ML19308C384
| ML19308C384 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1979 |
| From: | Sniezek J NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001230354 | |
| Download: ML19308C384 (88) | |
Text
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i Pd N U CL E A R R E G U L ATO R'f C O MMI S SIO N 1
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i IN THE MATTER CF:
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THRE" 'd" T ~SLAND SPECIAI, INQUIRY OEPOSITION i
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DEPOSITION OF:
1 I
j JAMES H.
SNIEZEK l
O Place -
3ETHESDA, MD.
Date -
Monday, September 24, 1979 Pages 1 - 88 0
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___________x In the Matter of:
4 THREE MILE ISLAND 3l SPECIAL INTERVIEWS i
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____________x 7
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DEPOSITION OF JAMES H.
SNIEZEK 8
9 Room 6211 Maryland National Bank Bldg.
10 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, Maryland l
11 i
Monday, September 24, 1979j 12 9:07 a.m.
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13 BEFOR2:
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For the Nuclear Reculatorv Commission:
h 15 GEORGE RIVENBARK, Interviewer l
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li 24 li iA eral Reporters, Inc. I!
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_C _O _N T _E _N'_T _S j
O' WITNESS:
EXAMINATION 3
, James H.
Sniezek 2
4 5
.6
_E _X _H _I _B _I _T _S EXHIBIT NUMBER:
IDENTIFIED r
8 5040 2
9 5041
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'MR..RIVENBARK:
On the record. 'This is a
()
2 deposition of Mr. James H. Sniezek by the NRC Three Mile 3
Island special inquiry group.
Present this morning are 4
Mr. Sniezek and myself, George Rivenbark, as well as the 5
court re por te r.
6 Woula you raise your right hand.
7 W here u pon,
o JAMES H. SNIEZEK v
was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, 10 was examined and testifieo as follows:
11 EXAMINATION 12 BY MR. RIVENBARK:
13 0
State your f ull name for the record.
14 A
My name is James H. Sniezek.
15 0
Mr. Sniezek, is it true that you have received a lo le tter f rom us explaining the nature of this deposition and 17 is this letter f rom Mr. Rogovin to you a copy of the letter lo that you received in the mail.
IV A
It definitely looks like a copy of the le tter tha t 20 I. received in the mail.
21 MR. RIVENBARK This letter is dated August 26th, 22 1 v 79.
I would like to numoer this as Exhibit No. 5040.
23 (Exhibit 5040 marked f or 24~
ia entif i'c a tion. )
25' i
([)
i
3 7244 01 02 rlp3WH I
BY MR. RIVENBARK 2
0 Did you bring with you today a copy of your 3
resume?
4 A
fes, I did bring a copy of my resume.
5 0
May I see it, please?
o (Document handeo to examiner. )
7 MR. RIVENSARK I have here a two-page paper 5
titled James H. Sniezek which summarizes Mr. Snie zek's 9
prof e ssional experience.
10 Woulo you mark tnis as Exhibit 5041, please?
11 (Exhibit 5041 marked for 12 identification.)
13 EY MR. RIVENSARK:
14 0
Mr. Sniezek, does this paper a ccurately sta te your 15 prof e ssional experience ?
16 A
This is an accurate summary of my prof e ssional 17 e x pe r ie nc e.
ic 0
Thank you, sir. Sniezek, is counsel representing ly you personally toaay?
20 A
No.
21 MR. RI V E?iB ARK :
I would like to note for the 22 record tnat the witness is noc represented by counsel tocay.
23 E i i.IR. RIVEN 3ARE:
24 0
l'r. Sniezek, if a t any time during the course of 25 this interview you f eel line you woulu like
'c be
4 7244 01 03 rl pBNH 1
represented by counsel or have counsel present, please s
2 acvise me and we will adjourn these proceedings to af ford 3
you the oppor tuni ty to make the necessary arrangements. Is 4
this procedure agreeable to you?
5 A
It is agreeable.
o 0
You snould be aware that the testimony that you 7
give has the same force and effect as if you were testifying 6
in a court of law.
My questions and your responses are 9
being taken down, and they will later be transcribed.
You 10 will be given the opportunity to look at that transcript and 11 make changes as you deem neces:
ty.
12 However, to the extent t ha t your subsequent changes are 13 significant, these changes may be viewed as af f ec ting your 14 credibility, so please be as complete and accurate as you 15 can in responding to my que stions.
lo liow, if you at any point during the de position don't 17 understand a question, plea se f eel f ree to stop and indicate 10 that ano we will make the clarification at that time.
av Le t me ask you to f ollow two basic ground rules ir 20 replying to my questions.
One is Inst you permit me to 21 finish my questions bef ore you give -- my questions bef ore 22 you give your re sponse even if you know what the ques tion is 23 going to be becs se the reporter canno t take botn of us down 24 speaking at ne s le time.
25 The second is that you respond audibly.
I/otions such as
5 7244 01 104 rl pSWH 1
nodding your head cannot.be taken down 'by-the reporter.
()
2 Mr. Sniezek, when' did you -first learn of the incident?
3 A
I' first learned of the incident, it was-about in 4
the neighbornood of 7:45 a.m. on Wednesday morning, March 5
28th, as soon as I walked into the office building at 6
East / West Towers.
7 0
Who informed you?
8 A
I' do not remember who informed me.
v 0
Do you know wha t' you were told whenever you 10 learned of the incident?
11 A
I was told to report to the incident response 12 center in the East / West Towers.
13 0
Did you receive any other instructions?
14 A
At that specific time, I did not receive any other
(
I S' specific instructions.
Io O
After you arrived at the incident response center, 17 did you get any f urther instructions f rom anyone?
lu A
At the time I arrived a t the incident r e s ponse 19 c en te r -- le t me just con template on that for a minute here.
20 I do not believe tha t I received any spoecific
'21 instructions. There were several mid level u pper level 22 managenent IE peo pl e there, and we basically knew by our
- 23 disciplines what had to be done and we started instituting i
24 things to ge t additional information to clar if y the 25 situation.
I don't recall any specific instructions being e.
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6 7244 01 Ob rl p3Wd I
receivea.
2 0
You were one of the senior leaders of the IRACT 3
support s ta f f ; i s tha t correct?
4 A
Yes.
5 0
Can you describe for me your assigned 6
responsibilities in the response actions?
7 A
My assigned responsibilities in the response 6
actions in this instance were to support the division of v
reactor operations inspec tions.
Since this is reactor 10 incioent, the division of reactor operations inspection 11 would be the lead -- in charge of responding to the 12 inciaent.
13 I conferred wi th the ROI repre senta tive there. I do not 14 recall whether it was Mr. !ioseley or Mr. Jordan at the time, 15 and I told them that I would proceed witn trying to clarify lo the radiological situations as f ar as releases to environs 17 and items of that nature, and that is what I proceeded to le do.
IV I would like to make it very clear that I belisve i t wa s 20 either t.r.
toseley or Joroan, but I am not definitely 21 positive who it was in ROI.
22 0
W ha t we re tne initial actions tnat you had to take 23 i n tne r e spon s e -- i n the incident response.
24 A
Ine initial action was to get a hold of our 2b Region I office and try to establish what was really
7 7244 01 06 y
rl pBWH I
occurring at Three Mile Island.as f ar as what their
()
2 understanding'of the o ccurrence was.
3 0
Did yo also =have to select your staff at t ha t 4
point?
5 A
At tha t point-I called the staff down f rom the o
f ourth floor tha t' I had.
I called my assistant director 7
down and I askea him to bring one or two people down. in the 6
initial steps of establishing what was-transpiring at Three Y
Mile Island.
Other than any other selection of staff, that 10 was -not necessary at that time.
11 0
Who was your a ssistant director?
12 A
My assistant director is Leo Higginbotham.
13 0
Do you recall who the other staff members are who 14 came down with Mr. Higginbotham?
\\-
15 A
No, I do not recall.
Io 3
Is there some defined basis as to how you select 17 the support staff needed in the response?
16 A
Yes, there is.
Within the division, I have a 19 division procedure which establishes who would fill the 20-various roles during the rasponse.
21 0
Incluaing those people who would be su pportive of 22 your activities?
23 A
Tnose only a pplied to the pe o ple on my s t a f f.
It 24 does not go beyono my staff.
25 0
Did you have people supporting you outside of your O
8 7244.01 07' ripBWH I
s taf f.?
]F 2'
A
-That is correct. I did have people supporting me 3
outside of my. staff.
~4 0
What kinds of f unctions were these peop1'e supposed 5
to perform?
o A
These-people were pulled inLas the incident we saw 7
was ge tting larger to provide three-shif t coverage in - the 8
incident re sponse center. f or the ' heal th physics f unction.
9 Basically, we set up on a three-shif t coverage for the 10 support staff with Mr. Higginbotham and myself being on 12
.I l hours on, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> off af ter the first 20 or so hours of. the 12 incident.
13 As we received these people from other offices, the 14 a ssi stants f rom other of fice s, namely for my dire ct support
("3 s/
15 we received people from NMSS and the office of standards 16 development.
We assigned them to specific shif ts, and they 17 woulc be collecting the data as it was received f rom the le field, recording it and analyzing the data we were ge tting iv -
f rom the field to de termine if we had a major off-site 20 problem.
21 Let me add one more. thing here, and that is NRR had a 22 support to my f unction also and the f unction of the 23 meterological -- meterology group which was being 24 cooroinated by an flRR member, Lake Barrett, who was 25 cooroinating.most of the !;RR radiological aspects, and ave O
9 244 01 06 ri pBWd -
I were sworking -together on the overall picture that existed at h
2 Three Mile I sland.
3_
0 Now, then, Lake Barrett works in Brian' Grimes' 4
organization?
5 A
I believe oo. I am not posi.tive where exactly he 6
fits in.
7 0
Is it f air to say that Brian Grimes of NRR had 6
similar responsibility to yours in the incident response?
9' A
No, I would not say t ha t is ture.
His 10 responsibility evolved during the course of the incident and 11 was more analyzing what was happening in the plant and 12 evaluating the potential releases that could occur.
That 13 tended to develop to be the NRR f unction whereas in my 14 f unction, we were more analyzing the releases that had L
15 o ccurreo, what levels they ware at, and to cetermine if any lo actions would have to be taken. I would _ classify ours as 17 being more tna environmental monitoring aspects of the 10 incioent.
19 0
The phsyical location of your support group in the 20 IRC, can you tell me abou t tha t ?
21 A
Our pnysical location shif ted.
Initially we were 22 loca tec witnin the IRC itself, within the main building, the 23 main room housing the I ACT. The EMT was in one roomi we were 24 in the ad jacent room.
That lasted for a day or a day and a 25 half. I don't recall the exact time f rame, but because of (G
_)
10 7244 01.~09 p
I the noise level. in the IRC and the number of people that Erl p6WH r"g
(,j 2
were in there, we moved my specific operation out of the 3
IRC and into my office, which is almost right across the 4
hall f rom the Ei4T room. ' Al so, because of the physical 5
limitations of space in IRC, the meterologist and the peo pl e 6
working with Lake Barre tt were in some other offices on the 7
other end of -- across the nall from the IRC.
6 We were all wi thin, I would say, 100 to 150 f ee t of each v
other on the same floors
-10 0
Can you describe the relationship that your group 11 nad witn Brian Grimes and his group on Wednesday, that is, 12 with respect to how you coordinated your activities with 13 their activities?
14 A
Basically, it was an informal type of
- n)
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15 cooraination.
When NRR came over with the radiological lo people from NRR, ce developed a natural type relationship
~
17 where NRR would tell us that we were -- they were trying to 16 do a specific analysis, and if we had any inf ormation or 19 they would ask us for inf ormation, we would go to the site 20 and try to get the inf ormation for them and work together to 21 develop the end product t ha t wa s be ing soutnt.
22 So basically it was an informal relationship, but there 23 was a sharing of inf orma tion.
If the NER group would get 24 some information from the site, they wotild normally come in 25 and provide us wi th the information so v e would all have the C)
11 7244-01 10 ripBWH I
same story of what was going on as f ar' as the radiological
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2 side of the incident was concerned.
3 0
Was there any change in this way of working with 4
Grimes' group as time passed?
5 A
There were some minor changes.
There is nothing 6
real marked.
Occasionally, they would get information we 7
didn't have and --- but I thought that they made a concerted 8
effort, especially Lake Barre tt, to keep us informed of the Y
significant information that they were ge tting.
10 I believe maybe the relationship could have been a little 11 closer, more of an integrated one team composed of IE/NRR 12 with overall in charge ano efforts could have been 13 integrated a little be tter; but they were not what I would 14 say detrimental to the situation.
/^)'
(-
15 0
Did you also coordinate your activities with the lo o ffice of state programs re presenta tives?
17 A
Yes.
We worked very closely with them.
They were lo loca ted in the incident response center.
19 A lot of the information we got we passed to them and 20 they would pass to the state.
They normally looked at any 21 records that we had, and I personally would touch base with 22 tnem three, f our times on an eight-hour cycle to see what 23 ty pe or f eedback they were getting f rom the state.
24 I would say tha t the relationship, the one that existed 25 with state programs, NRR, and IE was good; and the longer we m
12
- 244.01.31-rip 3h.i i
were there, the be tter it got.
