ML19308C390
| ML19308C390 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1979 |
| From: | Jones Rc BABCOCK & WILCOX CO., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001230360 | |
| Download: ML19308C390 (87) | |
Text
_ _ _ _.
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O N U CLE A R RE G U L AT O R'I CO MMIS SIO N I
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I IN THE MATTER OF:
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l TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY i
DEPOSITION l,
l DEPOSITION OF ROBERT C. JONES, JR.
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Place - Lynchburg, Virginia Date - Wednesday, October 3, 1979 Pages i _ 37 j
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!1 Tei.chene:
(20:13a-37 o ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficistReponers m Ncch Ccpitel Street Washington, D.C. 20001 00y y QO NATIONWIDE COVERAGE - DAILY i
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CR 7476 1
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AR
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2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
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4 N/
DEPOSITION OF:
5 ROBERT C. JONES, JR.
6
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x l'
7 8
Conference Roon A i
j Babcock & Wilcox 9j Old Forest Road Lynchburg, Virginia 10 {
l Wednesday, October 3, 1979 11 !
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l 12 l NRC/TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP l
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14L The interview of ROBERT C. JONES, JR. commenced at 15 11:00 a.m.
16 ll Present for the NRC:
Fred Hebdon and Fred Folsom.
I' 17 l!
Present for Babcock & Wilcox:
George Edgar, John
- 5 L Mullin and L sta Cannon.
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Ace ret Reporters. Inc.
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_C _O _N _T E N T _S 1
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2 Witness:
Examination by:
Page:
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4 ROBERT C. JONES, JR.
Mr. Hebdon & Mr. Folsom 3
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_P _R _O C_ _E _E _D ' _I N_ _G G_
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2 Whereupon,
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,RT C.
JONES, JR.
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was called as a witness end, having been first duly sworn, a
5; was examined ar'
.etified as follows:
6 EXAMINATION 7
BY MR. HEBDON:
8 Q
fould you please state your full name for the t
9' record.
l t
10 A
Robert Clarence Jones, Jr.
i i
i II l Q
For the record, this is a letter to Mr. Jones, f
12 '
dated October 1st, 1979 from a Mr. Mitchell Rogovin, Di"ector j
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,3 13 ll of the NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group.
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Have you read this document?
f 15 A
Yes.
t, 16 Q
Do you understand the information set forth in this j U i! letter, including the general nature of the NRC/TMI Special j
i Inquiry, your right to have an attorney present here today ic "
t as your representative, and the f act that the information 22 you provide here may eventually become public?
i l
i 2I A
Yes.
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22 l.
O Are you represented by counsel today?
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23 !!
A Yes.
24 '
MR. HEBDON:
Would you please state your name?
kr9 Reponers, inc.
Am 25 l MR. EDGAR:
My name is George Edgar.
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BY MR. HEBDON:
2 O
You should be aware that the testimony you give
(
)
3 has the same force and ef fect as if you were testifying in a 7
(
)
4 court of law.
My questions and your responses are being taken 5
down, and they will later be transcribed.
You will be given 6
the opportunity to look at that transcript and make any 7
changes that you deem necessary.
8 However, to the extent that your subsequent 9
changes are significant, those changes may be viewed as 10 affecting your credibility.
So please be as complete and Il accurate as you can in responding to my questions.
12 '
If you at any point during the deposition do not i
l 13 understand a question, please feel free to stop us and we'll j
73 i
i n,/
14 try to clarify the cuestion for you.
15 Do you have any questions?
16 '
A No.
)
i 17 Q
What is your current position?
?
13 li A
Supervisory engineer in ECCS Analysis.
I I
o IE Q
Would you briefly explain what that particular I
20 f position involves?
I n
i A
Basically it's just supervisor work of approximatelyj 21 ]
22 six engineers performing ECCS type calculations.
(~~')
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23 This includes large and small break analyses, as u
24 required by NRC, generation of mass and energy inputs, and i
' Adllbrd Reoorters, ine.
25 various other sundry type related activities, containment i
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5 1
pressure, et cetera.
(~)
2 Q
All right.
What was your position in late 1977?
I
(_/
f 3
A I was a senior engineer at that time, functioning i
I also as an acting supervisory engineer.
(
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5 Q
When did you become a supervisory engineer?
6 A
I believe it was July of this year, July of 1979.
I have been an acting supervisor, however, since about 1975.
7 g
Q All right.
For whom do you work?
9 A
Bert Dunn.
10 Q
What is your educational background?
11 A
I have a B.S.
in Nuclear Engineering from the 12 Pennsylvania State University.
I graduated 1971.
Presently 13 I am working on a Master's Degree in Physics at Lynchburg
(.si J College.
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14 1
15 0
I understand you have a copy of your resume that l
l you provided, and we'll include that in the record.
16l.
IThe documents follow:]
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October 1,1979 rs
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In Reply Refer to:
NTFTM 791001-05 Mr. R. C. Jones f~ ;
c/o George Edgar, Esquire U
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius Attorneys for Babcock and Wilcox Co.
1800 M Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036
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Dear Pr. Jones:
I a: writing to confir= that your deposition under oath in connection with the accident at Three Mile Island is scheduled for October 2-5, 1979 at Babcock and Wilcox facility, Lynchburg, Virginia.
This will also confirm my request for you to have your resume and any documents in your possession or control regarding TMI-2, the accident or precursor events which you have reason to believe may not be in official NRC files, including any diary or personal working file.
The deposition will be conducted by ce=bers of the NRC's Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island.
This Group is being directed independently of the NRC by the law firm of Rogovin, Stern and Huge.
It includes both URC personnel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and attorneys. Through a delegation of authority frc= the NRC under Section 161(c) of the Atonic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special
(^'/
(_-
Inquiry Group has a broad =andate to inquire into the causes of the accident at Three Mile Island, to identify major proble: areas and to nake reco==enda-tions for change. At the conclusion of its investigation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings and reco=mendations.
Unless you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in the depos-ition is voluntary and there will be no effect on you if you decline to ansuer so=c or all of the questions asked you.
Houevet, the Special Inquiry has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place.
Any person deposed may have an attorney present or any other person he wishes accompany hi= at the deposition as his representative.
You should realice that while we will try to respect any requests for con-fidentiality in connection with the publication of our report, we can nake no t
Names of witnesses and the information they provide nay eventually I
guarantees.
become public, inasmuch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Group's investigation will be made available to the NRC for whatever uses it may deem appropriate.
In time, this information may be made available to the public
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voluntarily, or become available to the public through the Freedom of N/
Information Act.
Moreover, other depar
'nts and agencies of governnent nay request access to this infornation purt..: to the Privacy Act of 1974 The infornation may also be made available in whole or in part to com=ittees or subcornittees of the U.S. Congress.
oFrtCE.
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Mr.
F.. C. Jon:s 2
October 1, 1979 (T
If you have testified preeiously with respect to the Dirce Mile Island V
accident, it would be useful if you could review any _ transcripts of your previous statement (s) prior to the deposition.
(~N Thank you for your cooperation.
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Sincerely, 9
/
3 MitchellRogovin,/, Director liRC/Dil Special Inquiry Group DISTRIBUTION TERA FFolsom
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A RESuuE s.
Robert C. Jones, Jr.
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Supervisory Engineer
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Nuclear Power Generation Division Babcock & Wilcox Co,mpany Lynchburg, Virginia
(_s)
I received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Nuclear. Engineering at Pennsyl-vania State University in June, 1971.
I am presently pursuing a Masters
- of Science in Physics at Lynchburg College.
0._
From June, 1971, to present, I have been employed by the Babcock & Wilcox Company, Nuclear Power Generation Division, in the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Analysis, Unit of the Plant Design Section.
In this area, my prime responsibility has been the performance of both large and small break ECCS analyses under both the Interin Acceptance Criteria and the present acceptance criteria of 10 CTR 50.46 and Appendix K to 10 CFR 50.
Following the issuance of the ECCS criteria of 10 CFR 50.46, I shared the lead re-sponsibility in the development of a compliant ECCS evaluation model to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46.
I have co-authored several B&W topical re-ports relating to the results of the ECCS evaluations.
Since 1975, I have supervised the work of six engineers in the ECCS Analysis My group is responsible for calculation of large and small break ECCS area.
evaluations; calculation of mass and energy releases to the containment
g during the LOCA; cvaluation of the containment pressure transient for the s/
LOCA; best estimate pre-test predictions of LOCA experiments as part of the NRC Standard Problem Program; and performance of ECCS calculations as part of the B&W con' tract R&D program.
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BY MR. HEBDON:
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2 Q
But just as a matter of reference, could you N.)
briefly describe your employment history, including positions 3
l held at B&W?
{v a
A I originally tarted in the ECCS analysis area.
It 5
had a different name at that time, but I don' t ' remember it.
6 a ~
I believe my position then was an assistant engineer.
7 I believe about one year after that I became 8
9 associate engineer, and around 1974 I think I became a full 10 engineer.
11 In 1975, I was appointed acting supervisory 12 l engineer.
13 In
'78, I was made a senior engineer, and just (sx -)
I 14 l this year I was made supervisory engineer.
15 Q
Okay. Has your employment then since graduating l
16 from college been at B&W7 1
17 l A
Yes.
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l
- 3 jl Q
I'd like to ask you some guestions concerning d
an incident that occurred at Davis-Besse on September 24th, ip 20 ll 1977.
I'm particularly interested in your perceptions and l
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21 your understanding prior to the accident at TMI.
,^3 22 Specifically prior to March 28, 1979, what knowledge i
i
. did you have concerning the incident that occurred at Davis-23 24 11 Besse on September 24th, 1977?
l ked Reporters, inc.
A 25 1
A I participated in a review meeting on the 1
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7
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I Davis-Besse transient that was held a day or two following it,
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2 and was headed by Joe Kelly, I believe was the main presenter x-3 of the data.
I 4
That incident involved, I believe, a loss of 5
feedwater type event, I don' t remember, that ultimately 6
resulted in a sticking open of the pilot operator relief a --
7 valve on the generator.
And some time later in the transient, 8
about 10 minutes or so, he closed the valve, and the transient 9
was essentially tenninated.
10 I was cognizant of the fact that he had shut down II the HPI system or throttled it back while the pressurizer 12 level was reading high, and subsequent to that Bert Dunn, 13 myself, and Joe Kelly had a discussion on that, and the in-l
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l# j appropriateness of such an action.
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O Was it a normal function of your job to be included l 15 '
in that particular meeting?
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A That was the first meeting of that type that I had l
l 5i ever been involved in.
I have never seen anv other transient type data of that sort.
ij Q
Why were you involved with that meeting?
Was it 2C q just coincidental that that was the first one you were involved 2I '
t 22 h'I with?
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23 y 7 m not sure how the selection process itself was j
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l 2 [ made.
I believe the reason I was chosen, however, was because Ajgherd Remners, inc y 25 'i the event was a loss-of-coolant type accident for some period i
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of time subsequent to closure of the valve, and this is
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2 dirnetly related to my responsibilities.
O At the time of this meeting, was it your perception 3
/T 4
that this was a loss-of-coolant accident or a depressur,ization
(_)
5 accident?
A Prior to the meeting, I had very little information 6
3 -
7 on the transient.
During the meeting it became obvious that 8
it involved a loss of coolant.
0 Was this the impression that was given by the other 9
10 people there, by Mr. Kelly, for example?
Did it appear that II he would characterize this as a loss-of-coolant accident or a 12 loss-of-pressure accident?
A I do not remember his exact clarification of it.
13 O
Id I believe it would be viewed as a loss-of-coolant accident, 15 but because of its short duration it could just as easily be 16 viewed as a loss-of-pressure accident.
l7 Q
Okay.
Do you recall -- or what do you recall of N
the discussion that went on at that meeting?
lI 10' ;
A Basically it was a presentation of data, what i
22]
happened at the plant, and a little bit of discussion about 21 the cause of the event, which I do not recollect at all, the 22 subsequent sticking open of the valve, the operator actions f
during the transient, and basically that's all I remember out 23 of the meeting itself.
I 24 l Ag,:no an=nus. ine.
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25 What involvement did you have with this particular O
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9
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incident after the meeting?
i A
Well, after the meeting, Bert Dunn, myself and Joe 2
Kelly conferred for a short period of time, discussing-the 3
inappropriateness of the operator terminating the HPI system 4
5 during.the transient.
Following that, I believe either Joe or Bert wrote 6
3 -
several memos relating to that aspect of the transient, and I 7
was involved from the standpoint of reviewing the memos that 8
9 were sent by Bert, and I believe it was on distribution for 10 the memo sent by Joe, and whether or not the prescription that 11 was developed for operator action concerning the HPI system 12 was appropriate, and I agreed with what was written in those 13 memos.
O 14 0
So you agreed then that the prescription that was 15 included in the memos was an appropriate action?
16 A
Yes, from my area of expertise.
17 Q
All right.
I'd like to ask you some specific cuestions about the incident scenario as you recall it, and jg 1-as a point of reference, I have got posted here on the wall a l
1 i
22 graph that was prepared by Mr. Leon Engle of the NRC Staff
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shortly following the Davis-Besse incident.
It's based on 22 reactimeter data that he received, and it's a plot of several
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parameters including pressurizer level, reactor coolant system I
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l 24 l temperature and pressure, and if you want to refer to that A
Terd Reporters, Inc.
25 for reference -- and, in fact, if you want to take a moment l
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10
~
l and look at it now, I think we can go off the record for a i
2 second.
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3
[ Discussion off the record.]
