ML19308B828
| ML19308B828 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1977 |
| From: | Bullock M EG&G, INC. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR ERDA-76-45-09, ERDA-76-45-9, NUDOCS 8001170406 | |
| Download: ML19308B828 (73) | |
Text
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l ERDA 76-45/9 SSDC-9 l0 SAFETY INFORMATION SYSTEM GUIDE 9
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SYSTEM SAFETY DEVELOPMENT CENTER b
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94EGsG EG&G Idaho, Inc.
l P.O. Box 1625 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 i
a MARCH 1977 UNITED STATES ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF SAFETY, STANDARDS, AND COMPLIANCE
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O N O TIC E This report was prepared as an acmunt of work sponsored by the United States Government. Neither the United States nor the Urited States Energy Research and Development Administration, nor any of their employees, nor any of their mntractors, subcontractors, or their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legalIMility or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights.
O Available from:
National Technical Information Service (NTIS)
U.S. Department of Consnerce 5285 Port Royal Road Springfield, Virginia 22161 Price:
Printed Copy:
$ 5.00 Microfiche:
$ 3.00 l
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I Prepared By i
M. G. Bullock
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Work Performed At EG&G IDAH0, INC.
IDAHO OPERATIONS OFFICE Under Contract No. EY-76-C-07-1570 i
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i DISCLAIMER
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This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United States Government.
Neither the United l
States nor the United States Energy Research and Develop-i ment Administration, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, com-i pleteness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights.
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O ACKNOWLEDGMENT Special acknowledgment is due to Dr. R. J. Nertney for his technical direction and to my co-workers for their assistance. Special thanks also go to Della Kellogg for her editorial assistance and to Joann Walker for drafting the safety management information tree.
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i CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENT..........................
11 I.
INTRODUCTION 1
II. THE SAFETY MANAGEMENT INFORMATION TREE............
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1.0 ESTABLISH GENERAL DESIGN AND EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS......................
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1.1 Establish Information Criteria 2
1.1.1 Survey Information Needs..........
3 1.1.2 Identify Information Sources........
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1.1.3 Define General Data Requirements......
5 1.1.4 Consider Information Diniraination Criteria..................
6 1.2 Design the Data Collection System.........
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1.2.1 Data Base Systems 6
1.2.2 Quick-Response Systems...........
7 1.3 Implement Data Collection System 11 1.4 Perform Appen.nriate Data Reduction and Analysis 12 1.5 Communicate the Results in Usable Form to the Decision Maker...............
12 1.6 Audit or Evaluate the Performance of I
the System 16 2.0 ESTABLISH HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION......
18 2.1 Accident Data Systems...............
20 2.2 Hazard Analysis Process..............
20 2.3 Survey and Special Studies 21 iii
O 3.0 PROVIDE INFORMATION FOR DESIGNERS, REVIEWERS, AND OPERATIONS 22 3.1 Sources of Expertise 21 3.2 CS&R Index 21 3.3 Literature Search Information...........
22 3.4 General Plant System Information 22 4.0 PROVIDE INFORMATION SOURCES FOR ACCIDENT / INCIDENT INVESTIGATORS 22 5.0 ESTABLISH RISK MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 23 6.0 ESTABLISH INFORMATION FOR SAFETY RESOURCE ALLOCATION 23 7.0 ESTABLISH INFORMATION FOR OTHER CORRECTIVE / PREVENTIVE ACTION..............
25 8.0 ESTABLISH INFORMATION TO MEET REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.................
25 III. CONCLUSION 29 IV. REFERENCES 30 APPENDIX A - SAFETY MANAGEMENT INFORMATION TREE A-1 APPENDIX B - CONTRACTOR SAFETY INFORMATION TREE B-1 APPENDIX C - LAWRENCE LIVERM0RE LABORATORY HIRAC PROGRAM.....
C-1 APPENDIX D - INFORMATION SOURCES FOR SAFETY ANALYSIS.......
D-1 FIGURES 1.
Information needs at managerial levels............
4 2.
Structure a data base design 8
3.
NSIC output via ERDA/ RECON system..............
9 4.
Steps in the data processing operation 10 O
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Steps in a data processing system..............
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Managerial control process utilizing a computer system.......................
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A s a fe ty i n fo rma ti on ma t ri x.................
17 8.
HIRAC Program form developed by LLL.............
19 9.
NSIC output via ERDA/ RECON system..............
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TYPICAL EXAMPLES OF ENERGY RESOURCES 26 4
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INTRODUCTION If you are one of the many safety professionals who have toyed with the idea of seeking computer aid for program planning and decision making to reduce accident loss, this Guide is for you.
If you are a manager interested in creating an information system that permits two-way responses for improvements essential to reducing unnecessary operating expenses, this Guide may be for you.
And if you are among the thousands of administrators with safety responsibilities who have been procrastinating because the very thought of a computerized system strikes you as an awesome undertaking, this Guide may bring you some comfort.
This Guide provides guidelines for the design and evaluation of a working safety information system. For the relatively few safety pro-fessionals who have already adopted computer-based programs, this Guide may aid them in the evaluation of their present system.
To those who intend to develop an information system, it will, hopefully, inspire new thinking and encourage steps towards systems safety management.
p For the line manager who is working "where the action is", this g
i Guide may pro. vide insight on the importance of accident facts as a tool V
for moving ideas up the communication ladder where they will be heard and acted upon; where what he has to say will influence beneficial changes among those who plan and control his operations.
In the design of a safety information system, it is our suggestion that the safety manager make friends with a computer expert or someone on the management team who has some feeling for, and understanding of, the art of information storage and retrieval as a new and better means for communication. McKinsey and Company, in a survey of computer experi-ence 11 the United States and Europe, cited two important points in its reportLIJ relevant to the safety manager who wants to process safety information:
(1)
In tae development of a computer system, don't try to work alone. The establishment of a safety management ir. formation system requires a joint effort by the data processing specialist, the professional safety manager, and a host of other functional managers.
