ML19308C433

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Deposition of Israel (NRC) on 790731 in Bethesda,Md. Pp 1-47
ML19308C433
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 07/31/1979
From: Hebdon F, Israel S
NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001240583
Download: ML19308C433 (47)


Text

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i NUCLE AR REGUL ATORY COMMISSION O

IN THE MATTER OF:

THREE MILE ISLA'ID INTERVIEW OF SANFORD ISRAEL O

P00R01MR Place - Bethesda, Maryland Date - Tuesday, 31 July 1979 Pages 1 - 47 l

O Telee en,:

s (202)347 0700 ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.

OfficialReporters 444 North Cecitel Street l

Wcshingten, D.C. 20001

- l

(

8 001 24Q NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAILY 7

m 4 '

1 1

CR6242 1

UNITED. STATES OF AMERICA

[

2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

4

.- - - - -x 5

In the Matter of:

6 TIIREE MILE ISLAND i

7

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 2

8 INTERVIEW OF SANFORD ISRAEL 9

10 Room 405 i

6935 Arlington Road 11 Bothesda, Maryland i

12 Tuesday, 31 July 1979 9:00 a.m.

O is PRESENT FOR NRC:

14 4.

PRED IIEBDON j

15 FRED FOLSOM, ESO.

i 16 I

17 i

18 i

19

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20 21 O:

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l 23 24 i ' Ace-Ferfors6 Reporters, Inc.

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l CR16242 2

HOFFMAN t-1 mte 1 1

PROCEEDING S 2

(9:00 a.m.)

3l (Witness sworn.)

(-

s I

4 MR. HEBDON:

Have you read and do you understand l

5 the witness notification I have just given you?

6, MR. ISRAEL:

Yes, I've read it.

I expect I under-7 stand it.

On a quick reading, I guess it's okay, i

8 MR. HEBDON:

Would you please state your name?

l l

9)

MR. ISRAEL:

Sanford Israel.

I 10 '

MR. HEBDON:

What is your current occupation?

II MR. ISRAEL:

Right now I'm detailed to the Bulletins 12

& Orders Group, Division of Systems Safety.

f ~)r

(_

13 MR. HEBDON:

What is your current permanent position?,

Id MR. IS RAEL:

Section leader in the Reactor Systems f

15 Branch.

i l

i 16 MR. HEBDON:

What was your position on January 10th, {

17 19787 18 !

MR. ISRAEL:

Section leader in the Reactor Systems I9 Branch.

I t

l 20 l MR. HEBDON:

How many people reported to you?.

i I

1 21 MR. IS RAEL:

Could have been six or seven.

l l

l

)

I 22 MR. HEBDON:

To whom do you report?

23 lI l

MR. ISRAEL:

Tom Novak.

i 24 MR. HEBDON:' Could you describe your employment

. Ace-FederM fleporters, Inc. ;

25 !

history, including positions held at the NRC?

I 1,

3

,, -mto 2.

1 MR. ISRAEL:

When you say employment history, are i

2 you talking about prior to the NRC?

'l

,3 !

MR. HEBDON:

Briefly.

I mean, you don't have to go

  • Os I

4 into detail with every position that you've held.

5 MR. ISRAEL:

Okay.

I was an engineer at McDonnell 6

Aircraft in '59 and '60.

And then up until, I guess, about 7

1974, I was with the firm, which kept changing names.

It 8

started off as Nuclear Development Associates, became United 9;

Nuclear, and became Gulf United Nuclear Fuels, and I think in

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j 10 '

'74 it ended up as Gulf Nuclear Fuels.

It was almost the same i

11 entity all the way through those years.

12 I was an engineer with that entity. I guess for the

)

13 last seven years, from '66,

'67 on, I was a group leader in 14 the thermohydraulics area.

15 In74 I came-to work for the AEC, the Reactor I

16 Systems Branch, as a case reviewer.

And I think it was some-

[

i 4

17 thing like in '76 when~ I became a section leader.

I've-been i

18 a section leader since '76.

19 '

MR. HEBDON:

What is your educational background?

20 i MR.. ISRAEL:

I have a bachelor's and a master's l

l 21 degree from MIT in mechanical engineering, j

r O

22 lt MR. azeoon:

ce11ine veur eetention to the meme of 23 hl ' January 10th, 1978,.that was signed by Mr. Novak, did you n _.

if 24 [ write the. memo?

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25 i MR. ISRAEL:- Yes, I did.

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MR. HEBDON:

Why did you write it?

2 MR. ISRAEL:

I was not able to ascertain -- my 1

3!

attention came back to the memo.

After Three Mile Island, I sb l

l 4

tried to go back over in my mind what my thought processes i

5 were which caused me to urite the memo.

I'm not really clear j

6 as to how it all evolved.

t l

7 But the best of my recollection, I think it had 8

something to do with seeing something in the Davis-Besse l

9 incident of September 1977 which indicated that the level was l

i 10 '

not -- there was a level in the pressurizer, and that there 11 may have been voids in the primary system.

The Ebersole draft !

I 12 of the Michelson report, there was a diagram in there that i

i ia showed that eue greseerizer eeree 11ne eesentie11v hed e 1eeg l

O 14 l seal in it, and it was a response by Pebble Springs to Ebersole t s 15 questions.

16 In this response, they were talking about monometers.

17 The response had nothing to do with pressurizers.

It had to l

i 18 !

do with -- I think the word "monometer" caught my mind.

And i

19 [ based on all of that, I think I put together the memo.

l 20 !

My concern was that the B&W pressurizer situation i

21 was different than Westinghouse's and CE.

At Westinghouse j

th Q

22 j and CE,.the pressurizer surge line, as far as I know, drops

!i 23 f directly into the hot leg. 'If you were in a situation where l

l e

24 l you had cooled off the pressurizer and you had steam in the l

Ace-Fe<12ral Reporters, Inc. l.

I 25'

' hot leg for~the B&W plant'with loop' seal and what I'll call i

i i

mts 4 5

I the monometer effect,. you could still have a level indication 2

in the pressurizer, whereas with the Westinghouse and CE

~

3 design the water, by gravity, would fall out of the pressurizer.

3 v.

t 4

MR. HEBDON:

Would this type of memo be a normal S

- function of your job?

6 MR. ISRAEL:

Yes.

7 MR. FOLSOM:

Let me interrupt.

8 Did you feel that the Davis-Besse response was 9

adequate to the questions put to them?

10 '

MR. ~ ISRAEL:

Do I feel --

II MR. FOLSOM:

Did you feel that the Davis-Besse l

2 1

response to the Ebersole questions was responsive?

i 13 V

MR. ISRAEL:

I said Pebble Springs.

l I4 MR. FOLSOM:

Pebble Springs, okay.

Sorry.

15 MR. ISRAEL:

I don't know what I thought about it 16 one way or the other.

I don't recall.

But whether I thought 17 it was responsive, I guess we never got any feedback from the j.

IO l ACRS or Ebersole, because that came up at an ACRS meeting.

So.

l 19 r I presume it satisfied Jesse and we never carried it any i

1 20 !

further, i

i 21 MR. HEBDON:

What did you have ia mind should be I

Q

,2 li

\\s done with the memo?

i i

23 i.

MR. ISRAEL:

Here again, this is reflecting back.

i i

ii u

24 !

I think my concern at the time, that we weren't actively

- Ace-Feceol Reporters, Inc. ;q 25 l reviewing any B&W plants, and I didn' t want to forget about it.

i I'

i i

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mto 5 6

1 I

1 So that the reviewer, the next reviewer picking up a B&W plant j 2

would look into the situation.

3 MR. HEBDON:

You weren't actively reviewing any B&W

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4 plants; is that just in your section or in RSB in general?

j l'

5 MR. ISRAEL:

As far as I know, RSB in general.

l l

s 6

MR. HEBDON:

Okay.

What corrective action did you i

i 7

have in mind for cps?

8 MR. IS RAEL:

As I guess I read in my memo -- let me 9

back up.

10 '

In writing 'that type of memo, one likes to point the 11 review in the direction of possible fixes.

And for the CP I 12 guess maybe you should have a pressurizer surge line that drops l

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.-13 straight in, though I had no prior knowledge as to maybe they 14 l-had some special reason wanting to make it a looser one.

That !

