ML19308C450
| ML19308C450 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/07/1979 |
| From: | Thornburg H NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001240607 | |
| Download: ML19308C450 (82) | |
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N U CL E A R R E G U L ATO R't CO MMI S SIO N j-.
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IN THE MATTER OF:
THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INTERVIEWS 3:
I I
INTERVIEW OF HAROLD D.
THORNBURG E00KORGH1 Place -
Bethesda, Maryland Date.
Friday, September 7, 1979 Pages 1 - 82 m.chone:
(202)347-3700 ACE -FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
A OffiaalReporters 444 North Ccpitol Streef
. Washington, D.C. 2000 T 001240 @ 7 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAILY
N 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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---__________x O
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4 In the Matter of:
5 THREE MILE ISLAND SPECIAL INTERVIEWS 6
-____________x 7
8 WITNESS:
HAROLD D. THORNBURG 9
Room 6717 10 Maryland National Bank Building 11 7735 Old Georgetown Road l
Bethesda, Maryland 12 l
Friday, September 7, 1979
()
13 9:20 a.m.
14 BEFORE:
15 JOSEPH F.
SCINTO, ESQ.
16 PETER SICILIA, JR.
17 18 19 20 21 I
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Ace.Federst Reporters, Inc.
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2 2
1 CONTENTS l-CR6827 2
WITNESS:
EXAMINATION 3
Harold D.
Thornburg 3
i 4
5 EXHIBITS 6
NUMBEh IDENTIFIED 7
5003 6
8 5004 7
9 10 i'
11
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13 5!O' 14 15 16 17 I'
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P_ R,Q Q E E Q I_ N,E S_
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MR. SCINTO:
Ms. Reporter, would you please note for 3
the record the names of people who are present today.
For the
,,~'t.)
4 record, my name is Joseph F.
Scinto, and I am with the 5
Commission's Special Inquiry Group.
With me today is Peter J.
6 Sicilia, also with the Special Inquiry Group.
7 We have with us, Mr. Harold D. Thornburg, whose deposition 8
I am going to ask him to take today.
9 Let the record show that there are no other persons present.
10 Mr. Thornburg, would you stand, hold up your right hand 11 and I would like to swear you.
12 Whereupon, 13 HAROLD D.
THORNBURG
{}
14 was called as a witness and, having first been duly sworn, was 15 examined and testified as follows:
16 DIRECT EXAMINATION 17 BY MR. SCINTO:
18 Q
Would you please state your full name for the 19 record?
i 20 A
Harold D. Thornburg.
l 1
21 Q
Mr. Thornburg, have you received from Mr. Rogovin, l
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(~J~'s 22 Director of this Special Inquiry Group, a letter dated j
s.
23 August 28th, 1979 to you providing you with certain information
()
24 concerning this deposition?
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25 A
I have.
4 cle-2 Q
Okay.
Excuse me.
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O ar raoranure neve vou reea enee 1eeter2
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2 A
Yes.
3 O
V Q
Okay.
Do you understand the information set forth 4
in that letter?
5 A
Yes, I believe I do.
f 6
Q Including the general nature of the TMI Special 7
Inquiry?
8 A
Yes.
9 10 Q
And your right to have an attorney present with you?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
And the fact that the information you provide may
'3
"" """ i '
O A
Yes.
14 15 Q
Mr. Thornburg, is counsel representing you personally 16 here today?
A No.
17 18 Q
If at any time, Mr. Thornburg, any time during the course of this interview you feel you woulck like to be l
19 20 represented by counsel, please advise me and we will adjourn the 21 hearing and afford you the time to make the necessary 22 arrangements and reschedule the rest of your inquiry.
23 Is that agreeable?
24 A
Yes, yes.
l Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 0
All right.
Mr. Thornburg, you should be aware that i l
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5 alc-3 i
the testimony you are about to give has the same force and O
'(_)
2 effect as if you were testifying in a court of law.
My 3
questions and your responses are being taken down and they will 4
be later transcribed.
You will be given the opportunity to 5
look at the transcript and makes changes you deem necessary.
6 However, to the extent that your subsequent changes are 7
significant, those changes may be viewed as affecting your 8
credibility; So, please be as correct and accurate as you can 9
in responding to my questions.
10 If at any time during the deposition you do not understand 11 the question, please feel free to stop me and indicate that 12 and we will make the clarification at that time.
()
13 I would like to warn you of two basic ground rules.
One is 14 that you permit me to finish my question before you give your 15 response, even if you know what the question is going to be 16 because the reporter cannot take down both of us speaking at 17 the same time.
18 Secondly, respond audibly, motions sach as nodding your 19 head cannot be taken down by the reporter.
I also want to note 20 for the record that I will try to afford you sae same courtesy 21 and let you finish your answer before I get into my next question.
()
22 A
I understand.
23 Q
Mr. Thornburg, I show you a copy of a letter from
()
.24 Mr. Rogovin to you dated August 28th, 1979.
Is that a copy of A&FWnot Ruonm. inc.
j 25 a letter to which you referred to when I asked you the question !-
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6 ele-4 before about it?
j A
It is.
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Q I would like to hand this to the reporter and ask you to mark this as the first exhibit.
()
4 (Exhibit No. 5003 identified.)
KXXX 5
6 BY MR. SCINTO:
7 Q
Mr. Thornburg, did you bring a copy of your resume 8
to this deposition?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
May I have a copy, please?
11 A
Yes.
12 MR. SCINTO:
Let the record note that Mr. Thornburg 13 has provided me with a copy of a one-page docurent with the 14 witness' full name at the top of the page.
~
15 BY MR. SCINTO:
16 Q
Does this accurately summarize your employment 17 background?
18 A
Yes.
To the best of my knowledge.
19 Q
Okay.
It does not indicate your educational 20 background; does it?
I didn't see it.
21 A
It does not, I am sorry.
I received it -- excuse i
22 me.
]
j 23 MR. SCINTO:
Ms. Reporter, would you mark this as an l
24 exhibit, as the next exhibit.
7~s A&L h1 Remrters, inc.
XXEX 25 (Exhibit No. 5004 identified.)
l
7 Glc-5 BY MR. SCINTO:
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Q Mr. Thornburg, would you briefly indicate what your 2
3 educational background is?
A I have a B.S.
in Chemistry from-Iowa State University 4
1952.
5 6
Q Thank you.
7 Mr. Thornburg, when were you personally informed that there 8
was an accident or incident involving the TMI facility, to the 9
best of your recollection?
10 A
When I came to work the morning of the 28th I noted 11 that the Incident Response Center was manned.
I inquired into 12 why it was manned.
( ).
13 Did I say 7:00 o' clock?
It should be more like 7:30.
14 Q
You didn't give a time.
15 A
Somewhere between 7:30 and 8:00 o' clock I inquired 16 if they needed my assistance, and I was told not at that time.
17 Since I had several meetings scheduled for that morning in my 18 office, I went to my office and conducted my normal business 19 until I noted that somewhere between 11:00 and noon that the 20 Center was still manned.
So, I went back and inquired as to 21 whether or not I could be of any help, and from what I could
()
22 gain orlear of what was going on, I thought that there was t
23 possibly something I could do.
And so I stayed there until
, ()
24 sometime the next day.
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25 Q
Thank you.
I will be going into that.
I i
8 clo-6 Did you make a note of any kind when you first were informed j
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A No.
I didn't know at that time what the significance 3
k) of the event was.
4 5
Q I can understand.
I will be asking those kinds of questions throughout because in case you had made a note, I 6
7 want to get a copy.
So, you first went into the IRC to work, as it were, around 8
9 noon or so?
10 A
Yes, sir.
11 Q
Okay.
Did you go to the IRC in response to a call 12 from anyone?at that time?
Was it just-that you noticed that 13 it was still operdting?
}
14 A
I noticed it w as still operating and I felt if it 15 had gone that long, it must have been something significant.
16 Q
When you went to the IRC, did you report to someone 17 for an assignment?
18 A
Yes, I went to John Davis and asked him if there was 19 anything I could do to help.
Did Mr. Davis give you any 20 Q
What did Mr.
J 21 assignments, specifically?
22 A
Yes, he asked me to periodically brief the Regional
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23 Directors about the status of the event which I did inter-(]
24 mittently into the night.
Ace 4dc0! Reporters, Inc.
25 Q.
Okay.
Now, when did you do -- when you -- strike l
1
9 ele that.
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O A
I might add that the Director of the Division of 2
3 Reactor Construction / Inspection during a reactor accident is O
not gere of the zaACT, due we do regart if we cen so thae if 4
5 there is any assistance that we can render, we can do it.
6 Q
Okay, fine, thank you.
7 Briefly, would you describe the duties or functions in 8
connection with the accident that you carried out during the 9
first hours of the accident?
10 That is, staying until'about 6:00, 8:00 p.m. or so on 11 Wednesday.
12 A
Principally I briefed the Regional Directors 13 Periodically and regional personnel regarding the status of the 14 incident.
15 I also answered various phone calls and responded to members 16 of the public or newspaper people or members of the Congressional 17 staff.
18 Q
When you said you briefed the Regional Directors, 19 were you including in there the Director of Region 1, or do you 20 mean the other regional directors?
21 A
The other regional directors, principally I didn't 22 have_to brief him.
23 0
I would like to follow that now for the next few O
24 time periods.
Ace-sdrJ Reporters, Inc.
l 25 Wednesday night, what duties or functions did you carry out i
10 sic-8 Wednesday night?
That is, after 8:00 p.m. into the early hours j
(
of Thursday?'
A At some point --
3 O
o And if you didn e ser et the Center, indiceee so.
A I did, I stayed in the Center until sometime the 5
next day.
At some point I relieved Norm Mosely as the IRACT 6
Director when it appeared that it was going to be a continuing 7
thing so that he could go home and get some sleep.
8 Ultimately Morris Howard and myself alternated as --
9 10 replaced Norm Mosely on shift.
After several days, I settled 11 into the'4:00 to 12:00, and Morris settled into the 12:00 to 12 8:00 shift, and Norm took the day shift.
However, we overlapped 13 by several hours each way, normally.
14 0
So, that at some point on Wednesday evening --
15 A
Probably early Thursday morning, I believe, Norm went home -- 3:00 or 4:00 in the morning, I just don't remember.
16 17 0
And you continued to function then as IRACT Director 18 through that --
19 A
Well, until Norm came back.
l 20 Q
Which was about when?
21 A
8:00 or so in the morning.
He left just a few hours, 22 maybe three.
F)N i
-23 Q
Now, the next period of time -- I would like to go to O.
24 the next period of time.
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25 A
_I would like to add --
11
- clo-9 Q
Please do.
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1 ta aow= oa **e oot for ea hour or o auri=9
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2 the night.
I don't remember, but I wasn't at the Center all the 3
time.
There was an hour or two when I laid down on a cot in 4
one of the offices.
5 Q
Okay.
Thursday now, during the day?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
This is now the daytime of Thursday.
What duties or 8
functions, if any, did you perform?
9 A
Thursday is not awfully clear to me.
When Norm came 10 11 back in the morning, I continued toanswer the phone and I believe 12 I briefed the Regional Directors that morning.
The other n
13 Regional Directors besides Grier.
v 14 I had a meeting in my office at 8:00 o' clock on another 15 matter which I carried out, went back to the Response Center and 16 I believe I went home.about 2:00 o' clock that afternoon and 17 slept for several hours and came back at around 6:00 or 7:00 18 that night.
19 Q
Okay.
Now, proceed to Thursday night.
20 A
I believe Thursday night I relieved Norm Mosely as -
21 from his position for that evening, to the best I can remember.
22 But as I said, my recollection of Thursday is faulty.
23 Q
Okay.
Now, I would like to go to Friday during the
,]
24 day.
- n-FL; Reporters, Iric.
25 A
As I remember Friday, I must have gone home late
12 als-10' Thursday night or Friday morning, for several hours, and I
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h-remember probably coming back around 9:00 or 10:00 o' clock 2
Friday.
And at.that point, Mr. Denton was going to the site.
3 and' people were looking for qualified NRC~ staff people to go 4
- he site and support.
5 I did two things Friday morning and Friday afternoon.
The 6
first thing, Mr. Denton had left and I was asked to find the 7
nearest place where he could land and make sure the helicopter 8
could land in, and I asked one of my staff members to call the 9
Air Force at the Pentagon to find out where their nearest 10 base was and to ask him to get ahold of the base commanding 11 officer, request that they receive the flight, request that 12 O
Mr. Denton's arrival with other staff members.