(2) Ultimate success of a management-oriented information system will rest largely on the meaningful participation of the line managers (supervisors) and staff specialists (planners and controllers), especially in the support areas of the management system to which the feedback Q
is to be directed.
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The safety management information tree, as shown in Appendix A, is a graphical representation of the necessary and sufficient elements in the design and evaluation of any safety management information system.
The tree structure shows that in order to establish and maintain an adequate safety information system, we must do the following:
1.0 Establish General Design and Evaluation Requirements 2.0 Establish Hazards Identification Information 3.0 Provide Information for Designers, Reviewers, and Operations 4.0 Provide Information Sources for Accident / Incident Investigators 5.0 Establish Risk Management Information 6.0 Establish Information for Safety Resource Allocation 7.0 Establish Information for Other Corrective / Preventive Action 8.0 Establish Information to Meet Reporting Requirements II. THE SAFETY MANAGEMENT INFORMATION TREE 1.0 ESTABLISH GENERAL DESIGN AND EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS (Page A-2)
This branch deals, in general, with the data processing functions which are common to all systems, whether it be for scientific or busi-l ness application.
For further discussion of topics in this section, refer to the text, Computers in Society [2], by Donald H. Sanders.
This book serves as a basis for this section.
1.1 Establish Information Criteria (Page A-9)
As used in this Guide, the term information designates data arranged
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in an ordered and useful form. This information will be thought of as relevant knowledge produced and acquired to provide insight in order to l
meet the organization's goals and objectives within its constraints.
The purpose of data processing is to evaluate and bring order to data, and place them in proper perspective so that meaningful informa-tion will be produced. The primary distinction' between data and infor-mation is that while all information consists of data, not all data produce specific and meaningful information that will reduce uncertainty and lead to greater insight.
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For information to be meaningfu'. and relevant, it must provide facts that are needed and that were previously unknown, unreduced, or unverified. To do this, the following must be done:
1.1.1 Survey Information Needs.
Information needs of individuals within an organization must be met.
A survey should be made to determine what information needs to be collected and in what form.
One common need basic to all leaders is an understanding of the organization's policies, programs, goals, and objectives. However, an additional
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i factor that complicates the subject of the information needed is the organizational level of the managerial job. Supervisors at the lower operating levels need information to help them make the day-to-day operating decisions. At the top levels, however, information is needed to h.pport long-range plannning and policy decisions.
Thus, because of the types of decisions they must make, the people at the top and lower levels generally utilize time differently, tend to need different degrees of information summarization, and are inclined to i
use information obtained from different sources.
In Figure 1, diagram (a) we see that at the lower supervisory levels, more time is spent in performing control activities (e.g., monitoring worksite activities),
while at the upper levels, more time is spent on management planning (e.g., determining whether new projects should be started).
Figure 1, diagram (b) shows that although lower level managers need detailed information relating to daily operations of specific departments, top administrators are best served with information that summarizes trends and indicates exceptions to what was expected. A final generalization, illustrated in Figure 1, diagram (c), is that the higher cne is in the organization, the more he needs and is likely to use information obtained from external sources. A foreman uses largely internally generated information to control production processes, but the president studying the feasibility of a new plant needs external information about pollu-tion control, competitive reactions, and availability of labor and suppliers. Lower level supervisors should have available information t
from outside sources about field level problems with similar plant system, equipment, or materials.
j 1.1.2 Identify Information Source. The input data used to produce information originate from internal and external sources.
Internal sources consist of individuals and departments located within an organi-zation which provide facts on a regular and planned basis to support decisions. However, all too often the potential user is unaware that the facts are available.
Internal data gathered on a formal basis usually relate to events that have already happened; they often repre-sent feedback to decision makers of the effectiveness and-accuracy of earlier plans. Once the need for the data is established, a systematic l
data-gathering procedure can be designed to produce the facts.
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Managerial Levels Time Utilization (a)
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Managerial Levels Extent of Information (b)
Summarization Use of External (environmental)
Top Information Middle Use of
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Managerial Levels Use of information Sources (c)
EGG-A 366 Fig.1 Information needs at managerial levels.
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O External sources are the generators and distributors of data located outside the organization. These sources provide information that may give managers or other personnel important clues on what is likely to happen.
For example, a significant number of accidents are required before a company's accident experience will reveal definite accident trends or significant trouble spots.
A 25-employer department could work about 8 to 10 years (500,000 man-hours) without an accident.
Yet, this department may well have a number of minor and serious hazards that could result in accidents. To prevent these accidents, a company cannot rely solely on its own experience.
It must profit by the experi-ence of other companies that contribute to the body of accident prevention knowledge.
Dr. R. J. Nertney of the System Safety Development Center has developed a safety information tree which outlines a general contractor information system in terms of outside experience; in-house experience; and codes, standards, and regulations requirements. This tree can be found in Appendix B.
1.1.3 Define General Data 1.equirements.
Information is a resource and, like other resources, it is usually not free.
It is therefore necessary that the cost of acquiring the data be compared with the value to be obtained. The brief comment on information economics just presented should be kept in mind as we look at the desirability of information that possess the characteristics of accuracy, timeliness, completeness, conciseness, and relevancy.
(1) Accuracy may be defined as the ratio of correct informa-tion to the total amount of information produced over a period of time.
If, for example,1,000 items of infor-mation are produced and 950 of these items give a correct report of the actual situation, then the level of accuracy is 0.95.
(2) Timeliness is another important characteristic.
It is of little consolation to a supervisor to know that the information that arrived too late was accurate.
In the past, a trade-off between timeliness and accuracy was often required; however, computer usage, together with proper indexing and cataloging, can reduce the signi-ficance of this conflict between accuracy and processing time.
(3) Completeness is obtained if the report gives the safety professionals the information they need to make the decision. More complete information can often be pro-vided through the design of systems that integrate and consolidate available facts. A dramatic, historical example of the consequences of failure to consolidate related pieces of information occurred at Pearl Harbor m
in 1941. Historians tell us that data available in
[d bits and pieces and at scattered points, if integrated,
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would have signaled the danger of a Jc.3nese attack.
