ML19308C546

Deposition of Israel (NRC) on 790726 in Bethesda,Md.Pp 1-65

ML19308C546
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	07/26/1979
From:	Helfman S, Israel S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280575
Download: ML19308C546 (68)

Text

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TE ??2SI2M'S CC.W.ISSION CN ACCI2r AT "'EPSI 2CIE ISLAC I

IN THE MATTER OF:

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TESTDONY OF SA2CRD ISPAEL

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PLACE: Bet.Sesda, Maryland DATE-

" " sday, July 26, 1979 PAGEs: 1 - 65 i

Columbia Reporting Company CF FICI A L. REPCRTERS 300 SEVENTH STREET S.W.

WASH:NCTON. D.C. 20024 Tt:,zPnoNE 55 4 050 8001280 6 1

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CERTIFICATE I certify that I have read this transcript and corrected any errors in the transcription that I have been able to identify, except for unimportant punctuation errors.

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I C O_ N T E _N T_ S WITNESS DIRECT CROSS REDIREC" RECRCSS Sanford Israel 3

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_E _X _H _I 3 _I _T _S DEPCSITION EXHIBIT NOS.

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PRESIDC7T'S COMMIS3!ON CN ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND l

---------------x s

Deposition of:

SANFORD ISRAEL

- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x Hearing Room 1132 Nucliar Regulatory Con =tission 7920 Norfolk Avenue j

3ethesda, Maryland

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i Thursday, July 26, 1979

,euez;;

The. above-entitled Matter convened for hearing, c:o a.w

-pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m.

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<52

[PRESENT:

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u On behalf of the President's Commission on Accident l

j at "'hree Mile Island:

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BY:

STAN M. EZLFMAN, Esquire Associate Chief Counsel and BY:

GARY M. SIDELL, Esquire Associate Chief Counsel 2100 M Street, Northwest Suite 714 i

Washington, D. C. 20037 i

on behalf of the Witness:

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3Y:

MARK E. CEOPKO, Esquire l

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiscion Office of the General Counsel i

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_P _R O O _C E_ E _D _I N_ _G _S

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HELF.wXT :

On the record.

Would you raise your right hand, Mr. Israel?

Thereupon, SANFORD ISRAEL

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was called as a 91tness, and ' aft.or.havin'g.been first d.cly

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sworn,.was examined and testified as* fc11cws:-

l DIRECT EXAMINATION SY MR. EELF.vRT:

Q Would you please state your full name for the record?

ez A

Sanford Israel.

eo D

Q Eave you ever had your deposition taken before?

m E

A No, I haven't.

E o

Q I think it might be a good idea to go through some u

of the characteristics of a deposition, for your own informatica.

The testimony you are about to give is sworn, and will have the same force and effect if the testimeny had been given in a court of law.

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l At the conclusion of the deposition the court i

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l reporter will reduce the testi=cny to a transcript, and within l

l several days, you will be getting a ecpy of it.

You will 1

i have the opportunity at that ti=e to make any changes in it r

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! which you feel are necessary.

Ecwever, ycu should be aware

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l that we will have the cpportunity to cce=ent en any changes 4

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I that you make.

And should such changes be substantial, it would reflect adversely on your credibility.

Therefore, it is important, during the course of,this deposition, that you ask for clarification of any questions that are asked which you

do not feel you understand fully before you answer them.

i For the benefit of the court reporter, it is l

i necessary that you give audible responses.

It is difficult for the court reporter to pick up gestures and nods of the head f And since the court. reporter can't take down two people ci u

ez talking at once, please allow me to finish my question before

-m you begin your answer, if you anticipate what my question is

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j going to be, and I will try to remember not to begin my next E

y question while you are completing your answer.

u Do you have any questions about that?

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A No.

l Q

Did you bring a resume with you?

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A Yes, I did.

Q May I have it, please?

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(Ixamining document) l Cees this accurately reflect ycur educatienal and I professional background and experience, employment background?

A Yes, it does.

i M. W W:

I would like to have this marked as l

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the first exhibit to the deposition.

Ufhereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 1 was. marked for identification.)

BY MR. EELFMAN:

Q For the record, could you please tell us what your title is at NRC, and describe generally what your responsibilitie are?

A I am section -- things have just changed.

There is an interim organi=ation since Three Mile Island cecurred.

oue j

I am in this interim organization, which is called Bulletins

=og and orders, and we are reviewing interim actions on the a

operating plants.

8 Kowever, my permanent assignment is section leader u

in Reactor Systems Branch.

I lead a group of about seven

! People.

It is our respcasibility to review certain sections of license applications to assure that they meet the regulations.

0 Was the latter your function and title at the time l

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j of the "'hree Mile Island incident?

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A That is correct.

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Was that your title and function through the year l 19787

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"' hat is correct.

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i Q

I would like to relate to you two paragraphs from l page 10, section entitled, " Chairman's Testimony, Background I

l Information Booklet; Three Mile Island, volume 2", which i

i i was provided to the President's Commission by the NRC on f

I April 19, 1979.

j It reads as follows:

"The staff has identified six main factors that caused and increased the severity of the accident.

These are as follows:

8 "2.

The pressurize: electromatic relief valve, e2;:

which opened during the initial pressure surge. failed to e

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close when the pressure decreased below the actuation level.

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"'his failure was not recognized and the relief line closed 4

ao for seme time.

"3.

Following rapid depressurization of the pressurizar, the pressurizar level indication may have lead l

to erroneous inferences of high level in the reactor ecolant system.

The pressurizer level indication apparently led the operators to prematurely terminate high pressure injection i

flow, even though substantial voids existed in the reactor i

! coolant system."

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MR. W MAN:

I would like to have these two pages, which contain paragrapha 2 and 3, marked as l

Exhibit 2 to the deposition.

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l (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.)

MR. CEOPKOf Let's stipulate this is the testimony of NRC Chairsuut Hendrie before the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulations of the Senate Committee on Enviernmental Public Works, taken on April 10, 1979.

MR. EEI2 MAN:

The stipulation is acceptable.

BY MR. HELFMAN:

N Q

Would you agree, based on your present understanding e2 i:

of the occurrence at Three Mile Island in March of this year, eo g

that the two factors described by Chairman Hendrie were in 4

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fact two of the six miin factors which.ciused'.or-increased the y

severity of the accident?

A Could I see that?

1 May I have a clarification?

MR. HELFMAN:

Off the record.

(Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.)

MR. HEIEMAN:

Back on the record.

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"HE WI" NESS:

Your question was, were those two of f

the six -

I BY MR. EZIEMAN:

i Q

Were these two amongst the main factors in the

! Three Mile Island event of March of this year?

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l A

I guess.

I would definitely say this is probably i

among the main factors. Terminating the EPI led to insufficient cooling of the core.

O That is paragraph 37 A

Right.

If I.could back up a little?

Q Would you agree --

P0RV A

The first paragraph, about the MIEW being opened, 6

if the operator had left the EPI running, the plant should have ridden:through,even with the open.

So it is a 5

g factor only insofar as it was opened and h's didn't -- and he c

terminated EPI.

But had he not terminated HPI --

I Q

Speaking in terms of what did happen, we knew that aeo the pressurizer relieve valve opened.

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A It was not recognized, and there was a lot of coolant--

t i ter:tinate EPI with a continuing loss of coolant.

3 Q

If we read these two together, paragraphs 2 and 4, would you agree they were the main factors?

A Continuing loss of coolant and terminate EPI would i

{ be a significant factor.

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Q So paragraph 2, when coupled with paragraph 3, J

i l you would aeree with that?

1 A

Right.

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Q I would like to show you a two-page memorandum, I

dated January 10, 1978, bearing the signature of "'homas M.

Novak, Chief, Reactor Systems Branch.

In the lower left-hand eerrier of the first page it reads, "

Contact:

Sandy Isreal, NRR."

I show you this document and ask you if you had seen it before?

A Yes.

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Q Did you have anything to do with the preparation c

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j of that document?

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Yes, I prepared the document.

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Q The document was prepared by you for Mr. Novak's E

j signature?

eu A

That is correct.

f MR. HEIJMAN:

I would like to have this marked as l

Exhibit 3 to the deposition.

(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 3 was marked for identification.)