7()
MR. HEBDON:
Let's go back on the record.
4 5
BY MR. HEBDON:
6 0
In the course of the review of this particular event I
7 and the meeting that you had, did you realize that steam formed 8
in the reactor coolant system during the transient?
9 A
Yes.
10 0
What significance did you assign to that fact?
II A
Very little.
It was a normal consequence of the 12 event that occurred, per se.
13 0
So then you didn't find it at all surprising that i
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O, 14 steam formed?
3 i
15 A
Not with the valve stuck open, no.
16 Q
All right.
Did you rtalize that the steam formation l 1
- 7 l in the reactor coolant system caused pressurizer level to i
il y increase while the leak continued?
l
'i A
Yes.
1 2C,
O What significance did you assign to that fact?
I i
i 2I ;
A That again is a normal response to a transient of j
I The fornation of steam in the system is indicative $
22 this type.
('(_)
l 23 [ of an expansion, if you wish, of the fluid which would result l
i 24 0 in a pushing of the water in the reactor coolant loops into Atheci amonm, inc. p 25 ) the pressurizer and the subsequent raising of the level.
l 4
11 1
Q So then you didn't find it particularly surprising
( ')
2 that pressurizer level increased while basically a small LOCA
~
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was continuing?
I
/
4 A
No.
LJ 5
0 That didn't raise any concerns, then, in your mind?
6 A
No.
7 0
You mentioned that you realized the operators had 8
secured high pressure injection.
Now we've had some discussions 9,
with some of the people here at B&W, and as it turns out, the 10 operator secured high pressure injection twice.
Were you aware 11 of that fact?
12 A
I don't know whether I was or wasn't.
I just do l
13 not remember the number of times that it occurred.
I do 7
I 14 l
remember, however, that such an action was taken to terminate.
li 15 O
If you look at this particular graph that we 16 have on the wall, you'll notice that pressurizer level 17 decreases initially and at about two and a half minutes, it is ;i starts coming back up, which I would assume is due to the d
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high pressure injection system.
r 20,1 Then at about four and a half minutes into the i
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event, the operator secures the pressure injection, and i
l 1
,m 22 I, pressurizer level starts going back down again.
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23 l And at about six minutes into the event, pressurizerl 1
1 24 level turns and comes back up, and over abou?. the next two i
. edllFrd Remrters, Inc.
25 i minutes goes back up to the point 'f being cff scale high.
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12 1
Now later on, at about 36 minutes, pressurizer
/T 2
level comes back down very rapidly, and as I understand it at U
3 that point, the operator started high pressure injection again, and then later on, at about 60 minutes into the event, they fi 4
a 5
secured it.
Now in the course of the conversations that you 6
and with Mr. Kelly and Mr. Dunn about the appropriateness of 7
securing the high pressure injection, were you referring to 8
the time that they secured it at about four and a half minutes 9
10 into the event, or the time they secured it about 60 minutes 11 into the event?
12 A
It would be a four and a half minute timeframe 13 rather than the 60 minutes, s
14 l
0 Okay.
So you were talking then about the first i
15 time they secured it?
16 A
Yes.
- 7 Q
Okay.
Now why did you teel that that action was l
13 j inappropriate?
b 1;.
A Basically they have a LOCA situation, they are
- ;i losing coolant from the reactor coolant system.
Injection must b
21 be supplied to the reactor system in order to keep the core I
I 22 covered.
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Later on in the event, if they could not have 23 i
i 24 isolated the break, you would have needed that HPI water for l
fral Reporters IN.
l Aa 25 that purpose.
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Q Okay, now, the later time that they secured it,
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about 60 minutos into the event, would you have considered
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3 that to be inappropriate operator action?
)
4 A
Referring to the graph, no, I would not have.
I believe what has happened at that time is you have essentially 5
6 a full primary system, you have pressurizer level back on sc&le, you have isolated the leak, at such time throttling 7
r termination of the HPI flow to control the pressurizer 8
level is appropriate, so long as the system temperatures are 9
10 subcooled.
11 0
So the second securing, then, you wouldn't have 12 considered to be inappropriate?
13 A
No.
(
)
%/
14 BY MR. FOLSOM.
15 0
For my education as a layman, when is HPI activated?!
l t
16 What events?
17 A
HPI is activated for several classes of events.
j The places that I know of it would be activated are the 13 e
1; loss-of-coolant type accidents, where the reactor coolant l
3.
system would go low, and overcooling type transients, that ll i
is transients where a break may have occurred on the secondary )
21 I
r-22 side of the system, or the generator wes filled totally with l
cold water, resulting in a depressurization of the primary j
23 l
24 syst,em to the ESFAS setpoint, the actuation setpoint.
Those j
Ad h6r:
J Reporters, tx.
25 are the two main types of accidents that you would actuate HPI. !
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14 1
O And this activates automatically, does it not?
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2 A
Yes.
v.)
3 MR. EDGAR:
Would you spell out the acronym ESFAS
(
4 for the reporter?
5 THE WITNESS:
Engineered Safety Features Actuation 6
System.
3 7
MR. EDGAR:
Off the record.
8
[ Discussion off the record.]
9 MR. HEBDON:
Back on the record.
10 BY MR. HEBDON:
11 Q
Now just to follow along just for a moment en 12 Mr. Folsom's question, is there anything that automatically 13 secures high pressure injection?
I
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s 14 A
To the best of my knowledge, no.
I 15 O
So then at some point in any transient that i
16 initiates high pressure injection, somebody's got to turn it ofi?
i 27 A
If it's appropriate to turn it off.
13 ]
Q Right, at some appropriate point, assuming yob ire i
19 not going to l_ ave the thing run forever.
I Now would you go on and discuss a little more i
21 + your conversations with Mr. Dunn and Mr. Kelly about the problem with the operator securing the high pressure injection? l 22
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Basically the conversation was an education, if l
23 !h 1
U 24 ( you wish, of Mr. Kelly to the phenomena that can occur 4
A< gero neponers. ine.
25 ! during a small break in the pressurizer, and the potential d
j 15
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l need of high pressure injection water later on in such a 2
transient, and not remembering all the details of what we said,
)
3 I believe we were pointing out to him that one of the important ;
4
)
factors is the integrated flow into the system, that is the 5
total amount of fluid injected as a function of time, as opposed 6
to the flow at any given time as being the important process.
l 7
Q To your knowledge, why was Mr. Kelly involved 8
with this discussion?
I 9
A I believe Joe was in the Nuclear Services area at 10 that time, and that would then be part.of'his normal function to review plant transients.
12 O
In the course of your discussion with Mr. Dunn and I3 Mr. Kelly, did you give any consideration to the possibility g}
1 Id ;h that the plant might go solid and that there might be a water l
I 15 ' surge through the pilot operated relief valve or through the 16 code safety valve if the high pressure injection system were I7 left on?
f A
I do not remember whether that point came up in j
)
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that conversation.
I l
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Q If it had come up, would it have been of particular 21 i concern?
22 i
(~x A
Not for this type of an event.
Subsequent discus-l'
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i 23 sions that were held concerning when it was appropriate for i
24 N the operator to terminate high pressure injection, that was A
r:t Reporters, Inc.
j f one of the considerations used in determining the prescription,;
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0 16
)
if you wish, in the Bert Dunn and Joe Kelly memos that went out.
2 Q
Do you *ecall when these subsequent discussions took 1
/
us 3
place and who participated?
(
4 A
I don't recall the discussions per se.
I believe
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that there was -- I participated in at least one with Bert and 5
Joe relative to the prescription and ideas that were being 6
7 generated at the time, relative to operator action to terminate 8
high pressure injection.
Most of my conversations were held pretty much 9
10 with Bert Dunn alone, concerning the adequacy of the prescrip-11 tion that he was presenting, and whether or not I agreed with l
12 him.
13 Q
Do I understand you then that the pressure of the
~
(
)
l l plant going solid was addressed during those discussions?
14 i
i 15 A
Yes, to a certain extent.
I remember the prescrip-i 16 tion that went out, one of the earlier prescriptions had a l
17 time limit for operator action to terminate the high pressure f
13., injection, and the time that we were trying to settle on for le the conditions at which the operator could appropriate take np action to terminate high pressure injection, we were consider-,
j e
21 ] ing essentially the filling up of the pressurizer and a slug i
i 22 of water going through the valve without a LOCA being present.
i I
t r
i 23 ll Q
Was it a particular concern that the plant might go l
~'
ti 24 solid 'and that this slug of water might go out through the Ac erst Reporters, Inc.
25 -l valve?
Was that viewed as any particular problem, or was it i
ll i"
1
17 I
just a matter of interest?
2 A
It was not viewed per se as a problem from a safety s
.J 3i standpoint.
There are, however, a couple of concerns that do i
4 get raised:
\\_/
5 Number one is it will result or potentially result 6
in damage to other equipment in the plant such as the quench p~
7 tank where the PORV - 'anyo effluent through the safety or 8
relief valves on the pressurizer valves would be put into, 9
and that subsequent release, the rupturing of that tank and 10 subsequent release of material into the containment, fluid 11 into the containment, could pose a problem as f ar as restart 12 of the plant and clean-up.
13 So it was more of an operational type concern there.
,_s
(
14 There is also the potential that if you hit the 4
15 valves with a slug of water, you may indeed create a loss-of-16 coolant accident, although again that is not really a safety 17 concern from the standpoint that the high pressure injection IS,j systems are designed to handle such events, it is certainly n
i 0
not a situation you would want to have occur.
22.l 0
So then your perceptivn was that even if it did l
ll l
21 L damage the safety valves, for example, that the high pressure l
22 l injection system was sufficiently large that it could have
(
)
(
a 23 l handled that problem?
1 24 '
A Yes.
i.
Argerc.4 Reporters. inc. ]
25 Q
Okay.
So then as I understand your comments, your n
li
r 18 3-I consideration of this issue of going solid and. water surge, 2
you didn't consider to be a major problem?
3 A
No.
4 Q
Would you go on and describe then what happened as a
()
5 result of these discussions?
6 A
Basically all I remember is a series of memos that 7
ere written with a subsequent memo from Bert Dunn to Jim e
Taylor, being essentially the final, if you wish, prescription 9
that we transmitted out of ECCS some time in -- I don't even 10 remember the date,
'78, I guess it would be.
And that was 11 the last of my real involvement in the problem.
12 MR. EDGAR:
Would you like to look at the memos to 13 fix the dates in your mind?
O 14 MR. HEBDON:
Let's go off the record.
15
[ Discussion off the record.]
16 MR. HEBDON:
Back on the record.
17 THE WITNESS:
The last memo of this package that I la j remember is the February 16th, 1978 memo from Bert Dunn to t-
!? '
Jim Taylor.
il 20 :
BY MR. HEBDON:
l 21 O
Do you recall seeing the memo that Mr. Walters 22 wrote to Mr. Kelly that's included in that package?
It's a 0
lhandwrittenmemodatedNovember10th.
23 24 A
No.
I've never seen that memo, at least in that l
l
\\r in o R n e n us,tnc.
25 timef rame.
f i
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19 1
Q When did you see that memo?
2 A
I may have seen that memo over the last month or
(
3 two, but I can' t renember.
I've seen several things over O
4 the 1eet few monthe.
5 0
Yes.
Okay.
So you did see the memo that Mr. Dunn 6
sent to Mr. Taylor?
o ~
7 A
Yes, both of the Bert Dunn to Jim Taylor memos 8
dated the 9th and the 16th I have seen.
9 Q
Okay.
Now to your recollection, what happened 10 after that, after those memos were written?
II A
Going back to the post-TMI timeframe and what I 12 would have seen prior to that time, I saw nothing else occur 13 per se.
I -- my role in this activity was basically as a 14 review process of the suitability of those memos that Bert 15 had written, and I did not see any of the subsecuent actions 16 which have -- which occurred.
17 Q
Did it raise any concerns in your mind that you 18 didn't see anything else as a result of this?
I I
19 [
A No, not really, because most of the paper that il went around on this problem I was not on distribution, anyway.
20 i
21 Lj I had essentially what you might call courtesy copies from (S
Bert because of my review, and just to put it into my files.
22
%1 23 I didn' t -- I was not really in the chain, if you wish, of a
24 the actual implementation or attempt to implement these fs A!, ')?erol Reporters, Inc.
l 25 procedures.
f, l
l
20 l
Q Based on subsequent discussions that you've had,
(}
2 including any discussions that might have occurred af ter the 3
Three Mile Island up until the present, what is your understand-()
4 ing of what did happen af ter this particular memo was written?
5 A
My understanding, which all comes subsequent to the 6
TMI 2 event, is that Jim Taylor wrote a memo to Don Hallman a __
7 conc rning our prescription.
8 There was some subsequent memos generated which 9
ultimately came to the Plant Integration Section to respond 10 to some concerns raised by, I-believe, Mr. Hallman, and that's 11 where it stopped, if you wish.
12 But all of this understanding does come post-TMI 2.
13 Q
Right.
What is your understanding of the concerns O
\\/
14 that Mr. Hallman's group raised?
i 15 A
Basically his concerns, referring back to the 16 document to refresh my mind, his concerns were relative to 17 the pressurizer going solid in a non-LOCA type event, and 18 causing damage either to the plant or the supporting system d
10 such as the quench tank.
h i
1
~
0 Would you identify the document you are referring 20 21 to?
I 22 A
This is the memo from Don Hallman to Bruce Karrasch A/
23 dated August 3rd, 1978.
