ML19308C392
| ML19308C392 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1979 |
| From: | Karrasch B BABCOCK & WILCOX CO., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001230362 | |
| Download: ML19308C392 (38) | |
Text
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s.w-i N U C L E A R R E G U 8. A T O R 't C O M M I S S I O N i
i IN THE MATTER OF:
niI SPEIAL DrJUIRY DEPOSITION i
~
DEPOSITION OF BRUCE A.
KARRASCH
^ O Place - Lynchburg, Virginia Date -
Wednesday, October 3, 1979 Pages 1 - 38 i.
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t4 (202)347-3700 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
O oricc i a.? -.c.
444 North Capitel Street Washingten. D.C 20001 8 0 0_; 3 3 g 9 7 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE DAILY 4
1 CR 7477 UNITED STATES OF AM5RICA
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j AR NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
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4 Deposition of:
5 BRUCE A. KARRASCH f
6
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x Conference Room A 8
Babcock & Wilcox Old Forest Road 9
Lynchburg, Virginia 10 Wednesday, October 3, 1979 11 l
12 The Deposition of BRUCE A. KARRASCH commenced at 13 4:15 p.m.
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(v Present for the NRC:
Fred Hebdon and Fred Folsom.
14 I
c Present for Babcock & Wilcox:
George Edgar, John j
15 16 Mullin, and Lista Cannon.
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s-23 Ad Lrci Remners, in.
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ESEEEEEE Witness:
Examination by:
Page:
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4 anuce x. xannisca ur. nesaon s xr. ro1som 3
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BRUCE A. KARRASCH i
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4 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, 5
was examined and testified as follows:
6 EXAMINATION 7
BY MR. HEBDON:
8 0
Would you please state your full name for the record.
9 A
Bruce Adolph Karrasch.
Spelled K-a-r-r-a-s-c-h.
10 Q
For the record, I have here a letter addressed to 11 Mr. Karrasch, dated October 1st, 1979 from Mitchell Rogovin, 12 Director of the NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group.
~
13 Have you had an opportunity to read this document i
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i 14 ' in full?
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15 A
No, I have not.
I glanced over it.
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16 Q
Why don't we go ahead and take a minute and let 17 you read it.
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18
[ Discussion off the record.)
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i MR. HEBDON:
Let's go back on the record.
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BY MR. HEBDON:
a 1
21 Q
So now you've read the document in full; is that j
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22 correct?
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l 23 A
Yes, I have.
24 Q
Do you understand the information set forth in this j
- a. hrs awonm, inc. f 25 l record, including the general nature of the NRC/TMI Special I
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4
-Inquiry; your right to have an attorney present here today as
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your representative; and the fact that the information you 2
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provide may eventually become public?
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A Yes, I do.
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4 5
0 Are you represented by counsel at this time?
A Yes, I am.
6 m.
MR. HEBDON:
Would you state your name, please.
7 MR. EDGAR:
George Edgar.
8 BY MR. HEBDON:
9 10 0
You should be aware that the testimony that you 11 give has the same force and effect as if you were testifying in a court of law.
My questions and your responses are being 12 13 taken down and they will be later transcribed.
You will be 14 given the opportunity to look at that transcript and make l
15 changes that you deem necessary.
16 However, to the extent that your subsequent changes 17 are significant, those changes may be viewed as aff ecting 16 your credibility.
So please be as complete and accurate as 19 ij you can in responding to the questions.
l I
i 20 If you at any point during the deposition do not 21 understand a question, please feel free to stop and we will 2;
try to clarify the question for you.
Okay?
-O v
23 Are there any questions?
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24 A
No.
A(3,ero newners, Inc.
j 25 0
What is your current position?
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A My position is manager of a unit in the Engineering 2
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Department called Plant Integration.
3 Q
What was your position in late 1977?
(7 '
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A The same position.
5 Q
For whom did you work?
6 5
A In late 1977, I worked for Donald Roy, and today 7
I work for Alan Womack.
8 Q
At approximately what time did the change in i
9 i
supervision occur?
10 A
It occurred in -- some time in the July-August 11 timeframe of 1978.
12 O
All right.
What is your educational background?
t
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A I have a Bachelor of Science Degree in Nuclear 14 Engineering from the University of Wisconsin, and I have a 15 j
Master of Nuclear Physics Degree from Lynchburg College.
j 16 l
Q We have a copy of your resume, and we'd like to j
i 17 have th at included in the record.
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[The documents follow:]
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S October 1,1979 (V
In Reply Refer to:
~ 3 NTFiH 791001-06 lir. B. A. Karrasch
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c/o George Edgar, Esquire V
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius Attorneys for Babcock and Wilcox Co.
1800 !! Street U.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036
Dear Mr. Karrasch:
I am writing to confirm that your deposition under oath in connection with the accident at 3ree Mile Island is scheduled for October 2-5, 1979 at Babcock and Wilcox facility, Lynchburg, Virginia.
This will also confir= cy request for you to have yo'ur resume and any documents in your possession or control regarding TMI-2, the accident or precursor events which you have reason to believe may not be in official imC files, including any diary or personal working file.
The deposition will be conducted by members of the ISC's Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island.
This Group is being directed independently of the URC by the law firm of Rogovin, Stern and iluge.
It includes both NRC personnel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and attorneys. Through a delegation of authority fro = the NRC under (l
Section 161(c) of the Ato ic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special Inquiry Group has a broad mandate to inquire into the causes of the accident at Tnrce Mile Island, to identify major probles areas and to take reco=menda-for change. At the conclusion of its investigation, the Group will ti-s is.
a detailed public report setting forth its findings and reco==endations.
Unicss you have been served with a subpoena, your participation 1.n the depos-ition is voluntary and there will be no effect on you if you decline to answer some or all of the questions asked you. However, the Special Inquiry has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place.
Any person deposed may have an attorney present or any other person he wishes acco pany hi= at the deposition as his representative.
