ML19308B900
| ML19308B900 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1979 |
| From: | Amyot D CANADA |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19308B896 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001170550 | |
| Download: ML19308B900 (19) | |
Text
12t DRAFT (DECEMBER, hW77))
~~
REPORT ON MISSISSAUCA TRAIN DERAILMENT AND EVACUATION i
l i
\\_)
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 10 I
l At approximately 2333 hrs, CPR train #54, consisting of 3 locomotives l
and 106 freight cars (total length.2 kilometres), travelling from Windsor, Chatham and London, to Scarborough, was derailed in an' industrial area in the middle of Mississauga at the Mavis Road crossing.
(The or. der of the freight cars was in keeping with CTC regulations, i.e.,
at least five non-explosive i
The remainder cars following the locomotive, and five preceding the caboose.
were it. no set order).
The accident was attributed to an overheated axle This resulted in a fire which ignited the gas bearing on a propane tank car.
af ter the derailment.
A huge column of fire lit up the sky.
Firefighters l
noticed the flames from their stations.
The 9 Fire Stations in Mississauga were alerted, and the first units arrived on the scene at 2355 hrs.
SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 11 At 0010 hrs, the first explosion occurred, which blew a propane car to At 0015, a second explosion pieces and sent a fireball to the south east.
caused by a BLEVE in a second propane tank car, hurled the car north east 2200 feet.
Five to ten minutes later, a 3rd explosion blew the end of a tank car 200 feet to the south.
The fire could be seen as far away as Niagara Falls and Peterborough.
The three locomotives, with 27 cars were uncoupled from the derailed cars and brought to a halt four miles up the track from where the derailment occurred. Twenty-four cars had derailed.
Of these, 22 were tank cars, 11 of which were propane.
Of the others, 3 contained styrene, 4 caustic soda, 3 toluene, 1 chlorine, and two boxcars contained insulation.
Ten propane cars were ruptured and burned, as well as the styrene and toluene cars.
One propane car remained intact. The tank car containing 90 tons of liquid chlorine began to leak.
(The *emaining 64 cars were subsequently pulled back from the site.)
The CPR Despatcher's Office was notified at the time of the derailment through the train radio system, and the CP emergency plan was immediately WOG/) 7853$
implecented.
Its technical experts were alerted through telephone fan-out, and-technical crews were instructed to converge on the accident site.
The CP procedures for " chemical emergencies" include calling local hospitals, police, fire departments, the Environce:tal Protection Services of Environment Canada, TEAP, and the Canadian representative of the Bure.u of Explosives, of the Association of A=erican Railways.
Mr. Nutkins, the Superintendent-in-Charge of the CPR Division, coordinated the CP response.
CP derailment cran'es were despatched from Toronto and Uindscr.
f At this tice, Mississauga and Peel Region police, firefighters, and i-ambulances arrived at the disaster scene.
The train manifest was obtained Th's identified the types of cargo carried, and outlined from the caboot.e car.
i cmergency procedures or derailrents, explosions, and fire.
Several more explosions occurred which spewed wreckage up to a mile away.
One propane i
tanker was throwa 2200 feet.
Windows were shattered in a 1/2 mile radius, and secondary fires were set in sheds close to the tracks, including a Municipal Public Works depot.
A Peel Police patrolling duty Inspector, James Kimber, called in a description of the emergency to Peel Police Headquarters, and asked the radio-room sergeant to put the Peel Police Disaster Plan into action.
This involved alerting the appropriate emergency agencies and technical experts.
t Ontario Provincial Police Fort Credit Detachment personnel were on site
}
I from the outset, and the OPP Disaster Procedure Manual instructions applied.
An emergency co==and post (Peel Region Co==and Post No.1) was set up in the Peel police =obile cot =and trailer, which was parked beside the Bell Canada line-testing centre at the corner of Mavis Road and Burnhamthorpe Road, about 1/2 mile fro = the crash site. The cotsand post was then established in the Bell Telephone Co==utications Building itself.
