ML19308C550
| ML19308C550 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/10/1979 |
| From: | Goldfrank J, Herbein J METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280579 | |
| Download: ML19308C550 (35) | |
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PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND
_________________________________________________x CONTINUED DEPCSITION of METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY by JOHN G.
HERBEIN, held at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station.
H~arrisburg, Pennsylvania, on the 10th day of August 1979, commencing at 2:15 p.m.,
before Stephen McCrystal, Notary Public of the State of New York.
l
.-L BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS FIVE DEEK.%I.%N STitEET NEw YortK.NEW YOftK 10038 (212] 374 1138 b
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f I
91 2
3 METROPOLITAN _ EDISON COMPANY:
I SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE, ESQS.
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Attorneys for Metropalitan Edison Company 5
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 6
BY ALAN R.
YUSPEH, ESQ.
of Counsel 8
9 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THREE M ISLAND:
ILE 10 JOAN GOLDFRANK, ESQ.
11 Associate Chief Counsel 12 13 o0o 14 JOHN M
H E RB E IN having been previously duly sworn, resumed the stand and 16 testified further as follows:
I MS. GOLDFRANK:
We are continuing the 18 deposition of Mr. Herbein.
19 DIRECT EXAMINATION 0
BY MS. GOLDFRANK:
91 Q
Your resume indicates that you received k
a senior reactor operator's license for Unit 1 23 sometime in February 1974; is that correct?
9%
A That is correct.
25 Q
And is it current presently?
BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE e
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a
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j 1
Herbein 92 2
A No, it is not.
3 Q
At what time did you no longer keep your 4
reactor operator's license current?
[
5 A
I believe the license came up for renewal in 6
the spring of 1976, and at that time, because of the I
duties that I was assigned, I felt that it was not 8
possible for me to participate in the training to 9
maintain my licensa current.
10 so I,in essence, at that time chose not to 11 renew'the license.
12 Q
And that would have been in your position 13 as manager of Generation Operations, Nuclear?
14 A
That is correct.
15 Q
while you were the superintendent of 16 the Nuclear Generator Station, did you have a current 17 senior reactor operator's license?
\\
10 A
That is correct.
19 Q
I understand that as of March 1,
- 1979, 20 Gary Miller became a manager, no longer reporting 91 to Mr.
(-
Lawyer,-but as manager, Generation Operations, oo reporting directly to you as vice-president, Generation.
"3 A
That is correct.
24 Q
Could you explain to me what went into O
that decision?
SENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
- a I
Herbein 93 2
A Prior to the accident, we had recogni=od that 3
our organi=ational structure had a number of levels, 4
and we felt that where possible across the entire a
system, not just in Met Ed but in the o u ter member 6
companies, we would consider reorgani=ing so as to I
reduce the number of levels from the corporation 8
president down to the working arm of the organization.
9 I believe that this move was consistent with 10 that general direc+. ion.
Additionally, I felt the 11 need to become more directly involved in the nuclear 12 station activities since TMI 2 had gone commercial 13 and had been transferred from Service company con-14 struction project into the operating plant status 15 that it was currently in, and for those reasons, 16 and additionally, the good job that we felt Mr. Miller II had done, we chose to promote him to the position of 10 station manager, and in that capacity, he reported 19 directly to me.
20 g
who else was involved in making this 21 decision aside from you?
22 A
well, I discussed it with Walt creitz, and 23 Mr.' Arnold was aware also of the decision.
24 Mr.'Dieckamp may have been aware of the decision.
25 g
was there a study performed by an outside BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE u.
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1 Herbein 94 2
consulting firm with respect to the organi:stion?
3 A
No, no study per se was performed by an outside 4
organization.
However, I do believe Mr. Arnold had 1
5 some of the members on his staff, based on direction 6
from Mr. Dieckamp, to examine ?.h e various levels that 7
existed within the various company organisations 8
within the generating function.
9 Q
so there was no external analysis, or 10 analysis performed by an external body to the GPU 11 family.
12 MR. YUSPEH:
Let's go off the record.
13 (Discussion was held off the record.)
14 A
No, tha t is not completely correct.
An external 15 analysis of the operating companies was performed by 16 a-consultant, Boo =, Allen & Hamilton, who looked 17 across all the companies at ways to improve efficiency I0 and overAll operating effectiveness in this regard.
I'#
In particular, in the generation function, they 20 identified ways to improve plant productivity, thermal 21 efficiency, maintenance procedures and outage manage-ment, and finally, procedures and means and methods
- 93 of operator training.
