ML19308C449
| ML19308C449 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1979 |
| From: | Frampton G, Logan J METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001240605 | |
| Download: ML19308C449 (65) | |
Text
l 4
0 'd i
v.;
O NUCLE AR REGUL ATO RY COMMISSION i
IN THE MATTER OF:
THREE MILE ISLAND j
SPECIAL INTERVIEWS i
l i
i INTERVIEW OF JOSEPH LOGAN o
200[0RG NAL Place -
Middletown, Pennsylvania Date.
Wednesday, September 12, 1979 Pages 1 - 65 I
l l
l T.i.cnori.:
(202)347-3700 l
ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficalReporters'8gg
~4 0 60f 444 Nerth Capitel Street Washington, D.C 20001 g
NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAILY
l~
l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
/~N NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION N_]
2
x 3
In the Matter of:
4 THREE MILE ISLAND 5
SPECIAL INTERVIEWS 6
X 7
INTERVIEW OF JOSEPH LOGAN I,
9 Trailer 11 I
Three Mile Island 10 Middletown, Pennsylvania 1I Wednesday, Septeter 12, 1979 2:00 p.m.
12 i'
(}
13 APPEARANCES:
14 GEORGE T.
- FRAMPTON, JR.,
ESQ.
DENNIS ALLISON IS MICHAEL WORAM MARK CUNNINGHAM 16 NRC Special Inquiry Group on TMI l
6935 Arlington Road i
17 Bethesda, Maryland 18 l DELISSA A.
RIDGWAY I
l For Metropolitan Edison Company 19 j
i I
i 20 l
21 22 i
23 l
(~)
24 3..r__., n..,,.... i,,.
I 25 l
I
1-A bSb1EEbb 1
O
'"Trav 8" or:
zx^* "^r on 2
Joseph Logan 2
3 4
5 l
6 7
I 8
l 9
l 10 l
11 i
12 i
O l
14 16 17 13 19 f
!t 20 l a
21 22 i
23 4
{
O 24 Ace-@b-al Reporters. Inc.
25 l
II
a i
2 jori l 1
P_ R_ O_ C_ E_ E_ D_ I N,G_ S_
crf'}83 L31 2
MR. FRAMPTON:
This is a deposition being conducted 3
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission'; Special Inquiry Group 4
on September 12 at Three Mile Isl?nd of Mr. Joseph Logan.
5 Dennis, would you swear the witness?
6 Whereupon, 7
JOSEPH LOGAN 8
was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, 9
was examined and testified as follows:
10 EXAMINATION II BY MR. FRAMPTON:
12 O
Mr. Logan, could you just very briefly summarize j
es
(
)
13 your experience and career before you came to Met Ed and tell 14 us when you were employed here and what you were doing up until l l
15 the time of the accident?
l i
16 A
Yes.
I spent approximately 25 years in the Navy.
17 Approximately 20 in the nuclear power field with the Navy.
I 18 became employed by Met Ed in January of 1978.
I spent approxi-mately one year obtaining senior reactor operators license in f
19 i
I 20 preparation for assuming the duties as suoerintendent of Unit 2, i
i 21 which I did on -- the date escapes me but say the first of 22 January 1979.
From that time on I functioned as the superintendent i
23 Q
You were the supervisor of Unit 2.
j
[)
24 A
~Yes.
Aced _lt! Reporters. Inc.
I 25 O
Going to March 28, the day of the accident, you have !
1
3
)ri I
testified previously that you arrived at the plant about 5:45
'2 in the morning, is that right?
3 A
Yes, approximately.
4 0
I think ycm have also said that when you got to the 5
Unit 2 control room, you found that the situation was that some 6
or all of the reactor coolant pumps were tripped, that the 7
pressurizer level was high, the pressurizer pressure was low, 8
and one steam generator was isolated, is that correct?
9 A
Yes.
10 0
When you arrived, were you the senior person on-site II in Unit 27 I2 A
Yes.
At the time I arrived, I was.
13 Q
Did you remain in that capacity until Mr. Miller
{}
14 got here?
15 A
That's correct.
I i
16 Q
When did he get on-site and into Unit 2 control room?;
I 17 Do you recall approximately?
i 18 A
I believe sometime between 6:45 and 7:00.
i l
I9 O
About an hour after you got here.
l l
20 A
Approximately, yes.
I 21 Q
As best you can recall, what were your main concerns' 22 or what appeared to you to be the main problem that was being l
l 23 confronted when you arrived on the site?
l
(~'
A The problem -- my problem was trying to identify 24 See ti_,)J Roonen, tnc.
25 what the problem was.
The indications were such that my i
l l
4
'jcri 1
initial reaction was to try to get one or more pumps operating As) 2 to remove the heat from the reactor.
That was my objective t
3 after arriving.
4 0
When you arrived, was there any discussion of whether 5
any natural circulation had been achieved?
6 A
If there was, I don't recall it right now.
7 Q
Do you recall being aware of whether there was 8
natural circulation or not at that time?
9 A
I don' t recall either discussing it or observing 10 it at that time.
The first indications were lack of pumps 11 and the other symptoms we mentioned, the isolation of the steam 12 generator and the high pressurizer level.
I don't recall the
~N 13 (d
subject of natural circulation coming up at that time.
I4 Q
From your point of view, was it important to get at 15 least one reactor coolant pump -- main reactor coolant pumo 16 going?
l t
17 A
I considered that very important, yes.
I i
18 0
What were the problems in doing that?
19 ;
A Two problems.
One, I was trying to find out why 20 they were off, first of all.
When I first arrived the i:ji-21 cations were presented to me.
The shift supervisor, Bill 22 Zewe, and the operators in the control room were performing i
23 various evolutions to handle the casualty.
I didn't want to l
J 24 I
/~)
spend a lot of time interrupting them to try to find out fee-f( St Reporters, Inc.
25 what happened.
6
5 jGri 1
George Kunder, Superintendent Technical Support, was in the p)
(_
2 control room area at the time so I tried to ascertain from him 3
why we were in that particular situation.
The last thing I 4
wanted to do was direct something without understanding what 5
the consequences might be.
6 My understanding from his was they had tripped the pumps 7
due to getting indications they weren't having flow through 8
two of them, I believe.
The other, they were approaching the 9
temperature / pressure relationships by tech spec where they 10 should secure the pumps.
At that time I felt we should go 11 ahead and start the pumps and had proceeded to discuss that 12 with Zewe when tne radiation alarms came on.
13 Q
Do you recall what the primary system temperatures 14 were when you first arrived and tried to determine what the 15 plant status was?
16 A
I don't recall.
i l
17 Q
You don't recall whether the hot leg temperatures l
18 I were especially high or had gone off-scale at that time?
j i
19 A
I can't recall seeing those or remembering those.
i l
20 Since then I, of course, have seen testimony and read testimony.I i
l l
21 Q
I understand it's hard to q-back and put yourself 22 in the position you were in ther.
Nevertheless, we will try toi 23 ask you to do it.
f 2
24 O
I don't recall that I recorded the temperatures.
i
(-)
Lee F,,,) Reporters, Inc.
25 If I did, it didn't make an impression on me.
From seeing I
6 Ji 1
what the temperatures were, I would assume I would have thought --
O) seeing what they were since then, they would have left some
\\_
2 3
impression on me, I am -ure.
4 Q
If you had noticed them.
From that you conclude 5
maybe you didn' t notice them.
6 A
That is what I believe.
7 Q
Were attempts them made to get one pump started?
8 A'
Yes.
I would like to qualify that.
To the best of 9
my knowledge, we did.
During the day we tried to start those 10 pumps more than once.
I believe we started -- I am almost 11 positive we tried to start the pump just before the indication 12 of radiation was received.
As I recall, the results at that 13 time were unsuccessful in that we got an indication we weren't
(}
14 moving water, low amperage, and secured the effort.
15 Q
When you say " low amperage," the amperage was 16 indicating almost no flow, is that correct?
17 A
Yes.
I l
18 Q
When you came on, or within the first hour or two j
19 when you were there, did you become aware at that time that 20 the emergency feedwater had been delayed at the beginning of l
i 21 the transient?
l 22 A
Io the best of my knowledge, I didn't find that out l
23 until perhaps the second day.
)
t
- ("]
24 Q
I take it when you first came on you weren' t aware M4 sd Reporters, tnc.
25 that the pressurizer relief valve -- the EMOV -- was open.
f i,
7
$cri 1
That was something nobody was aware of at 6:00 a.m, is that k'
2 right?
3 A
That's correct.
Not to the extent that it was 4
subsequently determined.
In other words, I had reason to 5
believe we had a leaking relief valve.
We all felt one of the 6
relief valves, or more, were leaking, but certainly not to 7
the extent this apparently was.
8 0
Did you believe that was a leak that may have been 9
increased during the accident or was that the same leak that 10 had been going on for some time before?
A normal operational II situation.
12 A
Are you asking me now do I believe that or what?
13 0
I think a lot of people have said -- operators and
()
14 others -- that there was a general awareness of some leakage 15 prior to the accident through either the code safeties or 16 PORV and it was believed that leakage was within either the 17 tech specs or within the plant limits, is that correct?
j l
18 A
Yes.
l l
19 0
Is that the leak you were referring to?
20 A
Yes.
I 21 Q
When you came on did it appear to you maybe one of I
22 those valves had malfunctioned?
.23 A
No.
That was the leak I was referring to.
When I i
(~}
24 I didn't receive any indications that the leak we came on, ice F J Enzners, ine.
j 25 previously suspected had increased.
i-
8
- jeri 1
Q Shortly thereafter, the block valve was closed, is 2
that right, on that EMOV?
3 A
That morning, it was.
Just when that occurred, as 4
I recall, sometime after 7:00,-I believe.
S Q
Okay.
What I am getting at is:
Do you remember how 6
that came to be closed?
7 A
Not by personal observation.
I read since then how 8
come we clored it.
9 Q
You weren't aware at the time of how the decision 10 got made.
II A
No.
12 Q
When it was made, were you aware people realized 13
_( }
that must have been the source of loss of primary coolant?
Was 14 that something where people said:
Aha.
Or what is their 15 generator awareness about that, to your recollection?