The i
Regional Municipality of Peel Peacetire Emergency Plan, the Emergency Fire Services Plan, as well as the applicable sections of the Toronto
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International Airport Disaster Plans and Emergency Procedures were also i
implemented.
Contact was cade with TEAP's Regional Control Cent,res in Niagara Falls, and in Sarhia.
The-Regional'.0ffice of EPS, Environment Canada, on being notified by the CP, despatcher. of a derailment. involving "one tanker car of toluene", asked the Regional Atmospheric EnYironme't n
Services to stand by.
As further information on the derailment'was provided, EPS in Ottawa was advised.
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When the Mississauga Public Works Yard, close to the crash scene was damaged by exploding propane, the Peel Department's fuel supply'went with it.
Brampton and Etobicoke Fire Departments maintained the disrupted supply, as well as backing up the Mississauga Fire Department with extra '
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fire truebs, in keeping with the Emergency. Fire Services Plan.
Firefighters had to wear oxygen re.spirators to avoid the toxic fumes from the burning unemicals, and applied fixed water jets and coolants to the fire.
Additional respirators were provided by the fire services of surrounding municipalities.
The 284 firefighters from Mississauga and an undetermined number from surrounding
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Municipalities were involved.
At 0130 hrs, Mississauga Fire Chief Gordon Bentley, and Superintendent Karl Barnhart of the Peel Regional Police, arranged for notification of residents in the i==ediate danger zone to evacuate because of the highly explosive nature of the chemical cargo and the presence of a chlorine tanker which could be ruptured by the explosion of neighbouring propane tankers.
At 0210 hrs, No.ll Division Peel Police alerted Metro Police for help.
Based on data fro: ceteorologists and environmental scientists and technicians, Peel Regional Police Chief Douglas Burrows, gave the order to evacuate 8000 residents living i= mediately South and West of the derailment line.
The. Peel Region Commissioner for Social Services, Mr. J. Crozier, was alerted to arrange for the reception of the evacuees; Square One Shopping Centre (1 1/2 miles NE c
of the site) was selected as the receotion area.
The Red Cross and the Metro Toronto Commissioner of Social Services, Mr. Ray Tomlinson, were also alerted.
This t
h!
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a was the beginning of a stage-by-stage evacuation of the City of Mississauga.
At 0215 hrs, the Provincial Asbulance Coordinating Centre sent a f
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general call for ambulances in the Metro area -- 139 ambulances and 300 ambulance workers arrived in the area with_in six hours, froc as far as Niagara and Kingston. Twenty-seven other support vehicles were also provided, including the Metro Toro'nto Disaster Bus.
Agencies supplying suppor't
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vehicles included the Red Cross, TTC, Mississauga and Oakville Transit.
c (Within 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br />, about 2C00 patients had been evacuated frco three active-trcatment hospitals and six nursing homes).
When the chlorine shiptent was discovered, TEAP alerted CHLOREP members -- chlorine cmergency plan experts in the area.
At 0220 hrs, CHLOREP teams arrived on the scene frcm the local Gulf refinery, with their equipment.
(They were replaced at 0700 hrs by those fro: Dev in' Sarnia, which had also been alerted).
'hase joined the CF chemical ecergency 1
It was impossible to take action to seal the chlorine tanker experts.
}
leak until the propane fires bu n: themse' ves out.
At 0230 hrs, the
!i Niagara Falls TEAP team arrived a: the derailment site.
At 0300' hrs, Metro Toron:o Pelice Force Emergency Task Force Unit, despatched the Emergency Task Force Mobile Command Centre to the site with a provision of air masks.
The cbile unit, with its com=unications, becace part of Peel Region Cocmand Post No.1.
At 0340 hrs, TEAP ccatac:ed CAM' E.':, the E=ergency Eesponse/Information Centre of Transport Canada, for technical assistance and to locate equip =ent.
(CAMITEC, like TEAP, provides cress Canada access with 24-hour manning for i
f assistance in transport of hazardous geads accidents.)
At 0345 hrs, the E=ergency Co-ad Group was convened under Superintendent Ken Sider of the Feel Regional Police, to censider the danger posed by the chlorine tank.