15 would be something I guess that would evolve once the reviewer 16 started asking questions of the applicant.

i i

17 MR. HEBDON:

Could you think of any particularly goodi i

t 18 !

reason for why they did it that way?

I r

i 19 i MR. IS RAEL:

No.

I didn't think about it one way or 20i ano ther, since the Westinghouse and CE designs have lines that i

21 drop straight-in and they have loop seals.

It wasn't obvious j

()-

22 to me why they did it or why Westinghouse and CE were doing it 4

23!

the other way.

I l^

24 h MR. HEBDON:

How about for OLs?

What sort of

'dce-Fednal Heporters, Inc. ';

251 corrective action did you anticipate?

l i

I l

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Ito.6, 7

1

.MR. ISRAEL:

For operating licenses, recognizing the.

.2 plant was already built, I recorrmended that we look a little

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- 3l further at'seeing what the' operating instructions were for l

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. 4 turning off the IIPI..

At the time I wrote the memo, it was my

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0 perception,~1ooking back, that the operator was sensitive to 6

voids in'the system, and that he would know how to handle the 7

situation.

But I had no direct knowledge of this.

I had not

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8 reviewad operating procedures as such.

9 MR. IIEDDON:

Why did you feel that the opera tor.

10 would be sensitive to voids?

MR. ISRAEL:

I guess it's for a couple reasons.

One,!

II 12 they recovered from the Davis-Besse incident, where they had a I3 void in the system.

And'the other reason is I had a casual I4 conversation with some of my carpool in the Operator Licensing i

15 Branch.

This had nothing to do with any of-these events.

I i

_16 don't even recall when it occurred.

17 I guess he had come back from some plant, and'he 18 in'dicated -- I don' t know how it came up in the conversation, I9 I but the operators were sensitive to getting voids in the f

l 20) primary systems.

i 21]

MR. IIEBDON:

Do-you recall who it was, who you talked m

j' 22

.to?

23 f MR. ISRAEL:

Mr. Joe Buzy, who is in my carpool.

2d l MR. IIEBDON:

Do you know if.anyone over carried out l Am Fe mM Hemrtm, Inc. ',

25 l.any of the recommendations contained in your memo?

l-

mto 7 8

I 1

MR. ISRAEL:

My understanding from Gerry Mazetis is 2

that they were looking into this on Midland.

He was responsi-

-).

ble, his group, his section, was responsible for Midland.

3 N/

4l MR. HEBDON:

Other than Midland, were there any l

5 plants reviewed subsequent to the memo to which this memo i

6 should have been applied?

7 MR. ISRAEL:

Not that I know of.

8 MR. HEBDON:

So Midland would then be the only B&W 9

plant that's been reviewed since January of '78?

s 10 MR. ISRAEL:

That's what I'll call an active review.

11 There may have been plants floating around, B&W plants floatingi t

l 12 around, that have been floating through ACRS and SER, and therel 0I

)

13 may have been one o_r two issues that were lef t.

But those are 3 14 the ones we were actively dealing with, in my mind.

.l i

15 MR. HEBDON:

Which p lants?

Do you recall any i

16 specific cases?

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17 MR. ISRAEL:

Maybe BSAR was still around at the time.!

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18 And I-checked back, and I guess even Three Mile Island 2 i

3 I

19 !

didn' t get its OL until I guess a month later.

But that was l

t l

20 j determined recently.

21

'MR. HEBDON:

Would there have been opportunity on l

(~j)

-.22l TMI-2 to implement that memo, other than going through some 4

23 hl sort 'of.an extraordinary event of reopening ' the hearing or

. l!

24 [

something along that line?

Iha you recall how far along that

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particular review was.at the time you wrote the memo?

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imti 8 9

.j MR. ISRAEL:

I' guess a while back I went to sae what 2

the dates were on Three Mile Island 2.

They had already been 3

through a hearing, ACRS, and I don't know.

Probably the pre-

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l 4

vious spring, I think,'they went through,_the spring of -- let's 5

see, I wrote the memo in '78.

6 MR. IIEBDON:

January

'78.

7 MR. IS RAEL:

So I think like the spring.of '77 I' i

8 think they went through hearings.

I J e m t'd af I

g Charles DeWitt-(?) in wt group was a reviewer on Three i

i 10 '

Mile Island. hhen I took over the section, he had in effect 11 completed his active review of Three Mile Island.

And the thingthatseemedtobedraggingoutoverthenextcoupleyearsl 12 i

()

13 seemed to be the steam line break analysis.

That seemed to be

-14 the principal thing he was working on as far as Three Mile 15 Island was concerned, i

16 MR. IIEBDON:

Okay.

Did anyone in your branch raise f

17 any additional concern as a result of the memo?

Was there any 18 l feedback to you?

t 19 i MR.. ISRAEL:

Not that I can recall.

I don't recall i

20 i having any significant discussion with anybody dealing with the,

~

21 memo, you know, at the time the memo was written, of course.

j 22 q MR. ~ IIEBDON:

Was the matter referred to anyone-in li 23 j DOR?

e 24 !

MR. ISRAEL:

Not that I know of..

LA*recainnmms,inc.l l

25 l MR. - IIEBDON:

Why not?

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i MR. IS RAEL:

I don't know.

I just don't know.

-2 MR. HEBDON:

Would it have been normal practice to

-3 at least put someone 'in DOR on distribution fier a memo like

(

i 4-that?

5 MR. ISRAEL:

Here again, I don't know.

I really 6

didn' t pay much attention to distributions of memos.

It was 7

sort of a haphazard situation, so I can' t say that it would be,

i-8 normal practice.

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l 9

MR. HEBDON:

So then, would it have been normal i

i 10 i practice not to send a memo like that to DOR?

i 11 MR. ' IS RAEL:

No, I guess it was sort of arbitrary as l i

12 to how relevant somebody saw it at the particular time, or

(.-)

13 important.

l 14 MR. FOLSOM:

Who would make that decision?

You say i

15 ;I it's arbitrary.

16 MR. ISRAEL:

Well, I could'have made the decision or l 1

i 17 Tom could have made the decision.

There wasn't a set policy 18 on where memos went, so there wasn't any -- I don't know that i

d-19 l there was any conscious decision to send it~or not to send it

?

I 20 i to DOR.

It just wasn't sent.

l

'21 MR. HEBDON:

It just didn't raise your level of

()

.-22 l ; consciousness sufficiently to feel that it needed to go to 23 DOR?

24 (

MR. ISRAEL:.Right.

ierm.,S neomm. w:. !

25l MR. HEBDON:- Okay.- In hindsight, as it relates to

-mta 10 11

.I' TMI,- what significance would you assign to that memo?

'2

-MR.

ISRAEL:

Well, my focus on the memo was the Y

3 loop seal.

The loop seal per'se mightyhave been Three Mile 1) tothebestli 4

~ Island's' problem.

Three Mile Island's problem was, 5

_of my' knowledge, anyway, was that they cut back on the safety 6

injection flow, and I guess the importance of the memo is that if

'7 somebody had started pursuing the loop seal and discussed what

~

8 instructions they had on training or whatever, how they were 9

sensitive, it may have come out as a peripheral type. thing; i

10 !

what instructions should be given to operators, the training 11

-they should have, turning of f IIPI.

i 12 So in that respect, if_a reviewer had carried:it' fari O() L 13 enough, he may have been able to pick that up and that may'have i

14 been disseminated to the operating plants, depending upon how l

15 exactly it was handled.

So it may have prevented that aspect i

.16 of Three Mile Island from a gross loss of inventory.

l 17 MR. IIEBDON:

Does the IIPI system fall within the_ area!

18 of review of the Reactor Systems Branch?

i 19 I MR. ISRAEL:

Yes.

I 20 MR.-IIEBDON:

Would the way in which the operator l

21

. utilized that system also fall in the area of review of your j

22. : branch?

1 MR. L IS RAEL:

We don't review operating procedures, 23 i

and when we review systems we see that they're redundant.and-24

< Aa-Federat Neoorters. Inc.,

i 25 j in-fact meet -the g'eneral design criteria, 35 or 36, I forget 1

m

' cts 11-12

~

1 which one.

It's general design criteria, and the analysis that 2

' aro presented.that we review just speak in terms of minimum 3.

safeguards being available, and the analyses are carried out

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-4 in that regard, showing that, yes, these are the results of 5

the Appendix K type of analysis.