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3Y MR. EEISMAN:

)

i Q

I call your. attention to the first paragraph, heginning with the fifth line down, which reads, "Under upset conditions, such as prolenged relief valve opening, and i

accidents where significant voids are formed in the primary i

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10 l system, it may be possible to end up with a two-phase mixture in the pressurizer that is not at'the highest termperature in the primary system.

Under these circumstances, additional less of primary system inventory or shrinkage in the primary system may not be indicated by pressurirer level.

This situation has already occurred on Davis Besse 1 when a relief valve stuck open."

And I call your attention to paragraph 3, which reads o

"Although the safety analyses do not require ter=ination of oe E

g the makeup system, operators would control makeup flow based oa E

on the pressurizer level as part of their normal procedures.

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j As a result, under certain conditions where the pressurizer 1

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could behave as a manometer, the operator could erroneously shut off makeup flew when significant void occurs

elsewhere in the system or loss of inventory is continuing."

My first question with respect to these two paragraphs, did you write them?

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Yes, I did.

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Q On January 10 of 1978?

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A No, probably not January 10th.

It was probably j scmetime before that.

My best guess would probably be over l Christmas vacation.

Things were slcw.

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Q Cf 19777 t

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Correct.

Q With respect to the first paragraph, you indicated that it may be possible to end up with a two-phase mixture in the pressurizar.

When you refer to a two-phase mixture, are you referring to a steam mixture?

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t A

Yes, steam and water.

l Q

Would it be fair to say that these two paragraphs g

in your memo predicted the two concerns addressed by e

j Chairman Eendrie as main factors which caused or increased

• eog the severity of the accident in March of 1979?

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A That is my understanding -- I have not gone over and read what the operator did e.nd why he did'certain things.

ou I am not familiar with the operator's motivations,.-why'.he-did whatever he did.

Q If we hypothetize that the operator looked at the pressurizer level indicator,. and because of an indication of l

coolant in the pressurizer, assumed there was abundant i

l l coolant in the core, and for that reason terminated EPI, would i

'you then agree that those paragraphs of your memo predicted lthe two aspects cf the TMI incident in March cf 1979 addressed I;by Chairman Eendrie?

A Yes, that would appear to be the case.

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Would it also be correct that in your memorandum i

O you indicated that the problems, which you addressed, were

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And I refer peculiar to B&W designs, Babcock and Wilcox?

you to the second sentence of your memorandum.

A Yes.

But now, we have to put everything in context.

Can I go ahead and explain the context of the situation?

Q Yes.

A When I wrote the memo, I was fixating on the fact o

that B&W had a loop seal in the pressurizer surge line, a;::zo S

which was different than tha other vendors, sdch as Nestinghous e z

4 and comb".: tion Engineering.

That was my fixatien.

Now, the loop seal may not have been the problem ao with Three Mile Is2and.

At Three Mile Island, the reactor l cooling pumps continuped to run, continued to put a fluid--

u.riIh fill the primary system axf rid, a two-phase fluid, so the m nometer effect really probably wasn't germane to what a

was going on.

It probably had nothing to do with the loop I, seal or the m nometer effect.

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90W Similarly, the 4ent was opened, and you were l! drawing, continuing drawing a mixture into the pressurizer i and this,~in itself, could have held water ue-in the i

i pressurirer, i

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Q

-Would you describe such a phenomenon as a manometer effect?

A No, it has nothing to do with the manometer effect.

Q What do you mean by a manometer effect?

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A What I was concerning about there - this is the second paragraph - if --

Q Before you get into that, could you describe what l a manometer effect is?

Ormwhat is a manometer?

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i A

This whole thing dealt with:having,let's say, steam

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tg iE in the hot leg.

I guess I am going to differentiate what I call the other and this design.

=m Q

Let's try to do thi

_.4 quickly as possible.

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j What is the relationship between steam or a u

two-phase mixture in the pressuri=ar, and coolant in the pressurizer, in terms of the manometer effect that you are i

talking about?

A The e.anometer effect that I portrayed here is, if I had a pressure out there in the het leg, in the loop seal --

Q You are referring to page 2 of your memorandur?

i A

Yes, page 2.

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- this would then support a colu=n of water in the pressuri=er, provided that the pres:sure in the pressurizer I

were belew the pressur

'" "a pri:.a:f system.

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So, essentially, what you are saying, would it be corract that the pressure in the het leg would push the level

of the water in the pressurizar above what it would otherwise

be, assuming that the pressure in the pressurizer were less

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\\ than the pressure in the hot leg?

A Yes.

But I would have to differentiate that from PwR the other m ~vendorsiwhich' drop'directly in the het leg.

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They don't have a loop seal.

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Q You were concerned in y ur mem randum with the 6u E

B&W design?

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A That is correct.

In the other designs, if you have 8

the same situation, if you have a pressure -- and I am not E

E j talking about'a flowing system, but a static system -- a lower a

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Ga he Prewurik6,,n) the surge like pressure here and drops straight in, gravity would then cause 3

the liquid to drop out of the pressurizer, because it

'Iwouldn't be held up.

Q So what you are saying, that the design of the B&W pressurizer system allows the pressure in the hot leg to i be trapped under the fluid in the pressurizer pushing the i

j level of the coolant up. ;Is :that-accurate?

i' A

I guess we are running into trouble.

t Because of the loco seal design, we are talking about i

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a static system here.

That is all I was referring to, no flow.

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'S You could sustain a column of water in the pressurizer, because of the loop seal, provided that the pressure?.in the pressurizer was somewhat less than the pressure.

Q Would it be accurate to say that where this condition I exists, the level of the coolant in the pressurizer would reflect greater pressure in the hot leg as compared to pressure in the pressurizer as opposed to coolant level in the core?

N A

That is correct.

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Q And that an operator --

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A But this is for static systems, we are talking about.

E Q

All right.

Eao And for static systems, you are referring to --

A No flow.

Q Through the pressurizer?

A Into the pressurizer.

That was the thrust where I was going with my memo.

Q Would it be accurate to say that an operator, who

! is relying on pressurizer level for infor=ation concerning i

{ core coolant level, would be misled as to the level of coolant i

in the core, because of pressure in the hot leg increasing I

l the level of coolant in the pressurizer unSekncwnst to him?

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only if he has cooled off the pressurizer,and only l

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r l if his training instructions were such that that is the only l

l thing that he was looking at.

a You indicate in the last paragraph of your memorandum of January 10, 1978, that "For OL reviews, procedures should be reviewed to ensure adequate information before the operator terminates makeup flow."

In the second to lact paragraph, the last sentence,

you stated, "As a result, under certain conditions where the I

d pressuri:er could behave as a manometer, the operator ue2 g

could erroneously shut off makeup flow when significant void j

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occurs elsewhere in. a system or loss of inventory is 1

continuing."

a 8

I In.the first paragraph, the fourth sentence down, you indicated, "However, under upset conditions, such as prolonged relief valve opening, and accidents where significant voids are formed in the primary system, it may be possible to end up with a two-phase mixtore in the pressurizer that is not at the highest temperature in the primary system."

l You go en to say, "Un' der these circu:nstances,

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l l additional loss of primary system inventory or shrinkage in c

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! the primary system may not be indicated by pressurizar level.

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• c.is situation has already occurred at Davis 3 esse 1, when i a relief valve stuck open."

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i A

That question was too long, and I am not sure of it.

Q Your comment was, that for the operator to be misled, he would have to have had inadequate information or procedures.

In your memorandum of Janua.7 10, 1978, you point to the loss of coolant due to prolongederalief. :

valve opening or shrinkage of the coolant, the operator's l reliance on pressurizer level for coolant level,and suggest that procedures should be devised to be sure the operator 8

has sufficient information prior to terminating makeup ficw.

Oa A

A Let me speak to the general issue, and maybe I zo g

will hit the point you are driving at.

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b3 Under normal operathou conditions, the operator,

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Ea j of' course, looks at the level in the pressuri=er and taken o

care of makeup flew.

Under upset conditions, it was my i

pte l eesception that the operator was sensitive to having voids i

in the system.

When I say upset conditions, where he lost level in the pressurizer, the pressurizar emptied out.

l l And this is what would happen under loss of coolant events, I

I j steam line brakes., what have you, you have cooling of the i

i l primary system.

It was my impression that the operator was l

i l sensitive to voids, and that he.was able.torhandlenthat situation.

When I wrote this memo I had fixated on the no-I i

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flow offact.in a loop seal.