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(4) Conciseness should go hand-in-hand with completeness.
Too often in the past, the solution has'been to employ an ineffective shotgun approach, peppering the safety manager with more information than can possibly be used.
Concise information that suninarizes the relevant data and that points out areas of exception to normal or planned activities is what is needed.
(5) Relevant information is the need-to-know information that leads to action or provides new knowledge and understanding. Data that were once valuable, but that are no longer relevant, should be dropped from the system.
1.1.4 Consider Information Dissemination Criteria.
Once we have established our information needs, have identified the information sources, and have defined what characteristics our data shou'1d possess, we are ready to think about how we intend to use the information.
Consideration should be given in the following areas:
(a) for public use, (b) for interagency use, (c) for ERDA use, and (d) for company use.
The output should be scaled to the particular needs of the users.
1.2 Design the Data Collection System (Page A-10)
The designer of any information system must keep the following in mind:
(a) the systeu must meet the needs of the user, (b) it must provide fast and easy access to the data, and (c) the information that it contains must be timely.
To aid the designer and to reduce difficulties experienced with traditional approaches, new concepts have been (and are being) developed.
These new concepts may be characterized as being:
(a) broader in scope than traditional systems (data base) and (b) quick-response systems.
1.2.1 Data Base Systems. Better integration of information-producing activities can lead to information that is more complete and relevant. Many computers were originally instal ~led to process a large volume job. Other applications treated independeatly were soon placed into effect, and, in most cases, the basic data were definea and organized for each application. The data were often expensively differently (with an increase in the possibility of error) because it was duplicated impossible to integrate these facts in meaningful ways. For example, the information from the payroll file and the personnel file could not be combined because of different methods of classifying employees.
Dissatisfied with such conditions, a few organizations began looking for ways to consolidate activities.
Data base design is the name normally given to such efforts. Data base (single flow) systems are designed around a single-integrated information file or data bank.
Transactions are introduced into the system only once; all data bank records that these transactions affect are updated at the time of input.
Such a data base will help organize, process, and present the necessary data elements to enable managers to extract the needed information.
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Earlier we discussed the three management levels, each with its own information needs. With this in mind, let us consider the need for data base design.
In addition to what might be termed the horizontal structure, as shown in Figure 2, diagram (a), an organization is also divided vertically into different s)ecialities or functions which generate separate information flows :see Figure 2, diagram (b)].
Combining the horizontal managerial levels with the vertical specialities produces the complex organizational structure, as shown in Figure 2, diagram (c).
Underlying this structure in Figure 2, diagram (c), we have a data base consisting ideally of internally and externally produced data relating to past, present, and predicted events.
With the above concepts in mind, we are now in a position to better appreciate the problems and challenges that designers face.
1.2.2 Quick-Response Systems.
Information is time dependent; it must be collected, manipulated, communicated, stored, retrieved, and presented in a time frame that is appropriate to the problem.
Quick-response systems have been developed to increase the timeliness, effectiveness, and availability of information. Quick-response systems allow users to react more rapidly tc changing conditions, reduce waste in the use of time and other resources, and permit quick follow-up on creative ideas.
One such system is the ERDA/ RECON (Remote Console) system, which is O
a computerized information retrieval system designed to assist a user in V
locating desired information in documents.
It permits a searcher to carry on a dialogue with a computer, allowing him to browse through large files of document citations.
Here is an example of how one might use the ERDA/ RECON system.
Several months ago, a contractor engineer came into the System Safety Development Center and said that he had heard rumors about explosions which involved ozone. He asked if we could assist him in retrieving some information. We entered the key words ozone and explosions into the ERDA/ RECON system and received seven citations which contained these
!J utn key words. A sample output of this search can be found in Figure 3.
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is interesting to note that this inform tion source is the very company that the? engineer worked for, and he could have found this very infor-matio'n "down the hall".
For those of you who may have the responsibility (f developing an information system, here are the basic steps in data precessing:
originating-recording, classifying, sorting, calculating, summarizing, storia.g. retrieving, reproducing, and communicating.
Figure 4 presents these steps and indicates some of the ways in which. they are accomplished.
The means of performing the steps vary according to whether manual, electromechanical, or electronic processing methods are used. Itany organizations find that the best solution to their processing require-ments is to use a combination of the methods. Of course, every pro-cessing step may not be required for every piece of useful information l (o}
produced.
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Lower Operating Managemen (a) m n
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Data Base Internal Data External Data Past l Present l Future Past lPresent Future
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DIS 3/6/000001-000005//5 PAGE 1 05Z0007973 NSC-01-01 17.00 (00007973) EXPLOSION IN NITROGEN DEWAR AT THE GROUND TEST REACTOR (GTR):
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0716-19(01) SP, EXPLOSIONS IN PILE IRRADIATED LIQUID NITROGEN, 0 ZONE IS FORMED FROM 0XYGEN AND EXPLODES ON CONTACT WITH AMBIENT AFTER THE NITR0 GEN EVAPORATES.:
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EXPLOSION:IN PILE LOOP: REACTOR,RESEARCH:
K NITR0 GEN : OPERATING EXPERIENCE
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Fig. 3 NSIC output via the ERDA/ RECON system.
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Processing Or,gination cassagng so,3,ng Calcuta9ng Summarization Stonng Retnewmg Reproducing Communicat,ng Methods Recorde ng Manual Human Hand Postmg Hand Posting Human Pegboards Pararen Fue Clerk Cierical Wntien Methods Oesert stion.
Pegboards Pegboards Bra,n Hand F.les. Journa:s Bookkeeper Carbon Reports Hand-W *.tten Edge-Notched Ca:culatrons Ledgers. etc Paper Hand-Carr ed Records.
Cards Messages Teaephone Pegboards Manual eth Typewnter.
Cash Register Mechan, cal Adding Account'ng Motonzed Rotary Xeron Documents Machine Cash Reg'sier Book n eep.ng CoHators Machines Machines Fates Microhlm Mac h.nes Prepared by Assestance Manual Macnine Ca?culators.
