ML19308C282
| ML19308C282 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1979 |
| From: | Walters F BABCOCK & WILCOX CO., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001220655 | |
| Download: ML19308C282 (46) | |
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N U CL E A R R E G U L ATO R'f CO MMIS SIO N i
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t IN THE MATT 1ER OF:
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ntr SPECIAL INCUIRY DEPOSITION DEPOSITION OF FRANK WALTERS O
l Place - Tuesday, October 2, 1979 4
Date.
Lynchburg, Virginia Pages 1 - 47 l
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(202)3474700 r.i.enon.:
t-ACE -FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.
OfficalReponers AM Nenh Ccpitol Street Wcshington, D.C. 20001
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NATIONWIDE COVERAGE-DAll
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.CR 7474 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
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2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NJ 3
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-DEPOSITION OF:
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5 FRANK WALTERS 6
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NRC/TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY 8
9 Conference Room A Babcock & Wilcox 10 Old Forest Road Lynchburg, Virginia 11 Tuesday, October 2, 1979 12 13 The Deposition of Frank Walters commenced at
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3:15 p.m.
15 '
Present for the NRC:
Fred Hebdon and Fred Folsom.
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16 Present for Babcock & Wilcox:
George Edgar, I.
'T h John Mullin, and'Lista Cannon.
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Whereupon, s.
FRANK WALTERS 3
f3 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, l
4 1v was examined and testified as follows:
5 EXAMINATION 6
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BY MR. HEBDON:
7 8
0 Would you please state your full name for the 9
- record, 10 A
James Franklin Walters.
11 MR. HEBDON:
Let's go off the record for a minute.
I 12 l
[ Discussion off the record.)
13 MR. HEBDON:
Back on the record.
C)
(_/
For the record, this is a letter to Mr. Walters 14 j
15 dated October 1st, 1979, from Mitchell Rogovin, Director n
P 16 of the NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group.
BY MR. HEBDON:
- 7'
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Have you read this document in full?
j A
Yes, I have.
l MR. HEBDON:
I've like to have this letter included
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[The document follows:]
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i Ac wa6 Remnus. In.
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October 1,1979 C
In Reply Refer to:
IGFTM 791C01-03 Mr. J. F. Walters f) c/o George Edgar, Esquire V
Morgan, Lewis 6 Bockius Attorneys for Babcock and Wilcox Co.
1800 M Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036
Dear Mr. Walters:
I am vriting to confirm that your deposition under oath in connection with the accident at Three Mile Island is scheduled for October 2-5, 1979 at Babcock and Wilcox f acility, Lynchburg, Virginia. This will also confirm my request for you to have yo'ur resume and any docu=ents in your possnssion or control regarding T:iI-2, the accident or precursor events which you have reason to believe may not be in official mC files, including any diary or personal working file.
The deposition will be conducted by members of the NRC's Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island.
This Group is being directed independently of the NRC by the law firm of Rogovin, Stern c.nd Huge.
It includes both URC personnel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and attorneys.
Through a delegation of authority from the NRC unde.
i f's Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special d
Inquiry Group has a broad mandate to inquire into the causes of the,secident at Three Mile Island, to identify major problem areas and to make reccamenda-tions for change. At the conclusion of its investigation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings and recommendations.
Unicos you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in the deposi-tion is voluntary and there vill be no effect on you if you decline to ansucr some or all of the questions asked you. However, the Special Inquiry has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place. Any j
person deposed may have an attorney present or any other person he wishes secompany him at the deposition as hic representative.
You should realice that while we vill try to respect any requests for con-fidentiality in connection with the publication of our report, we can make no guarantees.
Names of witnesses and the infor=ation they provide may eventually become public, inasmuch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Group'c investigation vill be made available to the NRC for whatever uses it may deem acoropriate.
In time, this information may be made available to the public h
voluntarily, or:become availabic to the public through the Freedom of
^'
's Information Act. -Moreover, other departmente and agencies of government may request necess to this information pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974 The inforection may also be made available in whole or in part to committeen or subco.m.ittees of the U.S. Congress.
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b SUANAME cATE,
7 raRC FoTW 318 (9 76) NRCM O240 D U.S. GoVERNP. TENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979 289 369 w
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Mr. J. F. Walters Oct:ber 1,1979
,V If you have testified previously with respect to the Tnree liile Island accident, it vould be useful tf you could revieu any transcripts of your previous statenent(s) prior to the deposition.
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Thank you for your coeperation.
Sincerely,
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0-liitchell Rogovin, Director liRC/"JII Special Inquiry Group DISTRIBUTION TERA pC)
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BY 14R. HEBDON:
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-2 Q
Do you understand the information set forth in this
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3 letter, including the general nature of the NRC/TMI Special l
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. 4 Inquiry, your right to have an attorney present here today 5
as,your representative, and the fact that the information you 6
provide here may eventually become public?
7 Yes, I do.
B Q
Is counsel representing you personally today?
9 A
Yes.
10 MR. EDGAR:
Yes.
Il MR. HEBDON:
Would you state your name for the 12 1 record?
13 MR. EDGAR:
George Edgar.
- 14 MR. FOLSOM:
The others in the room should also
-.I 15 identify themselves.
16 MR. MULLIN:
John Mullin, Babcock & Wilcox.
17 MS. C NNNON :
Lista Cannon, Sullivan & Cromwell.-
I3 !-
BY MR. HEBDON:
Q You should be aware that the testimony you.give 23 a 'has the same force and effect as ifLyou were testifying in a T
p' court of law.
My questions and your responses are being 21
.taken down, and they will later be transcribed.
- iou will be 22
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23 h :given;the opportunity to look at that transcript and make 24 T -
[D any-changes that.you deem necessary.
! Ace:Qat Reponen, Inc.
25
.However, to the extent that.your subsequent changes 1
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are significant, those changes may be viewed as affecting your
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2 credibility.
So please be as complete and accurate as you can
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3 in responding to my questions now.
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4 If you at any point during the deposition do not 5
understand a question, please feel free to stop and indicate 6
that, and we'll try to clarify the question for you.
0-_
7 What is your current position?
6 A
I'm supervisor engineer in the Plant Performance 9
Services Se'ction of our Customer Services.
10 0
Phat was your position in November of 19777 II A
Same position.
12 l 0
For whom did you work?
13 A
My immediate supervisor is Don Hallman.
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V 14 l 0
What is your educational background?
nn A
I have a B.S.
in Nuclear Engineering, 1965.
16 Q
believe you provided a copy of your resume that
~~Ij! we marked as insert No.
2, and we'd like to have that included I'
.2 in the record at this point.
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[The document follows:]
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Acl er9 Reporurs, lm.
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Resume of James Franklin Walters Address:
402 Lakewood Street Lynchburg, VA 24501 7
1 o
Education: BSNE, 1965 N.C. State College g
Work Experience with B&W:
5 -.
2/77 - Present Supervisor Engineer in Plant Performance Services Section of Nuclear Service.
Supervised plant restart testing and con-
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tract supplied information.
4/75 - 2/77 Senior Engineer in Mechanical Equipment Section of Nuclear
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Service.
9/73 - 4/75 Test Coordinator for initial startup testing on AP&L ANO-1.
12/72 - 9/73 First-of-a-Kind Test Engineer, Assistant Shift Engineer and Shift Engineer for B&W Advice and Consultation team for initial startup of Oconee I.