Initially, there were a lot p).,
(_
2' of things that -- because they were getting their own 3
marching orders and their management changed, they were 4
going out to get the information they wanted to get to 5
satisf y their own immedia te supervisors outside of the 6
incident response center aspects, and there probably was 7
seme-wasted motion there.
But as we evolved more as a E
working team, things got be tter the longer we were over V
there.
10 0
Can you describe how you worked with any other groups within the IRC other than the Grimes group and the 12 s ta te s grou p?
13 A
There was an ad hoc group established.
I believe 14 Steve Hanauer was in charge of that.
When there wrs the O
k' 15 threat of so-called hydrogen explosion and the need f or lo evacuation and points to be looking f or, we interf aced with 17 them on the coordination develo pment of, I believe it was, le the NRC action plan in case something was happening where 19 NRC woula have to take immediate actions. We worked very 20 closely with the operations people in there as f ar as what 21 was going on in the reactor to try to anticipate what would 22 happen f rom the radiological standpoint due to some reactor 23 manipulation that was going on.
24 As an. example, operations woulc tell us in a half hour 25 they were planning to vent a tank, f or example.
There may
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13 P244 Ol' 12 i
rlpBWH I
be some radiological release. We would then try to have an n()
2 AR.S~ nelicopter 'up in the air at the time of the release.
3 There was a lot of that type of coordination occurring.
f 4
(Discussion off the record.)
- ?,
i 5
MR. RIVENBARK:
Back on ne record.
6 BY MR. RIVENBARK8 7
0 How did you receive the raw data from the site?
8 Did it come f rom whom in the IRC, for instance?
9 A
That is a tough question.
We received it in 10 various manners and shapes.
Initially, we had the one phone 11 that was hooked up to the site.
Initially, we received some 12 meterological data directly f rom the site f rom our people on 13 site.
At t ha t time there was a conflict between the need 14 f or the operational type da ta, the reactor status, and the 15 radiological data. I believe that it was not im portan t to 16 determine the reactor sta tus, which if that could get under 17 control, we would then be able to terminate and limit any le off-site consequencesi so I shifted from that pho n e,
j 19 competing f or tha t phone to a separate line going to the 20 regional office since the regional office already had a 21 direct contac t with the site.
22 So after the first nou r, two hours or so, that magnitude 23 of time frame, most of our information was being relayed 24 through the regional of fice until such time as our regional 25 of fice had their trailers set up at the site and we had a O
14 7244 01 13 P' rlp3HH I
direc t. hotline f rom the site.f or the HP data.right into my
()
2 own office at the re sponse cen ter.
.3 O
Mas that particular line to the region one of the 4
normally monitored telephone lines?
5 A
It was not. a particular line.
It could be any 6
line-going to the regio.
Some of the data came in on the 7
monitor lines, but because of the noise level that was in 8
-the response center,-the crowds with various people sitting Y
on tables, wiggling on tables, you couldn't write.
10 Many times I would go to a dif f erent office, put it on 11 the speaker phone with pencil in hand or my staff would, and 12 we would take the data on an unmonitored line.
13 0
Do you know to whom you were usually speaking a t 14 the region?
(
15 A
There was no set person. Normally, when I would 16 speak to the site when we were able to get through to the 17 si te, if George Smith was there, I talked to him or someone lo lika Tom Essig, one of the section chief s that were looking Iv at the bigger pic ture.
But of ter: time s, I would get a call 20 in f rom someone '_lse who had a da ta impor tant to pa ss it in 21 to neadquar ters and.i t could have been anybody that I was 22 getting it from.
It was almost always an IE individual whom 23 I woulc' recognize by name.
When they told me who it was, I 24 would recognize them by name.
And at the regional office, 25 the same thing would a pply.
They would be the section O
15 7244 01 14 1
ripBMH 1
chief.
Bud Crocker, when he was in charge -- I usually 2
talked to the person in charge, but if he was on another 3
p hon e, we would get it f rom whomever had the updated 4
information. So most of the inf ormation we were getting was 5
via telephone.
o However, I don't recall if it was ' Wednesday or Thursday, 7
but eventually when they had facsimile systems working, they e
started sending the data in via the f acsimile system.
But Y
tha t would usually be eight hours after the fact. It would 10 be more confirmatory, and a lot of times we would get more 11 data in there than we got on the telephone, but it would be 12 data that was relatively insignificent type of data.
13 O
So it is f air to say, then, that the 14 communications f rom your group were not handled through the g
k 15 field communicator?
16 A
It is aefinitely true to say that they were not.
17 Af ter the first coupla of hours -- well, at s pots in be tw een le we inight go oack, but in general they were not handlea 19 through the field co mmuni ca to r.
20 0
Then the raw data now is coming f rom the region 21 generally in response to your reque st to the region f or 22 specific information?
23 A
Bo th ways. For example, af ter every All.S flight, 24 they wcule sene the results in automatically. If we would be 25 going f or a couple of hours on any data, we would bug them
16 7244 01 15 rlpBWH I
on w hat is going on and what is happening, and usually it N) 2 would be because field survey teams weren't back in-yet. But e would get very edgy in headquarters when we didn't have 3
w 4
information.
5 0
Had you se t up some specific list of questions 6
that you wanted responded to routinely?
7 A
There were specific items like -- such as the 6
level, the ground level measurements under the plume which 9
we were getting as a matter of routine with AMS flight, the 10 width cf tne plume by degrees, how f ar the flight was out,
.11 the beta / gamma versus the gamma type readings, those kinds 12 of things were a matter of routine that we were receiving 13 and that we wanted.
'14 We wanted to know if there were any parsonnel
(-)s
(
15 overexposure s when they came up and were very interested in a?{
lo the iodine levels if any iodine would be detected.
This is 17 one of the things as time wen t on we did not get inundated Ic with a lot of what I will classif y as le ss im portant da ta.
IV If things were going okay, we weren't getting it.
If tnere 20 were scmething abnormal, we would get it into headquarters.
21 22 23 24 25
17 7244 02 01
~
rl pBWd 1
0 I believe you have already told me that you got 2
rcw cata through the State Programs Office?
4 3
A Yes.
4 0
Now, the raw data that came into -- from the s a te's programs office'or f rom other places, did you have o
some formal depository or in-box for them to place o
7 inf ormation that was supposed to be directed to you?
6 A
No, we did no t.
Normally if it came in, they 9
woula hanacarry it or go over to the Xerox, run a copy of 10 wha tever da ta they had anc handcarry i t over or they would 11 bring over the log book and point out a log entry to my 12 group.
Likerise, with the FDA representative that was there 13 and the EPA representative, if they got any information, 14 they would come over and give us a copy of it.
(,
15 0
Did tne -- was tha t a f requent occurrence, getting lo information from the HEt', FDA, or the EPA peo pl e ?
17 A
Normally, tha t would be the very maximum, once a le shif t, but maybe once a day. Normally, it was that we hac ly alreacy received f rom the field as f ar as the magnitude of 20 the cata and what wa s ha ppening.
This would be a written 21 confirmation of that is what they f ound.
22 0
Did you have a procedure for -- in the reverse 23 direction --
24 A
We sure --
20 0
-- for dealing with it?
18 7244 02 02 ripBiiH I
A We sure dia.
In fact, this wasn't a wri tten 2
procedure, but every time we got data that was out of the 3
ordinary, we gave it to them.
All of the information faxed 4
in f rom the region we would run copies of, give copies to S
EPA and HEW and State Programs.
I believe State Programs o
was getting a copy routinely of that information so if they 7
saw anything impor tan t, they coulo track it back to the 6
state that we would communica te with these other groups.
State Programs very frequently, three or f our time s a v
10 shift, normally and the other groups, I would say, would 11 average a minimum twice a shif t, we woula go in and brief 12 them wha t is going on so they could inf orm their management 13 so they wouldn't be concerned because they weren't ge tting 14 any information.
/, '
IS O
So tne communications were both cral and wri tten?
.o A
Gral and wri tten. It was a mixture.
This was rew 17 cata that was not formal re por t s.
le O
Lo you know whether or not Grimes' peo pl e got all ly of tne raw data that you received?
20 A
I woulc envision tha t they probably dio not get it 21 all oecause a lot of it we woulc tell them that tnere is 22 nothinc, we are finding nothing except the backgrounc level, 23 so we wan tea to Xerox papers to give to them.
24 0
Is it f air to say that they got all of it wnic h 25 you evaluatea eno de termined to be of significance?
19 72 44 02 03
~
rlpbnH I
A I would say that would be a f air statement, but 2
the wora all gives me a little bit of headlburn because 1 j
3 could not swear tnat they did get all of it. I know of no 4
da ta t ha t they did not get that we evaluated to be 5
significant.
o Let me point out here, normally one of the peo ple f rom 7
t hei r s ho p w 5 normally ranked, you know -- we weren' t a o
mile apart.
We were toge ther basically, and I would be v
talking to, say, Lake Barrett, as an example, in an 10 eignt-hour shift, prooably with him a total of an hou r, a n 11 hour1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> ana a half, or his people I would say were witn us the 12 equivalent of two or three hours per shif t.
13 The data didn't always come in real frequently.
14 Sometimes it would be two or three hours before we got new 15 data, and there was good pretty good communications, I lo felt.
I aa not saying they coulon't be improved.
17 O
Then, it is f air to say, then, you did not have a le formal procedure for transmitting information to Grime s suc h ly as an in-box for Grimes or his group for passing on all 20 wri tten communications?
21 A
Tnat's true.
And I would not like to go to an 22 in-box system.
Ina t is how things ge t lost.
I believe in 23 handcarrying it to someone if it important and giving it to 24 them pe r sona lly.
Ins t way they know about it and they don' t 25 forget to look in tne in-box.
7244.02o04 20
" ErlpBWH I
- Q
.You f eel that this is how you commdnicated wi th
()'
2 their representative, by Mand-delivering the written 3
communications and by giving them the oral communications?
4 A
Yes.
5 0
Personally?
6 A
All of our communications -- let me take back the 7
word all again.. TF 1t is a bad statement to say all.
But 6
our communications were on a person-to-person basis to make y
sure that, one, if we thought something was significant, t
10 t ha t we could relay that personally to them, or if we had
.11 some acditional evaluation of the. data, we could relay that 12 to them personally also.
13 0
So either Lake Barrter or someone standing in for 14 Lake was the -- was in communication with you, your group on
(
15 every shift?
10 A
befinitely on every shif t.
You use the term 17.
standing in for Lake.
As far as I know, there was no formal le delegation, but there were people over there that we knew 19 were working f or him and witn him on this in group, and if 20 Lake or Brian weren't there and our primary dealings were 21 with La.<e, we would give it to one of hi s peo ple that would 22 be doing the work f or him.
23 0
Were there communications directly with Grimes?
24 A
Yes.
Several times Brian and I briefed EMT 25 jointly anc we ned communications on working out and what O.
7244 02 05 21 rl pSWH -
1 level, 'f or example, release should we be taking additional (f
2 steps.
We were in direct communications, but the majority 3
were with ' Lake Barre tt, working the specifics of the cases.
4 C
Was this set up on the first day, this arrangement S
of coordinating with Grimes' people.
o A
It ha ppened on the first day. I don't recall a 7
formal set-up. It transpired on the first day.
We 6
recognized wnat each other were doing and how we had to work 9
toge ther to ge t the overall job done.
10 0
Do you have any idea about when on the first day?
.11 A
Aoou t the time they came over, the team, the IRC 12 and they were there and they discussed basically what 13 aspects they should partici pa te in and there was an 14 agreement based on their expertise in the field that they O)
\\-
15 woulo co most of the calculational type part that would go lo on, whereas we would be looking at the survey data, that 17 ty pe o f information, and f eed that back to then to aid them 16 in whatever calculations they were doing.
And it evolved 19 naturally by the way the two organizations are, where NRR is 20 calcula tional, a li ttle more theoretical in their a pproach 21 and we are more the nuts and bolts hands-on.
And that is 22 the way the relationship coveloped, a rather natural 23 rela tion shi p, in the incicent response center.
24 O
So you f eel like you were ge tting all of the 25 substantive data that was being collected?
e i
l' I-
22
@244 02~06 rlpBWH I
A During the time of' the incident, I felt we were
()
2 getting -all of. the substantive data that was being 3
colle cted, and, again, all is a very, very di-fficult word to 4
deal with.
5 0
I am going to pursue one f acet of information. How o
did you know that you were getting the data that DOE 7
collected at the state's request or at the licensee's o
request?
9 A
Tha t data you never have proof positive, but there 10 was a lot of coordination from our field people. We had a
.11 man designated as the liaison with the other 12 agencies. Dr. Bores in our Region I office, he was actually 13 stationed, I believe, in the Capital City Airport where the 14 commana center was set up for coordination of the data, and 15 that was a decision that early -- it was about the second to day, I believe.
It was not a coordinated collection eff ort 17 going on where everybody had everybody else's data, lo I remember George Smi th, our regional branch chief, who ly was directing on-site radiological ef forts for IE, discussed 20 tha t and we agreea that 00E had the best f acilities there.
21 and theref ore, we had no problem with them taking all of the 22 data, collecting it, displaying i t.