You should reali::e that while we will try to respect any requests for con-fidentiality in connection with the publication of our report, we can make no guarantecs.
Uanes of witnesses and the information they provide may eventually become public, inas=uch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Group's investigation will be made availabic to the URC for whatever uses it may deem appropriate.
In time, this information may be made available to the public
(
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voluntarily, or become available to the public through the Freedon of Information Act.
Moreover, other departnents and agencies of government any
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request accesc to this information pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974 The information may also be made availabic in whole or in part to concittees or subec=ittees of the U.S. Congress.
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SURNAME -
t oATC Nn O FoRU 316 (F 7E: N R C'/. 0 2 4 *
^ U.S. Gov E rv.* ENT D AINTING o r Fs C E. 1979 289 369
. Mr. B. A. Karrasch October 1,1979 u-If you have testified previously with respect to the Tnrce Mile Island
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accident, it would be useful if you could review any transcripts of your previous statencat(s) prior to the deposition.
D Thank you for your cooperation.
(V Sincerely, f
Mitchell Rogovin, Director NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group DISTRIBUTION TERA FFolsom O
FHebdon V
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1[4 RESUME OF BRUCE A. KARRASCH
/
MANAGER, PLANT INTEGRATION UNIT
-NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION DIVISION BABCOCK & WILCOX O
v June 1967: Received Bachelor of Science Degree in Nuclear Engineering from p
University of Wisconsin - b_ega_n employment as_ an engineer for V
Babcock & Wilcox in Lynchburg, Va.
June 1967 - June 1969:
Engineer in the Thermal Hydraulics Group in Fuel Engineering - performed fluid flow and heat transfer calculations on the Mark B Fuel Assembly for 177 FA plants.
o-June 1969 - June 1971: Engineer in the Nuclear Analysis Group in Fuel Eng-ineering - performed 3-dimensional power peaking calculations for 177 FA plants.
June 1971: Received MS in Nuclear Physics from Lynchburg College.
June 1971 - March 1974: Engineer, and then
-arvisory Engineer, in the Control Analysis Unic in the Plant Analysis Section -
assisted 'n the NSS system design and analysis during the startup of Oconee I.
March 1974 - September 1975: Unit Manager,-Control Analysis - responsible for transient and steady state system analysis of B&W nuclear steam systems.
gV September 1975 - August 1976: Unit Manager, Core Integration - responsible for defining and controlling analytical and hardware interfaces between fuel assembly and remainder of nuclear steam supply system.
August 1976 - Present:
Unit Manager, Plant Integration - Responsible for defin-ing and controlling analytical and hardware interfaces among the various elements of the B&W nuclear steam sys-tem design.
O O
6 BY MR. HEBDON :
b-3 2
0 But just as a matter of reference, could you give us a
(
brief description of your employment history, including 3
/~T positions that you've held here at B&W.
5 A
Would you like me to just go through this?
6 0
No, not that kind of detail.
Just a brief description of the kind of positions you've held, the years 7
from when to when, and the name of the organization.
That 8
will be sufficient.
9 10 A
I received my Bachelor of Science Degree in the summer of 1967 and came to Lynchburg as an engineer in the 11 Thermal. Hydraulic Group in Fuel Engineering.
So I was 12 associated with the design of the fuel assembly itself.
13 O'
ja I was in that group for two years, and then transferred to a group that does the nuclear design of the fuel assembly in 15 16 the Fuel Engineering Department.
17 I stayed in that group for three years -- excuse 18 me, I stayed in that group for two yer.rs, and then transferred 19 e to a group in another section in Engineering called Control I
20
- Analysis, j
I was an engineer in the Control Analysis Group 21 l
22 for about two and a half years, and was promoted to unit O
manager of the Control Analysis Group in March of 1974.
23 I
24 I was manager of the Control Analysis Group for
/~S f it M2rci Reporters, Inc.
25 about a year and a half, and made a lateral rotation to
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7 manager of a group called Core Integration in September of 1975, j
and I was manager of that group for one year, and in August of 2
3 1970, several Integration groups were combined into one large unit called Plant Integration, and I was named manager of that
(}
4 5
group in August of 1976, and I have been in that position for 6
three years now.
o -
Q Okay.
I'd like to ask you some questions about an 7
incident that occurred at Davis-Besse on September 24th,1977, 8
and I'm particularly interested in your knowledge or under-9 10 standing concerning that incident prior to the accident at TMI.
11 A
All right.
12 O
SPecifically prior to March 28th, 1979, what knowledge l
13 did you have crncerning the incident that occurred at Davis-Besse O
ja on September 24th, 1977?
15 A
The knowledge that I had about the Davis-Besse 16 incident was -- can be classed as, oh, that of being informed 17 about it in a very general nature.
And the way that happened 18 was one of the people who wo-ks for me, Joe Kelly, was requested 19 g to go to the Davis-Besse site several days after the incident 4I 20 had occurred, and contribute to the datc-taking that was going 21 on, and to the resolution of the problem as to what had 22 happened.
And I was asked if Joe could go to the site, seeing O) m 23 as how he worked for me, and gave my permission for him to i!traveltothesite.
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!j 25 0
Who asked you if he could go?
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8 A
Both Joe and Eric Swanson, who was Joe's supervisor, 3-
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came to me -- I'm sure it was within a day or two after the 2
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incident -- and they asked -- and said the Customer Service 3
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Department had requested that Joe go to the site, and would 4
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that be okay, and I agreed.
0 You mentioned that Mr. Swanson was Mr. Kelly's 6
supervisor.
What's his relationship then to you?
7 A
MY 9r UP is organized -- or at that time was 8
organized into three subgroups, each of which had a supervisory 9
10 engineer in charge of them, and Eric Swanson was one of those 11 supervisory engineers.
12 Q
I see.
So then Mr. Swanson worked for you, essentially?
rs 13
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A Correct.
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15 0
And Mr. Kelly in turn worked for Mr. Swanson?
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16 A
That is correct.