Add ng Duplicators Machines Machines Addressang Message Cash Registers Con eyors Cash Registers Machines v
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Electro-Prepunched Determined by Card Sorter Accountmg Mach +nes Trays of Manual Tray Reproducing Printed Mechanical Cards.
Card Field (tabulators)
Cards Movernent Punch Documents Punched Keypunched Design. Sorter Calculation Punch Interpreter Card Methods Cards Collator Mark-Sensed Cards.
Manusi E:ectronic Magnetic Determined by Offhne Magnetizable Onkne Muit. pie Ontne Data Methods Tape Encoder.
Systems Des'gn.
Card Sorter.
Media and inquiry w Communication of Data and Information
--+ Feedback Communication Information Application EGG-A-1M Fig. 5 Steps in a data processing system.
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The control function looks at the past and the present.
It is a follow-up to planning; it is the check on past and current performance to see if planned goals are being achieved. The general control proce-dure consists of the following:
(1) Establish goals and standards.
(2) Measure actual performance.
(3) Compare actual performance with standards.
(4) Take appropriate control action.
Computer processing systems can also help in controlling by gathering, classifying, calculating, and summarizing actual ' performance data promptly and accurately. Once performance data are read into the computer, it is possible for the machine to compare the actual performance with the established standards. Periodic reports showing this comparison can be prepared; in some systems, it may be furnished to the safety manager only when variations are outside certain specified limits. Figure 6 shows the place of a computer system in the overall control process of a safety organization.
Here is an example to show a cost /effegtive decision made possible by a safety management information systemLlJ:
Case Study - Park rangers, a dedicated group of employees with a specialized talent for taking care of many tens of millions of visitors annually in national parks, appeared as one of the Department of the Interior's poorest groups of motor vehicle drivers. Their vehicle accident frequency rate was well over normally acceptable limits.
Defensive driver training seemed to be the only answer until compu-terized accident data revealed differently. A printout of a three-year driver experience for park rangers gave up these facts:
(1) Low injury costs among operators (most vehicle acci-dents involved no irjury at all).
(2) Minor property damage (only nicks to fenders, small damage under the vehicle, no serious collisions with other vehicles).
These facts finally brought out this story. Park rangers must cruise continuously in their vehicles to aid visitors.
Rangers often drive their vehicles off surfaced roads to reach camp sites.
In doing so, the vehicles frequently strike trees, rocks, and other obstructions.
The resulting damage was reported as " motor vehicle accident". Compu-terized causes for park ranger accidents backed these findings. The low cost of injury, property damage, and tort claims reduced the priority of this problem with safety management, even though the rate of such acci-dents remained high. The management cost / effective decision went something like this:
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4 Managerial Control Process Computer System e Measuring Actual Performance
- Comparing Per+ormance with Standards e Carrying Out Predetermined Decisions External information Factors Processing with information
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Appropnate Goals and D
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Fig. 6 Managerial control process utilizing a computer system.
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O (1) We could change the kind of vehicles being used to one that could take off-road travel with less damage, but the cost of such special vehicles would be prohibitive.
(2) We could simply direct park rangers to leave their vehicles on the main roadside and walk the 100 to 200 yards into the wooded areas to reach a camper, but this would add to patrol time and would require the hiring of many more park rangers. This solution would cost more than the accidents.
(3) We could do nothing but watch the total cases in the printouts. Then, if we found park ranger " repeaters",
we would take individual action as necessary. This was the t.olution management accepted. flass defensive driver training for park rangers was discontinued, because it was not the best cost / effective answer to this problem.
1.6 Audit or Evaluate the Performance of the System (Page A-2)
To aid those who may have the responsibility for the audit or evaluation of an existing safety information system, we have developed the safety information matrix shown in Figure 7.
This matrix can assist one in the following ways:
(1) To determine deviations in the system.
(2) To determine lack of definition in responsibilities or procedures.
(3) To provide feedback to management on the performance of the safety information system.
This matrix gives crder to the total information system and assists in evaluating answers to the questions of who is to do it, what is to be done, and when should it be done. The primary responsibility must be established for each element of the safety information system, which we have listed on the matrix as "Who?".
Also, the "What?" can be listed on the matrix along with the " Control Document", which would state the purpose, responsibilities, and procedure for the development of the safety information system.
Now that we have discussed the general design and evaluation requirements of an information system, we are ready to study the safety-related elements, which should be a part of the total safety management information system.
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Actual System Elements Hazard Safety Design A/i Risk Safety Resource Other Corrective /
Reporting Identification and Review Investigation Management Allocation Preventive Action Infontion System Information Information Information Information Information Information Requirements Establish Information Who?
Criteria J
Design Data Collection Systems Implement Data i
Collection What?
Systems N
Perform Appropriate Data Reduction and Analysis i
Consnunicate Control cue nt?
Re ts Audit j
the Performance Fig. 7 A safety information matrix.
0 2.0 ESTABLISH HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION INFORitATION (Page A-3)
Hazards identification, as used here, implies that not only have statistical data about hazards been collected, but that the data have been analyzed and corrective actions have been described.
Inputs into the hazards identification process should come from the following sources:
(1) Audits and Appraisals (2) Monitoring and Inspections (3) Safety Reviews (4) Accident / Incident Investigations A hazards identification reporting system should contain these basic elements:
(1) Hazard type and location.
(2) Responsible discipline or group.
(3) Current status.
(4) Priori ty.
(5) Cost and fiscal year of action.
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL), San Francisco Operations Office, has designed a good system entitled, " Hazards Identification, Recording, and Correction" (HIRAC). Since many of you might have to design such a system, here is a helpful hint. You may find that your present reporting form will not accommodate computer technology. To aid you in the design of an excellent form, examine the form designed by LLL for the HIRAC system, as shown in Figure 8.
A detailed explana-tion of the HIRAC programL4J, including sample output, can be found in Appendix C.
Proper identification of hazards that contribute in a major way to occupational injury and illness remains a basic need. Safety profes-sionals should concentrate on listing all hazards and on having respon-sible line management set priority for corrective action, rather than making field judgments. The principle of the " vital few" and the
" trivial many" is applicable in regards to the concentration of time, effort, and resources on the "few" major hazards, and less time and attention to the "many" trivial conditions.