And all of the l
23 agencies, I celieve all of the agencies -- I know we did I-24 We hao a re pre senta tive there, Dr. Bores, and I believe the i
25 other EPA, HEW had their representatives at the command i
V i
7244 02 07 23 rlpSMH i
center also.
So the information Was available to people.
m
(
)
2 No t only that, we had a sta te re pre sentative that was u
3 operating in conjunction with George Smith right at the IE 4
trailer.
5 O
Do you know who he was?
o A
He rota ted.
I don't remember the name.
I 7
remember on several instances where the state was --
c a pparently dion't have inf ormation and Geor; ~ : ;1d say, 9
hell, I just tolf the man standing right here next to hi m.
10 So --
.11 0
Was this as early as Thursday?
12 A
I really don' t know.
I really don't know.
It is 13 really a blur wnen things ha ppened.
I would guess that it 14 would have been about Thursday. Whether it would be
(\\
(_)
15 Wednesday or not, I have serious reservations.
Io O
Me will talk aoout it some more.
17 A
Okay.
lo O
So ur. Bore s wa s the contact that you were relying lv on to get the information from 00E?
20 A
Yes. He was the official -- I use the term 21 of ficial -- he ws tne de signa ted point or contact with 00E.
22 0
Turning to the states, how did you know you were 23 getting all of the states' own data or were you?
24 A
I have no idsa if we were getting states' own 2b da ta.
I know we were getting information from our State N._.Y
24 7244 02 06 ri pBWH '
1 Programs people who were - talking to the state people at the
( ).
2 State Capital. I also know that the State wasn't doing much 3
analyzing.
They were completely swamped out, so their da ta 4
collection ef forts were sort of insignificant compared to 5
the federal efforts that were going on.
o Whether we were ge tting all of the state data or not I 7
don't think was really important to the course of the 8
a cciden t.
9 0
When you were ge tting i t, you were getting it 10 through State Programs?
11 A
or our site people who had the information.
It 12 was coming both ways, bu t, again, I cannot guarantee that we 13 had all of the data.
14 I would like to point out that the data that we received 15 f rom other agencies we never -- well, I won't use the word to never -- basically the data that we got was always 17 complementary type da ta in support of -- three agencie s come 16 in with a split sample and they are within 5 percent of each IV other and another is way out in lef t field. We relied on 20 these three, and normally we found the one out in lef t field 21 af ter they dio a re-analysis, they were wrong.
22 So we were ge tting a lot of duplicative ty pe of da ta 23 collected by dif ferent agencies which tended to support that 24 their cata was all f airly correct when they were taking it.
25 I think that was -- workeo to the advantage of the to tal
(~
. (
25 g-
/244 02 09 7
F ripBWH-
-1 effort there whereathe agencies recognizing there was some
()
2 duplication -- but they all recognized each others' 3~
capabilities and could have some f aith in what the other-4 person was doing.
5 0
Were you aware-of the conversation between o
Mr. Gilinsky and Mr. Davis, Commissioner Gilinsky and John 7
Davis on Wednesday regarding a request that Mr. Davis a ssure 6
that the DOE, HEW, NRC information da ta be coordinated to 9
make sure tha t the state got all of that data?
10 A
I know that tha t is what we were trying to 11 a ccom pli sh.
I am not not aware that Commissioner Gilinsky 12 and Mr. Davis had a specific conversation regarding that.
13 It is our natural mode of operation to keep the other people 14 informeo.
l}
L 15 0
Then -
16 A
As I said before, as you know, the State Programs 17 representative was getting our data and they were to communicating with the State.
There was a state 19 representative on site at t he IE trailer.
He was getting 20 firsthand data as it was coming in, and whether or not the 21 State had a representative at the Capital City Airpor t where 22 the cocmand post -- I don't know that.
23 0
You don't know if Mr. Bores was, f or instance, 24 selected to perform his function before -- before the 25 Gilinsky-Davis conversation of which you are not aware, it i
l i
7244 02 10 26 rlp3NH 1
was on Wednesday?
'( )
2 A
You know --
3 0
Late Weonesday.
4 A
I would doubt whether Mr. Bores was selected
)
before them.
It would probably have been af ter because the o
magnitude of the accident wasn't appreciated in that time 7
f rame. The number of people at the site weren't appreciated e
and the DOE wasn't f ully set up.
I don't think HE4, EPA V
even even had anyone there at that time.
So I would doubt 10 whether Dr. Bores would have been selected before them.
It 11 would have been af ter that.
12 As we saw the magnitude growing and the need for 13 closer coordination and communication, that is when we 14 decided to have an NRC direct focal point so that we woul.d 15 be talking with the same tone of the f ederal government 16 coming out of Three Mile Island.
17 0
Wi th re spect to the informativo that our site 16 people that are NRC site people were giving directly to the 19 state, cid we have -- do you believe tha t we have -- do you i
20 believe we obtained all of the information that our site I
21 people were giving to tha state?
22 A
Knat ao you mean by that we cotained?
I am not 23 sure --
24 0
That our NRC people were f eeding the state 25 information about the radiological aspects of the incident
(~)%
P i..
9 27 7244 02 11 ripBWH I
and -- I can't addre ss specifically what aspects they we. 3, 2
but alc we have some way of ge tting whatever they were 3
giving to the state?
4 A
No, because most of that would have been by 5
telephone or turned to the person standing right next to you o
and say, this is the information.
I recall on several 7
occasions I asked George Smith does the state know about 6
this, and he said the guy is standing right here listening y
as I am talking to you ana giving you the inf ormation; so 10 there is no question in my mind that there was a conscious
.11 effort to keep the state informed on a very firsthand basis.
12 0
Are you aware of any problem with respect to our 13 not getting the information that our site people were givijg 14 to the state?
lb A
As f ar as the operation that I was aware of, I was lo not aware of any time tha t our people were not giving the 17 information to the state.
Like I said, that was one of our le concerns, to keep the state informed, lv 0
But not wne ther the s ta te i s informed.
My 20 question is whether we were inf ormed of what our people were 21 telling the state.
22 A
There is no question in my mind either that if our 23 site peo ple tolo the state something, I or my staff was 24 informed of it if it was an item of significance. I am sure 25 that there were many nits they weren't informed of that we 7
28 7244 02 12
~~
.rlp3NH I
were not aware of.
But as f ar as the significant i tem s,
()
2 they would tell us because they knew we were interested in 3
assuring that tne state was being kept informed.
4 0
Was there any special means of communicating and S
coordinating information on plant status and contingency o
planning information withir the IRACT support staff of which 7
you were a part.
6 A
The only f ormal means was to daily report, and 9
there was a daily reenter plant sta tus sheet put out.
I 10 don't recall when that started, the reenter plant s ta tu s
.11 sheet.
I think that was several days into the incident, but 12 updateo PNs was a good chronology of the major things that 13 were ha ppening, what was going on, and what was planned.
14 They were an invaluable piece of information, not only for 15 bringing the total NRC people up to speed on what was lo happening, but also other agencies and the public.
17 I thought it was a very valuable mechanism as f ar as what 16 the plant was doing et cetera.
There was enough 19 interaction, at least frou my perspective.
I thought there 20 was enough interaction be tween the EMT and the various IRACT 21 support groups to keep informed of which direction we were 22 proceeding.
And likewise, I think that the IRA.CT, as they 23 obtained new information, really did keep the EMT pretty 24 well informed.
25 0
Wi th re spec t to the communications to your group e
29 7244 02 13 ri p3WH I
f rom the EMT, what f orm did this take?
2-A All verbal.
I say all verbal.
There may have 3
been something in writing but i t was all verbel.
Ana 4
normally it was my indivicual EMT members, not as a body.
5 0
Mould you explain how they did this?
Did they 6
leave the EMT room and come out to where you were or did you 7
go into the EMT room or how was this handled?
8 A
This ha ppened both those ways.
Of tentimes they v
say what is going on in the same way, and in 15 minutes I 10 came in anc briefed them.
As a result of the briefing, they 11 would probaoly give us some specific direction that we 12 should proceea or give additional information in a certain 13 area.
14 Other time's an EMT member would just come into our 15 group's area and ask what was happening and we woula tell lo them, and he woula tell us something tha t -- a de velo pment 17 that would be occurring and we should start thinking of a 7
16 proceecing on the specific course.
./
IV We would take that as a direction and move that way.
I 20 felt the sense of direc tion f rom the EMT, I never lacked for 21 direction.
22 0
Were you al so in comcunication with both Moseley 23 and Stello?
24 A
Stello wasn't around tha t much. And you say 2b Mcseley?
I wa s -- in several times a shift, I woulo sit
30 7244 02 14 ri pSWH I
down and talk to either t40seley or Jordan or Thornberg, i
2 whoever -was running the operational IRACT, what was going 3
on, whet were the plans, you know, what is happening. And 4
ottentimes they would come over and say, hey, this is what 5
we are going to plan on doing.
You may some some impact o
here, some raciological type impact and we should be 7
thinking along those lines.
I guess because of my operations background, also I o
v understood some of the impacts of what were being planned of 10 w ha t it could have, and it was very beneficial to the 11 radiological side knowing the relative importance of the 12 various things that were transpiring on the operations sice, 13 so there was no queston that we knew what was happening on 14 the operational end in most cases and how it could af f ect us 7,
15 radiolcgically.
10 0
Did tno se people ever come to you and tell you, 17 that is, oia Moseley or the I RACT operational support staff 16 ever come directly to you and tell you t he se things or did 19 you --
20 A
Yes.
They did come directly to us on o ccasions.
21 0
And you have alreaJy told me that in between 22 times, you went to them to find out what was going on?
23 A
Yes.
We didn't isolate our selves in of fices, 24 yes.
I personally would go and talk to them, where are we 2b going, what i s na ppen ing, w ha t do you see as the problem,
/m
7244.02 15 31 rlpBWH I
wnat is ha ppening to core thermocouples, are they going
-( )
2 up, are they going down, the cooling system, what is 3
transpiring?
4 Likewise, the various NRR groups you drop in f or a couple 5
of minutes, see what was going on, if they were working a o
special type problem --
7 0
This is in the satellite offices?
6 A
The satellite offices.
We didn't just sit in our v
office.
We were in the satellite offices where we knew that 10 something was going on that we should be aware of.
We were 11 in there interf acing the dose assessments group.
We were 12 interf acing with them to see what information thay needed.
13 They were coming to us. What is this area? What are your TLD 14 readings?
How come this reading is so high?
And we would
()
15 be going back to the fielo.
We were trying to work as an lo overall team and to ao that in a very loose structure like 17 we ha ve, whi ch i sn' t all bad but it means you can't sit in le the of fice.
You nave to go and interface with the peo pl e,
19 see what they are doing, see what their neecs are, see what 20 they are coming up with and how it affects you and what you 21 have to do, fou can't manage a part of the incident by 22 sitting in your offica expecting things to come to you 23 formally.
You nave to get out there, look around.
24 i
25
(
l l
32 CR7244 1
Q With respect to the telephone system and how
~
rip 1 2 I it was arranged on Wednesday, we have already discussed that BWH 3
early on in the day.you were using -- were going to the I
l 4
field communicator on the telephone line that was direct to 5
the site.
Was that direct to Unit 1 or Unit 2, do you recall?
6 A
I don't remember which Unit it was in.
It 7
was into one of the control rooms.
I don't even know 8
where that line went any more.
I 9
Q But these communications were through the t
10 communicator and not separate?
II A
They were through the communicator.
Now, some 12 were in -- that way and at the same time I was going to the
()
13 regional office for data.
~
U Id j Q
Going by how, telephones outside the IRC?
15 A
Both.
By one of the recorder lines or going 16 across the nall in the office across the hall, the speaker i
U phones, so I could be on the speaker phone and free to look I
i 5h up documents and data while talking to the people without l
disrupting the whole Incident Response Center.
Both ways.
I' 20 ji We were going for communications whichever way we could get
[
J t
21 c it.
22 O
And then later on in the day you had your own I
M line to the region or was that a line that was available to l
r! anyone?
24
(
nw_ Jai Reporters, Inc.
25 A
That was a line that was available to anyone, but l
33
?
rlp':2 1
the region had a separate line going into the site.
~
k )m 2
O Yes.
3 A
And so I would call on any phone system, any phone 4
line and talk to the region and they wou]4 relay the informa-5 tion that they would have.
Likewise, they would call the 6
IRC, come through the main switchboard at IRC and call me 7
for information, and they would be transferred to any of 8
the lines that were open there.
I talked to them on those 9
lines.
10 0
Did you e'ver call the site directly on another 11 line?
12 A
I don't remember.
We may have.
I just don't 13 remember.
14 Q
I am trying as best I can to establish what 15' lines were there and who was using these on Wednesday.
16 A
I don't believe that in my group we called the 17 site directly on another line.
15 i
0 Can I ask you what was your general opinion of
.i 19,
the communications on Wednesday, communications with the
!a!
20 t site?
21 A
The communications on Wednesday were overloaded.
22 You couldn't get through.
The lines were busy.
You couldn't 23 get through.
There was a competing for communications between I
(~}
24 operations and the HP aspects, as far as the direct site wa&_esi nwonm. ine.
25 line, and I concluded it would be more important to get that t
i
34
~
7 rip 3 1
core data which is what would determine the overall course BNH 2
of the accident.