34 My staff carried this arrangement out.
We checked back 15 later and heard that t. hey had landed Mr. Denton at the site 16 first and then went on to.Olmstead Air Force Base and other 37 18 people were transferred back.
19 The Colonel was very cooperative on short notice and I 20 continued to be impressed with the support they gave us on very short notice.
21 The second function I carried out was to contact various 22 division directors in headquarters who I knew had health 23 24 physicists assigned to them or radiation waste management Cce.FeoertA Reporters, Inc.
25 Specialists or people capable of reviewing procedures.
l
13 cle-ll I contacted Dick Cunningham of NMSS and someone at NRR, j
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2 possibly Brian Grimes, and asked them if they could request any i
3 of their people of those specialties to start motion toward r)
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the East-West Towers, that I would brief them when they 4
5 arrived, that when we got the full number of people we wanted, we would start them in motion to the site and retain the names 6
7 f others for backup.
g So, I spent most of that afternoon briefing people and 9
taking names of others and asking them to stand by and this i
10 sort of thing.
11 Q
All right, now I want to go to Friday night.
12 A
Friday night I believe -- Friday afternoon I assisted
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13 in some of the briefing of the newspaper and TV people.
And I
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14 believe later Friday night then I relieved Norm Mosely again.
15 And for the next week I fairly routinely came in on the 4:00 to 16 12:00 shift -- Well, no.
I took Saturday off and Howard took 17 Sunday off and then we went into a 4:00 to 12:00, 12:00 to 8:00, 18 8:00 to 4:00 arrangement for the following week.
19 And I was on duty then on that configuration until the l
20 following Friday when they went back to where they cut back the 21 shift man.
(
)
22 Q
Let me go back over that.
23 A
Okay.
llh 24 Q
On Saturday night then you said you took Saturday off?
Aa.Feerd Reporters, lm 25 A
Yes.
I
14 01c-12 Q
So, Saturday night you did not relieve -- you were
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not on duty?
xs 2
A No, I think we were working twelve hour tricks then 3
and we pulled -- the day was two twelve-hour tricks and I 4
5 pulled -- Morris pulled one on Saturday and I pulled one on 6
Sunday for him.
7 Q
Okay.
Were those basically the eveniisg shifts that 8
y u're talking about that you pulled?
1 A
Evening and morning, early morning.
9 10 Q
Yes.
Through the night.
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
Okay.
You indicated that on Friday night to the
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13 early hours of Saturday, you believe you relieved Mr. Mosely on
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14 Saturday.
The rest of the day during the time period, were you 1
15 at IRC?
I i
16 A
Saturday, I.wasn't in Saturday, j
17 Q
Okay.
18 A
I went home on Saturday at 6:00 o' clock in the 19 morning.
20 Q
And you returned then to the Center?
21 A
Late Saturday night, oh, maybe 12:00 o' clock --
22 no, around 10:00 o' clock Saturday night or 11:00 o' clock.
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23 And then stayed through that night and into Sunday.
24 Q-Okay.
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i 25 I am getting. confused.
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15 elc-13 When you went home on Friday night, you went home on 3
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Friday night?
2 s_
A Well, it was actually early Saturday morning.
3
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Q Early Saturday morning you went home.
_4 5
And did you return on Saturday or was that --
A Yes, I returned in the evening during say 9:00 or 6
7 10:00 o' clock Saturday.
Q okay.
And at that time did you then act as IRACT 8
9 Director for that evening?
10 A
Yes, into the next morning.
11 Q
Would that be Sunday morning?
12 A
YeS-13 Q
Did you carry out any functions Sunday during the
}
14 day?
15 A
Well, I think the way it was, I would come in about 16 10:00 o' clock and work until about noon relieving Norm and then 17 for a couple of hours I answered the phone and that sort of 18 thing, helped an~ ar the phone.
19 Q
And then you went home?
20 A
Yes.
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21 Q
Sometime Sunday noon or early afternoon?
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22 A
Yes.
I am sorry about the confusion, but my memory --
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23 Q
No, no.
We are asking to the best of your
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24 recollection.
We fully recognize that.
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25 A
I should have kept a personal log.
l
16 cle-14 Q
Now, Sunday evening, did you work Sunday evening or j
(O was that the evening you took off?
)
2 A
Now, I-took off during the day Saturday.
3
.O Q
Okay~..
4 A
And Sunday evening I came in, you know, atmidnightob 5
11:00, something like that, stayed until sometime in the 6
morning -- Monday morning say -- no, wait a minute now.
No, no.
7 We started on-Sunday.
We started on the 12:00 to 4:00 shift.
8 I beg your pardon.
I came in around 3:00 or 4:00, worked 9
4:00 to 12:00 then.
I am sorry.
10 ji Q
That's fine.
Please take the opportunity to --
What we are trying to do is get it as best we can.
12 O
A I think that is when we started into some semblance j3 of a 4:00 to 12:00 shift.
14 15 0
Yes.
16 A
And there was some semblance of three shift staffing.
17 Q
Then Monday during the day before the 4:00 to 12:00 shift --
18 19 A
Came in around noon or 1:00 o' clock, stayed until 20 3:00 in the morning, I think.
That was sort of the typical j
1 21 way it went.
22 O
okay.
All right.
Now, following this first weekend of the accident and subsequently, did you perform any duties 23 24 in connection with assessing the situation or investigating the l Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 event or assessing the lessons to be learned?
l i
17 101n-15 A
Not during that period.
.)
()
Q During the period of the week following the accident, 2
how about after that?
3 A
At some point I did work on a draft for Norm of an 4
5 investigation plan.
6 We started to formulate an investigation plan sometime 7
during that first week.
I don't recall exactly when.
I did w rk on that at that time.
I am r.ow working on lessons learned 8
9 for I & E, but this effort did not start officially until the
-10 end of July, towards the end of July.
11 Q
Okay.
When -- I would like to turn back to the time 12 of Wednesday when you started to work, when you started -- when
(])
13 you went into the IRC and were given the task by Mr. Davis of 14 briefing Regional Directors.
15 Did anyone at that time acquaint you with the various 16 tasks which were underway at the Incident Response Center?
17 A
Morris Howard, who had been there longer than I had, 18 briefed me as to the status of the sequence of events and 19 generally what was going on.
20 Q
Okay.
Were you briefed or wete you otherwise aware 21 of the tasks going on at locations in I&E headquarters reher
(}
22 than in the Response Center, if any?
23
.A Yes, I was aware that NRR had a group of engineers
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24 and a group of health physicists.
Ace Federst Reporters, Inc.
.25 O
Were you generally aware of what they were doing or l
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010-16 1
just that they were therc?
()
2 A
Generally aware'that they were in technical support 3
of the response.
()
4 Q
Okay.
1 would like to explore that just a little 5
bit more.
6 During that period on Wednesday, did you feel -- did you 7
have a feeling on that day, during any time that you had -- you 8
personally had a good understanding of what each of the groups 9
that were performing various tasks were doing?
Who was 10 supervising them, how their work was being coordinated?
11 A
I knew generally what people were supposed to do, 12 because I had helped with some of the planning for the incident 13 Response, with respect to whether or not there was a firm
[~}
14 leadership in some of these groups, if that's the question you 15 cre asking me --
16 Q
That is a component of it.
I will be getting 17 around to another aspect of it, probably going back over this 18 again a couple of times.
A 19 A
I wasn't always sure who was in charge and whether 20 there were firm lines of authority and responsibility, i
21 Q
Okay.
How about -- let me ask it a different way.
(}
Did you have that -- did you personally have what you felt was 22
'23 a good understanding of what I & E field people were doing at C
24 the site?
h4a) i Reportm, Inc.
25 A
Yes.
i l
l
19 clo -17 Q
Okay.
Was there or wasn't there to your knowledge a concern in the Incident Response Center as to whether the V
2 I & E field people were adequately affecting the situation 3
during that first portion of the accident, the first day?
4 A
Nobody expressed that opinion to me.
5 Q
Were you concerned, personally, about the adequacy of 6
the assessment by the I & E' field people?
7 A
Not at that point, maybe in retrospect as you see 8
how the scenario unfolds.
9 Q
I recognize that.
Right now I am trying to get 10 11 a picture of how you felt then?
A I did feel that there were missing pieces.
There 12 was a puzzle and there were missing pieces to it.
13 ja Now, whether that was I & E field people's fault -- I am not 15 willing to say it was their fault at that point.
16 Q
I am trying to recollect how you felt at that time 17 about it?
A It's difficult to reconstruct.
jg 19 Q
RigM., right.
Now, let me -- Staying again with 20 the first day of the accident, did you personally undertake to supervise any of the tasks that were going on in IRC or to have 21 O
22 any of those tasks or groups coordinate through you personally?
V 23 A
Not to my recollection.
24 Q
Did you undertake to assign tasks or to form task s
i Ace Feder:4 Reporters, Inc.
25 groups to work on any particular projects?
20 cle-18 A
No, but I may have requested Regional Directors to r"3
-(>
2 furnish people in support of the effort and this sort of 3
thing.
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4 O
Okay.
5 A
I know I did dur'ng the course of the incident.
6 Q
Generally, would this have been on your own 7
initiative or because someone asked you to do that?
8 A
Generally because someone asked me to do it or there 9
was a task request for support from I & E people.
10 Q
Okey-doke.
Now, I would like to turn tc te period 11 of time on Wednesday evening when you relieved Mr.
'sely as 12 IRACT Director, f'N 13 When you replaced Mr. Mosely, did you have a preexisting O
14 knowledge of the function of the IRACT Director?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
Could you briefly indicate what those duties are, 17 what you believe those duties to be?
18 A
The duties were to -- in the beginning, of course, 19 to make sure the notifications had taken place, that we had 20 all the information we could get on the incident, and to 21 brief the EMT Executive Management Team, regarding the status
/'h 22 to file the response, and assess whether or not we thought the
\\J 23 response to the incident was adequate.
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21 Er. 6827 1
Q Okay.
Were there any other IRACT members on duty IAgo
-2 2
at the same time?
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A Mr. Howard and 1 -- well, Mr. Sneiak was there.
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4 think he was relieved some time during the night by
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5 Mr. Higgenbacha.
Now, I am not clear on that first nig.4t.
The 6
more I think about it, whether Morris Howard asked to relieve i
7 Mosely or I did -- the more I think about it, I am troubled 8
by my memory on that.
One of us did and the other of us assisted 9
whoever did relieve Morris or Norm.
10 0
All right.
Let me make the question -- let me go 11 back and make the same question a little bit more generally 12 and refer to either Wednesday night or Thursday night, wP 7ever
}lh 13 it was that you first relieved Mr. Mosely.
14 A
Right.
15 Q
And acted as IRACT Director.
16 At that time, did'you have a preexisting knowledge of the 17 functions?
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
And those functions are the ones that you just 20 described to me?
21 A
Yes, sir.
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(_)
22 O
Is that correct?
23 A
Yes, sir.
24 Ace Federst Reporters, Inc.
- I asked you about other members of IRACT who were Q
- Now, 25 on duty at the same time whenever it was that you were operating i
22 as IRACT Director --
I
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A Could I characterize?
2 3
Q Yes, please do.
()
4 A
That would be -- IRACT would consist of a director, 5
a person, an operations oriented person, I & E in constant 6
contact with the site.
Another I & E engineer to relieve this 7
first person and act as data taker and technical evaluator.
8 Health physics person from I & E and either the Director or the Assistant-Director of Fuel Facilities and Material -- the 9
10 Division of Fuel Facilities and Material Safety with health 11 physics background.
12 Did I say an HP?
One of the management members.
There 13 would be two health physicists management level person and a 14 technical staff member.
Normally there were several health 15 Physicists from NRR in support, depending on how close you were 16 to the time the incide.nt occurred.
As time went on, some of 17 the coverage wasn't as deep.
Then there would be several 18 reactor systems oriented NRR people and a supervisory level 19 person coordinating their activities.
That was the general l
20 character c: the staffing.
l 21 Mr. Mosely set up shift schedules soon after we began to 22 see what the pattern and the response would be.
And maybe some 23 of those old schedules survived, waich might be more accurate.
(~T 24 Q
Okay --
AcaLI: Reporters, inc.
25 A
Oh, then there would be a representative from the I
23 Executive Office for Operations Support to coordinate the
- els-21 j.
(
administrative side, the coordination of materials and possibly 2
3 resources from other agencies and to contact other agencies and 4
this sort of thing and several telephone operators, I am sorry.