1 9/71 - 12/72 Engineer assigned to write test specs and train operators
.O in variees aspects ef ta=t P P 7 io testi==-
h 2/69 - 9/71 Performance Engineer in Steam Generator Group of Component Engineering. Assigned various tasks from code development to R&D testing of scale prototype of full size OTSG.
Work Experience with Brown Engineering:
.9/65 - 2/69 Performance Engineer assigned various tasks on operation and developmental testing of large H /02 rocket engine (J-2) for 2
Saturn 5 rocket.
Most noteably was simulated environmental testing (approxi-mately 100,000 feet) of J-2 at AEDC. Also followed testing of same at MSFC in Huntsville, Alabama.
Was assigned task of informing NASA (MSFC) people on opera-tion and control of NERVA rocket engine until program folded..
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6 BY MR. HEBDON:
.)
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~ Just as a brief-background, would you give us a v
3 description of your employment history, including positions h
held at B&W?
4 5
A The first four years out of school, I worked in the 6
aerospace industry for' Brown Engineering.
The last 10 years 7
have been spent with B&W, first in the steam generator components engineering group for about.two years, two or 8
9 three-years.. Since that time, I spent in Nuclear Service 10
.ever s nce, first in start-up on the site, start-up of i
Oconee 1 and Arkansas Nuclear 1, and back in the office in 11 mechanical equipment section, and recently, or since last 12 three years been in the Plant Performances Services group
.13 of Nuclear Services.
14 15 0
Okay.
I'd like to ask you some questions concerning an-incident that occurred at Davis-Besse in September of-1977.
.16 I'm particularly interested in your knowledge-and understand-g;
- [
ing of that incident prior to the accident that occurred at i.;
'Three Mile Island. Specifically prior to March 28th, 1979, na what knowledge did you have concerning an incident that 4
occurred at Davis-Besse on September 24th, 19777 2;
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22 A
My knowledge of that transient was peripheral at
.v best.
I briefly looked at the transient plotted data, at
- 23 [
.i 24 the time I made a response to Mr. Kelly's memo, and that's
[si Ace g,fJ Reporcers. Inc.
25 about it.
I was not a part of the evaluation-team that went t
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I into that transient in detail.
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2 O
How did you acquire the information that you had?
3 A
It was part -- I believe it was part of an SPR, t()
4 site problem report, that was bmitted from the site.
5 Q
Was it a. normal function of your job to receive 6
and review such information?
7 A
Not at that time.
8 0
And why did it come to you?
9 A
Well, I think I looked at it when I got Mr. Kelly's 10 memo, I went and looked at the -- found the SPR.
I can't Il remember, seems like one of the guys in the group -- not my 12 section, but the start-up section -- actually was looking at 13 it, and I went over to his desk and looked at it for a while.
U<s I4 Q
Do you recall who that was?
r 15 A
Not really.
It might have been a guy by the name of 16 f Ken Goswell, but I'm not sure, I don' t recall.
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O Do you recall why he was reviewing it?
i d i-A No, I don't.
O So then it was more a matter of you went and found the site problem report, rather than someone sent it to you?
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A That's correct.
i 22 BY MR. FOLSOM:
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23 0
When you speak of Mr. Kelly's memo, could you 24 elaborate a little bit on what it is you're referring to?
A
'J Fleporters, Inc.
25 A
I received a memo in November of
'77, I believe it
8 I
was, from M*. Kelly, stating that scue of his recommendations
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2 as a result of working out this particular transient, and I 3
was asked to respond what I thought about it by my supervisor, j
(m) 4 and I made a response to that memo.
5 In doing that, I briefly looked at this transient, 6
the. data that was-in the SPR.
7 Q
I hand you a memorandum dated November 1, 1977, 8
from Mr. Kelly.
Is that the document to which you were 9
referring?
10 l A
That is the document which I'm referring to, yes.
II BY MR. HEBDON:
l 12 Q
What did you do with the information as it relates 13 to a specific incident in Davis-Besse?
O 14 l
A I only addressed the information in response to --
'I 15 in making a response, I only used the information to make a 16 response to Mr. Kelly's memo.
Later on in November.
It's
" ;j really the only thing I did with the data.
He Q
Okay, so you didn't perform any extensive review I
of the site problem report or any of the information that was Ej contained in it, other than to look at the information y
2' p specifically in the context of Mr. Kelly's memo?
22 A
That is true.
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23 Q
Did you talk with or meet with any representatives 24 T of the utility concerning this particular incident?
A al Reporters, Inc, 25
.A No, I did not.
9 1
Q Did you talk with or meet with any representatives
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2 of the NRC concerning this incident?
v 3
A No, I didn't.
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)
4 Q
I'd like to ask ycu some specific questions about s_-
5 the incident itself, and your understanding of what happened 6
during that incident.
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7 Did you realize that steam formed in the reactor 8
coolant system.during the transient?
9 A
No, I don't believe I did, in '77.
I 10 0
If you had realized that, what significant would i
11 l you have assigned to that fact?
I 12 A
I'm not sure what my reaction would have been to 13 that at that time.
Anything I give will be speculation at fs r
s xJ 14 best.
v 15 Q
Did you realize that the operators secured high 16 pressure injection before they identified or isolated the leak?
O A
I do not believe when I looked at this transient i
d 12 i that I came away with that piece of information.
0 Would you have considered that to be a problem if
- j you had recognized that?
1 2i,
A Based on what I knew in 1977, I don' t believe I i'
22 f would have.
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,\\J 23 0 0
You mentioned that you didn' t realize that steam 0
24 had formed in the reactor coolant system.
If you had realized Adlhweneponen.w.
l 25 that that steam formation caused pressurizer level to increase !
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10
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i-I while the leak was continuing, would that have caused any
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2 concerns in your mind?
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3 A
Yes, that definitely would have caused concerns, 1
4 yes, sir.
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O But you didn't realize that at the time that you 6
reviewed the incident?
a._
7 A
That's right.
I think my review of it was so 8
superficial that I did not catch that.
I certainly didn't sit 9
down and plot the data, pressure, temperature, anything, so I i
10 !
could have immediately drawn that conclusion.
i 11 O
Were plots of those parameters included in the 12 reports that you reviewed?
13 A
I did not see any.
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14 l 0
Did you give any consideration to what the operators i!
15 '
saw during that transient, and what they did as a result of 16 l that information?
i I
- ? j A
only in the context of my response to the Kelly
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memorandum.
i' O
And could you elaborate on that a little?
A Okay.
As I stated, I did not catch that the i
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21 operator terminated HPI briefly, the very first minute or two 22 that the pressurizer level went off scale high.
I made some
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23 comments in the memo in referring to Mr. Kelly's prescription 24 for what we might or might not should be telling our utility
' Ac r1 Reporters, Inc.
25 customers for termination of HPI.
His prescription, I thought,[
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-could lead to other problems, and I used the TMI-2 -- the
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2 TECO transient.
The part that I saw was af ter the operator 3
had found his problem, the open PORV, pressurizer relief I
I 4
valve, and started HPI and the system recovered and became.
5 subcooled.
He then terminated HPI.
And I so stated that I 6
thought that was the proper thing to do.
7 Q
Just for reference purposes, I've put up on the 8
wall here a graph that was prepared by Mr. Leon Engle of the 9
NRC Staff, shortly following the accident -- or, excuse me, 10 the incident at Davis-Besse.
II It's basically just a plot of some of the data that 12,
was available from the reactimeter.
If you'll notice in that fq.
particular graph, one of the parameters that's plotted is 13
,V i
14 I pressurizer level, and it decreases to a point at about two I
15 and a half minutes into the t' ansient where it turns and 16 starts to come back up.
