ML19308C055

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 1 to License DRP-73
ML19308C055
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/03/1978
From: Silver H, Varga S
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML19308C008 List:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001180438
Download: ML19308C055 (3)


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NUCLEAR REGULATOM/ COMMISSION J

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SAFETY _EVALUATICt1 BY tie OFFICE'OF NUCLEAR REACK)R REG"JIATION

{JPPORTIN3 AMD!DtiENT NO.1 'IO FACILITY OPERATING LICD;SE NO. DPR-73 u

FL".ITOPOLITAN EDISON

  • CQ4PANY JERSEY CDCRAL PgG'ER & I, GIT COMPANY PDi';SYLVANIA ELECTRIC cot 4PANY DOCFSr NO: 50-320 EP,.EE_MIp: ISL'SD NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT,,2_,

Introduction By letter dated February I4,1978, Metropolitan Edison Company requested a waiver of certain requirements of the Technical Specifications appended to

- Facility Operating License No. DPR-73 for 'Ihree Mile Island Nuclear Station,,

nit 2.

Tne requested waiver would remove restrictions on hydrostatic

_ testing at te.peratures above 180 degrees Fahrenheit and pressures up to 2285 psig prior to initial criticality only.

Discussion Technical Specification 3.4.9.1 restricts hydrostatic testing of the Reactor Coolant System to combinations of terperature and pressure shown in Figure 3.4-4.

These values were selected to assure that fracture toughness capability of the reactor coolant system-would not be exceeded during the first five effective full power years 09-operation.

l flydrostatic testing of the reactor coola'nt system is required to test new pressure boundaries which have not yet.been hydrostatically tested. Tnese

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new pressure' boundaries TcEulted fro ~:: plugging of ~steard ' gen'eiator tube

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rheets, replacement of reactor coolant purp gaskets, and instr.11ation of instrumentation in the steam generator as part of the tube test program.

Conformance with the present Technical Specifications would require being in operational Mode 4 to attain the required temperature and pressure conditions.

In the interest of minimizing delays, the licensee proposes that a waiver of the requirements of the Technical Specifications be granted to permit performance of hydrostatic tests with temperatures no lower than 180 degrees Fahrenheit and pressures no-higher than 2285 psig prior to initial criticality.

Similar tests havTpreviously been performed at higher pressures during precperational testing,'except that no fuel was present

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For preservice hydrostatic testing and testihg during the first few yea:s of life, the reactor veccel closure head and outlet noccle control the

-2 preccure te.parature limits involved in satisfying the fracture toughness requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appandix G.

Assuming apprcpriate referen ~

flaws and safety factors, Babcock & Wilcox performed an analysis in j

accordance with the methods of PJsW-10046A, " Methods of Co:pliance with Fracture b

Toughness and Operational Requirements of.10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G" which shows that the minimum metal temperature required for 2300 psi is 180 degrees 4

Fahrenheit if no significant thermal stresses are present.

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'Ihe licensee has confirmed that the temperature will be essentially static (i.e., a very low heatup rate will be ecployed) which will minimice thermal Tne te.marature will be measured on the outside of the vessel ctrecces.

closure head at its juncture with the flange, which is the area of highest s tress.

He have reviewed the infor 2tien provided by the licensee and find it ccceptable and in conformance with 10 CFR*Part 50, Appendix G.

The licensee also states, and we agree, that the integrity of the unirradiated fuel assemblies will not be affected by performance of hydrostatic tests at the requested conditions. The presence of the unirradiated fuel does not i

G'.i affect any test parameters nor does it have an impact on the system.s being.

tested.

Tnus, the test considerations and acceptable safety-related margins for these tests without the presence of fuel are unchanged.

i Based en the above, we conclude that performance of hydrostatic testing prior to initial criticality at essentially stable temparatures as low as 180 degrees Fahrenheit and pressures up to 2285 psig is acceptable.

We further conclude that the facility operating license can be amended by adding to Attachment 2 thereof appropriate waiver of the requirements of Technical Specification 3.4.9.1 to permit such testing.

Environm ntal Consideration

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We hc n determined that the amendment does net authorice a change in effluent tvmc or total amcunts nor an increase in pcwer level and will not result is any significant environmental i.g act.

Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental inpact and, pursuant to j

10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environ. ental impact statement or negative

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declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

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v Conclusion We have concluded, based on thTcDisideratioris discussed above, that:

(1) because the amendmnt does not-involve a significant increase probability or consequences of accidents previously consideied h

decrease ir any safety margin, it does not involve a significant hazard:

cont.iderat_on, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and s of the put'Lic will not be endangered by operati cc:i; Ton defense and security or to the health t.-

Also, we reaffirm our conclusions as otherwise stated in our Safety Evaluation Report.

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Harley

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roject Manager Light ter Reactors Branch 4 sd A

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- f I L. eve. h. Varga, lef s Branch 4 Light Water Rene Division of Proje Manage.mnt

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