5 Q
When you were acting as IRACT Director, was 6
Mr. Stello or Mr. Eisenhut -- at those times were they acting 7
as members of IRACT or were they serving some other function?
8 A
They didn't appear to be acting members as members 9
of IRACT as much as some other function.
10 Q
Okay.
When you went over the duties of IRACT 11 Director, I did not hear -- and it may be my recollection --
12 you use the term, used the idea that the IRACT Director would
()
13 supervise the support staff in assessing and developing 14 recommendations for a response.
15 Did I miss that?
Did you leave it out intentionally?
Or 16 did you leave it out unintentionally?
Is that a function of i
17 the IRACT Director?
18 A
Yes, it is a function of the IRACT Directo".
I 19 didn't leave it out intentionally.
20 Q
You may have included it.
21 A
I believe you asked me the question, "What did I
()
22 do," rather than what the job was designed to do.
I believe 23 that'is the question.
-24 Q
Fine.
Ace Feder:J Reporters, Inc.
25 A
I wasn't trying to be evasive.
t l
24 cis-22 Q
No.
A May I look at 0502?
2 Q
Certainly, please do.
3 A
Now, let's see what it says here.
If I can find 4
5 Q
au are referring to Manual, Chapter
- NRC Manual, 6
Chapter 0502 which is entitled --
7 A
NRC Incident Response Program.
8 0
Thank you.
9 A
You're welcome.
The Section E, Duties, Item 2, 10 11 Title, IRACT, I-R-A-C-T, it says under Item f,
" Direct the 12 actions of the IRACT Support Staff in order to implement O
13 EMT decisions r P ragr ph D above, performs actions required 14 by IRACT implementing procedures in order to carry out informa-15 tion evaluation assistant direction and coordination functions."
16 Q
Fine.
I underse mi.
I would like briefly to have a P cture of how the IRACT or the IRACT Director, how he works i
17 18 in response in accomplishing that role?
19 Let me ask some specific questions about that.
Specifically, 20 does the IRACT Director personally supervise the staff or does 21 he use the other IRACT members to supervise the staffs?
Do they O
22 do this as a group?
Do they split up and take individual 23 responsibility for certain areas?
That's the kind of thing I h
24 would like to have a picture of.
Could you indicate that?
Ace. Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 A~
Okay.
I was the IRACT Director in response to an
25 310-23 incident where we responded to Fort St. Vrain, where we had j
thought they had a high radiation release, when in fact they 2
hadn't.
In this case -- and when the Center was activated for 3
~O a short time, I had my two assistant directors assist me in the 4
5 management function.
One to coordinate the information and obtain the information from the regional offices and one to 6
direct the rest of the support staff.
7 Now, that was an easier situation because it was a matter 8
that I think we were activated for say. eight hours or so.
9 10 This was a longer term incident, and probably, you know, a 11 modification of the original concept was probably required to, 12 you know, to cope with it.
But my concept was that the IRACT Director was to direct
()
13 14 the Support Staff and what we call the Operations Staff.
But 15 he couldn't do it alone.
He needed some assistance.
16 Q
Okay.
Now; when you started on your duties as 17 IRACT Director, did you report to the EMT?
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
Did you check in with them?
20 A
Yes.
21 Q
Okay.
While you were functioning as IRACT
()
22 Director, and this is now, I believe, you indicated perhaps 23 Wednesday night, perhaps Thursday night, but it was those
( )/
24 evening shifts?
- Ace.Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 A
Yes.
l
26
$c-24 1
Q Did you believe at that time that you had a good 2
understandin' of the various activities that were underway at 3
the NRC?
O 4
A No.
S Q
Did you feel that you had a good understanding of 6
the activities that were underway at the rest of the satellite 7
offices at I & E Headquarters?
8 A
No.
9 Q
At the various offices that the tasks were underway 10 at the NRC offices?
II A
No.
I2 Q
At the other divisions such as the Division of
()
13 Research?
14 A
No.
15 Q
How about I & E Regional Headquarters?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
How about in the field?
18 A
Yes, we were in constant contact with the field.
l9 Q
Now, going back to those times as you were 20 operating as IRACT Director, frankly, would it have been 21 physically possible for you to personally have had a good
()
22 understanding of all of these activities, do you think?
l 23 A
No, no.
2d Q
.Okay.
Now, I would like to explore with you at those a-FMe d Regerters, Inc.
l l
times,'who was actually directing the various activities.
25 i
I l
27
)
010-25 1
Whether you personally as IRACT Director was personally
()
2 directing and supervising this range of activities that was 3
going on in the agency.
()
4 A
I was not.
5 Q
Okay.
Was it IRACT -- the people -- seeing the 6
People, that you were working with, was it -- those same people 7
as a group, were they supervising all of this work?
Was it all 8
being channeled through them?
9 A
Mostly being channeled through EMT and some of the 10 members from the other offices that were in EMT.
11 Q
I was going to --
12 A
Some on the Commission level.
13 Q
I was going to ask you whether EMT was directing 14 any of these activities, and you seemed to indicate that they 15 were directing a good deal of these activities directly.
Is 16 that correct?
17 A
They were aware of them.
I am not sure that they 18 were directing them entirely.
19 0
Okay.
Were they being directed by other division 20 directors who are not formally part of the EMT or IRACT?
21 A
They had reverted more to original lines than 22 the emergency organization or emergency response organization.
23 Q
Where were these organizational lines reporting in 24
, Ace-(,m},44 Reporters, Inc.
the emergency response organization?
Were they reporting through 25 the IRACT Director, or were they reporting to EMT?
28 A
Through EMT or directly to the Commission.
c10-26 j
(_3) 2 Q
Right.
As IRACT Director at that time, were you kept 3
generally aware of the nature of the work that was going on?
()
4 A
I stayed generally aware, I tried to.
5 Q
Okay.
6 A
To the extent I could and not leave my post.
7 Q
How did you do that?
How did you keep generally aware?
e Did people come to brief you?
Did you go out and seek the 9
informa' tion?
10 A
Normally I went out and sought it, but people did 11 talk to me, too, did brief me, yes.
12 Q
All right.
/~
13 A
I would like to say one thing now.
L) 14 Q
Please.
i 15 A
About the business of chain of command.
In any i
i 16 endeavor like an incident response or even planning a reactor 17 shutdown, the plan is good, very good as long as you're in a 18 short time span, but as time begins to linger, the -- there is a 19 certain natural compulsion for reversion back along normal 20 lines, the organizational lines of authority and responsibility.
21 The concept, the IRACT concept and the EMT concept, was 22 that we would form this organization to be able to compress the
-{ }
23 staff into some form so we could cope with these extraordinary
(~)
24 events.
Ace 4uJat Reporters, Inc.
25 I believe when we designed the organizational concept and
29 cic-27 considered incident response, we didn't foresee a slowly 3
()
ev lying event like this on this type of scenario on this 2
time scale.
We thought the worst 1.hing that could happen was a 3
,(_)
large LOCA and you had to respond in a different time frame.
4 And if you did have a LOCA, the radiological consequences would 5
ccur in less than 30 minutes and you would be on a different 6
part of the response scenario.
7 Not attempting to be apologetic, but after thinking about 8
9 it, that's the best feeling I have regarding it.
10 Q
Thank you.
And please feel free to make comments 11 like this at any time.
And I think I have indicated to you 12 what I'm trying to get at here was how did it actually work 13 under the circumstances here.
Begause there were character-(^}')
w.
14 istics of what happened that were not the same as those thought 15 about in advance, so it worked differently.
16 A
YeS.
17 Q
And what we are trying to identify is how it worked.
18 A
Yes.
19 MR. SCINTO:
Let's take a break.
20 (Short recess.)
21 BY MR. SCINTO:
22 Q
During the period when you were IRACT Director, did
( }')
23 the IRACT meet as a group to discuss the conditions or any h
24 recommendations?
l Ace Fedett Reponen, Inc.
25 A
No.
30 010-28 j
Q Would that be a normal mode of functioning for
()
IRACT to be meeting as a group periodically during the course 2
3 of the incident or is some other method of communication --
4 A
It is a method and it is a very good one.
5 Q
All right.
Is that the normal one or is it normally 6
just one of a constant type communication?
l 7
A Constant communication is more normal in the 8
practices I L ve been involved in and the other actual events.
9 Q
While you were IRACT Director, how did you keep the 10 EMT aware of any developments that occurred on your shift?
11 A
I just walled over and told them.
12 Q
Generally how did EMT keep you aware of the l ({}
13 developments on any matters that they were directing, if they 14 did?
15 A
They briefed me.
16 Q
As to Mr. Denton, Mr. Stello and the team arrived to 17 undertake on-site activity, did the role of the IRACT Director 18 change'from that which you described to me previously?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
Could you briefly describe what those changes were, 21 what the IRACT Director's role was after the NRC site center
' ()
22 was established?
23 A
Principally relayed information, monitored develop-l ()
24 ments and relayed information both ways.
- Ace Federe! Reporters, Inc.
25 Q
To whom?
How?
31 910-29 A
We received information directly from the control C\\
U r
m direct line regarding conditions at the site.
We relayed 2
requests for technical information to these people who were 3
located in the control room.
They would.in turn receive the 4
inf rmation, inform us, and we would inform either EMT or the 5
support team, the technical support team.
6 We also requested periodic information on the thermal 7
hydraulics of the core to determine what the conditions were, 8
fuel element temperatures, flows, temperatures and bulk coolant 9
10 temperatures, jj Q
After the site center was established, Mr. Denton and Mr. Stello, did the IRACT Director have
- while you were 12
'"^c' ire
- r
- r " " ve dire *
==""i ^*i " "i*" *"e O
is with the operation center at the site?
Not the control room, 14 but the NRC Operation Center at the site as IRACT Director?
15 16 A
Did not have continuous contact, but I did call them on a number of occasions.
17 18 Q
And did they call you?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
And did they call you directly?
21 A
Yes, occasionally.
C 22 Q
But was the direct communication or direct 23 communication through'EMT?
l 24 A
Generally through EMT.
They would communicate i Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 normally with the NRR person present.
32 010-30 1
Q Okay.
Okay.
Now, I would like to ask you a few
()
2 questions about the concept, the initial concept in the 3
response plan on organizing an IRC support staff?
()
~
IRACT Support Staff.
4 A
5 Q
An IRACT Support Staff, thank you for correcting me.
6 Let me ask, are you familiar with a document entitled 7
NRC Headquarters Incident Response Plan?
8 A
Yes, sir, I have general knowledge of it.
9 Q
Okay.
Do you have a personal copy of it at your 10 office?
11 A
I have one at my home and one at my office.
12 Q
Did you bring a copy with you today?
13 A
I am sorry, I did not.
{}
14 0
I brought a copy with me.
I would like to show it 15 to you.
Is this the plan?
16 A
Yes, sir.
17 O
All right.
Now, I would like to refer to it, 18 Section 3.5.1-E under IRACT Director Procedure.
That section 19 reads:
20 "When informed that the IRC is about to be 21 activated:"
that's the end of a quote.
There follows there 22 a Subsection 1, characterizes during duty hours.
There's a
)
23 Subsection A, referring to point of contact, then follows a ce f-).A Reporters, Inc.Subsection 3, which reads, " Select'a nucleus of staff members
('
24 25 for the IRACT_ Support Staff.
Notify (or have notified i
33
'sle-31 those members and have them report to the IRC."
j 2
Are you familiar with that provision of the response 3
plan?
4 A
Generally.
5 Q
Okay.
Does that turn out in practice to mean that 6
IRACT Director principally relies on the staff of his own I & E division?
7 A
No, this means 'jou call NRR and say we've got a 8
9 problem.
And you can help.
It is generally this, give me one 10 of your best people.
11 Q
Fine.
So, the people that the IRACT Director 12 believes would be helpful from another division in I & E or
[]
13 NRR division or from elsewhere, would he generally contact the 14 individual directly or would he generally contact the director 15 or the AD's of the other division and ask for someone with 16 certain capabilities?
17 A
He'd generally do the latter to be more efficient.
18 I had a subprocedure for the Division of Reactor Operations 19 inspection where we had amplified this, this section you 20 referred to, this Section 1, during duty hours and during non-21 duty hours.
And we had a detailed person to do this, these 22 things all set up, so they could then actually automatically 23 actuate by various members.
The IRACT Director didn't personally l
O 24 do al these things, but he checked that it got done.
Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 Q
Now, I would like to go back to Wednesday, the day of
34
- cle-32 ~
the incident during the day, daytime hours until about 6:00, 1
()
2 8 :00 p.m., thereabouts.