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HAZARDS HIRAC PROGRAM CONTROL Resp. Disc.
Current.
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ID No. -*
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Facility Team or Group Report Status Type Caty.
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Recommendations E
FY Fund Current Status Priority Cost.(.K$)
Action Type Change Date PZ 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 so os-69
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MM00YY DESCRIPTION
/ /
A Location Date Preparer P00R~0RIGINAL
(
/
)
(OSHA 19 _ _.
/
)
Standards Abbreviation ID No.
ID No.
ADMINISTRATIVE COMMENTO ADP Completed rh I
\\
Q-Fig. 8 HIRAC Program form developed by LLL.
I 19 l
l l
A variety of approaches to hazards identification has been used over the years. These approaches may be categorized into groups, such as those that:
(1) Utilize existing accident data systems.
(2) Pcint out or evaluate hazards before an accident.
(3) Use target studies or surveys to find conditions asso-ciated with some special industry, occupation, or hazard.
2.1 Accident Data Systems Accident facts are relatively ineffective if their only purpose is to tell the story statistically. The safety professional can and should use them as a tool to help control the hazards that are causing injuries.
A detailed study of accident facts, over a period of time, should bring out such information as follows:
(1) The relative importance of the various injury or energy sources.
(2) The conditions, processes, or activities that produce injuries or damage.
(3) The extent of recurrence of each type of incident (repeaters).
(4)
Information leading to means of preventing recurrence.
A major deficiency of existing accident data systems has been the manner in which the data have been presented and used.
Statistics which are accumulated and presented as large stacks of tabular data do not comunicate as well as those that are summarized. The generation of data 4s.an end in itself is..too often the rule. Simple cross-tabulation of ddthchin br. ovide much; insight into the causal aspects of accidents.
A sintjis ka)tiulatior. which;shows " sources of energy" would have much more diagnostic value if cross-tabulated against " sources of injury" to show high problem areas.
2.2 Hazard Analysis Process It was stated earlier that information from audits and appraisals, inspections, and safety reviews need to be considered wheu gerforming the hazard analysis process.Section VI of the MORT textL3J deals with 7
l the hazard analysis process, and some 25 monitoring techniques are discussed in the text starting on page 351.
In the design of an infor-mation system, it would be advisable to study this information.
O 20
OV 2.3 Survey and Special Studies The SSDC (System Safety Development Center) has found the RS0 (Reported Significant Observation) study to be an effective tool for identifying major hazards in the workplace, prior to the' occurrence of an accident. When key worded and indexed, this information can be useful in detecting causal factor relationship with high severity and low frequency, whereas a very large data base and long time period would be necessary to detect them " statistically".
Cross-tabulation and integration of the output help to pinpoint which combination of hazardous situations might pose a serious safety problem.
Details on how to make RS0 studies cfn]be found in SSDC-5, Reported Significant Observation (RS0) Studies 5 3.0 PROVIDE INFORMATION FOR DESIGNERS, REVIEWERS, AND OPERATIONS (Page A-4)
The information needs of individuals must be met. The designers, reviewers, and operation personnel information needs fall into the following basic areas:
(1) List of experts in specialized safety work.
b (2) Codes, standards, and regulations (CS&R) index.
(3) Literature search information.
(4) General plant system information.
Appendix D lists sevtral information sources which provide valuable safety data.
3.1 Sources of Expertise The SSDC has compiled an index of expertise in the areas of spe-cialized safety work, fire field, and mechanical structural failure.
This index is available at the safety division of each ERDA operations office.
l 3.2 CS&R Index l
l The Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company (REECo) has devel-oped an index to the ERDA-prescribed industrial safety codes and standards.
The codes and standards have been key worded and cross-indexed to faci-litate easy access for the user.
OO 21
O 3.3 Literature Search Information Information retrieval has become a major problem in many scientific areas.
Researchers spend considerable time and money on problems for which, unknown to them, solutions have already been found. Much work has been done in the field of computer-assisted information retrieval systems-The reviewer or designer might look into the ou of the ERDA/
RECON system for assistance in this area. Also, visual search microfilm systems can help engineers to rapidly locate current codes and standards.
3.4 General Plant System Information A general understanding of the plant overall system might be valuable in the design, review, or operation of a proposed or existing system. Such elements as personnel selection and training information, plant hardware use and misuse data, management control and procedure information, and the environment data could aid in this process.
4.0 PROVIDE INFORMATION SOURCES FOR ACCIDEfT/ INCIDENT INVESTIGATORS (Page A-4)
Information sources of accident / incident (A/I) investigators include a list of experts, information on CS&R to de.termine deviations, past experience data to determine trends, and info mation about the overall plant system to formulate recomendations.
In A/I investigation there is a definite need for us to learn from our past mistakes. Even if a second accident is not prevented, knowing that a similar accident occurred earlier might change the recommendations of the investigating committee.
It seems that experienced safety profes-sionals rely on their memory and make a literature search only when baffled by a problem. Thus, lacking assurance that all relevant mate-rial, including new information, is being applied.
For example, study the following accident summaries:
Suninary #1 - A scientist received an estimated dose of 1700 rem to the fingers of his left hand when he was accidentally exposed to X-rays from the primary beam of an 60 kv X-ray aenerator.
The incident happened late in the afternoon yhile he was in the process of making some physical measurementsL6].
Summary #2 - A radiochemist received a sing k exposure dose estimated at 2400 tem to the fingers of his left hand when exposed to X-rays from the beam port of an 60 kv X-ray spec-trometer.
The incident occurred late in the af ternoon while he was analyzing certain elementsL/J.
O 22
m From the summaries, it would appear that we are talking about the same accident, when in reality these accidents happened approximstely five years apart. To further study the availability of information on these two incidents, the Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, was queried via the RECON terminal, and the printout, shown in Figure 9, was received. Only the 1969 accident was found in the ERDA/ RECON system. The 1974 accident was missing, which inight indicate lag time of data entry or inconsistency in data collection.