1 24 Q
Now are these concerns that he raisc.; in this memo A! s'erci Reponers, Inc.
l v
25 similar to the concerns that you and Mr. Dunn and Mr. Kelly I
L i
1
21 had discussed about the f act that the plant might go solid if j
the HPI were left on?
2 3
A They are similar in nature.
They are essentially the same problem written down in more succinct terms, if you
( };
4 wish.
5 6
0 All right.
What is your assessment of the concern?
l A
I believe it's a concern that needed to be addressed 7
or would need to be addressed because there is a potential 8
for damage to supporting systems and a possibility that you 9
10 could create a LOCA.
i 11 However, I believe that the presecription with minor modifications probably could handle these concerns and, 12 13 in fact, the prescription that was posed at that timeframe is (m) 14 very similar to the present -- present-day prescriptions on 15 Operator interruption of high pressure injection system.
16 Q
Would the assessment of these concerns that you mentioned have been more extensive than the assessment -- than 17 18 j the rather informal assessment of this concern that you and P
I 1;
Mr. Kelly and Mr. Dunn made of the problem when you originally l i!
20 d were discussing it?
!l e
e 21 ti A
I do not believe that it would have taken a great i
l I
deal of time to assess the problem because I would have l
22 7-l
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t evaluated it from the standpoint of finding a prescription 23 24 that wocld have prevented these circumstances f rom occurring; Acqll Fro semrteri. ine.
l 25 that is the pressurizer going solid when it was unnecessary.
l I.
l I
22 l
To address the concerns directly, however, could take
'~
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time in order to develop all the supporting systems which may G
3 be affected, should the pressurizer go solid.
()
4 Q
Who would have been responsible for performing that 5
assessment?
6 A
I believe the integration -- Plant Integration 3 __
7 personnel would have been the most appropriate people, at 8
least from the standpoint of putting the overall picture 9
together.
10 There may have been -- there may have needed to II have been involvement by the Nuclear Services and personnel 12 at the actual plants in order to identify all the potential 13 equipment that may have been -- that may be affected by the v
14 pressurizer going solid.
15 Q
Was Mr. Kelly part of the Plant Integration group 16 that would have performed the assessment?
I7 A
I am not sure what his position was at this time.
Io j Q
So you didn't understand, you didn't have any U
feeling that he was part of the _ group that needed to do the i
e 20 assessment?
21 !
A No.
22 Q
Okay.
(g U
23 BY MR. FOLSOM:
I 24 0
I have a couple of questions, if I can interject i
A
- erd Reporters, Inc.
i
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25 them at this point.
l l
i l
23 l
You got courtesy copies of the Dunn memoranda'and I *)
2 Kelly's memoranda, do I understand?
\\_/
I 3
A I believe that I did get a copy of the Kelly -- the
(
')
4 initial Kelly memoranda dated -- I'm not sure exactly, November 5
1st.
6 O
Now you then had no further input into this debate 7
about operator action, if I'm right.
8 A
That's correct, mainly because Bert Dunn is quite a 9
capable engineer for handling this type of a problem.
He 10 decided to apparently handle this one himself.
11 Q
Did these courtesy memoranda and the information in 12 them serve any purpose for your future performance of your job?
l 13 Did you, or can you envision a future purpose?
I
(
14 A
Not really, except from the standpoint that. aas 15 a key personnel within the ECCS analysis area, and just to serve 16 as an information base of what had happened subsequent to the 17 ! event.
l 13 l Q
Changes in emergency core cooling system wouldn't D
be forecast by these -- by the Davis-Besse incident, or the 2^ p operator performance?
I!
l 21 ]
A No changes in the HPI system itself was really I
22 required.
It was a matter of further definition of the role gy l
23 j that the operator should play relative to high pressure injec-f
/
I 24 tion system, subsecuent to its actuation.
Ad hbro ammrters. ine.
l l
25 i
MR. HEBDON:
Let's go off the record for a minute.
t i
I
24
[ Discussion off the record.]
j MR. HEBDONO For the record, let's go ahead and 2
3 take a break until about 1:30, so that you can attend to some-bilsiness.
4 5
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m.,
the interview 6
was recessed, - to be reconvened at 1:30 p.m.,
7 this same day.]
8 9
10 11 1
12 i
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1 13
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15 1
16 l
17 la j
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24 0 A
ral Reportets, Inc.
25 I
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-. ~ -
1 25 AFTERNOON SESSION f
bu2
)
i
[l:30 p.m.]
(
)
2 3
Whereupon,
'm ROBERT C.
JONES, JR.
)
4 v
resumed the stand as a witness and, having been previously 5
duly sworn, was examined and testified further as follows:
6 MR. HEBDON:
Let's go back on the record.
7 Just as a point of record, you're still under oath 8
and all the precautions and statements and et cetera that were 9
in the letter and discussion that we had this morning -- yes, 10 11 this morning -- still apply, so we'll just go ahead and continue.
12 EXAMINATION [ Continued) 13 BY MR. HEBDON:
s e
s
/
14 j
0 I'd like to go on and ask you some questions 15 about a report that has come to be known as the Michaelson i
i 16 report that I understand you were involved with.
And again 17 I'm trying to focus initially, at least, on what you knew of that report and your understanding prior to the TMI accident.
15 y Prior to March 28th, 1979, what knowledge did you i
20 have concerning the Michaelson report?
h i
21 j A
Well, the Michaelson report was given to me by Mr.
i 22 Lightle some time during May of
'78.
I was the reviewer of (m;
the paper and wrote the response to that paper in January of i
s_-
23i' d
I, 24
'79, and assisted Bert in the response that we gave to the NRC l
lAw kr:4 Regmrters, inc.
25 on that paper, and on May 7th, 1979, blue book submittals.
l i
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26 1
Q Okay.
Now you received the report in May of '78?
(~'i 2
A Yes.
3 Q
Did you review it at that time?
ym) 4 A
I scanned it at that time.
It was too detailed (v
5 for me to take a review on at that time because we were in the 6
midst of another problem.
>~
7 Q
What was your initial perception of the significance 8
of the issues raised by the report?
9 A
My initial perceptions were that while the paper 10 raised valid concerns and appropriately presented the 11 phenomena that would occur during a very small break, there 12 was nothing really new or unique in what he was saying, except 13 the inferred bottom line, if you wish, on his paper.
7_
(._)
14 0
What did you understand to be the concerns that 15 he had?
16 A
Well, there were several concerns raised by the 17 Michaelson paper, or within the Michaelson paper.
His concerns la generally dealt -- they are really two kinds of concerns, if 17 you wish.
20 One of them dealt with the system response to a g
0 21 j very small break in which the steam generator is necessary 22 for heat removal, and he concentrated a lot on that 7s I
(
)
~
23 d phenomena, what its impact on the system would be, and the 24 !,
potential consequences gf that response.
Aq red Reporters, Inc.
25 l
The other activity or the other statement made in li e
\\
27 1
the Michaelson paper was a statement concerning the 2
pressurizer level which was a very short part of the actual
({}
3 Michaelson paper.
rm.
4 Q
This first concern about the steam generator, was this
(,)
5 concern or this perspective new to you?
6 A
No.
7 Q
Is it something that's addressed in the small break 8
LOCA analysis that B;W performs?
9 A
Yes, it's addressed, but we don ' t look at -- we 10 don't see all the phenomena that Mr. Michaelson raises in his 11 paper because we don' t look at the break sizes that he was 12 considering.
13 O
So then the break sizes he was discussing aren't O
14 analyzed or had not been analyzed?
15 A
They had not been specifically analyzed, but they 16 had been reviewed from the standpoint of are these smaller 17 breaks potentially worse than the smallest break that we had 18 analyzed, and our conclusions were that they were not.
t IE Q
So they were bounded by the breaks that you had M (
analyzed?
l 1
1 21 '
A That's correct.
l t
22 Q
Did it appear from Mr. Michaelson's report, based p,)
\\
]
on your perception of it, that he did not agree that they 23
(
y 24 f were bounded?
f_s w,rci Reporters, Inc. l l Ace {
25 A
Yes, that is essentially what he said in his report.
I i
28 l
I
'l O
If heu raised the issue in that sense, that he didn't L
2 feel that. the breaks that had been analyzed were bounded, did
(}
3 you consider that to be a major problem?
O 4
A No, not really, and the rationale behind that is g_j 5
what Mr. Michaelson is saying for these smaller breaks is that 6
because of the interruption of natural circulation that will 7
occur, the system will repressurize.
This repressurization 8
would in turn force more inventory out the break, and potentially 9
make it lose inventory f aster than the breaks that had been
'10 analyzed.
i Il That concern, or how he extended it to say that the 12 smaller break would discharge mass faster than the larger 13 break is essentially where the difference between B&W's v
14 assessment and my assessment of the paper lies, and his 15 assessment, his report itself.
16 Q
Af ter having read his report, did you feel, did 17 you still feel that B&W's assessment of that situation was 13 correct?
IE A
Yes, because the phenomena that he was discussing H
20 P we have -- we have not specifically seen, but we have i.
I 21 i
considered.
22 Q
Do you still feel that the disagreement over how
{-
s-23 those particular types of breaks would respond is bounded 24 '
by the analysis that had been done by B&W?
g,g Aagaos aeoorters, inc.
l A
Yes, and in fact we have specifically shown that 25 4
l i
I i
29
)
within the blue book report.
We looked at small breaks in an 8
f'T 2
attempt to analytically address Mr. Michaelson's concerns for
\\.!
3 these breaks, and they were shown to be inconsequential;
(~N; a
relative to large breaks, they were indeed bounded, u.-
5 0
Have you specifically analyzed the issue of the 6
repressurization and the leak rate that appears to have been the basis for the disagreement?
7 A
Yes.
8 9
Q And what is your conclusion?
10 A
Essentially the repressurization phenomena occurs 11 which we do -- which we agreed with Mr. Michaelson at that 12 time we responded to the question, and we have analytically 13 s'hown it, but in fact that repressurization is -- will only (n) l occur for a short period of time prior to the condensation
~'
14 i
! surf ace and steam generator being established.
15 I
i 16 i
During that period of time, we do not drastically
- 7 increase the leak rates to make them in excess of what we 13 ;
normally analyze, or what we have seen before with the normal U
p break spectrum.
4 i
i i
n Q
Now one point -- let me rephrase the question.
t l
21.;
In making your assessment of how long it takes l
l 1
l 22 to establish the condensate surf ace in the steam generators,
,s
(
l have you based those considerations on the 177 design or the l
23 a
24 205 design which, as I understand it, are considerably different?
ANllFrd Reporters, inc, f
l They are considerably different.
We did not really l A
25 I
30 I
specifically address for the 205 plants the time the condensation 2
surface is established.
{}
3 Rather, what we did was to look at the phenomena
()
4 that would occur during repressurization and its influence on 5
the leak rates, and were able to demonstrate to ourselves 6
that the system response would yield a slower leak rate 3..
7 even during the repressurization than you would get for a e
larger break that would be at a lower pressure.
9 The specific analytical support for our Michaelson 10 position that's given in the May 7th report was done for the 11 177 plants.
12 O
Would it make much difference if you considered the 13 205 plant which, as I understand the difference, is the fact 14 that the 205 plant, the auxiliary feed comes in at the bottom 15 of the generators; whereas in the 177, it comes in at the 16 top of the generators?
So in the 205 plant, you have to drain 17 the primary side down considerably further to get to the 18 level of flood.
19 h A
That would be a dif ference in the timing, in the II
' magnitude, if you wish, of the repressurization, but as f ar 20 g i
t 21 as the phenomena for what's going out the leak, or calculating 22 what's going out the leak, that is really not determined by 23 i where the auxiliary feedwater is, when you're looking at the i
24 !l repressurization phase.
f A
- eral Reporters, Inc.
25 0
Well, wouldn't the repressurization be much more i
.I l
31 1
severe if you had to drain the system down for either a much 2
longer time or a much greater amount of fluid before you reached
)
3 the point where you started to get the steam generator as a OV 4
heat sink?
5 A
Let me try to put the whole picture in a little bit 6
of technical perspective.
7 For the small breaks, what we do is we analyze 8
the largest small break that utilizes just the high pressure 9
injection system for mitigation.
10 This, in turn, bnplies a break that depends II relatively heavily on the steam generator for heat removal 12 during the first, say, thousand seconds of the transient, 13 7-which linits the system pressure to roughly 1200, 1000 to 1200
(>)
14 psi.
i 15 Now the smaller breaks which will interrupt the 16 circulation and start a repressurization, the volume of fluid I7 going out the break must match the volume of steam being is created to hold the given system pressure.
,i M'
Q Okay.
It 22 ;
A So what in turn happens, these smaller breaks 21 -
repressurize, which results in less of a volume of steam 22 being created in the primary system.
More mass is boiled, I.
23 ! but less volume of steam is generated, so that the volume of ll 24 fluid going out the break is less for these smaller breaks, Aj g l
,Ard Reporters. Inc. j l
l even though they are higher pressures, and that's how it 25 i
l 1
I I
l
32
-1 trades off.
2 Now small breaks are characterized by a period of
-(~}
s-3 time where what you're doing is boiling off and losing the
().
4 initial inventory wnile you're waiting for your high pressure 5
injection systems to match the decay heat that occurs at any 6
given system pressure at some time in the transient, which 7
is just the decaying of the energy within the core, decay 8
power history.
9 For these smaller breaks, you will still come down 10 to 1200 psi or 1000 psi, depending on the generator steam 11 safety systems, you will come down to that same pressure 12 once the condensation surf ace is established.