3 Who is acting as IRACT Director?
4 A
Mosely.
5 Q
Okay.
Who was acting as the EMT?-
6 A
As I can remember, Lee Gossick, Ed Case, John Davis.
7 I believe Bryan was in and out of there.
8 Q
Was Mr. Stello in the IRC on that day?
To your 9
recollection?
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
How would you characterize Mr. Stello's functions?
12 A
Mr. Stello and Mr. Mosely were operating very close 13 together.
He was -- Mr. Stello was located in the IRACT room
(}
14 most of the time.
15 0
They were working closely you say.
Would it be fair 16 to say, basically between the two of them, they were supervising 17 the support staff?
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
Who was acting, if you can recall, who was acting as 20 the Operations Officar?
Does that term Operations Officer have 21 any meaning to you?
22 A.
It does, but I am not sure that at that point I
(}
23 could designate who was the Operations Officer.
f~')
24 Q
All right.
Again, is there any response plan, to M fwM Reporters, Inc.
25 your knowledge, is there any response plan -- generally a l
i
35 position for a person designated as communications officer?
c10-33
)
.s A
Yes.
The communications officer -- operations
(,)
2 officer, it is located in the details of that thing.
I don't 3
(_)
recall them all.
Normally I think the Operations Officer was 4
our executive officer for support.
5 6
Q I am just trying to identify whether there is such a term and can you recall on that date who was serving that 7
function, the function of communications officer?
8 I am going through with a -- I am going through that with a 9
10 couple of functions.
11 A
Do you mind -- may I refresh myself?
12 Q
Certainly.
Please do.
Let the record note that he is -- the witness is now looking
/~h 13 V
14 through a copy to refresh his recollection of a document 15 entitled NRC Headquarters Incident Response Plan.
16 May we go off the. record for a moment?
17 (Discussion off the record.)
l 18 MR. SCINTO:
Back on the record, 19 Mr. Thornburg, if you need to refer to the book at all to I
20 refresh your recollection, don't hesitate to do so.
21 THE WITNESS:
Thank you,
')
22 BY MR. SCINTO:
f"J j
w 23 Q
I would like to ask you on that cay, Wednesday during 9e nl Reporters, tnc.
the day, who was acting as communications officer?
l 24 l
Am F 25 A
The Operations Officer, I believe, was Bernie Wise, f I
36 31G-34 1
to answer a previous question.
~
2 Q
Fine, fine.
( '-)
x-3 A
Communications officer, I believe, may have been f^)
4 Mr. Joseph Hagner.
%_/
5 0
All right.
I would like to -- for the record, you 6
are referring to the response plan to help you in responding.
7 I would like to ask specifically, is that the best of your 8
recollection as to the time, or is it something you are deriving 9
from something that is contained in the book?
10 A
I am deriving it from refreshing myself on what the 11 function is, and who would normally serve that function.
12 Q
But it is your recollection that you're using?
13 A
Yes, yes, k _3) 14 Q
Okay.
The reason that I put it in those terms is 15 if the book is a source, we will just make the book an exhibit.
16 But if it is your recollection, which is what I really want, we 17 won't need to.
18 A
Right.
I9 Q
Do you have any recollection of who may have been 20 acting as an EMT IRACT liasion officer of communicator?
21 A
I don't believe this function was filled at that 22 time.
(J 23 Q
Can you recall during that period, whether and how i
i l
24 the EMT was being briefed?
poJlhaf Remrters,Inc.
i 25 A
I believe they were being briefed.
I remember seeingl
37 I
c10-35 Mr. Mosely go in and describe certain events to then, or certain j
th 2
conditions.
I don't remember really Deing present to hear what 3
was being said.
O 4
0 Were status boarde beine maintained in Iac2 S
A In the first few hours.
6 Q
Does that answer mean that after the first few hours 7
they weren't being maintained, or after the first few hours 8
you don't recall?
9 A
It means that they were being maintained and 10 reasonably well up to date for the first few hours.
Following 11 that, logs were being kept and data sheets were being accumu-12 lated and the status board no longer had much function.
13 Q
And therefore, were not being --
14 A
Maintained.
15 0
-- maintained, thank you.
16 Who, if you car. recall, or if you knew, who was actually 17 establishing the priority on questions being transmitted to the 18 site during those first hours again?
19 A
Mosely.
20 0
Okay.
Were, again, at that time,_those first -- for 21 all, most, some, the majority, whatever, of the communications 22 to the site, being made through the field communicator or were 23 they being made through other firms and that is communications be..L]2e n.porms, inc.
(
24
_to the site?
j 25 A
To the best of my recollection, almost all of them l
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G Do you recall the various support groups that were Q
2 working at IRC and in the satellite offices or at NRR at that a
3 time?
O 4
A There was one group in Mosely's office, principally 5
thermal hydraulics people.
6 Q
What I am going to ask you to do, if you do recall 7
any of the groups, would you identify the groups you can recall, 8
members and leaders, and approximately what they were doing?
9 A
There was this one group that operated our of 10 Mosely's office, and they were principally thermal hydraulics 11 people, possibly with some physics people.
There was another 12 group in a nearby office around the corner, principally health
~'N
(',,j 13 physicists and environmental radiation people.
This is the l
14 first night.
15 Oh boy, I remember Mattson being in and out of the office 16 with the thermal hydra 61ics people, and most probably, nominally, i
1 17 their leader.
Frank Schroeder was in that group from time to 18 time.
19 A bright young fellow from licensing, Ted Marsh --
20 Can we go off the record for a minute?
21 MR. SCINTO:
Yes.
)
22 (Discussion off the record.)
23 TIIE WITNESS:
Warren Minners, M-i-n-n-e-r-s; Sandy 24 Israel, I-s-r-a-e-1; Denny Ross, who was probably the leader
' Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 when Mattson wasn't there; Tom Novak.
I l
1
cch 2 40 1
If I went much further, I would really be reaching.
fs
\\u 2
BY MR. SCINTO:
3 G
Fine, fine.
Thank you for that help.
That helps a O
4 lot.
5 A
And the health physics people, I believe, Lake 6
Barrett was in and out of that group; Bryan Grimes was probably 7
the nominal leader; Ellen Nore; Addensan came in and was one of 8
the lead technical people.
9 Can we go off the record for a minute?
10 MR. SCINTO:
Yes.
II (Discussion off the record.)
12 THE WITNESS:
George Knighton was in and out of that,
(}
13 and, beyond that -- and I imagine -- I think there were several 14 other people, but I just don' t recollect.
15 BY MR. SCINTO:
16 G
Fine, fine.' Was sur impression that the combina-17 tion of Mr. Stello and Mr. Mosely had a good understanding of 18 the work being done by all of those groups?
I I9 A
Yes, I believe in those early hours, yes.
20 Q
As I said, I'm limiting it to that time period.
21 A
Although they weren' t located -- they didn' t leave
(}
22 the IRACT room and -- and these people were working alone, and 23 there was some communication back and forth, they didn't know
(
2#
. A.e)x.i n.oonen, inc.intimately what was going on, but I believe generally they ' knew.
l 25 G
I guess what I'm asking, would they have bean able to S
- F 41 crh 3
- I understand the implications or the significance 'of the work that 2
was being done?
I recognize they may not have been aware of the i
3 details.
O 4
A Are you asking me in a technical sense?
5 0
Yes.
6 A
I don't think they were doing anything over the head 7
of that combination of people.
8 g
Thank you.
You have answered the question.
9 A
I would say one thing about Stello and Mosely.
You 10 had a combination of a man who understood this in intimate II detail -- Stello, a good sound technical systems man, and he had 12 Mosely, with a deep background in reactor operations.
OQ 13 And so if I had two people that I wanted at that place at Id that time, they would be two of the people that I would select 15 first.
16 g
All right. 'At any time during the course of that --
17 at any time during the course of your work in connection with 18 the NRC response to the TMI incident, did you observe or did you I9 otherwise feel inter-office rivalries?
20 A
Yes, I believe I did.
21 O
If so, would you please describe where and under what 22 circumstances?
23 A
Well, personally, I believe that there was a return l
24 to probably -- to the normal lines of authority and responsibil-l Ace-Feder:J Reporters, Inc.
25 ity too soon after the initiation of the incident.
l l
j.
cch 4 42 I
I would have expected that, you know.
As I said earlier, ~~
s 2
it is something that does happen during the course of protracted 3
events, but I wouldn't have quite expected it to occur this
/'
4 early.
5 In some of the, you know, in some of the requests for 6
information from the site, I at least got the inference from the 7
technical people that we weren't getting it fast enough or the 8
right kind and this sort of thing.
Information, you know, it is 9
difficult to come by with the communications systems we had and 10 this sort of thing.
II Those are impressions I have, and you asked me for my 12 impressions, and I have given them as honestly as I can.
p 13 j
G Did you observe or feel a sense from the field people, Id perhaps, that they were being asked too many questions, 15 unimportant questions, stupid questions?
A.
Oh, yes.
I'have been on both sides of that fence, 16 17 too, and I think.it ia only natural.
G Did that sa.me kind of problem, to your observation, 18 I9 occur at headquarters, for example?
Did I & E people feel
]
20 sometimes that NRR or research types were asking them ivory j
l 2I tower questions?
^
22 U
For example, did NRR appear to feel that I & E people were 23 not understanding the full complexity of the problems?
24 t.
)
A.
That might be the impression one would get.
i Ace 4uant Reporters, Inc.
25 G
Was it the impression that you got?
l
43 cah 5 1
A It was the impression I got at the time, yes.
And
,(_)
2 they did ask for. a lot of information, but in a situation like 3
that, you need a lot of information.
/~N i' '/
4 G
When you talked about going back to the normal lines 5
of authority, did you mean by that that people would respond to 6
their day-to-day supervisor, to his authority?
7 Let me stop.
Do not answer that question. ' That is badly 8
phrased.
Let me think about it and phrase it more accurately.
9 Let me put it a different way.
What did you mean by going 10 back to the normal lines of quthority?
11 A
People reporting -- people more through the chain, 12 reporting information more through the NRR chain than through
(~)
13 the IRACT chain.
V 14 In other words, if they had information, to be more inclined 15 to talk to the NRR member on EMT, and the IRACT director.
16 G
Fine.
I'm glad you phrased it that way.
That is 17 better phrasing than I would have made.
Thank you.
18 During the course of your work, were you personally given l
1 19 directions by any of the commissioners?
Directions, that is l
e l
20 not requests.
21 A
No, no I was not.
()
22 G
To your knowledge, to your know; edge were other 23 members of IRACT or cf the IRACT support staff given directions llh 24 by any of the commissioners?
t
' Ace Fecual Rnertus, Inc.
~
25 A
I don't recollect a case of that.
cch 6 44 I
MR. SCINTO:
Off the record.
U,o 2
(Discussion off the record.)
3 MR. SCINTO:
Back on the record.
O BY MR. SCINTO:
5 0
I would like to change topics now to some background 6
on the development of the NRC response plan.
7 Are you generally familiar with the background of the 8
development of manual chapter 0502?
9 A
Yes, sir.
10 G
When was the present version adopted, do you recall?
II A
Sometime.
Sometime in '78, early
'78, late '77.
12 g
Okay.
Are yN generally familiar with a version of 13 manual chapter 0502 promulgated in 1976?
I#
A Yes.
5 G
Okay.
This was superseded by a version promulgated 16 in 1978; is that correct?
I A
Yes.
18 G
I would like to direct your attention to section 024 9
of manual chapter 0502.
Okey doke?
20 A
That is.the new manual.
21 0
The present manual?
22 A
It is 024.
23 j
G 024?
l
,Fi.
-24 N./
A Yes.
l Ace-Feder.1 Reporters, Inc.
i I
25 MR. SCINTO:
And for the record, I will be reading it l
l 1
cnh 7 45 1
into the record so we don't have to --
y A
2 Okay.
I would like to read in that section, 0502--02, 3
entitled, " Objectives."
4 Reads, "It is the overall goal of the incident response 5
program to assure that proper actions are taken to protect 6
health and safety, the environment, and property from the 7
consequences of incidents which occur as a result of NRC/
8 licensed activities; to provide, as appropriate, for security, 9
and to ensure that the public is kept informed of actual or 10 potential hazards to health and safety arising from such II incidents.
12 "The following objectives are designed to meet that goal:"
(')
13 Thereafter follows a subsection 021, entitled, "Information"i 14 a subsection 022, entitled, " Evaluation"; a subsection, 15 entitled 023, entitled, " Assistance"; and a subsection 024, 16 entitled, " Direction," which reads:
"On the basis of I7 evaluation of information obtained, determine whether the action 18 or lack of action taken by the licensee warrant formal inter-
'9 vention by NRC and initiate this action.