6' But that's always on the assumption that the pumps l

7 keep running, or' minimum safeguards, anyway, keeps running.

t 8

And our review really hasn't gone beyond that.- The procedures 9

are usually reviewed by I&E, actual operating procedures.

I t

10 guess our thoughts just haven't gone beyond the point that, 11 yes, the system is available which, if utilized, will result j

i 12 in acceptable consequences, i

l

()

l 13 MR. IIEBDON:

Your memo does raise the issue of how l

14 the opera tor would perform.

Since I&E is the area that would I

i 15 be responsible for reviewing those procedures, is there any i

l 16 reason why you didn't send a copy of your memo to I&E to alert 17 them?

l t

18 l MR. ISRAEL:

I don't have an answer to that.

I was t

19 ;

probably pushing our frontier a little bit ahead to try to get [

I 20 i a better understanding of what was going on.

At the time I l

l

. guess my consciousness. wasn' t raised to the fact tha t, hey, 21 (it k) 22 there was a serious problem up there, that there was a serious il 23 gap in what was going on.

That's where I stood a' the time.

24 MR. IIEBDON:

'I'd like to go on and ask you some A u + w n.i nu m e m.anc '

l 25 l questions concerning the-September 24, 1977, incident at j

j j

!l i

i k.. _

i.:mta 12~

13 I

Davis-Besse.

Prior to the accident at TMI, what knowledge did 2

you have concerning the incident that occurred at Davis-Besse?

i 3

MR. IS RAEL:

I attended a meeting over in-the

,-g

't.f-4l Phillips Building withosomebody from I&E and somebody from

-5 whoever the project manager was on Davis-Besse.

I think it 6

was Leon Engel, but I'm not sure.

I guess they had some 7

traces, and there was a discussion of the event.

I think that 8

was my only real involvement.

I attended that meeting.

9 It wasn't.my assignment.

Davis-Besse wasn't my

?

.10 !

assignment.

I don't have a detailed knowledge of what went on.

II After Three Mile Island, having read my memo, i

12 evidently I just know that the pressurizer PORV stuck open.

(A_)

13 MR. FOLSOM:

Speaking of the meeting that you l

l 14 attended, where was that, again?

i 15 14R. IS RAEL:

It was held in the Phillips Building.

16 MR. FOLSOM:

The Phillips Building.

Do you recall i

17 who was present?

i 18 l MR. ISRAEL:

There was somebody from I&E and somebodyj l

I9 l

--- Leon Engel I think was the project manager.

I think Tom i

20 t

'was-there.

There must have been about 10 or 12 people.

I

'21 don't recall who the others were.

3 L

t\\

22 MR. HEBDON:

Tom who?

Q j

I 23 MR. ISRAEL:

Novak.

24 MR. HEBDON:

Was Roger Mattson at the meeting or Ace FMeal Heoorrers, inc. '

25 Carl Seyfert?

I f

a

mts:13 14 1

MR. ISRAEL:. I don ' t know.

I don't know whether 2

Roger ~was there.

Maybe Carl had been.

rs; 3}

MR. HEBDON:

Do you recall who actually' gave the E-l 4l briefing?

Was it I&E or somebody from NRR?

5 MR. ISRAEL:

No, I don't know.

6.'

MR. HEBDON:

Why did you go to-the meeting?

7 MR. ISRAEL:

Tom said, hey, come on down to this 8

mee ting, I presume, Davis-Besse.

9 MR. HEBDON:

Was it a normal function of your job 10 '

to attend such meetings?

11 MR. ISRAEL:

I can't relate whether it was a function!

12 or no t.-

It certainly wasn't out of place for me to attend suchi l

{ ).

13 a meeting.

Here again, Tom said, hey, there's a meeting, f

i 14 something happened at Davis-Besse, come on down.

I 15 MR. HEBDON:

What was your responsibility or function 16 with respect to the information that you got at the meeting?

1 17 MR. ISRAEL:

I didn't have any assignment.

Gerry, 18 I think, was assigned, who was my counterpart.

He's another l

19 1 section leader, Gerry Mazetis.

I I

i l

20l MR. HEBDON:

So it was just for general information?;

I 21 MR. ISRAEL:

That's right.

I had no action after i

l I

.(m 22 I that.

-() -

23 l MR.-HEBDON:

What did you do with the information 24 f that you got at that meeting?

Aa-rwees nnorms. sm. i 25

'MR.

ISRAEL:

I don't think I physically had any.

m-

,~

. mto ' 14 '

15 1

information.

It was just whatever I carried away in my head.

2 MR. HEBDON:

What significance did you attribute: to 3

the ' incident?

4 MR. ISRAEL:

I guess at the time I probably didn't l

5 attribute very much significance.

It seemed like a 6

Rube Goldberg affair stuck open and.the quench tank valve 7

popped open-and locked off some insulation.

It seemed to be 8

that type of thing.

At the time I didn't think it had any

~

9 safety significance, because the reactor was shut down and l

l 10 '

there wasn' t any safety problem.

It just seemed to be an i

II

'ol operational problem more than anything else.

I 12

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MR. HEBDON:

Did you see or discuss any reports that 2

were produced as a result of: investigations or analyses of the ;

I l

3l incident?

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c 4

MR. ISRAEL:

I don't know.

When I say "I don't know,"l 5

I don' t recall actively discussing with anybody that I may have 6

seen reports if they came across my desk.

But it doesn't stick 7

out in my mind, f

i 8

MR. HEBDON:

Would that type of report normally have 9;

been sent to you?

If, for example, I&E had done an investiga-i 10 tion of the incident, would that have been sent to you normally?

1 II MR. ISRAEL:

No, it wouldn' t have been sent to me.

12 It probably would have been sent to Novak, and Novak usually 13 sends things around, you know, for-your-information type of i

I4 thing.

15 MR. HEBDON:

Since Mazetis was the one that actually i i

16 went out to the site, would it have gone to him rather than you, I7 or would it normally have been sent to both of you?

I~

I3 MR. ISRAEL:

Usually, I&E type of information doesn' t get sent to the section leader, as I recall.

Mostly I&E LERs l

20 l and that sort of thing that I get to see come from Tom.

They li l

21 may not be sent to Tom directly; they could be coming from rm It) 22 l another individual, they could even be coming from the AD to Tom, l

" Hey,foryourinformal;-

23 and he would pin a note on it and saying,

\\

Am Federal Reporters, Inc. l

- tion," and that sort of thing.

25 l MR. HEBDON:

So, these things were just sent to you l

l-l

pv2 17-I for-information, then, without any active effort to. include 2

them in the licensing process?

i 3

-q MR. ISRAEL:

Unless he wanted me to take action or L'

4 something.

But since I wasn't actively involved in Davis-Besse['

it probably would be only for information.

l 5

6 MR. HEBDON:

So, as far as you know, he would do any 7

screening of.these reports and LERs and such things to see if l

8 they needed to be included in the licensing process?

9 MR. ISRAEL:

Yeah.

When you say " included in the 10 t licensing process," they're sent around to make people aware j

of what's going on with operating plants so that it may sharpen!

II l

12 the reviewer's perception of what's going on.

I mean, you say 13 "the licensing process," certainly we're not going to change th i

1 Id regulations.

i l

MR. HEBDON:

But would they change the emphasis of f

15 '

s the-things that you review or change the questions that you 16 I7 were asked?

Is there any formal effort to feed back this l

i I8 l operating experience into the concerns, into the issues that I

you address in-the licensing of new plants?

I9 20,

MR. ISRAEL:

No.

That seems to be haphazard.

We've i

2I talked about it, Tom and I.

What I was trying to get him to j

22 I do is identify some individual who would screen all of the i

23, LERs and then write internal memos or something to focus 2dbl people's attention, because this mass of paper comes across, Ace Federal Reoorters, Inc.

25 l he just sees anything in and out.

It's random and haphazard.

pv3 1

18 1

We didn't have any formal --

2 MR.. HEB DON :

Did you-realize that the steam formed 3-1 in the reactor coolant system during the-transient?

- O-1 6

4' MR. ISRAEL:

Which one are we talking about?

i 5

MR. HEBDON:

Still Davis-Besse.

We're still trying 6

to get at the knowledge that you had-prior to TMI.