5.0 ESTABLISH RISK MANAGEMENT INFORMATION (Page A-5)
The output of the hazard identification system should be the input of the risk management system. Hazards are the prime source of risk.
Based on the MORT concept that accidents result from unplant.ed and unwanted transfers of energy, and that hazards are the potential for unwanted releases of energy, the risk management system must provide the following information to the safety professional:
I (1)
Identification of all energy sources.
p (2) Identification of potential targets of uncontrolled energy release.
(3)
Identification of the control mechanisms and barriers.
(4)
Identification of the residual risk.
A risk-management guide is being developed by the SSDC, which discusses these items mentioned above. This guide should be studied so as to understand the methods for calculating the residual risk. Once the residual risk has been identified, it is the input for the safety resource allocation system.
(Resource allocation is the topic of our next exciting section, so don't miss it.)
6.0 ESTABLISH INFORMATION FOR SAFETY RESOURCE ALLOCATION (Page A-6)
The resources allocated to controlling risk should be consistent with the magnitude of the risk. One major problem with risk assessment is that the information needed to make the analyses is buried in many weekly reports or scattered through several departments or areas. The safety information system should assist the safety professional in collecting and analyzing the data needed to perform the necessary risk assessment and resource allocation. The information collected should assist in the following araas:
23
O
> PROCESSING <
DIS 3/6/000001-000005//1 PAGE 1 28X0039594 NSC-01-01 15.00 (00039994) HAND EXPOSURE FROM X-RAY DIFRACTION UNIT:
DIVISION OF OPERATIONAL SAFETY,AEC:
1969:
N:
SERIOUS ACCIDENTS ISSUE NO. 305 +.3 PAGES, NOVEMBER 12,1969:
AVAILABILITY - DIVISION OF OPERATIONAL SAFETY, U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON,D.C.20545:
15.00 :
0028:
DOS:
A:
A SCIENTIST RECEIVED AN ESTIMATED DOSE OF 1700 REMS TO THE FINGERS OF HIS LEFT HAND, 50 TO HIS RIGHT EYE,2400 TO THE SKIN OF HIS UPPER LEFT ARM WHEN HE WAS ACCIDENTALLY EXPOSED TO 8-KEV X RAYS FROM THE PRIMARY BEAM 0F AN X-RAY DIFFRACTION UNIT WHILE HE WAS MAKING SOME PHYSICAL MEASUREMENTS.:
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS : INCIDENT, EXPOSURE:
DOSE : HA7ARD, RELATIVE: RADIATION SAFETY Key AND CONTROL: INCIDENT, HUMAN ERROR:X-RAY:
Words SAFETY PROGRAM : OPERATOR ACTION :
INSTRUMENT, ALARM: DOSIMETRY, CLINICAL:
Fig. 9 NSIC output via the ERDA/ RECON system.
O 24
O (1) Classification of hazards by type of energy release.
(2) Determination of present resource allocation.
(3) Determination of residual risk for each hazard type.
(4) Comparison of allocated resources and residual risk.
(5) Reallocation of efforts based on this comparison.
l (6) Presentation of new residual risk to management.
It seems particularly appropriate to reiterate that all accidental injuries and damage result from the application of specific forms of energy in amounts exceeding the controls or barriers. Thus, the various forms of energy (mechanical, thermal, electrical, chemical, apd radiation) constitute the direct causes of accidents, Also, prevention of accidents can often be achieved by controlling the source of the unwanted energy or the vehicles or carriers through which the energy reaches the targets.
While the specific types of energy which cause accidents are quite limited in number, the forms in which they abound and the variety of the vehicles or carriers of energy are innumerable.
To aid in the classi-fication of hazards, the SSDC has developed a listing of typical-energy sources, as shown in Table I.
v 7.0 ESTABLISH INFORMATION FOR OTHER CORRECTIVE / PREVENTIVE ACTION (Page A-7)
Much information needed by safety professionals can be found throughout their company's many different organizations.
For instance, operations can provide useful data from operational readiness reviews and preventive maintenance, if good records are kept on the findings.
Also, many organizations within a company make special studies, such as single failure analysis and job safety analysis.
The information reported in these studies could also aid the safety effort if the work was coor-dinated within the company.
8.0 ESTABLISH INFORMATION TO MEETING REPORTING REQUIREMENTS (Page A-8)
The reporting system should supply the necessary information to meet the day-to-day functional requirements, along with the ideal and contractual requirements placed on any company. This should include, for example, personnel injury / illness histories, vehicle accident experience, and property damage, fire damage, and radiation exposure data. These basic requirements are the subject of other SSDC publica-tions, such as SSDC-7,[#J.ERDA Guide to the Classification of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses v
25
[
TABLE I TYPICAL EXAMPLES OF ENERGY SOURCES Electrical _
Mass, Gravity, Height Battery Banks Human Effort Diesel Units Stai rs High Lines Lifts Transformers Cranes Wiring Bucket and Ladder Switchgear Trucks Underground Wiring Slings Cable Runs Hoists Service Outlets and Fittings Ele.va tors Pumps Jacks Motors Scaffolds and Ladders Heaters Crane Cabs Power Tools Pits Small Equipment Excavations Elevated Doors Nuclear Canals Vessels Vaults Temporary Storage Areas Pressure-Volume /K-Constant-Distance Receiving Areas Shipping Areas Boilers Casks Heated Surge Tanks Burial Ground Autoclaves Storage Racks Test Loops and Facilities Canals and Basins Gas Bottles Reactor In-Tank Storage Areas Pressure Vessels Dollies Coiled Springs Trucks Stressed Members Hand Carry Gas Receivers Cranes Lifts Kinetic-Rotational Commercial Shops Centrifuges Hot Cells Motors Assembly Areas Pumps Inspection Areas Cooling Tower Fans Test Rigs Cafeteria Equipment Reactors laundry Equipment Critical Facilities Gears Subcritical Facilities Shop Equipment (Grinders, Saws, Laboratories Brushes,etc.)