16 A
I believe this occurred sometime during the morning 17 after I started working with the emergency plan.
I was not i
18 aware that it had been shut and that the leak had been 19 discovered or whatever until quite sometime after that.
I am l
20 sure that at the time it was shut, that people realized i
21 because of the indication they had discovered a leak or 22 source of leak.
23 Q
You said you began to work with the emergency plan.
24
(^)
Was that a role that you began to play from the beginning or hee F%,J Reporters, Inc.
25 was that a role that you were assigned when Mr. Miller came i
i
9 jcri 1
on-site and split up various responsiblities?
2 A
When we first declared the site emergency, of 3
course I implemented the emergency plan.
However, I had other 4
people there to take the general direction of the plan.
When 5
Mr. Miller arrived and assumed the overall charge of the 6
operation, he assigned me to take personal charge of the 7
implementation of that plan.
8 Q
Did you do that from the Unit 2 control room?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
Were you the one that would have directed someone II to set up the ECS emergency control station?
I2 A
It gets set up automatically upon initiation of the
()
I3 emergency, but, yes, any tasking to it that was outside of Id what is required in the plan, yes.
15 Q
That would have flowed through you then?
i 16 A
Yes, to the people I had there to implement it.
1 i
17 Q
Where was the ECS set up?
Did it have a location?
I 18 A
We started -- our set-up is, in the control room we l
19 have part of our emergency organization there and part of it i
20 is in Unit 1.
Normally, we take the off-unit site, if you 21 will, because there is less confusion over there to provide 22 the off-site direction for the runners and the off-site 23 sampling and on-site sampling.
1
(~ )
2d Q
Did your role throughout the day on Wednesday l
&FL J Reprters. Inc.
6 25 primarily consist of directing the emergency plan?
1 i
l
e %> gj.
e k ?
%ff ll b%
$/ N *{y
/gfl 8%$*
+++
%4l
,-E EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 g a at ll @ lilE I.I
[
M i
l 1.8 1.25 IA I.6 I
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART l4tR>%,,
- }g&v f4%
't O
h
%$'&,,,s/
}
s L-2.__
. _. c. _ Aa __ _ _ _ _ =
10 jcri 1
A Yes.
I 'i
'J 2
O Maybe we can just go through quickly and ask you 3
physically if you can recall what hours you were here and 4
what hours you were off during the first five days, let's say.
5 A
The first day, I was there from, say, about a quarter 6
of 6:00 until around noon the following day.
After that we 7
split up into --
8 0
You were on-site until noon on Thursday?
Or are 9
we talking about the first day now?
l 10 A
The following day.
I am trying to remember if it i
11 was Wednesday or Thursday when it happened.
12 Q
Wednesday is the day.
l (l
13 A
Okay, it was Thursday, the followin<g' day.
We split 14 up into sections af ter that and it seems to me they were about l l
15 a 12-hour shift.
Eight or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, I don't remember at the l
16 moment.
17 Q
12 on and 12 off?
)
18 A
No.
There were three of us.
Seelinger, Miller l
l 19 l and myself.
Andit shifted in the next few days.
\\
20 Q
So Mr. Seelinger, Gary Miller and yourself were i
21 otating.
j 22 A
As I recall, that is how we initially set it up.
i 23. It changed subsequently with the addition of Kunder, and l
(~'
24 ' Miller came off, so it was -- it's kind of difficult to tell
}
Aai~ b neconers. im:.
25 you exactly what the organization was.
i ia
11 jeri 1
Q Underneath you, do you recall who was rotating?
2 A
We had Jim Floyd, the Supervisor of Operations for m
3 Unit 2.
Mike Ross, Supervisor of Operations for Unit 1.
4 Q
Were they 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> on and off?
5 A
At one time, they were.
I am trying to remember 6
if initially we set it up with 1 and 3 or not.
It evades 7
me.
8 Q
But you recall Floyd and Ross.
9 A
Yes.
I know they were on.
At one time they were on 10 12 on, 12 off.
II O
Okay.
What times were you actually physically here 12 at the plant?
You said you were here for 29 or 30 straight
(}
13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.
14 A
Yes.
I' 15 Q
Then you left at around noon on Thursday to go home.
16 A
Yes.
l 17 O
Do you recall about when you came back?
I 18 I
A It seems to me the first day it was sometime after t
I i
I9 ' midnight.
20 0
After midnight on Thursday.
Friday morning.
21 A
Yes.
22 O
Do you recall whether you were in the Unit 2 control 23 room then through Friday morning?
f) 24 A
If I came back at midnight, I was in there through pst,a nemrieri. ine.
25 i
Friday morning.
t L
12 i)cri 1
Q How about on Saturday and Sunday?
Do you recall
()
2 anything about those days?
3 A
I was in, I know, on Sunday, but which hours I 4
can ' t rememb er.
I was in every day after that but the actual el 5
hours I don't remember.
3t 2 6
Q Just let me ask you a couple of questions about plant 7
Operations that go to the morning.and early afternoon of the 8
first day, March 28, Wednesday.,,
Wereyouawareordidyou.#foarticipateinanydiscussion 9
10 during that time about the question of the situation being at 11 or near saturation about the relationship between the 12 temperature and pressure?
13 A
I never participated, as I recall, in any such 14 discussion.
15 Q
Do you recall whether there was any discussion about 16 ge-ting steam voides and whether the system was in a superheat {
i i
17 situation?
18 A
I don't recall any such discussion.
i I
19 Q
What about awareness that the rupture disk had l
I 20 blown on the reactor coolant drain tank?
Did you become f
21 aware of that at all when you came on or within an hour or so 22 after you first came to the plant?
23 A
Right now I can't recall when I became aware of that.
24 I don't believe it was one of the things Zewe initially told f3 kt-K,
) Aeporters. Inc.
25 me when I got there but I can't remember when I was told
i 13 J
1 about that.
(3 A/
2 Q
But you nave a recollection that he fomd that out or 3
told you about it sometime?
4 A
I believe he told me sometime during the day about 5
it.
6 Q
Were you in on any conversations or decisions about 7
whether the high pressure injection should be throttled back 8
or increased or what the appropriate level flow for it should 9
be?
10 A
Again, I may have participated in some of the 11 discussion.
My primary function at this particular time was 12 the implementation of the emergency plan.
({}
13 0
I understand that.
14 A
However, in talking with Gary -- part of the job 15 entailed I keep him informed of what was going on, and in the l
16 process of conversations that were going on I may have gotten 17 into it but I can't recall any specific discussion with him 18 on any of these particular subjects.
t 19 Q
Let me ask you one or two more questions about j
20 operations and then I will move on to the emergency plan.
21 Did you become aware during Wednesday of some very high l
22-thermocouple readings from the in-core thermocouples?
Is that i 23 something you heard discussed as to whether readings were taken
(~')
24
_and whether they were to be believed?
l Au-Fw21 Rmorters, Inc.
I L
25 A
At this time again, I know they were taken at least j
14 1
from reading it.
In the back of my mind, I can see the l'h kl 2
gentleman that took them walking by and saying some thing.
I 3
don't know if that is because I read that or -- I recall him 4
going by and saying something about the thermocouples.
I 5
also in the back of my mind recall him saying he really didn't 6
believe it because some were reading up and some reading down.
7 Q
Do you remember who that individual was?
Was that 8
Mr. Porter?
9 A
Ivan Porter.
10 Q
Do you recall any discussion in the control room 11 about the pressure spike in the late afternoon on Wednesday?
l 12 The 28 psi pressure spike in the containment building.
()
13 A
No.
I 14 Q
You don't recall whether people were aware of that.
15 Whether you were are aware of it at the time.
16 A
When that spike apparently occurred, I was near the 1
17 control panel and we were in the process of -- again, I believe,I
[
18 trying to start to pump or some manipulation at the panel.
I l
19 recall hearing a noise which, as I recall, I asked "What was l
1 l
20 that?"
The reply I had from somebody was "It was the 21 ventilation."
The sound could have been attributed to that.
22 It was a kind of metallic hollow sound as though a damper or l
f 23 something had been changed in the ventilation.
I thought j
24 I perhaps it was.
l
[}
aa4_Jd Rewrters, inc.
25 As far as anybody mentioning a pressure spike, I don't l
i
^
15 1
recall that.
(~h
\\-)
2 I might parenthetically add I didn' t realize the spray pumps 3
had been actuatzJ either.
4 Q
On that first day, what kind of communication did you 5
have with any NRC people, either over the phone or through 6
contact with the inspectors who came into the control room 7
around noon or so?
8 A
I didn't have any phone conversations with NRC.
9 Q
Was that being done primarily from the Unit 1 10 control room?
11 A
No.
We had people in there.
As I recall the 12 initial calls were either made by George Kunder or one of T
13 our engineers there.
I had directed the calls to be made from
('/
14 our emergency plan.
One of those calls is to the NRC.
I can't 15 recall if George made the actual phone call or one of our 16 other engineers who were there by that time.
17 I didn't. personally speak on the phone with anybody in that 18 j calling.
I 19 I
In the control room itself, the NRC personnel that showed 20 l up, I am sure I had some contact with them but I can't tell you f
I 21 any conversations I had.
At the time we had so many people 1
22 cycling in there through the day I don't know if I would have i
i 23 recognized them as NRC or who.
24 Q
Would you say there was a substantial problem with f~')
i
%a4mnt Reprters, inc.
I 25 too many people in the Unit 2 control room?
?
i i
16 jcri 1
A I would say the number of people didn't contribute
~
(m')
2 to efficiency in the control room, 3
Q Can you be any more specific than that?
Do you think 4
it would have been better to chase a lot of those people out 5
of there?
6 A
From an operating standpoint, yes.
They weren't 7
required.
The noise level would gradually increase over 8
time and you would request that people hold it down or move 9
to other areas to hold their conversations.
There was also 10 concern -- when we had to go into masks, concern as to 11 availability and things of this nature.
It created problems.
12 To answer your basic question, I think it would have been 13 better if we had less people there from the operating standpoint.
tv 14 In all fairness I have to say that information need to be 15 extracted for purposes that certainly the NRC needed, if you 16 will.
I can understand that also.