17 O
Now Mr. Kelly went out to the Davis-Besse site; after that, what information did you receive concerning the 18 19 d incident itself?
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A The knowledge that was transmitted to me about 20 the incident was that -- and this was within a couple of days, i
21
,^s 22 either during the time which Joe was there or right after his
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23 return, but the only knowledge that I recall was that it was i
24 a loss-of-feedwater incident, and that the cause of the j
eers Reporters, Inc.
25 incident had been identified while Joe was at the site.
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9 The response of our system had been deemed to be acceptable.
j The temperatures and pressures versus time had been examined, 2
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3 and the result on the components was okay.
()
There was no reason to not restart the plant, and 4
that the cause of the loss of feedwater had been identified 5
6 and fixed, and that the plant was going to return to power.
7 Q
Did he give you any. indication of the loss-of-coolant accident that occurred as part of the transient?
8 9
A No, sir, he did not.
10 Q
Did you ever find out that a loss-of-coolant accident 11 occurred as part of that transient?
12 A
I recall attending a briefing, a meeting, after 13 Joe had returned to inform interested people within NPGD 14 of the incident, what had happened, the cause, the corrective' 15 action that was underway.
And I recall attending that meeting 16 and confirming that the corrective action was underway and 17 that the plant could be restarted.
I do not recall any more 18 detail about the incident than that it was a loss of feedwater.
19 y Some equipment had malfunctioned, and that the equipment 20 was being fixed prior to plant restart.
21 But any details about loss-of-coolant accident, I 22 do not recall being informed about
__ m.
23 Q
Do you recall any details of any discussions of 24 the transient itself, what actually happened, for example, so'~'ye nwnws. w.
25 and graphs of the transient or descriptions of the actions l
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that various public people took?
2 A
No, I cannot recall.
3 0
I'd like to go on and discuss a series of memos
().
4 that have come to be known as the Kelly-Dunn memorandum.
5 Did you receive a memorandum dated. November 1st, 6
1977, in.which Mr. Kelly raised concerns about customer guidance 7
related to the high pressure injection system operation?
8 A
I don't recall if I received that memorandum.
9 MR. HEBDON:
Let's go off the record a minute.
10
[ Discussion off the record.]
II MR. HEBDON:
Let's go back on the record.
I2 BY MR. HEBDON :
13 rg Q
For the record, this is a memo from Mr. Kelly to V
I4 distribution list dated November 1st, 1977.
Subject is 15 customer guidance on high pressure injection operation.
16 Do you recall ever seeing that memo?
17
[ Handing document to witness.]
18 A
I do not recall seeing this memo prior to the TMI 2 I9, incident.
1 20 Q
Okay.
Now if you'll notice, it is addressed to 21 you, you are one of the first names on the distribution.
t 22 A
That is correct.
{~j}
t 23 j
Q Can we assume from that that a copy was in fact provided to you, and it's just a matter of recollection, f
24
%g y L,pc amorms, ine.
that you don't recall seeing it?
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11 A
I think that's a valid assumption.
j 0
So then you don't recall reviewing this particular 2
4 mem at all, then?
3 A
I do not.
4 0
Do you recall any discussions with Mr. Kelly about 5
the issues that are raised in this memo?
6 A
No, sir, I do not recall.
7 0
Do you racall any discussions with him about the 8
operation of the high pressure injection system?
9 i
l A
No, I do not.
10 ji 0
Would it have been normal for him to discuss such issues with you?
12 A
That's a difficult question to answer.
I believe 13 (m)
Joe discussed the issue with Eric Swanson, that was his ja immediate supervisor at that time, and I was added to the 15 distribution to this for information that Joe was trying to get 16 opinions from the rest of the distribution list as to his 37 thoughts on this incident, ig I believe if Joe or Eric had thought it were j9 4i significant enough to demand immediate attention, they would l
20 ll have personally called it to my attention.
I don't believe 21 that happened on this instance.
22
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0 Okay.
So then it wouldn't have been all that 23 24 l! unusual for him not to bring this issue up with you specifically?
gw; sepo,eni. inc.
25 A
I think that's accurate.
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Q Do you recall receiving a memorandum dated February 2
9th, 1978, in which a Mr. Dunn raised concerns about operator 3
interruption of high pressure injection?
O(_/
4 A
No, I do not recall receiving that memorandum.
5 Q
There are actually two memos involved.
One is the 6
memo dated February 9 th,1978 from Mr. Dunn to Mr. Taylor.
7 The subject is operator interruption of the high pressure 8
injection.
9 And the second one is dated February 16th,1978, 10 from Mr. Dunn to Mr. Taylor on the same subject.
Il
[ Handing documents to the witness.]
12 Do you recall ever seeing either of those two memos?
13 A
I do not recall seeing either of these memos prior 14 to the TMI 2 accident.
15 Q
Do you recall ever discussing these issues with 16 Mr. Dunn?
17 A
No, I do not.
18 Q
Okay.
19 BY MR. FOLSOM:
l 20 Q
Each one of those has your name as one of the o
21 distributees or copies, recipient of copies.
Was this a pro 22 forma matter that copies would be sent to you?
U~
what I did with them back at this time.
7 BY MR. HEBDON:
8 9
0 You don't recall seeing those memos or addressing 10 these issues prior to the accident at TMI?
11 A
That is correct.
12 O
Okay.
Did you receive a memorandum dated August 3rd 13 1978, in which Mr. Hallman discusses the issue of operator
)
14 interruption of high pressure injection?
i 15 A
Yes, I do recall receiving that memorandum.
f fromMr.Hallman.fo 16 0
For the record, I have here a memo-17 Mr. Karrasch, dated August 3rd, 1978, subject is operator 18 interruption of high pressure injection.
19ll
[ Handing document to the witness.]
l 20 :
Is that the memo that you recall seeing?
i 21 A
Yes, sir, it is.
l t
7, 22 Q
First of all, the two ref erences cited in that memo 1
( s) s 23 are the two memos from Mr. Dunn to Mr. Taylor that were just i
discussed.
