ML19308B860
| ML19308B860 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane, Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1978 |
| From: | TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR EP-1202.06, NUDOCS 8001170461 | |
| Download: ML19308B860 (5) | |
Text
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P33 S'3 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station D_IST :
Unit 1 i\\ "EM*0RARY MODI?!CATICN ltE0CEST
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iTOM TAMBLING'S NOTES FROM INSPECTION
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' 1.
Restoration of SEAS and guidance for blocking equipnent following an
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SFAS actuation. : Presently your procedures do not address restoration of f
'SFAS following trips real or not.
Reviewed EP 1202.04, EP 1202.06, TP 1102.03, TP 1102.10, SP 1102.10, SP 1104.07, SP 1105.03, and AP 3005.53.
EP's and SP's address blocking SEAS and in some cascs blocking the logic output for a high incident level. There is no guidance for unblocking.
To read, Initiate if the situation or if the initial activation was not real - i.e., contai==ent isolation valves open to establish makeup and seal injection and high presspre shutdown.
SP 1104.07, High Pressure Injection System addresses biccking HPI flow in actual situation.
Better in an EP.
Also, showed guidance for other considerations.
EP's on reactor and turbine trip do not address potential SFAS actuation and what to do i=sediately and to restore.
Cross reference to a procedure test? Request a commitment to review procedures and to revise, to
% provide statements covering restoration blocking and unblocking.
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2.
What is being done about the water ha=ner in the lines to the deaerator?
FCR in time shall tur'n around a manual valve around level control to permit continual flow to this line.
3.
Power and Steae Pressure Osci11ations - Requested of Quenno: and Lingenfelter that we keep our finger on this to insure that proble= does net get worse and new proble=s do not develop.
Suggest that you utilize V&LP Monitor.
4.
Statement in daily setup about GDC 17.
Any plans to nake it a Standard Standing Order, etc.
Response - that was just to bring people's attention to it.
A procedure has been revised.
5.
Interim fix for compliance to GDC 17.
Operation on Transformer 01 with fast transfer to 02 appears satisf actory, i.e., no conflict with Tech Specs, dare not appear to be an unreviewed safety cuestion based upon FSAR, appears to meet GDC 17. However, prior to i=plenentation require an engineering evaluation. An evaluation against any other ce==itments and a 50.59 safety evaluation.
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NRC OIE INSPECT 20N NOVEMBER l-2, 1978 EXIT INTERVIEW cNOVEMBER 1,1978
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Attendees l
, h7 C IJ. Creswall'
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[d B. Beyer W. Green E
1.
Jim Cresvell has the pressurizer level calculations. Will take the=
back to the office for review.
2.
Terry Murray has his cc ments on the loss of off-site power test. Jim Creswell requested that we send the acceptance criteria for the loss of off-site power test to him as soon as they are ready.
- 3. t Cc n:s on high pressure injection incident of Septe=ber:
a.
FSAR says high pressure injection would be available'within 30 I
iseconds after SFAS.
One leg took approximately one minute.
I lRecom= ended we should do a!50.59 review to insure that FSAR LOCA Criteria are met.
b.
I understand there is an Emergency Procedure modification in the works to insure leakage is evaluated before stopping high pressure There is a question of unblocking and containment injectica pumps.
. A 50.59 review is needed if actuation would be requiredy,/
N isolation.
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c.
Creswell reviewed with Lingenfelter criteria for incore operability.
I Creswell felt that this should be incorporated into the procedure from the SCM.
4.
Discussed Main Stea= Safety Valve blowback settings and adjustments.
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NRC ENTRANCE INTERVIEW T. TAMBLING ISEPTEMBER 27, 1978-ATTENDEES: {T.Tambling,C.Domeck,F. Miller,T.Murray
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- 1. > Follo.rup on blocking of SFAS equipment HPI (for Streeter) - N k
Also - survey for NRR -_What ada'inistrative procedures are available to k w,; operator regarding resetting of SFAS equipment.
2.
D. Lee scheduling of Testing Want to witness some of tests.
Fred Miller owes J. Streeter call on HPI Operation 3.
Followup en LERs 4.
Circulars Items ofInoncompliance and other open ite=s 5.
6.
Review with C. R. Domeek pressuri:er line problems.
7.
Offsite Power - failure to meet FSAR commitment (Design Criteria 17)
- will be Deviation Wants to see interim compensatory measures prior to exit on Friday.
7.
Exit on Friday e
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