
Do yo u f e el th a t i4 RR, the t ecnnical re vie' err in tae 16 civision of site safety or division of system saf ety, neve 19 e good understanding of the concerns taet are ceing raised 2) by the inscectors es they review the plants and by tne people 21 in IE hee.douartsrs as tney are involved with tne operetion of 22 tne plants?
23 A
Yes, I dc.
24 0
Joes IE revie. clant procedures?
25 A
Yes.
$70dO4a2 16 gsh 1
O Is that an aree that you are normally involved with?
2 A
Ine review of plent procedures is done by the 3
regional offices.
4 O
Do you normally get involved with that et all in 5
headouarte rs ?
6 A
No.
7 0
Prior to March 28, 1979, again, prior to the fMI 8
accident, what knowledae did you have concerning the incident 9
that occurred at Davis-3 esse on September 24, 19.77?
10 A
nould you repeat that question, please?
11 0
Prior to the TMI a ccident, anat knowle dge ^id you 12 nave concerning the incident that occurref et Javis-neese 13 on September 24, 1977?
s 14 A
I don't recall.
I would nave to go to my files.
15 0
Do you know of any precursor events thet cre 16 relevant to the eccident at Til?
17 A
Tnere have oeen otner losses of pre ssure tarou;"
13 the power-operated relief velve at otner B&n reactors.
Ix 0
Do you recall any specific inc idents whe re thet nas 20 happened, soecilic plants or so=cific dates?
21 A
I don't recall scecific detes.
I da bolic<e intro 22 was an incident et dancho Seco.
23 Q~
How significant did voo ~.nsider unese incioents 24 to oe?
25 A
Ine most si?nificent crevicJs incicent the: I a"
y_
s
$70304.3 17 gsh I
aware of, I do believe involved a significant decrease in 0
-2 temperature.
But I an not sure of that, and I would want to 3
consult ny files.
4-0 Do you recall which plant it was at?
5 A
Not for certain.
6 0
Would you consult your fil es, and if you have any 7
information that is relevant to this inquiry, if you would S
let me know at a later date.
9 Do you have any additional information that nigqt ce 10 relevant to our inquiry to the events surrounding the 11 accident at Tl41?
12 A
I have some concerns.
One concern involves failure 13 to follow procedure, and that is set forth in NUREG s603, 14 which says that emergency procedure 2202-1.5 requires that 15 the electro-magnetic relief isolation valve be closed wnen 16
'he following symotoms exist.
17 Relief valve discherpe line temaereture exceeding 13 the nornal 120 degrees F.
The relief valve dischergs 19 temperature was aporoximetely i s) degrees et the tins of the 23 accident.
21 O
Nov what is tne reference tnet vou are r:f rrin-to 22 nere?
tiey I see the cover to tnat?
23 (Witne ss hands docu9ent to Jr.
iebdon.)
24
!A R. H5EDO.1: This is JJ2E0 05 JO, invest 1 ^- co'.'to 25 the 14 arch 25th, 1979, Three !!!e Islan accident s" :he Jrfice
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The procedure' sets. ailimit to: be observed by. the
-~
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- ocerator
- land / calls for --isol;ating : the line.
Tne operator did
~
> fin,]3 3.,H34 noU.do.th'at.~ Tne o.oerator-thought that the relief - we11, 4i he(thought that;;the.relle'f valve.was closed.
Tne procedure O
g i
y 05.
! calls tout-for closing ~ the < isolation valve in the event' that 165
[theref are -abnorma11y high temperatures.
t 7I lThe isol5 tion valve was not. closed.
w ;
.. 'O _ "
All right. 'Do - you-have any. additional -information
[
1.8,
E9-hthat1might -be ' relevant ~ to our inquiry?
10?
Si:
JI9 ha ve.-.a, comme t, and that has to^do with providing
~
31.1
=saf ety-grade temperature monitoring eculpment -- specifically, l12
' thermocouples - to measure temperatures at the top of the' f
13i C or e '.
tN.
14 The --1'nformation was available to the operator, but
~
15' he failed to act on it.
High temoeratures at the top of the 16' core 11ndicated that boiling"was-occurring in'the core.
And-
= 171 that boilingcdisplacediwater from tne reactor vessel-to the i
si 3 L tonlV free surf ace. that exists in the s ystem..
And.thst's the L.
19
. free: surf ace in the pressurizer.
Pushing water'up into the 20::
- pressurizer caused the operator to conclude that he needed to'
, 21 "stopf supplyingj water to the reactor. coolant system, when. in w-122--
f act,3he was losing water 'from the reactor coolant system L23 -
andineeded lto : supply. it.
. y-i4'
- 24 Inthink.that thatsaspect of the-design of.this-25' - f plant.;has ? no t :been adequately considered.
Yhe 'Acas is aware 9
4)
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of this concern. In fact, Dr. Okrent, at an ACRS neeting in 2
the not too distant past, referred to the accident in FE R M I - 1, 3
which is -- has sone similarity in terms of overheating of 4
the core.