Do you recall reviewing those references as a l
24
- Aches neoonen, inc.
25 result of receiving this memo?
t i
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A I do not believe that I did.
2 Q
Okay.
But you do recall receiving this memo?
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3 A
Yes, sir, I do.
rx A
a What was your understanding of the issues that
()
5 were raised in this memo?
6 A
My understanding of this was that Don Hallman was s
7 asking two specific questions of me, the manager of Plant 8
Integration, and I should take appropriate action to answer 9
his questions.
10 0
What were the two specific questions that he asked?
II A
If the pressurizer goes solid with one or more HPI 12 pumps continuing to operate, would there be a pressure spike 13 before the reliefs open which could cause damage to the RCS, f3(. )
14 first question.
15 And two, what damage would the water surge through 16 the relief valve discharge piping and quench tank cause.
17 Q
If I'm not mistaken, you've just read from the i
IB letter those two questions.
I9 A
Correct.
l l
20 -
Q What was your understanding of why he was asking i
21 those questions?
22 A
I don't believe at the time I received the memoran-i
,-}
.j 23 dum that I asked myself that question or that I delved into it l
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24 in that much detail.
I took the memorandum, noted the two Ajlkers peponen. ine.
j 25 questions that Don was asking me, and passed it on with a note i i
15 at the top to one of the people who works for me in Plant 3
Integration, and asked him to please address Don's questions 2
3 and respond back.
MR. FOLSOM:
May we go off the record just a moment.
(~j) 4 g
[ Discussion off the record.]
5 MR. FOLSOM:
Back on the record.
6 For the record, we would.like to insert the memoran-7 dum from Mr. Hallman to Mr. Karrasch in the record as Insert 8
No. 3 at this point.
9
[The document follows:]
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end a chsi.ge in 3M's philescphy fer n?!
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To date, i uclear Servic'e h:s ne: notified our op' era:ing plan:s to ch:n c EFI pelicy vi:h T.cferences 1 and 2 becaus e cf our che;.e-s:ated ques ticas.
Yet, the censis:en:
the pestibili:y of uncovering the core if,p cscn: E?I p.olicy is.
references su;;es:
con:inued.
i*e request the: In:c. g ::ica.:ccolve the issue of' hev. the.E?.I.sys ten. shc. uld. be used.
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16 1
BY MR. HEBDON:
2 Q
In the beginning parts of this memorandum, there is a rx (J
l I
3 discussion of the fact that references 1 and 2, the Dunn to
/.
(-)
4 Taylor memos, recommend a change in B&W's philosophy for 5
high pressure injection system, and. talk about just a basic 6
description of what that change would be.
O -
7 Did this memo raise any curiosity in your mind as 8
to what this was all about?
9 A
I cannot recall exactly except to say that I believe 10
'I scanned the memorandum very quickly to find what I perceived i
II at that time to be the important issues, and those were the 12 two questions that Don was asking me.
And I knew where those g7 two questions could best be answered within my group, and I 13 Q,)
14 took action to send the memorandum on.
15 I do not recall understanding the significance of 16 the referenced memorandums or of the opening paragraph.
17 Q
When you reviewed this memo, did you recognize 18 that the action that Mr. Hallman is calling for is a request i
l9 !; that Integration -- by which I assume he means Plant Integra-o 20 tion -- resolve the issue of how the high pressure injection f
21 system should be used?
Did you recognize that as an issue, as 22
/~]
being the real objective of this memorandum?
a 23 A
No, sir, I did not.
1 24 Q
Okay.
Now you mentioned that you sent this on to derst Reporters. inc.
25 someone within your group.
Todwhom did you send it?
l.
t l
c
17 j
A I sent it either to afellow named Art McBride or to
(-
2 Eric Swanson.
I do not recall which one.
3 0
Have you subsequent to TMI had any discussions with i
either of these two gentlemen to see if either one of them
(}
)
4 recalls having received this memo?
5 A
Yes, I have.
I talked to both of them subsequent 6
and they do not recall receiving the memo or taking 7
to TMI, any action on it.
8 9
Q Do you have any sort of an internal document 10 control system that might indicate where this thing went?
11 A
I did not at that time.
12 BY MR. FOLSOM:
13 0
Do you know where it went?
7,
'~'
14 A
No, sir, I do not.
15 BY MR. HEBDON:
l Q
So it's your understanding that you forwarded it 16 i
17 co one of these two people, but neither one of them recalls l
l 18 ever receiving it, and I would assume they've checked their j
i 19 f iles to see if they have it in their files?
l o
i 20 '
A That is correct.
21 Q
So as far as we can tell, it came to you, and you l
l 22 sent it on and it hasn't been seen since?
,xx i
(_)
I 23 A
Correct.
24 BY MR. FOLSOM:
4 hkera! Reporters, tnc.
I 25 0
Would it be fair to say as a consequence that as l
r-18 f ar as you know, no action was ever taken on it?
j 2
A No, that is not true.
I took action later in the 3
sequence of events prior to TMI 2, but the initial action,
()
4 my receiving the memorandum and seeing what I thought were two specific questions to be answered and passing it on is all --
5 6
you know, that's' what I recall about the initial action on that o.
memo in the month of August.
7 BY MR. HEBDON:
8 9
0 Okay.
Could you go on then and describe what did 10 eventually happen, what additional actions you took with respect 11 to this issue?
12 A
Okay.
Mr. Hallman on several occasions prior to 13 the end of 1978 inquired as to the status of his request, and
()
14 I responded to him that I had passed the memorandum on to 15 someone else in the group, and he should be expecting a 16 response.Right aiter the first of the year, I recall a 17 contact with Don again, and a discussion revolving about this 18 memorandum, and I recall taking action myself to try and 19 a nswer the questions.
We hadn't gotten a response obviously 20 from either Swanson or McBride; and I knew at that time, I l
21 thought that I had some time to look into it myself af ter the 22 first of the year, 1979, and I do recall getting the memorandum gm i d
[
23 from some place.