U Now I would hypothesize that the reason -it starts H
coming back up is because the high pressure injection is 2
starting to have an influence there at about four and a half M! minutes into the event, the operator secures high pressure
~
q 21 injection, and you can see pressurizer level turns and starts 22 to go back down again.
nV 23 Now at about six minutes into the event, pressurizer 24 level turns again and starts going back up, and continues herei Reporters, inc.
25 up until about eight' minutes, it's off scale high.
How would i
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12 1
you -- what would be your' explanatios for the increase in
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2 Pressurizer level from six minutes to about eight minutes?
s U
3 MR. EDGAR:
Do you want to look at that a little-0
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4 more closely?
v 5
MR. HEBDON:
Yes, if you want to take a minute 6;
or two to study that, please feel free.
Let's go off the record for a minute.
7
[ Discussion off the record.]
8 9
MR. HEBDON:
Let's go back on the record.
10 BY MR. HEBDON:
11 Q
Okay, now, as I understood your response from a 12 [ minute ago, you said something about they secured the high 13 pressure injection and at that time the plant was subcooled.
G
-\\~'4 Could you elaborate on that?
Or have I misunderstood you?
14 i
d 15 A
Okay, that is correct, and the point that I am 16 talking about, the graph that I seen first of all, the time
- 7 was compressed in this, so it wasn't that expanded, but I am
'i 1
,;[ talking about the point from when he closed the block valve on the pressurizer which here it's 20 minutes out to about --
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I don't know, like 35 or 40 minutes; something like that, just 21 right at the end of this graph, the return.
Pressurizer 22 level shows it going off scale bottom at 36 minutes, when fa,_)
23 they turned right around and came back, after he turned on
~'
,4-24 HPI, some time during this time.
At that point in time the A
wal Rmortns, tx.
25 precsure came back, if I remember correctly, to around 14 or 1500l i
i l
1 13 I
pounds, and pressurizer level to about mid-scale, both trending
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2 Q
high at the time, and he secured HPI the second time.
3 Q
The second time he secured it?
4
()
A Right.
5 0
Now the part of the transient that I was referring 6
to was the point earlier on, around four and a half to about 7
eight minutes, where he secares the high pressure injection 8
the first time.
9 A
Right.
10 Q
Now looking at that particular transient and trying II to recall what you remember of your analysis of the event at 12 that time, do you recall focusing at all on this question 13
<3 of whj pressurizer level went up in around six minutes?
N' Id A
I do not recall at all focusing on that point of il 15 the transient at that time.
16 Q
Do you recall giving any consideration to why I
the operator secured high pressure injection the first time h,
3h at about four minutes?
A Based on that particular graph, I have uc idea why I ;j he secured it at that time.
Again, my curves were a little 2If more compressed than that that I was looking at, so I thought I
22 I
p he secured.it around eight minutes.
v 3y
'y 0
Well, if he had secured it around eight minutes, 24 "
would you have considered that to be inappropriate operator Ac erd Reporters, Inc.
l action?
25 i
l
14 F-1 A
At the time in 1977, my own mind was that that
)
2 was the reason why he had done -- he hao werminated HPI.
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3 O
What reason?
(
)
4 A
Because pressurizer level was going out the top, or u
5 had gone off scale high.
Whether that's correct operator 6
action or not, I don't know that it crossed my mind at that 7
point in time.
8 0
If you had recognized that the reason that the pressurizer level was going up was because of void formation, 9
y) would you have considered securing high pressure injection 11 to be an appropriate action?
1 ?.
A If I had realized that, that would not have been 13 an appropriate action, no, dhat's correct.
s L1 14 Q
Now I think one of the concerns that you raised v
t h
15 is the issue that the plant might go solia.
16 l A
Yes.
I O
If you had recognized this idea of saturation
,3g pressure being approached in void formation, would you have a
been more concerned about going solid or more concerned a
about the void formation?
y A
I would have been more concerned about the void ng l
22 l formation in the core at this particular time, no doubt about r-(-)
23j it, if I had realized that.
i b
i 24 '
O Okay.
In the course of your analysis of this
> Adlheo neponen. w.
l) i 25 particular incident, did you give any consideration to what l
l l
15
)~ ~
1 would have happened had the plant been at a higher power level?
I) 2 A
No, I didn't perform any extensive analysis of it, tj 3
so I did not consider that.
(o) 4 Q
Okay.
Okay, I'd like to go on and discuss something 5
that I think we've been talking about somewhat peripherally 6
here, and that's a series of menos that were written that I o -.
7 think have come to be known as the Kelly-Dunn memorandum.
8 Do you have a copy of a memo that was written by 9
Mr. Kelly and sent for distribution?
It's dated November 1st, 10 1977, and the subject is customer guidance on high pressure II injection operation.
12 j You said before that you recall seeing that memo.
13 Approximately when did you see that the first time?
cw ks' m
14!
A Between November 1st and November 10th of
'77.
E 15 Q
What did you understand to be Mr. Kelly's concerns?
16 A
Well, his concern was that the operator had 17 j prematurely cut off the high pressure injection during this 15 !:
I wasn't too -- I didn't get caught up in that concern.
I was more concerned in the letter I wrote November 10th, in response to his prescription on what the guidelines i
I 2i[
should be given the operators.
l r3 22,
Q Okay, I have here a memo from you to Mr. Kelly,
(_)
F 23 [l dated November 10, 1977.
Is that the memo that you prepared?
t 24 h A
That is correct.
,ujlhere sworars ine.
l 25 Q
Okay, if we could back up just a little bit, is the !
1 i
16 i-rev.!ew of the memo that Mr. Kelly wrote part of the normal j
function'of your job?
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A
.If my immediate' supervisor gives me instructions 3
to comment on any memos that come.in to him, yes, it is a f~j';1 4
w Part of my job.
5 0
So he did give it to you to comment on?
6 b -.
A Yes, sir.
7 0
Who was your immediate supervisor?
8 A
Don Hallman.
9 10 0
Did you contact anyone about this particular matter I
ji>
in the course of reviewing Mr. Kelly's memo?
12 l A
Yes, I contacted at least one person and talked about the particular prescription that Mr. Kelly had addressed 13 (3
%)
14 in his memo.
U 15 0
Who was that one person?
16 A
His name is Herb Smith.
7; Q
What's his position and function?
O A
He's in Customer Service Department, in Mechanical
- 3 Services.
I'm not sure exactly what his job title is, or n
'his job function.
37 0
What aspect of this issue did you discuss with him?
r-22 A
I discussed Mr. Kelly's prescription on what L>
a
.n. s instructions we should give the operators on when and when g
t 24 j-not to terminate the HPI.
1 Ad hud Rmorms, tnc.
i 25 Q
What was the content of that discussion?
i I
i i
17 A
We discussed quite a few things in general, I think.
1 The specific comment that Mr. Smith had was essentially my
./' T 2
.g-same concern, was how were we going to convey-the prescription 3
here to the operator so that they would understand it in 1
()
4 P ain simple language, and be' able to retain it for this type l
-5 transient in the future.
6 3....
His specific comatents were that this particular 7
Prescription had too many " ands" in it, too many things for 8
9 him to remember, for the operator to remember.
10-0 By saying it had too many " ands" in it, you mean 1) that in a more general sense than just the grammatical comment?
12 '
A Yes.