9*4 From-that study, I believe, some organizational 25 considerations were developed in-house, and it is those
{
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BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
1 Herbein 95 2
kinds of considerations that identify such specifics 3
as span of control, levels within the organization 4
to which I referred earlier, but I would like to 5
clarify that.
6 The Boo =, Allen, Hamilton study did not I
specifically address organizational structures.
8 Q
Though the study did not specifically 9
address organizational structures, it was a starting 10 point, so to speak, for discussion within the GPU 11 organization as to organizational changes?
12 A
It is difficult to characterize it that way.
13 I would say that the study and the areas addressed 14 caused management to look to some degree at the 15 organi=ational structure within_the generating 16 functions across the operating companies, and it 17 was that look that identified the considerations 18 regarding number of levels of organization and the 19 various spans of control assigned to individual 20 managers.
21 Q
Are you a member of the GOKB, General 22 -
Office Review Board?-
23 A
Yes, I am.
24 Q
And whut le the purpose of the GORB7 25 A
The_GORB is an advisory group directly to the S ENJAMIN R EPORTING ' SERVICE
1 Herbein 96 2
president of Metropolitan Edison, who, set aside from 3
the day-to-day operational activitics of the plant, 4
can look at the broad perspective of nuclear safety
\\
5 and radiation protection.
6 Q
rirst of all, who makes up the members I
of GORB7 8
A I forget the exact breakdown, but a certain 9
percentage of the GORB is permitted to be part of 10 line management, while the greater percentage must 11 be from off-line groups, external to the day-to-day 12 operational activities associated with Three Mile 13 Island.
14 Q
And are members of the GORB made up of 15 employees of other GPU companies?
16 A
several of the GORB members are from Metropolitan 17 gdison company.
Additionally, there are-managers from 18 the Service company, _thure is a Babcock & Wilcox 19 member, art there is also consultants from the firm U
of Pickard & Lowe, and the GORB encompasses the 91 technical disciplines that are directly applicable-C-
99 to nuclear power generation, and they include such 23 areas as metallurgy, instrument and control, plant
'4
-operations, et cetera.
.o5 Q
How does the GoRB-relate to the Plant B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE l
I Herbein 97 5
2 Operations Review Committee?
3 A
The Plant Operations Review Committee is 4
directly advisory to the unit superintendent and is
,~
(
5 required by the technical specifications to review 6
procedure changes, plant modifications, any activities 7
that directly affect the nuclear safety of the 8
operating unit on a day-to-day basis, while the GORB 9
is an overview group that is required by the Unit 1 10 technical specifications, b u't not by Unit 2 technical 11.
specifications, and again, the GORB is advisory to 12 the president of the company for long-range, broader 13 view kind of considerations.
14 Q
Even though the Unit 2 tech specs do not 15 require the GORB, does the TMI GORB cover Unit 2?
16 A
Yes, it does.
17 Q
And'as such, woild it oversee the 18 operations of Unit 2 PORC7 19 A
From the broad sense of overviewing plant 20 operations and considerations regarding radiation 21 exposure, and its function to advise the president oo of the company of anything that they felt it was 23 significant he should be aware of, yes, I would i
24 say the GORB did perform that function on Unit 2.
25 Q
How would the Generation Review Committee BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE I
I Herbein 98 2
relate to the GORB7 3
A The Generation Review Committee is required, 4
again by the technical specifications, and is an off-(
5 site group who is required to review procedure changes 6
and change modifications after they have been completed I
to see that they are, in fact, accomplished properly 8
and did not violate any of the nuclear safety prin-9 ciples of operation and maintenance activity.
10 Q
Does the GORB review the GRC functions?
II A
In a general sense, in that the GORB oversees 12 the entire Three Mile Island operation, including the 13 support rendered by the corporate technical support 14 staff in Reading, yes, I w3uld say that the G O F ';
15 overview did encompass the functions performed by the 16 Generation Review Committee for Unit 2 under the 17 technical specifications.
18 Q
The GRC was set up pursuant to technical 19 specifications?.
20 A
That is correct, and in fact, the intention
- 1 9
of the standard technical specifications which were nn implemented on Unit 2 were that the Generation Review 3
Committee would, in essence, replace the GORB
'4 requirement.
Hence the GORB was no longer required 25 in the Unit 2 technical specifications.
BENJAMIN R EPORTING S ERVICE
I' Herbein 99 2
Q What function does the Nuclear Management 3
Review Committee have?