17 0
Were there open lines or dedicated lines from the 18 Unit 2 control room to outside agencies that first day?
19 A
We had a dedicated line to the NRC and one to the 20 state.
Maggie Reilly's group.
21 Q
That is Pennsylvania BRH?
l 22 A
yes.
j 23 Q
When you say to the NRC, was that a line to Region 1 24 in Philadelphia - King of Prussia?
l 7%
e.s,_. 3 e..m.
mm 25 A
I celieve that is where it terminated, yes.
l
17
)cri I
Q Do you know whether on that line they ever talked with
(
I 2
the headquarters in Bethesda?
Coul'd you in Unit 2 talk to
'~~
3 NRC people in Bethesda on this line?
4 A
I don't know.
5 Q
Do you know who manned that telephone or primarily 6
was on that line during Wednesday, the first day?
7 A
I don't recall.
You mean Met Eck?
I don't recall who 8
we had in there.
It was one of our engineers.
I can't recall 9
who was in there.
10 Q
Do you know whether that was a Met Ed person or a II line sort of made available for the NRC inspectors who came to 12 use it to call their own people back in Region l?
,j 13 A
Initially we had a Met Ed line that was open to them.l
(
Id I can't recall when NRC brought their own line in.
I don't 15 remember whether it was the first or second day or when.
l' 16 Q
NRC inspectors did appear at the Unit 2 control room 17 in the middle of the day, isn't that right?
i l
A Yes.
Around -- I want to say around 10:00.
I don't ;
I6
)
I9(l recall the exact time.
i i
20 d Q
I think it may be about that time or perhaps a littlej i
1 f
2I later.
22 What did you understand their role to be?
What were they i
doing there for the NRC and what were they doing there for you,I 23 24l e*F9 era neponers, inc.
l 1 if anything?
l 25 A
One, nobody told me what they were doing there.
I t
i l
I a
18 I
Two, I would have to assume they were there for, one, to
'O
(/
2
-provide technical assistance if t ey could, and to keep their 3
own people apprized of the situation.
4 Those are the only comments I think I can make about their 5
presence.
6 Q
Did you observe them making any substantive inputs 7
to plant operations?
That is, were they making suggestions 8
or recommendations at all during that first day?
9 A
I don't specifically recall them making any 10 recommendations.
They may have.
They may have made them to Il Gary.
I don't know.
12 Q
That wouldn't go through you, in any event.
[)
13 A
No.
They-didn't make any recommendations to me v
Id on the implementation of the emergency plan.
15 Q
If they were getting plant parameters to report back 16 to their superiors, that would not have been through you either, 17 is that correct?
18 A
No.
They may have asked -- I don't recall, they may 19 I
have asked some radiation readings we were getting on-site and l
20 off-site.
They were certainly available to them.
1 21 I think at the time we were posting these on a board, I believe,.also, that was available.
22 I
i l
23 O
That is what I was going to ask you.
Did you have l
gai_.a) aeoorters. ine.
- any contact role with them in your work on the emergency plan
-/~'
2#
25 where you-were regularly giving them information they were i
19 1
reque.tting, for example?
h~'
A I can't recall specifically giving them a regular 3
report on what was going on, but they were in the control room.
4 The infonmation that was flowingr I am sure they overheard.
S If there was anything they requested, I am sure they would provide it.
As I recall, one was in the shift supervisors 7
office in the control room where Gary was.
When I was making 8
the report I am sure he was aware of that and in fact reporting 9
that over the phone to his folks.
10 0
Maybe you can take a moment and describe to us what 11 kinds of things you were having done during that day to give 12 us an idea of the kinds of functions you were responsible for
(')\\
13
(_
or had to see that other people were doing.
14 A
Initially, of course, there is a series of phone 15 calls made to aler. people to the accident.
Following
- that, 16 i
there is the direction on monitoring of the air that was being 17 done by Met Ed people on-site and off-site.
Tne recording of 18 l
these, passing that information to the state, and also to 19 Gary for -- sometime during the morning Jack Herbein arrived l
l at the observation center.
21 Recommendations to the state were being planned through 22 Dick Dubiel, who was taking the data.
Dick is our Supervisor 23 of Radiation Protection Gear.
The results of the readings were,
i l
(~]
24 behg Mscmed Md h Mate heau M Rada&n HeaM ad j
ie..L.i n porters, inc.
l 25 i
l I
l
20 I
the recommendations were being discussed between Dick and jm V
2 Maggie Reilly.
.3 Q
Is he the main person in the Unit 2 control room 4
that was sort of responsible for gathering and assessing the 5
monitoring?
6 A
Yes.
He was making the assessment and discussing 7
those with the state.
8 0
Was he also discussing those on a regular basis with 9
NRC people.or primarily the state?
10 A
I don't know that he was discussing them with the II NRC.
However, I would assume by this time he was because they 12 were in the control room and I would assume they were p) 13 interested in those: values and what was being done with that x_
14 information.
15 Q
What other kinds of things were you primarily 16 looking after at this time?
17 A
Initially, when we were taking the readings, one 18 concerning in my mind was our own site people that were coming 19 in and also were already in and the areas in which they were 20 located.
21 For instance, the Unit 1 servicing building and places like 22 that.
And the storehouse;out here.
When readings would appeari 23 to be increasing or something, we had to make decisions as far l t
i as evacuating _those people, accountability, things of that l
b) 24 b4. J Reporters, Inc.
nature.
These were being discussed with Gary as to what f
25 l
j l
21 1
' actions we should take about sending people, for instance,
.(~y
- \\_)
2 to the observation center.
-3 Implementation of donning masks and things like that when 4
required.
Trying to ensure that readings we were getting were 5
being recorded and tracked and also trying to verify some of 6
the readings if they appeared to be perhaps in error.
7 Things basically of that nature.
I was trying to keep track 8
of the releases that were taking place through the stack, where 9
they were going and what effect that might have on the general 10 populace and the people on the site.
11 0
In implementing the emergency plan and getting 12 monitoring teams out and reporting back, what would you say was
s, 13 the major problem or the two or three major problems that you (O
14 faced?
What were the things that concerned you the most?
15 A
Getting results back when you would request them.
16 This was, I suppose, due to the number of teams we had and 17 communications problems.
Basic communications problems.
18 Getting the word back from the readings.
19 0
Were you relying mainly on your own -- that is, l
1 I
20 Met Ed -- teams on that first day?
Were you getting much I
i t
21 help from other federal support teams or from NRC?
l 22 A
Right at the moment, I can't recall when our I
23 support did arrive.
It was, as I recall, sometime during j
(^}
24 the day but right at the moment I don't recall specifically
[
pc.L.J.i Reporters, inc.
25 what time this assistance did start showing up.
I i
I 1
22 1
Q Can you recall there were some DOE teams, or a DOE J
2 team arrived?
3 A
Yes.
We had requested -- I don't remember the name 4
of the team that they have --
5 Q
ARMS team?
ARMS.
That is the Aerial Monitoring.
6 Then there is the IRAP team.
7 A
Yes, we had requested their assistance and they 8
showed up sometime during this and provided assistance.
9 O
Do you recall whether they had effective means for 10 getting readings back into the Unit 2 control room?
11 A
We were getting readings -- again I can't recall 12 when -- we started getting readings from them.
I don't recall 13 that being a problem, though it may have been.
A lot of
(}
14 those readings were being received through Dick Dubiel.
I 15 don't recall that being a specific problem.
16 Q
Do you know who from Met Ed was involved in trying i
17 to get a helicopter -- helicopters other than a state police l
18 helicopter to help with monitoring?
Do you know anything l
19 about that?
I 20 A
I know Gary wanted to send one over to the other 21 side of the river.
j 22 Q
To Dillsburg?
j i
i 23 A
Yes.
I don't recall who tried to get that.
l 24 Q
I believe I have read or been told the company may j
9r;l Reporters, Inc.
ace F 25 have leased one or two helicopters.
Do you have any idea where t
23 1
those came from or who arranged'to get them?
jcri 2
A At that time, no.
Since then I am aware there are 3
two companies we hire to provide helicopter service.
I can't 4
tell you the names.
I know them because I talked to them.
5 Q
Were those arrangements in place before the accident?
6 Did the company have some arrangement with a helicopter service 7
or did somebody have to go to the phonebook and look up in 8
the yellow pages under helicopter?
9 A
I believe -- this is strictly conjecture -- we have 10 some arrangements with them, because another one of our plans 11 speaks to helicopter assistance for one of our odner emergency 12 plans.
So I believe we do have contact or a contract or some
~
()
13 exploratory means of getting them in a hurry if we need them.
14 O
Do you know who would be the person who would know 15 how that was done on Wednesday March 28?
16 A
Gary Miller would.
At least, he would know.
Perhaps 17 Dick Dubiel also.
18 Q
Mr. Dubiel also might know.
19 A
He might.
20 Q
His role was Supervisor of Radiation Protection?
21
'A Yes.
l l
22 O
He might be in charge of brining in resources to i
23 help with monitoring in case of an emergency?
f~ j 24 A
Yes, I would certainly expect him to be aware of hm-0,,, x1 Reprters, tre.
i E2 25 where to get additional assistance.
i l
l' 1
24 LRW 3 I
Q Mr. Robert Arnold mentioned in an interview with I&E
'2 that he and Mr. Keaton at GPU had called the plant about 2:00
' n the af ternoon that first day and expressed some concern about 3
i 4
the system not being solid.
Were you aware of specific inputs 5
from either Mr. Herbein or Mr. Arnold that first day of 6
plant operations?
7 A
If you mean in regards to specific direction, no.
8 If you mean whether conversations were being conducted, yes, 9
I was aware of that.
They were conducted between Gary Miller 10 and Jack quite extensively.
I don't recall Mr. Arnold talking.
II He me.y very well have.
Gary was on the phone an extensive 12 amount of time i-the shift supervisor's office.
()
13 Q
So you don't recall any specific directions or Id recommendations that may have been made by Mr. Arnold or 15 Mr. Herbeing at this time.
16 A
No.
I7 Q
I think Mr. Miller left the site in the afternoon j
18 to go to a briefing at the Lt. Governor's office, is that right?
l 19 20 A
He left to go to Harrisburg.