13 Q
Yes, but as I understand it, that's where the O
14 problem lies is, that with the 205 plant, because of the 15 flood at the bottom, it could take a very long period of time, 16 if ever, to establish that condensation surface, and that you 17 could have a problem during that interim period when you are 18 between the natural circulation mode and the pot boiling mode.
i~ 1 A
Well, the design characteristics on the 205 plants li 0 are such that you must have a condensation surf ace established 20 l}
,1 4
21 in the generator before you can even start to uncover the core.
22 That is in small breaks the level in the system slowly O
p 23 decreases, such that the hot leg level anithe steam generator i
l'l 24 level are coming down at equivalent rates due to actions of l
A(~ )pg Remnm, lnc.
l the vent valves, the internal vent valves.
j' 25 l
l l
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33 l
When you drain the generator or lose all the water
({ }
inventory in the primary side of the generator, you still have 2
3 mass above the inlet nozzles to the reactor vessels because of
()
4 the raised designs.
5 What that means, in turn, is that you have steam 6
in contact with the liquid surface on the secondary side through 3 __
7 the' tube connection.
You will get condensation before you can 8
uncover the core, so the period of interest, if you wish, is 9
the time period is whether or not you will deplete mass at a 10 faster rate for these smaller breaks prior to the condensation Il surface being established than you would for the larger small 12 breaks.
13 That is if, say, a.01 square foot break took
,s
)
Id 150 seconds to drain out the generator, and the.04 square foot 15 break took 1000 thousands to drain the generator, well, then 16 the.01 square foot break could be worse, but the actual I7 phenomena that will occur will automatically result in a lo !! smaller break taking a longer period of time to displace this ti much inventory when the system gets down to 1200 psi, the j
i 20l establishment of the condensation surface, the HPI system 3
21 will then match the core decay heat for that break.
22 l (S
0 Why is longer worse?
It would seem to me -- or
\\_)
23 I'm sorry, why is longer not worse?
It would seem like the 24 q longer it takes to establish the boiling pot cooling mode, i
Ac erot Reporters, Inc.
25 the more chance there is of having damage to the core.
i l
1 0
34
/-
i
.A There are a lot of experimental evidence which
- s hows that so long as you keep the core covered with a two-2 P ase mixture during 'dae small break, you will have no core h
3 I'}
4 damage and no cladding heat-up.
Cladding temperature will V
5 stay within a few degrees of the fluid temperature,.so that the real problem is rather do smaller breaks result in 6
a -
earlier time for drainage of the system, which will therefore 7
P ace more demands on the high pressure injection system.
l 8
9 0
So as long as you keep water in the core --
10 A
Right.
11 0
-- even if you haven't established the cooling l
12 surf ace in the steam generators, your analyses show that l
i l
13 you're still all right?
'O 14 A
That's right.
T.2 15 Q
So then I guess to summarize a little bit, even 16 based on the analyses that you've done now, you still feel 17 that the Michaelson report concerns had previously been 13 adequately addressed in the B&W analyses?
Is that a reasonable i;
statement?
Previously meaning prior to writing the Michaelson i
- t l
20 e report.
~
21 A
They have been considered, but you would not really 22 have found any direct documentation that would say that,
)
l 23 but the analysis does bound the phenomena for the smaller U
24 ;
breaks, which were the concerns of Mr. Michaelson.
- Ah"' wi neoonm. inc.]
23 i
O Okay.
I'd like to go back a little bit and try to i
i
35 get into some of the more administrative aspects of the work j
r]
2 that you did with the Michaelson report.
-v 3
When you first received the report, do you recall what sort of context it was provided to you in?
Was this a
()
4 "here's something you need to get to when you get some time,"
5 6
or, was it, "here's something I need an answer to by Friday,"
or were you given any sort of a priority?
7 A
Well, at the time we were already engaged in a g
9 very high priority item, so in general anything that was coming n) in over the timeframe was being delayed, anyway, because my 11 unit was -- we were all tied up on another problem.
12 The letter came to me and Mr. Lightle asked me to 13 respond to this thing, and I '. old him, well, when we finish t'"')
14 this problem, I'll take a look at it, and tell you about when 15 I could respond to this thing.
16 I was not given any indications that the thing 17 was a high priority type effort.
13 Q
Did you give him any indication of when you thought 10 you could reasonably be expected to get an anc'ier back to him?
h l
20 d A
At that time I don't really remember whether I did i
N
- )
- or didn't.
As I said, we did have another problem at the time,
22 and what I was telling him was simply when this was over, s
(v) l 23 i I'll take a look.
l l
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v 24 [
Q But you didn' t give him any sort of a feel for whether )
! Adl hero peooners. inc. i j
25 that was going to be a month, a year, 18 months?
lli l
i n
h t
36 j
A Not offhand.
If I would have given him one at the
("N 2
time, looking back, I would have said it would be another V
two to three months before I could really tell you a whole 3
(]
lot about it.
4 5
0 okay.
So now you received the report then and I assume you glanced through it, and then set it aside?
6 A
Right.
7 8
Q Can you describe what then happened?
9 A
Some time around September, August, September, we 10 had finished the problem we were working on and were trying 11 to get back in a more orderly process of doing work.
Becaus?
12 of the tie-up of many people we had to get back and go pretty 7-13 much on a priority type basis, the most important work first.
\\
)
14 I took the report and told Bob that I would respond 1
15 to it, but it would take me a month or so, and all that happened 16 af ter that was it just kept getting put of f and Bob was 17 asking me, when are you going to get to it.
la Q
Did he indicate to you that he was getting any i
1; pressure from anyone to get the thing finished?
h 20 1,
A The only type of pressure that I heard about was, l
21
" Hey, when can you respond?"
Not per se pressure, we-need-a-22 response-by statement.
l
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.i 23 l
Q Did he indicate to you that he was getting any i
t i
i 24 " pressure from TVA to get it finished, or was it just something Adl heat seporters, inc.
l 25 he had on his action item list that he felt he needed to get i
l l
i
37 I
to?
2 A
All I got the indications wL1 it whs an outstanding
'}
3 item that just needed to be responded to, rather than that he l
( )
4 was getting a lot of pressure on it.
S O
Okay.
Could you continue with your chronology?
6)
A Okay.
Some time in the September framework, I read 7
the report and I had to figure out how to respond to it.
It 8
was quite an extensive paper.
I don't remember how many pages, 9
40 or so, and I could not really figure out how to respond, 10 which is one of the reasons I told Mr. Lightle a couple of II months, because you could attack the problem in several ways:
12 a very detailed, rigorous recheck of all his numbers, and I3 rewrite a report very sLmilar to Mr. Michaelson's, or 7_
t.
)
Id approach it in a much simpler fashion.
I i
15 Some time around, oh, I guess, November, I had kind 16 of come to the conclusion that the only way I was going to 17 address this paper in any sort of a timely fashion would be 13!! on a simplistic basis.
I!
In December Bob and I talked -- or it could have l-22 been the end of November -- and discussed possibly setting up 21 a telephone conversation with TVA to discuss the concerns in I
22 the paper.
g,s 4
t v
23 Some time in December that conversation was held l
l' n
I don't remember all the people involved. l Acqggrr:t Remrters, inc.
I 25 ! There was me and Lightle, and Dennis Renner from our Licensing f i
i 1
38 1
organization, and on the other end of the phone were several
(^)
2 TVA personnel, including Mr. Michaelson, and we discussed the L/
3 paper at length for, I don't know, an hour and a half or so,
/%
4 with a commitment coming out of that to essentially document
()
5 in writing what we had told them over the phone.
6 Q
Do you recall any commitment to simply provide 7
them the information in the discussions that had gone back and 8
forth between B&W and the NRC concerning the issue of the 9
small break LOCAs?
10 A
I don't understand your question.
il Q
Well, as I understand it, there had been a 12 considerable amount of discussion back and forth between the 13 NRC and B&W on this issue of small break LOCAs, and that p_
J v
14 this matter had been reviewed by the NRC.
15 Do you recall any discussion of the NRC's involvement 16 with this whole business?
17 A
Up to the timef rame that I'm talking about, which lo is December of
'78, there was no NRC involvement at all at j
i El this time, up to this time.
il 20 0 0
Well, the NRC had been involved with the issue of 21 s mall break LOCAs, hadn 't they?
22 A
Yes, they had been involved with the issue of
,3 s
V./
1 23 small break LOCAs and are continuing -- I don't remember l
24 ific request per se of telling TVA about any NRC --
Acjlgeru neponen. ine.l any spec l
25 any issues raised by NRC concerning small LOCAs.
The only I
i
1 39 1
small break issue that was out there was our recent analysis
(
2 that we had done on the 177 plants which ~did not affect TVA at 3
all.
4 Q
Had the NRC reviewed your small break analysis of
(,)
u 5
the 205 plants?
6 A
Yes, and it was approved, I think, around 1976 as 7
meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix 'K.
8 Q
Was there any feeling on your part and did you 9
express any -- let me make that two questions.
10 Was there any feeling on your part that since is II had already been reviewed by the NRC and approved, there 7't 12 any need to get into all this business of small break LOCAs 13 again on the 205 plants?
g) iu./
14 A
I wouldn't really say that.
There was no, say, 15 licensing pressure per se to re-look at small break LOCAs.
16 We continually try to keep up with the interplay that goes 17 on in the industry and R&D concerning LOCA analysis and small IS LOCA analysis, when it becomes applicable, to see if there is ll M
anything that would invalidate the analyses that we had done.
20 "
At this time there really wasn't any new information 2 I 'i through the NRC that was affecting.the credibility of that 22 small break LOCA analysis that had been performed for the 205 7m
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23 l
plants.
24 )d O
So then as I understand it, you, don't recall at any
, Aegru Repornri, inc.
25 time in your conversations with TVA and with Mr. Michaelson l
l l
l
40 I
saying anything to the-effect that this issue has already been
('s 2
reviewed by the NRC and why are we trying to reopen it now?
~
ss 3
A I don't recall that statement being made per se.
)
4 We were telling them that we had convinced the NRC that what
(,
5 we had done does cover these smaller breaks, and the whole 6
purpose of the telephone call was to kind of explain the 7
rationale behind that.
Why are the smaller breaks bounded 8
by the larger breaks.
But nothing specifically say4rr why vpen it at this time.
Y IO Q
Was there any feeling in your mind that because of II the fact that the NRC had already reviewed this issue and that 12 they agreed that the snall break -- that the small break i
13 LOCAs were bounded, that there couldn't possibly be any way in f~s
(
)
'x J Id l which that issue could be reopened and resurfaced to the extent 15 that there might be something wrong in the analysis, or mis-16 understanding or misconception in the analysis?
I7 A
Could I please have that guestion read back?
,i
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Q Let me try to restate it.
li U
A All right.
20 L Q
What I'm trying to get at is whether or not there 21 '
was any sort of a mindset on the part of you and the people 22 here at B&W that "we have reviewed all of this stuff, we have f
<~s
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i
' j 23 I sent it to the NRC, and they've reviewed it, they have agreed
>i 24 in our review, there is no way that some guy with a 40-page
- 1 1
Acillrrd Reporters. Inc.
25 report out. of TVA could bring up something that we and the NRC t
i I
)
41 taken collectively haven't already addressed"?
1 2
A I do not claim to be knowledgeable enough to say 3
that we have absolutely addressed every possible concern that.
/'N 4
anybody could raise.
LOCA analysis is a field, small and
\\m)-
j 5
large breaks is a field where there is an ever-changing 6
technological basis.
It's a field where really a mindset to throw away phenomena would make it very difficult for you to do 7
8 your job.
I myself have no mindset.
Mr. Michaelson's paper 9
10 came in, I looked at it.
My initial glance did tell me there 11 was nothing new in there.
I did reconfirm my initial under-12 standing of small breaks due to hand-scratching calculations 13 on the back of the envelope to confirm that I was correct, and
(~T
\\2 that indeed I did cover the direct concern dealing with an ja I
15 energy balance which Mr. Michaelson was addressing, and the 16 phenomena that I identified to Mr. Michaelson, which is my 17 volume balance technique, does in fact imply ultimately the 13 energy balance problem that he is addressing, and that in i
19 n fact my technique is more appropriate than his.
And we have i!
i
!! seen that on previous analyses, but we don't have a mindset 20 l
21 per se, because we just can't have one.
22 0
Is it possible that there was any sort of a mindset O
23 to the effect of "the NRC has bought it, why rock the boat"?
l -
24 ii A
There is always pressures, if you wish, to not A/ )cro Reporters, inc.
\\"#
-- to not rock the boat if it's not necessary.
But by the 25 I
I i
42 r
I same token, if rocking the boat is necessary, I have no
(]
2 inhibitions to not rock the boat.
I've rocked it several LJ 3
times around here.
()
4 Q
Okay.
Would you go on with your description of 5
the events.
We were up to the phone call.
61 A
I believe we were up to the phone call.
3 -
7 At the end of that phone call, there was a dis-8 agreement between Mr. Michaelson and myself -- we dominated 9
the phone call -- that could not be resolved over the telephone 10 per se.
11 There were a lot of issues that were resolved, if you 12 wish, by the phone call, the agreement with the repressurization 13 phenomena, for example.
But the bottom line as to where the 14 small breaks are worse than larger small breaks was not 15 totally resolved by the phone call.
16 We asked TVA to provide us a written description or 17 another question rather than the Michaelson paper to address 18 which more specifically outlined their concerns after this phone i
10 call, to narrow the scope of the response.
U
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20 l!