5 At at accident, too, tnere was available to the 6
operator temperature responses from the top of the core.
The 7
operator did not act on that information.
The result was 3
that there was'some core damage.
9 I think that adequate instrunentation in tnis area --
10 Specifically, core temperature -- has not been provided.
And 11 I think that is in part why tne operator failed to t,ke 12 copropriate action.
13 O
Do you know of any cases where these t fpes of 14 concerns were raised prior to the accident that occurred et 15 FMI?
16 A
rie ll, of course, the concern was raised during the 17 FERMI-2 studies, and I have heard it voiced, es I said, just IS recently, by Dr. Okrent.
19 C
FE Ri!.I-2 st udie s or FEM AI-l ?
20 A
l'n sorry, FERMI-l.
21 O
In what context were those concerns raised on 22 FERMI-l?
Was this a study of tne accident tnat occurrea at 23 FERMI-1?
N 24 A
I can't give you a reference just offhand.
25 0
riould you have that reference in your files?
,,n r,.V4,1 u
a.a
. g sh 1
A I snould have.
2 O
dould you provide a copy of it, ?leese?
(
.)
~ Inst will be difficult to ca.
ncre aro
~,t many li A
~
.m 4
copies around.
5 0
Either that, or just provide the reference.
6 A
I could copy relevant pages to use if you wish.
7 0
Inct would be fine.
There's no need to provide the 8
entire raport, just the rele vsnt pages.
9 Do you nave any a dditional inf ormation that might 10 be relevent?
Jl A
No.
12
.i.-?. riEE000: Do you h3ve any additional questions?
13 MR..; ARLE R : Yes.
_s
(_I 14 BY V.H. PARLE R:
15 0
Yes.
E rlier in one ci your responces. I ': h in!: you 16 said there is one _EP an hour for escn PNR, or so stiin; ic 17 that e ff ect.
IS A
to, R~r:'s not true.
During one 12-mentn ;eriod 19 recently, ther? More 2070 L:Rs sub91tted to tne co791Fsioi> n 20 PWRS. Since tnere are 2 000 work ing nours in tne year, that's 21 one LER oer workino hour.
22 All those LERs cross my cesk.
was going to get te.
All 23 0
In at's the point that :
24 tnere L3.Rs cross your desk.
How eocut all nemorands cuch Es 25 the " arch 31st, ' 73 menorandu from sr. Ster nerce tr.c"
l
$70e04.8
.22 g sh I
also cross your desk?
2 A
Only those that are assigned to me.
3 0
Which ones are assigned to you?
gg 4
A That particular one was -- I have a different 5
supervisor since that memorandum was received.
Now, bas i ca ll y, 6
all pertinent PWR correspondance going to the assistant 7
director crosses my desk if it relates to PWRs.
S O
Who is the assistant director that you report to?
9 A
Ed Jordan.
10 0
So now, you -- and I guess you alone revie"? all LERs 11 for PWRs?
12 A
no, sir.
Tne responsioility for the reviea of _Eds 13 rests, in part, in the regional office.
LERs ere suonitted 14 to the directors of the regional of fices.
Copies come to IE 15 headouarters.
16 0
r.'n o in IE headouarters has the responsiollity for 17 a systenatic evaluation of these LE:<s?
13 A
Inct ouestion you ought to addre ss to Ed Jurden.
19 BY z.iR. MESDON:
23 0
fou mentioned that all tnese LEds come ecro ss your 21 desk.
22 A
Yes.
23 0
For what purpose?
. 24 A
Scanning.
25 0
nnet sort of things are you looking f or wnen you scen i.
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xa
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, ?L irablems: that are - sign 1 tic an t ' *.o b:: ref erred to" other jR
-3;
. :nembers;offthe staff.-
~ !,m) ?
f4 -
O lnow-.would you define a signif1 cant problen?
15-
"A Done. thet he's _ strong i af ety ' implications or s
6 perticularly. in'the: generic:erca..
. 7..
'O
.Wnen you : scan -- excuse me, go ahead.
y
-8
-A It's'a redundant _ system.- Tne same responsibilities rest ~ with tne region.
t iO -
0
- All r.ight..
When you review these or when you scan 11 these LERs, co..you ever me!:e a "what if" type analysis of f
12.
!ier?
Do you ever look et then froti the perspectiveJof 13.
"what if tne plant had been at higher power," or
"! hat if the 9,3
(/
l14 operator hadn't figured this out : or-that' out," that type of
.15 perspective?
.16-A Sf course. On o ccasion.
n
~ 17J O
-nnen you taalyze the incidents or the L: ins, donyou ild normallyf l ook.e t them fron.the perspective of when~it actually 19-
~. happened, or do. you.' try -to' extrapolate to worse ~ case 29-conditions?
?
21.
lI It is' Very difficult:to do a. significant enalysis i22' onj tne LEHs. when theyfre coming in at the. rate of ~ one an hour.
i
._{-
Db3 fAndilet' me 'adotthat neny of tnose LERs are trivial and we have ful
. arranged reperting requirements which. re.sult '-in the Lreporting
- 24:
"251
=of5trivialDinc' dents.