4 A
The Nuclear Management Review Commictee was 5
established bv Mr. Dieckamp, I beliave, in 1975 to 6
directly involve the operating company presidents 7
and Nuclear Generation vice-president: in the problems 8
and occurrences that existed at both TMI units and 9
at our oyster Creek Generating Station in New Jersey.
10 on an annual basis, the Nuclear Management 11 Review Committee, consisted as previously described, 12 would meet at an individual nuclear unit, would receive 13 presentations in various areas from the plant staff 14 according to pre-set agenda, and then,through inter-15 action and discussion, assist in setting priorities 16 and giving advice on current problems.
17 Q
What we have already marked as Finfrock 18 Exhibit 11 appears to be concerning January 18, 19 1979 Nuclear Plant Management Review Committee meeting 20 that was held on the Three Mile Island.
Were you 21 present at that mee ting?
,t 22 A
Yes, I believe I was.
23 Q
Do you remember the presentation at that 24 '
meeting by Gary Miller?
1 25 A
Yes, I do recall the presentation made by Gary j
i j
B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE l
a 1
Herbein 100 2
. Miller at.the meeting.
3 Q
The January 18, 1979 meeting?
4 A'
Yes.
5 Q
What was the reaction by you to his 6
presentation?
I A
I believe his presentation may have taken a 8
bit different tone than what perhaps the written 9
document here may convey.
I think Mr. Miller was 10 objective in his presentation and attempted to point 11 out~some difficulties that he felt the plant people i
12 had experienced in the area of personnel retention 13 and-hiring practices.
14 Q
You did not feel that this outline, 15 which is contained in rinfrock Exhibit 11, is really 16 an accurate representation of the tenor that Gary II Miller's actual presentation contained?
18 A
No, I wouldn't characterize it as that.
I 19 would say that he, for the most part, probably 20 followed the outline of the presentation I have here.
21 I think he was objective to the extent that perhaps
' 2 some of this may not be objective.
I think he was 3
in the presentation.-
-og He frankly and honestly _ stated, to the best of
.n5 his-ability, what.he believed some
,f the problems o
S ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
I Herbein 101 2
were from a plant perspective, and I wouldn't say 3
that this doesn't characterize what he said to the 4
extent that these are notes, and a person doesn't
(.
5 always follow the notes in a presentation precisely; f
6 why, there may have been some differences in that I
form, but in essence, his remarks followed this 8
general outline.
9 Q
And how were his remarks received by you?
10 Did you agree with what he was stating?
11 A
I think I agreed conceptually with some of the 12 points he made.
Perhaps I didn't agree with the 13 precise way in-which he commented on certain subjects, 14 but in essence, I was supportive and felt that some 15 of the items he addressed needed further focus and 16 needed some improvement in certain areas.
II Q
Do you remember specific ' things that you 18 agreed needed further focus?
19 A
Not specifically, other than Gary, I think, 20 perceived at the time it would be good to add some 91 engineers to the plant staff in order to accommodate
~
on attrition which we could probably expect here at
'3 Three Mile Island, both from a need within the system 04 to man Forked River, and in turn, train personnel for
_o5 startup and operations, as well as the fact that we BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE i
v e
1
!!c rbe i n 102 2
do have a young staff that is very mobile and eager 3
to advance, and there are a number of other utilities 4
that have nuclear power plants and hence would v
(
5 naturally be expected to draw from the staffs of the 6
existing operating plants.
7 To that extent, we would probably experience 8
some attrition and should, in turn, plan to add 9
engineers to the staff in anticipation of that 10 occurring.
11 Q
Were'there any actions taken as a result 12 of Mr. Miller's presentation at that January 1979 13 mee ting?
14 A
I think there were.
I don't know that I can 15 state specifically the kind of things that were done.
16 I think the reorganization that took place was a step 17 1.n the right direction to attempt to alleviate and 18 more sharply focus on some of the perceptions that 19 the plant staff had of problems in this particliar 20 area.
21 Q
On March 28, 1979, how did you learn of
.(.
22 th'e incident at Unit 27 23 A
I was called in Philadelphia early in the 24 morning by Gary and members of the plant staff and 25 advised that the plant had tripped and that it had BENJAMIN R EPORTING S ERVICE
1 Herbein 103 2
been necessary to shut off the reactor coolant pumps 3
because of a continuing decrease in system pressure.
4 At the time we talked, I don't believe it was
(-
recognized that the electromatic block valve was, in a
6 fact, the cause of the system depressurization.