7 MR. ISRAEL:

All I know is, when I read the first j

8 paragraph in my memo -- I don't have it here -- it indicates

~

9 that I thought that there was steam formed in the primary sys-l i

n 10 !

tem.

t 11 MR. HEBDON: What significance did you assign to that 12 fact?

l i

()

13 MR. ISRAEL:

I didn't find it necessarily significant, i

becauseanytimeyoudropoutofthepressurizer,youcouldformf 14 l

15 steam in the primary system during that type of an event.

i l

16 MR. HEBDON:

Would you have found it that unusual, 17 either based on your review of operating experience or your j

18 review of the design of the plant, that voiding occurred in the]

19 l primary? ~ Was it considered to be that unusual an event, or I

20 was it a fairly normal event' on the transient?

21 MR. ISRAEL:

Well, if I drop out of the pressurizer, I

()

22 g I will form a void.

The void has to goasomeplace else.

It has d

23 to be in the primary system someplace.

I didn't find it very

?

24 [ difficult to realize, and, I guess, prior to that I had always Ate ferrat ' amrtett inc.

l' 4

25 l been. concentrating maybe on the upper head, which is sort of a l

I 1

.pv4

'l 19 1

stagnant region.

2 And if you empty out the pressurizer, - the upper head 3

is probably the next hottest region in the primary system.

A I

4 void could form in the upper head.

Even though the primary i

5 system could be cooling down, theupperheadisfairlystagnantf 6l so that could stay relatively hot and a void could form there.

l I

i 7

MR. FOLSOM:

Tellthislaymanwhattheupperheadis.j i

8 MR. ISRAEL:

That's the region of the pressure vessel) i 9

the top region of the pressure vessel.

10 I MR. FOLSOM:

Oh, it's in the pressure vessel.

3 MR. ISRAEL:

And it's above the hot cold leg eleva-II i

12 tion.

I am really familiar wtih the Westinghouse plants that 13 have heavy core support plate that really almost isolates that 14 upper head region.

They have little weep holes.

In a normal 15 operation there is some recirculation of water in the upper 1

i 16 head.

But I guess the changeover rate is probably fairly low.

i 17 It's also heavy metal up there, eight-or 16-inch thick core l

i I

18 l plate, plus eight-inch thick head region, plus there's a lot of; I

19 i control rod mechanisms.

l l

4-20 l So, I always thought if we dropped out of the pres-

-21 surizer, the next place a void would be formed would be the i

l

p) 22 i upper head.

I guess at least that's always been my understand-(

23 !l ing of the situation.

24 h MR. HEBDON:

Did you have any concern that that had Aar Federal Reporters, Inc, ;

i 25 l happened during the Davis-Besse incident?

I s

i i

i

'pv5-20 1

MR. ISRAEL:

-No.

2 MR..HEBDON:

Did you realize-that the steam formation; 3

~in the reactor coolant system caused pressurizer level to 4

increase'while the leaE continued?

i i

1 5

MR. ISRAEL:

You had better repeat the question.

j 6

MR. HEBDON:

Did you realize that'the steam formation 7

in the reactor coolant system caused pressurizer level to 8

increase while the leak continued?

l 9

MR. ISRAEL:

No.

This is my perception, going back- !

10 '

wards:

I don't think I thought about the continuing leak.

I l

11 think the only thing I thought was that the pressurizer level

{

i 12 was hanging up there, and I probably had a void someplace else l i

()

13 in the system.

I didn't carry that next step further.

l l

l 14 MR. HEBDON:

Did you realize thatLthe operators 15 ;

secured HPI before they identified or isolated the leak?

i l

16 MR. ISRAEL:

No, I didn't carry my thinking along l

l 17 those -lines at all.

I la ll Were you aware of the fact that they had!;

MR. HEBDON:

i I

19 1 secured it?

t 1

20 {

MR. ISRAEL:

I just' don't know.

Did any or all of-these events raise any !

21 MR. HEBDON:

t

()

22 g. concerns in your' mind with respect to accident analysis or Il 23 0 operator training or the adequacy of plant procedures?

' E, 24 l MR. ISRAEL:

No, I don't think so.

The only reason-Anreest nwonne. toc. '

\\

-\\

25 j I say that is I wrote my memo and I was focusing on the loop 1

1 i-1 l,

I

t

.Pv6 21 1

seal.

I am pretty sure I didn't realize it was a loop seal or

~2 what the pressurizer surge line looked like when I had that t

1 3l briefing on Davis-Besse.

So, I presume that I walked away from!

(,,s) i 4

Davis-Besse and said, " Hey, it wasn' t a safety-significant I

t 5

event because they shut the plant down."

And somewhere in the l 6

back of my mind, the thought stuck that, " Hey, the pressurizer l I

7 level held up.

Possibly, it may have been voiding the primary l i

8 system."

This is a year and a half later, and I don't know.

l 9

MR. HEBDON:

If you had realized at the time that the 10 {

operators had secured the HPI before they identified or iso-I 11 f lated the leak, would you have been concerned about that?

12 MR. ISRAEL:

Not necessarily.

Sometimes the operatori

(

13 could do that sort of a thing And then maybe he's evaluating i

1 14 to see what sort of changes occur in the plant, and he'll undo ;

15 l it, you know, does it consciously, to see what's happening.

16 I am trying to -- I am in sort of a funny situation.

17 Yes, I know Three Mile Island happened, and now I am trying to 18 tell you what I thought back then.

This is all being colored 1

19 {- by that.

20 l MR. HEBDON:

Yes, it's impossible to completely 3

i 21, separate them, obviously.

i

()

22f MR. ISRAEL:

Davis-Besse, by itself, just passed me 23 l by.

There is nothing -- I am back down to there was nothing back:

i i

i t

L 24

- then that aroused my concerns about Davis-Besse, per se.

Aa FMetal Reporters, lm.

25 i MR..HEBDON:

Did you consider what would have l

i i

i

pv7 22 I

happened if the plant had been at a higher power level?

2 MR. ISRAEL:

No.. I answer that very quickly because 3li 1

somebody asked me that more recently.

I just didn' t think I

pd 4j about it one way or the other.

5 MR. HEBDON:

Do you normally assess the "what if" type 6

of analyses of incidents that occur at plants?

7 MR. ISRAEL:

Do we what?

l l

P MR. HEBDON:

Do you normally consider "what if" type !

9 of analyses, what if they had been at higher power levels, what 10 '

if they hadn't found the leak so soon, thattypeofthing,whenl II you review LERs and reports of incidents?

i I2 MR. ISRAEL:

I can't say whether I do or not.

What j 13 s/

comes to mind is when I interview applicatns for jobs, I would !

l I#

say we are detectives.

I don't know what makes a good detective, 15 how one goes about it.

I say -- do I go through "what if"?

l t

16 Probably not.

If I am in a hurry when I am reading something, I7 l I probably don't go through those type of machinations because that would mean I would have to sit down and spend a-good deal !

IE of time thinking about the event.

I 20 !

Probably most of those LERs are given a fairly super-l i

t 21 l ficial reading.

22{

MR. HEBDON:

You say you consider yourself to be a 23 l detective.

i What sort of questions are you trying to answer as l

a detective?

l

' Am Ferteral Hmorters, Inc.

25

- MR. ISRAEL:

To see if there are any holes in the l

1 I

.pv8 23 I

safety'of the plant, at least within the framework of the'regu-2 lations that our standard review plans allow us.

Obviously, wel

-)

.can go to multiple failures and things like that, which are 3

my

-4 just beyond what we get into.

I i

5 MR. HEBDON:

Is your emphasis mostly on the design or!

6 in the operation?

7 MR. ISRAEL:

The design.

l 8

MR. HEBDON:

Did you consider that any of the events 9l that occurred at Davis-Besse had any generic implications to 10 '

other'B&W plants?

l 11 MR. ISRAEL:

As I say, Davis-Besse passed by itself, 12 it just passed me by.

)

13 MR. HEBDON:

Do you now consider that any of the events l

l 14 had generic implications, with the benefit of hindsight?

l 15 MR. ISRAEL:

I haven't gone back and reviewed the Davis-16 Besse incident.

So, I am not familiar with all the various i

17 aspects of Davis-Besse at the time.

As I say, it passed me by,- !