I may have even asked Don to send me another l
l 24 copy, and looking at it, and looking at the two questions, l
!j A(~N.r.:
3 t
n.coners. inc.
i 25 and taking action myself to convince myself that the two i
l
\\
l l
i
19 1
questions could be answered affirmatively, and it -- well, let 2
me leave it at that.
m 2
N,I 3
Q So then some time in January you did take the memo
!([j 4
and look at it.
Now prior to that time Mr. Hallman raised 5
the issue with you, I assume, some number of times, as to 6
whether or not a response was being prepared.
m 7
Do you recall if you made any effort to find the 8
person to whom you had sent it, to ask them if they were in 9
fact working on it?
10 A
I'm quite sure that I did not make that follow-up.
11 Q
Is there any reason why you didn' t?
12 A
I can't recall if there is a specific reason why I I
13 didn't.
I
(_)
i 14 0
Well, would it have been a normal practice if 15 someone came over to you and asked, "Where is the response to 1
i 16 my memo?" -- would it have been a normal practice not to go 1
i i
17 and find the person who was working on it and ask them how l
18 they were coming or if they were making any progress or i
19 anything was being done, or if they ever even planned to get n
N l
20 '
to it?
l 1
21 A
I would say that's a normal practice within B&W.
i l
22 It just didn't happen on this occasion.
,cy
\\)
23 l Q
Okay.
Now you mentioned that you did sit down and l
li 24 review the two specific qucstions that are included in this i
Ahers a. porters, inc.
25 I
memo.
What was your conclusion concerning each of the two l
I l
i
20 l
questions?
(')
2 A
We had been, in the fall of 1978, doing a considerable v
3 amount of work on another issue which could result in water
(_)
4 relief,through the sfety valves.
5 Q
Nhat was -hat?
6 A
Anticipated transient without scram issue, which is 7
an event where the pressurizer can go solid very quickly due 8
to reactor coolant system overheating and cause water relief 9
through the safety valves into the cuench tank, and our 10 evaluations on the ATWS issue showed that even though the 11 safety valves and the piping in the quench tank were not 12 qualified for water relief, that the evaluations we had done
(^)
13 to date showed that it was an acceptable condition for those
\\._)
i 14 valves.
So my being aware of that and connecting that up with 15 the two questions, I was then able to respond back to Don, 16 which I did verbally, and I told Don that the -- I'm not I
17 sure exactly what the words were, but they were to the ef f ect 18 that his two questions could be answered af finnatively.
l 1
19 0
Well, now, wait a minute.
i i
20 A
That water relief through the safety valve was j
i 21 an acceptable condition.
l l
22 Q
Okay.
By affirmatively, you don't mean that the i
\\_/
I 23 answer to the cuestions is ves?
1 1
24 A
No.
Merst Resmriers. Inc.
25 Q
All right.
Now the second question, it seems to i
4 I
I l i
21 I
specifically address what we were just talking about.
It says 2
what damage would the water surge through the relief valve 3
discharge piping and quench tank cause?
O V
4 As I understand what you're saying, your answer to 5
that is it wouldn't cause any unacceptable damage?
6 A
That is correct.
7 Q
And the other one is if the pressurizer goes solid 8
with one or more HPI pumps continuing to operate, would 9
there be a pressure spike before the relief valve opens which 10 would cause damage to the reactor coolant system?
I As I understand it, then, your answer to that was 12 there would not be a pressure spike that could cause damage.
13 A
That is correct.
Our evaluations in the ATWS Id had shown that the relief, opening of the relief valves 15 more than offset the insurge as the pressurizer becomes full, 16 and that no big spike in pressure would occur which could I7 causa damage to the reactor coolant system.
18 Q
Now you said that you relayed this information to i
}0 Mr. Karrasch -- or, excuse me, to Mr. Hallman.
Approximately l
l 20 when did you nave this discussion with him?
t 21 A
I had that discussion some time between January 15th' 22 and March 15th.
That's about as close as I can put it in the 23 timeframe.
O O
Did you just call him up and tell him that this 24 Al u m i h.pon m.inc.
25 was the response to his memo, or what sort of context was this j l
I l
l
22 n
I conversation?
2 A
It was an informal conversation, and I do not i
3 recall exactly how it went, but I do remember contacting Don 4
and telling him that I had reviewed the two questions that~he 5
had asked in the memorandum, and that as a result of knowledge 6
that I had gained in the ATWS issue that I could now answer his g.
7 questions such that water relief through the discharge valves 8
was an acceptable condition.
9 0
When did you gain this knowledge from the ATWS 10 evaluation?
II A
I cannot' recall the exact date.
12 Q
Approximately when?
13 A
During the fall of 1978.
Id Q
So then some time during the fall of 1978, you 15 realized that this question of water passing through the 16 relief valve really was not a particularly significant concern?
I7 A
That is correct.
18 Q
What was Mr. Hallman's reaction when you provided I9 him with this information?
20 A
I don't recall exactly, excppt to say that it was 21 an acknowledgement to me that I had answered his question, 22 and thank you, and that was all.
There was no real discussion 23 or definition of follow-up action on either one of our parts.
24 O
Q Did he give you any indication as to whether or noti
, AL,, erd Reporters. Inc.
l 25 he felt that the issue was closed?
I
r 23 A
No, sir, he did not.
j 2
0 Did you provide any of this information to either 3
Mr. Dunn or Mr. Taylor?
(
A No, I did not.
4 5
0 Do you recall if Mr. Kelly was involved with this at all?
6 A
I do not recall.
My guess is he was not, but I 7
can't recall for sure about Joe.
8 9
0 Do you recall if during your conversation with Mr. Hallman, he addressed this last paragraph of the memo 10 11 that talks about the fact that Integration should resolve the issue of how the high pressure injection system should'be 12 used?
13 14 A
I don't believe -- our conversation was very short, and I do not believe he asked me about that.
15 16 0
Okay.
Now this conversation with Mr. Hallman was 17 some time between January and March.