Centact was established with AES of Environcent Canada to get continuous reports en vind ccaditions.
At 0350 hrs, a foam l
tender was despatched frc._ Transport Canada's Toronto International Airport in answer to a request frc= Mississauga's Fire Chief.
-S-
' At 0400 hrs. following a further serias of explosions, Peel Police Chief Dou'glas Burrows or'dered a 2nd evacuation of approximately.10' square miles - bounded by Burnh'anthorpe Road, Erindale Station Road, Queensway, and Creeman Road /. The first reception area vss set up at Square"One Shopping Centre, and volunteer organizations provided the ' emergency welfare services, under the direction of Mr. Crozier. There were special lolice i
patrols set up to watch for possible looters.
Residents left on request by their own cars or transit buses. At the same time, police were stopping people from re-entering the evacuated area.
At 0450 hrs, Ontario Ministry of the Environment officials, at the scene of the derailment, began alerting other Provincial officials, including the Solicitor-General.
Chlorine gas was escaping, but most was being drawn up with burning propane, whose flames rose several hundred feet into the air.
(Out of 90 tons of chlorine, some 20 tons remained in the tanker when the fire column subsided, but the exact amount could not be determined at this time).
At 0600 hrs, the EPC RD was contacted by DND SSO (Major Weber),- to through the OPP (Peel Detachment) j advise that the Province 4had made a request for manpower to assist the police, j
and for foam' pumpers and respirators.
One pumper was despatched from j
Downsview, and thirty-two Chemox respirators (oxygen masks) were obtained from Camt Borden and CFB Toronto.
The EPC RD was also contacted by Allan D. Heath, the ADM of Occupational Safety in the Ministry of Labour, to assist in locating technical experts in the handling of PCBs, since it was thought that a PCB tank car was involved in the derailment.
(The waybill information was not consistent with the location of cars in the train, so it was not possible to quickly determine if the PCB shipment was among the derailed cars.) The EPC RD located two officers with expertise in PCBs, i
but their services were not required when it was confirmed that no PCBs were present in.the shipment.
The PCB warning apparently came from the police on the site.
Solicitor-General Roy McMurtry, the Provincial Minister responsible for coordinating Provincial emer'gency measures was notified of the derailment at 0600 hrs. The first four members of the Emergency Operations Control Group (EOCG) met at this time.
This included the Chairman of Peel Regional Council, Mr. Frank Bean, the Mayor of Mississauga,' Mrs. Hazel McCallion, Peel Regional Police Chief Douglas Burrows, and Mississauga Fire Chief Gordon Bentley.
the blaze, which was fueled by increasing amounts of At 0700 hrs, escaping and exploding propane, became so.f.ntense that.the police com=and post had to be relocated.
At 0730 hrs, Metro Toronto's Mobile Command Unit was positioned next to No. 11 Division Police Station (corner Dundas St. and #10 Hwy)
(Peel Region Command Post No. 3), and began implementing the procedures outlined in the Metro Toronto Police Emergency Planning Guide.
(This guide incorporates the Police, Fire, Engineering Services, Medical Services, and Welfare Disaster Plans.) Metro Police daily support over the next six days involved an average of 277 police per day.
- .- a; to 40 patrol cars and 21 mobile-sound-trucks. One hundred and twenty-five members of Metropolitan Toronto Auxiliary Police Force were mobilized and reported to Command Post No.1.
(At 0430 hrs on Nov 12, the Command Post No. 3 was moved to No. 12 Divisica Police Station at the corner of Dixie Road and Eglinton Avenue -- since it was expected that the chlorine car would explode.
The Metro Mobile Command Unit was accordingly moved to the new site, and its communications were relayed through 22 Division to Metro's emergency network).
Staff Superintendent Jack Ward, in his capacity as Acting Deputy Chief of Metro Police, had the initial responsibility of coordinating the l
. I supply of personnel and equipment of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force to municipal,and police authorities in Peel Region.