The operator had to remember essentia]1y three things or three steps performed here that had to happen in
.n ja parallel before-he would terminate high pressure injection, i
15 Q
Did you have any concern with the actual actions
'16 that that particular recommendation said should be carried out by the operator, o~ was your concern with the way it was
- y explained to the operator?
s A
My concern was twofold:
One is, how was I going to convey the black and y a g
3 7;, white. from his memo to an operator,
e-L22 And secondly,'if we literally relied on it, what V
- 23 might' that get us into, in something other than a LOCA--
- i..
.24 initiated ~-transient.
Ace-al Reporters, Inc.
25 0
Could you elaborate on that second concern a little h
l r
18 I
more?
,)
2 A
Well, as I've stated before, in going over this
/
3 transient here, my concern was that if we literally relied
(_/
d on this transient or this particular prescription here, we 5
would not get ourselves a' problem with turning on the HPI 6
system and leaving it on for some period of time, in which p-7 if we had something other than a LOCA transient, overcooling 8
transient, that we would not fill the RCS full of solid 9
water, go completely solid in the RCS and therefore create a 10 LOCA when we're up against the safety valves.
II So then your concern, as I understand it, was that Q
12 if the operators followed these instructions during, say, a (v'T cooldown transient, that initiated HPI, they might go solid 13 I#
and lift the code safeties?
15 A
That's correct.
16 O
Why was that a concern?
What would have been
" h the harm of lifting the code safeties?
U d A
My concern at that time was that I didn't know I
the response of the code safeties nor of the pilot operator
- 2) relief valve, and whether or not they would recede, and 21
- therefore essentially we would wind up creating a LOCA in j
22 response to a normal, every-day cooling transient, because t
(~)
'~'
3 !,! we had not lost any fluid out of the system and we would put a bench in if we heat up at all.
Which it was bound to do.I I
24 A
al Reporters, Inc.
25 And then we'd -go up against the code relief valves and open:
1 i
i I
19 1
those.
(~N 2
Q So then you didn't know if the code safety valves x_/.
3 had been analyzed for water surges?
Is that the problem?
()
4 A
That is correct.
5 BY MR.'FOLSOM:
6 0
Let me' ask a question, if I may, and clarify some-
- 3... -
7 thing.
You speak of turning on the HPI.
Doesn't the HPI
-8 turn on automatically?
9 A
Yes, indeed it does.
10
-Q Isn't it designed to do just that?
II A
That is ' correct.
12 {
Q Then isn't anything the operator does an interference 13 with the safety feature that's been designed into the plant?
7s
_d 14 A
I didn't understand the last part.
i 15 Q-Isn't anything that the operator does to inhibit 16 the HPI an interference with a safety feature that's designed Ul into the plant?
Uh A
What you're asking -- I take it -- as a statement 5
or question is anything that he does --
20 J Q
If he interferes with the HPI, isn't that an 2I o interference.-with a safety feature?
l 22 [
A No, I' don't think so, under certain circumstances.
(~S V-23' f_
Q Well,Lnormally when the HPI comes on, isn't it L
24
- intended as_a safety factor?
g ) Reporters, Inc.
lAc g
25 A-Yes, it's a safety system.
i l-1
20 1
O Isn't it actuated by problems that --
o
( )
2 A
It is actuated by certain things, low RCS pressure, v
3 yes.
4 0
Then my feeling would be, and I would like your
()
5 response, isn't it normal for the HPI to come on?
6 A
Oh, yes, no doubt about that, it is normal for it 7
to come on, but there is nothing that automatically shuts it 8
down once it comes on, and if you have a severe LOCA, that's 9
fine, but if you don't have any loss of coolant out of the 10 system, something has to terminate it.
11 Q
Okay.
12 A
And that's the operator.
13 0
Okay, thank you.
That's what I as a layman needed 7
(._./
14 to know.
i 15 B'l MR. HEBDON:
16 Q
Getting back to the question of whether or not the PORV and the code safeties have ever been analyzed for water
,1 a
surge, did you know for a fact that they had not been analyzed t'
or was it simply a matter that you were concerned because i
- ;! you didn't know if they had been analyzed?
21 A
It was a simple matter of over a period of a number 22 l of years, I had heard dif ferent things, but the basic thing
-s D
23 lal was that I did not know had they been analyzed for' passage of 24 h solid water.
. Acjlhwa anonen, ine.
j 25 0
Who would have been responsible for that analysis?
I I
}
I 1
i i
21 l-1 A-I would expect the old Control Analysis Group,
"~
(]
2 Design Engineering.
3 O
Did you contact anyone in Plant Design to see if O
4 two e va1ve waa ever seeo aca1 zea for water eree2 7
5 A
I' don't believe I contacted anybody in Plant 6
Design, no.
p._
7 0
Now you prepared a memo that you sent to Mr. Kelly 8
and I think the initial part of it discusses the fact that 9
the operators responded correctly, based on their training.
10 What was the basis for that observation?
11 A
My memo addresses the 9/24 transient that we just.
12 talked about earlier, mainly off this page here, and that 13 when I looked-at the transient, got Mr. Kelly's letter, 14 read what he was asking to do, and talked with Mr. Smith, I I
15 )
came back and sat down my own thoughts and decided that in 16
. response.to terminating HPI, you know, subcooling transient,
'7, which I was concerned about, that the operator did the right I
12 g thing at Toledo -- at Toledo, and the second time that he P
terminated HPI, he found I1is problem, his PORV valve was 2 '. ;
open.
He immediately cle: ad that, his pressurizer level 2i -
dropped out the bottom, HiI came on, some 10 or 15 minutes, 22 or whatever the time period is later,-both pressurizer level pV 23 and pressure are recovering and on scale, and he decided then, 24 I reckon, that this period of time he~had a subcooled g
'Ac
/d Reporters, Inc.
25 reactor, both indications was on scale, and therefore he 1
I
E 22 terminated HPI.
And I thought that to be the correct response j
~
for that period of time.
I ^-
2 L ;'
3 0
If we could back up just a little bit.
At the time that you analyzed the Davis-Besse incident, did you realize
~')
4 (V
that the operators had secured the HPI the first time at 5
about four and a half minutes?
6
>~
A I do not believe that I did.
I certainly didn't 7
dwell on it, or it didn't occur to me, no.
8 9
0 Okay.
So then is it possible that maybe you and i
10 '
Mr. Kelly were talking about two different things, and that 11 l you were talking about the second time they secured it, and i
12 l he was talking about the first time that they secured it, and i
that possibly the two of you never realized you were talking 13
\\
l 14 about two different things?
'iI A
Yes, I think indeed that is the case in f act --
15 I
16 l the point in fact.
1 g
Q Okay.
What was done as a result of your memo?
II A
Let me see.
Nothing that I was involved in at l
that time was done as a result of my writing a memo to Mr.
j
!l Kelly, that I was aware of.
l h
i 2;
O Could you describe any subsecuent involvement I
22 j that you had, or any knowledge that you have, of this particu-
/,;
23 y lar issue?
il 24 A
Some time in early '78, ir. Dunn of ECCS Analysis I
,A wel Reponm. inc.
25 sent a memo to Mr. Taylor.
This memo in a round-about fashion l l
l 1
23 wound up in my hands, concerning essentially the same general i
(~')
2
'information, what prescription should be given the operators wJ 3
for termination of HPI.
I)
Q What did you do with that memo?
4 Ns 5.
A I talxed with one of the guys that works for me, 6
Mr. Cal Goslow, and asked him -- well, once I read the memo, p_
I had still the same concerns essentially, was that if we 7
left the HPI on for a certain length of time, that would go 8
9, solid in the RCS.