Was that the end of it?
Was there any other activity associated with this particular ig 19 issue?
l 20 A
There was none.
l r
21 0
Have you been involved with this particular issue 22 subsequent to TMI?
23 A
Yes, sir, I have.
I I
24 j
Q Could you describe that involvement?
A[ r s
erd Reporters, lm.
l l
t w
25 l
A As a result of the President's Commission inquiring !
i l
I l
e 24 as to our involvement in the TMI 2 incident, this same series j
2 of memos was also questioned some time later in the summer --
(
'\\
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I
/
3 I suspect it was in August some time -- and the same line of l
i questioning was given to mequnder oath by the Kameny Commission l
/~S
(_,)
4 also.
5 0
Other than your testimony to the Kameny Commission, 6
3 do you recall any other involvement with this issue?
7 A
No, sir.
8 9
0 Okay.
10 MR. HEBDON:
Do you have any more questions in this l 11 area before we go on?
12 MR. FOLSOM:
No.
em 13 BY MR. HEBDON:
I
'J ja O
I'd like to go on and ask you some more general I
15 questions, particularly relating to plant procedures, i
16 Based on your understanding of the B&W organization,j l
17 who in B&W was responsible for preparing plant operating i
18 procedures?
19 A
My understanding is that the utility is responsible !
I 20 '
forrpreparing plant operating procedures.
i 21 Q
Does B&W prepare draft procedures?
j i
22 A
To my knowledge, we do.
I don't know if they're I
.)
23 called draft procedures.
I do know that we prepare some type i
24 ! of operating procedure which goes to the utility custe.3er j
Aherd Reporters, Inc.
25 for him to use as the basis for his operating procedures.
i t
I
i 25 1
O Is your group involved with that particular activity 2
at all?
,_.s l
)
v 3
A We are at times called upon to review certain of the documentation which is prepared by Customer ~ Service which
(_,)
4 5
has the responsibility for the procedures.
We are sometimes 6
asked to review those for them on certain areas where my group 3
7 has a special expertise.
8 Q
How does your group include operational information 9
in the review of these operating procedures?
10 A
Part of the documentation which my group is 11 responsible for is called a reactor coolant system description, 12 and a secondary system description.
Our review of their 13 procedures -- our review of the procedures prepared by Nuclear 7s
)
w/
14 Services is to assure that there is a consistency of informa-i 15 tion in the procedures and in the design of the reactor coolant 16 system as defined in our document.
17 An example might be that the procedures might f
I i
18 call out a value of reactor coolant system flow rate, and 19 what it is supposed to do when you secure reactor coolant 20 pump as instruction to the operator.
Our review would be to t
21 assure that that description in the procedures is consistent l
l withthewaytheplantreallyworksasdefinedinourdocumentah 22
< s N-]
l 23 tion, our reactor coolant system description.
24 Q
Okay.
Based on your knowledge, who at B&W was j
,A eral Reprters, Inc.
25 l
responsible f or preparing standard technical specifications?
i t
I 1
26 1
A The Licensing Section in Engineering in responsible, 2
I believe they are responsible for standard technical specifica-
, g-)
V 3
tions.
()
4 0
Is your group involved with that activity at all?
5 A
Yes.
Again our group can be called upon by 6
Licensing to assist in the preparation and review of technical D -
7 specifications in those areas where we have design responsibility.
8 0
In the work that your group does in the design area, 9
how do you become aware of and then f actor into your design 10 work tne operational experience as developed at the various 11 plants?
12 A
Our group becomes aware of operational experience 13 through the site problem report procedure which is part of S
(G 14 the NPGD operating procedures.
We are called upon to review 15 and select one of those also -- a select number of those, 16 and determine if the site problem report is applicable to 17 other operating plants and if the site problem report should 18 lead to design change on our future jobs, which are in the l
l 19 construction stage or in the preconstruction stage, but are
{
i 20 still contracts.
l 21 O
Who decides which site problem reports you should 22 review?
23 A
The Customer Service Department does that.
f-0 Do you recall if your group reviewed the site i
24 A( S, ers Reorters. lm.
l 25 problem report for the Davis-Besse incident in September of I
I l
27
'77?
A No, sir, I do not. :all.
2 U
3 0
W uld you have any record of whether or not that
()
site problem report was sent to you?
4 A
I do not have a record of that.
Customer Service 5
Department could have that record.
4 o.
7 Q
okay.
I'd like to ask you some questions about some of your activities immediately following the accident 8
9 at TMI, particularly about the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.-
Would you describe your involvement with the TMI 10 11 task force that was formed on March 28th, 1979?
12 A
Let me describe my activities from March 28th on.
13 0
okay.
O 14 A
I'm not quite sure when the task force was 15 formally set up.
I was informed that there was an incident at TMI 2 16 some time during the morning of March 28th,~ after arriving
- 7 18 in the office.
I guess all I can really recall is getting 19 informed that the plant status was as follows, and I can i
20 recall the reactor coolant pumps were off, the reactor coolant j 21 pressure was high, and that the plant had gone into a loss of feedwater -- had had a loss-of-feedwater incident at 4 :00 22 23 o' clock in the morning, and that we were trying to get more 24 data as to what had happened.
I was informed of this pretty i.
('N A( 7v11 Reporters.1%
j 25 early on Wednesday morning, j
i l
l
28 b-Q Approximately what time?
)
A Appr ximately 8:00 or 9:00 o' clock.
2
(
)
Q In this initial status report, do you recall any 3
()
discussion of the hot leg temperatures?
4 A
No, sir, I do not.
5 Q
Do you recall any discussion of the status of the 6
high pressure injection system, whether it was on or off?
7 A
No, I do not, 8
t Q
Okay, go on then with your discussion.
9 A
Okay, that was a briefing in the morning, and it 10 ij was to alert us to the fact that this loss of feedwater had 12 occurred, and that we were going to be getting data and more em 13 information in the upcoming hours, and meeting again at 1:00 14 o' clock in the afternoon, sometime around the noon hour, to 1
take a look at the data and make an evaluation.