18 and I guess my attention right now is just focused on the opera-i 19 l tor securing the HPI, or at least cutting it back as they did i

20 !

on Three Mile Island.

[

l 21 l Whether somebody could have picked that aspect out ofI-i

()

22 Davis-Besse and said, "Ah hah, this is a serious problem," I I

23 ls1 don't know. Certainly, it was generic.

They recovered at 1

24 h Davis-Besse.

, ; Ace reewai Reportvi. inc. j 2S i MR. HEBDON:

Were you aware that later on, at the i

pv9 24 I

request of the -I&E. inspector, they included a precaution in the l

2 Davis-Besse emergency procedure requiring that the' operator not, 3l' secure HPI?

I b ):

4 MR. ISRAEL:

No.

As I said, Iwasn'tfollowingDavisj 5

besse.

6 MR. HEB DON :

Are you aware of that now?

7 MR. - IS RAEL:

Only since you told me.

j i

8 MR. HEBDON:

What awareness or what knowledge did you -

9 have of the awareness or the understanding on the part of the i

i 10 '

operators of what was going on?

11 MR. ISRAEL:

At Davis-Besse?

I 12.

MR. HEBDON:

At Davis-Besse, did you have any thoughts l( )

13 or any recollections in that area?

j l

14 MR. ISRAEL:

No.

l 15 MR. HEBDON:

For example, do you know if the operators i

I 16 realized that-they had boiling in the RCS?

17 MR. ISRAEL:

No.

18 !

MR. HEBDON:

Did you ever discuss the incident or any !

P il i

19 ll of the issues raised by the incident with Joseph Kelly or i

20 !

Burt Dunn or any other employee of B&W?-

f i

. R.

ISRAEL:

Davis-Besse incident?

M 21

()

22 MR. HEBDON:

The Davis-Besse incident.

l 23 MR. IS RAEL:

I am pretty sure I didn't, although I i

1 24[ don't' recall.

{

_A n ru w st u n a r m.tne !

25 MR. HEBDON :

Were you aware of their concerns'about

pv10 I

25 1

the_ incident?

i 2

-MR. ISRAEL:

Not at the time.

l I

3 MR. HEBDON:

What was your perception of the relation-7,

(_)

4 ship between I&E regions and the headquarters, both in the l

5 Specific context of the incident at Davis-Besse and in any more 6

general sense?

i 7

MR. ISRAEL:

I have no concept of the interaction.

I 8

MR. HEBDON:

Do you interact with them to any great 9

extent?

If there were concerns raised, if an inspector in the i 10 l region had concerns, would you find it surprising that he would, i

11 come to you with them?

12 MR. ISRAEL:

I just have no concept of that portion

()

13 of our operation, because we are in DSS.

Certainly, my under-i il standing is that I&E is responsible for the operating plants l

14 15 and they handle the day-to-day LERs, actions, whatever occurs.

16 And if they have a problem with that, they would go back to DOR;[

l 17 they wouldn't come to us.

I 18 MR. HEBDON:

So, you would be very surpised, then, if i

191 an I&E inspector ever came to you directly with a concern,uwith !

f 20 i a technical concern?

i 21 MR. ISRAEL:

Yeah.

We're not on that path of the i

(~._)-

22 h organization.

S MR. HEBDON:

So, is there 'any tecbnical interchange 23 l'l

- 24 : between the technical reviewers in DSS and the technical people i Arit Fer1eral Heoorreti, Inc.

25 ! in the regions or iri the I&E headquarters?

I i

L I

L t

L

l

.pv'll i

26 i

i 1

MR. ISRAEL:

Usually, not in a plant-specific situa-2 tion.

We've gone to them to get.information about operating 3

f-plants.

I' remember I was involved in the water hammer study a l >)

4l couple of years ago, where we were trying to cull through and j

I 5

get information as to what events were happening up there; 6,

therefore, we went to I&E headquarters here, and we had people I

7 who helped us sort out this information.

i l

8 We've gone back to I&E dealing with pre-op tests to 9

find out exactly what exactly the plants were doing for these l

10 pre-op tests.

Pre-op tests we've reviewed to the extent that i

II if the applicant'has committed to performing certain pre-op 12 tests but we wanted to get feedback information, so we'd go 13 to I&E and say, " Hey, what are they.really doing?"

i Id MR. HEBDON:

But that was more in the data-gathering l 1

15 context than in a technical exchange among professionals type t

16 i of interaction?

I7 p MR. ISRAEL:

Right.

MR. HEBDON:

Okay.

Now, moving on to the Michelson f

I8 I9 f Report, again, we are trying to get'at what you knew prior to l

1 20 the TMI incident, which again we realize is pretty difficult to l

21 separate.. But what-knowledge did you have concerning the i

22 ll Michelson Report prior to March 28,

/~T 1979?

(_j 23 ll j

MR. ISRAEL:

Well, I had received a draft from Il 24hJesseIbersoleofareport dealing with the small-break LOCAs,1 Arw ferietal Reporters, Inc.

25 and-subsequently I learned that that draft was generated by I

i L

i

pv12 27 I

Michelson.

At the time, Michelson just didn' t mean anything 2

to me.

It was more recent that I connected Michelson with this q

3, Ebersole draft.

When I say "more recently," after Three Mile V

I 4'

Island.

I 5

MR. HEBDON:

How did you actually acquire that informd-6 tion?

7 MR. ISRAEL:

Jesse sent it to me, i

8 MR. HEBDON:

Youhaveanyideawhyhesentittoyou?l 9

MR. ISRAEL:

Yes.

Jesse was always bringing up 10 questions of small-break LOCAs at the ACRS meetings, so what-II ever meetings I was attending that he was at, he would bring up-l 12 questions about small-break LOCAs.

I i

13 And his principal concern-seemed to be loss of natura Id circulation and noncondensibles.

My guess was, in this con-I 15 !

text that he sent me the draft.

I i

16 l

-MR. HEBDON: - What significance did you attribute co I7 the concerns that he had been raising?

IB MR. ISRAEL:

We had brought this up.

It was on i

19 l D. C. Cook and Westinghouse did provi a an analysis of small t

20 !

breaks - it was a very small region, which we normally don't 21 l look at.. - showing that there wasn' t any problem..

f f

22 b There was also a discussion on D.

C. Cook about 23 li l noncondensibles.

We agreed that the noncondensibles didn't

~

24 ]!

i appear to be a problem.

Ace-f ederal Heoorters, Inc. ;

25 l I think this all occurred prior to my' receiving this f

~

i j-I g

pv13 28 1

draft, the Ebersole draft, and I didn't read the report in its 2

entirety.

And judging from my notes, I probably read the first i

3l few pages, and I was looking for something new dealing with fs N-]

\\

4j natural circulation, loss of natural circulation and noncon-i 5 !

densibles.

I didn't see anything new in there.

I probably 3

I just put the report aside; in addition to which, shortly there-l 6.

l i

7 after, B&W made a presentation

-- this is the Pebbles Spring i

I 8

presentation, dealing with small breaks and what have you.

i I

9l-And since we received no more feedback from ACRS, I 10 !

didn' t think about it any further than that.

Il MR. HEBDON:

So your concern in this area was more i

12 in the context of responding to the ACRS than any technical j

t

()

13 concern of.your own?

l 14 I

MR. ISRAEL.

That's right.

I didn't see anything 15 new.

Nothing jumped out at me in the draft that I had, to 16 alter what I had learned.

On probably D. C.

Cook, I just put 17 l it aside in my mind.

It didn't seem to be a significant issue.

18 l MR. HEBDON:

Were you aware in your reading of the

]

I 19 1 report of the concern raised by Michelson that the operators 20 l might be misled by pressurizer level?

i 21 MR. ISRAEL:

Here, again, I have to go back to hind-l

().

22 sight.

Let me recreate my thoughts.

When I discovered my memo l-23 again after Three Mile Island -- I say " discovered," I had put 24 [

it aside and hadn't thought about it.

I couldn't recreate the Amrmee nemnm. v=. {

l 25 l. basis on which I had generated it.

And when the Michelson l

i

,l r

'l I

i i

I i

pvl4 29 i

Report came out, I determined that, yes, this is the Ebersole 2

draft of the Michelson Report.

t 3I At that time, my only recollection was I still I

)-

4 associated that report with natural circulation, noncondensi-5 bles.