This direction could 20 take the form of oral and written directives by a responsible 21 officer of NRC or, in the extreme, could theoretically involve 22 on-site direction of action."
23 Thereafter ther. is a section, a subsection 025, entitled,
()
" Coordination," and this is followed by section 0502 -- 03, 24 Am.FerJ Rumrters,...c.
25
" Responsibilities and Authorities."
I l
crh 8 46 1
Now, directing your attention to subsection 024, which I k-2 have just read for the re6ord, what does that subsection suggest 3
to you about the NRC's possible role in the event of an
(^\\
4 incident?
5 A
Cou3d I give you some background?
6 G
Please do.
You may shortcut a lot of my questions.
7 A
Back in early 1976, Dr. Volgenau was assigned as the 8
director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
- And, 9
following the Brown's Ferry incident, I & E reviewed their 10 incident response posture, and we held a series of meetings with Il the EDO, with the director of NMSS, the director of NRR, the 12 director of I & E, and, I even believe, the commission.
The
-()
13 commission or two was present at some of the early meetings.
14 And we discussed the role of NRR in incidents response, and 15 we also performed a staff cooperative effort between NRR and 16 NMSS and I & E, reviewing what we thought the scenarios woul' 17 be -- what we thought the demands would be on the incident 18 response center, what we thought we would need in terms of 19 resources.
20 And, as I said, you know, the goals and objectives and 21 this sort of thing.
<m 22 In these discussions we discussed these various objectives
(_)
23 and information, evaluation, assistance, coordination, and
)
24 those were probably, you know, those were the functions that Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 were described in the early 0502 chapter.
That was approved j
l
cah 9 47 I
back in '76.
V 2
But in these discussions, various uppper level staff members 3
or management personnel in the agency -- it was felt that
- k-4 I & E -- or NRC had another function, and that was direction, 5
if necessary, if required --if the licensee wasn't doing hi:,
6
- job, or public health and safety wasn't -- and property wasn't 7
being protected.
That the NRC did have a responsibility to 8
take whatever steps were necessary to cause health and safety 9
and property to be protected.
10 I was thinking at that time -- we visualized a necessity to 11 order a person to close a valve or to take some individual 12 action.
I'm not sure that we contemplated not so much walking O
in end eekins over.
G Fine.
From what you indicate, it appears, then, that IS this was -- this concept of this role for the NRC was something 16 that was something in sddition to those roles of information and I7 evaluation.
And so that this is a role that wasn't articulated 18 before for NRC incident response.
Is that correct?
l I9 A
It wasn't articulated.
I believe we also felt that 20 we would do this.
2I G
But it was not articulated before?
I'N 22
.()
A It was not articulated, no.
23 G
Could you characterize in general terms any other 24 differences between the role that was visualized for the NRC Act ral Reporters, Inc.
response in the 1976 version, in the 1978 version?
And I'm not
- -e
- cnh 10 48 1
really looking for details; I'm looing for certain general nU 2
concepts of -- for example, would you describe the 1978 version 3
in suggesting a more active role, and, if so, in what way?
_ O 4
I'm talking about the general characteri::ations and, if you 5
can't, you can't.
6 A.
Oh, I believe the principal difference would be --
7 well, the concept of enuncicating the concept of direction, if 8
necessary.
I believe we sharpened, focused more fully on 9
coordination, and we, as a result, you know, of 0502, and th' 10 concept in 0502, of course, we developed this document you II referred to previously -- the NRC Headquarters Incident Rest,onse 12 Plan, which put more specificity and more details and prc.ced-O
'3 ure1ized how we wou1d perform those other obsectives.
I4 O
For example -- I want to refer to sections 022 and D
023.
Do they indicate a role, for example, of the NRC 16 exchanging opinion and' advice with the licensee and making I7 technical expertise available to him in the new version of 0502?
I 18 g,
7.m not so sure we envisioned, at that poing, i
l I9 assisting the licensee in technical evaluations and this sort of t'
20 thing.
And we probably assumed he could adequately do that.
21 We wanted to make sure we tracked the course of events and 22 understood them and evaluated them.
23 Now, the assistace role was to bring -- to marshall 24 radiological assistance.
Am Feder) Reporters, Inc.
0 Fine, fine.
Mr. Thornburg, in response to my request, 25 l
l ll
cch 11 49 1
did you seek to obtain copies of a memorandum dated June 13, 2
1977, from Mr. Jordan, Mr. E. Jordan?
3 A
Yes, I did.
O 4
4 On the NRC incident response program?
5 A
Yes, I did.
6 O
Okay.
And a copy of a letter -- memo, dated August 7
15, 1977, from Mr. Hegner to Mr. Carter and Mr. Grimes?
8 A
Yes, I did.
9 G
With respect to the memo from Mr. Jordan, do you 10 have any recollection of seeing this letter before I asked you 11 to obtain it from the I & E files?
12 A
Yes, I do have some recollection.
()
13
~ G How about the other letter, the August 15, 1977, 14 letter?
I notice you are on it for a carbon, but that's not 15 my question.
My question is whether you have any recollection 16 of it.
17 A
Yes, I had been responsible for I & E's effort in l
18 reviewing incident response and for developing the new manual 19 chapter and the new concept center and the brief to commission, 20 and, sometime in '77, and for the general upgrading, I had the 21 management responsibility for that.
- ()
22 One of the final acts was to get the manual chapter approved, 23 you know, a major milestone.
And it was -- I was very interested h
24 'in seeing that the manual chapter got approved and finalized.
Ace #eoerd Reporters, Inc.
25 And I believe I remember this memorandum, because I think at
cah 12 50 1
that time I~had been asking Mr. Hagner'i supervisor, who, I O
-\\
2 believe was Mr. Brine at that time, where is the manual chapter.
3 G
By this me.morandum, you're referring to the August O
4 15 memorandum.
Is that right?
5 A
Yes.
I think I still had an interest in where it 6
was at that time.
7 0
Would you briefly describe the nature of the June 8
13 memorandum. the June 13 one from Mr. Jordan?
Is it a 9
transmittal letter?
Is it a request for comments?
What?
10 A
It's final review requests.
I'm a little at a loss 11 as to whether t'iey say, " Hey, this is the last time around."
12 I don't know if the concurrent copy is attached to this or not.
()
13 G
Lo you have a copy of the attachment?
14 A
No, I do not.
I just have the memorandum, 15 unfortunately.
16 G
No, that's okay.
The series of questions that I had 17 in mind are not going to be very useful without it.
Let me --
18 A
I notice attached to this now is a memorandum to me.
19 I have one attachment to the attached list.
I don' t have the 20 attached list, but I was exhorting them to move the chapter on 21 then.
()
22 G
Let me put it this way, without the attachments, the l
23 series _of questions I have in mind aren't going to make sense,
()
24 Maybe your recollection, however, is good enough to help.
So t
l Am Famd Rummrs, Inc.
25 let me put it in terms of your recollection, and if you don't l,
t
cch 13 51 1
recall it, we will just end this.
d 2
A Okay.
3 G
Going back to that period of time, does:your
'O_
4 recollection -- do you have enough of a recollection to recall 5
whether there would have been a reason -- let me cast a 6
hypothetical first, and then let me go back.
7 If, if attached to Mr. Jordan's memorandum June 13, 1977, 8
was a draft of 0502, revised 0502, which looked like the old 9
version, did not have the direction language, did not have the 10 other language, and, if the draf t attached to Hagner's Il memorandum of August 16 looked like present 0502, having the 12 direction language and the rest'of it, do you recall that 13 period of time to identify why that might have happened, if that Id were true?
15 A
I believe that the draft that Jordan was discussing 16 in his June 13, 1977, memo, had the directions statement in it.
17 G
Okay.
18 A
Because I worked on the draft earlier in the year, 19 around January, and I remember putting that language at least in 20 the draft that I was working with at that time.
21 G
Fine.
Since we don't have the document here, there's O
2 no use errine te gursue.
73 A
But I do recollect working, doing some of the original O
24 t
L ij drafting.
I did it myself, so make -- to cast 0502 in the Ace Feder*J Reporters, Inc.
25 language that we had been considering, you know, in our joint
c h 14 52 1
('
(
2 4
Let me reiterate and let me clarify the concept that 3
under the conditions characterized in 0502, the present 0502 O
4 under the direction, under the conditions pictured there, the 5
concept that the NRC role could include that range of activities 6
was something I believe you indicated that was generally felt 7
as a result of discussing with the senior staff members involved?
8 A
The senior staff members we had an early meeting 9
when we had our joing consideration.
We agreed at that time 10 that the three line offices, the two licensing offices and I &E 11 would jointly review incident response from the, you know, from 12 the level of objectives and goals, and look at what the demands
~
()
13 would be placed on the center, and try to structure, generally, 14 what we were af terlin terms of incident response.
15 And the question of direction did come up in these early 16 manuscript discussions; and we, I think, articulated it more 17 in our joint work in NRR and NMSS.
18 G
Okay.
But that was general feeling.
You're not 19 actributing it to any one person's view?
20 A
In my recollection, it is a general thing.
I think 21 the question was even asked, in connection with some of the,
()
22 you know, censideration of Brown's Ferry.
I think the question 23 was asked at the commission level at that time, but I just can't
()
24 clearly recall.
Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 4
Have you been able~to familiarize yourself with a l
cch 15 l
53 1
report, entitled, "NRC. Incident Response Draft No.
2," dated
(
(
l 2
July 23, 1976?
3 A
I recall the document.
I recall participating in
(
)
4 its generation.
I have not read it recently, unfortunately.
'~
5 G
I'm going to show you a copy of the document for 6
the purpose of refreshing your recollection.
Could you tell me 7
a little bit about this document?
How did it get developed, 8
and where did it come from?
9 A
As I indicated previously, in early or sometime 10 in the spring of 1977, 1976, we had joint management level II discussions with NRR. and I & E, the EDO participated in, 12 which we discussed incident response, goals and objectives, and
~
(_)s 13 what we thought resource requirements would be and how we 14 thought we ought to go about incident response.
15 And at that time I had been appointed by the director of l
l 16 I & E to head up this ffort.
During the course of these-17 discussions, and they were principally between Volgenau, 18 Chatman, and Rousche.
During that period of time, it was agreed l l
19 that the staffs would jointly get together and try to scope 20 what we were after in incident response, you know, try to focus 21 more clearly on the goals on incident response and the h,)
22 capabilities we thought we should have.
23 Generally the timing of response, what did we think, you I
24 know, how rapidly did we think we should respond.
Something 4_r e... a. n.. ~.
25 about the general scenarios that one might have to expect to I
cah 16 54 1
respond to.
To give you an idea what does it take to respond O
2 to these things.
Some basis for resource requirements and then 3
to come up with some sort of recommendations for implementation.
O 4
And basically, it was sort of a thinking piece that the 5
staffs worked at jointly to try to get our arms around what we 4
6 were really af ter in incident response, to define the 7
objectives, to talk about the resource requirements, and to try 8
and pin down what is the spectrum of things we might have to 9
respond to.
10 G
Let me ask you just a few questions about this.
The 11 documents you and I have just been looking at, is, in the front 12 cover, indicates a draft number 2.
And it is dated July 23,
()
13 1976.
14 To your recollection, was this ever finalized?
Was a final 15 report ever put together?
16 A
I don't believe it was.
End T-3 17 18 19 20 21
()
22 23 13 r_j 24
- Am FWest Roorwrs lM.
25 l
i
1 CR #6827 55 Tape 4 cth 1
O Okay.
2 A
We used this to attempt to articulate -- to have some 3
basis for moving on into an implementation phase, to see what
'l 4
it was they needed and the sorts of things we would have to 5
respond to.
We used this to then in turn, a month or so later, 6
to brief the management level team again, who had been working 7
in this area and, ultimately, we used it as a basis to brief 8
the commission on what we thought our role in incident response 9
was, to summarize what we thought the resources were and to 10 give them an action plan to set up a dedicated center that had 11 some resources, and generally, in the configuration that it was 12 in when we responded to Three Mile Island.
()
13 g
All right.
Am I correct in assuming that a copy of 14 this document would or should properly be contained in I &E 15 files, the division files, the office files?
i 16 A
I suppose it should, but, as I said, we used it as a 17 source document and basically used it as a basis to develop our 18 later thinking.
19 MR. SCINTO:
Off the record.
20 (Discussion off the record.)