I Q
Was this a conference call between you and 8
Mr. Miller and the other members of the plant staff?
9 A
Yes, as I recall, it was.
10 Q
And usually when there is a reactor trip, 11 you would be notified?
12 A
Yes, that is usually the case.
13 Q
Had you asked the plant or asked Gary 14 tiller to notify you whenever there was a reactor 15 trip?
16 A
I believe he and I,
through years of working I7 together, have devel'oped a mutual understanding of 18 what it is I need to know with regard to plant upsets 19 and transients, including reactor trips.
20 Q
In that conference call with Gary Miller 21 and other members of the plant staff, you indicated C
that you were told that pressure was decreasing, o3 correct?
A I guess I did state that, and I can't state 25 with certainty at this point in time just what I BENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE e
1 Herbein 104 2
was told during that phone call.
I believe I may have 3
been told that, but I don't believe that was an area 4
of principal focus, although I do believe it was sug-f 5
gested that we look at the block valve on the electto-6 matic relief.
I I think the phone call was around 6:30 or.a 8
quarter of 7:00, perhaps as early as a quarter after 9
6:00.
10 Q
Do you remember in that conversation what 11 was indicated with respect to temperature?
12 A
No, I don't believe -- I really don't recall.
13 I think I answered similar questions in the NRC 14 investigation.
15 Q
But at the moment you can't remember?
16 A
I can't remember what they told me the tempera-II ture and pressure was on March 28th at 0630, or whenever 18 the particular phone call took place.
19 Q
Do you remember if temperature was dis-20 cussed during that phone call?
ol A
Temperature probably was discussed, but I don't C
remember the specific values that were relayed, and "3
l
~
as I.have indicated previously, the discussions on 94 the early morning of March 28th were addressed by the 25 NRC in their investigation and discussions with me, B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE 4
I Horbein 105 2
and those are a matter of record.
3 (Discussion was held off the record.)
4 Q
You indicated in our discussion off the i
5 record that you jotted down some readings during 6
that phone call on an index card, correct?
7 A
That is correct, I did, and the values on the 8
index card were read into the transcript that was 9
made in conjunction with the NRC investigation.
10 Q
Do you remember in the discussion that 11 morning what was discussed concerning -- in that phone 12 conference call -- concerning HPI?
13 A
I believe it was indicated that high-pressure 14 injection was used or in use.
15 g
was it indicated that HPI had been throttled 16 back?
II A
No, that was not indicated.
I was not aware 18 of the fact that high-pressure injection had been 19 throttled back until several days after the accident.
20 g
Did you indicate to cary Miller or the rest 21 of the plant staff that you were talking with on the 22 phone at about 6:30, a quarter of 7:00, that morning, 23 whether or not you should take any specific actions?
24
'A I think I indicated,that it would be desirable 25 to restart our reactor coolant pumps, if possible.
l B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE i
I Herbein 106 2
Q And did you indicate anything else to them?
3 A
I don't really recall.
4 Q
Did you then come to the Island after that
'l 5
phone call?
C A
No, I did not.
I Q
At'what time did you come to the Island?
8 A
I believe I left Philadelphia approximately 9
11 o' clock and arrived at the observation Center 10 by helicopter shortly before' noon.
11 Q
Were you asked to come to the Island?
12 A
Yes, I was.
13 Q
And who asked you to come?
14 A
Mr. Creitz called me in Philadelphia and dis-15 cussed the situation and felt that at that time it 10 was desirable for me to come back to Three Mile 17 Island.
I8 Q
Had you ever participated in any of the 19 emergency drills that are held on Three Mile Island?
20 A
As station superintendent in 1974 and 1975, 21 I believe I did participate in one or two of the
~
emergency drills that are required by the NRC.
23 Additionally, to the best of my recollection, I 24 participated'in the emergency drill that was held i
25 prior to the issuance of the operating license in l
3 ENJ AMIN. R EPO RTING SERVICE t-
9 1
IIerboin 107 2
the spring of 1974.
2 Q
Since you have held positions on the 4
corporate management level in Reading, you have not 5
participated in emergency drilic?
6 A
I have participated to the extent that I have I
been notified that drills were in progress and was 8
relayed certain information of a simulation nature.
9 other than that, I have not been involved in the 10 drills.
11 Q
once you came to the observation Center, 12 did you check in with Gary Miller?
13 A
Yes, I communicated with him through the 14 observation telephone system to the control room and 15 was apprised of the condition of the plant as it 16 existed at that time.