Pilot Plants Floor Polishers O
26
x TABLE I (continued)
Kinetic-Linear Thermal (Except Radiant)
Cars Convection Trucks Heavy Metal Weld Preheat Buses Exposed Steam Pipes Fork Lifts Electric Heaters Carts Fire Boxes Dollies Leading Melting Pot Railroad Electric Wiring and Equipment Surfaces Furnaces Obstructions Shears Presses Thermal Radiation Crane Loads In Motion PV Blowdown Furnaces Power Assisted Driving Tools Boilers Steam Lines Flammable flaterials Lab and Pilot Plant Equipment Solar Packing flaterials Rags Gasoline (Storage and in Vehicles)
Electromagnetic and Particulate Lube Oil Radiation Coolant Oil Paint Solvent Canals Diesel Fuel Plug Storage Buildings and Contents Storage Areas Trailers and Contents Storage Buildings Grease Radioactive Sources Hydrogen (Incl. Battery Banks)
Waste and Scrap Gases - Other Contamination Spray Paint Irradiated Experimental and i
Solvent Vats Reactor Equipment Electric Furance Explosive Pyrophoric Blacklight (Magniflux) l Laser Caps Medical X-Ray Primer Cord Radiography Equipment and Sources Dynamite Welding Powder Metallurgy Electric Arc - Other (High Current Dusts Circuits)
Hydrogen (Incl. Battery Banks Electron Beam and Water Decomp.)
Gases - Other Nitrates Electric Squibbs N
Peroxides-Superoxides l
27
O TABLE I (continued)
Acoustical Radiation Equipment Noise Ultrasonic Cleaners Corrosive Acids Caustics
" Natural" Chemicals (Soil, Air Water)
Decon Solutions Toxic / Pathogenic Acetone Fluorides Carbon Monoxide Lead Ammonia and Compounds Asbestos Trichloroethylene Dusts and Particulates Pesticides-Herbicides-Insecticides Bacteria Beryllium and Compounds Chlorine and Compounds Decon Solutions Sandblast Metal Plating Asphyxiation-Drowning O
28
1 3
III.
CONCLUSION The installation and operation of a computer-based information system do not guarantee success for the safety manager.
The technique alone will not solve managerial problems, does not replace the need to "think", and is not a means to an end in itself.
In fact, the volume of data produced may bring about more problems for solution than one indi-vidual can possibly handle. The safety manager must get all safety professionals involved, as well as all line managers.
The computer will demand new skills of the safety professional.
The data that provide the means for managerial improvements must be matched with, and be responsive to, the needs of each functional director.
A basic part of the information system will be the development of an educaticnal program to instruct supervisors, concerning the ultimate value of their input about causes, costs, and other data regarding accidents. Middle managers must become acquainted with the results in printouts and make the system a useful tool for improvement of their own missions and objectives. Top management must be briefed as to what the f
system is, how it works, and the part it can play in running the affairs of their concern more effectively.
A safety management information system will make the " user" smarter.
It will give them confidence that their decisions are sound, because it will provide facts and figures to support their point of view.
The information system should free the safety professional from some trivial items and permit concentration on the problems with high " payoff" potential. The decisions will be backed with economic considerations, not merely with frequency rates.
Most importantly, the safety professional will be able to present
~
the program so that it can be understood and will. impress even the hard-nosed, profit-minded executive. For example, if the boss doesn't "see the need", it could well be that the safety professional is not pre-senting the case in the language that management most commonly uses.
~
Let's look at the frequency and severity rates. Although these old and well-recognized statistics are currently used in industry, they perhaps do not tell top management very much about the day-to-day happenings in the safety effort. These figures are largely historical, having little predictive value unless accompanied by trend analysis.
By themselves, they have very little attention-getting potential in discussion with the
" boss". Although better than no measurement at all, frequency and severity do not compete well with dollars and cents, which are sent to top management from most other functions.
OO 29
Top management wants to participate in profit improvement programs, even if we call them " safety programs". So when the boss asks, "What will a safety infor tion system get me?", you can say, " Boss, it will get you five thisgs J:
(1) Money - Money which accumulates from lack of accidents.
Money which transfers directly from overhead to profit.
(2) Money - Money that would ordinarily be spent for fire and equipment losses.
(3) Money - Money saved through reduction of workmen's compen-sation premiums.
(4) Money - Money that would be spent paying damages, filling out papers, and doing things over.
(5) Money - Money spent in replacing injured employees."
IV. REFERENCES
[1]
W. C. Pope, In Case of Accident - Call the Computer, U.S. Department of the Interior Publication No. 23, 0-387-89, 1970
[2] Donald H. Sanders, Computers in Society, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973
[3]
W. G. Johnson, MORT - The Management Oversight and R_isk Tree, SAN 821-2, February 12, 1973
[4] "HIRAC Program", Hazards Control Manual, Section AD-46, University of California, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (December 17,1975)
[5]
R. W. Eicher, Reported Significant Observation (RS0) Studies, ERDA-76-45-5, SSDC-5 (March 1976)
[6] " Hand Exposure from X-Ra; Diffraction Unit", Serious Accidents, Division of Operational Safety, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Issue No. 305 (November 12,1969)
[7] " Accidental Exposure Involving X-Ray Spectrometer Unit", Serious Accidents, Division of Operational Safety, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Issue No. 338 (December 6, 1974)
[8]
C. R. Shaber, J. P. Byrom, D. K. Chandler, R. W. Eicher, ERDA Guide to the Classification of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, ERDA-76/45-7, SSDC-7 (October 1976)
[9] Keith E. Barenklau, "A Formula for Motivating Top Management",
Selected Readings in Safety, Academy Press Division, Internatiotal Safety Academy, 1973 I
30
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APPENDIX A l
O i
SAFETY MANAGEMENT INFORMATION TREE 1
I r
1 1
L o
h I
i L
6 1
F' A-1 it. T *,
W Ma p4
% LW 4
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i d
OBJECT!vf :
ESTA2LISM AND MAINTA!4 An A0E% ATE SAFETf thF09mATION SYSTEu a
I I
l l
Estabitsh General Provide Infomation for Access on Establish alyttc4 Establish Information Desten & Evaluation Designers, Reviewers, Ned=a re.