21 MR. SCINTO:
Back on the record.
-( )
22 BY MR. SCINTO:
23 0
Mr. Thornburg, are you f amiliar with the report on h
24 the Brown's Ferry file, entitled " Recommendations Relating to l
Ace FeTeret Reporters, Inc.
25 Brown's Ferry, File Report by Special Review Group, New Reg.
i e
ch2 56 l
1 0500," dated'F,ebruary 1976?
O
'2 A.
I'was at the time it was written and shortly
- v' N
3 thereafter.
I do remember, but I'm not familiar with the
~/
4 details.
5 G
Okay doke.
Was in the development of manual chapter 6
0502 in 1978, the revision, was there an effort to include 7
people. familiar with the NRC response, experience at Brown's 8
Ferry, in the developing or in commenting on the draft?
9 A.
Oh, yes.
Stello was intimately involved.
I was --
10 a number of I & E staff personnel.
I would say, yes.
II There is one thing I didn't bring out.
We did have a 12 consultant work with us in some of this latter work on the O
ce=ter-
"itre c re reti = to rx the c====iceti==
=a de e 14 us set up, establish drills, and this sort of thing, as part of I
15 this general effort to upgrade intident response.
16 0
In connection with Brown's Ferry report, I would like 17 to direct your attention to two particular passages in the 18 report.
Okay?
The first is a passage on page 7 in the middle of the page.
20 I'll be reading it into the record.
21 Which reads:
This is entitled -- which is the first 22
- (d paragraph of a subsection no. 1.6.6, " Recommendations for the 23 NRC" is the title and subsection.
p.
24 The first paragraph reads:
"The NRC must also consider the Ace.kJ Reporters, Inc.
i 23 Brown's Ferry lessons for improving its policies and procedures l
l
cch 3 57 1
and -
2 I'm sorry.
That's not correct.
There is no "and" before 3
the word procedure.
/')
~'
4 "The NRC must also consider the Brown's Ferry lessons for 5
improving its policies, procedures, and criteria.
The NRC is 6
responsible for ensuring the health and safety.of the public 7
and the safe operation of Brown's Ferry and all other reactors.
8 NRC provices this assurance of public safety through the 9
establishment of safety standi-ds, evaluation of the safety 10 of the plant, and inspection and enforcement programs.
11 "The licensee, TVA, has the responsibility for the safe 12 design, construction, and operation of its plant within the r'N 13
()
framework of the NRC regulatory program.
Id "If the NRC were to become too closely involved in the 15 licensee's operations, this might have an adverse affect on the 16 licensee's view of his' safety responsibilities.
I7 "In other words, it is the licensee's responsibility to 18 operate the reactor safely, and it is NRC's responsibility to 19 assure that he does so."
20 The second paragraph I would like to refer you to is on the 21 top of page 59, and it is the last paragraph in a section 6.4.1.
f~
22
(,T Section 6.4 is entitled, "NRC's Actions During and After the j
23 Fire," and section 6.4.1 is a section entitled, "During the
('N 24 s !
Fire and the First 24 Hours Afterwards."
Assea; Reponm, Inc.
25 The paragraph that I'm referring you to reads:
"During the l
l
'cch 4 I
incident, the safety decisions were made by the plant operating (x-2 staff, as is proper.
Presumably, if the NRC on-site inspectors 3
recognize aan two office staff or the headquarters cadre had 4
felt the need of requesting any decision, this would have been 5
communicated to the operating staff with whatever force or 6
urgency would have been appropriate.
7 "The review group is not aware of any such communications 8
during this incident.
The group has no recommendation for any 9
change (except improved communications) in this NRC approach to 10 safety during the course of that incident.
II
" Distance, inevitable communication information difficulties 12 and the odd expected things that can occur, mandate the ad hoc
()
13 responses and monitory NRC stance.
One does the best one can in 14 the circumstances; the group believes that the NRC groups did 15 very well."
16 Now, are you familiar with those aspects of the report?
I7 A
Yes.
18 G
Concerning the NRC's response from which I quoted I9 those passages?
20 A
Yes.
21 G
Okay.
Now, do you consider the changes in the NRC
()
.22 role, reflected in the 1978 version of 0502, in which we 23 articulated more clearly for the first time the concepts of i
('h 24 x /
on-site potential direction of operations.
Dc you consider
- Ace-L;ral Reporters, Inc.
25 that to be consistent with these two passages, and if so why?
l I
4 59 cnh 5 1
What do you feel the differences are?
x' 2
A Well, I lived through both circumstances.
I know.
3 I believe we didn't issue any orders at Brown's Ferry incident.
O 4
I believe the only time we did enter any intervention in the 5
first few hours was to ask -them to make sure that they 6
discontinued electrical leads to make sure they couldn't be 7
driven out under any circumstances.
I remember that in the 8
middle of the night somewhere.
9 There is some change, yes.
The possibility of a 10 direction is brought up.
I think somewhere in the report you 11 read from, from the Brown's Ferry study, that there is the 12 gender of that thought.
And these are two different timetables
-s
(}
13 too, you know.
One is dcne as one point, and one is done later.
14 This business is continually evolving.
15 The way in which, at least, I envisioned the changing role 16 in the revision of 0502 was not to go in and strong arm people 17 at the site, not to push them around, but, if necessary, under 18 certain conditions, you might have to, to direct.
19 Now, my view of that isn't that this is such a major 20 departure.
I think it is more facing the fact:
NRC does have 21 responsibility for public health and safety and protection of m
22
()
property.
And this responsibility has to be used judiciously, 23 and I can remember at one point telling one of the commissioners e 9 erd Reporters, Inc.
24 when he said, "Why don't you guys order them to do something,"
Ace-F 25 and I told him if I didn't think what he thought, we should do
cch 6 60 1
at that time was right or nor, because I wasn't there.
And (Q/
2 that is generally my feeling at this point.
I don't see a 3
great stark difference in position, really.
- ' 'i 4
Time has passed since the two events, and I don't believe I 5
agreed quite so much with the second statement you read from 6
this report.
I think we have to recognize that we have some 7
responsibilities, and we have to be prepared to take that 8
responsibility.
9 G
Thank you.
Okay.
I would like to again change 10 directions.
Do you recall your deposition by the President's 11 Commission?
12 A
Yes.
The main thing I recall with it is I can't y
13 understand why he can't speak in complete sentences.
(a, 14 G
Do you recall in that deposition stating that by 15 Wednesday, March 28 -- Sorry, let me ask this question somewhat 16 differently.
17 Do you recall the following exchange?
A question asked to 18 you was "So, by Wednesday, March 28, in the evening around 6 or 19 7 o' clock, you became aware of full damage."
20 And your answer was "I felt f airly certain at that time 21 there was extensive fuel damage based on the radiation business.
I~h 22 I felt earlier that there probably was, because the primary
\\j 23 system radio activity was fairly high -- reported to be fairly 9 erst Reporters, Inc.
24 high.
So there must have been some fuel damage early on."
AceF 25 Do you recall that?
I
crh 7 61 I
A Yes.
(3 2
O Okay.
Could you tell me-in a little bit more detail 3
what was it that had led you to the conclusion that there had (s\\
\\J g
been extensive fuel damage?
5 A
In order to have large amounts of radioactivity in 6
the primary system water, there have to be -- it's logical that 7
there is a large release of radioactivity, and the next -- the 8
barrier to separate the radioactivity from the core, with the 9
core cladding intact -- so one would assume that something had 10 occurred, some breach of the core cladding had occurred at the 11 point too high radiation levels were reported.
12 O
High radiation levels in what?
In the primary rm
()
coolant?
14 A
In the primary coolant and containment.
15 G
Was there information at that time about high -- I'm 16 asking, you know --
17 A
My understanding was -- my memory says that at some 18 point in the morning, high primary system radioactivity in the 19 sampling had caused some alarms to go off.
As I remember, there 20 was also a very high radiation rating in the containment dome 2I monitor.
/~'
22
(_)
Now, people thought maybe the dome monitor was in error, 23 and -- but you did have the fact of the apparent high radiation in the primary water early on, the first few hours.
Then, at w.,
e n.ponen, ne, 25 5 or 6 in the evening, when it is reported that there is high i
~
j',
~/:-
~
.s 62 cnh 8 1
activity at the site boundary, then I became convincM, yes, the 2
dome monitor is probably right.
There is probably high radio-3 activity in the system water, and there has probably been core O
4 damage.
5 0
Fine.
Okay.
I am not clear from reading your 6
testimony whether you personally had also concluded, at about-7 the same time, about 6 p.m. or so on Wednesday, that the core 8
had been' uncovered for an extended period of time.
9 Would you clarify that?
10 A.
Well, here again, it's kind of backing into logic.
II You've got fuel failures.
What's the easiest way to get fuel 12 failure?
You fail to cool the core.
It has inadequate cooling.
O
~
is one of the weys you cen do thet ie, you know, not heve eneueh 14 water inventory.
And maybe other ways.
That's the logic that 15 led me to that.
16 G
Now, I'm asking you to cast your recollection back to 17 that day, Wednesday.
And when you say that you thought there 18 had been substantial core damage or extensive fuel damage, could I9 you describe for me in a little bit more detail what you thought
]_
20 had happened or what you thought might have been the state of 2I the core?
22 For example, did you have in mind a partial core melt?
23 Partial cladding melt?
Extensive performation, ballooning and j
24 rupture?
What was it that you had in mind?
What kind of
' Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
25 picture did you have in mind when you said substantial fuel
~
c2h 9 63 1
damage?
'q
'V 2
A It could have been any of those things.
I didn't l'
3 know for sure, didn't have enough information, but I did know,
'd 4
if you had high radioactivity, you can, you know, following the 5
logic training, there was a possibility of core damage.
6 G
Did you have in mind at that time, casting back to 7
that time, did you have in mind a condition in which there had 8
been large quantities of hydrogen from metal-water reaction or 9
otherwise?
10 A
No.
II G
Did you have in mind a condition where the pellets 12 were no longer contained in cladding, but were in a fluidized in 13
()
bed-type condition?
14 A
No, not at that point.
15 0
When you reached the belief that there had been 16 substantial fuel damage, did you feel that this same belief was 17 already shared by other senior staff members, or that your 18 belief was unique?
19 A
No, I believe it was shared by other senior staff 20 members.
21 G
Did you believe that the core was in worse condition
(
22 than other aenior staff members thought at that time?
- And, 23 specifically, if you know, did Mr. Stello believe that there had 9rol Regmrs, Inc.
24 been less damare than you believed?
Ace.F M
A We didn't discuss it.
I don't know, you know, how he I
s 64 cah 10 I
visualized the thing, but my assumption is that most everyone 2
would have arrived at the same conclusion I did by the same 3
logic.
I i,/
4 G
You don' t have any logic of how he personally --
5 but you believe that generally -- that was your belief that was 6
generally shared?
7 A
Right.
I discussed it with Morris Howard, and we 8
said, you know, it looks like -- with the high radiation levels,
9 that there is, there is core damage.
10 B
hhen do you recall -- if you recall -- becoming aware that there had been substantial superheating of the primary 12 cooland in the region of the core?
()
13 A
The confirmation in my view that the core had been I4 uncovered came from the nuclear data, the data from the neutron 15 monitors, which indicated a difference in the transmission of 16 neutrons in the neutron population.
The next day or so.
I7 G
Okay.
IO A
Denny Ross sent down some information that there were 19 several periods where the neutron population had shown a 20 difference, indicating that the core had been uncevered --
21 G
I have just asked you --
!'~')
22 A
-- or that the water level had changed.
There is 23 another way you can put it, but that's tedious.
24 G
I asked you whether at about 6 o' clock on Wednesday, Ao..
ei n con.n, inc.
- S you had any vision of a substantial amount of hydrogen
c:h 11 65 1
generation.
Did you at that time -- did yt have any indication r~
1
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2 that anyone else thought that there was a large quantity of 3
hydrogen in the pressure vessel, which had been generated by
~
4 metal-water reaction?
5 A
Not at that time, no.
6 G
Now, now, now.
It's a maJ.ter of hindsight.
If you 7
had had the opportunity to think about it, wouldn't the idea --
8 would the idea that the core had been uncovered for an extended 9
period of time, have led you to be concerned about the possible 10 generation of large quantities of hydrogen from metal-water 11 reaction or from otherwise?
12 A
Yes.
( );
13 G
Now, if you had been informed or you otherwise 14 believed that there was a large quantity of hydrogen in the 15 primary system, would that have been of concern to you with 16 respect to the efforts' to try to get the reactor on to the 17 residual heat removal system?