I thought he went to f
i 21 the Governor's office.
It could have been the Lt. Governor.
22 Q
Do you happen to know, did Mr. Herbein go with him?
}
i 23 A
I believe he did, yes.
j Q
And Mr. Kunder?- Do you know whether he left as well?
b) 24 L
$ce FL at Reporters, Inc.
25 A
I don't believe he went, j
i I
I
25 1
Q You don't,.to your recollection?
fh NJ 2
A I don't.
3 Q
When Mr. Miller left, you became the senior person 4
in the Unit 2 control room.
5 A
That is correct.
6 Q
Did you then have any additional responsibility for 7
operations?
Did you kind of move into his shoes or did you 8
stay on the emergency plan?
9 A
By that time the emergency plan was more or less 10 functioning and automatic.
Dick Dubiel was there.
We had 11 other people.
I kind of moved over into that position.
12 Q
Do you recall whether Mr. Arnold called the plant
()
13 during that period of time when you were serving in that 14 capacity or do you recall -- let me stop there.
Do you recall 15 whether he called?
16 A
I don't recall him speaking to me during that period 17 of time, though he could have.
During the subsequent days.
18 But I don't remember that particular time him speaking to me.
19 Q
Do you recall any input from the NRC with respect to f
I i
20 plant. operations during that period of time in the af ternoon?
21 A
Guidance to me?
22 Q
Right.
Guidance, recommendations or suggestions of i
I 23 any kind.
.(')
24 A
I don't recall.
La4_jd Reprters, ine.
j 25 0
It appears that one NRC official had a telephone
{
.I
26 1
conversation about 4:00 to 4:30 in the afternoon with people 7-2 in the Unit 1 control room and asked them to relay a concern 3
about the core being covered over to Unit 2.
Do you have any 4
recollection of any such message being related to you?
Does 5
that ring a bell?
6 A
I am afraid it doesn't.
7 O
Okay.
I think it was -- correct me if I am wrong --
8 it was before Mr. Miller went off to Harrisburg that he was 9
instructed to close the steam relief valves.
The atmospheric 10 dump valves.
Do you recall whether that is correct?
11 A
Right now I don't know if that was before or after.
12 I recall them being shut.
()
13 Q
What was the situation with respect to the plant 14 status after those valves were closed off?
Did you have a heat i
115 sinc as a result of the valvec being open which you lost on I
l 16 account of their closure?
l
\\
17 A
I believe we problbably were steamed to the condenser.
i 18 We lost, obviously, with shutting the safeties, we lost a heat l
sync.
Whether we initiated -- I ma almost sure we did --
l 19 I
20 i steaming through the condenser, I would nave to assume we did.
l 21 I am kind of vague in my mind as to what we were doing right j
I 22 then but we must have.
i 23 Q
I have the impression -- you other folks correct i
9erpt Reporters Inc.
24 me if I am wrong -- that at that time one of the steam
&F 25 generators was isolated.
i
27 I
A The B steam generator.
jcri 7s 2
- Q The A steam generator had been steaming out through 3
the steam safety valves.
'4 A
That is correct.
5 Q
What was the situation in the condenser at that time 6
just'before the safeties were closed?
Do you remember that?
7 A
You mean whether we were using the condenser as an 8
additional heat sync with the --
9 Q
Right.
l 10 0
Right now, I don't recall.
i 11 Q
Had there been a loss of sacuum of any kind in the 12 condensers?
Do you recall that?
/~
13 A
The reason I am hesitating in saying this, I am (Tj Id trying to remember if this occurred.
The previous time, we 15 Pad lost vacuum in there once or twice before, and I don't 16 recall if it occurred during this accident also.
That may 17 have been the reason we were using the safeties.
If we had 18 lost it, I know we regained vacuum.
To answer your question, though, right now I wouldn't l
I l
20 swear we had lost it.
j 2I BY MR. WORAM:
22 O
If you did, in fact, have vacuum, would there be any i i
23 reason in your opinion to be using those safeties?
b) 24 That is what I am trying to hypothesize-in my mind, l
A Sce FMI Reporters, Inc.
25 why we would use the safeties, if there was some other reason l
i t
28 Iori28 I
we. would use them if we had the condenser.
That is why I say o5-).
2 we.may have lost the vacuum but I am not sure I am 3
associating it with-the right accident.
4 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
5 Q
Do you recall whether that decision to close the 6
steam safety relief valves was a decision that was imposed on 7
you-by outside pressure?
8 A
I have subsequently read that it was.
Gary resisted 9
the closing of them.
Again I am trying to rationalize in my 10 own mind with the condenser vaccum back why he would have II resisted that.
12 Q
Assuming you weren't -- you didn't have the 13
()
condenser available and you were steaming out the relief Id safety valves as the sole method of taking heat out of the 15 steam generator, what would the effect have been to close those 16 valves off?
I7 A
Your pressure would rise in the steam.mader, 18 depending on what you got to -- whether you would have sufficient temperature there to reach the relief -- the other 20 relief valve settings.
They could have lifted.
21 Q
Were you aware of whether there was any real heat i
22 transfer out of the primary system-even while the valves were 23 open?
Was there any circulation or any other mechanism whereby
("]
24 you were taking some heat out of the primary system at that iAce F_,J rieporters, Inc.
25 time?
r I
i i
I
29 I
1
'O You had to be removing it in order to heat the water.
['"'
2 Q
To produce steam.
3 A
That was obvious.
There had to be some circulation.
'4 Otherwise you would reach thepoint where you would equalize 5
with the primary and secondary side.
6 Q
You don' t recall, once the steam safeties were 7
closed, whether you were then able to get another heat sync 8
or not.
9 A
If we closed it, I am almost positive we had the 10 condenser on.
I don't remember when we got the coolant pump 11 started, whether that was before he shut those or not.
12 0
I think that would have been later in the afternoon
/~
13
(,)N that the main pumps would be started.
Do you recall any of 14 the circumstances surrounding the decision late in the 15 afternoon to try to restart the pumps and bring the pressure way back up?
Do you know how that came about?
17 A
The desire had beer all along to try to get the 18 pu..ps on.
The decision to attempt to start them again was 19 made in conjunction with the B&W representative, Lee Rogers, 1
20 who was there, Gary, myself, herbein had an input into it, I
21 perhaps Arnold.
l 22
^
Q What'did Lee Rogers have to say about that?
l t
23 A
EHe was providing the technical input, if you would,
(")
24 2ced. Jai Reporteri. ine.
to starting the pump.
Any recommendations that might come from i'
2S them based on observations that we would have once we
[
30
'jcri I
started -- let's say we had a low current indicating low flow,
-(3
\\_)
2 this type of thing.
As I recall, the recommendations he 3
provided had to do with the interval between attempting to 4
start the pump and securing it and perhaps attempting to 5
start it again.
This type of thing.
6 Also the sealing water, as I recall, flowed to the pump for 7
seals.
8 Q
Do you remember whether Mr. Rogers or Mr. Herbein 9
came in late in the afternoon and said in substance:
The 10 engineers at B&W think we ought to be trying to bring the 11 pressure up again and restart the pumps?
12 A
Specifically walk into the control room and say
(}
13 that?
14 Q
In substance.
Do you recall whether any message 15 was being communicated from B&W in Lynchburg as to what 16 strategy they thought should be employed at this time?
17 A
I can't say that word came specifically from B&W or
~18 Jack Herbein.
Jack was not on the site.
You may or may not 19 be aware of that.
i 20 Q
He was in the observation center at this time.
21 A
Yes.
l i
22 O
He was also in touch with Mr. Arnold, who was in f
23 touch with B&W.
l t
('~'}
24 A
Plus Mr. Rogers was in touch with B&W also.
l I
Me F
,st Reorters, lm 25 Q
Mr. Rogers was in touch with his man outside the
}
l l
31 I
plant who was in touch with Lynchburg, is that correct?
~x
(\\-)
2 A'
That is my understanding of how he got that 3l accomplished.
4 Q
Was there any thought given during th?. afternoon to 5
trying to call B&W at Lynchburg directly?
E'stablish a phone 4-6 line to them.
7 A
By Met Ed or Rogers?
8 O
By Met Ed.
9 A
I would assume that, yes -- I don't know that but I 10 would certainly assume that either Gary would have made that decision or Jack up on the hill would have made the decision II 12 that it would certainly be beneficial to have the NSS supplier's
(}
13 input into the accident.
14 Q
But you are not aware of any attempt to get a phone 15 line from the Unit 2 control room to B&W before late in the 16 afternoon.
f 17 A'
I am not specifically aware of that, no.
18 O
During the time Mr. Miller was in Harrisburg with I9 Mr. Herbein, what was basically the strategy of trying to 20 cool the primary systea?
21 A
I believe at that time we were using injection and 22 coming out the electromatic relief valve, and also steaming -- !
i 23 O
Was the pressure low at that point?
Were you trying f~';
24 to get the pressure down.so you could go on decay heat?
i Dce4w si Keporters, Inc.
I 25 A
At some tum we certainly tried that.
i
32 jhri.
I I don't remember if we were still attempting at that time to C)
\\/
2 accomplish getting decay heat in that method.
We had attempted 3
that during the day.
Whether we were still ocntinuing during 4
this period,-I don't really remember.
5 Q
If you stopped attempting that, what would be the 6
alternative strategy for heat removal?
7 A
As I sav you feed and bleed.
Using the injection 8
and the supply water in there, relatively cold water, and 9
taking water out through the pressurizer, through the electro-10 matic re. lief and also removing heat through the steam Il generator.
12 O
When you say " feed and bleed," would it be right to
()
13 say the bleeding part of it was trying to get heat out of the 14 EMOV in the form of steam and also take it out to a certain 15 extent through a steam generator?
16 A
That is correct.
17 BY MR. ALLISON:
18 0
When you said " feed and bleed," you mean feed in with 19 the HPI pumps and bleed out through the electromatic relief 20 valves?
l 21 A
Yes.
l 22 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
23 Q
I think, Mr. Logan, you said that you were on-site 24 until around noon the next day.
Were you in the Unit 2 control!
( ')
p>FLJ Reprtm, Inc, 25 room at that time, during that time?