It would be more important to get that
( '}
3 directly from the site than the direct HP data because this 4
was going into the control room, and any surveys that were S
being done could be coordinated from some other place besides 6
the control room, whereas the reactor data, it seemed like 7
that was the most important coming into the control room; and going a step further, the communicators were operations 8
9 people and not Hp's and therefore they could have missed g.
10 some of the significance.
So that is another reason for 11 not --
12 O
The communicators in the IRACT center?
13 A
In the IRACT center in the communicators we 14 had on.the hotline to the site wasn't operations men.
15 0
You mean at the site end?
16 A
At both ends of the line there were operations 17 people.
I don't see that as a big problen.
I know that is our communicator on this end understood HP and we were I
i: '
there, but I'd -- didn't want to get garbled data back i
li 20 1 that would cause a problem that didn't exist or indicate f
21 a problem did not exist when one actually did exist, so I 22 want to get good, reliable communications between HP's 23 talking to each other.
24 I
Q And you accomplished that via your telephone 7-e I..(_,, n,
,t.r.. i ne.
conversations through the region --
25 I
i
35 Through the regional offic', we were talking to e
7 rlp 4 1
A BWH llh 2
an HP on the end of their direct line, and so we were 3
getting -- but then we had one more person in the circuit 4
which can cause problems because you are getting a second-5 hand story then; but once we got the hotline to the site end, 6
the new system in my office, we were talking direct with the 7
site.
l 8
Q When was that hotline in?
Thursday?
Wednesday 9
night?
l 10 A
It wasn't Wednesday night, I know that.
I believe 11 it was sometime Thursday, but I don't remember.
I know 12 there was a lot of activity, a lot of phone people crawling 13 around that place.
I believe it was late Thursday night, b) 14 but I don't really recall.
15 Q
Do you know why that was directed to at the l
i 1
16 site, what location' 17 A
That went into the IE trailer at the site.
That l
- 5 ij was the IE trailer at the site that you push a button in n
I h
if my office and it rang right there.
That was where the h
20 '
HP operations -- the environmental monitoring was being lj i
i, 21 a coordinated from the IE standpoint or the NRC standpoint.
}
22 O
What was your involvement in the requests that I
- 3 were made by headquarters for DOE assistance on Wednesday?
l e.
I 7,
24 [
Did you have any?
acijci seporters. inc. !;
25 ll A
That happened automatically.
I don't recall that I
36 I had any specific direct involvemer$ in that.
rip 5 1
BWH 7
(v) 2 0
What I had in mind was the initial calls and 3
this is what has happened.
These are the details of the:
4 accident.
We would like to have you stand by.
Later there was a request to move the AMS helicopters up.
I was wonder-5 ing.if you knew who was making the decisions and what bases 6
7 to take each step.
A Okay.
I was involved.o I knew what was 8
9 happening.
I had no argument with what was happening and our executive officers for support group, Bernie Weiss, was 10 11 doing the contacting.
These were discussed with the EMT as 12 we were progressing and I was involved in knowing that it 13 was going on, and it appeared to be logical.
{' }
14 0
I guess I was also curious as to why one doesn't 15 say we have had an accident, would you move up, as opposed 16 to would you stay on standby.
It seemed that the move up occurred at the time that you made an off-site measurement
- 7 that indicated an off-site readiation from the plant, and I
- 3 I
i; ' am just curious about the logic for what point in time do j
i f
20 you finally ask the AMS system to move up.
Also how much j
21 of it is automatic by DOE whenever you call them up?
22 A
I think in response to that there are a couple i
One of the most important things is to tell l
l of factors.
23 i
/'
24 people they might have to be called upon and get ready and aaL_]s.i semrieri, ine.
i 25 get into an alert or standby status, which I believe is the I
i I
37 rip 6 1
initial thing that was done, so that people can be contacted 2
and therefore you eliminate an hour or two delay time if 3
you waited to call them up and alert them.
So they were 4
alerted in the move up, and I believe they moved up initially.
- believe, 5
There were things available out in Alexandria, T
6 and then they were moved to Capital City Airport.
There 7
was a move up to Alexandria for some types of aircraft, is 8
my impression.
And then there was a move up there to the 9
Capital City Airport.
I think there is a lot of logic 10 in that, in the incident response, as you see a situation li developing, you get people closer in so that their need to 12 respond becomes imminent, then they can respond on very short 13 notice.
f)'.
\\-
14 As far as the specific criteria on when you go from i
15 alert to full response status, I am not sure that there is l
l 16 any one specific set of criteria that would suffice in all 17 cases.
As I recall, the first AMS flight was between 2:00 i
i I
e.
- 34 and 3:00 o' clock on Wednesday afternoon, and I don't recall l
i H
what specifically triggered that any more.
il 20 l Q
Do you think that the decision as to when to move l
t i
21 helicopters up would have been made by Weiss alone or that i
22 he would have been directed by IRACT or someone else?
j i
23 A
There is no question that he did not make that i
T")
24 alone.
That was in consultation with IRACT and EMT, is j
4 4_;
.m..,m o m 25 my impression thinking back on it.
I remember the discussions,;
f
t 38 2
rip 7 1
you know, we discussed do you think we should move them up, BWH
(_)
2 should we keep them here, and EMT is involved in those 3
decisions quite heavily and I think they should be because-the EMT's 4
we are calling on other agencies' support 5
decisien with a recommendation from the IRACT.
And as I 6
recall, that is basically how it worked.
7 Q
Wednesday afternoon, DOE notified NRC that 8
they were cranking up their atmospheric release advisory 9
capability known as ARAC, A-R-A-C, out of Livermore.. Were 10 you made aware that they were doing this at the time?
11 A
I was aware they were doing it.
I don't recall 12 if it was that specific time.
I knew that they had cranked
~N 13 up and we started getting maps into the Incident Response (d
14 Center.
15 0
Did you use the data at any point that was 16 coming into the Incident Response Center?
17 A
Yes.
We used it more as a confirmation of
- 3 i the plume and where the highest concentrations would be
,a 19 1 as rieasured by the AMS and ground level surveys, but since i
b I
I we didn't have the source term and it is based -- came in 20 I
21 :
based on unit source term, an absolute meaning to that 22 data did not exist.
As far as the overall trend and the i
23 shape based on the atmospheric conditions of the plume and l
l.
[S 24 l wehre you could expect the highest concentrations, it was j
l rnq)uneponm.w.
25 useful in that way as a confirmatory type of data.
I l
39
~
rip 8 1
Q Would you explain a little bit why you can't
_.BWH
()
2 use the unit source term data?
3 A
That has no relationship to what was being 4
released from the site at that time.
5 0
Does that mean you didn't know your own source 6
term so you couldn't use that data?
You were -- your 7
knowledge of what was going on was based on the measurements 8
of the releases, the doses as measured around the site and 9
not based on absolute curie value of the release?
10 A
That's right.
We did not have a direct, absolute 11 curie value of the release.
We were taking our measurements 12 on the site, and those measurements would tell us whether 13 or not we had to take action.
Based on the radiological 14 conditions that existed, we had to take actions to protect 15 the public.
16 Now, the unit source term, if we had the source term 17 value to plug into the ARAC computation, that would have 13 been very useful.
We did not have that available to us but l
I?d yet it was good confirmatory data that this is where the i
20 levels of where the areas of most concern would exist and 21 these are the areasoof the least concern by direction and 22 distance.
23 Q
I have been told that the coordinates of the 24 data that came in were skewed by our receiver.
Were you l
gS
{
Au,,/cf Amorms, inc.
25 aware of that, that they were sent out in a-rectangular i
i l
i 40
?
rip 9 1
pattern and received by us in a -- excuse me.
They were WH 2
sent out in a square pattern and they were received in a 3
rectangular pattern because of the receiver at headquarters l
4 end; were you aware of that?
5 A
No, I was not.
This is the first time I have 6
heard that.
Let me elaborate on this point.
7 This is one of the reasons.why,I will be quite honest, 8
I hesitate to run with new data when we don't understand 9
exactly how it is coming in, how it is being developed, the 10 quality of control that goes into it because you get into 11 a lot of trouble making erroneous decisions.
That is why 12 I say the main value of the ARAC data was to confirm the l
~1 13 general direction that we would have a problem if we had G
14 one.
15 Q
Did anyone from headquarters ever call the ARAC 16 people and ask them about what they were doing?
l l
17 A
Not from my staff directly.
I is ll Q
I understand that ARAC data was available on I
i n
17 ' a two-hour basis if wanted, that it took weather from all i
2; l of the surrounding airports in the area of the site and I
i I
21 i factored those in and that while the grids that were coming l
22 out were two-mile grids, that they were available down to j
23 62 and a half meters if wanted.
f j
A Like I say, one of the problems is the source
(~')
24 Aci. _ a nenonen, inc.
25 term as far as the absolute usefulness of the data.
l a
t l.
4_
rip 10 1
Q Did you have any involvement with HEW and EPA,
- "WH
(_,'
2 FDA other than what you have talked about before with respect 3
to coordinating the data there within the IRC?
i l
4 A
As far as environmental monitoring data from l
5 our group in headquarters, no.
We had a lot of -- well, 6
we had interface on other peripheral issues that were 7
directly related to the monitoring at Three Mile Island.
8 0
What kind of issues were they?
9 A
An example would be under HEW, the epidemiological 10 study type people wanted -- we were getting pressure from 11 Secretary Califano at that time to revise the licensee's 12 personnel monitoring system so it would be easier to 13 epidemiological studies two days into the accident.
We were L,i 14 supposed to be devising that kind of stuff with a lot of 15 harassment which I would classify -- which wasn't germane 16 to getting the situation under control, that type of inter-17 action.
i Q
Anything with EPA?
15 qll 19 A
No, I don't recall any other peripheral type O
20 things with EPA.
i 21 !
O When did you leave the IRC on Wednesday, about?
i 22 A
Is this related to when I went home?
l i
I 23 Q
Yes.
Just information for the record.
24 A
I didn't.
I left the IRC, it would have been l
i nc.
. erd Reporters, ine, 25 4:00 o' clock Thursday morning.
i
{
h i
42 rip 11 1
O When did you return on Thu'rsday?
2 A
It would have been about 2:00 o' clock Thursday
('
3 afternoon, somewhere between 2:00 and 3:00 o' clock.
4 Q
Do you recall what was happening when you came 5
back?
6 A
No, I don't.
I don't recall.
That was the 7
29th -- yes.
I don't remember whether it was just when I came back or not.
We had a flap going with the release to 8
9 the Surquehanna.
10 Q
My next question is going to be, what were your 11 major activities on Thursday when you returned?
12 A
If that is the day of the release to the
~g 13 Susquehanna, my major activities were involved in trying to d
la sort out what was really going on with that release and --
15 Q
Do you recall where yor. learned of that release 16 and what you were told to do about it?
17 A
Let me just think a couple of seconds on that.
13l (Pause.)
i i
is I don't recall specifically how I first learned about h
20 it.
I believe it was from the site that they had to release water to the river and the state was saying they shouldn't 21 l
22 be releasing water to the river.
I don't recall the times.
23 I know'a couple of times stick in my mind.
There is a 24 6:00 o' clock time in the evening and there is a midnight
/^
1 A=(,)j st Remrters, Ire.
i I
25 time, _as I recall, and the times get jumbled in my mind right I
43 rlp 12 1
now which was which; but there was a release to the river BWH
(,
2 which we -- they were releasing and we stopped the release i
3 because they had not sampled, as I recall.
The licensee 4
had not sampled.
We made them take samples, and after they 5
sampled, we -- I am talking the site, and it was probably 6
my decision also involved.
I don't recall the specifics, l
7 but we talked -- they sampled but they saw nothing in the 8
samples -- I'm sorry.
They saw xenon in the sample.
That 9i was well within mpc values.
They were then -- they then i
10 said that they could release.
They released, and then --
l 11 I am very confused on that point right now.
I don't recall 12 the sequence.
I know we stopped the release.
We found j
r 13 there was some iodine and we made them terminate the release.
i_)
i 14 j
Q This was an order?
j l
15 A
This was a verbal order which was -- came from 16 EMT, and I relayed it personally on the control room phone 7
where I got on the operations phone, went to our men on the b
i 15g end of the line, and told him to terminate -- I told our i
10 men at the site to tell them t; terminate the release, that 20 J they were ordered to terminate the release.
That order was L
i I
given.
The men at the site told me the order was given and 21 l
22 i
a couple of minutes later he came back and said that they i
23 i
have terminated the release.
This was between 6:00 and 6:15, 24 '
but I don't remember if it was midnight or 6:00 -- it was A-ca neoonen. w. j 25 l
either on the 6:00 or the 12:00.
I think it was at 6:00 o' clock i
I
44 rip 13 1
that evening, Thursday evening when that happened.
WH 2
Q After they were allowed to release again, 3
do you recall if they were order to stop again?
4 A
After the NRC gave them the go-ahead about six 5
hours later then?
6 0
Yes.
Were they ordered to stop again by NRC 7
or do you know?
8 A
I don't recall that they were.
I really don't 9
know.
j
\\
10 MR. RIVENBARK:
Off the record.
4 i.
11 (Discussion of the record.)