17 Q
And what responsibilities did you undertake?
18 A
I initiated the initial steps that provided for 19 an observation Center watch that could, in fact, keep 20 track of the various off-site dose rates that were 21 being transmitted by the off-site monitoring teams.
(,
22 Additionally, I asked that additional telephones 23 be installed.
I periodically briefed Mr. Creit: and 24 Mr. Arnold on the conditions as I understood them j
25 from talking with Gary Miller.
1 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
I lierbein 108 2
Additionally, I felt there was a need to talk 3
to the press, who had accumulated in fairly significant 4
numbers around the Observation Tower through the morning,
[
5 and I was asked several times by Bill Gross, the 6
Observation Center coordinator, to come and explain I
the condition of the plant to the members of the press 8
that were around the observation Center.
9 Q
The information that you indicated to the 10 press with respect to the status of the plant, that 11 information was coming to you from your communications 12 with' Gary Miller?
13 A
For the most part, yes, and I believe I may have 14 talked occasionally with other members of the plant 15 staff, although I don't remember precisely who or what 16 the conversations consisted of.
II Q
Is there, within Metropolitan Edison, a 18 Public Information officer?
I9 A
Yes, there is.
Mr. Blain Fabian is the manager 20 of Communication Services, and in that capacity he
~1 handles the company communications with the general
.~
no and with the press.
public 3
9 Q
Why did you undertake the responsibility 94 of communicating with the press that morning or that 25 afternoon, as opposed to Mr. Fabian?
B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
I Horbein 109 2
A Well, Blain wasn't here at the time.
Mr. Gross 3
had done the best he could with the information that 4
had been relayed to him on the status of the plant.
~(
5 I felt that it was necessary to advise the press, 6
and in turn the general public, of what actually was I
happening,so that they would have our best assessment 8
of the conditions a t the time.
9 I felt since the accident itself was very tech-10 nical and I didn't fully understand all tne ramifica-II
%g tions myself, it was probably be st 'tha t I make the 12 effort to communicate what I understood at that time 13 directly through the press, rather than go through I4 our Communications Services Group.
15 Additionally,,the press apparently had been 16 waiting for some time to learn of plant status from 17 somebody familiar with its~ operation, and since I
~ 18 was present, I felt it was necessary to give the best 19 information that I could at the time.
20 g
was Blain Fabian contacted at the time?
"1 A
I am not sure of the context in which you ask
- (T the question, but Blain was aware that Three Mile
'3 Island had a problem.
"4 I called Blain in the morning before I left 5
n Philadelphia and advised him that the plant had B ENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
1 ite rbe i n 110 2
tripped.
At the time I called Blain, I was not aware 3
of any radiation release or any fuel failure.
4 Q
Did you ask him to come to the Island r-l 5
when you talked to him from Philadelphia?
6 A
No, I didn't.
At that time, it was more of a I
routine notification to just make him aware of the 8
plant trip rather than any emergency conditions in 9
effect.
10 Q
When you got to the Observation Center, 11 did you contact him at that point?
12 A
No, I did not.
13 Q
The afternoon of March 28, you went with 14 Mr. Miller and Mr. Kunder to Harrisburg, correct?
15 A
That is correct.
16 Q
And this was at the request of the II Governors is that correct?
18 A
As I understand it, it was at the request of 19 the Lie tenant-Governor.
I am not sure if his com-20 municat.ons were with the Governor in this regard,
'l but the State Government people, including the no Lieutenant-Governor, were concerned as to the status 23 and condition of the plant, and I briefed then for.
94 a 30 to 40-minute period on conditions as we understood 5
o
.them at the time and the direction we were attempting B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
I Ilerbein 111 2
to go with the plant.
3 Q
why did you bring Mr. Miller and Mr. Kunder 4
with you?.
[
5 A
I had originally indicated to Mr. Miller I 6
thought it would be helpful if someone like Mr. Kunder I
could accompany me on the briefing of the Lieutenant-8 Governor.
M 'r. Miller indicated to me that he felt that 9
if Mr. Kunder was to accompany me, then he also should 10 come along because there may be or there could be 11 information that George might not be able to relay as 12 effectively as perhaps Mr. Miller could.
13 so as a result of his request, both Mr. Miller 14 and Mr. Kunder accompanied me to the Lieutenant-15 Governor's office.
16 g
Did Mr. Miller explain to you as to why 17 Mr. Kunder would not be able to possibly answer all 18 the questions raised?
19 A
I don't directly remember that.