{
j 1
t I
+
33 1
A What period of time are you speaking of?
p
' (.)
2 O
Let me ask you specifically from midnight on 3
Wednesday night, which would have been 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> after the 4
accident, through noon on Thursday mouning.
5 A
I didn't leave the room.
6 Q
I think -- I believe a number of people left the P ant around 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. on Thursday morning, l
7 e
Mr. Miller went home, I think.
9 Do you recall that?
10 A
Yes.
I don't remember Gary specifically left.
We
-11 had a lot of people leave so we could set up some type of 12 rotation.
13 Q
Was that late at night?
2:00, 3:00, 4:00 a.m.?
(}
14 A
I don't know.
15 Q
Did Mr. Herbein and the other prople from the 16 observation center leave at that time, too?
17 A
I don't know.
I 18 Q
What I am getting at really is:
In that period of i
19 time, midnight until noon on the 29th, who was basically the 20 senior person on-site or in the area?
i
\\
l 21 A
On-site, I was certainly when Gary left.
I don't 22 know if Jack stayed up in the observation center.
I believe
\\
23 he did.
I believe he slept there.
I am not sure of that.
l l
l
(~}
24 He was certainly available at any time.
1ce F-m.et Recenm, Inc.
)
25 0
What was your understanding about who was ultimately I i
l l
34 1
in charge in the chain of command once Mr. Herbein got to the
[/
N-2 observation center and established himself there?
Let me pick 3
a time.
Let me pick 10:00 p.m. on the day of the accident, 4
March 28.
Would you have said that Mr. Mi.'.ler was really 5
in charge or would you say the command control had passed over 6
to Mr. I.*erbein in the observation center?
7 A
On-site, Gary was in charge.
Certainly he was in 8
communications and taking direction from Jack, but I am sure l
9 it was based on several inputs.
His, Jack's and B&W input and 10 oi
=r technical inputs they may have had that I am not aware 11 of up at the observation center.
12 But as far as directions to operators to actually do some-(}
13 thing, that came from Gary.
14 Q
When Mr. Miller left, that would have left you as 15 senior person in charge of operating the plant.
16 A
That is true.
You can't run these things remote 17 control.
You have to have somebody there to provide the 18 direction.
I I
19 MR. FRAMPTON:
Let's take a five-minute break.
l e3 20 (Recess.)
Back on the record, i
22 Mr. Allison, do you want to take over at this point?
l 23 MR. ALLISON:
Okay.
l
(~])
24 BY MR. ALLISON:
Sce K-,0 Reimrters. Inc.
25 Q
To go back to the timeframe of 6:00 in the morning i
h I.
a 35 1
on the 28th, you were asked if you appreciated or knew at that
')
'(( /
2 time that natural circulation was not working.
You said you 3
didn't have any recollection of knowing that.
Your previous 4
testimony indicates, and you.have indicated today too, you 5
were very-concerned to get the reactor coolant pumps started 6
to provide core cooling fl' r at that time.'
7 To use a little hindsight on that, if natural circulation 8
had been working, you wouldn't have needed the reactor coolant 9
pumps to be started to get adequate core cooling, would you?
10 A
I suppose not.
I have never been on natural Il circulation.
That is a new t enomena for me.
I do know with h
12 the pumps running you move a lot more heat than with natural
(}
13 circulation.
-14 Q
So would it be fair to characterize it as you felt 15 a lot better if you could get the reactor coolant pump f
16 running?
j w
l 17 A
Exactly.
1 18 O
Had you known that natural circualtion was not working 19 at that time, then would your attitude have been different 20 than it was?
Would you have been a lot more desperate to get 21 the reactor coolant pump started or something?
22 A
I suppose I would.
As I say, I don't think about 23 natural circulation and I don' t know whether it was because.
I f]
24 I just assumed it was working or what, but if I had any i
aw;. 3 new nen.uw.
25
.inclincation certainly that we were getting to the stage whereI
36 1
we would have been steaming inside there, I am sure that my
[)-
2 desperation ~ attempts to get the pump running would have 3
increased.
4 BY MR. WORAM:
5 Q
Let me ask something that might help.
Prior to the 6
incident on the 28th -- now natural circulation is a topic 7
of considerable discussion -- was there much attention given 8
to natural circulation in the training of the operating staff?
9 Were people genera'.ly aware -- obviously if you asked somebody 10 is there such a '.hing, they would tell you yes, but was it a 11 topic of any significant interest at all?
12 A
To my knowledge, no.
I think you realize that I had 13 only been in that position for about three months.
Before that 14 my interaction with people in terms of discussing natural 15 circulation was somewhat limited.
It came up during my 16 qualifications obviously but it was just one of numerous 17 subjects.
I don't think I had seriously considered it.
I 18 don't want to say I hadn't seriously considered it.
I guess 19 what I am trying to say is I wanted to assume we would always 20 have a pump running.
f 21 The concept of natural circulation, however, I was aware 22 of and realized the capability existed.
But if at all
\\
l L
23 possible, I would certainly prefer to have the motive force l
l
,r%.,
from the pump.
24 j
Ace-(,,J Remners, lrm, Doyouknowofanytrainingappliedtotheoperating!
25 Q
i I
l l
37
}cri 1
staff in terms of how specifically you could tell if natural
(,)
2 circulation was doing shat you wanted it to do?
3 A
Other than procedures which we had, I don't know of 4
any -- for instance, at the simulator, I don't think we ever 5
went through a natural circulation drill.
It was not covered 6
down there, as I recall, in any of the casualty drills we 7
conducted.
Other than a procedure which was one among many 8
procedures, I don't recall any specific discussions or training 9
on natural circulation.
1 10 Q
I see.
11 BY MR. ALLISON:
12 Q
To move on down to the time Gary Miller went to l
(
x.
Harrisburg about 1400 on the 28th, what instructions did he 13 v
14 leave with you when he left?
15 A
I don't recall specifically what instructions he 16 left.
I say this, I don't recall that we were to do anything 1
17 that we weren't doing when he left.
In other words, as I recalE,
\\
18 we were to continue in the mode we were in.
19 Q
Do you think he instructed you to maintian the l
i 20 status quo, if possible, or something to that effect?
I 21 A
I believe that was the guidance that I was i
i 22 provided.
23 l Q
Did you feel free if something came up to change the !
24 status quo in response to that, whatever it might be, while he Sce FSReporters, Inc, 25 was gone?
38 I
A If there was an emergency, certainly I felt competent 2
'o handle it.
()
c 3
Q Did anything like that come up while he was gone?
4 A
I don't believe so.
5 Q
Could you think of any way in which his absence was 6
harmful?
The absence of him, Herbein and whoever else went 7
with him.
8 A
Based on the fact that I can't recall any situation 9
coming up that required any abnormal direction, I can't say 10 that his absence was detrimental at that particular time.
Il O
On the 1400 phone call from Arnold and Keaton in 12 New Jersey, the control room, where they expressed concern
(~;'
about having a solid system, they said in their I&E interviews 13 i
G Id they think they talked to Kunder and Rogers.
Do you remember i
i 15 Kunder and Rogers bringing that subject up to you at all l
16 around that time?
17 A
I don't recall that, no.
t 18 Q
On the steam generator, securing the steam through
{
l9 the steaming through the atmospheric dump valves when that was 20 secured, the I&E report seems to indicate heat sync was lost 21 for about five hours.
That is, that I presume what that means i
22 is the condenser wasn't available to dump steam to for 4-1/2 1
23 of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after the decision to stop steaming through the l
24 atmospheric dumps.
However, I read other testimony of people Sce-1 Reporters, Inc.
25 where plant operators seemed pretty we.11 convinced heat sync i
i f,
39 1
wasn't lost.
What I am after, and I don't know if you have it,
)
2 is any specific recollection one way or the other as to 3
whether condenser vacuum was available, whether steam was 4
being dumped out at that time in the condenser.
5 A
I don't specifically recall either way but I believe 6
if we had lost the condenser for five hours, it would have left 7
some impression on me.
I can recall the problem of losing 8
condenser vacuum at some time during this accident or before 9
the accident but I can't pinpoint it to that particular time, 10 but at that particular loss of vacuum that I was speaking of, 11 it wasn't a period of 4 or 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
12 O
You dan't recall then any excitement on the part of l
l gS 13 the control room operators as to where we will put the heat.
l C) i 14 We haven't any place to put the steam.
Anything like that.
i 1
15 A
Not in my mind right now, I don't recall that.
If l
\\
16 that initiated the use of he atmospheric dumps, I don't think l
l 17 that that would have caused a lot of screaming and hollering.
18 They may have said we are losing vacuum but they were aware 19 they had the dumps as an alternate source.
l l
Q I was asking more in the line of was there l
20 I l
21 consternatic that we haven't got condenser vacuum available l
22 and we can' t use the steam dumps.
That kind of a -- do you i
i 23 recall any consternation during the period when steam dumping l
24 was not going on?
Aces 4: cemnen, im.
25 A
Can we go off the record?
40 jcri 1
(Discussion off the record.)
(
)
U' 2
MR. ALLISON:
Back on the record.
3 That is all I have on Wednesday.
4 MR. CUNNINGHAM:
I have a question.
5 BY MR. CUNNINGHAM:
6 0
You said that when you came on shift you tried to 7
start one of the reactor coolant pumps and could not get it 8
started.
There was no flow indication.
Did you'.have a feel 9
for why it wouldn't start?
Did that concern you a great deal 10 that you couldn' t get it started?
II A
Certainly it concerned me we couldn't start it.
The 12 low amperage would indicate it wasn't pumping water and the
,( )
13 hypothesis that we made was that we must have steam in there 1/
somehow.
This didn't occur however as soon as I got there.
15 As I recall, it was almost an hour later after I arrived.
l 16 Some time within that.
l l
17 Q
So this would have been about 7:00.
l i
1 18 l
A As I recall, it was about 6:451 I tried to tie this l
\\
I l9 ! in because it seems to me it occurred just about the time we 20 got the first radiation alarm.
21 Q
So you just had some feeling there was steam in the 22 system and that is why you oculd not get the pump going?
l 23 A
Yes, that is basically it.
k 24 Q
Thank you.
Au Fm J Repenm, ine.