15 16 Q
Excuse me.
Make an evaluation of what?
A Our normal course on incidents which f all outside 17 the normal anticipated transients is to get data from the plant 18 19 as to what the performance was of the reactor coolant system 20 and assist the utility in chtermining if the plant had sustained '
l 21 any damage.
So our normal course of action will be, on an l
l
~c 22 incident like this, is to get data from the utility customer j
d 23 through the Customer Service Department, do an engineering I
24 ; evaluation as to any damage to the reactor coolant system, at erst Reporters, Inc, 25 times try and help the utility determine what the cause of the i
l l
'I
29 accident was, and how to correct it, and then get the plant j
2 started up again. - So when these things happen, it becomes a O
relatively high priority ef fort within Customer Service and 3
Engineering to respond to the utility.
(_).
4 5
Q Was there any perception at this 8:00 to 9:00 o' clock meeting that the plant was not in a safe and stable 6
o._
condition?
7 A
About the only thing I can remember is that the 8
reactor coolant pumps were off at that status review, and 9
that's a very abnormal condition.
That doesn't occur very 10 11 frequently in our plants, and I -- my personal thoughts were I'd really like to see what happened and get data, because 12 that -- that's a unique condition for our plants.
But that's 13 G
ja really all I recall.
13 Q
But to put this in context, was the meeting from 16 the perspective of we need to start doing the analysis so 17 we can get the plant started back up again; or was it from the perspective of they've still got a problem and we've 18 19 got to try to figure out what we can do to help?
I' go A
At that time it was the former.
The incident was 21 over, things were under control, and now let's find out what r
22 happened and take action.
\\_'/
23 Q
Okay.
Now would you go on with your discussion.
24 A
Well, at the noon session or the 1:00 o' clock j
g-As,%ers Reporters, ine.
25 session, that perception had changed very rapidly, because t
I
30 at that session I can recall hearing that the pumps were still 1
of f, the operators were trying to establish natural circulation, 2
the reactor coolant pressure was very low, less than 1000 --
3 i
()
between 500 and 1000 pounds.
And there were temperature 4
readings -- I don't recall, of the in-core thermocouples or 5
6 RTDs c;. the hot legs, that were in excess of 600 degrees, and as we were attempting to get more information between the 7
hours of like 1:00 o' clock and 3 :00 or 4 :00 o' clock that 8
9 afternoon, it became pretty clear to me that that was a 10 significant problem, and voiding in the reactor coolant system.
11 And it was a large group of people, you know, 12 a room about twice the size of this, trying to get data and communicate with the site.
,s 13 I
\\
Lj 14 0
rid you have any involvement with this activity I
15 between the 8:00 o' clock in the morning meeting and the 16 second meeting?
17 A
No, sir, I did not.
18 0
So you just went away and went about your normal 19 j duties and then went back to it at the later meeting?
I l
20 A
YeS-i 21 '
0 At that meeting did you have any indication of r-'
22 when the people here at B&W became aware of the hot leg
(._)
23 temperatures?
24 A
No, sir, I do not.
You mean when prior to that d
berei neporters, inc.
25 meeting?
i I
1 l
31 i
0 When prior to that meeting.
rm 2
A No, sir.
k_)
3 0
So you recall that they were aware of it at the
(')
second meeting, but you don't know when between the first 4
meeting and the second meeting they learned of it?
5 6
A That is correct.
o-_
7 0
Okay.
Do you recall at that time any discussion about the fact that the plant had established a strategy of 8
trying to depressurize the system and blow it down in order 9
a to ensure that the core was covered by dumping the core flood 10 11 tanks into the core?
12 A
No, sir, I do not recall that discussion.
13 0
Do you recall a discussion of that issue at any time?
l bu2 ja A
No, I really can't say for sure.
There were many 15 discussions going on in a large room filled with people about 16 natural circulation, reactor coolant pumps on or off, high 17 Pressure injection flow rate, how can the plant possibly be 18 in this set of conditions; those types of things.
And I 19 don' t really recall the specifics of that four-hour af ternoon 20 during March 28.
21 0
During that period, what sort of communications i
22 did you have with the Unit 2 control room?
l k'_')s 23 A
We had none.
We were receiving second-hand i
information through the site operations engineer who was at l
24 g-f l A(,)eral Recrter. Me 25 his home in Harris-- somewhere in the Harrisburg area.
He was ;
k, I
32 not on the site, and he was getting -- he was getting, at i
least I believe he was getting phone calls from a B&W
<x-2
)
representative who was in the control room.
I 3
l 0
Could you name those two people?
(,)
4 A
I believe the B&W guy in the control room was Lee 5
Rogers, and the site engineer who was relaying us the informa-6 c -
tion was Greg Schadel.
7 Q
And so you were using this relay system then to get 8
information back and forth; is that correct?-
9 10 A
That is correct.
11 BY MR. FOLSOM:
12 O
Who on this end was manning the telepho.'e with l
em 13 Schadel?
)
l 14 A
We had all the department managers for sure were I
15 there.
Mr. Dentons, Dr. Roy, Mr. Caseba. Mr. McMillan was not j 16 there.
I know that those three.
i 17 0
Was it an open mike type of telephone conversation? [
18 A
Yes, it was, very much so.
19 BY MR. HEBDON:
q h
20 j Q
Did you feel that you were having any difficulty i
i 21 getting information from the plant as to the status?
j
("
22 A
Yes, sir.
We felt we couldn't really -- the V) 23 information would come every one or two hours, and when we 24 l finally realized we were voiding in the reactor coolant system,,
d derd Reporters, inc.
t it was qcite frustrating to sit there and wait for the telephone 25 i
i h
t
33 I
to ring.
That's about all we could do.
^
2 O
Were you able to ask questions of the status of the f
)
C/
3 plant and get answers, or was the communication more than just
(_)
4 "here's the latest status report"?