18 A
Yes.
19 G
Why?
20 A
Well, we knew at that time -- we felt at the time 21 they were making the RHR changes, or at some point later on in f w) 22 the evening, that there was a bubble -- that there was some
!v 23 voiding in it, and we thought probably more of system than llh 24 hydrogen at that time.
You are a little afraid of a sudden Ase Feoeret Reporters, Inc.
25 change in pressure.
You don't know where this bubble is going,
cch 12 66 I
whether it would void out the core and put you in a worse heat
\\/
2 situation or not.
That's my recollection.
3 0
Do you recall when you first learned, Thorn, that
(' )
4 NRC people were concerned about the existence of a!.large 5
quantity of hydrogen in the primary system?
Not oxygen; I.'m 6
going to ask you about that later, but hydrogen.
When you first 7
got that in mind, when you first were informed that the staff, 8
the NRC staff had that in mind?
9 A
I think I heard it on the radio coming to work, 10 coming back here Thursday or Friday.
I can't remember.
It was II the next day or so, and when I got in here, sure enough, that's 12 the information.
There was some announcement about an impending
(_~)
13 evacuation and talk about a hydrogen bubble.
14 0
Well, I think you indicated that you were acting as 15 IRACT's director on the Thursday night?
16 A
Yes.
I7 G
Do you recall working on matters of hydrogen bubble 18 then?
I9 A
Yes, yes.
I remember we were, you know, getting 20 information about the size of the bubble.
There were calcula-21 tions regarding the size of the bubble and some discussions with
,m i _)
22 the BMW people, and some discussion of measurements, some 23 discussion of some kind of acoustical information.
And we were 24 talking bubble size and this sort of thing.
As...oerei neoomri, Inc.
25 G
So then the first time you heard about the bubble
cnh 13 67 1
must have been before Thursday night?
The hydrogen must have O'V 2
been before Thursday night?
3 A
Maybe sometime Thursday.
I remember -- maybe it was O"
4 when they started mixing the oxygen with the hydrogen, and'they 5
were talking evacuation.
I do remember hearing that over my 6
car radio.
7 G
Okay.
Right.
Okay.
When you became informed that 8
there was a concern about hydrogen generation, was that concern 9
associated with any one person in particular, or was that a 10 generally shared concern?
II A
Well, I think there was a lot of discussion of it in 12 EMT, and I think Dr. Mattson was probably more concerned than g('N 13 most.
14 G
Okay.
Do you recall now what was it at that time 15 that you understood was the nature of the concern?
16 A
What they wsre concerned might happen?
17 G
If you recall.
18 A
Do you mean the early --
19 G
The earliest time, the hydrogen --
20 A
Well, at the earliest time, I think there was some 21 discussion about possible explosion and this sort of thing.
()
22 But the questions you ask are -- you have to have oxygen, and 23 you have to have a detonation source, and this type of thing, Aas.F9el Roponen, W.
24 and you are worried about impediment to water flow and heat 25 transfer.
cnh 14 68 1
O
- Okay, Back, back-to Wednesday.
Were you still in l)
\\_/
2 the IRC when it was learned that the licensee had been able to 3
activate a reactor coolant pump?
[i 4
A Yes.
5 G
Okay.
Did you feel that operation using a reactant 6
cooling pump -- primarily cooling circulation was beneficial 7
from the standpoint of stabilizing the core?
8 A
Yes.
I wanted to see some kind of core circulation, 9
because we were worried at that time, I think, about the 10 system voiding.
11 0
Did you have the opportunity to observe the reaction 12 of others or to discuss with other senior staff inembers whether Lj)
(
13 they felt that the activation of the reactor cooling pump was 14 beneficial?
15 A
Here again, I remember talking to Morris Howard about 16 it, and we both did, as I recall.
I don't remember hearing much 17 discussion on the part of other staff members.
18 G
Was it your impression that it was a general feeling 19 that activation of the reactant cooling pump was beneficial?
/
20 A
Yes.
21 G
Before the reactor cooling pump was actuated, before f')
22 it was actuated, had the core cooling reached the condition v
1 1
23 that you would have characterized as stable?
' Ace h 24 A
No.
Fooerat Reporters, Inc.
25 0
How were they cooling it, if at all?
Sorry, that's
m 69 cah 15 1
not the question I wanted to ask.
2 At that~ time, how did you think that they were cooling the 3
core?
If you can recall; 4
A Pool boiling, I think.-- felt that there was some 5
sort of a steam slug in the piping, and that there was 6
eventually a pool voiding situation.
7 0
But you did not think this was an adequate, stable 8
way to cool the core?
9 A
No.
I wanted to see water circulation.
It may be End T-4 10 old fashioned.
11 12
.h 14 15 16 17 l
18 19 l
20 21 (2) 22 l
j 23 L
24 j
(~~)
- Ace-ra) Reporters, Inc.
25
'CR6827.05 70
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4 Late on Wednesday, after die reactor cooling pumps
J 2
were turned on, did you consider whether or not fuel damage 3
might be so severe from the standpoint of primary system
(
)
4
. adioactivity and debris, that the use of the RHR could be 5
undesirable?
6 A
Yes, later on.
I thought early that RHR was 7
something we should do, and the more I thought about it, the 8
more I felt that you shouldn' t for two reasons.
One is 9
radioactive debris, and -some of the piping was outside of the 10 containment, as I remember.
Some critical piping.
II And secondly, I thought you had erased a couple of options,
12 maybe if you went to RHR, you didn' t have anyplace else to go.
/~N 13 And you were putting some fluid outside of the containment,
(,)
14 But I can remember early on being an advocate of going on 15 RHR.
16 g
Do you recall Lin those early hours, the early hours 17 of the accident before the pump was on, the S taf f, the NRC 3
Staff members discussing as a posture of action, turning on, F [ attempting to turn on the cooling pumps?
il 20 A
I don' t remember that.
I don' t recall that early 21 on.
r (m)
G When was the first time you recall about hearing 22 23 about the possible generation of oxygen in the primary coolant?
I Em-F9erJ Regmrters, Inc.
24 A
Sometime Friday.
Of course, you have got to consider 25 we had radiolysis of water.
o
71 rmg 2 1
G Right, right.
Who, to your recollection, was actual
,\\l) 2 directing the investigations or the studies or the inquiries t
3 being made concerning oxygen generation in the primary coolant?
4 A.
As I remember, Dr. Mattson and Saul Levine and 5
Dr. Budnitz.
Don' t ask me how to spell it.
6 G
And to whom were they reporting their conclusions 7
and with whom were they discussing implications?
aco 8
A I think there was some discussion with Dr. Hendrie 9
and some of the people in EMT and possibly even with Stello 10 or Denton at the site.
11 G
You indicated that the functions at IRAC, at 12 headquarters, were changed af ter Mr. Stello and Mr. Denton
['h 13 became established at the site?
Am I correct in surmising V
14 that, since the oxygen question appeared to arise after that 15 time, the work on the oxygen problem was not coordinated to 16 headquarters, IRAC?
17 A
No, it was not.
IS G
Okay.
Were you or was to your knowledge, the IRAC I? L members at headquarters involved in the consideration of 20 potential evacuation on the Saturday evening and on Sunday 21 during the day?
()
22 A
No.
No, I don' t believe we were actively involved.
23 Now, I'll go back to Friday morning.
When I asked 9a semnm. ix.
24 you what your timing -- what you were doing during the various ;
l Aa-r 25 times you indicated on Friday morning you had worked Thursday I
72 rmg 3 1
night and on Friday morning you came in late, somewhere around O
(_/
2 9:00, 10:00 o' clock.
3 Let me ask -then -- this is a former question.
Were you p's/
4 involved in the discussion on Friday morning concerning 5
evacuation.of the surrounding communities?
6 A
No, I was not.
7 G
Okay.
You were acting as IRAC director on Thursday 8
night, I believe you told me that.
9 A
I'm pretty sure I was, yes.
10 0
In that role, were you generally following the 11 status of plant efforts to achieve letdown from:.the primary 12 system?
()
13 A
Yes, following system reactor system parameters.
14 G
Were you generally aware of the problems the plant 15 was having controlling radioactive effluent releases?
16 A
Yes.
17 0
Is my understanding that --
15 A
Now -- excuse me.
In referring to radioacti've IE d releases, are we talking about the matter of that waste treat-20 ment system, that sanitary system?
21 4
I was including that, yes.
22 A
Okay.
There were some airborne problems.
{}
23 G
I am just trying to find out what your familiarity
(^}-
24 was as IRAC director on Thursday night, ka.F;~.J Ramrters, inc.
{
25 It is my understanding that some of the people working in l
i
73 rmg 4 1
the IRCJ on Friday morning understood that the waste gas tanks
/
2 were full.
Do you recall that information coming into IRC 3
when you were IRAC director?
l.*
4 A
I remember taking up tracking the level in them, 5
the pressure in them.
You are talking gaseous?
6 Gaseous waste gas tanks.
7 A
We had some pressure reading and pressure readings 8
were indicating it was rather high.
And you know, near the 9
limit of what they should take.
And I can remember us keeping 10 tabs on that pressure for several days, several shifts at 11 least.
And that af ter it rose to about -- I don' t know, about 12 75 pounds or 90 pounds or whatever the number was, the thing
()
13 leveled out and stayed there for quite a spell.
14 I don' t think the rise occurred during my duty, but I 15 remember tracking it and being concerned about it.
16 G
Do you recall any discussions of the significance of 17 having the waste gas tanks full, what that would mean to effortq
- 5 ; to control the plant's efforts to control the releases?
l I? f A
Yes.
1 I
20 G
When was that generally -- what was the nature of 21 those discussion?
(m; 22 A
Well, I think -- and here again, relying on an v
23 imperfect recollection, but I believe I came on shif t and I ac>F9ca nmonni. ine.
24 said, "You know, the tanks are high in pressure and that we j
25 should track them. "
i l
74 i
rmg S 1
That, and then there were efforts of course to get a recombiner l
(
)
xs 2
going and this sort of thing.
And didn't have anywhere else 3
for the gas to go, if you didn't put up the tanks.
4 G
Would that mean you would have trouble establishing 5
a letdown?
That you had gas -- or let me put it a different 6
way -- that you would have gas pressure backing up through the 7
system, and then you have trouble with establishing the letdown 2 l
8 A
Yes, that was part of it, yes.
9 G
And would it also -- well, I don't want to -- I 10 want to go back to what people were thinking at that time.
11 A
I remember the letdown consideration.
12 O
Was there any consideration of whether or not if the
()
13 waste gas tanks were full, that might be bypassing the filter 14 systems?
15 A
Now that you mention it, I believe that was brought 16 up.
And then the general question, what, you know, what do 17 you do with all the gas.
J 3'
I remember trying to get the designers in the middle of the i
19 night to look up piping routes to other tanks and this sort l
20 of thing.
21 G
Right.
Do you recall -- you have responded
<~
(
)
22 reasonably well, except I am having a little trouble v
23 establishing time on that.
tan you help better on the time, h
24 whether that is Thursday night or some other night?
I
. -Fer:J Reprters Inc.
25 A
I' m sorry, I can ' t.
I just can ' t.
1
75 rmg 6 1
g When you were on duty, when you were in the response
)
2 center on Wednesday. -- no, let me ask this in a different way.
3 If you were functioning as an IRAC director and you felt 4
there was a serious imminent danger of a substantial release 5
to the atmosphere, would you believe that it was your function 6
to recommend to the EMT that it recommend to the state that 7
people in the nearby area be evacuated if there were no other 8
appropriate protective actions available?
9 A
Yes.
10 G
Let me ask you a different question now.
You, as 11 a person, if you were not a member, were not the IRAC member, 12 but were in the response center in any general capacity and
[}
13 you had reached a conclusion that there was an imminent danger v
14 of a substantial release to the atmosphere, would you have 15 felt compelled to bring your feelings -- would yc.u have felt 16 that it was your position to recommend that somebody start 17 going on evacuation?
IS A
Yes.
19 G
- Okay, I would like to set up this question looking i
20 back to the Wednesday af ter you had reached the conclusion 21 which you said you believed was generally shared that there
(}
22 had been substantial core damage, but before the reactor 23 coolant pump was actuated.
{c)4C}al Reporters, Inc.During that period of time, during that period of time,
(
24 p
25 I think you have indicated that you concluded that there was
2 76 rmg 7 1
substantial core damage, that you were -- also indicated that
. f3 there was -- you were aware of high activity in the primary s_)
2 3
cooling and high activity in the containment, and that there 4
was uncertainty about the continued stability of the cooling 5
of the core.