I asked Mr. Cal Goslow to go down and l
10 talk with Bert Dunn and see if we could come up with a 11 different prescription or different wording.
Couldn't we do 12 something a little easier that the operator would be able 13 to understand and remember, than what was in his memo.
-s
\\
\\~/
14 He come back e, said that -- in fact, I think he 15 and Mr. Street went down and talked to him -- he came back 16 and said they had talked it over, had decided upon certain 7
things, and that Mr. Dunn was going to put out a second memo a
which tollowed a couple of weeks later.
E Again I received a copy of that memo, read it, and decided that the problem -- my concern still existed with
'l the second memo, and asked Mr. Goslow to go down and talk j
U 22 h with Mr. Dunn again about it.
,s (J
It turned out in the last couple of months that l
23 24 he never talked with Mr. Dunn, I don't believe, again.
He Ac tral Reponers, Inc.
25 talked with Mr. Parton of Plant Integration about the problem, j l
i,
24 I
over the period of the next month or two, something in that 2
order, and essentially due to the press of business, every-day
(,)
3 business and all, Mr. Goslow went out of town for a couple of 7x
()
4 months, was back in and out of town, and due to this -- this 5
particular item was not carried forth at that time -- or was 6
not addressed any ;nore during this period of time.
7 0
To your knowledge, was that then the end of the issue 8
prior to Three Mile Island?
9 A
No, it wasn't.
After about two or three months, 10 that general area, I became concerned that we were not getting 11 I any response from Integration, so I went to my immediate 12 supervisor, Mr. Hallman, and suggested that maybe we should 13 send a memo to Plant Integration, asking them would they r~3
(_)
14 respond to our concerns that we had verbally expressed, and 15 he agreed that that was probably a good point to make.
16 So at that time I addressed a memo stating our
- 7 concerns to Mr. Karrasch of Plant Integration.
That was August U-of
'78.
O What eventually became of that?
2' j A
Thereafter for a few months after we wrote the memo, 21 I kept asking my supervisor whetner or not we had heard 22 l anything back from Plant I~;.tegration, and he essentially said (N
L.)
23 no, he hadn't, or nothing -- we had not received any answer l
24 '
on it.
And that went on for a couple of months or four or A
erst Reponers, Inc.
25 five months, ever what it was, until -- I think he. -- in f act, j
25
^
j I knew of nothing at that time af ter that, other than the
>~
brief conversation with my immediate supervisor, asking him
(
)
2 3
had we got the comment on it, and his reply, no.
That was 4
all I knew anything about at that time.
(,)
5 Q
So you had no indication of why you weren't getting 6
a response?
w.-
7 A
That is correct.
8 0
Is that where the issue then ended?
9 A
As far as what I knew then, that's where it ended, to as far as my knowledge of it.
I only knew that Mr. Hallman 11 had talked to Mr. Karrasch once or twice in the hall and --
12 l but we had still not received a written reply addressing our 13 concerns that I knew anything about.
O,r 3 14 l 0
Af ter you received the memo that Mr. Dunn wrote,
'i 15 and you and the people within your part.of the organization 16 l still had this concern about the possibility of going solid, 1
I 7l were you still focusing on the second securing of the high t
,;J pressure injection?
A Yes.
My intentions all along was on this second l
z+
termination of HPI in that transient.
4 O
Do you have any feel for whether or not the other
'm 22 People, Mr. Hallman, for example, were also focusing on the
(
l h
v 23 ]
second securing of high prersure injection?
f 24 A
I really have no way of knowing that.
It would A
ec Rmorters, lm.
25 be purely speculation.
l l
t l
1 k
26 1
O Okay, but you don' t have any perceptions, speculation
()
2 is obviously all you can give?
3 A
That's all I could give you, right.
,n
()
4 Q
Do you have any speculation on that?
5 A
As far as I know, Mr. Hallman never looked at the 6
transient, so I don't have any idea.
i 7
Q So no one within your group, then, that you know 8
of within your management conducted a separate analysis of 9
the data from that particular transient?
10 A
That is correct.
~
11 Q
So then would it be fair to say that the body of 12 knowledge within your part of the organization concerning 13 that transient was basically the information that you had
<3 V
14 l obtained from your review of the event?
Y 15 A
As far as I know, there was.
16 Q
Okay.
Have you ever discussed this matter with anyone at the NRC7 h
4p A
No, never have.
Q Did you give any consideration to whether this i
i 2:
material should be reviewed for possible Part 21 implications? '
21 A
Not at the time, no.
22 0
At any other time?
(~^)
v 23 ]
A
.I'm not even sure that Part 21 was in effect at l
i 24 i that time.
j betal Remum, ine.
-A 25 0
At any other time did you consider whether this i
i
27 I
might be -- might have Part 21 implications?
2
)
A No, I don't think so.
3 O
Okay.
Pere you aware at any time that Mr. Creswell,
()
I&E Region III, had concerns similar to those that were raised d
5; by Mr.,Dunn about the operator securing the high pressure 6
injection?
p...
7 A
very peripherally, and I don't know how, it might 8
even been off television or some memos that came around or 9
something discussing that, or from the site people, but there i
10 was -- I don't remember what timespan it was.
It must have Il been the middle of '78 or so, I don't even remember what time 12 l it was,
13 I do remember some discussion, that's all.
c, L.]
Id O
Discussion of what?
I5 A
I just remember that Mr. Creswell's name was brought 16 up in concern of HPI termination on the TECO transient, and U
that was it.
i I
15 O
Do you recall who was involved with that discussion?
A No, I don't.
I expect I've heard it two or three M,
times, but no specific -- I can't remember anybody's name, no.
2i.
Just general conversation.
I 22 l
(,
O Do you know if anyone within the B&W organization A.,.I 22 might have more infonnation, or have been core aware of Mr.
24 '
Creswell's concerns?
At erst Reporters, Inc.
25 A
Well, there's certainly more people than I am that l
28 I
should know that, yes.
I don't know all of them, but the B&W
(-,
2 site operation manager, I think, would have known.
But I don't
)
v 3
know what he knew.
He was there.
i) 4 0
You don't know of any mechanism or any memos that s_
S he might have written back to B&W describing or discussing the 6
concerns Mr. Creswell had?
a.
7 A
No, I don't.
8 Q
Okay.
I'd like to ask you some more general 9
questions that relate tb --
10 l l
MR. EDGAR:
Could we go off the record a moment?
II MR. HEBDON:
Sure.
12 l
[ Discussion off the record.]
13 MR. HEBDON:
Let's go back on the record.
xs/
Id I
BY MR. HEBDON:
1 15 Q
Just to clarify this, I think Mr. Creswell has 16 been involved with Davis-Besse quite a bit, and particularly the two transients that occurred there, one in September of 3o
'77, and one in November of '77.
1
~
Do you recall if the rather peripheral reference l
l M
to Mr. Creswell that you recall had to do with one of those 1
q 4
21 incidents or the other?
Or can you distinguish between the two 22 l at all?
n i
N)
\\
23 h A
No, I have essentially talked to them both in the 241 same vein, because I was on the peripheral, af ter the fact, i Ac bra Remners, Inc.
l 25 when both of them occurred.
So I really -- since they occurred f i
29 within a month of each other -- didn't really distinguish j
,G 2
them myself.
L) 3 0,
okay.
I'd like to go on and-ask you some questions
^
that are more general in nature about how some of the various
(
')
4 t/
things are don 2 within the B&W organization.