I think the
'20 concern centered around Mr. Kunder just having been 21 transferred to Unit 2 and not being intimately familiar with the plant systems.
23 g
why did you feel it was necessary to 1
o4 bring either Mr. Miller or Mr. Kunder?
)
~
o-
~3 A
I felt that they had more direct, first-hand BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE 1
I Herbein 112 2
knowledge of conditions at the plant since they had 3
been there throughout the morning,,whereas I only 4
arrived at the observation Center around noon and 5
wasn't fully cognizant of the events that had gotten 6
us to the point that we were at that time.
7 Q
who made the decision to order an evacuation 8
of women and children within a five-mile radius?
9 A
To the best of my knowledge, that was the 10 Governor.
11 Q
Do you know i'f anybody from Metropolitan 12 Edison was contacted or consulted concerning that 13 decision?
14 A
I don't know directly of any contact with 15 Metropolitan Edison that led to that decision.
I 16 think the people in the control room were in 17 communication with the Bureau of Radiological IO Protection through the communications methods 19 established by the emergency plan.
Whether or not 20 that information was used directly to influence the 2I decision to evacuate, I don't know.
22 Q
Did the Governor discuss that with you 23 on the afternoon -- or the Lieutenant-Governor discuss 94 that question or ovacuation with you on the afternoon n5 of March 28th?
B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
'4
I lierbein 113 2
A I don't recall that he did directly.
As I 3
recall it, he was more concerned with the status of 4
the plant, when we expected to be on our shutdown f
\\
5 cooling system, and the magnitude and possible effect 6
of any off-site radiation releases that were in 7
progress at t'ae time or earlier that morning.
8 In general, he was more interested in the 9
plant status, it seemed.
10 Q
Is it carrect to say that the reason why 11 you decided to talk with the press on March 28th was 12 that you felt that they had been awaiting information 13 concerning plant status, and you did not wa"t to 14 await Mr. Fabian's arrival at the Observatigo TJnter 15 to address them?
16 A
I wouldn't characterize it quite that way.
I 17 would say that, yes, they were waiting, and to the 18 extent that the press, in turn, would notify the 19 general public of the conditions that existed, I 20 felt it was necessary to convey what I knew at the 21 time of the situation.
C.
Q Why did you not feel it appropriate to 23 wait for Mr. Fabian to come and address the press,as l
24 he was the communications of ficer of Met Ed?
25 A
I guess it was a question of judgment and the B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
I Herbein 114 2
need tc convey to the public at the time conditions 3
that existed at the plant the way I understood them.
4 Q
At what time did Mr. Fabian arrive?
5 A
I am not sure of that.
6 Q
Did he arrive on the 28th?
I A
I don't believe that he did.
8 Q
Were you notified on March 30th of a 9
decision by Mr. Floyd to allow venting of the waste 10 tank?
11 A
I was aware of that decision after the fact.
12 I don't believe I was made aware of that deed or 13 decision prior to its being executed.
14 Q
And what response did you have when you 15 became aware of his decision and action?
16 A
I really don't recall specifically.
I would II imagine that I asked questions regarding the technical I8 details involved in the need to vent the gas from on 19 top of the makeup tank, so that I could understand 20 the flow path involved, and in turn, the judgment 21 that was made to execute the venting.
22 Q
Did you disagree with his decision after 23 the-analysis was explained to you?
"4 A
I don't recall that I did.
25 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
4 1
Herbein 115 2'
Q Did the !!RC express any concern to you 3
with respect to Mr. Floyd's= action?
4 A
Not that I recall at the time, and again, I i'
5 was made aware of the venting after it had occurred.
6 9
' When did y ou become aware of it?
7 A
I don't remember specifically.
It wasn't on 8
the morning of --
9 Q
March 307 10 A
-- the 30th of March.
11 Q
.You have, since March 28th, been inti-12 mately involved with recovery efforts on Three Mile 13 Island, correct?
14 A
That is correct.
15 Q
Wha t kind of things were you looking at 16 in determining what actions should be taken in the 17 recovery effort?
18 A
I would say the need to clarify the organica-19 tional functions within the effort, the need to 20 control the radioactive releases to the environment, 21 as well as the need to keep the personnel radiation 22
~
exposures of the workmen here en site to the minimum 23 value feasible.
24 Additionally, I a.rve been concerned with the 25
. placement into oper stion of the various support B ENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE T
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l' Herbein 116 2
s y.i te m s that we have installed in Unit 2 since the 3
accident.