Subsequently, what I just told'you probably occurred in.

6 April or so.

Subsequently I went back and I thumbed through a 7

draft report, and I noticed comments to the effect that, " Hey, l l

Si Michelson -had that the operator may be misled by the level, and ;

l l

t 9

I am in a dilemma."

10 As best as I can remember, I didn't associate the II Ebersole draft with the level.

On the other hand, I can't say 12 for certain that, " Hey, I didn't read those words in there,

()

13 and that somehow got reflected in my memo."

I just can't put end#2 14 the two together.

15 i

i I6 f

4 i.

I 17 i

18 l I

19 1 l

l 20 !

1 21

()

22 l

-23 i

24 :

l I

. AceSederal Reporters, inc,l 25 !

i e

i

.,.1

M242(03101 30 cg'c ' MR. HEBOON:

As f ar as you can recall, you didn't 2

- attach any significance to that.

3 MR. ISRAEL:

That's right.

I'm. not even sure that

3 4

I read it a t 'the time.

~

w)..

5 MR. FOLSOM:- May I clarify one thing in my mind?

6

.You spoke of.a presentation by B&W.

7 MR. ISRAEL:

Well, B&W was the vendor for-- Pebble 8

Springs, so. I presume ttat they're the ones who wrote this.

(;

9 MR. HEBDON:

Tha t's the Pebble Springs question, 10 number.six.

We'll be getting to it in just a minute.

11 Did you. discuss the report with anyone, or. did you 12-assign. it to anyone f or additional review?

13 MR.. ISRAEL:

I don' t recall discussing it with 14 anyone, although Jerry Mazetis says I gave him a copy.

- g

- (_) 1 15 MR. HEBDON:

You don't recall giving the copy to

- 16 Mazetis?

17 MR. ISRAEL:

No.

He told me tha t I gave him a 16 co py.

19 MR. HEBDON:

What would be your responsibility I

20-lwith ' respect to. such informa tion?

21 MR. ISRAEL:

I guess I don't perceive any formal

~

22' responsibili ty :I. had' with respect to such information.

I

- 23.'

read it' with respect to wha t my previous interactions had

-24 been with Jesse.

That's been noted.

I didn't see anything

, ()

25 new.-

Subsequently, the Pebble Springs response came Hup 4

e 4

av 4

w

- - -vs

,r-.g er,-9 w-y s47 g

,p,4,

--y e

..m.

y

.c JC242iO3 02 31

~mgc:

11-which d'ealt' with' the same general subjec t, and I got nothing

~2

-formally coming back f rom ACRS. ~There wasn't anything new 3'

' that could crop up, so-I did'whatever I did.

I. don c

(

4:

perceive any' formal responsibility with respect to the 5-re po r t.

o MR.-HEBDON:

Administrative 1y, did you have any 7

responsibility ~ to inf orm other people in the organiz'ation 8

that you had received this communication f rom the. ACRS?

9-MR. ISRAEL:

Not that I.know of.

10 MR. HEBDON:

You didn't feel that you had an U

11 responsibility to tell Tom Novak, f or example, hey, I just j

12

.got this report f rom Jesse Ebersole.

I just wanted you to 13 -

know I'm going to take a-look at it.

14-MR. ISRAEL-Right.

h.

IS MR. HEBDON:

Is it a fairly normal f unction for

'lo you interact.directly with ACHS members without going 17-

'through 'any ~ other parts-of the NRC line organiza tion?

18 MR. ISRAEL:

I had received information f rom, l-19 -

yeah,- Ivan Catton, I think sont me some thi ng.. So it was 20 like-af ter an ACRS meeting, I said, hey, I've got thus and 21'

- such. ;He sen t it to me.

So ;it was in that context tha.t. I

'22

' did n' t ' say - any th i ng.

12 3 MR. HEBDON - So. your perce ption was -then that i t 24' wa sn ' t that unusual for-ACRS members to interact or to 12 51 contact ' staff members directly?

A f

,C ^

3.

5

.. ~.

16242'03 03 32

.cgc.

I

MR.-ISRAEL

Right.

Though it's only happened to-2 me.probably.one or.two time s.

3 MR. HEBDON:

What, in f ac t, was finally done with

- f'}.

L4 t he -re por t?

v S-

- MR.. ISRAEL:

What --

1 6

MR. HEBDON:

What was. finally done with the 7

re por t?. What-finally happened to it?- Did you ever provide 8

_any comments to Dr. Ebersole?

1A MR. ISRAEL - No.

No, I didn't.

As a matter of 10 fact, I haven't seen Jesse -probably since that memo' was 11 wri tten.

My memo was written -- he had illness; there1was 12, illness in the 'f amily, so he didn't attend ACRS meetings for 13 quite awhile, and I don't think ' I've seen him.

14 MR. HEBDON:

You didn't send him any wri tten -

h 15 comments?

16 MR. ISRAEL: -Not that I know of.

17.

MR. FOLSOM:

Excuse me.

You're now speaking of

-18.

the Michelson report.

Not Mr. Israel's January 10 memo.

19 Right?

20 MR.-HEBDON:. Well, either one actually.

Did you 21 send a copy of your January 10 memo to Dr. Ebersole?

22-MR. ISRAEL:

No.

- 23 MR. HEBDON - Did you send any comments to 24.

Dr. Ebersole _ as a result of _ your-review of the Michelson

!(

)

25 re por t?

i s

n Y

t

4

- 6242 03L04 33 mgc?

1 MR. ISRAEL:

Not that I know of.-

When we talk

~

2-about the Michelson, LI guess we keep talking about the

'3 Ebersole draf t which I guess is somewhat diff erent.

c(~'i

.4-MR. HEBDON:

It's all covered under pretty much p

S

.the same heading, although you're right.

They are somewhat

-6 dif f erent documen ts.

'7 What would have happened to the report if it had 8'

been formally submitted to NRR by the ACRS and then 9'

forwarded to you for-review?

10 MR. ISRAEL:

Then we'd formally have to give --

II.

usually there's an ac tion, ~ formally.

We'd have to respond.

12 There'd be a formal response required.

13 MR. HEBDON:

With the benefit of hindsignt, if it 14 had been submitted in tha t format, do you think you would

()

15 have been'mora cracerned about the issues that were raised?

16 Would your cc,nclusions about the significance of the report 17 have been any dif ferent, had it been submitted to you 18 formally?' C1n you theorize on what your response would have 19 been?-

20.

MF. ISRAEL:

No, because I would have just focused

'21 on the natural circulation issue and the' non-condensibles.

22 I'm sorry, I probably 'would nave just focused on the natural 23_

circulation ' issues _ and the non-condensible issues.

I may 24 not have pr eked up the level' problem

}

'26 >

-k9. FOLSOM:

Would you have-generated a response?

a l

x-1 v

4

-- +-.

rv >= h i-y

'9

I 16242:03 05 34 mgc l-MR. ISRAEL: ' Yeah.

l 2-MR. FOLSOM To.somebody. 1ro whom?

3 MR. ISRAEL:

Yeah.

That would have been 4

. required.. When things come across formally, they generally

{.

5 go to an AD or Director, Division.

They get a green tickett 6

I don't know what color ticke t.' - It requires some sort of 7

formal action, so our response would have been generated.

6 MR. HEBDON:

Do you have any idea why the report 9

wasn't submitted formally?

10 MR. ISRAEL:

I have no idea.

11

'MR.EHEBDON: - You don't have any theory on that or 12 anything f rom wha t Dr. Ebersole said when he gave i t to you, 13 or anything like that that would have given you on idea of 14 why he submi tted it informally?

-15 MR. ISRAEL:

No.

10 MR. HEBDON:

In hindsight, what significance do i

t 17 you assign to that re port?

18 MR. ISRAEL:

I guess it focused on -- one of the

19

-issues it focused on was the level indication, and if 12 0.

somebody had sicked that up out of the report and started i

21 probing and' delving into - the area, something.may have come 22-out of that -- a better unoerstanding as to just what was l

23

. going; on' up there, the operating plants and the industry in J-L 24 general.

( )'

-25

.The ;other issues, natural circulation i ssues and s

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6242,03 06 35

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!mgc-I and non-condensibles, we've had a very intensive effort over 2

'the last couple of ' months where various vendors have 3

performed analyses directed at the Michelson issues.