O Before we go on to that, could you explain what 1
21 the disagreement was that was left at the end of the phone i
22 conversation?
i
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A Basically it deals with the disagreement between 23 l 24 ] my volume balance and Mr. Michaelson's energy balance concept.
I
'Aq ps Reprters, inc.
25 l 0
Could you explain your understanding of the I
l i
I I
43 h
I difference between those two approaches?
2 A
Okay.
The energy balance concept, which Mr.
3 Michaelson proposes in his paper, is not a new engineering
(
4 concept.
In order for the system to depressurize, it is 5
obvious that the energy being removed from the system must 6
exceed the energy being put into the system.
7 The difference is, however, that during the small 8
break you have a phase change.
You boil liquid to steam.
9 That phase change generates a volume of steam which must find 10 a plTce to Jo because you've got a limited volume system.
II That is not accounted for in an energy balance per se, or at 12 least not a simple energy balance.
13 You can set up a full energy balance which accounts O
I4 for phase changes and associated effects within the energy 15 balance.
Mr. Michaelson did not do that.
16 My concept says n ntially if you create 10 cubic 17 feet of steam, the system will repressurize unless you push I3 out of the system 10 cubic feet of water.
It's about that i
i 19 ;!:simple.
20 Now the process of doing that, however, automaticallh 21 '
forces the energy going out the break to exceed the energy 22 coming into the break -- coming into the system, and that's 23 where the disagreement lies.
What I'm saying is you can use the volume balance l
24 i
i As h,ol Reporters, Inc.
I V
25 concept to estimate how much fluid must go out the break in I
i l
44 5-1 order to hold pressure or whether you would repressurize.
2 You can, by the same token, use that to find the
(}
3 maximum repressurization and to find the leak rate for a given m
(_)
4 set of conditions.
5 When you impose a break size effect, you change the 6
volume or fou change the pressure that you must go to, to
= - -
7 push out that volume.
8 When the pressure goes up, the volume of steam 9
created goes down, so you in fact push out less liquid out of 10 the system by going up in pressure.
You try to put in --
Il Q
You lost me on the last sentence.
12 A
Let me try to put it in other terms.
13 If you create 50 pounds of steam due to boiling, 73 L) 14 that will occupy -- that will require so much volume, displace l 15 so much volume in the primary system.
16 If, however, you're at 1600 psi and generate 50 17 pounds of steam, it occupies less space.
So the volume fluid 18 l you have to put out of that system is significantly less.
h M
Q Because the press'; e increases?
n l
20 fl A
Because the pressure increases.
21 P Q
The pressure will increase, if I understand it r~)
correctly, the pressure will increase to the point at which j
22
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23 the steam bubble is equal in size to the volume that's going 24 out?
eraf Reporters, Inc. j A
I 25 l A
Not the steam bubble size, but the rate of steam i
45 b-1 production in volumetric terms is equal to volume of steam
-2 going out.
3 Q
Over a period of time?
()
4 A
The size and magnitude of the bubble is dependent 5
on how fast you get there.
6 Q
So in a sense it's almost like a double balance, a -
7 it's a balance between the pressure going up, which forces 8
the steam out faster, at a higher pressure, more liquid will 9
come out the hole?
10 A
Right.
11 Q
But at the same time, balancing the fact that 12 the higher the pressure, the smaller the bubble, and therefore 13 the less liquid that has to go out the hole?
O 14 A
That's correct.
15 Q
You reach a balance then?
16 A
Right.
17 Q
All right.
18 A
And that's the simple concept where me and Mr.
1 I? 'd) Michaelson disagree.
20 l Q
Now, as I understand it, I've just described your i
^'l explanation of how it works.
22 A
- Yes,
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o 23 0
What's your perception then of Mr. Michaelson's 24 0 understanding of how it works?
Or would it be easier just to A
are neponers inc.
25 say how does his understanding differ from what we've just j
j l
i l
46 1
discussed?
2 A
Basically Mr. Michaelson only looked at the energy 3
going out the hole.
He did not follow through, if you wish, 4
to calculate the volumetric effect.
He said I have insufficient
,')
8a 5
energy removal, therefore I must repressurize, which we agree 6
with.
7 What he is saying, though, is he is saying, well, 8
because I repressurize, I'm going to put more mass out and 9
could be in a worse situation than these larger small breaks.
10 He did not try to tie 5.he mass rate out the break to the 11 repressurization per se.
12 He did not figure out about how much repressurization 13 he would get if he just changed the break size and kept other
(,,l 14 parameters the same, the amount of steam being produced or I
15 t he core decay heat the same.
He did not make that extension.
16 He just said this is my concern, this may cause the situation 17 to be worse than,these smaller breaks may cause the situation 15 f to be worse, worse than the larger breaks that you've analyzed.
1 12 What we attempted to dc in our response was simply 4
i
~
22 q say, yeah, that will hap pen, but as f ar as the repressurization'i il 21 !j is concerned, bu t if you carry that one step further to look i
22 at what will happen at the leak, how much mass will go out
~
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23 J and what phenomena control that, that's where the volume 24 balance comes into play, and that's where you can demonstrate Acjggero sepoi, ri. ine. l 25 that smaller breaks are less severe than the larger smaller i
i
47
~
P 1
breaks.
2 O
Okay.
Let's go on and discuss the secruence.
Now 3
you had this phone conversation with Mr. Michaelson and, as a
I understand it, at the end of the conversaticn you still had
[]
the. question, you still had the disagreement on this issue 5
of volume balance versus energy balance.
Where did it go from 6
0 -.
there?
7 A
Well, first let me back up and say I'm not sure 8
that we necessarily disagreed per se on the concept.
It's a 9
matter of the concept was difficult to express over the phone, 10 11 and for Mr. Michaelson to absorb over the phone.
We then asked'for a letter back which more 12 13 specifically gave us the concern they wanted addressed.
O 14 In January I wrote my response to the Michadson paper and 15 specifically addressing that second letter, if you wish, which came in somewhere at the end of December, beginning of 16 17 January, and responded to it in'a memo from me to Mr. Lightle, dated some time in mid-July, end of July, which was transmitted 13 I
1; h to the customer.
i i'
29 l Q
I'm sorry, July?
l l
21 A
Excuse me, January.
22 Q
And that was sent on to TVA?
23 A
Yes, through Mr. Lightle.
24 Q
Was that letter consistent with the things you A. A er@l Reporters, Inc.
25 had discussed with Mr. Michaelsoa. in the phone conversation i
l i.
l
48
~
1 that you had in December?
g
)
2 A
Yes.
u/
3 Q
Were there any new issues raised in Mr. Michaelson's I
)
4 short letter to you, or in the material ". hat you sent back?
5 A
No new issues were raised.
Subsequent to our 6
letter, the receipt of our letter by TVA, an additional letter 7
was sent to B&W by TVA, requesting further explanation of the 8
volume balance and basically agreeing with the remainder of 9
what we had said in my response.
10 That letter was ' received some time in February, 11 I'm not sure whether it was the middle, end, beginning, I 12 just don't know.
That letter came to me.
I considered at 13 the time the issue was basically resolved, and this was a cleani 7-q
'V 14 I
up, just a matter of writing down words in more specific 15 terms the volume balance concept.
16 I had intended to respond to that by the end of 17 March, when we were rudely interrupted by the TMI 2 transient.
i 15 j Q
Was it your perception that this last letter that j
!I 19 f you received included all of the remaining outstanding 22 l concerns that TVA had, or did you feel, or was it your 21 ' perception that this was just an interim set of questions 1
22 to help them better understand what you had said?
{
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23 i
A I'm not sure I could answer what it meant.
My i
d i
I 24 '
own conception was, it was a set of questions to just kind Ac br;l Remrters. Inc.
l 25 of put the lid on the paper, to close the lid.
I n
49 Q
Okay.
Where does the Michaelson report issue stand now?
(l 2
tj A
We responded -- we wrote an additional response 3
~
to the Michaelson paper, the more detailed response -- a more
( )h 4
s_
detailed response than what we had provided them in my January 5
letter in the blue book as an appendix, May 7th, 1979 report.
6
'7 Bert Dunn wrote that with my input and review essentially, because I was tied up on writing the rest of the report.
8 That was reviewed -j the NRC Staff and my understanding of 9
10 where they are at, though I have not seen their SER yet, is 11 that they have pretty much agreed with us.
As f ar as TVA itself is concerned, we told them in 12 7,
13 response to that Februsry lettcr that we felt that this
'~'
jaj appendix and the May 7th report fully documents ou; response il 15 to the TVA letter.
They have since written back otht:r letters.
16 They apparently do not consider it completed.
We do. It's a 17 bone of contention now, as far -- I don't know what its ultimate resolution will be.
18 i
!a!
I, 1; ;'
BY MR. FOLSOM:
l 5
22 H 0
Just for a brief point of clarification, do you,
't I
"'l i
2; to your knowledge, know who instigated the December '70 I
t t
22 l conference call?
l r~s Y.]
l 23 A
No, I really don't know.
I know I didn't per se.
l 24 I may have mentioned it as an idea to Bob.
Bob may have An rc8 Remrters, Inc.
i 25 ! mentioned it to me, or it could have come thrc gh TVA.
I just l
I l
50 don't know.
g BY MR. HEBDON:
{~)
2 3
0 You don't recall then if it was B&W or TVA who
()
initiated it?
4 A
No, I don' t remember.
5 0
Do y u feel that the Michaelson report describes 6
what happened at the accident at TMI?
7 A
The only portion of the Michaelson report that 8
applies in any standpoint to the TMI event is his statement i
9 that the pressurizer level is not an indication of the actual 10 11 level within the reactor coolhnt system during a small LOCA.
12 0
Okay, I'd like to get into that separately in a 13 minute.
O 14 Do you feel that his discussion of volume balance --
15 excuse me, his discussion of the energy balance describes 16 what happened at TMI?
17 A
From the standpoint that the generator is unnecessary
-- is necessary for heat removal for a very small LOCA which ja bu3 1;
the event at TMI 2 was, yes, it describes that.
I!
0 Does it describe it any more accurately than the 29 +i f
21 analyses that had been performed by B&W?
22 A
Not really.
O V
23 0
Having considered the accident that occurred at l
l 24 ! TMI, do you still feel that that very small class of LOCAs is
,_s i Ace
'd Reponm, Inc.
25 bounded by the small break analyses that had been performed?
i I
i
51 l
A Yes, I do believe that, and the basis for that is
~
O tworo1a=
3 Number one, I still feel that the volume balance 4
technique is the more appropriate technique for examining 5
small break LOCAs by hand, rather than by computer evaluations.
6 We have, however, subsequently -- subsequent to TMI evaluated 7
the effect of a break in the PORV, a stuck-open PORV, and 8
shown that its consequences are minimal, provided that the 9
high pressure injection system is left on.
10 Q
Okay.
I'd like to go back and discuss this issue II of one of the points made in Mr. Michaelson's report is this 12 issue of aperator interpretation of pressurizer level.
13 p
Would you describe your perception of that C/
I4 particular issue and the secuence of events associated 15 with that issue?
16 A
I don' t remember the exact basis behind Mr.
I7 Michaelson's concern of the pressurizer not being a good I3 indication of the water level in the reactor coolant system.
i Ull I believe he mentions a break in the PORV within his paper, l
n i
l 20 but I think most of his concern was addressed to the phase 21 of the accident where the system would be refilling rather 22 than the early phases of the LOCA.
23 As far as the concern itself, there is obviously the indications that the response to the operators to the A
t Ac nt Reportm, Inc.
25 Davis-Be'sse 1 transient in September of '77, which indicates 1
I i
l l
l
52
~
I that there could be a misinterpretation; thus the memos that Q'
/
2 were formulated came out.
3 As far as new concerns or new phenomena being O
-V identified by that paper, there was none.
We had analyzed a 5
break in the pressurizer for the 205 plants back in 1972 or 6
73 which demonstrates that the pressurizar will fill up for 7
one of those breaks.
8 Q
Was there any connection made in your mind between 9
the issue raised by Michaelson about pressurizer level and the 10 memos that you had been involved with that Mr. Kelly and Mr.
I Dunn prepared?
12 A
There was a little bit of a tie-back, nothing 13 specific per se, because I had -- I myself considered the issue N
of operator intervention on the HPI system resolved by the 15 Bert Dunn memo', February of
'78.
O Did you feel that the Bert Dunn memos -- the Bert I7 Dunn memo also resolved Mr. Michaelson's concern?
IO i
A Yes.
Yes.
And I believe the statement made in our io e'q January response to the Michaelson paper said clearly that 20 the pressurizer is not a good indication, and that the 21 operator must follow other instrumentation, including indica-22 tions of subcooled temperatures in the primary system before
'3 l
he should consider termination,of high pressure injection system, j
i 24 1
A which is essentially the prescription offered by Bert Dunn, jd Reponen. Inc.
j Ace 25 except for not in the same specific terms.
j i
i
l 53
~
l Q
Did you consider at all that possibly Mr.
(
)
2 Michaelson's concerns about the pressurizer level issue 3
were essentially a moot point because of the things thet you 4
had assumed would be done as a result of Bert Dunn's memo?
()
5 A
To a certain extent, yes.
However, I was surprised 6
at the operator response at Davis-Besse in the first place, y _.
7 so it seems -- it doesn't seem right that an operator would 8
tre minate high pressure injection if it came on, unless he had 9
very good reasons.
10 So as far as using the pressurizer as correct level II indication, I myself had faith that the operators would use 12 other indications besides just pressurizer level before making 13 such a decision.