12 MR. RIVENBARK:
Back on the record.
13 BY MR. RIVENBARK:
i
( /
I 14 i
O Were you involved in the sampling of the primary l
l 15 coolant in the containment on Thursday?
16 A
I was not directly involved in that decision to 17 sample.
I knew what was happening, I knew the efforts were is lI. going on, our IE site people were involved in it, NRR was 0
1:
invclved in it.
We were knowledgeable that was going on n
2 0 ', but we were not involved in the details.
i i
21 l Q
Were you involved in getting the thing analyzed 22 l after it was taken?
I A
The involvement from headquarters, no.
As I
23 0
(^)
24 far as IE involvement, as I recall, that sample was brought av '- _.eral Reporters, Inc.
25 into our mobile lab and caused everything to go off scale.
l
45 rip 14 1
I don't recall us -- whether we actually did a gross count WH on that or not in our mobile lab, but we were involved in 2
3 the operations center making arrangements with the labs and 4
the military to get aircraft to get it flown to the labs.
I was not directly involved in that effort.
5 6
Q I am talking about both samples, both contain-7 ment air samples, containment atmosphere samples and the 8
reactor coolant samples.
9 A
Yes.
And what I said basically applies to 10 both of those.
11 Q
Do you recall a request from Commissioner Bradford 12 on Thursday for levels at York Haven, Pennsylvania, and
(~ ;
13 surrounding communities?
It was late in the afternoon and 3
a 14 the transcripts indicate that Dudley Thompson asked you to 15 get the information.
i l
16 A
I recall the request.
I don't remember if it l
17 1 came from Bradford.
I remember a request for levels.
l 15 g Q
Do you know what prompted the request?
l I? "
A I have no idea -- Oh, I'm sorry.
Let me back j
track.
No, I had that confused with something else.
I don't 20 ls 1
1 21 ' know what specifically prompted Commissioner Bradford,if he l
cnd 3 22 is the one who requested it, to make the request.
I start 23 l Q
With respect to the gas releases on Thursday, i
4 i
/' '
24 do you recall whther it was your impression at the time that nci m 2rd Reporters, Inc.
25,j these were uncontrolled, whether they were continuous, and li i
i i
46 rlp 15 1
what was causing those releases?
,~BWH
(,)
2 A
It is my impression at the time that they were uncontrolled releases and that they were caused by a lifting 3
of one of the relief valves at a certain set point, the 4
release valve that was lifting prematurely in the waste 5
6 gas system.
Aparently, there was a loo pound system and 7
these were occurring at about 85 or 86 pounds pressure in 8
the system.
The pressure went up to about 88 pounds and 9
then it could happen again.
That was their concern.
So 10 I was under the impression that they were uncontrollable 11 from that standpoint.
12 Q
Was it your impression that these were relief 13 valves on the waste gas decay tanks themselves?
}
14 A
There was a lot of confusion that existed at 15 that time.
I am not sure if at that time that was my l
l 16 impression or not.
I know that we had a lot of discussions 17 with the operations people.
That was one of the areas isj right there that, you know, they were getting up to a 0
i; 'l pressure, the alert for any releases.
0 20 Q
I was going to ask you next, what was headquarters 21 doing to figure out what would happen in the coming days and l
l 22 whether or not it could stop the releases.
This is Thursday I
i I
23 now.
1 24 A
There was a lot of activity.
I am trying to figure
{~')
Acs%mi Reporters. Inc.
25 out what was actually causing it, and we felt if we could t
I
.i
47 rip 16 1
figure out what was casuing it, there might be a chance of sBWH 2
stopping it.
And this was a lot of the discussion that 3
went on with how to get the pressure down, you know, without 4
actually causing intentional releases; but the specifics just 5
escape me right now.
I know that that was a point that every-6 one was concerned about, but the specifics that transpired 7
just escape me right now.
8 Q
Do you recall whether or not there was any 9
discussion on Thursday about -- or consideration of the j
l 10 possible need for evacuation related to these releases?
l 11 A
Within my group, what I was doing, we were 12 monitoring it and we had no real serious discussion regard-l
(~i 13 ing these because we had had some and we looked at the 1._/
14 magnitu e and the duration.
They did not specifically look i
15 like they would be something that would require evacuation, l
16 and I don't recall if this was the day when we had 1200 --
17 Q
The 1200 MR reading was on Friday morning.
I i
i i
4!
am going to get to that.
I am going to Thursday discussing l
i:
12 the fact that -- the point that these -- that there might e
20 have been releases on Thursday from these systems and that l
l 21 you were considering --
l l
22 A
We knew there were releases.
There were two i
23 or three releases.
Specifically,where we saw them in the 4
24 b.
AMS tanks and we saw them, but they were of very short
("
AC.w. erst Reporters, Inc.
25 j duration, as I recall, and they would not have -- integrating l
i
48 rip 17 1
under the curve, they did not have a large impact for 2
population dose.
3 Q
Do you know if the AMS measurements were made 4
at the moment of the release?
5 A
As I recall, in some cases they were, and in 6
others they probably were not.
This is one of the things I
7 where it was attempted, that as pressure would be building up, you tried to have the aircraft in the air to anticipate --
8 9
Q Directly over the release pipe?
10 A
No.
That's not important.
It is what is off-site 11 in the prevailing winds directly over the release point.
If 12 I fly down the stack, I am going to get a very high level, 13 so -- if we got a measurement directly over the release
,4
%s 14 point, that was a nice data point if you get it for a I
15 matter of seconds and it is gone.
It is not a problem any l
l 16 more from the public health and safety point of view.
j l
17 1 Q
On Thursday, what is your impression of how the l
l
'.3$ communications were working on Thursday, communications with li i?
the site again?
Maybe the best way to do this would be to l
i 20 l start off by getting you to remember as well as you can h
l 21 i what was the communications methods?
What were the hookups lonThursday?
f 22 i
23 i
A Thursday was a very long day, and I don't j
l recall specifically when I got my own line going into the
(')
24 Ace s Usi Aeporters. Inc.
l I
25 IE trailer. When that was all set up on Thursday, the i
a h
49 7
rip 18 1
communications I would classify as better than on Wednesday BWH 2
because we were -- we knew what problems existed in communi-(}
3 cations.
We could work around the problems on Thursday.
I 4
would say the majority of the communications were just a 5
refinement of Wednesday where we went via the regional 6
office and then we got the direct telephone numbers at the 7
sited even though they weren't in the trailer, for example, 8
even though they were not direct, constantly open lines.
So 9
we called those numbers and if the line wasn't busy, you had 10 no problem getting through.
You could talk directly.
11 As I recall Thursday, the communications were somewhat 12 improved over Wednesday.
I don't recall the exact communica-13 tions systems that we had.
They definitely improved when V
14 we got our own line in, and I don't recall the time frame i
15 when we had our own line in going to the site.
16 0
Did you ever use the direct line to Unit 1 or 17 Unit 2 or the three-way line to Unit 1 and Unit 2 on Thursday 13 1
or thereafter?
I ask that because you indicated that your IE line was into the trailer later on.
3 l!
20 A
We had a line I was using to one of the control 21 rooms that was different than the other one.
We did have 22 a direct line going into one of the control rooms.
i l
23 Q
That line, was that through a communicator?
24 A
No, that was not.
We did not have the staff j3 Aceg jet Regners. lrc, 25 to set up a communicator not was it necessary.
^
a
l 50
>- ^ rip 19 1
O Was that a direct line used by your group?
n BWH y) 2 A
Yes.
3 0
Was it used by others as well or only by you?
l 4
A It would have been used by other people working i
5 with us occasionally, like the NRR people, if they had some 6
information.
If they are trying to get a hold of one of 7
their people in the site, we would say use this line.
You 8
can probably get them through this line.
9 Q
That would probably have been to Unit 1 as 10 opposed to Unit 2; is that not correct?
II A
I believe that was right.
It was Unit 1 and 12 the other one was going into the Unit 2 control room.
That's 13 right.
We' did have the line going into Unit 1 control room.
14 I don't recall when we started manning that at the site and 15 really started using that, but there was some time delay 16 on that where they didn't know because there was pretty 17 good separation between the two control rooms.
15l 0
In essense, you had two lines, then, that you lI I?l could use, this one to Unit 1 and the other one to the trailer?,
O l
20 '
A Yes, but most of the time we used the trailer 21 because I was the focal poin) for coordination, and instead j
22 l
of causing confusion by going into different point and 23 getting conflicting results, I preferred to have it come
,n through the lead IE group on site through George Smith who 24 s,h n ponen, inc.
at 25 had the state there and was coordinating with DOE because i
1
51 2
rip 20 i
the control room, if there was site dhta they needed, George BWH
('l 2
would go to the control room; but the environmental data
\\_/
3 was really through the trailer.
The control room, Unit 1 control room would not know that as readily as our IE trailer.
4 5
MY primary concern was associated with the environment out-6 side the fence.
I knew that we had HP's in plant.
I knew that the licensee had qualified HP's, and I felt that they 7
could concentrate on the plant workers; and I was concerned 8
with knowing what was going on in the environment for the 9
10 health and safety of the public.
That was where my primary 11 emphasis was,on the outside, offsite.
12 Q
After the Vollmer team arrived at the site on 13 Thursday, did that impact your work in any way?
O 14 A
What was that?
What time was that?
15 0
He arrived at the site at about -- it was in 16 the neighborhood of noontime.
It could have been 2:00 17 o' clock in the afternoon.
I don't know the precise time, l
but he was there, for instance, when you arrived back in
- 3 i
I 19 the IRC on Thursday.
l d
f A
At the time the Vollmer team arrived on site, l
20 I believe
-- and I don't know who they all had there with 21 22 them -- I believe at that time the lines of communication 23 with the site went from a focal point line of communication
)
j 24 to a more of a split line of communication.
If NRR had A=4,ci sem ners,ine.
25 questions, they tended to go to the NRR people and, likewise, l
j i
l i
52 rip 21 1
feed back to the NRR people.
That would tend to make
(-}WH
(_/
2 occasionally the story coming from IE and NRR a little 3
different.
Not necessarily different, but not consistent.
4 They might have old information that we had already acted 5
on, or they might have information newer than what we had, 6
and so there appeared to be more confusion that existed 7
after that happened because there was not a formal channel-8 ing of communication at that time and we tended more, it 9
is my impression, to report to our old organizational units 10 instead of an integrated team unit at that time.
'l 0
To your knowledge, was the communication with the NRR people also through the trailer, same trailer that 13 the IE comminucations were directed to or was the Vollmer
(}
14 team to another trailer?
15 A
I believe that was to another trailer.
I know --
16 I am not sure right immediately, but eventually there were l
17 separate trailers.
15 Q
For sure after Stello and Company arrived?
I? [
A I don't know when he got there.
\\
20 Q
Do you know when you went home on Thursday or 21 did you go home on Thursday?
22 A
I went home on Thursday because we decided that 23 it might be pretty well prolonged by Thursday.
It looked
(~}
24 grimmer than it had before then.
I went 12 on and 12 off, i
taf _JO Reporters, lm.
i 25 l and I was basically that after Thursday, the 2:00 in the 1
I l
I
l 53 rip.22
.I afternoon until the 2:00 in the morning shift.
P
(
2 0
And Mr. Higginbotham relieved you at that time?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
Did he also relieve you on Monday when you went --
5 on Wednesday when you went home?
6 A
Yes.
We were on port or. starboard.
Leo and I 7
were there continuously for about the first week, and after 8
about the first week, we brought Jay Cunningham, the senior 9
reactor physicist into a three-way rotation for a period 10 of time.
11 Q
So you returned at 2:00 p.m. on Friday?
12 A
Around that time, yes.
These are all plus or minus G
~13 an hour or so.
(_/
L 14 *r O
Do you recall what was happening when you came 15 in on Friday?
16 A
When I came in on Friday, all hell had broken 17 loose as far as the EMT was concerned, as I recall Friday.
18 There was a lot of talk about hydrogen explosion.
If I have 19 got the date right now.
There was one of those days that I I
20 came in, there was a lot of talk about potential hydrogen j
21 explosion, a lot of discussion on that, tnd a lot of discussioni l
22 about evacuation had transpired.
There was concern about if i
I 23 we had to get our people, NRC people, how we could get them i
(~}
24 j out.
I believe at that time is when we were moving to get Ae2&_Jo anerten, ine.
25 more involvement of the FDAA involvement.
I believe that was r
l
54 rip 23 1
Friday when we were moving in that direction.
FDAA got BWH 2
more involved.
3 0
Can you discuss briefly how the FDAA was 4
involved or were you directly in that activity?
5 A
I wasn't directly inve-lved, but we brought an 6
FDAA representative into the Incident Response Center.
I believe it was Friday, but I could be mistaken.
When it was 7
8 recognized that things were really getting serious and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration should -- as far 9
10 as relocation to various areas for the NRC people so we could 11 still do our job but not be right next to the plant but a 12 little further away, I believe that was Friday when we
, ~ ~
13 started getting those people involved on relocation plans t
v 14 l for the NRC.
i I
Q So you missed the excitement on -- earlier in l
15 16 the morning?
Mr. Higginbotham was there at that time?
j 17 A
Yes, that's correct.
t 18 i
MR. RIVENBARK:
Off the record.