5 To your knowledge, who in B&W organizationally is 6
w..
responsible for preparing plant operating procedures?
7 A
Customer Services, and within that the different 8
groups within Customer Services prepare plant operation 9
10 procedures.
11 1 0
Do you get involved with that at all?
12 A
Yes, I do.
13 0
How do you include operational information in the work that you do with operating procedures?
jaj I
15 A
How do I factor in operational information?
16 0
How do you get the information?
How do you distill it?
How do you feed it back into the work that you do?
- 3 A
Well, there are some formal ways within the B&W organization: mainly the site problem report issued from the j
i n
sites, that would contain mainly mechanical equipment failure type information.
I
~
There may be also site problem reports written on 22
(
)
I 23 !
transients, as this one was, or things like that, that we l
24 received back here and be able to look at, that could be Acgrei aeponers, inc.
25 factored in future -- or revisions to procedures, or more
?
l f.
l 1
30 than likely another avenue that we use, called the site p-j instruction format, if we noticed that there was something T^;
2
(,-
that was of grave concern that had happened, and we became 3
aware of it and looked at it, or looked at-it in depth, then
()
4 we would write a site instruction back to the utilities, 5;
telling them. that a certain thing had occurred, and it was 6
either not correct action or it was a failure, or something, 7
and make them aware of it.
8 9
O To what extent was the experience from the 10 September 24th Davis-Besse incident used in subsequent 11 l Operating procedures?
l 12 l A
To my 'own personal knowledge in 1977, I don't know 13 of any during '78, but that's my own knowledge.
There are gs
(
)
other people that could have taken the same action within 14 15 the cervice.
16 Q
Who, for example?
- 7 A
Well, there was the start-up group at that time i
that Davis-Besse was considering to start up the plant.
a, O
They may have taken some 30 tion, I don't remember.
Also it's possible Engineering or something N
may evaluate the transient.
They may have sent something out l
f-22 l on it that I didn't see.
I'm not sure.
t i
23j' O
To your knowledge, who in B&W is responsible 24 for preparing standard technical specifications?
A wat Remriers. Inc.
~The licensing group, as far as I know, prepares j
25 A
I I
i l
31 1
standard tech specs.
)
2 O
Do you get involved with that at all?
3 A
We review certain ones of them having to do with e
(_m) 4 the plant operation or'special requirements or physics testing, 5
or in that area.
6 Q
Do you know if the Davis-Besse incident was
- 3. -_
7 incorporated in any of that review by your group?
8 A
Well, I know of none myself, my own information.
9 Q
Do you know if anyone else included it?
10 A
I h' ave no idea.
Il Q
Who is responsible for seeing that tech specs 12 l are consistent with operating procedures?
13 A
We in Plant Performance Services review certain --
(v-14 like 7 said earlier -- technical specifications and see
,1 15 during tests, physics testing or plant testing that we don' t 16 violate them, or that if we are outside of them, they are l
U jl taken into -- taken into account, that we will be outside of II l U them;for any and all plant operations, we may review a few i.
for start-up, shut-down of the unit, but l'm not aware of
[4 any specific one at this moment.
2:
e 21 J Q
Do you know if anyone with B&W actually goes 22 through and sits down with all the operating procedures and g3
\\_/
l 23 l tech specs and makes sure that they are consistent?
24 c A
I myself am not aware of anybody.
Act rat Reporters, tr%
25 Q-Who in B&W reviews the actual procedures that are l
k
32 1
developed by.the licensee to see that they are consistent o
()
2 with the procedures proposed by B&W?
v 3
A I do not know of any formal program-in which that's done on an across-the-board basis.
We review certain
(
4 5
Procedures in our group every once in a while, or at the request of the customer that we agree. are the actions taken 6
- w. ~
and the procedures are in accordance with our recommendations.
7 But I know of no across-the-board actions where all of them 8
are done.
9 10 0
What group within B&W would be responsible for 11 that, if it were done?
12 l A
I think that would fall under Nuclear Service i
department or Customer Service department's responsibility.
13
/.'N
/
s#
l Q
So it would fall within your group's responsibility?
14 1
15 A
Part of them would, yes.
16 Q
We started to talk about this a little bit earlier, y
but just to summarize, are you aware that the Davis-Besse D
i; [
small break procedure was revised to include precautions p
designed to prevent premature securing of high pressure na injection?
21 A
No, I am not.
I 22 Q
Does it surprise you that B&W isn't aware that that em
(
)
l 23 !
change was made?
14 A
No, it doesn't.
.Ac d Reponen, W.
25 Q
So it would not be normal for B&W to review such a l.
33 1
change?
(~') bu2 2
A I think that's true, as far as my own group is s_/
3 concerned.
I can't speak for people that would decide on p) 4 other parts of the company.
5 0
Would your group have been the group to review that 6
change if it had been forwarded to you?
7 A
Yes, I believe so.
8 0
I'd like to shift now and ask you some questions 9
about your involvement with the post-TMI recovery effort, 10 particularly the first day or day and a half following the 11 accident.
12 Would you describe your involvement with the TMI 13 task force that was formed on March 28th, 1979?
IU) 14 A
What was my involvement?
15 Q
Yes.
16 A
Well, I was pretty well in peripheral of the whole 17 thing, except very early in the morning.
I don't know that I il n was officially ever part of the task force that was formed.
Q You said that very early in the morning, though, 2: j that you were involved?
21 A
Yes.
22,
O Why was that?
f-)f
(-
i A
Well, at a quarter to 8:00 on that infamous 23 h 24 '
Wednesday morning, we got a telephone call from the site Acjlhner aeporters. w.
l 25 operations manager at TMI 2, saying that they had a bad trip I
i l
34
~
1 that night.
We discussed it~briefly, I reckon 15 minutes or r%
()
2
.less, and told him that we were going to get a bunch of people 3
together, and that we'd get back to him shortly, or if we (m) 4 couldn't get to him, for him to get to us.
And so about 8 : 3 0 5
or so, we convened a large group of people down at one of 6
the conference rooms.
p_
7 Q
-Did you actually take the call?
8' A
No, I did not.
9 Q
Do you recall who did?
10 A
Bill Spangler.
II Q
Why were you involved with it?
12 l A
Mr. Hallman and myself were standing in front of 13 his office, and Bill hollered out and told us to come over, a
14 that he had TMI 2 on the phone, Lee Rogers, and we might want i
15 to hear what was going on.
i6 Q
So you went over, then, and listened to the conversa-tion?
II L A
Yes.
O Other than just saying that they had a trip, do T3 you recall any other specifics of the conversation?
21 i A
The only three things I recall were that they had 22 a radiation alarm in the top of the reactor building, that
(~3
\\_)
h 22 they had no reactor coolant pumps running,'and it seems like 24 'l to me we discussed what the temperature was, but I'm not A
eraf Reporters, f N.
i 25 specific what the number was.
l
35
~ '
I Q
Now as I understand it, you weren't involved with
( )~
2 the task group specifically later on in the day; is tha't cor-3 rect?
,.m
,(,)
4 A
I was in the meeting at 8:30 for 15 -- for 30 5
minutes or so. when they decided to send people to the site, 6
and then that broke up, and about -- I don't know when it was, 7
earlier in the morning, we contacted TMI again, or they con-8 tacted us, and I was in on that phone call.
I forget, it 9
was something between 10:00 and 1:00 or something, and there 10 was a conversation with Mr. Schadel at his home in Harrisburg.