They consist of backup diesel generators, 4
additional ventilation filtration system, a tank farm 6
5 that, in essence, is usedas a storage facility for 6
radioactive water prior to processing, a backup I
pressure volume control system that will be^used to 8
' control primary system pressure, and Steam Generator B 9
long-term cooling-system, as well as the syst.em that 10 is called EPICOR II, which will be used to process 11 radioactive water contained in tanks in the Unit 2 12 auxiliary building.
13 (Continued on Page 117.)
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 k;
22 23 24' B ENJAMIN R EPORTING S ERVICE
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T-2 SM/mf-1 1
Horbein 117 2'
Additionally, I have been involved 3
with the planning for Unit i restart. In this 4
regard I'have worked.with the Training staff r
\\-
5 the area of Operator Training to encompass the 6
lessons learned from the TMI 2 accident, and I have 7
also been involved in the decision to install 8
various hardware improvements in Unit 1 based on 9
the Unit 2 accident experience.
~
10 Q
In what way are you applying the 11 lessons learned from.TMI 2 in the training?
12 A
There have been various bulletins published 13 by the NRC since the accident.
I believe those 14 bulletins are 79-05A and 05B that prescribe speci-15 fic training in the areas of heat transfer, loss 16 of natural circulation, the use of high pressure 17
. injection.
18 We have ensured that the items addressed in those NRC bulletins are included in our training.
"O Recently the NRC has published a Lessons 91 Learned document assembled by Dr. Roger Matson
-(-
which outlines specific concerns that need to be "3
addressed on operating units.
24 We have incorporated these considerations 25 in addition to the mechanical plant modifications BENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
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I 2.
Herbein that will be made in our Operating Training Program.
3 Q
Aside frem taking the specific or direct lessons learned from the March 28th accident,.
(
are there plans to go back and look at things that 6
could be wrong or way s in which training would have 7
fallen short in a general sense so that you might 8
not be able to anticipate another incident that 9
you cannot specifically train for?
10 A
Yes, I think we have recognized that that 11 is a possibility, a nd as a result, have included some 19
~
general kinds of accident training in a recent 13 Simulator Program that our operators have all gone 14 through that teaches them more directly how to 15 generally diagnose and access plant conditions 16 and reach appropriate decisions regarding actions 17
.to be taken with the plant controls.
18 In addition,.the simulator training 19 our operators have just undertaken does take an 20 accident and develop it through to the final con-21 clusion where the plant, through operator action i
22 has been returned to a safe condition.
23 Additionally, the NRC investigative 24 report has. pointed out a number of areas where 25 training improvements can be made as a result of the i
SENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
3 I
Herbe-in 119 2
Unit 2 accident.
3 we are presently looking at those 4
and intend to expand our training in the Health 0
5 Physics and Maintenance Areas to address some of 6
those specific concerns.
7 Q
was there a Recovery Organization set 8
out in an Emergency Response Plan or in some kind 9
of administrative procedure?
10 A
The Recovery Organization per se, was 11 established shortly after the accident by 12 Mr. Dieckamp, and we have continued to develop that 13 organization since the accident occurred. There was 14 not, prior to the accident, a formal Recovery 15 organization designated.
our planning with regard 16 to the emergency whi'ch occurred here at Three 17
. Mile Island did exercise prior to the accident in 18 the form of the Station Emergency Radiation Plan, 19 and that was the document followed by the plant 20 staff through the course of the-accident.
91 Q
What do you feel are the lessons learned C
with respect to the March 28 incident?
"3 A
Well, I think there are a number and I think 24 most of them have been addressed in-the documents.
5' that I previously referenced.
They include a B ENJAMIN R EPORTING S ERVICE
4 I
Herbein 120 2-better understanding on the part of the operators 3
of heat transfer phenomena.
I think our procedures 4
need to be improved to the point where an objective
\\-
5 is stated in a procedure rather than just a sequential 6
series of action steps.
I think we have learned 7
.thst our training in the areas of natural circula-8 tion and continued high pressure injection need to 9
be improved.
10 I also think we have seen the need 11 to improve some of the plant hardware systems 12 to enable more accurately following the course of 13 an accident of the type that we experienecd.
In 14 this regard we need to be able to better examine 15 the reactor coolant system in the contents of any 16 spilled water in the reactor building, both during 17
,and following an incident of the type of the accident 18 at TMI 2.