19 /
liscussion off the record.)
l li MR. RIVENBARK:
Back on the record.
20 l 21 BY MR. RIVENBARK:
i 22 Q
Now, earlier before you came in on Friday, someone 23 l
has reported a release of 1200 MR per hour and they did not j
l i
24 identify the location of that 1200 MR release at that time.
%edd hal Reporters, Inc.
25 Do you know how that was or where that release was later i
l
55 rip 24 1
determined to have taken place, where the measurement --
BWH
(_))
2 excuse me -- where the measurement was determined to have 3
taken place?
4 A
It is my understanding that based on the discussions 5
with our site people with my staff that was there that was 6
measured right above the stack, 150 feet above the stack, 7
and it was a momentary type release.
8 Q
Have you heard who it was that reported that 9
release to the headquarters?
10 A
I have heard many stories on how that got in.
11 I do not know who actually reported that to headquarters.
,, - l 12 Q
Do'you know in headquarters informed the EMT.
13 group that they had received such a message?
(-)
V 14 A
I do not have firsthand knowledge of who 15 reported it.
16 Q
All of this took place before you arrived at 17 the Center?
18 A
That's correct.
19 Q
On Friday there was some problem with getting j
i f
20 AMS information for sometime.
Mr. Hegner called Mr. Stone 21 who was an NRC representative over at the DOE center in 22 Germantown and asked them to get the next AMS report for 23 headquarters.
Were you aware of this?
l 24 A
I am not aware of any time when it was difficult j
(~)
Amqja Reprters. lN.
l 25 to get the AMS information if, in fact, a flight was made.
j l
l l
4 a
56 7
rip 25 1
We were getting it directly from the 'ite.
I don't under-s
,_BWH~
~
(_)
2 stand what the problem could have been unless it was raining 3
or something and they weren't flying and therefore there was no infonmation to get.
4 5
Q Were you involved in getting or requesting 6
additional DOE health physics systems at the site from ANL 7
or ORNL?
8 A
We never went via direct labs.
If we requested 9
any assistance, we got it directly from DOE and where they 10 got it was their business.
11 Q
And referring really to someone from headquarters 12 called DOE, Joe Deal, called to Joe Deal and explained that rx 13 we had a problem with a shortage of health physics people at
(
14 the site and was mentioning ANL and ORNL, and I was curious 15 if you had been involved in -- problem of the shortage and 16 knew about it or had participated in the request to go to 17 DOE to ask for --
18 A
What day did this occur?
19
+
Q This was on Friday.
20 A
It doesn' t ring a bell.
It doesn't ring a bell.
21 Q
All right.
Were you aware of the meeting that 22 was held at the Capital City Airport where at the time on 23 Friday evening -- of a meeting that was held at the Capital I
g-)
City Airport held at 7:00 p.m.,
as I understand it, between l
24 Aasjd Reponen, W.
l 25 the DOE, the EPA, the FDA, the Pennsylvania State radiological l l
U g
y
-g
l 57 rlp 26 1
people and the NRC person to discuss coordination of the
' BWH
'2 data.
Apparently the RAP from Bettis was selected to coordinate 3
that data.
Do you have any comment to make about that 4
particular activity?
5 A
Yes.
I was aware of that meeting about 4:00 6
o' clock in the afternoon I recall I discussed that 7
specific meeting w'.th George Smith, and it was at that 8
time, I believe, when Dr. Bores was going to be the NRC 9
representative for coordination.
I believe that Dr. Bores, 10 Mr. Smith, and probably somebody else attended that meeting.
11 That meeting is where it was agreed that DOE was a logical 12 choice to coordinate the data.
I wasn't aware that a 13 specific lab was designated as the people to do the work; 14 but it looked like DOE had the most people and ucc: facilities i
15 and were the logical ones to coordinate it.
I was aware of 16 that meeting and I fully supported the decision.
I t
17 0
This was later cited as -- or rather the selection i
18 of the RAP group from Bettis to coordinate, this was later l
l 19 cited as the possible reason that we did not get information l
S I
20 from DOE for a while because it was decided that DOE was 21 ; probably given all of t
4.nformation to this person who, 22 because of the RAP tie to the State, wac giving possibly
}
23 the information to the State and that the NRC might have not 24 have gotten the RAP information because of that.
(~'
Ac:
m.
- si amorters, inc. [i 25 A
I am not a. tare of any time that we didn't get i
I
i 58 P
rip 27 1
information from DOE that -- as we needed it.
l 2
O Including the ground measurements?
3 A
Including the ground measurements because we 4
knew -- was it the Brookhaven group that was out working?
5 The State had called them specifically, and it is my impres-6 sion that we were getting their specific data and the teams --
7 some were operating one side of the rive, some the other 8
side of the river; and it is my impression the coordination 9
was pretty good.
And I don't recall any feedback from our 10 site people saying it wasn't.
You know, I have no idea how 11 this impression that we weren't getting information from 12 DOE has come up.
13 Q
I believe in part it came up again on Saturday.
q v
14 I think Mr. Bores called in at one point and indicated that 15 the only data we were getting was from AMS, that we weren't I
i 16 getting the ground data, and I was just curious to know if l
l 17 you knew any of the whys.
You weren't aware of it?
j 18 A
If anybody should know, it should be Dr. Bores 19 ;!
that should know why we weren't.
llJ i
20 j Q
And he didn't explain it, I believe, except to j
I i
21 conjecture what I told you before about the possibility of j
l 22 it being --
l l
23 A
It may be.
l
.i 24 0
-- filtered into the State.
Aes _;.i nworms. ine.
25 A
That may be true.
I don't know.
I i
i 1
1
59
'" rip 28 1
Q All right.
It is not something that jumped l
2 out at you?
3 A
No, because it was my impression that everybody 4
was working very hard to coordinate data.
That was the 5
purpose of the meeting Friday because there was so much data 6
being generated as more and more agencies were coming in, 7
EPA, HEW, so that there would be a coordinated effort to 8
assimilate the information and know what was really 9
happening out there.
10 Q
But based on what you have said so far, is it 11 fair to say that if some of it was lost, it did not perturb 12 our activities at headquarters?
p 13 A
I don't remember.
I really cna remember.
I
/
\\_
14 am -- it may have been, but I was very excited at the time i
15 because we weren't getting information and I remember there 16 were times when up to four hours we hadn't gotten any and I l
17 was beating on the site to try to get some new data.
- Now, 18 l whether this i s tied to that, I really don't know.
l 19 Q
Now, what was your impression of the communications l 20 on Friday at the -- with the site, and were there any changes 21 in the telephone connections and communications on Friday with ;
I 22 our lines at the site and communica;'.ons with the site on j
23 l Friday as opposed to Thursdar r.j;L We have already identi-i 24 fied that on Thursday we we.e probably communicating with l
r ', 3)
Ac'i _, rJ Reporters, ine, 25 l the trailer directly.
i l
l
i i
60 P
rip 29 1
A
-Yes.
(sBWH
)
2 0
And we were also communicating with Unit 1 3
directly?
4 A
Right.
I am trying to remember when I had --
5 what I referred to as the black phone installed in my office.
6 with a continuously open line where I would ring a buzzer 7
and they would pick up at the other end, nobody else on 8
the line.
It was a private line that -- direct communications 9
when that was installed, it was really good.
No problem at 10 all.
11 Q
This is in addition to the line to Unit 1 and
'12 to --
rx 13 A
Yes, in addition to. When I got data, that was
\\_]
14 my line I used because it was immediate.
I had a squawk 15 box.
It was immediate.
Push the button and talk.
1 16 Q
To whom?
end 4 17 A
Talk to DOE trailer.
18 19 l
20 21 22 23 l
2s
\\
- Au-((,e9 Remners, lrc j
25 i
1 l
I t.
1244.05.1 6I Db gsh 1
0 Up'until this time, you were just ringing the 2
trailer on wnatever telephone was available.
3 A
The normal phone system, yes.
4 0
But sometime Friday or Saturday --
5 A
It was about that time-frame.
I don't remencer 6
when.
Communications were very good after that.
The longer 7
we were there, the better they got.
And Friday, they 8
were definitely -- I would have to classify them better than 9
Thursday.
10 It is my impression that every day they were gettino 11 better because if there were problems developed, we were 12 able to work around them to overcome the problems.
13 So by Friday, I would say that communications would have 14 been much better than Thursday.
15 0
The communications within the IRC itself, how 16 were they progressing on Friday as opposed to Thursday?
I7 A
They were all person-to person voice communications.
18 0
The same as before?
19 A
Yes.
20 MR. RIVENBARK: Off the record.
21 (Discussion off the record.)
22 MR.RIVENBARK: Back on the record.
23 BY MR. RIVENBARK:
24 0
Did the arrival of the Denton team at the site 25 n,
44.05.2 62 iMi.gsh I
on Friday afternoon change your activities in any way?
(3 s_/
2 A
They remained essentially what they were before it 3
brought a clearer focal point at -the site for the dec., ion-4 making at the site.
5 And it tended to cause a little more cohesiveness in the-6 site e. ort than what had existed before.
7 I had referred before to the Vollmer team at the site.
8 I know our site people looked at Denton as in charge and 9
therefore, their marching orders were coming from Denton.
10 0
Was he involved, though, in your principal 11 activities which were related to the environmental activities 12 at the site, as you have described -- was he also involved 13 in the environmental activities up there?
14 A
He was, but it was my impression from a very, very 15 high level overview.
And the environmental effort still
'~'
16 resided with George Smith primarily et the site and George 17 would brief Mr. Denton as far as what things were transpiring.
18 0
Did your communications with the site decrease as 19 a result of Denton's going up there, or did the function for 20 evaluation of the radiological aspect of things remain up at 21 IE headquarters?
22 A
the functions remained essentially the same.
The 23 one thing that changed, and I really don't know what 24 significance to attribute to it, is that once Mr. Denton got
- 2:5 to the site, there was a slight conflicti whereas, before the
! O ss l
63 244.05.3 CH: gsh I
directions would come from the EMT, now the directions would iO
\\s/
2 come-from Mr. Denton at the site.
3 And occasionally, I would be told by the EMT that -- or 4
an EMT member, that we were proceeding in a certain direction 5
after I discussed it with them.
6 And when our site people had.a discussion with Mr. Denton, 7
the direction would change.
3 0
Can you think of an example ?
9 A
An example is the whole body counting at Three 10 Mile Island.
There was a clamor for some whole body counting 11 activity. And we were going to do a limited amount of it.
12 And we discussed this with the site people so we were 13 proceeding.
And then the state got involved, apparently, and 14 Mr. Denton was involved with some discussions.
And after 15 that, we -- it expanded tremendously the whole body counting 16 aspects where we brought in the Helgison lab and opened it 1/
up to almost everyone within about a 4-or 5-mile radius.
18 O
Do any other examples come to mind?
19 A
That is probably one of the biggest ones.
20 0
Was that on -- within the first five days, or was 21 that later than that?
22 A
I think that may have been a little bit later than 23 that, that type activity.
But initially, I think it was a 24.
good move and it brought up a better sense of direction, a 25 the decision-makino, a more authori ta tive - dec ision-ma king O
l244.05.4 64 DH 'gsh I
right at the site, where you don't have to come back several p)
\\~
2 hundred milcs and.get information over the telephone and
~
3 make decisions.
4 You have someone at the site who had the authority and 5
responsioility to make important decisions.
6 And it was my impression that he did that.
7 O
Moving now to Saturday, do you remember what major 8
activities you were involved in on Saturday?
9 A
No.
10 0
Were you involved in the -- in any coolant sample 11 work at that time?
12 A
de were not really involved in coolant sample work.
13 0
What about the shielding of the recombiners? 'Were 14 you involved in that in any way?
15 A
We knew there were about a half million dollars 16 worth of lead bricks ordered and they were doing shielding, 17 thinking of doing shielding.
18 We were aware of the discussion, but our involvement --- we 19 had no real direct involvement in that.
20 These were site decisions that were being made and first-21 hand knowledge.
22 Sitting osck, it is hard to second-guess the need for that 23 type of --
24 0
Do the quantity of shielding that was required and 25 that sort of thing was not something that your group was l
~T) l
65 44.05.5 DH.gsh I
working with.
(~/3 L.
2-A No.
3 0
I believe we touched on this before, but I will ask 4
you again Were you involved in the evacuation contingency 5
plans that Mr. Gilinsky requested be prepared on Saturday 6
night?
I believe Saturday night he made a request that there 7
be certain contingency plans done over the night and be 8
made available the next morning.
9 Were you involved in that in some way?
10 A
Yes.
We knew that that was going to occur and we 11 interfaced with the group for the various considerations from 12 the radiological end and the IE input to the overall product.
13 We were involved in that.
14 0
Can you give me some examples of what it was that
'~'
15 you were interested in there and who you worked with on those 16 things?
17 A
de had no direct assignnent.
That came -- anything 18 specific, we were in an initial meeting with Dr. Hanauer 19 and I think it was Bob Bernero who was involved in those 20 initial meetings to discuss the various aspects that should 21 oe considered.