And I sent it out through Tom's 1

l signature to branch members to make them aware of the fact 4

that this was,aese little (_fferent design --

0 At this point, I am far less concerned what your i

I subjective thoughts were in preparing this memorandum than 1

I am what the memorandun says on its face.

l Wouldn't you agree that you indicated in your memorandum that the operator would be misled as to coolant i

j level on the basis of his reading of pressurizer coolant

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level, which would not accurately reflect core coolant level, i::

a:o on account of this manometer effect, " pressure in the hot E

leg pushing the level ~in the pressuri=er up.

Doesn't it

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expressly say that in your memorandum?

eu A

Yes, but it was put there to --

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Q I am not concerned with your subjective motives at l

lthis point.

Would you agree that that is what your memorandum states?

A Certainly, If the operator were only fisating on j the pressurirer level as a basis for determining core i

j environ =ent.

O The memorandum does say that?

Do you agree?

The

operator wculd be misled as to the coolant level in the core 4

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i l on the basis of his reading of coolant level in the pressurizer?

I A

Secause of the manometer effect.

t Q

Is that correct?

Do you agree?

A That is right, if that is all he was fixating on.

Q But your memorandum does say that.

It does say that he would be misled, or could be misled as to core coolant level based on his reading of pressurizer coolant level.

1 I refer you again to the end of the first paragraph, "Under thees circumstances, additional loss of primary system ou i

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inventory or shrinkage in the primary system may not be m

g indicated by pressurizer level."

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A of course, that is what the memo says.

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$g Q

And in the second to last paragraph, "As a result, u

under certain conditions where the pressurizer could behave I as a manometer, the operator could erroneously shut off makeup flew when significant void occurs elsewhere in the system or loss of inventory is continuing."

And the concluding sentence of the last paragraph, j "For Ou reviews, procedures should be reviewed to ensure I

i i adequate informatien before the operator terminstes makeup flow."

l A

Right.

The indication here being if that is all he is fixatirg on.

Q You do suggest that procedures should be reviewed to e

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l ensure that the operator is as.re of this possible misleading information from pressurizer level.

Isn't that your final suggestion?

A Correct.

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Q Let me ask you this:

What is wrong with shutting i

j off makeup flow when there are voids in the system or

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significant loss of core coolant?

I A

It has to be continuing less of core cociant.

8 Q

Continuing loss of core coolant?

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A Right.

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Q What is the effect that should be avoided?

3 A

You would just lose inventory, depending on where --

Eao you just continue to lose inventory in the primary system.

Q If the operator has terminated makeup flow, and j

there is a continuing loss of inventory in the core, what i

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} is the inevitable result, which we should seek to avoid?

f A

Core meltdcwn, obviously.

l Q

A meltdown?

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A Yes, total loss of coolant, i

j Q

" hat would be the result of the total uncovering of 1

i the core?

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A Yes.

Q Would I be correct in assuming that such an event, t

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lmeltdown prece!ad by a total core uncovering, would be a I

j class 9 accident?

A Core meltdown is a class 9 accident.

Q This result of uncovering, the result of termination i

.I of makeup flow at a time when there is continuing less of l

l coolant in the core, and that is uncovering and meltdewn, is j

! a rather obviously conclusion from the steps you outlined in

! your memorandum; is it not?

Substantial void in the system, or continuing loss

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of coolant in the core, the operator obtained misleading information about core inventory on the basis of reading E

pressurizer level and terminates makeup flow, believing that a!

the core has ample coolant, it is not a very subtle conclusion o

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! to draw, that this could result in core uncosiring and possible i

j meltdown?

A Yes.

That is assuming the operator is not paying attention to anything else that is going on.

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Q I am just working on the basis of your memorandum.

i It is not a very subtle conclusien to draw, that the i outcome of such a. sequence of events would be core uncovering j and possible meltdown?

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And I am referring specifically to termination of 1

l l makeup flow on the basis of misleading information obtained by n

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l pressurizer level indication?

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A only if one makes the assumption that the operator i

l i is not paying attentien to anything else going on.

l Q

Or makes the a'ssumption that he needs additional 1,

procedures to ensure that he has adequate information before i

he terminates makeup flow, as you stated in the last sentence l

of the last paragraph in your memorandum?

I am working solely from your memorandum now.

d A

I understand.

or int a

Procedures uma traine&

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Q But, would you agree that core uncovering and meltdow s

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5 is a probable consequence of turning off makeup flow at a E

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time when there are substantial voids or significant, ao i

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l l continual loss of coolant in the core?

HfE, A

only if it is continuous termination of M.

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1 Q

Assuming he doesn't catch a mistake-within a few i

minutes and turns it back on.

A l

It is possibly more than a few minutes.

t t

O But would you agree that if the operator has =isleading i

j information frem the pressurizer level, concludes that he HPI has adequate coolant, terminates 3 !=,

that,ifn: fact, what is

!?cing on in the core is a significant, continuous less of 1

ccolant, substantial voids, as you indicated in your memorandum.

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i i that the obvious consecuence would be core uncevering and j

i j possible meltdewn?

I A

only if he fails to cerrect.the situation.

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Q With that caveat, you would agree?

l A

Certainly.

If he turns it off and doesn't pay attention to any other symptoms that may be showing up in I the control room, obviously if water runs out of the plant --

Q If he takes the steps discussed in your memorandum e

and nothing further, and I am working solely from your ue g

memorandum now, misleading information from the pressurirer i

=C as to level in the core, substantial, continuous loss of g

l a

5 inventory from the core, or substantial voids, yet he HPE g

terminates 91K, is it not an obvious consequence?

HPI A

only if SEI were turned off permanently.

t Q

Permanently?

HPZ A

That is right.

Certainly, if he turned off DEI and monitoring other parameters in his plant, he may be led to believe, hey, I still have a significant event occurring if91 i

and turn N back on.

Q I don't think there is any need to go around on l this again, and again, and again.

t l

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But it is correct that you concluded your l

C j memorandum with the suggestion that CL procedures should be t

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i reviewed to ensure that adequate information is in the hands of the operator before he terminates makeup: flow?

A That is right.

j IL.ur branch--- -- does not review operator procedures.

O Q

I understand that.

We will get to that in a moment.

Right now we are just working on the basis of your memorandu=.

Would it occur to scmeone who looks at your memorandum, that unless the operator has information or I

l procedures which would lead him to look for other indications, e

other than pressurizer level indication, that an obvi'ous, 5

1. ff b

potential consequence of his having turned off put, on the a

1

(

basis of misleading information :n the pressurizer, would a

result in core uncovering and meltdcwn?

u l

A Only if the operator was not paying attention to l

other symptoms in the plant.

If that is the only thing he

! is fixating on, he is not paying attention to anything else.

~

i Q

In the second to last paragraph in your memorandum, i

1 l

don't you, in fact, indicate that under certain conditions l

l where the pressurizer could behave as a manometer, the operator could erroneously shut off makeup flow when significant void occurs elsewhere in the system or loss of inventory is

! continuing?

)

A That is right.

I t

j 25 l

i f

i Q

Ar.d the operater's action, which you describe in f that paragraph, you assume would be the result of his having

~

I l controlled makeup flow baxed on the pressurizer level as a l

! part of his normal procedure?

i A

We are talking about --

Q Iet me ask you if you could answer my question, and then provide an explanation.

t IT2, CHOPKO:

I think, if I may, the document speaks ci for itself.

I think Mr. Israel is indicating there are uo certain assumptions that underlie this.

And the question

-e 2

has been asked several times.

And I think Mr. Israel E

j has indicated on the record that it is possible that

$g if the operator ignores everything else, and does u

exactly the process laid out in the memorandum, you could have a class 9 meltdown.

But to do that he has to ignore everything else that happens around him.

I think he answered that seieral'. times. And I think it is obvious to me that is going to be his answer, that the memorandum is based on a set of assumptions that l

has to occur.

And one of those assumptions, that the ocerator has to ignore everything else.

i I

l

! BY MR. M MAN:

Q So we can pass this by and get on to scmething else, i

i

26 I

)

let me ask this:

Don't you assume in this memcrandum that ths operator will be basing his decision on pressuri:er level as part of his normal procedure, and a result of his view of j pressurizer level, could erroneously shut off makeup?

(,efuded i

A No'rmally, procedures in normal -- not loss of coolant.

g l That is not a normal procedure.