So it was partly a combination of Bert's
,o()
L response and my f aith in the operators.
j 14 4
15 Q
So your feeling was then that the operators had --
l 16 at Davis-Besse, that their response was not typical of the way 17 other operators would have responded under the same circum-18 stances?
j 19 A
Well, let's just say I hope so.
I do not have a
- u i
i 20 great deal of interface with operators per se.
I was surprised l
2I I at the Davis-Besse response.
I certainly thought that after l
l n
the Bert'Dunn memo that that had been corrected, anyway, and j
22 V
23 would ensure that the operators would take proper response.
,,I l
"l Q
Okay.
To back up for just a moment, the analysis A
r;l Reporters, Inc.
t 25 l of the Michaelson report that's contained in the May 7th, '79 l
l 1
54 I
letter report to the NRC discusses the Michaelson report in (Jl 2
the context of the 177 design, while the Michaelson report is 3
written in the context of the 205 design.
Was there any attempt to resolve that difference?
(a!
4 5
A The response in the May 7th report, though it makes reference to the analyses performed for the 177 plants, is 6
really a discussion of the phenomena that occurs during a 7
small break, and that's independent of the actual plant.
And 8
here I'm specifically talking not per se the computer evaluations, 9
10 but rather the assessment provided in, I think it's Appendix 4 11 or 5 of the May 7th report.
That was really a generic response'.
12 0
So then would it be fair to say that your perception 13 I
is that even though the report is written in the context of 7-(
I l
x>
l the 177 design, that it's equally applicable to the 205 design? =
14 l'
15 A
As far as the phenomena is concerned, yes.
l i
16 0
Are thero any inconsistencies that would result 17 from the f act that those two designs are somewhat different?
A The only difference would be the detail, the 13 li 1; '
analytical details.
There is in the May 7th report the actual !
d ng analysis computer evaluation of those small breaks.
They do iI I
21 [
not apply to the 205s except from the standpoint of identifyingj 22 that phenomena is the same, 7se>
23 0
Do you feel that there is any need to perform a l
i 24 '
similar analysis for the 205, similar detailed analysis?
Aallku Rnmum, Inc, }
25 l
A No.
t I
l
55 f
1 Q
Why?
2 A
Basically because we have seen nothing from the
(}
3 evaluations that we have done to disprove the basis for our
()
4 response to the Michaelson paper.
Our understanding of the 5
phenomena, engineering assessment, the physics of the process, 6
et cetera, the computer evaluation that was done showed that 7
what we were saying was correct.
8 Q
Okay.
Do you know if a specific analysis of the --
9 the stuck-open electromatic relief valve has ever been performed 10 by B&W7 11 A
Prior to Three Mile Island?
No.
Post-Three Mile 12 Island, yes.
~
13 Q
Do you know if such an analysis has ever been 14 l requested by any of the customers, for example, Toledo Edison?
15 A
Not to my knowledge.
16 0
This would be prior to Three Mile Island.
17 A
Not to my knowledge.
18 Q
Do you recall if there was ever any discussion of 19..
the need for a specific analysis of that event as a result l
20 ;
of the September 24th incident at Davis-Besse?
I 21 l A
We deemed such an analysis to be unnecessary 22 basically because we had performed a similar -- similar type l
l 23 1 of event, analysis of a similar type of event for the 205 6
1 24 plants, which demonstrated the same types of phenomena that 1
' A( )mi nwoners w.
25 were indicated in the Davis-Besse transient.
I l
I 56 Q
Do I understand than that'for the 205 design 3ou j
had analyzed the stuck-open PORV?
(~T 2
v' A
No, we analyzed a' stuck-open safety valve.
It'F 3
located at the same place, top of the pressurizer, but it is' (v~)
4 5
bigger in size.
It is a requested analysis by the NRC for 6
Chapter 15 of the SAR, Safety Analysis Reports.
We have per-a -
formed that analysis for the 205s.
7 8
Q But you have not analyzed the stuck-open PORV for the 9
205s?
10 A
No.
11 O
I guess, as I understand it, then, you haven't 12 analyzed the PORVs for any of the designs?
13 A
Pre-TMI, that's correct.
O la O
Okay.
And you don't recall anyone ever having 15 requested that such an analysis be performed?
16 A
That's correct.
17 MR. HEBDON:
Let's take a break for a few minutes.
[ Recess.]
18 l i
T.3 1; p MR. HEBDON:
Okay, let's go back on the record, b
2c i MR. FOLSOM:
Before you go on, may I ask a question?
l l
t 21 '
BY MR. FOLSOM:
22 Q
When you made your reply in effect to TVA by your 23 I
letter to the NRC in May of this year., did you know that the 24 instructions had been proposed by Kelly and Dunn had not gone l
/~N A( jeral Remrters, Inc.
25 out?
i
57 1
A No, I did not.
2 Q
So that the instructions with respect to operator
(\\-)
3; performance and not securing HPI for 20 minutes had not been m
(,)
4 promulgated by B&W to its customers?
5 A
I was on.the--I had assumed that it had been.
6 I had no knowledge one way or the other, however.
7 MR. E') GAR:
What timeframe are we talking about here?
8 BY MR. FOLSOM:
9 Q
The time of the response to the NRC in May of
'79.
10 MR. EDGAR:
This is May '79.
Il THE WITNESS:
Oh, in May
'79.
By that time it had 12 become obvious that we had not sent those instructions out of 13 house.
But during April we did in fact send those instructions 7 ~3 L) l out to the customers.
l I4 i
15 BY MR. FOLSOM-i' 16 Q
So that by the time your May letter was prepared, 17 the so-called blue book --
l 13 A
Yeah,. the instructions had been sent to the customers a
i and, in f act, were included in our small break operating 20 j guidelines which were part of the May 7th report, anyway, d
1 2I BY MR. HEB DON:
l r-22 Q
Have you been involved at all cith the Pebble Springs k3 l
23 Safety Analysis Report, or the review of that particular case? {
24 l A
Could you be more specific?
i fer:J Reporters, inc. l
{
A Q
Okay.
Well, that was just a general question.
25 l!
i
58 1
Have you been involved with Pebble Springs at all?
[i 2
A To a certain extent.
q; 3
0 Let me give you the specifics, and there are two of
(,)
4 them:
5 First of all, for the record, this is a page 6
that's been taken from Amendment 11 of the PSAR fc" Pebble 7
Springs.
It's page 15.13-28, and it discusses operator action 8
associated with various Chapter 15 events.
9 This particular section is talking about inventory 10 control.
And would you take a moment and read -- you can 11 read the whole thing, but the particular area that I'm 12 interested in is subparagraph (b) on that particular part of 13 the page.
,- s, U
14
[ Handing document to the witness.]
l 15 A
[ Witness reading document.]
16 I won' t say that I am not intimately f amiliar with 17 what's -- what's in that letter or in that amendment.
I do, 15 ! however, agree with it.
Il If O
Well, first of all, just as a point of background, H
20 ll did you write that particular section?
l
!.l 21 A
No.
I 22 0
Would someone in your group have written that?
j g-l
' ~,
23 A
To the best of my knowledge, it's not written by J
24 " anybody within my group.
A erst Reporms, Inc.
25 0
Just from your understanding of the way B&W
59 I
is organized, who would have written that?
(,)
2 A
Quite possibly, Integration.
3 0
Okay.
You said now that you agree with the state-7 I
4 ments contained in that particular section.
_/
5 A
Yes.
0 0
The reason I'm interested in this is that that 7
particular subparagraph (b) seems to say that the operator 8
operates the high pressure injection system looking at 9
pressurizer level alone, without any consideration of any of 10 the other plant parameters.
That doesn't seem to be very con-11 sistent with the discussions that we had earlier about the 12 fact that pressurizer level alone is not necessarily a good I3 r~)
indication of what's going on in the plant and your discussion
\\~/
l
- ! of the fact that the operators at Davis-Besse took an in-j 15 appropriate action.
16 A
Yeah, I figured that's the way you would go with this question.
I o
I80 The reason behind my agreement with the statement i
4 I ~' !
is talking about -- and it is based on a brief, quick look at l
20 h it, is basically they're talking about stabilizing the ii h
l 91 '
transient, number one, and then going through a near normal l
22 tN cooldown.
(_/
23 Now my definition of a normal cooldown, or a near j
i normal cooldown follow.ng one of these events would be that
-I 24 '
4 AtOerd Reporms,1N.j 25 I
i you would have to have a full primary system, and that's why i
I
)
i j
60 1
I agree with it.
If you have a full' primary system, the entire loops are filled with liquid, then reliance or using the
(~
2 L:
pressurizer level to control HPI flow is an appropriate 3
(~)
4 procedure.
V In general terms I do agree with it.
The only 5
difference is today we would indeed impose a little bit 6
3._
i stricter condition from the standpoint of what type of 7
temperature limits you must have in the reactor coolant system, 8
temperature measurements before you would take such an action.
9 p)
Q Well, let me -- if I were to look at this particular 11 section in subparagraph (b) and I read that particular 12 description, the operator must control pressurizer level to 13 prevent filling of the pressurizer and thus increase reactor I,)
coolant pressure, and then they go on to discuss the f act that j ja i
15 the HPI valves can then be closed, slowly decrease HPI flow, 16 all talking about in the context of pressurizer level -- if I l
17 look at that discussion and I look at what the operators did 13 at Davis-Besse, they had normal pressurizer level -- normal 19 pressurizer level.
It was right within 20 inches of the h
4 2c j normal level.
21 ]
A But you have to read the rest of the statement.
1 i
22 i That is a subparagraph of a paragraph.
(
I l
x-23 0
okay.
o 24 4 A
And that paragraph says that you have a stabilized j
'A ed Reponm. W.
l 25 system and you're going through a near normal cooldown, and l
\\\\
61 that's the basis for my saying -- my agreement with it.
It is j
probably an interpretation of those words.
FS ARs or --
(D' 2
are not explicit from the standpoint of what you would want 3
( })
an operator to do as far as in rigorous terms, as far as 4
actions and other indications per se, and how he -- what numbers 5
must he have before he 'does something like that.
And that's 6
p --
the basis of my statement for agreement with that.
7 I'm interpreting, if you wish, in light of the 8
full system, when I say near normal cooldown, I don't see how 9
10 he would accomplish such a thing or perform such a function 11 unless you have a full system.
12 Q
So then as I understand it, what you are saying is l
33 that the discussion in that particular section is accuratc l
~
/
3
\\ /
14 if it's taken in the context that the primary cystem pressure 15 is above the saturation pressure, so that you're reasonably 16 confident you don't have voids in the primary?
17 A
That's correct.
18 j Q
Okay.
The other issue associated with Pebble h
- ; Springs is a series of questions that were asked by Mr.
I Ebersol of the ACRS concerning the Pebble Springs docket.
20 li il1 In fact, it appears that at least two of those questions 21 7,
22 were based on the Michaelson report which he had received a I
i s
y,)
a 23 l copy of.
i 24 p Were you involved at all in the preparation of the Adlhea semners. w.
f 25 l response to those questions?
Are you familiar with them at i
i
62 I
all?
I
(}
2 A
I am familiar with them.- My boss, Ber t Dunn, 3
was the one that wrote the response to it.
I served in a
()
4 review capacity to the response.
5 Q
So then you did review the response?
6 A
Yes.
>~
7 Q
In the course of reviewing that response -- let me 8
back up a little bit.
9 In the course of reading the questions that were 10 asked by Mr. Ebersol, did you note that one of the questions 11 addressed this issue of operator interpretation of pressurizer 12 level?
13 A
I don't remember the question now.
Could I see it 14 again?
15 O
Certainly.
16 For the record, this is a copy of the question and 17 the response.
This has been referred to, I believe, as 15 question No. 6 of the questions that were asked by Mr. Ebersol.
I9,
[ Handing document to the witness.]
d 20 !
A
[ Witness reading document.]
l F
21
[ Discussion off the record.]
22 BY MR. HEBDON:
. O.
23 O'
My question is in the course of reviewing that 24 question in preparation for reviewing the answer, did you 73
-- Ac
.r:I Reporters, Inc.
25 recognize that Mr. Ebersol had asked a question about how I
63 1
the operators would interpret pressurizer level during these
(~
2 types of transients?
j L/
3 A
Yes, he does ask that, and I recognized it when I l
[
]'
4 review'ed it.
5 0
Do you recall if you considered whether or not 6
you had answered that question?
If you'd like to take some 7
time and read the whole thing, please feel free.
8 A
Yeah, I'm going to have to.
9 0
Okay, why don't you just start from the beginning 10 and read it.
11 A
[ Witness reading document.]
12 I'm ready.
13 0
We're still on the _ecord, so go ahead.
/-
14 ;
A In reviewing or rereading this paper, it is apparent I
15 i that we did not answer the question as far as interpreting 16 level in the pressurizer directly.
I may be wrong in my 17 earlier statement which said that did I know at the time that is g we were talking about pressurizer levels and interpreting b
I 19 them.
l l
20 '
My understanding is that there was a series of i
li 21 l guestions asked by Mr. Ebersol during various ACRS hearings l
l 22 i
and what we attempted to do, or Bert attempted to do, in this
-s I l l
l 23 h response basically was to address a response to the whole f
x_/
24 jj series of questions that Mr. Ebersol had raised, and as such, Acqlge Reponen, inc.
25 j my review, which then consisted of reviewing some of the ACRS l
I
{
l
64
~
1 transcripts to understand basically the question.
I agreed 2
that this response addressed my understanding of the question
( l\\
3 that Dr. Ebersol was raising, so in fact I did not truly
()
4 understand the first part of the question relative to inter-5 preting level in pressurizer when this response was generated.