11 The conversation went on for some period of time, 12 and after that I was not involved in any real close contact 13 with what was going on.
("}
v 14 l 0
Why were you net involved af ter that?
15 A'
I don't know.
My immediate supervisor, Mr. Hallman, 16 went on shift, he and three or four other people, and I was
'. 7 essentially working day shift to support and do whatever was
'l e needed and required at that time.
b Q
Okay.
Now the second conversation at 8:30, could
'- / you hear the conversation?
Was it on a speaker phone, or 21 i was somebody talking on the phone, and you were just listening l
('T 22 to one end of the conversction?
\\.j' 23 A
No, the conversation at 8:30 was only amongst B&W 24 people downstairs, in the conference room.
It was not on Ac eral Reporters, Inc.
25 the phone, it was amongst the engineering people, management il
36 e
1 people with B&W.
( )
2 0
I thought you mentioned there was a call to Mr.
3 Stradel, I believe his name was.
(n) 4 A
Schadel.
That was some time later in the morning 5
between 10:00 and 1:00, I don' t remember exactly what time.
6 Q
Okay.
You weren't involved with that phone
- c. --
7 conversation?
8 A
I was in the room, involved in the conversation.
9 O
Could you hear both sides of the conversation, or 10 just the one end?
II A
Yes, they were on the speaker phone.
12 O
Okay.
Do you recall any discussion in the course 3
of any of these conversations.about a strategy at the plant 13 G
14 to try to depressurize the system and blow it down in order 15 to ensure that the core was covered by dumping the core flood 16 tanks?
P A
I don't remember any detailed conversation.
The 15 L only thing that come s to me, I do remember it seems like F
they said something about depressurizing to let the core flood l
i' '
tanks come into_the system, but that's it.
21 Q
Do you recall when that discussion took place il 22 during the day?
(-)
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- ?
23ll A
Well, it had to be in that telephone call, and it 24 !
was some time, I think, about 1:00 o' clock, 1:30, some thing
>llh.,.i nesoneri. ine.
j I
25 like that, around noontime.
But I'm not sure.
l
37 H-Q So as you recall, it was in the first time that 3
(}
'Q A
I'm not sure that was the first time-they called 3
.( )
- 4 back, or they instructed if it was -- I believe it was probably the second time.
There might have been another phone call 5
some time in the morning, but I don't. remember.
6 Q
Okay.
Do you recall any discussions of high hot 7
leg temperatures?
g A
In the particular meeting I was in, there was.a 9
response from Mr. Schadel that said they were reading 700 10 11 degrees on one of the hot legs.
12 l Q
Now this was approximately what time was that 13 meeting?
,.s I
i l
A That was around the noontime, 11:00 to 1:00,
^
14 15 something -- I don't remember.
16 Q
Okay, and there was a discussion of the high hot leg g
temperatures being as high as 700 degrees?
h A
He passed that along as a piece of information.
ng i
p Q
Okay.
T.2 3
Do you recall any discussion about the fact that i
2; the high hot leg temperatures might indicate saturated 22 steam or void formation in the reactor coolant system, in the b) i!
my c
22 ii hot leg?
h 24 A
From our side of the conversation, definitely yes.
l hiw l Heporters, inc.
fl
,A 25 lie knew that that 's what it meant.
t l
i l
[
38
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-Q And this was the meeting that occurred around j
4 \\
2 11:00 or 1:00 o' clock?
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3 A
Right.
Right.
m 4
O Do you recall any recommendations to increase high k,,)
5 pressure injection flow?
6 A
Yes.
I think it was at the same meeting later on there was a recommendation passed along, and I'm not sure 7
exactly how it got passed along, b'ut-there was some words 8
given about establishing 400 or 450 gallons a minute flow 9
10 rate, high pressure injection flow.
11 Q
You do recall, though, that there was a recommenda-12 j tion for a specific amount of flow?
r3 13 A
Yes.
\\
v 14 O
Do you recall any recommendations about the subj ect 1
15 of getting the pressure back up again?
16 A
No, I do not recall anything about the pressure,
- 7 just the HPI flow.
- g Q
Do you recall how any of these communications --
or how any of these recommendations were communicated to Mr.
n, Rogers or to the site?
J l
2; A
I don't know -- well, I only have to assume that Mr. Schadel, who was on the other end of the phone, communicated
(^3 22 L. )
23 j with Mr. Rogers.
I do not know.
24
'O Do you recall during any of the meetings or l
4 no neconus. w.
25 discussions that you were involved with on Wednesday, any j
i l
i
39 I
discussion about.the fact that high pressure injection had
~.,
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1 2
been turned-off and throttled for most of the time?
v 3
A' No, sir, not at this time, to this time period.
,,(,,)
4 I mean 11:00, 12:00,'1:00 o' clock, I -had heard nothing about 5
that.
6 O
Then what was the basis of the recommendation that 7
the HPI flow be 450 gallons a minute?
Were they talking 8
about incrdasing it to 450 or decreasing it to 4507 9
A Making sure that they had that much.
I 10 l 0
That they had at least that?
II A
At least that.
I think we had become aware that I
II I evidently there was a problem, at least a LOCA of some size, 13 and that we did not have core cocling at that time, and we
(~)
%J 14 said, hey, this is how much we need.
Get it in there.
And ll 15 I don't think it occurred to us whether it was too low or too 16 high.
It was a point that temperatures, things were not right, get this, it should be on this much, get it in there.
13 [;
I did not know at that time that they had been --
I prematurely terminated HPI.
Z O
So you don't recall any discussions during any of 2;,
those meetings or phone calls that the HPI was turned off?
)
22,,
A No, I do not.
(^J x.
?
23 O
At any time in the course of all this, did you l
24 : connect the TMI accident and the Davis-Besse incident that I
heral Reporters; tnc.{
A lyouhadlookedatearlier,doyourecallmakinganyconnection!
25 l
'A 40 between.the two events?
3 A
I made a connection between a memo I had written j')
2
'a and the information we had asked for Plant Integration into 3
f')
TMI 2 ~ transient later on that day, I think.
4 xs 5
Q Could you explain that?
A Well, the memos that I had l written indour concern 6;
c,. _ _
about going solid in the RCS, and that we had not received 7
any' instruction.
Therefore.we had not passed along anything 8
specifically to the utilities, you might say, at this time 9
jo-in 1979, that might increase or enhance the operator under-11 standing of when he should terminate HPI, when he should or when he shouldn't, and on what instrumentation he might do 12 this.
13
(,.i 14 l
0 Well, if you were concerned about this guidance
^
15 in a memo, did you have any perception that HPI had been 16 secured?
i 7
A No, sir.
d
- 3,
O So then why did you connect that, then, with your memo?
n.
A Because it was a concern and a general topic of 4
HPI initiation or termination.
7.4 I
22 0
Did you give any consideration to saying to some-l73/
body that because of your experience with this issue of 23 24 possibility of securing high pressure injection and the Ajlkmi amonm. ix.
25 Possibility that.the operators didn't have as much guidance i
l l
t
41
~
1 as they might have, did you consider bringing that point to
(-)s 2
anybody's attention?
r 3
A Well, we were trying to establish and bring it j
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4 to people's attention or at least get an answer to whether or 5
not we had a problem, whether the engineers considered our 6
concerns a problem, whether or not this was an enhancement of 7
what the operators already knew, or any significant increase 8
in that.
~
9 I don't know that I even considered it at that point 10 in time.
II Q
Did you try to find out if high pressure injection 12 '
had been secured?
13 A
At TMI 2?