A communic,ations channel was cleared for use of radio equipped mobile units operating in Mississauga, and dispatchers were assigned to coord'inage the actisities of officers using this frequency. By 1100 hrs, a mobile communications post was also established at the Westgate Plaza in Mississauga.
Chief Harold Adamson, having been notified, assumed overall command respon'sibility t
for Metro Police's support role, and was in constant contact.with his authorities, and with the Solicitor-General and the Mayors of Etobicoke and Mississauga.
Mr. J.H. Pollard, Metro Coordinator of Emergency Planning,-
and Dr. G.W. Moss, Medical Officer of Health, City of Toronto, joined Chief Ada son at the scene of the derail =ent.
Regular Force and Auxiliary Polic~e of Metro were assigned duties related to traffic control, evacuation of residents fro = ho=es and hospitals, ambulance escorts, road blocks, property protection and =aintenance of cocmunications links.
Shortly after 0900 hrs, Police Chief Burrows, in consultation with the me=hers of the EOCG, ordered the evacuation of Mississauga General (3rd' evacuation order)
Hospital, Mississauga Extendicare Nursing Home, and Chelsey Park.A There were 450 patients in the Hospital, and 539 in the other two facilities.
Twc hundred and sixty-two of the hospital patients were discharged.
The other patients were transferred to Toronto, and surrounding area hospitals and nursing ho=es.
This operation started at 1006 hrs, and was coordinated by Inspector Lawson, Peel Regional Police Force, as the officer-in-charge of patient evacuation, by Mr. Ar= strong, the Regional ~ Ambulance Coordinator, m
i l
?
2 e U by Officials of the Institutional'Divisio'n o'f the Ministry'of Health, and Health Services Consulta"nt Branch, and. was completed by 1315 hrs. 'The
,j Ambulance comLunications system was.used.to contact the hospital's, and.
j the Ambulance Disaster Plan implemented, which. involved,.id'entif'ying the recipient hospitals, availability of beds, etc.
Hospita.1 Disaster Plans '
and Ambulance District Plans were also implemented, and the Ontario Medical Association arranged for specialists and medical volunteers to stand-by.
The. release of Energency Health supplies from the Dept. of National' Health and Welfare was also arranged.
The Solicitor-General, in consultation with the EOCG members and Hospital officials, then decided to evacuate the 280 patients in the Queensway General Hospital.
Eighty-eight were discharged, and by 1815 hrs, the others had been transferred to surrounding hospitals.
This was followed by the evacuation of 322 patients from three more nursing homes.
Three co=puters provided by Dow Chemical Corporation, were programmed to constantly correlate data on weather, wind changes, types of buildings, population densities, and other factors in order to assist evacuation planning and decision making.
At 1130 hrs, EPS Ontario Region, requested information on wind trajectory forecasts from Atmospheric Environment Se rvices.
The first wind trajectory results were supplied to the Ontario Ministry of the Environment about one hour and fif teen minutes later.
(The computerized wind forecasts are made by the Canadian Meteorological Centre in Montreal, using a program which was implemented after the Three
)
1 Mile Island nucicar incident last March demonstrated the need for such a l
program).
AES also offered to supply accident site mini-sonde observations, and displayed mobile observing facilities at the command post for direct on-site measurement of vertical wind and temperature profiles.
Short-term low-level wind and air stability forecasts were supplied at two to three
- 9'-
hour intervals.
From 1000 hrs onwards, EPS also had representatives at the 3
disaster site.
At 1117 hrs, Peel Region Police establishe'd their secon'd' command post in their Mobile Co==and Post -vehicle #160.
This was locat,ed at Westdale Plaza, Dundas Street and Eringate Station Road (Peel Region Command Post No. 2).
At 1230 hrs, the first reception centre at Square One Shopping Centre was evacuated (4t*n evacuation order), involving the transfer of 10C0 evacuees to the Sherway Gardens Mall in Etobicoke.
At 1335 hrs, a fifth evacuation was carried out involving the entire area bounded by Burnhamtherpe Road (North), Cavthra Road (East), Lakeshore Road (South), and the Credit River (West), and a sixth evacuation at 1540 hrs, which widened the area to Dixie Road on the East, and Eighway 22 in the West, and at 1725 hrs, further widened to Etobicoke Creek in the East.