6 Okay.
Those conditions in mind, did you consider at that 7
time whether a precautionary evacuation shot s d have been 8
considered?
9 A
I don't think there was enough evidence that that 10 was -- should have been the course of action.
11 0
To your knowledge, to your knowledge, did anybody 12 else mention -- was anybody else considering whether a
()
13 precautionary evacuation should have been considered under 14 those circumstances?
15 A
Not to my knowledge.
l 16 G
Okay.
Nowf with hindsight, looking back, now 17 looking back on it, had you focused on the uncertainty as to 15 the condition of the core, might you have given consideration I? !j to whether or not a precautionary evacuation was a good idea?
20 A
In perfect hindsight, yes.
21 G
That's exactly my question.
That's what I have
/'
22 been trying to distinguish between hindsight and -- okay.
(_-)
23 Do you have anything specific?
(~}
24 MR. SICILIA:
Yes.
I just want to ask one question.
Mer-f_)d Regerters, Inc.
i 25 1
1
77 rmg 8 1
BY.MR. SICILIA:
p\\ /
2 G
Early on, Harry, in this deposition, I think you 3
said -- and correct me if I am wrong -- that you contacted
~
4 other regional offices.
Is that correct?
5 A
Yes.
6 G
And the basis for contacting them was what?
7 A
I was requested by Mr. Davis to keep him informed.
8 There were a lot of press inquiries coming in all over the 9
country to our regional offices.
10 G
Okay.
11 A
And they -- and we felt it was a good idea to keep 12 our people informed in a major fashion.
(A,)
13 G
Okay.
You briefed them.
Did you request any 14 assistance for availability or resources or request the 15 availability of resources?
16 A
Oh, yes.
And I remember, you know, we started 17 dispatching people to the site that day, and all during the 13 1 course of the first few days there was discussion of resources l
19 f back and forth with the regional offices, getting people to 1
20 report up there, report to headquarters to help out and this 21 sort of thing.
j
-()
22 G
Okay.
And that was based on a request from John 23 Davis?
i 24 A
Yes.
do-r:A Reporters, Inc.
l 25 G
I have only one other question.
Did you have --
l l
l
78
~rmg 9 1
on March 28, 29, or 30, did you have any direct contact with
.(
g 2
the utility personnel?
3 A
No.
4 MR. SICILIA:
Okay, I have no questions.
5 MR. SCINTO:
Okay, I have a few minor clean-ups.
6 BY MR. SCINTO:
7 G
Do you recall an effort to obtain lead bricks?
8 A
That didn' t happen on my shift.
9 G
Okay.
Let me ask another related one.
When you 10 took over as -- relieved Mr. Mosely as IRAC director, were you 11 generally being briefed by Mr. Mosely about what things he 12 had directed people to do?
What things you expected to be 13 followed during your shift?
14 A
Yes, Mosely and I have similar operating backgrounds 15 and he was giving me the general briefing that the off-going 16 senior shif t engineer gave to the oncoming one.
17 G
Do you recall being briefed or being told about 13 efforts to obtain lead bricks?
19 A
I don' t think Norm -- Norm may have mentioned it in j
20 passing, but I don't remember being briefed in detail.
I i
21 remember some discussion of it around the center.
22 G
Now, there is one question in this transcript which 23 I have got to ask you about, because to leave it dangling like
(~
24 that -- I ask you whether you thought that Mr. Stello and her-Is)} Reporters, Inc.
25 Mr. Eisenhut were acting as members of IRAC or otherwise.
And!
79 rmg 10 1
I believe the answer'was, or otherwise,
()
2 How would you characterize the nature of their roles during
\\_/
3 the first days of the event?
Were they supervising the support r~(j) '
4 staff?
Were they acting as part of the EMT decisionmaking 5
process?
How would you characterize it?
We just can't leave 6
it as otherwise on the record.
7 G
Well, I think they were supervising the support 8
staff and also operating very closely with EMT, maybe advising 9
them.
And at some point, maybe relieving them.
10 0
But you did not -- when you were operating as IRAC 11 director, you did not think that they were reporting to you 12 under your supervision?
.e-13 A.
No.
t 14 G
Okay.
Now I want to ask some concluding questions.
15 I would like to ask you now as a concl" ding question, that if 16 you believe that there. has been any question or area that I 17 touched on today which is not adequately explained because 15 i perhaps of the way I posed the questions, would you please 19 - indicate these areas now and please add any additional 20 information you would like to add on these.
21 A
I can't do it from recollection.
You know, at this 22 point, I can' t recollect. from the past several hours.
l 23 G
Right.
I recognize that problem to you, but if you 24 fg did, I want to give you this opportunity.
-t.
,A Reporters, Inc, j
25 A
Yes.
l
80 rmg 11 1
G Okay.
Now, is there any other information abc,.t
/"_)\\
(
2 other matters that you have that you would like' to bring to 3
the attention of the Special Inquiry Group?
If so, please N
/
4 take as much time as you feel is necessary, or if you would 5
prefer to do so in writing, we can 'do".that.
6 Or if you prefer to schedule another deposition, I will 7
do that.
But if there is any other information that you have 8
that you think would be valuable or that you would like to brinc 9
to the attention of the Special Inquiry Group, please take 10 this opportunity or any other opportunity you like.
I will 11 make arrangements for you.
12 O
It seemed to me there was something in my mind that
()
13 I wanted to mention.
If you will give me a moment to reflect.
14 G
Please.
15 A
I think there is one matter, 'and that is in ful-16 filling the task I had of sort of being the project manager 17 for upgrading incident response, I felt there sas a lot of
- 5 interoffice rivalry in developing the response plan, and I 19 1 had to deal with NMSS and NRR in great detail about how the l
20 EMT was organized and who did what and what the lines of 21 authority and responsibility were.
{}
22 I worked on that for -- that was a matter that took me 23 several months to resolve.
It was a very difficult time.
f'}
24 I think that's the only other thing I can recollect that L-94u.at Reporters, Inc.
25 we haven't touched on.
1
81 rmg 12 1
g Can I just point out -- you said you worked for a (I
2 long time on those organizational problems with a lot of 3
friction?
sd 4
A Yes.
5 g
Yet I think you also indicated that in reality, 6
in an extended event, the organizational structure that was 7
worked out for F?!T really tends to not stay in the emergency 8
response modt but go back to the traditional lines?
9 A
That's not all bad.
It's not a simple matter to 10 address.
11 g
My statement is a correct statement?
12 A
Yes.
()
13 g
I am not sure we got it.
I thought you nodded 14 agreement and then proceeded on.
I want to make sure the 15 record is correct.
16 Okay, that's _ all I.have.
17 A
Okay.
16 MR. SCINTO:
Oh, yes, I have some things I am 19 supposed to say here.
20 THE WITNESS:
If I don't accomplish I am going to 21 dry up and blow away.
[^
22 MR. SCINTO:
This is an ongoing investigation, and
\\.s}
23 although I have completed questions I have for you today, we 24 may need to bring you back for further depositions.
We will, I
(']
AcaLE) Reponm, Inc.
25 however, make every effort to avoid doing so.
I
82 rmg 13 1
I will now recess this deposition rather than terminate it.
2 I wish to thank you for yo'ur time in being with us here today.
3 Thank you, sir.
4 THE WITNESS:
You're welcome.
- 5 MR. SCINTO:
I really do mean that.
6 (whereupon, at 12 :34 p.m., the hearing was 7
recessed. )
8 9
10 i
11 12 O
14 15 16 17 i
1 15 I ? i!.
20 21 22 23 ca-Reporters, leie.
l 25 I
\\
gi AUG 23 lib-Mr. liarold D. Thornburg U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cocnission Vaahington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Thornburg:
I am writing to confirm that your deposition under oath in countetion with the accident at Three Mile Island is scheduled for September 7,1979 at 9:00 a.m. at Room 6717 Maryland National Bank Building, Bethesda, Maryland.
This will also confirm my request for you to bring with you a copy of your resume and any documents in your possession or control concerning TMI-2, the accident or precursor events which you have reason to believe may not be in official NRC files, including any diary or personal working file.
The deposition will be conducted by cembers of the NRC's Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island.
the NRC by the law firm of Rogovin, Stern and Huge.This Group is being direct It includes both NRC personnel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and attorneys.
Through a delegation of authority from the NRC under
[
Section 161(c) of'the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special i
v Inquiry Group has a broad mandate to inquire into the causes of the accident
[
at Three Mile Island, to identify major problem areas and to make recommenda-tic.ns for change.
At the conclusion of its investigation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings and recommendations.
L E
Unless you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in thel deposition is voluntary and there will be no effect on you if you decline to answer so:.e or all'of the questions asked you.
[
has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify underH oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place.
L Any person deposed may have an attorney present or any other person he wishes accompany him at the deposition as his representative.
The Office of the,
General Counsel of NRC has advised us that it is willing to send an NRC attorneytoalldepositionsofNRCemployeeswhowillrepresentyouasan\\,
individual rather than represent NRC.
Since the.NRC attorney may attend
\\
only at your affirmative request,-you should notify Richard Hallory (634-3224)',
in the Office of the Cencral Counsel as soon as practicable if you wish to have an NRC attorney present.
s You should realize that while we will try to respect any requests for confi-p\\j
\\
dentiality in connection with the publication of our report, we can make no Names of witnesses and the information they provide may eventuallv guarantees.
become public, inasmuch as the entire record of the, Special Inquiry Group's N
investigation will be made available to the NRC for whatever uses it may deem appropriate.
In tine, this information cay be made available to the public o me e >l.
..Th.ocycot%
g, I Ek. Na
- ;gx s u n.,e g
oue >p
1 voluntarily, or become available to the public through the Freedom of Teformation Act. Moreover, other departments and agencies of government may cequest access to this information pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974. The information may also be made availabic in whoic or in part to committees or subcommittees of the U.S. Congress.
If you have testified previously with respect to the Three FRie Island accident, it would be useful if you could review any tranrcripts of your previous statement (s) prior to the deposition.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely, f
f LJi
!!itchell Rogovin, Director NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group n.
4 h
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' NRC FORM 218 (9-76) NRCM C240 DU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979 289 369
HAP,0LD D. THORNBURG 1978-Director, Division of Reactor Construction Inspection, HQ -
present Directs development and administers the nation inspection and
(~')
enforcement program for civilian power reactors in construction.
w Develops inspection programs; provides technical management and support to NRC responses to incidents; monitors and appraises program performance by Regions.
p.
V 1977-1978 Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, HQ -
Directed development and admir.istered the national inspection and enforcement program for civilian power reactors in operation.
Developed inspection program; provided technical management and support to NRC response to incidents; monitored and appraised program perfonnance by Regions.
1976 - 1977 Director, Division of Materials Inspection Programs -
Responsible for inspection policy, programs, and technical support in the areas of nuclear material safety, special nuclear materials safeguards, nuclear power plant physical security, transportation safety and security, environmental protection and incident response. Assigned as Director and Deputy Director in acting capacity for IE.
1573 - 1976 Chief, Field Succort and Enfoacereent Brar.ch - Coordinated regicnal office inspection and investigation activities.
Handled GRC Headquarters liaison on nonroutine occurrences.
~
Developed enforcement criteria used by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
(NRC/AEC)
O 1972 - 1973 Chief. Standards and erecederes 8 aech - rermeleted inspection policy and procedures.
Responsible for technical support in the Division of Regulatory Operations. (AEC) 1971 - 1972 Agency Coordinator - Responsible for liaison with Federal 5
and State agencies in the preparation and processing of n
environmental impact statements for nuclear power plants.
9 (AEC)
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9.h 1971 Treining Cfficer - Restonsi'le for establishing a progra n c
for tecnnical training of AEC compliance inspectors.
(A: ~)
1964 - 1970 Senior Insoector - Responsible for supervision of inspection of test and startup of several nuclear power plants. Trained inspectors and supervisors, supervised inspection programs, and operations and construction inspection programs.
i (AEC, Region III).
1962 - 1964 Reactor Insoector - Responsible for reactor inspection at W
p several nuclear power plants and research reactors. Assisted
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i.")
in the AEC/URATOM bilateral agreement for technical cooperation in Europe. (AEC)
F 1952 - 1961 Stift Supervisor - Supervised operations at Savannah River Z
(N Plant. Developed operating procedures, supervised reactor U
operations, construction and test and startup, and served as radio chemist.
fornhtVfO' mm W
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