I

])

4 guess there must be about six of thems I'm not really sure.

5 The only things that. come to my mind are natural 6

. circulations, the non-condensibles of course, the level, and 7

I forget what the other three are.

6 My understanding is that the recent analyses that 9

were generated by the vendors 'and our understanding of them 10 was that 'the. natural circulation issue was not an issue, il that non-condensibles is not an issue.

Obviously the level 12 indication, without having to do any analysis, is an issue.

13 MR. HEBDON:

Would any other organization within 14 NRR have been concerned with how the operator would i

()

15 interpret pressurizer level?

Is there any other branch'that i

16 would be interested in that issue?

]

17 MR. ISRAEL:

Maybe the Operator Licensing Branch.

16 MR. HEBDON:

But pre ssurizer level and how it's:

19 interpreted would be primarily within the purview of the 20 Reactor Systems -Branch.

21 MR. ISRAEL:

No.

Well, you see there's a

-22

. disconnect. I don't think we've had -- we haven't focused on 23 operator actions.

We've only focused on systems.

So yes, 24-they had minimum systems available, and I can't see a sharp

])

'25 focus ono the level indica tor coming out of our Branch 4

~f

6242 03 07 36 mgc I

nece ssarily.

2 MR. HEBDutis There just wasn't that much emphasis 3

on what the operator saw.

Is tha t wha t you're saying?

( )

4 MR. 16HAEL:

That's right.

You see, all of our v

5 reviews seem to start with the tact that transients -- the 6

plant is scrammed.

The D&B ra tio is acceptable.

The 7

primary system pressure is acceptable.

This is our concern d

abou t normal transients.

And what happens af ter tha t, you Y

know, how the opera tor recovers and maintains.a stable -- we 10 just don't seem to get into t ha t -- LOCA, performing an 11 Appendix K analysis, and saying, ho y, the peak clad 12 tempera ture goes up, comes down, all the pumps como on, e t 13 cetera, et cetera.

14 There are only two other aspects of a LOCA that we c,

(_)

lb probably get into.

That is switch over f rom injec tion. to lo recirculation and also hot 109 injection.

There may be some 17 operator action there, but it looks very specific.

16 We did not review wha t the ac tual opera tor IV interactions are.

What comes to mind is, hey, what ha ppen s 20 if you have a leak, and the a pplicant responds, well, we had 21 a detectors we give an alarm.

And our review would 22 e ssentially end there.

The fact that, hey, they had an 23 alarm to de termine that you had a leak -- I'm using this 24 generically and i t doesn' t have anything to do with Three

(,';

25 Mile Island or Davis-Besse, wha t have you -- but our review

6242 03 08 37 mgc I

seems to end.

Yes, we de termine they tave a system or 2

some thing occurs which tells the operator tha t some thing has 3

o ccu rred.

We don't pursue i t beyond that -- wha t is it the i

4 operator does.

We end there with the systems, usually.

V 5

That's true V5 percent of the time.

Every now and o

again, a reviewer may go down one of these pa ths, but 7

usually it just ends there at a system level.

Yes, there 6

are systems available to handle the situation.

There is no Y

thorough review or the follow-up to say, okay, now that's 10 availablet wha t's the actual implementation?

How does the 11 operator interact with that?

12 I think different pa ths you could go down -- maybe 13 not use the system correctly.

We just don't go down that 14 path.

()

15 MR. HEBDON:

Is it your perception that that kind 16 of approach is taken throughout NRR, or is that just an 17 a pproacn in your particular branch?

Do you have any 16 perception as to whether things are done diff erently in any 19 of the other branches?

20 MR. ISRAEL:

I cannot, for other branches.

21 MR. HEBDON:

Okay.

I'd like to go on and discuss 22 the questions that were raised by Dr. Ebersole concerning 23 the. Pebble Springs docket, par ticularly wha t's come to be 24 known as " Pebble Springs Question Number Six."

And, again, 25 we're trying to focus on the information that you had and

5

\\,

16242- 03 o0'/

38'

'mgc-I the perceptions that you had prior to the TMI accident, 2

prior to March 28. 1979 What knowledge did you have 3

concernir.g the questions raised by Dr. Ebersole of the ACRS i

(

4 concerning B&W's small break LOCA analysis?

j S

MR. ISRAEL:

There must have been about 30 6

questions, I think, in the Pebble Springs response.

And the 7

only one.that comes to~ mind is the one that has a figure in 8

.i t -- the cutaway of the primary system with the bubbles 9

going up the various lanes.

And there was some discussion 10 of talking about a monome ter ef f ect, or something like 11:

t ha t.

That's my recollection of the Pebble Springs 12 response, and I gue ss the eff ect that, yes, they should have 13 cooling in the core even for small breaks.

14~

MR. HEBDON:

Was Pebble Springs assigned to your l)

IS-section for review?

Do you recall?

Or was that. the other lo section?

3

-17 MR. ISRAEL:

Pebble Springs -- that was the other 16 section.

I'm not even sure how much review we did on Pebble 1

19 S prings.

Because I think that was a standard plant.

Now, 120 -

wait a minute -- -it wasn't in my section anyway.

l 21 MR. HEBDON:

Okay.

Do you recall a discussion L22 -

initiated by=Dr. Ebersole-at a January, 1978, ACRS meeting 23'

'concerning the PG&E response to the questions?

I dot re.all the-discussion

'24.

.MR.

ISRAEL:

'No.

n f(])

25 tthen, but.let me just say tha t I have a hearing difficulty.

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H-mgc:

1 I don't 'always hear everything at ACRS, but I went back and 2-

- l ook e d a t ' t he transcript recently.

And, yes, now I know J3 what the discussion was, or I recollect now what the disc'ssion was.

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MR. HEBOON:

Do you f eel that.PG&E adequately o

. responded to the questions?

I E7 MR. ISRAEL:

They responded I guess to the 6

questions that, hay, they have sufficient core cooling for.

9 small-breaks.

Heading back over the transcript, which I did 10 recently, Je sse suddenly brought' up -- well, brought up 1

11-operator action, and as.f ar as PG&E, in my recollection, I-12 PG&E's. response was that that would be handled in training.

i 13 MR. HEBDON:

Well, one of the questions that was 14 part of that question raised the issue of how the operator

( )-

IS'

' would ' interpret pre ssurizer level.

And by my reading of the 16 respense that PG&E provided, they didn' t answer that 17 particular part of' the question.

Did anyone in your branch 18 4

review the responses to see :if they did, in fact, res pond to 19 the questions that were asked?

1 20 MR. ISRAEL:

No.

The reason I say no is that we

'21 didn' t ' spend any time on ~ the -Pebble Springs responses, 22 because those were questions;that were asked -- Jesse, in 23.

ef f ect, bypassed NRR and lad gone -- ordinarily, questions-i 12 4 L that would go to the applicant.would come out of-NRR.

.This

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'is a _ question -he asked directly of the applicant.

The f

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'6242 03=llE 40 mgc I

applicant responded, so we didn't assign any --

2 MR. HEBDON:

Well, Steve Varga sent the questions

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3 to the applicant, if ' I'm not mistaken, so they were sent out F$

4-under NRR's auspices.

V.

6 MR. ISRAEL:

But they didn't come out of the NRR 6

review groups.

7.

MR. HEBDON:

So you f elt then that because of the V

iO '

0 fact that you didn't ask the question, that you didn't have t

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' any responsibility to review the answer?

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MR. ISRAEL:

Tha t's right.

We did not get

& [g M 49 t

lI involved in evaluating the responses.

f' 12 MR. HEBOON:

'In the course of the exchange that

<.6 F

13 took place at the hearing, Dr. Ebersole asked them the

-14 question of how the operator would in terpret pre ssuri ze r l( )

15 level, and they came back with the response that i t would be 16 included in the training.

And then Dr. Ebersole raises the 17 issue that the simulator wouldn't simulate the event 18 correctly, and no one disagreed' with that statement.

He 19-asked, "Does anyone disagree with that," and no one does.

20 Were you aware of tha t exchange at the time?

21.

MR. ISRAEL:

-I don't recall.

22 MR. HEBDON:

Do you-recall if you were at t ha t 12 3

. meeting?

lb4 MR. ISRAEL:

I was at that meeting, and I don't

'(])\\

25.

recall.