25
41 JERI 1
BY MR. WORAM:
2 Q
I have a few questions.
In reviewing the reactimeter 3
data, I see that the pressurizer spray valves was open several 4
times in the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Do you have any notion as to why 5
that was-being done?
6 A
The first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
7 Q
Yes.
8 A
I don't know what direction was being given to open 9
it.
At some time we were spraying down to remove hydrogen 10 but I don't know if that was during the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or 11 whether we were trying to keep that line from getting a shock 12 by not being operated or what.
.f~T 13 0
Okay.
One of the problems we have is during the V
14 course of the accident in the first day based on the level 15 drop in BWST enough water came out of the BWST to fill the 16 entire primary system several times.
The question is 17 obviously:
Where uid the water go?
18 A
I think probably the obvious answer is into the 19 containment vessel.
20 Q
How did it get there?
21 A
There is a relief valve on the make-up pump suction.
22 At some time discovered that that valve was leaking.
We 23 surmised that was a path.
24 In the back of my mind, I forget what brought this up but
(~j
&ce-Lp) Reporters, Inc.
25' we did determine.that.
i t
j l
42 1
0 Do you heve any feeling for about hoi.nuch water you
(-)~
k-2 could have put through that?
3 A
Right at the moment, I don't, because I don't know 4
how large that relief is.
5 0
or for how long that condition was going on.
6 A
No, I can't answer that.
7 Q
Was any thought given to the fact that sooner or later 8
you might run out of borated water in the BWST and where you 9
would go from there?
10 A
Yes.
We had come up with several alternatives of Il gaining water from Unit 1.
Things, in fact, we did.
I think 12 we -- I don't knew at this particular time whether we contacted
()
our supplier to bring any in or not but that was an option.
13 14 We discussed how we could get it over from Unit l's fuel 15 pool.
16 To answer your question, yes, we were concerned about it 17 and took action to correct it.
18 BY MR. CUNNINGHAM:
19 Q
Did you say that you in fact at some time did bring 20 water from the Unit 1 BWST --
21 A
We brought it from Unit 1.
I believe it was from 22-their pool.
23 Q
From the spent fuel pool.
f
(~')
24 A
I believe so.
Am 4
~.d Rew nen,Inc.
l 25 l
l l
43 jeri 1
BY MR. WORAM:
2 Q
Did it go into Unit 2's BWST?
3 A'
Yes.
4 0
When did that take place?
5 A
I don't believe it was the first day.
Maybe the 6
second.
7 O
I understand at the insistence of some NRC people 8
hourly readings were being taken by hand by some people in the 9
control room.
Do you remember something like that going on?
10 A
I don't recall that being done.
It may have been Il true, however.
12 MR. WORAM:
That is all I have.
13' BY MR. FRAMPTON:
Id Q
Let go on to March 30, which was Friday, the third 15 day after the accident.
I think you said that you had come 16 back around midnight Thursday and then were on early Friday 17 morning in the Unit 2 control room, is that right?
l 18 A
I believe that is true.
l9 0
I believe we had testimony that Mr. Zewe and his crew l 1
20 were there up until about 7:00 a.m. and they were to be j
21 relieved by Mr. Hitz and his crew.
Does that accord with your j
22 recollection?
l 6
23 A
.I have no recollection of who relieved him.
Certainly!
l
)
Greg-Hitz was on. duty during some period during that time, 24 w.u.i non.n. inc.
25 I am sure.
l-
44 0
What I want to ask you about is your recollection of j
jcri r
(_%)
2 the circumstances : leading up to the venting of the make-up 3
tank.
When you came on at around midnight or after that, were you made aware that gas was building up in the make-up tank?
4 5
That that was a problem of any kind?
A Right now, I don't recall on that particular day that 6
I was aware of it.
If it was a problem, I probably was aware 7
f it.
In subsequent days, we did have that problem.
If it 8
started then I ara sure I was probably aware of it.
9 10 0
Do you recall when that problem came to the fore with 11 the loss of make-up and the need to vent the make-up tank 12 over an extended period of time?
('T 13 A
I can't recall that sequence.
us/
14 0
A decision was made, according to what we have been 15 told at least, by Mr. Zewe and Mr. Hitz on Friday morning 16 around 7:00 to open the vent valve on the make-up tank as a 17 means of getting the gas that had accumulated out of the 18 tank.
They have told us that the purpose of this action was 19 to avoid the loss of water from the BWST which was going l
I 20 through the make-up tank and into the reactor coolant bleed tank and also because of the need to restore make-up flow.
21 22 Does that jog your recollection about that particul&r i
action or evolution?
23
/"N 24 -
A Not particularly.
We were having trouble with letdown; i
}
Sce4~At Reporters, Inc.
25 flow, however, during the accident.
i i
i
45 1
Part ofithe reason, we surmised, was the boron buildup in i
2 the line, because of the cooldown and everything, the pressure 3
in the make-up tank building up had also reduced the back 4
pressure that had been there.
If we had a pressure, an 5
excessive pressure in the make-up tank, I am sure that would 6
have been taken into account as one contributor to this 7
reduced flow.
8 But to answer your question about spe.;ifically its impact 9
on venting this tank, I don't know.
10 0
Apparently prior to this tima the operators had 11 correlated the venting of the tank with some relea es.
That 12 is, that there were some leaks in the vent header or the waste
(
13 gas compressor.
When they vented the make-up tank, that let xs 14 some gas loose in the auxiliary building and they were seeing 15 releases as a resu'.t of that.
i 16 So the decision to open the vent valve of the mi
-up tank i
i i
17 and leave it open was a decision which people realized might 18 cause some kind of off-site release.
As a result, there were i
}
19 telephone calls made to the Unit 1 control room about 7:00 l
l i
20 or 8:00 on Friday morning notifying them this was going to 21 occur and asking them to alert the monitoring teams and call l
22 out helicopters.
Do you recollect that?
j I
23 A
I don't rememb er if that was the day.
Whenever j
9r;1 Reporters, Inc.
24 w a vented that tank, in subsequent periods to the accident, 2ce F 25 that was a procedure we followed in addition to, as I recall, I
I
46 1
calling the observation center.
fh
%/
2 Now whether we did that on Friday morning, I don't know.
3 I don' t recall Friday morning.
4 Q
Do you recall whether there was any kind of 5
procedure or regular practice, formal or informal, to notify 6
people before the make-up tank was vented?
7 A
Before the accident?
8 Q
No.
After the accident.
9 A
As I say, we did do that as a routine policy af ter 04 10 the accident.
sth 11 Q
Before you would vent the tank, you would notify 12 people that that was about to occur.
~
()
13 A
Yes.
14 Q
What was the purpose of that?
Was that because you 15 identified a leak?
16 A
Yes.
And as I say, I don't recall whether it was l
17 identified as being a leak and contributing to off-site 18 releases but once that had been identified, I know we would i
19 have a helicopter up and our monitoring team would be j
}
20 monitoring.
i l
i 21 Q
Do you recall whether Mr. Herbein was aware of this 22 problem or continuing series of actions?
23 A
On Friday morning or after that?
'f')
24 Q
At any time.
Ace-F dA Roorters, lm.
l 25 A
.Yes.
As I say, the notification would go to the
{
l
47 I
observation center, which was to him.
I don't recall on 2
Friday morning F specific time that this was started.
3 Q
Do you rr :all whether any discussion was had as to 4
whether th' '
.:lould be done or not?
That is, whether you 5
should look for some alternative to burping the make-up tank?
6 A
I don't recall a discussion.
I know that at some 7
time after the 28th, we did pipe the tank to the reactor 8
compartment.
9 Q
Once you ran some additional piping back into the 10 containment, then you could degas the primary system into the Il containment building, is that right?
I2 A
Yes.
l
(_).
I3 O
Prior to that, I believe the primary method of Id degassing was to take the gas out of the make-up tank.
15 A
That is true.
16 Q
My question is whether there was any discussion I7 or decision made at that time before the new piping was in:
l i
l I6 Look, we have to do this even though it may result in some f
I9. releases.
I.
i 20 A
I can't recall that but I would assume that that j
i l
21 was done.
22 0
Do you recall being in on any decisionmaking with 23 respect to that matter of burping versus releases?
lb 2
t
)
A I don't recall any conversation, though there may i
w FL,4 Reprters, ine.
25 have been.
l
48 1
O If somebody made a deliberate decision:
Well, here t, 3 2
are the plusses and here are the minuses and here is what we 3
will do, would you know who that would be?
Would that have 4
been made by an operator, shift supervisor, vice president?
5 A
I would assume, if we were going to have a release, 6
as I say, that would have been discussed with Jack up on the 7
hill and I don't know what his discussions would have been with 8
the NRC representatives up there.
I am sure that if we were 9
going to make such a release it would certainly have been 10 discussed with him.
11 And by that time, I might add, we had NRC representatives 12 in the control room and in the shift supervisor's office that in s_)
13 were privy to such conversations and I am sure they wert in t
14 contact with their representatives also.
15 Q
Mr. Logan, you were questioned I think in the 16 previous deposition about a planned or implemented cutback in 17 the maintenance budget in or around the beginning of 1979.
j t
18 Rather than go over the same ground, because I think you said l
l 19 you weren' t too certain about the details of that -- am I 20 correct?
i 21 A
That is true.
22 Q
I want to ask you who should we ask about that?
Who 23 would be the most likely to be knowledgeable about what the 7-)s 24 facts wer'e?
l
(
A&Fwnd Rownen, Inc.
25 A
I think you could get that from either Gary or i
49
,jori 1
Dan Shovlin.
Dan is our superintendent of maintenance.
And
>\\-
2 Gary Miller, of course, is in the budget process certainly.
3 Q
Thank you.
4 Moving on to another topic, in the early part of this year, 5
you apparently had begun a program to look at the large number 6
of alarms that showed in the Unit 2 control room and to see 7
whether there were some that could be eliminated.
Can you 8
tell me what you know about how that project got started and d
9 and what point it was at on March 28?
10 A
The project got started due to the numerous alarms 11 that existed under " normal conditions.'