22 And various groups broke off and worked on those.
And we 23 looked at the draft of the plan that was put together.to 24 see what impact it would have on us and what role we would 25 fulfill to make sure that we could have our act in order, O
44.05.6 66 114 gsh I
if anything was to be implemented.
n(-)
2 0
On Saturday, at one point, someone from the region 3
told Mr. Cunningham that the region was telefaxing some red 4
level readings to headquarters so that headquarters coulo 5
telefax it to Grier, who was at the site at that point.
6 Do you understand why this was necessary, why it was done?
7 A
The only thing I can understand is the facsimile 8
machine between the region and the site, if that was broken.
9 0
They normally had such capability?
10 A
Yes. Normally, what was happening was the region, 11 the site would phone the information to the region, would 12 transcribe it and fax it to us.
If there was any significant 13 information, the region would call us in advance or the site 14 might even call us in advance and say, we have some hot lo_
numbers here.
16 But the more I would say mundane-type of inf ormation 'would 17 normally come in on the fax.
18 I don't recall this circumstance at all.
Or even if we 19 did ;c, I don't know.
20 0
Onward to Sunday, which incidentally, is the last 21 day I'm going to talk about.
Do you recall any ma jor 22 activ.ities that your group was involved in on Sunday?
23 A
No, I don't.
Nothing sticks out.
24-0 Is it f air to say that the communications were the 25 same on Saturday and Sunday as they had been late Friday?
O
44.05.7 67 DH 'gsh
-1 A
1 would say that they were probably better.
I
)
2 think-by now al' of the bugs.were probably worked out in 3
communications.
4 O
And we had the same situation except that you had 5
~ the black' telephone now?
6-A Yes.
7 0
The line directly to the trailer?
8 A
That's correct.
9 0
Were any special instructions given to the site by 10 headquarters for off-site or on-site radiological monitoring, 11 some directi,'s as to specifically what to monitor and how 12.
frequently to report it at any time during the first --
12 A
There were no standing instructions as to specifics id because the situation was changing.
15 We knew what stations, air monitoring stations were set 16 up.
We knew the frequency of the survey teams that were out 17 there and the basic composition, what they could monitor for.
18 We knew we had the thermal luminescent dosimeter stations 19 established and that they were being picked up on a 24-hour 20 basis.
21 We knew what environmental samples, milk, vegetation, 22 things like.that, were being taken and we had a basic 23 agreement that what we were doing with our resources was a 24 logical approach.
25 And they were oeing integrated with what FDA and epa were Oa i
._,,..,.m_
244.05.8 68 DH. gsh I
doing, for example.
rm
(_f 2
We knew that FPA was out.with their dosimeters and their 3
monitors and EPA had their stations set up and we were trying 4
to complement.
We were basically in closer to the plant 5
and they were out at a greater distance from the plant.
6 There was this type vf coordination effort that went on 7
in trying to assure that everything was being collected by one 8
agency or another, or in some cases, there was some 9
duplication.
10 0
Was this true before the Friday DOE meeting?
11 A
Yes, it was.
As I recall, EPA and FDA really first 12 started coming in around Friday and Saturday. Up until that 13 time, DOE and us were the lone agencies out there in 14 conjunction with the state and the licensee, of course.
And O
15 it is a matter of recognizing a long-term situation versus 16 a short-term situation.
Until probably about Thursday, I
17 don't think that people were really thinking the magnitude 18 of the problem and the long-term aspects of the problem and 19 the need for coordination, better coordination and data 20 display and interf acing for long-term became apparent and 21 then we moved in that direction.
22 But like I say, two of the agencies really came in richt 23 around Friday, as I recall, EPA and HEW.
24 0
Was there a pattern set cy the initial reports that 25 were prepared that was followed in the later radiological O
i
1244_.05.9 69 DH gsh_
l-monitoring reports?
r3 kJ 2
A No. I say no, but like on the AMS, we get certain 3
. data in.
The more we look at it, we learned that there were 4
thirgs missing.
de asked for specific things to be covered.
5 Initially, Ewe got some data.
We assumed that it was all 6
gamma dose rate data, and we found that it.wss beta / gamma.
7 And so we got clarifying open window, closed window 8
instrument type, things of that nature.
We were able to 9
get some --
10 0
Were' random, on-the-spot release monitoring reports 11 clearly identified as to the time and location anc 12 circumstances?
13 A
They were identified as to time. Location was a 14 little more difficult.
They would be identified by 15 location.
But to correlate those to the maps, charts we had 16 was sometimes a little more difficult.
17 They were identified, but not in a consistent format.
It IB may come in opposite the greenhouse, okay?
And it would 19 come, actually, now exactly where is this greenhouse?
And 20 we would get it pinpointed on our charts.
21 So when any references were made to that house, we knew 22 basically where it was.
23 What we were looking at was a problem, not how accurately 24 located.
Whether it was a half a mile -- whether it was 25 2000 feet from the site or 2l00 wasn't important in our minds.
s-)
L
7244.05.10 70 DH gsh l'
O What about the circumstances of the particular
(~)
-\\>
'2-release -- releases that were being monitored?
Were they 3
also noted on the' charts?
4 A
Oftentimes, we did not-know why we were getting 5
the reading out there unti.1 --- there are. certain ones.
I 6
guess it was Friday, Friday morning.
And some of the releases 7
I think we had Thursday from what we thought was from the 8
waste, the gas decay system.
9 Those were correlated.
But afterwards, the routine 10 monitoring, you did not know why you had the high reading, if 11 you had a high reading.
12 0
Was the release data gathered by NRC, DOE, and 13 Metropolitan Edison compared at the site?
14 A
Yes.
Well, Met Ed -- I am not sure that Metropolitan t,')
%J 15 Edison, of that relationship with the DOE command center.
16 But that is where it was coming together and that was the 17 reason for it, to look at the comparative data.
IS C
Was it the DOE group or the DOE RAP group that 19 oid the comparisons, or do you know who that was?
20 A
Our people, Dr. Bores was supposed to be looking 21 at the data to see if it was the same ballpark type data.
22 If we were out in a sector and took a measurement and 23 DOE was out in a sector at the same time and took -
24 measurement, there is a factor of 10 difference t!'a t would 25 cause us some concern.
e3
\\,
I I
I 71 7244.05.11 bH gsh 1
0 So Mr. Bores would be the man who would have made
(~(3/
2 the comparisons at the site for the NRC.
3 A
Yes.
4 0
Were the readings on in-plant radiation monitors 5
ever collected and presented together as a single body of 6
data to describe the radioactivity distribution within the 7
plant?
8 A
As a single body of data,.I would say no.
We 9
received:a lot of in-plant readings and on-site readings 10 which we looked at to see if there was anything ma jor, any 11 trends and --
12 But ou. primary emphasis was not on the in-plant. It was 13 on -- within the site boundary but not in plant and off-site.
14 We did pay a lot of attention to the in-plant readings --
'~
15 on-site readings, but outside the plant because we knew that 16 they reflected what would be going out into the environs.
17 Eut the direct radiation level readings inside the plant, 18 we did not see a direct correlation between the-and what 19 would necessarily be out in the environs.
20 So we did keep an eye on, auite closely on what was 21 the on-site readings at the fence line in locations on-site.
22 0
I now have a few auestions that are related to 23 precursor events.
24 Prior to the PAI-2 accident of March 28th, 1979, what 25 knowledge did you have of an incident at the Davis-Besse plant
7244.05.12 72
'lHi gsh' I
on September 24th,1977?
O
(/
2 A
I had no specific knowledge of the details.
I 3
knew that there was some general discussion of it.
But the 4
knowledge was really af ter Three Mile. Island, moreso than 5
before Three Mile Island.
6 And even right now, I am not sure of the specifics of that 7
event.
8 0
Do you recall what brought the Davis-Besse transient 9
to your attention?
10 A
I have no idea.
11 0
Do you recall or have any recollection of a memo 12 and enclosure to you dated April 6th, 1978 from R.C. Knop, 13 spelled K-n-o p, chief of Region III's reactor project 14 section 1 about instrumentation adequacy at Davis-Besse?
15 A
That doesn't ring a bell at all.
16 O
Do you know what follow-up to the general subject 17 of the Davis-Besse transient.and the problems with -- or the 18 adequacy of the instrumentation -- do you know what f ollow-up 19 was conducted with respect to any generic application 20 study?
21 A
I have no idea.
I don't remember the memo.
And 22 therefore, I don't remember the follow-up.
23 C
I have some general questions now that are, again, 24 considered to be precursor-type things.
25 What is your general perception of the relationship between o
s.
i-i i
73 f244.05.13-
"DH gsh 1
IE headquarters and IE regions?
t
(_g) 2 By that I mean is it adversary or cooperative?
3 A
It is a combination of the both. IE headquarters 4
would probably look at it as more cooperative.
The regional 5
offices in general would probably look at it as more adversary.
6.
And I think it is a pretty general statement.
It would 7
depend upon somewhat the region, somewhat the specific 8
branch within the region.
And it would depend upon the 9
specific area in headquarters.
10 I think the region would look at headquarters as more 11 turning down all of their good ideas that they have instead 12 of just rubber-stamping them and passing them on to other 13 offices.
14 I think IE headquarters would look more at their function A
t' ')
15 as to evaluate based on past precedent and experience and 16 the knowledge of where headquarters organizations, NRR, 17 standards, NMSS, et cetera, are moving on various subjects.
18 Unfortunately, or maybe fortunately, any time you are 19 in an area of second guessing what the region recommendations 20 are, that sometimes tends to develop an adversary-type 21 concept when that is not the intent.
22 The intent is to get the overall NRC mission accomplished.
23 0
Do you consider the relationship an enhancement 24 as opposed to a hindrance ?
25 A
The relationship between --
l t~
(_h/
7244.05.14 74 DH gsh I'
O Between headquarters and the regions.
\\_)
2 A
I think it is very important that the relationship 3
that exists, the fact that there are -- like I said, I think 4
there are some adversary-type concepts from the regional 5
viewpoint of headquarters.
6 I think it is important to be that way.
Not that they 7
consider it that way, but that the role we perform is not 8
a rubber-stamping role.
9 I think that we have to bring about the uniformity between 10 the three regions.
And unfortunately, I think sometimes 11 we have to do what maybe the regional supervision should be 12 doing, and that is saying no, and not just rubber-stamping 13 recommendations that the individual inspector has made, 14 0
Have you ever been discouraged from using strongly g-
'J 15 woroed statements to describe any deficiencies that you found 16 in plants?
17 A
I would say yes.
18 O
Do you know why?
19 A
Because I was being discouraged in my own best 20 interest because, as.I recall back, I am thinking many years 21 ago when I was going to use strongly worded statements.
And 22 reflecting on them after receiving advice from my branch 23 chief at that time, I was pro bably wrong.
I was probably l
24 wrong.
l 25 And so I think the dicouragement came f rom the overall l
(~sb w
i l244.05.15 75
>DH-_gsh I
good.of the agency and my overall good being at the heart (9
s_/
2 of my branch chief at that time.
3 Make darn sure that you know what you are saying if you 4
are going to say it and don't just cause a lot of commotion 5
for the sake of causing commotion.
6 Make sure that you're right.
Make sure that it is really 7
important what you are saying and get it in the proper 8
context.
9 0
Could you freely contact technical reviewers and 10 other offices, for example, NRR, to discuss your technical 11 concerns?
12 A
I think I have never had a problem with that.
And 13 I also think that IE manual, as it is written, encourages 14 that. It encourages in writing a free exchange of inf ormation.
15 But what it does limit is taking office positions at 16 the inspector level. You see, there is one other aspect here 17 that I will mention.
It is related -- it is a little 18 peripheral.
19 What we find at headquarters many times is that the 20 region will go to one of the licensing offices, either the 21 inspector -- section chief, sometimes a branch chief, and 22 will beat very hard on a subject.
c I
23 But they have gone to the wrong people and they have i
24 polarized the office and not given our headouarters group a 25 chance to work on the problem with the right people and get t
244.05.16 76 P.
DH gsh l'
it resolved.
2 And then they come in here to headquarters with the 3
problem and it is very dit.ficult sometimes to resolve a 4
problem hat has been. presented wrongly to another office.
~
5 The office' has been polarized. before the right people f
,6 can even work on it.
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 O
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 4
23 l
24 25 O
l
_ _.. -,. _., _.. -. _ _,, -. _ ~ _.. _ _,. ~.. _, _ _ _.. _. _... - -, _..,
oCR 7079 WHITLOCK 77 t-6 mte 1 1
0 Does IE review plant receipt procedures?
. u) 2 A.
Yes.
.3 g
What is the purpose of that review?
4 A
The purpose of the review of plant procedures is to --
5 it is a twofold purpose:
one, to assure that plant review 6
function was implemented.
This is the review by the plant
'7 operations review committee or a similar type committee, and 8
that.has been approved by plant management.
9 The second purpose is to review to make sure that the 10 procedure is technically adequate.
11 0
Do you ever review the procedures of the -- from the 12 perspective of what the operator sees and what he may or may
(~)T 13 not do as a result of what he sees?
14 A
As far as the technical adequacy would be, part of 15 the review as far as what the operator sees or what he is 16 required to do, based on what he sees -- what was the other 17 part of that?
18 g
Is what he may or may not do as a result of what he 19 sees.
20 A
Yes.