Ihat is an emergency procedure.

I

> w- > - - - -,

7.g..

Q In the first paragraph, don't you specifically Pj address upset conditions, such as prolonged relief valve e

2 opening, and accidents where significant voids are in'the 1

e o

g primary system?

And then, don't you go en to say that the E

operator could erroneously terminate makeup flow.

$ao And once again, I want to remind you I am referring solely to what you say in your memorandum.

A Under the first paragraph I say that loss frem the primary system may not be indicated by the pressurizer level.

And in the third paragraph I say, under normal procedures he l probably controls makeup flow based on pressurizer level.

l And the next sentence I say, Hey, he could still be possibly I

j doing this under emerejency situations.

' ~'

Q 3ecause he would be unaware of significant voids or loss of inventory in the c re?

Aren't you assuming that the operator is acting on i

l

a I

l 27 l

l l

u l

i l the basis of erreneous infor=ation?

A No.

The operator here is acting on the basis of tunnel vision, that he is only paying attention to the l

l pressurizar level.

i l

Q As a part of his normal procedure?

I A

Well, normal procedure is not emergency conditions.

Q Would you consider prolonged relief valve. opening or significant voids in the primary system to be normal y

operating condition?

C y

l A

No.

With.a stuck open relief valve, I would guess eob that would fall under emergency procedures, e<

Q Would you consider. a manometer effect in the o

i pressurizer a normal procedure or condition?

u A

No, I wouldn't, because the mancmeter effect -- in

! order for the manometer effect to be there, you have to have steam in the het leg.

Eere again, we are talking about a (CoolLn0 static system; we are not talking about losses through the pressurizer.

j i

Q In the first paragraph in your memorandun, don't you i

refer to prolonged relief valve opening, and don't you also i refer to the situation that occurred in the cavis Bessie' 1, i where the relief valve stuck open?

A Yes, but here again, it was my focus when I wrote

l I

I 28 i the na o --

l 1

Q once again, I am not concerned with your subjective l int'ents or feelings when you wrote this.

I am concerned

~

solely with what this memorandum would say to anyone who reads this, whether they talked to you about it or knew you or not.

A In the first paragraph I am talking about a concern about getting the pressurizer so it is not at the highest temperature in the primary system.

8 Q

Aren't you really describing a set of circumstances e

i z

g

in the first paragraph?

2g A.

Yes, but the circumstances I am describing in the first paragraph, how I get to a situation uhere I don't have --

.C where I cool off the pressurizar, because I have to cool off the pressurizer in erfer for the manometer effect to be there.

l Q

0: at least the pressuri=er has to be cooler than the hot leg.

t A

The pressurizar has to be the icwer pressure than the rest of the system.

And then I jumped in the second paragraph and said, Hey, the manometer effect would occur if I had all steam in i

the hot leg.

I wasn't focusing on a continuous loss of coolant

through the pressurimer, as I mentioned earlier.

i Q

Cnce again, we may get into the question of what you

?

i l

29 i

l intended to say here.

Right now we are concerned only with what you said here.

In the first paragraph, you talk about prolonged relief valve opening, or accidents where there are significant voids in the primary' system:

you refer to mis' leading information en account of the operator's reading of the pressurizer level as an indicatica or core coolant level; you go on to indicate, on the basis of this misleading information, b

the operator could erroneously shut off makeup flew;- and a

2 G

finally you suggest that procedures should be reviewed to k

~

g be sure adequate information be provided to the operator before 4

he terminates makeup flow.

I am not concerned with what your subjective thinking was; I am concerned with what your memorandum would say to j anyone who reads it.

And the question is:

Having read this i

i memorandum, would it occur naturally, to someone, that a potential consequence of this scenario, which you described, is core uncovering and possible meltdown unless something was done?

i A

Here again, only if you make the assumption that t

! the operator is not paying attention to anything else there.

t j

Q Cnless the operator were to do something about what l

j you described here.

I i

I l

30 i

l l

A Right.

{

j Q

After you prepared this memorandum, what did you do with it?

I A

I would guess that I had a draft put in Tom's i

inbox, and that he probably read it and okayed it for typing.

It was typed and signed.

Q And Tom is Thomas M. Novak, Chief of the Reactor Systems Branch?

c A

Yes.

u G

l Q

Was he your supervisor or superior at that time?

8 b

A That is correct.

m

(

0 Would you consider it normal procedure to provide g

I a memorandum, such as this, to your supervisor or superior W

for approval and further action?

A Correct.

i l

Q Do you recall if Mr. Novak made any changes in your memorandum.before returning it to you for typing?

i A

I don't recall that at all.

I f

Q Did he return it to you for typing?

)

A My guess, he would give it right to the secretary, i

! That is usual.

t t

Q Is it likely or unlikely that Mr. Novak would have changed the mamorandum around or made changes in it?

i

9 31 l

i I

(

A I think if Mr. Novak had concerns er something bothering him about the memorandum, he would have gotten in touch with me.

,Q Does it appear to you now, on reviewing the memorandum,,

i that any of it is the work product of Mr. Novak as opposed to yourself?

A It has been too long.

i j

Q You don't recall?

o A

I don't recall.

ue E

Q After you provided this memorandum to Mr. Novak,

-e

{

do you know what Mr. Movah did with it?

e

.I l

A The normal procedure would be, after it is typed, E

i g

l it would come to'me for concurrence.

Then it would go to Tom,.

~

u who would sign it, and teencur in it, and probably issue it :

l l

to the people in the group, Mr. Ross.

i I

Q Mr. Ross?

A Carbon copy.

Denwood Q

Is that W Ross?

I I

A That is correct.

I, Q

Who wculd have determined the circulation or the i

routing of this memcrandum?

Would that have been Mr. Novak's l

l respcnsibility?

l A

That is very icose in our organi:ation. I never I

i

I 32 i

i

)

i I paid too much attention to where carbon copies went to.

O Would it have been your responsibility to determine

! circulation or routing of the memoraddum?

A I haven't done that in the past.

Tom would doodle nane,

of different people to route it to.

Q So the decision to send a copy to Mr. Ross was Mr. Novak's decision?

I A

I would guess so.

8 Q

It was not your suggestion, as far as you recall?

O2 E

A I don't know one way or the other.

8 j

Q

--with respect to normal circulation procedures or

<l routing procedures of memorandums, would it have been SC Mr. Novak's responsibility or yours to determine who this memorandum would go to?

A It is not clear' est whose responsibility it is.

As I mantioned, I never paid too much attention to routing, i

unless it was a memo out of the branch, on a particular case.

l l

Then I would make sure I picked up the branch chief and the i

project manager on that particular case.

But after that, j

I didn't pay much attention to it, f

Sometimes the secretary would put dcwn a standard l list of people it went to.

i

{

Q So sometimes you would determine the routing,

""~

i i

i

=..

t I

33 i

I I

' sometimes Mr. Nevak would determine the routing, and sometimes the secretary would determine the routing?

A They would all add to it, probably.

There wasn't any clear responsibility for making sure that the routing was complete.

Q Did you or did you net determine that this memorandum i should be routed, for example, to the Division of Operating i

Reactors?

I A

As far as I knew, I didn't make a conscious decisicn e2 i one way or the other.

i c

I m

o D

Q Do you knew if Mr. Novak routed this to the Division m

(

of Operating Reactors?

8 i

A I don't knew whether he did.

u Q

Cr to any other division?

s A

I don't know.

t i

Q So far as you do know, to whom did Mr. Novack route your memorandum in 1978?

A I know nothing more than what is on the memcrandum, j Reactor Systems Branch is mentioned and Mr. Ecss.

i Q

That is Mr. Novak's own branch?

A That is correct.

I 1

Q Would that have included you and the people en yeur

! staff?

l

i l

34 i

I I

-s i

6 i

A That is correct.

i Q

Were there any other staff leaders other than yourself?

I A

Yes, Jerrf Mazetis.

O Were there any others?

A Jerry Mazetis is a section leader.

We have five j or six people.

Maybe 13 to 15 people in the branch.

I O

You and your team, and Mr. Itazetis and his team?

A Right.

y Q

Both teams were within Mr. Novak's branch?

C l

A That is correct.

eo t

Q So essentially ha routed the memorandum internally?

m

(

i A

Basically.

g S

Q As far as you knew, there was no other routing?

u A

As far as I know.