As an example, if you 12 had three pumps in a system, two of which normally operate 13 with one as a back-up, and the back-up were off, you
()
14 would -- you may have an alarm, which in our estimation was 15 not a good idea because operators then become accustomed to 16 having alarms and the obvious can result.
l 17 This was of concern to Jack Herbein and to myself and to 18 the operators, and we had instituted a program to try to come 19 up with means of eliminating these types of " nuisance alarms" l
l 20 that were on there either by. moving the circuitry or by
~
21 perhaps putting it on a computer as opposed to having it on a 22 visual display.
23 The actions we had taken were to obtain assistance from
)
24 B&W in the form of some engineering assistance to take the
&Fimb Reprters, loc.
j 25 alarms that we identified along with our people wo come up l
i I
I
50 1
with suggestions on the best remedy to eliminate the alarm,
(\\
s_)
2 as I say either to change the circuitry -- in the instance 3
I cited, to have the alarm only if it tripped, for instance.
4 If it were normal shut-off by somebody" turning it on, 5
perhaps you wouldn' t get the alarm.
The extent of this, I 6
can't tell you in numbers how many we had worked on at this 7
Particular time, but I am sure that that figure is available.
8 I would say probably maybe 10 or 15 we had in the engineering 9
EMC -- the change modification circuitry to accomplaih that 10 goal.
It was a continuing thing.
11 Q
Were there any other aspects of that program?
For 12 example, were you looking at any possible changes in the 13 acknowledgement system or any other aspects of control room
(~)~g 14 design?
15 A
I don't recall a specific effort ongoing at that 16 time for the acknowledgement circuit, although certainly the 17 issue had been raised by some of the operators.
18 0
You were aware that the operators or some of the f
! operators were interested in improving that circuitry or 19 20 system?
i l
21 A
Yes, I believe I was.
There were, I think, several l
22 items of that nature that, being a new plant, were items that 23 would be looked at as we progressed or tried to improve the i
t
/~T~
24 situation.
=4-b newners, ire.
l 25
.O Do you recall what some of the others were?
i i
1 i
t
51 1
A In terms of modification to the condenser, for
(
' ~ ' '
2 instance, that was one.
We had some instrumentation in thera 3
that we felt -- and I believe the manufacturer felt -- was not 4
installed optimally.
We had some problems with some valves in, 5
for instance, the bypass valve yokes.
6 These are things that hold the valves.
When they slam shut, 7
we had been having some problems with these things cracking.
8 Things of this nature.
9 Q
You have had a good bit of experience in this business 10 and familiarity with it.
On the basis of your experience, how 11 would you evaluate the control room in Unit 2 in terms of its 12 contribution to handling a transient or a potential accident?
l em(,)
13 How does it strike you from that point of view?
14 A
My experience has been limited to Navy ships and this 15 one plus one simulator so I would like to speak strictly from j
16 that comparison.
It doesn't compare very good with a Navy 17 ship control room, Control rooms on ships are extremely small 1
l 18 ! compared to a civilian plant.
Automation is not the word in i
19 Navy nuclear ships for control of reactors.
The numbers of 20 people that you have to do a certain job are -- is a greater 21 number.
22 For instance, you would have one operator to control one 23 panel, one small panel, as opposed to one operator covering a 24 significantly larger group of panels.
I think the design in l
llh
?ce Fecers Reporters, Inc.
25 some respects can certainly be improved from the human l
i l
52 1
engineering standpoint.
2 Q
Are there any particular features that stick out in 3
your mind as being subjects for improvement?
I am not talking 4
necessarily as relates to this accident, but in general?
5 A
Yes.
The Bailey instrumentation, for instance, on 6
the control console.
You are down at one end controlling an 7
instrument that will control your pressure in the primary 8
plant.
In order to see the actual pressure, you have to look 9
about four panels and pull the instrument out so you can see 10 the needle on the side of it.
It shouldn't be that way.
11 O
On the first day of the accident, March 28, did you 12 find that there were aspects of the control room layout or
(~)
13 design that hindered effective response to the accident or made U
14 it more difficult?
15 A
At this time I got there, no, I can't say that the 16 design contributed to any aspect of the accident.
17 Q
One of the things that we are looking at is whether 18 the current minimum shif t crew requirements that are 19 promulgated by NRC in standard technical specifications are l
20 really adequate.
Those tech specs only require three licensed 21 operators, one of whom I believe must be a senior operator and 22 two auxiliary operators per shift.
That is the minimum.
23 Indeed, for up to two hours, one of those three control room i
('
24 operators'can be out of the plant.
So that it's possible for j
aw4w-)d Remnon, Inc.
25 a two-hour period to have only two licensed personnel in the i
i
l 53 1
entire unit and only one of those in the control room.
(D
~
'\\/
2 Do you think that is adequate to handle a transient or 3
abnormal occurrence?
4 A
No.
5 Q
Apparently Met Ed has its own minimum requirements 6
as a matter of policy that are somewhat higher than that.
7 A
Yes.
I can't tell you whether it's written but we 8
always maintain at least one senior license in the control room 9
in addition to at least two RO licensees and normally three 10 RO licenses in the control room.
Il Q
What about auxiliary operators or unlicensed 12 personnel?
(}
13 A
The minimum we would have I believe was four.
We 14 would have up to 7 at times.
15 0
In your experience and training in the operation of I
16 power reactors, PWRs, what have you learned or been taught 17 about the phenomenon of going solid?
Have you had any 18 perceived wisdom about that in the past?
Prior to the accident 19 here.
i 20 A
Not in my experience in the civilian community.
l 21 Certainly in the Navy, we had experience -- and in the early 22 days of the FBM we used to go solid and we shut down.
We got 23 away from that through sad experiences.
That is something that
['}
24 is very difficult to control -- a solid plant is.
It's not a l
~
2ce-twJ Reporters, Inc.
I 25 desirable condition to be in if you have any kind of i
54 1
temperature transients.
.2 O
Would you say that there was an accum11ated training 3
wisdom to try to strenuously avoid going solid during 4
operation?
5 A
Very definitely.
6 BY MR. ALLISON:
7 Q
Is it difficult to control the pressure in a solid 8
plant when you shut down?
Let's say this plant.
The 9
preceding questions went to normal operation.
If your plant 10 is water solid, you shut down like you were here, is it 11 difficult to control the pressure there?
12 A
For instance, right now, no.
()
13 Q
Not now.
I am talking about, let's say, the morning 14 of March 28, 15 Q
It wouldn't be once you were cooled down.
Certainly 16 you could use your heaters-and things like this to control 17 this.
I am thinking in terms of really, I suppose, a naval i
18 plant, my experience with that, in trying to control cooler l
I r
19 temperatures, which is the way we control pressure to recirc l
l l
20 the steam generators and use the cooler to cool that water 21 which in turn cooled the primary.
i i
22 You wouldn't have to cool it very much before you lost it.
23 Here it is a much larger plant and effectively I would think l
I
(
)
it would be a little easier by comparison to control than in a i ex 24 pmF._ sci Reporters, ts.
o 25 small plant.
i
l 55 I
Q Would 'it be' easy to control right after turbine trip 7.s t
2 when a plant is cooling down and dumps steam out the 3
atmospheric dumps perhaps?
4 A
In any transient, it would be difficult.
If you can 5
get in a steady-state situation where anything you will change 6
will be done extremely gradually, it would not be near as 7
difficult as if you have some transients going.
8 MR. FRAMPTON:
Off the record.
9 (Discussion off the record.)
10 MR. FRAMPTON:
Back on the record.
II MR. WORAM:
I have one question.
I2 BY MR. WORAM:
13 Q
Evidently, Unit 2 has been a much more troublesome, Id exclusive of the March 28 incident, even before that it was much 15 more troublesome -- maybe finicky might be a better word for 16 it -- finicky plant than Unit 1.
At least that is the 17 impression I get from the other staff members that I have been 18 present for the interview with.
One, is that your opinion?
I9 Two, if it is, do you have any opinion as to why that is so?
20 A
Let me say this:
I have discussed this at various 21 times with Gary Miller, who was here during both' Unit 1 and j
22 Unit 2 start-ups, and I was led to believe they had as many i
23 problems -- not maybe the same type of problems -- as Unit 2 had.
I am saying Unit 1 had problems in its start-up.
If you b) 2#
j ace-A o aeponers, Inc.
25 are comparing Unit 1 in its stage of operation, which was very l
t
)
56 1
successful I might add, say in -- it happened to be down at 2
the time we went down, but when it was operating, just before 3
the accident stage of Unit 2, yes, there was a difference.
4 It's not a difference that I think you can equate however.
5 Unit 2 was still in the shakedown period, if you will.
6 There were some basic things that were wrong over there 7
that should have been corrected in my estimation during the 8
test phase on the secondary side of the plant which we were 9
having trouble with.
I don't think Unit 1 had those problems 10 because Unit 1 didn't have the same equipment, if you will.
end 5 11 In that regard we did have problems, yes.
st 6 12 O
Would you briefly identify those secondary problems?
13 A
The heat'er drain pumps, for example, we were having 14 a significant amount of trouble with those primarily because 15 of the design.
In evaluating that design along with the 16 pump manufacturer, they decided that they had to have some 17 extra lines, some pre-heating lines for the heater drain pumps 18 and' larger drain lines.
I 19 We had wiped out, if you will, at least two pump rotors 20 while I was here by securing the pump and then trying to start 21 it -- not immediately but the next time we tried to start it, i
22 it wiped the bearing.
Basically a design problem which in 23 my estimation should have been caught during the test program.
na k] lei aeporms, inc. This condenser problem manifested itself when we would, for 24
'/
j 25 instance, trip and the bypass valves would open.
We would lose'.
h
57 1
indication of level in the condenser.
This we had tracked h-'
2 down to we think the position of the level instrumentation in 3
there, which should not have been where it was located.
These 4
are the type of things that are examples that I think should 5
have been caught.
6 Q
Is there anything in the secondary system of Unit 2 7
that would cause the plant to cool down more rapidly than 8
Unit 1 in the event of reactor trip, for instance?
9 A
I am not that familiar with Unit 1.
I have strictly 10 been focused on Unit 2 in my time.
11 0
To be more straightforward, my impression is that 12 after a trip, Uni. 2 had a history of severe loy pressure
()
13 transients to the point of getting high pressure injection 14 where that didn't happen at Unit 1.