For example, on the emergency procedure, if 21 we would look at the actions that the operator would be 22 expected to take, I don't think that we have ever reviewed it 23 really 'from the hwan engineering aspect.
That hasn't been
. (~}
24
.the thrust behind our review.
It would be very difficult to l
l AceLpJ Reponen. Inc.
l 25 develop a' generic program that could address that, because l
l
mto 2 78 2
I you are talking about 20 different operators, each of which 2
Ir-y perceive something differently.
3 g
How -- I guess the answer is that you do review it 4
from the perspective of what the operator sees, but not 5
necessarily on what he may do or not do as a result of that?
6 A
We have no idea what he may not do.
We look for 7
the procedure and what it tells him to do.
8 G
Do you ever discuss any issues associated with the 9
licensing review in NRR, the issues associated with the 10 review of the operating procedures?
II NRR reviewers get a copy of the plant operating A
12 procedures before the plant is licensed, and they use those
.(
13 procedures as one of their main ingredients in their review I4 of the licensed operators before they actually issue the 15 license.
16 MR. RIVENBARK:
Off the record.
17 (Discussion off the record.)
I8 MR. RIVENBARK:
Back on the record.
i I9 h BY MR. RIVENBARK:
0 k
20 G
What is your perception of the relative quality of 21 the procedures from one plant to another?
22 A
At this time, I think I am the wrong person -- I i
23 i
can't answer that question, in all honesty, because I have 9 eras Reporters, Inc, l
not been in the business of reviewing plant procedures for 24
! Ac;-
j many years.
At the time,'as an inspector, there was a vast 25 i
79 mt0 3
?
I difference in the relative quality of procedures.
K,'
2 G
What is your perception of the relationship that 3
existed between I&E and NRR before the TMI incident?
4 A.
Before the Three Mile Island incident, which 5
encompasses a long period of time, I think that, starting five 6
or six years ago, the relationship between IE and NRR has 7
been steadily improving.
I think that we have got a fair 8
working relationship.
W6 understand each other's needs and 9
each other's concerns.
And I think we have worked at trying 10 to develop a good working relationship.
There are areas where II we say that we may say that they haven't been supportive in I2 our concerns in an area.
Likewise, NRR might say that we 13
(
)
haven't always supported them in their concerns.
Id But basically, there is a pretty good understanding and 15 a pretty good working relationship.
16 Q.
How effectively does the I&E and NRR relationship 17 facilitate the feedback of operaticnal experience into the 18 licensing process?
l I9 A.
Gee.
I think, you know, NRR gets copies of our inspection reports, direct feedback from every inspection.
l 20 t
I 21 Our bulletins they work on with us, our circulars, information 22 notices. Problems that we are having are fed back.
We have 23 got -- we get memos from the field which we give to NRR, 24 l problems that we are having.
l A
erJ Reporters, Inc, l
25 l I think they have the information.
I don't think it is i
i I
\\
L
mtc 4 80
?
I IE's function to tell them what they should include in their 2
licensing process.
I think we should give them the informa-3 tion, and sometimes we do recommend things that get included 4
in the tech specs.
But I think the final decision is an NRR 5
decision, taking into account all factors involved.
Many 6
times we recommend something should be included as a license 7
condition and they have information that we did not have, 8
were not privy to, and after we see the total story we agree 9
with them that it maybe should not or something different 10 should be included in.
II IE has one part of the action, and I think we have to feed 12 it back to NRR so that they can consider it.
But I don't 13
(,
think there has to be a lot of second-guessing on whether 14 they actually took the positive action on our recommendation 15 that we may have, that they should.
16 G
But you do feed back information about the diffi-17 culties that IE has in implementing the various license 18 conditions that NRR imposes?
l9 A
I think what you get into here -- and I think a lot 1
20 of that comes from the inspectors -- we probably have not 21 done a good job of expressing our reason for existence, and 22 they are accepting our reason for existence.
In my view, we 23 are not compliance inspectors; we are safety inspectors.
We I,
24 l Aceeeral Reporters, Inc.
are out there doing independent assessments of the safety of 25 i
operations, whether or not it is included in the technical l
l l
i
a l
f mta 5 1
81 P
I specifications.
2 Now, when we find something isn't right, what you get down 3
to, can you write them a traffic ticket, notice of violation, 4
or do you take action to get the safety problem corrected?
5 I think there is a threshold '.here that has to be looked at.
6 Nothing prohibits us from inspection things that are not in 7
the tech specs.
In fact, we do inspect things that are not --
8 that are not definitely covered by the tech specs as to what 9
we do with enforcement action.
And things shouldn't be so 10 cookbook easy that all we have is a checklist.
We have to Il evaluate the operations, the impact it has on safety, and 12 therefore, even if it is not in the tech specs, it doesn't
(
)
13 mean we can't inspect it.
Id G
Is your relationship with DOR as a specific part 15 of NRR about the same as with the remainder of the N9R in 16 feedback and your relationship with them?
17 A
I would think that the feedback in my experience in 18 the operations group, the feedback in DOR and the working l9 relationship is probably better there than the other organiza-20 tions.
There is a closer working relationship, is my 21 impression.
22 G
Is there a method within I&E to exchange information 23 among inspectors of similar plants in different regions?
4er) Reporters, Inc.
24 A
I am going to talk around that cuestian a little Ace,
25 bit.
We do not have a mechanism, for example, wPere we have 2
l J
mte 6 82
~
l a meeting of inspectors of the GE Mark VI containment type i
i uf 2
facilities or the two-loop Westinghouse facilities and the 3
three-loop Westinghouse facilities and the four-loop and 4
things of that nature.
hewouldspendallofourtimeinmeetings.
Now, the 5
6 regions get -- and I may be wrong, but it is my impression 7
right.now that the regions get copies of the inspection 8
reports for the other regions.
And sometimes the inspectors 9
would review those inspection reports.
10 But what we do have formalized in IE is periodic branch 11 chief meetings and section chief meetings to review items of I2 common interest.
13
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0 Are these section chiefs across all regions?
Id A.
Across all regions.
As an example, in my division 15 we have usually a branch chief meeting twice a year, and in 16 the three areas I have reactors, there can be a section chief 17 meeting once a year, material licensing meeting, section 18 chiefs, once a year, and fuel facilities meetings normally I9 )ionce a year, where we discuss common problems and concerns i
n 20 and try to come up with solutions to them.
21 I
But as far as inspectors meetings, information exchanges 22 on common plants, I think what you find is that there are a 23 lot of rhetoric where people say it is good, but you try to n
i 24 l implement it and they say they don't have time to attend l
Ac er:1 Reporters, Inc.
25 because of other pressures.
I really question how much they i
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1 would get out of it.
2 I think the commonality comes ab'ou't in the IE training 3
courses that we have for the pressurized water reactors, the 4
B&W, where the inspectors are in for the same two weeks of 5
training, or they are down on a simulator together.
That is 6
where the interchanges can really come about without creating 7,- something that may tend to be artificial, but very formal as 8
far as information interchanges.
9 It is my experience, when you are sitting in on the same 10 basic course covering your plant or going to a simulator II training on your type of plant, that is where the information 12 exchanges really occur between inspectors.
()
I3 4
If, for instance, a question came up about how do 14 you prevent overpressurizing a reactor coolant system during 15 startup or what systems are there to provide pressure relief 16 during startup, how would -- if a question came up on a design 17 of a specific vendor in one area, how would that information 18 l become available to the other inspectors to make sure that i
I9d they considered the same -- from a safety point of view, now?
h 20 l Mind you, if we assume that the licensing did not lay a 21 requirement on it for that initially, and here it is, it is 22 a safety item.
23 But one inspector picks it up and he says -- and it is Clear that it is:something that is worthwhile to consider.
) feral Reporters, Inc. l A;
25 How does that feed back -- how does that information get
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exchanged to the inspectors of other similar plants in other
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2 regions, so that they can do something immediately to look 3
at theirs to see if they would not arrive at the same conclu-4 sion?
5 A.
It gets fed back very formally, not in a meeting 6
where, if an inspector wasn't there, he wouldn't have access 7
to it, or the new inspector that comes in the next week would 8
not have access to it.
It gets fed back via a program 9
revision.
10 The IE inspection manual, in the guidance section there are Il procedures pertaining to that.
Now, depending upon the signi-12 ficance of it, it could go out.
If it was really a significant I3 item, then let's not just feed it back to our inspectors but Id, to the industry as a bulletin, circular, information notice, i
15 what have you.
16 If it is something we want to inspect, we issue it as a I7 temporary instruction and we get out there and find out what 18 is going on in that area.
We issue many, many temporary l
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instructions that go to all our inspectors in like facilities.
20 If it is really important, we get NRR in on it on the design 21 change, and then we go to the Office of Standards Development 22 to get a reg guide out on it.
f s.3 Again, we are talking the range of the magnitude of the I
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issue that is involved.
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i 25 f G
Is that an effective system?
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A.
It is very effective.
2 Q.
Is there a difference in your review procedures and 3
philosophy for review of safety-related versus non-safety-4 related systems?
5 A.
I don't know the difference between a safety-related 6
system and a non-safety-related system.
We have mouthed a 7
lot of words in NRC based on ASME and things of that nature.
8 But we have kidded ourselves, also.
We have tied it to seismic 9
for systems that are safety-related, fire protection, rad 10 waste, they are classified as not safety-related.
And our 11 program is structured on safety-related as defined in the 12 tech specs.
I3
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Those systems which are in our operations program are structured that way.
That goes beyond those systems.
It 15 takes into account the rad waste systems and the other systems 16 that are, quote, "non-safety-related," quote, by our strict I7 NRC definition.
Obviously, we do a different level review, 18 because you do have systems that aren't as important as other I9 systems, and our primary emphasis has always been on the i
20 classical safety-related systems, the containment, ECCS, 21 emergency power systems, those types of systems.
22 But we still look at almost all plant : systems.
A case in 23 point is our preoperational inspection program, where we have 24 l Aer't Reporters, Inc. 'categorized our systems with primary emphasis on those that t
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25 are very important to safety, and then another-- get into some j
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of the secondary systems like circ water systems. Non-essential
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2 service water we examine, but to.a less rigorous degree.
And 3
we categorize them, and at that stage look at most of our 4
systems.
5 4
Can you tell me what it means for a system to be 6
considered safety-related?
7 A.
I can go back to the Reg Guide-1.28.
I forget the 8
two reg guides that -- the prevent and mitigate concept is a 9
safety-related definition, and the NRC has played that quite 10 rigorously, requiring seismic considerations, quality assurance II considerations, things of that nature, as related to those 12 safety-related systems.
h I3 g
Is there some specific design review that is required Id for changes to safety-related systems as opposed to non-safety 15 related systems?
16 A.
That would be included in the licensee's quality I7 assurance program, where they address the safety-related I8 systems and what they are going to do to assure they are built properly and designs are controlled and modifications 20 are controlled versus the non-safety-related systems, where 21 their QA program would not encompass generally the non-safety-22 l
related systems.
1 23 0
Is that also true of what the -- does the designee bl 2#
get involved in review of the design, of changes to the A 6 2 er:A Reporters lasc.
l safety-related or to non-safety-related systems?
j 25 1 l
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A After the plant is licensed?
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yes.
m 3
A After the plant is licensed, 50.59 on design changes 4
to the facility is described in the SAR.
That would apply, 5
whether or not it was a safety-related system, classical 6
safety-related system or a non-safety-related system.
The 7
licensee would still have to do the 50.59 review, and that 8
is where we would be involved as far as the adequacy of that 9
review.
10 0
Would that mean, then, that there would be a need 11 to review a design change to a safety-related system, but not 12 any need to review a change to a non-stfety-related system?
13 A
No.
50.59 doesn't differentiate between safety
{a; 14 and non-safety related systems.
It talks about systems 15 described in the SAR.
So if it is described in the SAR and 16 they are going t o make a design change, they have to do a 17 50.59 review.
18 G
And I&E then does what?
I 19 l A
On a sampling basis, we examine design changes they i
ll 20 make to see if they did an adequate 50.59 evaluation, to 21 determine that an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
22 Let me add something here.
We have a specific inspection fprocedurethatcovers chis t.spect.
23 9er:
24 G
Do you believe that the designation of systems as f
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Am.c 25 ! safety-related is applied in a consistent and rational manner? l l
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A No.
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Can you -- okay.
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3 A
I will elaborate on that.
I believe it is applied 4
in a fairly consistent manner, but not in a rational manner.
5 Because I believe fire protection systems, rad waste systems, 6
instrument error systems, systems of that nature, are safety-7 related.
8 0
Like the air startup on the diesel?
9 A
Yes.
And there should be quality assurance programs 10 of a graded sort applied to those systems.
11 0
Is there anything else you would like to say before 12 we wrap this up?
( ~ '3 13 A
No, I don't have anything else.
v 14 G
I thank you for coming over.
I 15 Let me say that this is an ongoing investigation and, 16 although I have completed the questions I have for you today, 17 we may need to bring you back for further depositions.
We 18 will, however, make every effort to avoid having to do so.
19 l
I will now recess this deposition, rather than terminate i
I 20 d it.
Thank you.
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All right.
22 (Whereupon, at 11:47 p.m.,
the taking of the e-6 23 i
instant deposition was recessed.)
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