4 i

l Q

Do you recall having a conversation with Mr. Tedesco Ijconcerning your memorandum?

A Yes.

l Q

Could you describe for the record who he is and what i

lhistitleis?

i i

A At that time he was assistant director, I guess, l

I: Reactor Safety.

He was Mr. tiovah's boss.

I l

Q Was this conversation after the incident at Three I, Mile Island in March of 1979?

I

35 li i

l A

That is correct.

l l

Q Let me show you this docu=ent, and have you take i a look at it.

And I will then ssk you if that is an accurate l

i refl,ection of your conversation with Mr. Tedesco.

A I guess so.

I couldn't remember the details of the t

I conversation.

MR. HELFMAN:

I would like to have this marked an i

exhibit to the deposition.

l (Whereupon, Depositien Exhibit No. 4 I

ez l

was marked for identification.)

ee i

~!

MR. EELFMAN:

I will nota for the record that the z

E title is, " Background Information to January 10, 1978 S

i Note to RS3 -- Loop Seals in Pressurizer Surge Line."

u t

I j BY MR. EELFMAN:

O Would it be accurate to say that the first paragraph l

I of this memorandum is essentially a su= mary of your January 10, 1973 memorandus signed by Mr. Novak?

A Here again, the mano=eter effect is only a concern lwhen I would have steam in the het leg.

There may be other i

Isituations where I could have hot water in the het leg and i

!the pressurizer cooled off, and the pressuri:e could be filled i

i

&nd I could have voids someolace else in the system. -

i i

Q.

But that wasca_ scenario not discussed in your l

i f

~

i 36 1

I l

i i

memorandum, and not discussed here; is that correct?

(;tka. Polis SiM h41b=0 A

" hat may have been4 you know.

• he Davis Bessie incident may not have been a manometer effect at all, nothing to do with the manometer effect.

And to the extent that it is discussed in my memo -- I didn't mean to indicate that l Davis Bessie 1 was a manometer effect.

I I

What was the question?

Q The question was, is this first paragraph, which 6

summarizes your conversation with Mr. Tedesco, a summary of ue l

2 g

j your memorandum which was signed by Mr. Novak in January of :

2 g

i 19787 Cnce again, I am talking about the document-and I

a 8

not what subjective,. mental processes you may have had at

! the time.

i I

j A

I would guess the last sentence is probably too i

strong in terms of characterizing my memo.

"The operator I

l relies on level indicatien for the control of makeup flow f to the plant system.'

i l

Certainly, under normal circumstances, he would,

{ but under upset conditions, one would expect it would be more

than that.

O In the su= mary of your conversation with.".r.

Tedesco, i it states, "The operator relies en level indication for the i

t b

i I

i.

37 I

~

I l

' control of makeup flew to the plant system."

And in your memorandum of January 10, 1978, you state, "The operator could erroneously shut off makeup flow when significant void l

l cccurs elsewhere in che system or loss of inventory occurs I

elsewhere in the system."

So the statement in the conversation is stronger than in your memorandum; is that what you are referring to?

A Right.

I 8

Q In the summary of your conversation with aa A

Mr. Tedesco, the problem which concerned you is characterized

=

l o

b as a generic technical matter.

m

(

Is that accurate?

s i

o A

Well, I had indicated to Mr. Tedesco that I had --

I was fixating on the manometer effect in the pressurizer I

surge line, the pressurizer, and this wasn't the result of a specific plant review.

It was just something that I was doing on my cwn.

j Q

It was a concern about B&W plant design.

A It came out to be a concern about S&W plant design, but I wasn't reviewing S&W plant designs, so to speak.

It j was just a matter of somehow information coming together and the idea popped in my head that this loop seal could

' behave in this fashion, as a mancmeter.

It wasn't that I

-~~

i, 1

i i

38

! specifically was looking.

I wasn't reviewing S&W plant designs with the idea in mind -e as an assignment, so to speak.

It was a matter of pulling together various pieces of I

! infor=ation, randomly, I might add.

It wasn't an assignment, l' that I was deliberately looking for this item.

(

I guess I am not really expressing myself properly.

l Q

In other words, as Mr. Tedesco states in this I

su==ary, that this problem was not the result of a review of 8

i any specific plant design?

o2 E

A That is correct.

mo h

Q It was more a concern.for plant designs notably the B&W plant design, not a specific license application,

.C but a generic concern?

A It was not a specific license application.

And I i

shy away from agrseing with you that it was a B&W concern, 1

t because it wasn't.

It was not a work assignment that I had.

f It was just a matter of having read something here and there, in another place,and somehow pulling this together.

It turned out to be applicable to the B&W.

l l

0 You, in fact, mentioned that in your January 10, 1978 l

l

memorandum?

i f

A Right.

Q j

Would it be accurate to say that after discussing I

39 1

i the matter with you, that Mr. Tedesco concluded it was a j generic technical matter?

I A

Right.

Q It also states in the Tedesco summary of your conversation, that it was recognized that the loop seal configuration appears to be unique to Bsw plant designs.

A Yes, as far as I know.

Q Would you charac terize that as a generic cencarn?

i e

A All right, um Q

Yes?

eo b

A Yes.

m 4

Q And Mr. Tedesco accurately relates that misleading o

level information would result from the fact that instrumentation u

installed to measure system coolant is installed on the I

l pressurizar.

l A

Under normal operator conditions, an operator would i

l I

determine the coolant -- would deter

tine he had a full primarf system, under normal operation conditions.

Q In the final paragraph of the Tedesco summary, it t,

f states that " Operating experience available at the time that the memcrandum was prepared did not reveal any situation lfor which the operator could not effect safe plant shutdcwn; s

l consequently, actions to pursue this matter further at the time 1

i 40 i

~

l i

l i

were not taken.

This has remained generally true up to now."

Q In your January 10, 1978 memorandum,. signed by i

l Mr. Novak, you stated that the operator could erroneously i

l shut off the makeup flow on the basis of misleading information.

I A

That is correct.

j However, the last paragraph in the Tedesco note l

I y

here dealt with, why didn't we pursue it any further.

That aj is basii: ally what it came down to.

5 S

And my recollection at the the was, I didn't, at c

4 the time I wrote the memorandum, I hadn't been aroused suggiciently to think of it as an immediate safety concern.

i ou And basically that probably stemmed from the perception I f had, that the operators were sensitive to voids in the primary il system.

So that this--he would be sensitive if he pressurized the level, would drop out of the pressurizer to some cooling situation, the void would then have to appear, would then l

l show up someplace else in the primary system.

And my perception that he was sensitive to that -

t l

0 But this information, this perception of yours, jdoes net appear on the face of your memorandum.

A It does not appear on the facerof my =e=orandum, t'

l!

i 41 I

! because had I had a different perception, I probably would i

I t have -- if I had perceived that the operator really was just I

fixating en the. press"ri:er level, I believe I would have j handled it mach differently.

~

l Q

l 1 am not concerned with that question at this point.

4 l

A Sut the way the memorandum was written, my fixation Iwas with tha mancmeter effect. And all of our memos, we get jinto a routine of trying to develop interest in considering I

e

whatever these memese o

are, and one of those is to add safety e

y concern.

So I probably overstated the safety concern so that t

b sther people would pick it up.

m 4

g Basically, at the time,'I am pretty sure my t

o

-perception was the operator was sensitive, unless it -- if u

it truely believed what the operator was going to do was fixate

{

i on the crassurizer level, I find it hard to believe we would have handled it that way.

I hope I would not have handled it insuchacasualmannfer.

t l

Q I underJtand that concern of yours.

But once again, I I an not interested in your subjective thought processes at i

i i the time of the memorandum.

I am concerned with what the

!memorandum says.

j You emphasi:ed tha ? safety co=cern in the memorandum?

i A

Yes.

But the purpcse of the memorandum was to get

42 I

I i

i f the reviewers to take a look at this situation, on plants that would be coming in at that time.

We did not have any --

.at that time we weren't actively reviewing any 3&W plants.

i

' And I didn't want to forget about it, so this was a mechanism.

Q That is the reason you expressed the safety in the l memorandum?

i I

A That is correct.