The evacuation area was expanded a seventh time, as unpredictable winds carried the threat to other areas, which necessitated the closing of the Sherway Gardens Reception Centre in Etobicoke at 1900 hrs.
The main reception centre had been re-located three times, and eight smaller ones also set up, some cf which were also closed and their evacuees coved, as t'ae evacuation area was expanded.
These reception centres included the following:
Square One Shopping Centre (evacuated); Sherway Gardens in Etobicoke (also evacuated); the International Centre at Airport i
Road (housing 1200 evacuees); Streetsville Secondary School, Streetsville; j
Galaxy Club, Oakville; Sheridan College (2 campuses - Brampton and Oakville);
i Westwood Secondary Sc'hool, FMiten; Morningstar Secondary School, Malton; Bracpton Centennial Collegiate, Brampton; J.A. Turner Secondary School, Brampton, and W.J. Fenten Secondary School, Brampton.
Hundreds of volunteer l
I L
helpers were provided by St. John Ambulance, Canadian Red Cross, Salvation Army, Boy ~ Scouts, Girl Guides, Service Clubs, Humane Societies, Church organizations, and other co== unity organizations, and by private citizens who, in answer to radio requests, opened their homes to evacuees and their pets. More than enough food was provided free by neighbouring commercial establish =ents and the public, and collected by volunteer organizations.
The Police-and SPCA arranged for the feeding of pets lef t behind in 'the evacuation.
The C anadian Ar=ed Forces, through prior arrangements.with
(
the St. John Ambulance, provided 1200 sleeping bags, 850 air mattresses, l
l 6372 blankets, and 24 K boxes (for hot food) for the reception centres.
[
NHW participated in the coordination of emergency health and welfare requirenents and remained o= stand-by for further assistance.
I At 1900 hrs, on decision by the Mayor of Oakville and his Police 1
Chief, and the administrators of the Oakville-Trafalgar; Hospital and A
Oakville Extendicare Nursing Ho e, the 468 patients in these two l
h institutions were evacuated to Eamilton and Burlington hospitals.
Federal a
EHS equipment and supplies were used to expand these facilities.
1 By midnight, h
this operatio,n was complete'd.
i : i, In 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br />, three large active-treatment hospitals and six nursing
(!
1" 3
containing approximately 2000 patients, had been evacuated without a o
- homes, single untoward event.
ll i
This had been achieved with resources from Federal,
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I Provincial and Municipal agencies, the facilities. of approxi=ately 25 i
hospitals and nursing homes, and ambulance and public transit services from i
25 communities outside the eva:uated area.
l At 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />, the amateur radio operators emergency network was activated for round-the-clock operations.
At 1900 hrs, they were asked by the Red Cross to assist in establishing communications between reception ~
j centres and Red Cross Headquarters, as telephone lines were completely
/ t jammed.
Twelve stations were established, including a " net centrol" station which.were manned by 175 operators ini 6-8 hour. shif ts.
.There were
' two operators in each eva'cuation centre, and five at Red Cross. Headquarters.
(The network operations were carried on continuously (operators 't'aking leave from their. normal work to do so), and terminated at 2359. hrs Wednesday)).
The COMSONT net, involving 60 stations, was also in operation, passing emergency messsses between Municipalities throughout the Province, and with U.S. networks.
The EPC RD was in contact with the Director of Emergency Health and Welfare Services in Ottawa, as well as the ADM for the ' lnistry of Community and Social Services.
He was also.in touch with officials'in the Ministries of the Solicitor-General, Labour, HealtN, and Natural Resources, and with Federal and Provincial Departments of the Environment, with Transport i
Canada, DND, the RCMP, the CTC, and.with Metro Toronto and Peel Region t
officials, as well as EPC HQ.
He also responded to Media and public inquiries (including the 3 main Toronto newspapers and 6 radio and TV stations, i
including the CBC), and assisted several disaster research teams from
, Canadian and American universities.