19 we need to improve the range of our
'20 radition monitoring instrumentation, so that it 21 will be able to determine the degree to which i
(_
22 nobel gas and iodine are being released from the j
1 23 site.
i 24 We need to look at the location of' 25 several_of the key instrument transmitters in B ENJAMIN R EPORTING S ERVICE
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b 5"
Herbein the reactor building to insure that should such 3
an accident occur in the future they won't be submerged with spilled coolant as they were following b
5 the March 28th incident.
6 I think we have recognized the need to improve our communications both with the off-site 8
Regulatory Groups and the general public.
9 I feel that steps are being taken in 10 this specific area that wil'1 he an improvement 11 over what we have had in the past.
12 I think f or: the most part that covers it.
13 Q
What are your impressions as to how 14 the TMI staff responded to the March 28th incident?
15 A
To the extent that they reacted to the 16 information that they had at the time interpreted 17
- to be true, I think they did a credible job.
18 obviously, they were wrong in their assessment of 19 plant conditions initially and we now know that 20 some of the actions taken were incorrect.
I think 21
{
they did the best they could in a very difficult and complex set of circumstances.
23 Q
Since March 28 you have made numerous
' 24 statements concerning the accident on March 28 to 25 various groups.
You testified before the House-of BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
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122 6
1 Herbein o
-Representatives Committee on Interior and Insular 3
Affairs, before udall's Committee on May 24.
~
A Yes, May 24, that is correct.
l' 5
Q You also testified before the 6
President's Commission on May 307 7
A Yes, that is correct.
O Q
You also prepared or under direction 9
was prepared a statement dated May 18, 1979 that 10 was provided to the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island.
19
~
A Yes, that is correct.
13 Q
You were interviewed by the NRC, by 14 a Mr. Marsh, correct?
15 A
Yes, that is correct.
16 Q
Were you interviewed by the NRC more 17
.than once?
IP A
As I recall, I was' interviewed once by the 19 Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
20 Q
Have you been interviewed concerning 21 the March 28 accident by any other organizations 22 other than the NRC, the President's Commission, the 23 Udall Committee?
0'4 A
I have discussed the accident with the State 25 of Pennsylvania House Select Committee in a general S ENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE q
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7 Herbein 123 sense during a tour that they participated in, I 3
believe, which was the end of April.
4 Q
Was a recording made of that tour or
..(
g.
- a. transcript made of that tour?
6 A
No transcript was made of that.
7 Q
Was a recording made of it?
8 A
Yes, I believe a recording was made.
9 Q
Other than these organizations, can 10 you think of any others that you have been interviewed 11 by or discussed the March 28th accident with?
12 A
No, I think we have covered them all.
13 (Discussion was held off the record.)
14 MS. GOLDFRANK:
I would like to request 15 that a search be made of your files to 16 determine if you still have the notes that 17 you jotted down as a result of your conference 18 call with Gary Miller and other plant staff 19 members the member of March 28th that is 20 referenced in your interview with the NRC.
21 y
THE WITNESS:
I understand and I will conduct a search and get back to you on the 23 results of that search.
24 MS. GOLDFRANK:
At this time I would 25
'like to recess this deposition.
9 ENJAMIN - REPORTING SERVICE i
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1 124 8-Herbein 2
I have no further questions and don't 3~
think we will.have further questions at-some 4
time i t.
the future, but it is possbile that 5
we would cael you back.
6 THE WITNESS:
I understand.
I (Deposition.was. concluded at 3:30 p.m.)
8-9 3o33 c, 3g33g73 10 subscribed and sworn to before me II this,,,, day of,,,,,,,,,,,,1979.
g 12
. 13 o0o 14 15
-16 17 18 19 20 21
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C E R T I F I C A TE 3
STATE OF NEW YORK )
- ss:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)
Y I, STEPHEN McCRYSTAL, a Notcry Public 6
of the State of New York, do hereby certify 7
4 that the foregoing deposition of JOHN G.
8 HERBEIN, was taken before me on the 9
loth day of August, 1979.
10 The said witness was duly sworn before 11 the commencement of his testimony; that the 12 said testimony was taken stenographically by 13 myself and then transcribed.
14 The within transcript is a true record of 15 the said deposition.
16 I am not related by blood or marriage to 17 any of the said parties, nor interested 18 directly or indirectly in the matter in 19 controversy, nor am I in the employ of any of 20 the counsel.
21-
{
IN' WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set this,[j),dayof,,,,g,g[,,,,,,,1979.
my hand 23
]1
/
24
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STEPHEN McCRYSTAL 25 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE se e y
g