That is the reason I added the last couple of paragraphs, was to maintain some interest on the j

part of the reviewers.

e I

O The question I have, concerning the Tedesco. summary e

o t

of your conversati'on with him, is his statement that '

s 43 operating experience at the time of the January,1978

$g memorandum did not reveal a situation for which the operator o

could not affect safe plant shutdown?

f, A

Why, that was the Davis Bessie situation, and that was probably the only one I was familiar with.

They did shut the plant down.

Q Now, referring back to your January 10, 1978 f memorandum, isn't it the concern which appears on the face of the memorandum that the operator be given adequate, accurate Il information, so that he would take the necessary steps to

ensure a safe plant shutdown?

l A

As I mentioned, we have not been involved in i

f I

1 1

f i

i i

I 43 i

i

! reviewing operating procedures.

I may have had this perception

)

that the operator was sensitive to voids in the system, and j he would do things to bring it to a safe shutdown.

i l

I guess I was looking for feedback here as to what I

it was that he was looking at, or how he would handle the situation.

Q Cnce again, I am concerned with what it says on the face of your memorandum.

I am drawing a distinction between d

that and what your subjective thoughts were at the time, zg on the face of your January 10, 1978 memorandum, 5

6g are you not -- do you not express a concern that procedures E

be reviewed to ensure that operaters have the accurate y

infor=ation so that they would be able to effect a safe plant shutdown?

A No, the rationale there was for the reviese.'.s to

-get a better understanding of what it was the operator was trained, or by procedures were doing to bring the plant. to a safe shutdown in a situation.

In other words, I was t 71ng to get more information i

in an area that I thought was already there.

It was already 9

}:y perception that the operators might have known hcw to bring jthe plant to a safe shutdown under these situations.

There i

<as nothing that we had, that we were reviewing, in this area, i

i

4 e

44 l,

I l and I was trying to generate interest in reviewe s to pick this

! up and go into this area a little bit.

i And I put procedures -- we don't review precedures.

And usually what happens in the situation, we wouldn't review

! the procedures, but put a question on the docket "What would I

operators de under the situation?" and get back some sort of su= mary what the procedures say.

j Q

once again, I understand you may:have had. additional i'

c subjective thoughts at the time of this preparation of this a

j memorandum, which are not expressed in this memorandum.

I am o

b concerned-solely with what the memorandum says, and I am a

trying to compara Mr. Tedesco's summary with your original y

memorandum.

u Mr. Tedesco states that operating experience did j not reveal' any situation for which the operator could not i

effect a safe plant shutdswn.

On the face of your memorandum, isn't there a concern expressed that the operator have the accurate information necessary to effect a safe plant shutdrwn?

l 3

i l

l And I refer to the last sentence of the last paragraph of i

i

! your memorandum.

I A

Tou are fixating on accurate information?

l Q

Yes.

A And I am not sure accurate information is what I am i

i 45 i

I looking for here.

\\

{

And I guess maybe you better explain what you mean

) by accurate information.

I i

Q All right.

I will read it to you, out of your 1

1 memorandum.

This is the second to last paragraph.

"As a result, I

j under certain conditions where the pressurizer could behave as a manometer, the operator could erroneously shut off makeup flow when significant void occurs elsewhere in the system

.o u

j os loss of inventory is continuing."

=C A

okay.

E Q

I The operator could erreneously shut off makeup flow.

Previously, in your memorandum, you talked of the aou operator relying on pressurizer level, under certain situations that would be a misleading or inaccurate indication of i

'core coolant level.

Isn't it ture that in order to effect a safe plant shutdown, the operator would have to have accurate information ilthout core coolant inventory?

l A

No.

This is where. I guess, it is a matter of femantics.

Let's take a large break loca. You never have a i

acovery of level up into the pressurizer.

It is all - the I

.nference I am getting fr:m your question, he should have an i

J

t 46 l

i

~

i accurate measurement of level, and that is not really necessar1,

i based on more recent work.

l We find the ' operator should be interested in i

l subcooling in other aspects to indicate if he should terainate "hase are secondary parameters en the indicator level.

i l It indicates you have a saturated condition or voids i

( someplace else in the cr ee.

But it is not a direct level.

And we talk about accurate.

If a temperature is 1

i g

l off 2 or 3 degrees, so accurate --

e Q

This new learning, what you refer to, is post c

o t

January, 1978?

e

<5 i

A, Yes.

I mentioned earlier en=t I had this perception E

that semehow the operator knew hcw to diagnose his plant when eo i he got into some situation.

I did not specifically know what t

j he would be doing.

Q Apart from your subjective feelings, I am talking abouu what appears on the face of your memorandum, and I am trying to compare the statper$1n Mr. Tedesco's summary that l

! there was no situation revealed by operating experience for lwhich the operator could not effect safe plant shutdown.

! And I emphasi:e the words "could not".

In your January 10, 1978 memorandum, the cencern is

' expressed, is it not, that the cperator he provided with i

6 i

f I

i 47 accurate information concerning core coolant level in the face of his reliance en pressurizer level as an indicator of core l coolant level?

A No.

No, no.

We are talking about accurate.

No.

i l You are fixating en pressurizer level, or core coolant level, I and that isn't what my last sentence refers to.

"To ensure

adecuate information...', in other words--to go back to i

my subjective view, and I have to take it into context of N

what my understanding was, what my feeling was--that the e2 I

A operator would icek for other parameters to determine if he *.-

e

• O had other voids in t e system, whether the system was solid, h

4 and only had a bubble in the pressurizer.

o i

And in the Tedesco memo, hey, there wasn't any u

situation where the cperator didn't bring the plant to a safe shutdown.

The Davis Bessie, what I was referring to --

j i

t Q

In other words, the prier experience, and Davis I

e Bessie for example, the plant was brought to a safe shutdown.

A That is right.

Q Doesn't Mr. Tedesco's statement assume that the i

f l

operator has the necessary information to bring the plant to i

l a safe shutdet-'

Isn't that an implicit assu=ption?

A Yes, that the operator has 'the information, whatever

..~

i l

48 i

i

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i i

i i

i i

l that infernation is.

O Whatever it is.

And going back to your January 10, 1978 memorandum, isn't there a concern expressed on the face of the memorandum, i

irrespective of your subjective feelings, that the cperator i could be misled by pressurizer level indication as an indicator of core coolant level?

I l

A Yes, but that was put in there to ' elicit the reviewer's dilligence in looking at this matter.

c 1

2 G

Q Were you satisfied with the dilligence with which a

2 the reviewers' looked at this matter?

w m

A None of my people have looked at a B&W plant, 8

actively reviewed it, since that time.

u Q

When you refer to reviewer, you are talking about I

j the people on your staff; not reviewers of your staff?

A Correct.

l Q

Would you anticipate that having stressed the safety I concern in order to alert your reviewers to the problem would also have alerted Mr. Novak to the problem?

A The problem of a loop seal manometer effect, I

I would think so, sure.

O Would it have alerted -- it should have alerted

Mr. Novak, as you intended to alert your reviewers; is that a l

I I

)

i l

49 l

1 l fair statement?

}

A Alerted them, maybe, we should look at the loop seal, yes.

I l

Q 3ecause of its potential consequences, as outlined i

' in your memorandum?

l A

Yes.

I I

Q And the safety concerns, which you expressed?

I A

Correct.

8 Q

Do you know if to date your safety concerns have ea g

been addressed by reviewers?- And.by use of that term, I o

don't mean the people on your staff, but Mr. Novak and his

<3 superiors and so'forth.

A

.y discussions with Mr. Mazetis indicates that one of his reviewers was pursuing this matter, Midland plant.

Q That is a partic21ar license application review?

A that is correct.

Q My question was directed to -- and I as using the the term reviewer differently.

Mr. Novak, who reviews your work or supervises. your work, and perhaps the people who r

l'

! supervise his work, do you know if to date the concerns you I,

} expressed in your =emorandum has been reviewed by the I

j hierarchy of NRC, as cpposed to the reviewers on your staff?

i l

A As of today?

l l

t

1 50 i

i i

i Q

Yes.

l A

Ch, yes.

But not because of my memo.

Because of i Three Mile Island.

In other words, we had an extensive review WC of procedures when PWE should be terminated.

f Q

Do you know which particular branches have reviewed the problem addressed in your memorandum, in light of the..

I TMI-2 experience?

l A

The Analysis Branch.