The evacuation area was patrolled by local police, reinforced with Metro Toronto (95 per.shif t), OPP (65 per shif t), and RCMP Police (52 per shif t), totalling approximately 212 officers tb cordon off the area, to control traffic, man roadblocks, and to patrol the area using cruisers, l
i as well as a helicopter equipped with ficodlights for night patrol, to prevent I
possible looting.
(Ontario law permits firefighters to remove people forcibly who are at risk, but the police do not have, in law, the same authority.
However, the police were able to prevent access to the evacuated area, by roadblocks, etc.)
The final authority for evacuation bnd re-entry rested l
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. with the Provincial Government. DND had a force of 250 on standby in London, to move in on Provincial request to support police action.
Provincial Environtent Ministry provided ten air pollution experts with air conitoring machines to measure toxic content. The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) had issued a Notification to Shipping on the Great Lakes to stay clear of the" area due to the danger of chlorine gas. Air Traffic Control (ATC) restricted air traffic in a three mile radius of the derailment site, and prohibited flights below 9000 feet.
(Two private planes and an OPP helicopter were allowed in the restricted air: space to take photographs for emergency operations.)
Radio and TV coverage was given from the time of derailment, with round-the-clock operations during the following days -- providing information and serving as message transmission centres.
Several stations implemented contingency plans for increased coverage and increased st'affing.
CBC had four crews out in the field.
Canadian Press rented a trailer and positioned it beyond the police lines for media use.
By day's end, more than 2000 persons had been transported by ambulance from hospitals and nursing homes.
A total of 240,000 residents of Mississauga had been evacuated by private cars and transit buses. Tvacuees were mainly lodged with friends, relatives, at hotels within the entire Metropolitan area, or in evacuation centres.
(No more than 1500 persons stayed overnight in the reception centres). The quarantined area covered approxicately 60' square miles. No serious injuries or mishaps were reported.
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 12 Com= uter trains and highway traffic which normally. went through the evacuated area, were re-routed.
Highways in the area were closed by the OPP at 0600 hrs, including the Queen Elizabeth Way (QEW), #5 Dundas Street, Bloor Street, Burnhamthorpe Road, Lakeshore Blvd., and Ewy 427.
Entry and egress to the Mississauga Peel Regional area would be by #401 Hwy and Eglinten Avenue.
In keeping with expert advice, the decision was made.to allow the
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propane fire-to burn itsdlf out, rather than have the flames ext,inguished.
At 1000 hrs, the propane tanker immediately next to the chlorine tanker
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was extinguished.
Two tank cars were still lurning, but under control.
Procor Ltd. of Oakville, who built the' chlorine tankers, prepared a steel patch to cover the hole in the ruptured tank car, in order to keep the chlorine under pressure in liquid while being transferred to
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tank cars.
Throughout the day, CP Rail rescue crane and crew was at' work, removing the boxcars and tankers which had not derailed, and clearing up as m'uch debris as possible without disturbing the chlorine tanker and the propane tankers surrounding it.
The steel patch could not be used to seal the tanker because it had been deformed by extreme heat and stress.
Parts of Metro and Hamilton were put on alert as a precautionary measure.
At 1200 hrs, the CBC erroneously reported that evacuation of Etobicoke residents had started.
Advice from experts in the Chemical industry was relied on heavily by the emergency control centre.
Several of these were provided by the companies involved, others by industry emergency response groups, e.g., TEAP, and others through Government emergency response agencies such as EPS and CANUTEC.
At 1545 hrs, the Assis. tant Deputy Solicitor-General confirmed that the Armed Forces troops would not be required to assist the police, as suf ficient police reinforcements had been provided, but advised that there was an urgent need for additional air pack respirators.
At 1625 hrs, the military advised that they had located 85 respirators and 65 spare cannisters in Halifax.
These were airlifted to Downsview, and were available at the disaster site by 0340 hrs on November 13th.
l
. I Throughout the night, all vehicles leaving the Peel Region evacuated area were stopped and search.ed by.the. Police in view of reported break and enter occurrences in the area.