6 Q
So then as I understand it, you didn't recognize 7
or didn't focus on the fact that that was part of the question?
8 A
No, we did not, apparently.
We tried to understand 9
or address the concerns that he was raising throughout the 10 history, if you wish, of -- along -- that goes along with Il this question, and we answered it in that fashion, though 12 my understanding is this queFtion appeared to have satisfied 13 his concerns.
. - ~
(
i u/
14 Q
Well, were you involved at all with the actual I
15 ACRS meeting in which those were discussed?
16 A
No, I read the transcript, the transcripts of the 17 hearings.
18 l Q
Did you read the transcript of the hearing that 19 was conducted af ter these questions were -- the response to l
20 j these questions were submitted, the hearing at which these 21 "i issues were discussed?
22 g^)
A There were several ACRS transcripts that I read LJ 23 ] concerning in which Dr. Ebersol raised a series of questions
<i I
24 j relative to small breakt nd heat removal through the steam Aedlhra semrieri. inc.
I l
25 l generator, and if I remember right, they were mostly from the i
65
~
l standpoint of refilling of the primary system and the l
2 response that was generated addressed not necessarily this
[ ')
v 3
question specifically, but rather the history of the questions.
7_(_)
4 Q
Did you review the transcript of the meeting that 5
was held with the ACRS af ter this response was provided?
6 A
No.
7 Q
Do you recall discussing that meeting with anyone?
8 A
No, not per se.
The only portion of the question 9
that I was involved with was this, it was the last time that 10 I ever have seen the question per se.
As far as generating a Il response to it.
12 Q
So then you were not were involved with the ACRS 13 meeting or had no conversations with anyone about the ACRS
-s
(
)
~j Id meeting that was held af ter these responses were submitted?
15 A
Not in that timeframe,'no.
16 Q
Okay.
I'd like to go on and ask you some more 17 general questions about plant procedures and how B&W does lo some of the functions that they do.
U From your understanding of the B&W organization, who' I
I 20 j!in B&W was responsible for preparing plant operating procedures?
21 ]
A I don't believe anybody within B&W was directly i
22 related to preparing plant operating procedures, but rather (a'S 23l providing guidelines f or generations of procedures, and that l
h i
24 J activity is done by Don Hallman's people in the Nuclear i
Acjlhud Reporters, lm.
l 25 Services organization.
l i
66 j
Q Well, B&W does prepare proposed procedures, do they fi 2
not?
O 3
A The exact details, I don't know what they call them, proposed procedures or guidelines to me essentially are (v) 4 5
the same.
6 Q
All right.
Is your function involved with that particular activity at all?
7 A
Before Three Mile Island, I had never seen the 8
9 proposed procedures.
10 Q
So you had not been involved with that at all?
11 A
Right.
12 Q
Based on your understanding of B&W, who in B&W is responsible for preparing standard technical specifications?
13 cs
\\
A The Licensing organization compiles them.
The 14 15 Integration people are responsible for review, I think, of 16 just about all of the standard tech specs, and then the 17 effective task or units would handle any specific tech spec.
i I
18 i
Q Do you get involved with that at all?
I t
1; A
Yes, we would be involved in review of the ECCS l
l 20 y equipment-related tech specs.
I' L
0 l
l 1
21 i
0 But you would not be involved with the review of 22 the -- for example, the small break LOCA procedures?
,-s 1
s l
(~/
23 l
A We had not -- let's sry I had not been involved at j
i i
.i 24 );
all.
I believe that was done in either Hallman's organization, j f
Ah brd R*porten. W.
25 i Nuclear Services, or Plant Integration.
I l
i i
I l
f
67 i
1 Q
Okay.
(^
A Prior to Three Mile Island.
2 LJ 3
0 In your work on the standard technical specifica-tions, how do you incorporate operational information?
)
4 5
A What do you mean by operational -information?
6 0
Well, specifically the Davis-Besse incident, for 7
example, the September 24th, '77 incident, how would you have incorporated that information in the preparation of standard g
9 technical specifications?
10 A
Okay, standard technical specifications do not 11 include provisions for such information per se.
They are 12 oriented towards limited conditions for operation, such as 13 if you have only three pumps operating, your power is restricted
,x t
i
\\_ '
14 i
to roughly 75 percent of the rated power.
It consir.ts of 15 required saf ety equipment that must remain available while 16 the plant is Operating, but as far as responser during 17 I
accidents, there are no provisions for it.
13 ll 0
Okay, who is responsible for seeing that the i;
technical specifications are consistent with the operating n
procedures?
f i
i, e
II l
A Again, the connection isn' t clear because the i
21 j!
I i
22 l
standard technical specifications -- what I am saying is they em
(_)
23 l
are oriented for what types of equipment and how many must I-24 be available and how you control a core to prevent excessive l
Achro seponm. inc.
25 power peaks which could cause problems during accidents.
The l
l
68 1
emergency procedures are a different matter.
They don't really relate per se, except for providing input as to how
()
2 much equipment would be available for the emergency procedures, 3
and I don't believe there is -- I know of nobody specifically
( ))
a that's in charge of making sure that those' two are together.
5 6
0 okay.
u -
7 A
The people over there would have copies of the 1
standard tech specs over in the Nuclear Services organization 8
so they could figure out what equipment is available.
9 10 0
Are you aware that the Davis-Besse small break 11 procedure was revised to include precautions designed to 12 prevent premature securing of HPI and to alert the operators 13 to possible failures of the PORV?
- fsU, 14 A
No.
At what time, though, are you talking about?
15 0
Prior to Three Mile Island.
16 A
Okay.
No.
17 0
would such a change be reviewed by B&W, to your 13 knowledge?
i 19 3 A
Not necessarily.
But I believe that question d
20 ii would be better oriented towards the Nuclear Services people.
i i'
I 21 They can define the actual interplay between us and the 22 utilities.
%)
1 23 0
It strikes me as just a little strange that your 24 group does the ECCS analysis, and yet you don't have any l
7-A.
,Jud Reporters, tnc.
25 involvement with the procedures associated with small breaks i
I
69 D=
I or breaks of any kind.
Doesn't that strike you as being at all
()
2 inconsistent?
3 A
It is somewhat inconsistent.
As I said, to my r^
(_)3 4
knowledge, we've never reviewed it.
There may have been 5
instances where we have.
Af ter Three Mile Island, we are 6
definitely in the review chain for procedures, but I had never 7
seen it before, and it does seem strange, yes.
8 Q
In your opinion, should you have been in that 9
review chain before Three Mile Island?
10 A
Yes.
II Q
Do you know if anyone ever took any actions to 12 try and have you included in that review chain?
I3
/)
A Not tiat I know of.
U f
Id 0
Okay.
15 BY MR. FOLSOM:
16 0
Along the same line, the very name emergency core I7 cooling system brings to mind the thought that you would I3l! automatically be receiving all LERs dealing with the core l
0 cooling system.
Are you on the receiving end of LERs?
20 A
As f ar as any formal process or formal review i
21 chain is concerned, no.
I see them here and there, however.
l l
22
(~')
BY MR. HEBDON:
j L.J l
lI 23 Q
How do you incorporate operating experience, then, l
24 : in your ECCS analyses?
AOde<si aeporters, im.
i i i SC !
A From the standpoint of operator actions, we don't i
I
70 I
per.se.
We have defined certain operator actions that must 2
be performed.
We have not incorporated any operating
()
3 er.perience into the actual small break analyses.
(j 4
Q Your analysis is simply an effort to model,the real 5
world, as I understand it.
Do you ever try to get any feedback 6
of what's going on in the real world and see if the transients a..
7 that have occurred, that have been small breaks, have reacted 8
in the way that your models would have predicted that they 9
would react?
10 A
The only one that I know of that I have specifically 11 seen was the Davic-Besse 1 transient that occurred in September 12 of '77.
Other than that, we -- I have never seen any other 13 transients that say whether or not the ECCS systems or 14 the system response during a LOCA responds any different than 15 what we expect.
I've just never seen any.
There are not a 16 great deal of small LOCAs available, however, to review.
17 Q
Are there any more, to your knowledge, other than 18 the one that occurred at Davis-Besse?
i 19 f A
There was a subsequent one, my understanding is M f there was a subsequent one in October, I believe, that i
21 occurred at Davis-Besse, very similar to the September one.
22 I did not see that because my understanding was it was very L
23
- similar, 24 Other than that, no.
I have not seen any other j
7, dest Reporters, in l A 25 l LOCA.
a
71 1
Q To your' knowledge, have there ever been any cases of pipe cracks or any sort of incident that would be classified X
2
,V 3
as a small LOCA?
A There have been other incidents.
Most of them have
( })
4 been -- the one that specifically comes'to my mind is the 5
stuck-open PORV that occurred at a plant in Europe which I had 6
2 -
never heard of until very recently.
7 There have been cracks and very tiny leaks that 8
would be within the capability of the makeup system that we 9
10 would not have seen.
11 Q
Has there ever been a leak of the order of magnitude 12 that it required the HPI to initiate?
13 A
Offhand, I don't know of any, other than the ones fs
)
x /
that we just previously discussed.
There may be some tube 14 q 15 rupture type, steam generator tube rupture cases that may 16 have required operation of the HPI, but I don't know of any
- 7 specifically.
la i
0 If such events had occurred, would your group have i
19 reviewed them to see if the response of the system was as you j
u have predicted?
2; h 1
21,;
A I don't know whether we would have been called l
22 l in to review it or not.
(7-- )
x-23 O
But yaadidn't actually do such a review, if again I
}
E 24 we're theorizing that maybe such things had happened, but in j
Adlhwa nnenus. ine.
l l
I 25 l fact you've never reviewed any such incident?
i i
i I!
l 72 1
A Right.
The only thing.is'that you do have the 2
Davis-Besse 1 transient, which is about the only one I know of,
~)
3 anyway, where the HPI was activated Gd you had a loss-of-()
coolant accident.
We were called in to review that.
4 I do know that other operational transients we 5
have been -- we have looked at within B&W itself, either by 6
0 ~
the Nuclear Services organization or by the Plant Integration.
7 g
people.
But ECCS specifically has not necessarily been involved.
9 10 Q
In reviewing. the Davis-Besse incident that occurred, 11 did you give any consideration to setting up your model of how 12 the plant ought to respond with the initial conditions and the events that happened at Davis-Besse, and then, running 13 O
14 your model, and comparing the results-to the results that 15 actually occurred at Davis-Besse?
16 A
No, we did not.
At least I didn't, offhand.
17 Basically because we had analyzed -- again we have analyzed la pressurizer break, although it's a big one,..a safety valve, 19. and it has shown the same type of performance that occurred
- g i at Davis-Besse, as far as pressurizer level response is I
21 concerned.
22 Q
So then would it be safe to say that you felt l - O) u l
23 l that your analysis that had been run on the saf ety valve was d
j
(
24 close enough to the Davis-Besse incident that the results i
f A(~>;er:4 Reporters, Inc.
(
25 could be compared?
l i
I
73
~
l A
Not on a time-history basis, but from a (v) 2 phenomenological standpoint, yes.
3 Q
Okay.
(
4 BY MR. FOLSOM:
5 Q
You design emergency core cooling system; is that 6
correct?
>~
7 A
We provide input to the design, yes, we set the 8
design requirements.
9 Q
What kind of fire drills do you design around?
10 A
The systems are designed basically to meet the II conservative NRC criteria with respect to large and small I2 LOCAs.
13 fS For the large breaks, the important systems are L) 14 the core flood tanks and the low pressure injection systems.
I 15 '
We provide design input on those.
I 16 For the smaller breaks, it's the high pressure 17 injection system, and again we supply the design inputs for IS ll those.
IE Q
But this is all, if I may interrupt a moment, this l
20 ;l is all on a theoretical basis?
Or do you break a pipe here l
P o
21 1 and there to find out what's going to happen?
22 A
No, it's done on basically a theoretical basis.
rs NJ 23 0
How can you afford then to overlook the actual
\\
4 '?
events that your designed machine is intended to cope with?
AcOanemnm.ine.l I
25 Maybe that's a "why have you stopped beating your I'
74 1
wife, or why haven't you stopped beating your wife" question.
( )
2 A
Well, I wouldn't necessarily say we overlook that.
3 The computer codes that we utilize to perform these calculations
(
)
4 have not been constructed to necessarily match the real world 5
performance of the system.
The design calculations that are 6
done are done in a very conservative manner.
7 Q
The worst-way type?
8 A
Well, it's a little bit of both.
It's a worst-size 9
break, but the big actors are the conservatisms relative to 10 specific items such as the core decay heat that we utilize 11 within the evaluation.
It's a very specific conservative item.
12 That is very important, in order to predict a real world 13 respcnse, what is the actual core heat.
So we don't -- so 14 we have conservative models rather than realistic models in 15 the first place.
The codes themselves are constructed from 16 first principles in general, conservation of energy, momentum 17 of mass equations.
15 p So from that standpoint, they are -- are reasonable.
ii 1:
We have benchmarked the computer codes versus various b
22 experiments such as the NRC standard problem program where we g
i 21 ; looked at LOFT, and we have benchmarked versus the semi-scale i
I 22 J experiments.
pl k
23 We have also looked at various supports of the i
l 24 h program, to look at separate effects item, so the computer i
er:A Reporters, Inc ]
At 25 l programs themselves are all based or have a reasonable basis l
i
75 for demonstrating that the plants will operate safely or j
2 can handle any of these transients.