The focus is not on loop MP[

seals; the focus is when you should terminate SMiE.

l ag Q

What other branches,besides the Analysis Branch, 5

that you are aware of?

m

(

A Well, thic is part of the tsam that was established d

very quickly post TMI, the Orders group, that we were looking i

I

at other B&W reactors;

.and mainly, in the Rostoczy.section f and the operating License Branchs and also the Reactor Systems i

l Branch.

l Q

Are you aware of what has been happening with the l

j memorandum and the concerns raised in there?

Has it been sent to technical people to review, or has it gone down the i,

' organization structurs?

l A

No, it has been superceded by the Three Mile Island t

event, which indicated one of the concerns was, hey, a guy I

HPL turned off the eset.

And that is what is ccming out.

So this d

l 51 i

l

' memorandum probably isn't being reviewed at all.

It has been eclipsed by Three Mile Island.

Q When you'say your memorandunt is not being reviewed at all, do you mean that it is not part of the review that is ongoing concerning the TMI-2 incident at all?

i A

This memorandum had to do with loop seals, and one of the problems with loop seals, they may give you a 1-vel

indication in the pressurizer which may not be an indicator..

o.

of other voids in the system.

u o'

j The issue that is being pursued, because of, i:eo Three Mile Island-2, is the pressurizer level" indication may E<

j not be a:i -adequate indication of level inventory in the primary-i

{system, u

i I

Q l

or accurste indicator?

A What was the word I used?

\\

l O

Adequate.

A I guess it is a matter of semantics.

I am not sure why you. choose accurate.

l Q

In your use of the term " adequate

• and my suggestion i

l of the term ' accurate", I am attempting to draw a distinctica r

i between accurate, but inadequate, and inaccurate indication.

j Would it be correct that in your January 10, 1978 i

! memorandum, you expressed a concern that pressuri=e

!evel 1

i t

i 52 i

I I

i l

l

! indication, under certain circu= stances, could be an inaccurate indicator or core coolant invuntory?

And I refer you to the second to the last sentence of the first paragraph,which begins with the word "under",..and reads, "cader these circumstances, additional 1cas of primary system inventory or shrinkage in the primary system may not be indicated by pressurizer level."

Is the second to last paragraph of your me.,.orandum I

l in which you indicate that operators base their makeup ficw C

i a

of control on pressurize level as part of normal procedures and that,las ca result',' under certain conditions, the operator wa I

4

! could erroneously shut off makeup flow where significant g

lvoidshaveoccurredelsewhereinthesystem,wherelossof inventory is continuing Does that describe the situation Ijwhere the pressurizer level would be giving an inaccurate indication of core coolant level?

A I could say inadequate also.

Q When you say " inadequate", do you mean inaccurate?

t' l

A We are into semantics, and I don't know where it is i

coming out.

You definitely have something in mind when you

,say accurate.

i, Q

I have nothing in mind other than clarifying your

\\

use of the term " inadequate".

.$4y reading of your memorandum i

I l-1

I i

53 i

i l

! indicates that the cperator, if he relies on pressurizar

! level indication, could, under certain circu= stances, he relying on inaccurate information.

'"he pressurizer level would I

l be indicating more coolant in the core than actually exists i

in the core.

A No, it is more inadequate, than inaccurate.

Even -- it is not sufficient by itself.

Q Why not?

o A

In order to make sure that the system -- you only u

e gg a

2 l want the void in the pressurizer, steam bubblzesir. pressurizer.

E I

C So you are going tot ve a level, there has to be a level h

w m

indication of the pressurizer, but that is inadequate by I

itself under these situatiens to define that you have no aeu voids somsplace else.

But, you see, after all is said and done, you still

' need a level in the pressurizer.

So when I say inadequate, it is not sufficient by itself to be a true indicator of something which failed in the primary system.

Q If the operator were relying on pressurizar level i

j indication, would he he receiving accurate information about i

l core coolant inventory under the circumstances you describe in ymt-January,1978 memorandum?

l A

Es would need other information, because --

i I

I L _

3

-. ~

54 I

I i

t o

My question is --

I A

Ycu see, it is inadequate.

Indeed, he could have I

i i

a filled system.

l Q

But under the circumstances you described in your 1

memorandum, where you hr.re prolonged relief. valve oporting, j voids elsewhere in the primary aystem, additional loss of pri. mary system inventory, or shrinkage in the primary system, all of which may not be indicated by the pressurizer level --

d i I am quoting your memorandum -- that if the operator relies o

I l cn pressuri=er level indication, he would be receiving 0z E

2 inaccurate information about the level of coolant in the core.

g Under this scenario that you set out in your I

g mercrandum, doesn't the pressuri=er level give an inaccurate u

indication of core coolant level?

Isn't that why the operator has to look --

A No, it is inadequate.

l Q

It is accurate but inadequate?

Would you characteriz'n it as an accurate indicator in this scenario of core coolant level?

l A

It does not indicate, under these conditions where l

j you have higher terporatute voids elsewhere, it does not indicate what the plant -- let me back up.

t i

Sy itself, going through these types of scenarios, i

f

1 55 i

l 1

s l it msy be an inadequate indication by itself.

}

Q As a result of that, woulda't the pressurizer level I indicate greater coolant in the core than actually e.li:isti?

i A

If the operator is sensitive to voids in the system,

,i i he would recognize that he can't rely on the pressurizer level to indicate the inventory in the primary system.

Q If he was relying on pressurizer level --

i A

If that is all he is doing, saying, hey, if I have l

6 a level in my indicator, or his training, his experience, l

u i

l C

l his background, whatever, tells him that is all he needs 2

e l

o g

to determine that his

• prima _nstem-is filled, then he has a

an erroneous conclusion.

o Q

Ee is operating on the basis of inaccurate u

information*, erroneous information?

A The erroneous information is that it is his understanding that is all he needs.

Q In this scenario, is the pressurizar level indication an accurate indication of core coolant inventory?

A This scenario says, hay, if that is all he is fixating on, he could erroneously turn off - it would he l

erroneous, because he could have voids elsewhere in the systa=,

! and he could take action based on that erroneous conc _usion I

{that he has drawn.

i' 1

l

56 t

I 3ecause he is relying en inaccurate informatien of i

0 core cociant inventory, is that correct?

6 i

i A

Inadequate indication.

MR. N N:

Off the record.

(Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.)

MR. HELFMAN:

Back cn the record.

BY-MR. HELFMAN:

Q In the scenario which you have described here, is ci pressuriser level a necessary but not comp 3et?ly sufficient uo y

indicator of core coolant level?

Would you go that far?

m A

Under these conditions, it is a necessary indication l

but not sufficient - in order to know that you have a filled 3ng l primary system, you would have to have a level in the o

j pressurizar.

i Q

All right.

l The obves. 5e. is not true - the reverse is not *me.

l z<

A se -

l Under these conditiens, if he has a level in his pressuri:er, t

and concludes the system is filled, that is not true, because he could have voids elsewhere in the system.

It is not sufficient by itself, under these conditiens, to knew that l

l you have a filled system.

You see, I stress filled system, because under sc=e

! of these events, the system may not refill --

I 1

57 i

l i

1

{

Q.

What you are sayfag, under these circumstances s

i described in your January 10, 1978 memorandum, there could be voids in the core, there would be a loss of coolant level

! in the core, and at the same time, the pressurizer could

) indicate sufficient coolant in the core?

I l

A

"'here would be voids in the primary system.

I l

Q And the pressurizar would indicate --

i I

A If the pressurizar was eccled off, etc., whatever I described, it would 'ct as a manometer.

It would not a

du*g reflect that you had a --

E I

C Q

-- loss of coolant in the core?

a 5

A In the primary. system.

Q Excuse me.

sou A

Right.

I Q

Is that an accurate statement?

l A

But the mancmeter effect is already after you have steam in the hot leg to below the surge line.

There may be other conditions where -

Q So you would already have loss of coolant or a ivoid in the primary system,'and;under the circumstances you I

\\; described in your memorandum, the pressurizer level would

! indicate ample coolant in the primary system?

i i

A The crassurizer would indicate there is fluid in

l 58 1

l l

t I

the pressuri=er.

The operator is the one that has to draw he

the inference that tr. has ample inventory.