(']
RJ 14l Q
During the TMI 2 accident, particularly that first h
15 day or day and a half.
16 A
I do not remember that.
I certainly didn't U
answer the question -- ask the question.
Things were pretty 0l hectic.
There may have been something passed along that other
~
people remember.
I don't remember it.
2 Q
You don't recall, dnen, anyone who had been g
c 21 involved with this Davis-Besse issue and the high pressure 22 injection saying that based on our experience, based on what
(~%;
\\j 23 d we learned at Davis-Besse, it's possible the operators might 2e L have secured high pressure injection prematurely?
You A
rat Reporters, Inc.
25 l don't recall any discussion to that effect?
42 1
A No, I don't recall any discussion to that effect
/~8
(_)
2 during that period of time.
3 Q
Okay.
I'd like.to go on and ask some questions j
(^h, X. >
4 that re a little bit more general in-nature, and these don't 5
specifi : ally relate to your involvement with any of these issues, but are more just an attempt to get a general percep-6 7
tion of the understanding within B&W of how certain things 8
are supposed to work.
9 In your opinion, what is meant by the term "unreviewed 10 safety question"?
11 A
I don't know that I've ever really thought about it 12 in any detail.
I think there are identifications of problems 13 by various individuals or organizations that whether or not
~]
s_-
14 their immediate available information goes to them, they h
15 understand whether or not something has been looked at, and 16 they may set up or write a piece of paper or something to
'7 formalize something, on whether or not it's been reviewed, or i
15 " ask people to review it.
Whether or not they consider it an R
unreviewed safety question or what the formal NRC requirements 2 ' are for the unreviewed issue, I don't know that I've ever i
21 ' really concerned myself with that.
22 Q
Okay.
In your opinion, what issues or problems
{}
23 should be submitted to the NRC for review?
24 A
What problems should be submitted to the NRC for A
ral Reporters, lm.
l 25 review?
I don't know how to answer that question.
It's a I
I
43 1
question to me that certainly doesn't have a very specific
~
r' N 4,. /;
answer, and I don't know what context to try to answer in, 2
3 or I'm trying to answer it in my own personal viewpoint, the
/~(_)
/
vendor's viewpoint, the utility viewpoint, or the NRC's view-4 5
point.
Everybody's got their own.
So I really don't know 6
what -- I really. don' t know what should be submitted to the 7
NRC for review for what problems.
8 Q
What would you do if you identified an issue.or 9
a problem that you felt should be brought to the attention of 10 the NRC, ausuming that based on some criteria you identified II an issue?
12,
A Well, myself, if something comes up, I am seriously r3 enough concerned about, I reckon in the future I'll have to --
13 V
I4 I'll either make Engineering aware of it or the licensing 15 group within B&W aware of it, and try to get them to either 16 tell me they will bring it up, or. eitb ar they assert to me I7 that it's no problem.
IE h Q
Do you know if there is any formal procedure within 4
B&W for raising such concerns that are identified by people 2 ',, within the organization?
II A
Yes, there is a formal avenue of expressing that,
(^T and it's known as the plant's PSCC format, or preliminary 22 y
L) 23 safety concern condition.
24 Q
In the course of your work, do you ever consider Ac, rat Reporters, Inc 25 what would happen if the operator took incorrect action I
i
44 I
during a transient?
~
3 2
A Well, sure, I have from time to time, but as far as (v
3 a formal rewriting or restructing of all procedures and all, I 4
don't believe that there's been any great task done specifically (v) 5 to identify all incorrect actions or lapse of memories or what-6 ever to correct these in any procedure or formulation that's
>~
7 been undertaken.
8 O
Do you know of any other precursor events that you 9
believe are relevant to the accident at TMI?
10 MR. EDGAR:
Could we explain precursor?
11 BY MR. HEBDON:
12 O
Certainly.
Precursor is basically, by the 13 definition that we are using, any event or action that might gs
%.])
14 d have indicated that the accident at TMI was coing to eventually i
15 happen some day.
The memos that Mr. Kelly und Mr. Dunn wrote 16 that you were involved with, I think would be a precursor.
!7 The Davis-Besse incident in September of '77 would be a_ pre-15 g cursor.
Do you know c' any others that you feel are relevant' i;
2C -j to the accident at TMI?
!i 21 4 A
No, I personally don't know of any others.
22 O
Okay.
Do you have any additional information that
,g
,t/
23 h you believe might be relevant to our inquiry into the events t
24 ' surrounding the accident at TMI?
[ Ac d Reporms, Inc.
25 A
No, I don't think so.
f I
45 l
O Have we failed to elicit any information in areas
.n.
2
( j, that you believe td be important?.
x 3
A Well, I think that the issue of the training of p-()
the operators and the display of information to the operators 4
5
.and his responsibility during any accident or normal operating 6
needs to have much further work done, and to be addressed in 7
much further detail than it has been in the past.
8 Q
Could you expand on those a little?
9l A
Well, all I'm trying to say is I think we probably 10 have not defined well enough where the specific responsibility II is of the reactor operator and the shift supervisor in carrying 12 out his day-to-day operations, as well as being cognizant of 13 and well prepared to handle any and all transients or incidents V
l 14 j.
that may occur within a power plant.
il 15 I don't believe we have given them sufficient recall 16 and I'm not talking about, when I say "we," B&W, I'm talking 7
about the whole industry, to pull out procedures, information,
+5I.
at a very quick notice and immediately start addressing plant symptoms that he sees at some pcint in time.
And I'm not t
22 saying in the first two minutes, I'm just saying when he
-21 arrives on the scene, since the shift supervisor is not 22 necessarily in the control room all the time.
)
v
,3l I think we have to take a good hard look at what e
24 is needed by.the operators to be able to respond to a very l
A d Roonm, Inc.
2-large amount of different-looking transients that an NSS can l
j e
46 I
go through during an off-normal transient or something, major m
-( )
-LOCA or'small-break LOCA, or something in this area.
2 3
0 Okay.
Is there anything else that you would like to
/m(,)
4 add?
3 A
No, I don't believe so at this time.
6 Q
Thank-you.
7 -_
7 MR. HEBDON:
Anything else?
8 BY MR. FOLSOM:
9 Q
I would like to ask a couple of questions.
B&W 10 doesn't do control room design; right?
A I am not really sufficient to answer that question.
M 12 There are C&I people within B&W that could answer it better 13 than I could.
I really don't know.
(-)g w
Id BY MR. HEBDON:
15 Q
Excuse me, who is C&I?
16 A
Control & Instrumentation group.
I don't think, from what I know, we have ever 3
done the actual control room layout.
That's my knowledge.
BY MR. FOLSOM:
f
=
U-j Q
Wouldn't improved control room design aid you in 21 /
training operators?
I r~~S A
Well, I'm sure the answer to that is yes, but the 22
()
E 22 next question is what do you do, and I don't know what we 24 '
should do to. improve it.
There are certain specific pieces l
Acl Wrr) Remriers, lfv.
25 of information that, you know, today we are working on that l
47 I
~
we think will enhance it, but to go into any real,overall, 2
r~1 general, specific topics, I couldn't answer it at this time.
L) 3 MR. FOLSOM:
Okay.
MR. HEBDON:
Okay.
Do you have anything else?
-(~,)
5 Do you have anything.else to add?
6 THE WITNESS:
"r, I don't think so.
MR. HEBDON:
Okay.
That completes the interview.
8 Thank you very much.
9
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m.,
the deposition was 10 I J
adjourned.]
11 12 13
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