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(Police were also alerted to the breakout, at2000 hrs,of18(inmates
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from the Maplehurst Correctional Institution in neighbou, ring Milton, Ontario --
o minimum security facility).
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13 The propane flames died out at 0230 hrs.
By 0830 hrs, the chlorine Icak was sealed, and preparations were cade to pump out the tank.
At 0810 hrs, three persons were arrested for looting 3 homes ($100,000 stolen property).
At 1300 hrs, a meeting of the respcasible officials was held at the Command Centre to 'ecide whether it.as safe for evacuees to return to their homes.
New boundaries were set for the evacuated area as follows:
Dundas Street (North), #10 Hwy (East), QIW (South), and Credit River (West).
At 1500 hrs, Solicitor-General Roy McMurtry announced the beginning i
of re-entry of evacuees into peripheral areas (Burnhamthorpe Road (North),
Cawthra Road (East), QEW (South), and Erin Mills Road (West)).
At 2042 hrs, the boundaries of the restricted area were established as Burnhamthorpe Road (North), #10 Hwy (East), Lake Ontario (South), and Credit River (West).
By late evening, 110,000 evacuees had returned home.
That evening in Ottava, John Magee, Chairman of the Rail Safety Advisory Committee of the CTC, told the Commons Transport Cc=mittee that an overheated axle bearing had caused a freight car's wheels to come off 1 1/2 miles before the train derailed. Transport Minister Donald Mazankowski announced that the CTC would hold a full public inquiry into the derailment
- r. -~_-
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beginning on December 4t'h.
WEDNESDAY,' NOVEMBER 14 DND began to gradually withdraw the material it had'provided the reception centres as these closed down.'
The air packs were also returned'
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to Halifax (being required for a naval exercise).
A 20 square-nile area of Mississauga remained quarantined, a'nd the three main hospitals which had been evacuated, remained closed.
The still restricted zone was bounded by Burnhamthorpe Road (North), Hwy 10 (East),
Lakeshore Blvd. (South)~, and Erin Mills Parkway (West).
In the morning, brisk winds slowed down the operation to seal the chlorine leak.
Operations were temporarily suspended while alternate methods were examined.
People in the Southwesterly direction were warned of a possible further evacuation.
There were reports that chlorine was being detected in the air samples in Port Credit.
Arrangements were made to house in hotels, people currently lodged at the International Centre.
However, as all hotels in the Metro area were booked, the International Centre was forced to remain open an extra night.
CP Rail officials announced that they would open a claims office in Mississauga next Monday to begin paying " reasonable out-of-pocket expenses" of displaced residents.
A class-action lawsuit was being considered by a number of evacuees for costs incurred and income lost.
At 1200 hrs, a special meeting was called by the Solicitor-General, at which it was decided not to allow the remaining evacuees to return home I
for at least another night because of the difficulty experienced in capping the chlorine tanker.
This was followed by a press conference.
A request formulated at the meeting was also conveyed by Graham Scott, Deputy Minister
[
y i
ef Environment, to 'the EPC Regional Director for transmi.ttal to 'ttawa.
O for a) the availability of a seni'or_ federal of ficial on the site; b)' the attendance on site of an.outside scientificadvisor;andc)ydditional back-up crews.
This request was transmitted to EPC HQ for tirgent attention.
Commissioner John Magee and his technical advisor', #111 Fovaskewich, Manager of CT'C's Dangerous Co=modities Assessment Division, flew 'from Ottawa to the derailment site in the evening.
They conferred with the officials at the site and held a press conference.
The transfer of propane was completed, and the empty cars were removed from the derailment scene by late evening.
All patients had been returned to the Queensway Hospital without mishap between 1300 hrs and 2100 hrs.
(Some Metro Police were re-assigned to the Princess Anne Regal Party Royal Visit).
TIR'RSDAY, NOVEMBER 15 At 0815 hrs, large pockets of chlorine gas ere reported in the Credit River valley arda, and all personnel on duty in the evacuated area were warned.
By 0930 hrs, the report was discounted.