15 A
We had some problems with the relief valves not 16 reseating.
In fact, we have changed all those.
17 Q
Which?
18 A
The main reliefs.
When we tripped, the relief would 19 pop.
It's normal.
In some cases they didn't reseat.
In fact 20 we have replaced all those relief valves with relief valves 21 that are made by the same manufacturer that Unit 1 has.
I 22 don't recall the name now.
23 But they are a smaller valve and we put in additional valves
. f')
24 because of that.
3 w r. _... n.. n. e. ioc.
25 i
58 1
BY MR. CUNNINGHAM:
i\\
\\'
2 O
Those are the secondary side steam relief valves.
3 A
Main steam relief valves, yes.
4 BY MR. ALLISON:
5 0
Wednesday evening you were there in the control room 6
until about noon Thursday before you went home.
Do I understand 7
your previous testimony that you believed at that time that you 8
were in charge of the plant, both operational and radiological 9
aspects, but you believed Jack Herbein was in the observation 10 center in overall charge of the operation, is that correct?
11 A
That is substantially correct.
Being the senior 12 member of the site staff on-site, I was in charge of the f;
13 immediate operation of the plant.
To my knowledge, Jack v
14 Herbein was in the observation center and in charge of the 15 overall direction of the operation.
16 Q
Could you tell me why you believed that?
Did anyone l
17 tell you -- let me rephrase the question.
Did anyone give you 18 any specific instructions that he was there, that he wanted 19 l to know what was happening, to call him before you changed l
20 lthingoranythingofthatnature?
21 A
I don't recall those specific directions but I am I
i 22 sure that knowing Jack Herbein as I do, I am sure he probably l
23 put out guidance.
Also, because he was there, Jack is, having i
24 been superintendent here and very interested in anything that j
K F9rd Reporters, Inc.
i 25 goes on on the site during my tenure here, I would certainly i
I
59 1
have followed that direction.
p) 2 I know he was at the observation center because I had talked q,
3 to him and heard him several times during the day.
4 0
You didn' t talk to him af ter 2:00 or 3 :00 in the 5
morning, did you?
6 A
I don' t ' recall.
If something came up, I certainly 7
would have.
8 Q
That' night, Wednesday night, did you believe at 9
that time that the incident had been -- that the plant had 10 been brought under control?
II A
I felt we had it under control at that time.
As I 12 recall, we had pumpe running.
We were removing the heat.
I 13 felt we had the immediate problem under control.
14 0
When you left Thursday about noon, who relieved you?
15 Who was in charge of the plant when you left?
Do you recall?
16 A
I can' t recall right ' low.
I believe it would have
-17 been Seelinger, Miller or possibly could have been Kunder.
I 18 believe it was Seelinger or Miller.
l 19 Q
Just a few more questions on the organization.
The 20 organization you got into was I believe you said you, 21 Seelinger and Miller.
You thought it was initially in three.
U 22 sections in charge of the plant.
23 A
I believe that is true, yes.
24 Q
To whom were you reporting?
DF(g-) Reporters, Inc.
j 25 A
Herbein.
I
)
I l
y,,
60 1
Q Do you recall if Bob Arnold was trading watches with r)/
2 Jack Herbein?
3 A
I don' t know that.
4 O
And reporting to you with Floyd and Ross.
Is that 5
correct?
6 A
Yes, and I am trying to think if there was somebody 7
else.
I don't recall if Kunder was alternating with them or 8
alternating with Seelinger and myself.
At somestime he did 9
but I don't remember at the initial stage of the game.
10 Q
Now Floyd and Ross and possibly Kunder were in charge II of the operation of Unit 2, is that correct?
12 A
Yes.
They were assisting the Unit superintendent
()
13 that was on watch.
14 Q
Was there another set of watch teams who was in 15 charge of the radiological aspects?
16 A
Yes.
We had a team.
They operated from Unit 11 17 Limroth, I believe was there.
Mulleavy and Dubiel, I believe, 18 were at least three of the watch standards, i
19 0
You think Limroth, Mulleavy and Dubiel were the 20 persons in charge of that activit?
21 A
I believe.
I know at son s time during this accident 22 they were three of the people in charge.
There may heve been 23 others.
(}
24 Q
Can you recall when this organization came into i
)ce-FwJ Reporters. Inc.
-25 being?
I think you already told us when your watches I
61 I
were stood, p.
2 A
When they set up the ECS they went into an organizatica 3
there but when they decided who was going to spend what period 4
of time there, I don't know.
5 MS. RIDGWAY:
Could you clarify what organizationa 6
you are talking about?
Which particular configuration?
7 MR. ALLISON:
That would be the configuration we 8
just went over.
9 MS. RIDGWAY:
Specifically?
10 THE WITNESS:
Talking about radiation?
11 MR. ALLISON:
I am talking about Herbein, Logan, 12 Seelinger, Miller, Kunder, Floyd, Ross, Limroth, Mulleavy C
13 and --
( -)
14 THE WITNESS:
Excuse me.
Well, that went into --
15 Seelinger, Logan and Miller routine went in on Thursday 16 morning.
In other words, when I left at noon, one of those 17 individuals relieved me.
That organization was in place.
As 18 far as the radiological group -- Limroth, Mulleavy and 19 Dubiel -- I would say probably the same time but I couldn't 20 swear to that.
21 BY MR. ALLISON:
22 Q
And Mr. Floyd and Mr. Ross, did that continue from 23 the beginning of the accident?
f}
24 A
Yes, the same time that the Miller, Logan and i
e Fi #O RHmners, Inc.
25 Seelinger.
l i
i t
62 1
Q Did I understand you a little earlier tr. day that you
_jcri 2
weren't in on the discussions or the decision -- you weren' t 3
consulted about the decision on venting the make-up tank, is 4
that correct?
5 A
That is not correct.
I said I didn't recall being in 6
on it.
I would presume if I was there I would have been 7
brought in on it.
8 Q
You presume if you were there you would have been in 9
on it but you don't recall the specific discussion.
10 A
On the specific time that you referenced.
Subsequent, II or at least after that -- this went on day after day after 12 day and I recall, we decided what we would do and go through 13 the chain of the notifications and getting the people on the
(}
14 station to do the monitoring.
I just can't recall that 15 specific incident.
16 Q
I am speaking of the initial instance, which was 17 from midnight Thursday night, Friday morning, some small
- 0 i burps were started, until about 7
- 00 in the morning on Friday 19 morning, when continuous venting started.
If you had been 1
20 brought in, you said that is the kind of thing you thought 21 should be talked over with Jack Herbein.
22 A
Yes.
If we were going to have a release that had l
23 not been planned, I am sure we would have discussed that with
(~';
24 Jack.
ee F-a Rumrters, inc, s
l 25 Q
Is it possible that you or someone else would not f
i
63 1
have' thought the release would be as big as it turned out to O
(~
2 be so you would not have thought it necessary to consult with 3
Herbein?
4 A
I hesitate to answer that.
I don't want to get in 5
that situation.
6 Q
Did you have problems or were you aware that Gary 7
Miller and Jack Herbein had problems being called away often-8 times to explain to senior company people, to NRC people, to 9
state officials, what is happening in the plant?
10 A
During what period of time?
i 11 0
The first day.
12 A
Gary was gone not continuously but a large part of 13 the time.
With whom, I can't tell you.
I know Jack
(}
14 certainly but I don't know who else he was talking to.
15 Q
Okay.
Did you have that problem yourself being 16 called away an awful lot?
17 A
No.
My involvement was strictly with implementing 18 the emergency plan and ensuring that Gary was apprized of what 19 was going on in terms of notifications and doses that we were 20 measuring with their teams.
21 Q
I will ask you for an opinion now.
In your opinion, 22 would you have been a lot better off on the morning of the 23 28th, if you had available a back-up system in natural
~ irculation that you knew would-cool the core?
Something like
. f)
24 c
ke FL2) Roorters, ine, 25 the automatic depressurization system on a boiling water I,
f f
64 I
reactor with a whole bunch of big relief valves where they (q,
sJ 2
blow it down and --
3 A
You are asking me now in hindsight in my opinion.
4 I would have to say yes.
I think that would have been -- if 5
we could have vented off the legs -- I understand that at least 6
one plant has such a capability -- I think it would have been 7
extremely beneficial.
6 MR. ALLISON:
That is all I have.
9 BY MR. FRAMPTON:
10 0
When you are talking about the capability to vent II off the legs, you are talking about relief valves or control 12 lable vent valves and loops which will help you vent steam
(}
13 bubbles to --
Id A
Yes.
Once we had determined we had steam in those 15 candy canes, we could have vented that off, we could have gotten 16 the pumps started much earlier and been able to remove heat l
17 a lot more efficiently than we were doing.
)
18 0
would-that have allowed you to get the pumps 19 started again or to go into a more effectiv-a feed and bleed?
l 20 Even'if you kept producing steam, as long as you had water to 21 dump in and seeam it off, you would have had an easy way to 22 steam it right out of the primary system.
23 A
~ The desire in my mind was to get forced circulation
()
going to' remove the heat.
In that case, if we had a means of l
'24 Aw4 Jal Ruomes, tnc.
25
-emoving the system from those loops we could have gotten the I
-,-e
65 1
the pump going.
O
-(_)
2 Q
Thank you.
Mr. Logan, thank you very much for your 3
time and your help.
I owuld like to ask you one:.last question.
4 That is this:
You have been interviewed by I&E, by the 5
President's Commission, by us.
We have asked you an awful lot 6
of questions.
Are there any areas or subject matters that i
7 none of these people have touched at all, that nobody asked 8
about, that you think is important to the accident or the 9
course of the event or the response to it thatought to be 10 brought to our attention?
Something that nobody has really 11 gone into.
12 A
I can't think of anything right at the moment that 13 has not been explored or is not being explored right at the
(}
14 moment.
15 MR. FR.".MPTON :
Okay, thank you very much.
end 6 16 (Whereupon, the deposition was concluded at 4:30 p.m.)
17 18 l
19 20 21 22 23
('
24
- 3. s_ )o r.
,.,.. i,,..
25 l
T
.-