My aw.ireness of the give-and-ta'ke, because I have l

6242 03 12 41 mgc 1

a hearing problem --

2 MR. FOLSOM:

You've read the tran sc ri pt.

3 MR. ISRAEL:

Tha t's right.

Since Three Mile

(

4 Island.

LJ 5

MR. FOLSOM:

Do you recall this being in the o

transcript?

7 MR. ISRAEL:

Yes, that was in the transcript.

6 MR. HdBDON:

Doe that raise any concerns in your Y

mind?

10 MR. ISRAEL:

Whether that is part of the simula tor il training?

Does i t raise concerns in my mind now or then?

12 MR. HEBDON:

Well, first, if you weren't aware of 13 i t, then obviously it didn't raise any concerns.

14 MR. ISRAEL:

Tha t's right.

)

15 MR. HEBDON :

In hindsight, if you had been aware 16 of i t, would it have raised any concerns?

17 MR. ISRAEL Not necessarily, because I'm not 16 involved in opera tor training and how f aithf ully a simula tor 19 simulates an event.

I'm not really f amiliar with that 20 a spe c t.

21 MR. HEBDON:

Would it have concerned you, for 22 example, that if the simula tor didn't simulate the event, 23 t ha t possibly the computer codes used to analyze the 24 response of the plant as part of the design function might

'}

25 also not model the event correctly?

6242 03 13 42 mgc I

MR. ISRAEL:

No, no.

Appendix K calculations are 2

totally different than the algorithms and analogs that are 3

stuck in the simulator.

In fact, w ha t they would do is take 4

A ppendix K calculations, and I'm not an authority on this, o

but I'll give you my perce ption, although it may be totally 6

wron g, that they would take certain key parameters and just 7

develop an algorithm for a specific type of break via 6

tempera ture or pre ssure or something, and then that would 9

drive the pre ssure indicator on the simulator.

10 So there wasn't any real -- there's no real time il analysis being done on the simulator.

It's all coming out 12 of Appendix K analysis.

Now, to the extent to which they 13 include all the various parameters on a simulator, they just 14 may not do that.

I) 15 MR. HEBDON:

So then and now, you wouldn't have 16 been concerned that a similar def ect could exist in the 17 Appendix K analysis?

16 MR. ISRAEL:

No, because they're totally diff erent 19 animals.

The simulator, there's an abridged response 20 f unction based on the Appendix K analysis.

If that response 21 was put in, that would ring a bell wi th me.

22 MR. HEBDON:

With whom did you discuss either the 23 question and response that was asked in writing or tne 24 exchange that took place at the ACRS meeting?

~()

25 MR. ISRAEL:

I don' t recall.

I t hi nk there must

6242 03 14 43 mgc l

have been a meeting, because a number of us went down to the 2

Pebble Springs meeting.

'lhere must have been a mee ting 3

about the Pebble -prings questions and the responses.

That

/~ ~ ;

4 was about it.

I don't recall the extent to which it was n/

5 di scu ssed, except that there was a mee ting.

6 A decision was made at the meeting that tha t would 7

be -- we were not going to assign resources to evalua te the 6

responses.

But the a pplicant would then responds they would Y

have that in te ra c tion.

But ACHS at the time --

10 MR. HEBDON:

Do you recall who attended tha t ll meeting?

12 MR. ISRAEL:

No.

Well, Novak was there.

And 13 Varga, you mentioned Varga, I guess he must have been 14 there.

I don' t know who else.

There must have been 10 or (m) 15 12 people there.

There were about 30 questions in a noinber lo of areas.

I guess there were peo ple there involved in the 17 other areas.

I don't recall who they were.

IU MR. IlEBDON:

When was the meeting held?

Was it 19 before the questions were sen t to PG&E, or af ter the 20 responses were received?

21-MR. ISRAEL:

Af ter the responses were received, as 22 far as I know.

23 MR. IIEBDON:

Af ter the responses were received 12 4 from PG&E.

Was i t prior to the ACRS meeting?

(( )

25 MR. ISRAEL:

I believe so, yes.

6242 03 15 44 mgc I

MR. HEEDON:

So then it was between the time when 2

responses were received f rom PG&E and the ACRS meeting in 3

January.

Okay.

4 MR. FOLSOM:

May I -- you know we're going to be

(;

S presenting ma terial f or other laymen like myself.

What is 6

Appendix K?

This is some thing tha t you gentlemen know, but 7

I don't.

6 MR. ISRAEL:

The Appendix to 10 CFR 50, which is

  1. 7 9

the Code of Federal Regula tions dealing with power plants.

W 10 Appendix K deals with requirements as to the type of an 11 analysis method used to evaluate loss of coolant accidents.

12 So when I talk abou t Appendix K analyses, that's loss of 13 cool an t a cciden ts.

14 MR. FOLSOM:

That's shorthand f or some thing you've

')

Ib just explained a little more f ully, and that's what I was lo trying to bring ou t.

Thank you.

17 Can we take a break here?

18 MR. HEBDON:

Yes, I think we can.

We can all 19 probably use a break at this point.

Can we adjourn for 20 about ten minutes and reconvene here?

21 (Brief recess.)

22 23 24 c

29 l

CR~6242-45 HOFFMAN nt-4 mte.~1' I

MR. HEBDON:

Okay, let's go ahead and reconvene.

2 You recognize that you're still under oath and that.

i 3 I the precautions and the information we provided you in the I,

I

. v).

'4 l witness notification is still applicable.

So if there are 5

any questions you feel you don't want to respond to, you have 6

that option.

7 Do you have anything else to add concerning the B

Pebble Springs ques tion?

9 MR. ISRAEL:

Not that I can think of.

l 10 I MR. HEBDON:

Okay.

Other than your January 10, 1978, memo, have you written any other memoranda or notices or notes !

II 12 to anyone about the incident at Davis-Besse?

qQ 13 MR. ISRAEL:

Not that I know of.

Id MR. HEBDON:

Have you received or have you seen any 15 memos or notes of that type concerning that incident?

16 MR. ISRAEL:

I may have.

17 MR. HEBDON:

In a.neeting on July 3rd, 1979, with 18 Mr. De Young and Mr. Parler, did you make reference to an l9 exchange of memorandums or notes between you and Mr. Novak l

i 20 {

concerning significant factors concerned with the incident at 2I

-Davis-Besse?

.n.

22 i MR.-ISRAEL:

Repeat the question again.

-23 MR. HEBDON:

At a meeting on July 3rd,.1979, with

- 24 lMr. De Young and Mr. Perler, did you make reference to an 3

' Ace $erlevel Reporters, Inc.

25

. exchange of memorandum or notes between you and Mr. Novak

+

Et2 2 46 1

.concerning significant issues associated with the incident at 2

Davis-Besse?

l 3'

MR. IS RAEL:

No, I didn' t make that comment.

It was

,s l

V).

/

4 that somebody called me up af ter that.

5 MR. HEBDON:

Me?

6 MR. ISRAEL:

You called me up after that.

And I 7

wasn't the one to make that comment. I think it was Denny Ross 8

who made that comment.

I don't recall making.the comment.

9 MR. HEDDON:

Okay.

Do you know of any other I

l 10 '

precursor events -- start' that question over.

11 Do you know of any other precursor events that are 12 relevant to the accident at TMI?

-q(j 13 MR. ISRAEL:

No.

14 MR. HEBDON:

Do you have any additional information 15 that imight be relevant to our inquiry into the events surround-16 ing the accident at TMI?

17 MR. IS RAEL:

Not that I know of.

18 MR. HEBDON:

Do you have anything else to add to thisi i

19.1 interview?

'l 20 f MR.- ISRAEL:

No.

1 21 MR.'HEBDON:

Do'you have any other questions?

=( ).

22 MR. FOLSOM:

Let me just think.

23 (Pause.)

23 No, I don't believe so.-

Ace Feieraf Reportees, Inc, 25

.MR HEBDON:. Those are all the questions that we have.

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=- - -.. - - -. -.

'mte 3-47 P

1'

' Those are 'the issues that we wanted to discuss with you.

If

'2 you have.no'other concerns, then this' interview is. completed.

.:0-3 Thank you.

4 MR. ISRAEL:

Okay.

5 (Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m.,

the interview was

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concluded.)

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