(v)
Now when you go and say do we overlook operating 3
a events, there really has been no conscious effort to overlook
()
them.
LOCAs do not generally occur.
The only specific item 5
prior to Three Mile Island that I know about is the Davis-6 Besse 1 incident.
7 8
0 Do you know how many PORV valves have failed open 9
over the last five years?
10 A
I don't remember the actual number.
I believe it's 11 10 -- five -- I'm not sure.
I've seen it recently, but I was 12 not very aware of every incident that occurred.
13 0
Well, it isn't my province to lecture you, but Is)
L~/
14 it would seem to me that it would be very important to know, I
'.for you to know, in your box in the organizational chart, to l
15 16 know the experience in the industry.
17 MR. EDGAR:
Was there anything in any transients 15 that you have seen that would lead you to have any doubts J
i; as to the conservatism in your evaluation?
2; THE WITNESS:
There are no transients that I've l
i u
il 21 ;
seen that would lead me to doubt the conservatism of the model, i
f 22 inasf ar as the -- whether or not I should see incidents where
,_..s I
bu4 23 valves have opened, et cetera, I believe we should.
d 24 p Again there is some review internally within j
AM Ltd Reporters, W.
25 j the company on these transients, and mostly, I believe, in
76 I
Nuclear Service.
' ))
t' 2
So from that standpoint, they are reviewed.
I just s_
3 have not been involved at all.
\\2 4
MR. EDGAR:
Well, does your job involve designing 5
the emergency core cooling system, or does it involve doing 6
analyses of the overall system response to a loss-of-coolant 7
accident?
Which is it?
8 THE WITNESS:
My job includes the analysis of.the 9
overall system response to it, to a transient.
It also includes 10 setting up criteria for designing the systems.
MR. EDGAR:
Okay, and who designs the systems?
I2 THE WITNESS:
The actual systems designs are done 13
(}
in the equipment area, and I don't know its exact title.
I#
BY MR. HEBDON:
15 Q
But of the -- some number of PORV failures that 16 have occurred, which from your perception are the only LOCAs I7 that have occurred on B&W plants, of the size that you've I8 been concerned about in an ECCS analysis, the only one that
~
b[l you've ever reviewed in any detail is the Davis-Besse incident?.
i 20 A
That's correct.
2I BY MR. FOLSOM:
22 Q
Did any varjstion in your analysis follow on that
(}
23 review?
!i..
24 Ac(q~)
A No.
The analysis -- that review did not affect erot Reporters, Inc.
how we do the analyses at all.
We were quite confident that 25
77 1
our computer programs would predict that phenomena.
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2 Q
And design against it?
Q./
3 A
Yes, and protect against it.
We were definitely
)
4 convinced'it would protect against it.
5 Q
Well, I'm bound to ask the next question:
6 How did TMI happen, if you designed and analyzed 7
to protect against it?
8 A
Well, my understanding of what happened at the 9
Three Mile Island event is that the operator throttled back 10 and possibly terminated the high pressure injection flow for a 11 fairly substantial period of time, while pulling even letdown 12 out of the primary system itself, pulling inventory out besides c
13 the leak.
(3 wJ 14 There is no system in the world that can be designed 15 that could prevent that if the operator turns them off.
16 Q
But there again you were in the chain of command 17 of considering changes of operator instructions, and you reviewed 18 the proposed instructions that Mr. Dunn prepared, and it sat, 19 ll it fell between the chairs.
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20 I'm not scolding you.
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21 A
Well, you've got to understand that the originator 22 is the one that is mostly responsible for the work and is gS LJ 23 the one that would be most responsible for its follow-through. :
24 0 I am simply providing the quality assurance check of its hrd Repot ters, lm.
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2 Q
Okay.
3 A
I did, however, assume that the thing had been O
4 img1e ented.
5 MR. EDGAR-Can we go off the record.
6
[ Discussion off the record.]
7 MR. HEBDON:
Let's go back on.the record.
8 BY MR. HEBDON:
9 0
I'd like to go on and ask you some questions about 10 some of the things that happened af ter the TMI accident, 11 particularly during the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following the accident.
12 Would you describe your involvement with the TMI 13 task force that was formed on March 28, 1979?
14 A
I had very little involvement with the TMI task l
l 15 force during that, except at one point during the day at about, 16 oh, 1:30, somebody came up and asked me a question, asked me 17 what it would do -- he told me a few initial conditions of 18 the transient, where it was, and asked me what my recommenda-19,
tion was.
And I think they were saying that the system was l
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i 20 solid, and a couple of other things.
21 Q
Okay, when did this conversation occur?
22 A
About 1:30 in the af ternoon, because I had just
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u) 23 returned from school.
24 Q
Who talked to you?
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25 A
I believe it was Lou Cartin.
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i 79 l
Q Okay, now, what were the conditions that he described 2
to you?
3 A
Basically what I was told about was this very solid 4
system.
It was solid at very high pressures, and they asked 5
me what should they do to get out of this situation and get 6
onto a normal cooldown process.
7 Q
So then it was your understanding that he believed 8
that the system was solid at that time?
9 A
At that time.
It turned out I started to do some 10 work, he came back to me and he told me forget it, the system Il ain't there any more.
It was in a different state.
And I I2 don't remember what the exact state was at the time.
It was 13 no longer solid.
I4 Q
Did he indicate to you that it was -- that he had 15 misunderstood the state, or that the condition had changed?
16 A
The condition had changed is what happened.
Now 17 when I say solid, I will have to kind of back up on that.
It 18 wasn't really solid.
I meant the solid pressurizer and a 19 very high pressure system.
It was up around 2200 psi, and i
20 l they were asking essentially how do they make it totally solid, 21 get the heat removal to the generator going so they can cool 22 down.
That was essentially the question that I was asked, 23 l
alang those lines, but within about 15 minutes he had come 24 i n back to me and told me forget it, the system isn't there any
- Acc, emi Reporters, Inc.
25 more.
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1 Q
What did he then say was the state of the condition 4-2 of the system?
l 3
A I believe he was telling me at that time that the
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4 system was superheated, the hot leg temperatures were 5
indicating superheat.
6 Q
Did he give you any indication of whether he felt 7
that that condition had existed for some time, or whether 8
that condition had just developed?
9 A
I don't recollect which way it was.
There was a 10 communication to Lou between us and the site.
Any information 11 we had was just about two hours old or so.
At least that's 12 my understanding of what it was.
And so even when he told me 13 the condition at around 1:30, they were probably reflective (s
i LJ 14 of the system conditions probably around 10:00 or 11:00 o' clock 15 that morning.
16 0
Would it be fair to say, though, that based on 17 the discussions that you had with him, it would appear that 18 the realization that the system was superheated here at B&W, 19 j that realization occurred some time around quarter to 2:007 20 A
That was about the time I heard about it.
I can't j
21 answer for anybody else.
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So there may be some other timelags in there?
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23 A
Right.
I said I was not directly involved with j
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The only other decision I was involved in that,
A(_s) rs n.mners, w.j day was the decision to start the RC pumps at around 7:00 i
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Let's go to that in a minute.
2 Did you make any recommendation about what should be 3
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done?
4 A
No.
I was starting to get to work on it and he 5
came back and told me forget it, he said about 15 minutes later.
6 Q
Okay.
Now what was your later involvement?
7 A
I was in the -- in the project control center, I 8
went back there around 6:00 o' clock or so that evening to find 9
go~
out what the status of the plant was.
They had made the system 11 solid again and there were many discussions going on about 12 whether or not to turn on the RC pumps, and I was involved in the interplay that went on between the various people 13 O
that were there, and there were several, about what to do, ja whether or not to start the reactor coolant pumps.
15 l
16 0
What were the concerns about starting the reactor 17 coolant pumps?
A I don't remember at that time what it was.
One 18 19 of the biggest concerns was really whether we should turn them 20 all the way on or just bump them, try it for 15 seconds and see if it has an effect on the system, and whether it's 21 beneficial; which is what we decided to do.
And then we 22 turned them on about 15 minutes later.
l, 23 l
24 l
Q Who from the ECCS analysis group was acuive --
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25 more actively involved with the task force?
1
I 82 1
A Bert Dunn.
2 Q
So would it be fair to say then that he was the 3
representative of the ECCS analysis group on that task force?
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4 A
Yes, on that day.
5 O
So he then would have been the ECCS analysis expert?
6 A
Yes.
7 0
On that particular group?
8 A
Yes.-
9 Q
Okay.
Do you know if at any time on Wednesday, 10 the day of the accident, that you or any of the people here 11 at B&W, realized that the high pressure injection system had 12 been secured?
13 A
I jus.t cannot remember whether I knew or not at 14 that time.
15 0
When you had the discussion about the f act that 16 the plant was solid, do you recall if there was any discussion 17 of whether the high pressure injection was still on?
A I believe it would have had to Fave been on at that 13 ;
19 time.
I just don. -- don't remember.
'0 0
When you said it would have had to have been on at 2
that time --
22 A
Well, it is also in retrospect, now, you know, 23 making that statement, that in order to have the system filling 24 up if you had a leak, and now you've got water in the system, l
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j 25 then you would have had to have some sort of injection dystem i
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on.
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j Q
Well, when.they reached the conclusion that the 3
system was solid, would that not have been associated with 4
high pressurizer' level?
5 A
Quite. possibly.
6 O
Did you consider at all that they might have had a 3 --
7 response similar to the response that you saw at Davis-Besse 8
where the pressurizer level pegged high while the high 9
pressure injection system was secured due to the boiling 10 in the primary?
II A
I just don't remember enough facts about what
^
12 happened in that day, because the day was a very hectic day.
13 Number one, Bert was gone and I took over some of his functions I4 at the time, and then there were -- people did come in and 15 out trying to find out what has happened, et cetera.
There 16 were meetings on that, and some comments about where the I7 system was at the time, or where it had been.
So it's difficult 18 for me to segregate, especially at this time, what knowledge 19, I had at that specific -- at that specific time relative to h
20 any other portion of that day.
It was just too hectic a day 21 to remember any details.
22 0
Okay.
We1.1, you don' t recall, though, whether at l
23 any time during that day you had any perception of whether 24 l
3 the high pressure injection was on or off?
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I did have a perception by the end of that day l
25 j
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84 that that they had had the high pressure injection off for a j
2 period of time, and that they had superheat temperatures at jr]
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3 another period of time.,
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okay,.but you don't recall the relative times of 5
'Jthose various perceptions?
I 6
No, I do not.
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7 0
What in your opinion is meant by the term an un-teviewed safety question?
8 A
Well, in my opinion, simply it's a concern that would 9
jo be raised by an engineer within B&W or external, say a customer, 11 which has a safety implication, which is a difficult thing to 12 define.
It's something which would affect the public health 13 that has not previously been raised or addressed by the NRC.
14 Q
How would you define the term safety implication 15 or s?fety concern?
16 A
The most -- the main definition would probably 17 be a release of radiation to the environment, a potential 18 for the increase of radiation to the environment.
19 Q
Okay.
What issues or problems, in your opinion, l
l 20 should be submitted to the NRC for review?
21 A
Very simply, problems which would endanger the 22 public health, problems associated with release of radiation, O
23 Problems associated with inadequate emergency system designs, i
I 24 items along those sorts would be what I would feel would
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25 definitely need escalation to the NRC, items associated with l
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the failures of equipment to meet the actual design require-l
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2 ments placed' u'pon it also should probably be submitted to the 3
NRC for review.. Though they may not necessarily have
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4 significant consequecces.
5 0
In your opinion, what is the relationship between 6
these issues that should be reported and the unreviewed safety 7
questions?
8 A
They are essentially one and the same.
9 Q
So you feel that the two issues or the two terms 10 are interchangeable?
II A
To a certain extent.
An unreviewed safety concern 12 is scrething that I would place, say, with a given engineer, 13 me raising a concern.
What would go to the NRC would be 14 af ter an in-house review has determined that indeed it is a 15 real concern and it should be escalated.
16 0
Okay.
What would you do if you identified an 17 issue or problem that you felt should be brought to the 18 attention of the NRC?
I9 A
I would write a preliminary safety concern report.
i 20 Q
What would happen to it then?
21 A
That would be transmitted to Licensing who would 22 send.it out for review and comments among the various organiza-i i
23 tions within the company, and they would then make an ultimate I
24 ! determination on whether or not it is a real concern or not, l fS c
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25 and whether it requires escalation to the NRC.
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86 j
Q Okay.
Do you know of any other precursor events that in your opinion' are relevant to the accident at TMI?
([)
2 And let me define a precursor event the way we are using the 3
O 4
eer -
It's basically any event or issue that might have 5
indicated that the accident at TMI was going to happen at 6
p ~
7 some point in the future.
The Davis-Besse incident would be an example.
8 The Michaelson report might be an example of a precursor event.
9 Are you aware of any others that in your opinion u) 11 are relevant to the accident at TMI?
12 A
No.
13 Q
Do you have any additional information that might O
14 be relevant to our inquiry into the events surrounding the i
i 15 accident at TMI?
16 A
You're pretty much covered anything I've known.
t 17 0
Okay.
Have we f ailed to elicit any information in 18 areas that you believe to be important?
19 l A
No.
I 20 Q
Do you have anything else to add?
P 21 A
No.
22 MR. HEBDON:
Mr. Folsom, do you have anything?
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l 23 MR. FOLSOM:
No.
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24 MR. HEBDON:
That completes the interview.
l *-()secf Reporters,1N.
I 25 Thank you very much.
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1 (Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m.,
the interview Q
2 was adjourned.]
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