~
i 7
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1370.04.10 c
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The reason for that, ss 1 understand it, w" s
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build a statistical data osse. I don't think it contrioutes to 3
the safcty of the industry to "avc the LER s yster include 4
both significant events and non-significant events.
5 0
Recognizi:.g thet significant is a vary judge.?ntal 6
statement, that
- rcentage of the LERs would you say involve 7
significant events?
6 A
Le ss than 10 percent.
9 0
iinen you review the LERs, what do you consider to 10 be the role of the operctor?
Do you look at the oper ator, 11 tne e c : _ '-n s tn a the ope rator took?
30 vou try to make en 12 asseccm:n cf nether you tnink that ect ion was apprr,priate, 13 or do you look at it more from en equioment perspective?
14 Tnere is no way that I can look in any det' ail at 15 the ac tions whic h tne '
.etor takes.
Basically, I nave to lo look et it from tne point of view of equipment.
17 4.R. H E B J 0.'s Do you neve any other cuestions ?
a.r..>, a >.
1 :s
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e
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19 u
do '. aoout the inspection reoorts themselves ?
Do 20 tne ome across your desk also ?
Are vou res.consiole f or y1
++nn>
w..
22 A
fn e y cone across my desh and I'm not respo'.siole 23 for :.n e m.
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370.04.!!
25 gsh I
fney come across my desk for inf ormation.
Nor are tney 2
reviewed or signed off by anyoody in needquarters.
3 0
.dow about in the erea of 2iRd and I&E interf ace 4
ouestions such as wnen responsibility snould be transferred 5
for a particular matter f rom I&E to NRR?
Do you ever get to 6
that sort of thing?
7 A
Yes.
5 0
You are familiar with the agreement dated sarch 21st, 9
'77 between Mr. Volgenau and 4r. Rushe on the NHH/I&E 10 interf ace ano division of responsibility?
11 (Counsel nands document to ditness.)
12 A
I don't recell seein;i this menorendu a.
There
'>=s 13 an etrlier document that definea that interface.
One of the
~,
14 signers of that document utes Jan Scovalt.
15 0
General]v, w".at 12 ycur understanding of wnat the 16 ground rules are fcr tne transf er of responsibility f ror ene 17 o ffice to anotner?
IS A
Basicelly, inspection and enforcerent, ins;ects ao; 19 enforces tne reguletions, tne license, the technical 20 specifications and commitments in the FSAR.
21 dnere it is necessary te make
-- where it's 22 nece ssary to do evaluation o.f technical specifications or of 23 the FSAR, thet f alls in the area of responsiollity of 6.
o 24 0
Incidentally, Roger, do you -- your area of 25 res pensioility, oo you get involved in. Cart 21 ;roolems or
270.04.12 P.
gsh-1 reports?
2 A
We ll, I see some Part 21 reports.
And cr. accs ura, 3
I've had some concerns on that area.
4 0
In response to a similar question, you ; eve me e 5
gentleman's name that the question should be eskea.
- But, 6
again, e generel question.
7 Do you, to your personal knowledge -- are you, to 8
your personal knowledge, aware of any place in 1&E headquarters 9
or in the NRC wnere tne LERs are lookef at significant issues la and inspection reports are l oo%e s at :;I~nificent i ss'.:c s and
.11 are raised in Part 21 reports?
12 A
The inspec te r ic obliaete; ur.-ier the IE ineocction 13 manual to review every LER and meke a dlsposition on it.
14 The LERs, es I ncve mentioned, cross our cesks in 15 technical progr:ns. fne LEds also go to OJ.P for tabulation 15 or a stetistical basis.
17 Inspection recorts, si;nificent issues fro' la inspection reports are fic;;cd
- well, cefore they ;o into 1>
the insoection report, they are fle;ged in the ceily report 2;
and inev are flagged in nemorence fron tne regionel a f fices to
,4 mi
..e_
n
.o_2_e.
22 iion when tne regional office hes an issue tith whien 23 tney are ancomfortacle, they define that in a menorandun s
2' sucn as tne one from Sternoerg.
And they send it to 25 needouarters f or ac tion.
'.nd tncsc tnings ere track =d 'eith :nc
370.04.13-27 gsh-1 action item tracking system.
2 riith regard to Part 21 repo:ts, basically, tnose
)
of those revurts, I do oelieve invol/e 3
re oc rt s -- mos t
,x s
4 construction, and the y are trackec' oy -- I know they are 5
teacked by the executive of ficer f or operation support in
~6 terms of f ollow-up and teoulation of actions taken.
3 BY MR. HESDON:
9 0
Do you nave anything else that you would lik e to h'
10 a dd ?
i 11 A
llo.
g, 12 MR. d55DOJ: Tnet's all
- w ouestions I heve.
13 Inank you very much.
Inat ends thrt interview.
f rb "y_)
14 (Whereupon, at 11 : 55 a.n., tne interview was 15 concluded.)
16 1
17 4
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19 20 21 i
22 23
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24 25
.