5 A
"Here 's the latest s tatus, and I can' t answer your 6
questions, but I will try. "
w 7
Q Did you eventually get the answers to your questions?
8 A
Not really during that afternoon.
We got the data 9
and we were trying to determine why the plant had gotten to 10 that condition and the message we were relaying across the 11 telephone was make sure they turn on the high pressure injec-12 tion system.
13 Q
At what point did you make that recommendation?
i
(~'/)
l
\\_
14 A
As soon as we determined that there was voiding 15 in the reactor coolant system.
l 16 O
Which would be about when in time?
l 17 A
I think it was relatively early in the af ternoon, 18 between the hours of 1:00 o' clock and 3:00 o' clock.
i 19 Q
Do you recall any indication that the high
!Ii pressure injection system was turned off?
l 20 l
1 21 A
That was one of the questions we couldn't get I
22 answered.
(~')
x-j 23 Q
So then your recommendation was more in the context !
?
l l
24 of "if it's turned off, turn it on," is that correct?
i l Ac erp Reporurs.1%
25 A
That is correct.
4 I
34 1
Q Although you were unable to find out whether it was
~
2 on or off?
3 A
That is correct.
()
4 Q
When did you find out whether or not it was on or 5
off?
6 A
I don't believe until long af ter that -- you know, m..
7 long after that day when we really started to delve into 8
the sequence of events which would be weeks afterwards that 9
we really discovered whether it was -- whether it was on or 10 off.
11 0
So then it's your perception that during the --
12 at least the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> immediately following the accident, 13 the people here at B&W weren't able to determine whether the 14 high pressure injection system was on or of f?
15 A
Yeah, I can only speak for my own -- from my own 16 recollection.
17 0
Understood.
Based on your perception.
18 A
I think that's right.
i I?
O Do you recall receiving a request from the plant f
20 at some pc: :t to calculate how much high pressure injection l
21 flow to maintain?
i 22 A
No, I do not recall that.
23 BY MR. FOLSOM:
1 i
- ( s, Q
Do you recall any directions from this end to the 24 Ac, just Roorters. lm f
i l
25 plant, to Mr. Schadel, as to what amount of high pressure t
i
35 I
injection should be?
2 A
I do not recall a number.
I do recall that at
( ')
w/
3 least personally I was with Bert Dunn, he was in the meeting k
4 also, and we both knew what was going on, that there was voidin 5
and our bmmediate reaction was to get all the water that you 6
can into the system.
That message came.
7 Q
To whom did you communicate that reaction?
8 A
Greg Schadel, on the other end of the telephone.
9 BY MR. HEBDON:
About when do you recall making that recommendation?
10 Q
II A
I am sure it was prior to 3:00 o' clock in the 12 afternoon.
13 Q
Okay.
What caused you to realize that there was I
(')
l
(_/
14 void formation in the reactor coolant system?
l t
i 15 A
The data that we got back on temperature and l
16 pressure in the reactor coolant system.
i 17 Q
Do you recall what specifically caused you to 18 realize that?
j i
19 i A
Well, I can remember in my own mind hearing a I
20 l pressure of 5 or 600 pounds and a temperature of 600 degrees, l
l 21 and I renember the steam tables well enough to know that i
(^;
22 that's just a long ways from being subcooled, and I can
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23 remember my reaction that, you know, my goodness, the system 24 is voiding.
l AcSr3 Reporters, Inc.
25 Q
Approximately when do you recall hearing that?
i i
i l
36 A
Between the hours of 1:00 and 3:00 o' clock.
j 2
BY MR. FOLSOM:
7
(
)
3 Q
Did Bert Dunn say to you, " Hey, that sounds like
'~'
Davis-Besse"?
(J) 4 5
A I'm sure he did not.
BY MR. HEBDON:
6 1
0 You don't recall anyone making any parallels 7
l between the accident that was occurring at TMI and the incident 8
that occurred earlier at Davis-Besse?
9 10 A
No, sir, I do not.
11 Q
Okay.
Do you recall anyone making a phone call to Mr. Arnold of Met Ed some time around 4:00 or 4:30 in the 12 r~s -
13 afternoon?
e
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14 A
No, sir, I do not.
i 15 Q
The subject would have been, one, the issue of I
i 16 repressurizing the system, and the other would have been i
i
- 7 giving him a number for HPI flow.
Do you recall any conversa-18 tions with anyone other than Mr. Schadel concerning those two 19,
issues?
20 A
I recall that Mr. Dentons and Dr. Roy were trying i
l very hard to communicate with the site through a different 21 i
r-22 channel than Mr. Schadel, and on occasion they would step j
(l 23 out of the big room into Mr. Dentons' office which was right I
i 24 next to the room, and make phone calls.
But that's as far kd Rewrtm. inc.
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- A 25 as my recollection really goes.
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37 Q
But you don't recall such n phone call being made j
from the central conference room that you were using?
2 3
A I do not.
Q Do you know of any other precursor events that
(
)
4 you believe are relevant to the accident at TMI?
5 Let me define what we mean by a precursor event.
6 3.._
It's basically any event or incident or issue that 7
might have indicated that an accident such as the accident 8
that occurred at TMI would happen at some point in the future.
9 10 Using that as a definition, do you know of any 11 other precursor events that you think are relevant?
12 A
No, sir, I do not.
l O
Do you have any additional information that you 13 ;
I v
14 believe might be relevant to our inquiry into the events 15 surrounding the accident at TMI?
i 16 A
No, I do not.
l 17 Q
Have we f ailed to elicit any information in areas 18 that you believe to be important?
i 19 A
No.
t i
20 Q
Is there anything else you'd like to add?
)
A No, sir.
l 21 l
MR. HEBDON:
Do you have any additional questions?
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22 O
l MR. FOLSOM:
No, I don't.
Thank you.
23 24 MR. HEBDON:
That's all we have.
Thank you very lAc ret Reporters. W 25 much.
38 l
[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m.,
the interview
~
2 was adjourned.]
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