Q And therefore, as you state in your memorandum, l cuote, "As a result, under certain conditions where the i

i pressurizer could behave as a manometer, the operator could erroneously shut off makeup flow when significant void occurs elsewhere in the system er loss of inventory is i

i' continuing."

y I

A What is missing, if that is the only thing that e

j he is psying attention to, and he disregards other systems, eo b

that is right.

j e<

I 5

MR. HMAN:

Let's take a five minute break.

l o

(Whereupon, a five minute recess was taken.)

u MR.EILFMAN:

Back on the record.

I I

{ SY MR. HILFMAN:

i Q

You mentioned in your January 10, 1978 memorandum that the situation which you are describing has already occurred in Cavis Bassie 1, when a relief valve was stuck l open.

)

Were you relying on the September 24, 1977 l

l

' transien't at Davis Besse 17 l

l A

Yes, I believe that was the date, the one in 1

September.

i e

i 1

i 59 l

i I

r i

I But, here again, as I mentioned, that may not have i! any-%d ng to do with -- the manometer effect may not have i

j anything to do with the Davis Bessie 1.

The only reason that l was in',seted in the memo was that voids elcewhere camer. did I

i not shew up in the pressurirer level.

t Q

That is the scenario at Davis Besse 1; is that not correct?

A As far as I knew, yes.

That is the one, yes, d

l Q

And that was also the transient in 1977, in which a

j there was an unexplained closure of a feed water valve-which E

.resulted in a rise of reactor coolant system' temperature, and C

E g

pressure resulting in the pressurizar power relief valve to i

j open, and this valve stuck open, coolant escaped through the a

Qu 8

PP.RV and filled in the quench tank to such an extent that j the ruptured, the dis'c ruptured.

Nevertheless, the pressurizer

! level indication increased to its maximum. rIs that.your

! understanding of that transient?

A I don't recall the details of the transient.

Q Let me show you a document, which is entitled

! " Davis-Basse Unit Cne Nuclear Power Station, Supplemental l

r i Information for LIR NP-32-77-16,* arid the four paragraphs which are entitled, " Description of occurrence."

Is that the transient that you were referring to in f

I i

l

U l

60 1

your memorandum?

A Let me state this:

That there was a transient, and I presume that is the one that was in September.

Q Yes.

A And there was an internal meeting, to go over the j details of tha transient, and I hsppened to be at the meeting.

l That really was my only involvament.

Somehow I came away with the impressinn there were voids in the system and the pressursig \\trt\\

d vas high.

I don't recall the details of what uo=

the transient was, w

=

-Q You don't recall the details at this time?

z j

A That is right, nor was I involved in the review of

$g the event.

u Q

You were not offically assigned to review the Davis-Besse event?

l A

That is correct.

MR'.'.EETJMAN :

Let's mark, as an exhibit.to the deposition, this previously referred to supplemental Information for the LZR NP-32-77-16, at the top of which is the date of the event, which is indicated as l

September 24,' 1977.

The facility is Davis-Besse Unit 1.

THE WIT.4ESS:

I am not surs I even saw the LER at the meeting.

There were some traces of things that t

l i.

61 l!

i i

i i

were happening.

I MR. N.W :

You are not sure you saw this particular i

document, that is going to be marked as an exhibit?

i THE WITNESS:

I couldn't swear to it.

CWhereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 5 I

i I

l was marked for identification.)

RR. W"L' MAN:

We should indicate for the record that i

this is a three-page supplemental information.

My y

question referred to page 1.

The supplemental information o

is covered by a document entitled, " Licensee Event I

o

~

Report, Exhibit A", which is covered by a letter dated e

Cetober 7,1977, signed by Jack Evans, Station ~,

E E

Superintendant, Davis-Besse Neclear Power Station, o*

t addressed to a Mr. Kappler, Regional Director of Recier. III.

i I

I

• "a whole doc'ument is marked as Exhibit 5.

i I

We should also note for the record that the memorandum of January 10, 1978, signed by Thomas Novak, and prepared by Sandy Israel, has already been marked for i

l identification as Exhibit No. 5 to the deposition of I

{

Mr. Foster of' July 6, 1979.

I

!3Y MR. ret? MAN:

t i

Q Were you aware at the time that you prepared your 5

i

-e Ar a

62 d

I, I

I l memorandum that a region inspector by the name of James Creswell had discovered that the operator had manually l

l I

HPC j terminated eeE. during this incident at Davis-Sesse?

I I

A Was I aware of what?

I Q

At the b e you prepared your memorandum for I

Mr. Novak's signature, were you aware that a regional inspector by the name of James Creswell had discovered that the plant HPI operator had manually terminated Pes?

y A

Not to my knowledge.

e i

i Q

Are you aware of that now?

a!

A You j.st told me.

m Q

Since the incident at TMI, had you become apprised g

5 t

l of Mr. Creswell's findings?

ou A

I knew there was a Creswell memorandum, and I had i, started into a review group of B&W reactors.

This Creswell i

I memorandum, that was one of the things we were supposed to go over, and I probably had it -- this is post TMI I am 1

talking about.

I probably had it in my hand, but I think I gave it to other people in the group to review it.

I don't l recall reading it, physically.

I may have had it in my hand, lbut. I don't recall reading the Creswell memorandum, post TMI, I because that was something that came up post -- in review i

'of B&W plants in general.

. 3._.6 l

63 q

i I

i.

i i

.q i

l Q

Prior to your preparation of the January 10, 1978 l

t i

j memorandum, which was signed by Mr-Novak, had you been l provided with a copy of a report known as the Michaelson report?

~

l I

A I had what I called the Ebr, ole draft, which turned

}

I out to be a draft of the Michaelson report.

Q A handwritten draft?

A That is correct.

Q You received it from Mr. Ebersole?

e A

Yes.

=

C

-b Q

Who is he?

m 4

A Jessie Ebersole is a member of ACRS.

l o

Q How did Mr. Ebersole come to give you this =amorandum?

i' A

I had attended several ACM meetings over the l previously -- I don't know, two or three years, what have you.

l And Mr. Ebersole brought up concerns about natural circulation I

i with small breaks in non-condensibles,and 2 believe that after some meeting,a : ACR$ meeting, I had a discussion with Jessie, and in effect he said he would like to send me a report to l look. at.

Q Who is Fr. Michaelson, or who was he at that time?

A I did not know Mr. Michaelson.

From what I read, or from I read, he was working for Jessie.

I don't know.

I I

_. m _..._ _

i 64 l

Q Would it be accurate to say that fir. Ebersole provided you with a copy of the Michaelson memorandum?

A That is right.

It was informal.

Q Would you describe this as a formal procedure for routing memorandum within NRC7 j

A I had, I received other information infor= ally, but net very much, one or two pieces, from consultants at

ACRS. It wasn't anything unusual in my mind.

ci Q

Would you describe that as an official routing uo procedure for NRC?

e i

o b

A No.

=

1 a

When you characterize it as NRC, he is an individual 1

E o

and he provided me with a document.

It wasn't what I call an u

1 official NRC transmittal.

Offical transmittals usually 1

l come in at a higher level, t

Q Eigher than the ACRS?

-A ACRS is one branch, one organization within NRC.

When things are sent over officially, they usually come from Mr. Fraley, or whoever happens to be chairman of ACRS, comes I

r l

I i

over to a manager here at NRC, probably a division director or I

l higher.

I am not really totally familiar hcw official

. correspondence gets into the train.

i Q

But this informaly transmittal essentially bypassed i

es

~..

65 m

i all cf the formal tra smittal structure? Would that be an n

l l accurate conclusion?

A Yes, I guess.

l i

Q Co you recall how long before you prepared your i

i memorandum Mr. Ebersole provided you with the Michaelsen memorandum?

I A

I don't have a date a

• w when I received it.

l Q

Could you estimate months, weeks, years?

l 6

l A

I would put it in the fall of 1977.

l v

}

e 2

MR. EIJMAN:

Let's take a two minute break.

5 l,.

[

(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)

a:

5 MR. EIEMAN:

Back on the record.

m E

l a

j We have no further questions at this time.

c MR. SIDELL:

What we have been doing previously is

.I l

l recessing rather chan adjouring, so if in the future i

l there may occur occasions for us to speak to you under i

I cath on the record, we will do so.

So, rather than terminating or adjouring the deposition, we will merely recess it.

Probably, in al.L likelihood, to be adjourned, but if it should be necessary, continued.

l Off the record.

i (Whs.reupen, at 12 : 45 p.m., the deposition of SANTORD ISRAEL was recesseed.)

I i

I

- -