The steel patch was replaced by a neoprene patch, which eventually sealed the chlorine tanker.
About 20 tons of liquid chlorine remained in the tanker.
Attempts to ceasure the amount by I-ray were inconclusive.
A layer of ice, one foot thick, which had formed inside the tsaker, added to the problem of emptying it.
This was resolved by applying a liquid line below the ice and a vacuum line above it.
Chlorine fumes were drawn from the tanker and pumped into a container of'another chemical to neutralize them.
It was also essential to draw the gas off to lower the pressure on the patch.
It was esti=ated that 35 to 100 pounds of chlorine was escaping
each hour.
By 1150 hrs, most of the, chlorine had been pumped 'into trucks and transported to Toronto, n the process, one firefighter was hospitalized for suspiciau_of intialation of ciTor'inFsas~-'winicia proved neoative.._ Seven other
.firefighters were also checked and declared in satisfactory condition. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~7 - \\
Commissioner Magee and his technical avisor attended the meeting
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at the Pe'l Command Centre in the afternoon, and at the. press conference e
which followed, Mr. McMurtry announced that the remaining 120,000 residents could not return tonight and that there was no degree of certainty' that the state of emergency would end tomorrow.
It would depend on favourable. wind conditions, i.e.,
north to south.
Four special medical centres were set up in Mississauga_for people who had lost touch with their family doctors b,ecause of the emergency.
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 16 Emergency crews drained 14 tons of caustic soda during the early morning hours. While the transfer was in process, there was a delay in allowing remaining evacuees to return to th41r ho=es.
Around noon, the Solicitor-General, Roy McMurtry, Mazel ti:Callion, Mayor of Mississauga, i
P21tce Chief Borrows, and Peel Regional Chairman Frank Bean met with dozens of experts, including some from as far away as Sweden.
At 1500 hrs, an f
announcement was made that 90,000 out of the remaining 120,000 evacuees would be allowed to return home, but six remaining tons of chlorine in the tanker meant that those closest to the site must wait.
By late afternoon, another meeting had been convened by the Solicitor-General and Regional I
Police Chief, to decide the fate of roughly 33,000 who lived nearest to the disaster site. The borders of the restricted area were now Burnhamthorpe Road (North), #10 Hwy (East), QEW (South), and Credit River (West). At 1920 hrs, most of the chlorine having been safely neutralized, the Solicitor-
/
O Ceneral' announced that all remaining.' evacuees could return'to their homes.
By late evening, re-entr9 was com;ileted. 'By midnight', Metro Police,lth'e OPP, and'the RCMP' personnel ha'd completed'their tou,r of duty in"suppor't of~
the Peel Regional Police.
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17' At' 0400 hrs, the Metro Toronto Police Force ccmmunication's post'was closed.
SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 18 At 1900 hrs, the AES disaster site atmospheric monitoring was stood down.
On November 30th, the Metropolitan Toronto Emergency Planning Advisory Board met under the chairmanship of Chi
- of Police, Harold Adamson.
The role played by Metro Toronto was reviewed and reported upon by the heads of services involved.
A critique and debriefing meeting was also being prepared by Peel Region Police, and several Agencies were preparing reports on their participation.
Interested Agencies f' om the United States arid Europe were also r
sending rcpresentatives to collect first-hand information on how the response was carried out.
COMBENTARY Not a single fatality had occurred, despite the massive explosions, toxic gases, and large-scale evacuation.
(
The success of this large-scale operation wac due to':
e l
- a) very professional pre-planning -- tested in a number of i
iecent emergencies, including an air crash and a refinery tank farm fire; b)' the fortuitous location of the accident -- which occurred' in an industrial area in the city,'relatively unpopulated, but having all necessary access roads, fire hydrants, and a Bell Telephone exchange 500 yards away; c) very favourable atmospheric conditions -- moderate temperature favourable to outdoor activity, moderate winds, etc.;
d) the timing of the derailment -- midnight on the 1st day of a long week-end; e) the extraordinary public response; f) the efficiency of the police, fire and health services; and g) the proximity of the emergency resources and services of large urban centres.
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