Risk Manageneat
& Actuartal For Other Corrective /
Requi resea t s 4 Operations Material 8 Infomation Method s Preventive Action 3.0 3.0
- 5. 0 1.0 I
4 4
4 p. A-4 o A-5 k p. A-7 E
Establish Hazard Provide Information Establish Infomation Estabitsh Inforestion p
Identtf tcation Sources for For Safety Resource To Meet Reporting Infomation A/I Investigators Material &,
Allocation Requirement s yp y
y 2.0 4.0 6.0
- 8. 0
-en 0.A-3
- p. A-4
- p. A-6
- p. A-8 a
IV o %t Orgen f ration's Estab11sh Isu>1earnt Conriunicate The bl5 &
Information Data Collection Results In Usable Objectives Criteria Systees Foru To The witnin Its Decision Mater onstraints A
i.1 1.3 1.5 Or.
f p A.jj E
i r
i lDef tne Managemend l Define Personnel l [
Provide l
l Cont rol l lResponsib111ttes 1 I Trainine l
- 1. 3.1 1.3.2
- 1. 3. 3 Provide Fast & Easy Access to Data; Design Data Must Meet Perfore Appropriate Audit The Inf ormation Collection Systems Users heeds Data Reduction Performance of Needs To Be 8 Analysis The System fleely
- 1. 4
- 1. 6 I p. A-10 W
u i
a i
i i
O, l Preventive ll Predictive l l Comparative l l Determine l Deterutne Lack [
Provide 1 Deviations l l of Definition I Feedback of I'*'I I4I I43 g6 1.6.1
- 1. 6. 2 Results to Managesernt
- 1. 6. 3
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(
4
?:
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ESTABLISH HAZARD ~ ~ l, 1
IDENTIFICATION I
INFORMATION I
L -- --
---...J 2.0 A
b i
l i
I I
Include Audits Include Monitoring Include Include Accident /
& Appraisals
& Inspections Safety Reviews Incident Information y
A.1 A.2 A.3
.A. 4 4
4 Identify Hazards Define Responsible Establish List Cost &
Feed Risk &
Li t By Type &
Discipline or Location Group Current Status Correction Type Fiscal Year Safety Resource
& Priority of Action Allocation Systems A.l.1 A.I.2 A.I.3 A.I.4 A.l.5 A.I.6
- 23
~
E
<q..
~.. en, p.A-2 n.A-2
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e-------------,
IPROVIDE INFORMATION FOR l PROVIDE INFORMATION I DESIGNERS, REVIEWERS 1
SOURCES FOR
& OPERATIONS i' A/I INVESTIGATORS J
T------
- - - - F- -- - 4. 0 3.0 B
b I
I I
I I
Provide General Plant Provide List Provide Codes, Provide of Experts Standards & Regulations Information for System Information B.1 (CS&R) Information Literature Searches B.4 1,
[
B.2
[
B.3 I
Own Own utside r cedur Organi-Customer Organi-Organi-Personne
& Mgmt.
zation zation zation Control B.2.1 8.2.3 B.3.1 B.3.2 B.4 B.4.3 Plant T
Other En ron-Hardware QC)
.2.2 B.4.2 8.4.4 W
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4 4
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(-_------_._D 5.:2 1
ESTABLISH RISK IMANAGEMENTINFORMATIONl' t______
5.0 i
1 C
O r
I I
I l
Identify Identify Potential Identify Control Analyze and Identify Corrnunicate Residual Energy Sources Targets of Uncontrolled Mechanism & Barriers Residual Risks Risks to Management C.)
Energy Release C.3 C.4 Control System C.2 i
C.5 C3
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9 6%
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p A*
g ESTABL!sH INFOR*% TION i
- FOR SAFETY RESDURCE e I
ALLGCATION 8
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D I
i i
I i
I I
I Classify Hazards By Determine Pree.ent Determine Residual Risk Compare Residual Rish Reallocate Efforts Determine & Comunicate Type cf Energy Release Safety Resource For Each Hazard Type To Allocated Resource 5 Based On The New Residual Risk To A 1 cation Comparison Managemerit D.1 D.3 0.4 D.5 0.6 D.2 C:3 E :3 MMb
=
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~7 gESTABLISH INFORMATION g IFOR OTHER CORRECTIVE / l I PREVENTIVE ACTION I
L J
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7.0 f
E O
I I
Accumulate Routine Make Special Studies Other Operational Safety Information E.2 E.3 4
E.i 23 i
i Use Fa re q
Perform JSA Other E.2.1 E.2.2 E.2.3 I
i i
O From Periodic From Operational Q
Inspection &
Resdiness Review Preventive N
Maintenance E.1.2
'o AE.1.1
- o A
sammuns Report As Report As Found Left Information Information E.1.X.1 E.1.X.2
.' i.~2
[v v,
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L;2 A r-ABLISH INFORMATION I iEST l
TO MEET REPORTING 1
i REQUIREMENTS I
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Meet Functional Meet Legal &
Requirements Contractual F.1 Requirements F.2 E
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Survey Identify Def toe General Cost Information Needs Information Sources Data Requirements Effective D
GI G2 G.3 G.4 I
i W
I t
i I
l I
I I
i l
(Internalf Enternalf f C5&R l For For Inter-for "aas at sup 1sor Cr ts Pubite Use agency use ompany use Ac c ura t Timely Relevant u
.1 u.a.2 i
u.-.3 G.I.1 G. I.2 G.I.3 G.2.1 G.2.2 G.2. 3 G.3.1 G.3.3 G. 3.5 Civic Media Mgmt.
Employe q
amplete Concise G. 4.1.1 G.4.1,3 g,4 3 1 G.4.3.2 l
Tech.
EacA mer C:l3 C3 G.
2.1 G.4..2
- C r
- *j'f 2
- r c _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. A_- 2 p
q l COLLECTION SYSTEMS DESIGN DATA i
1 L______
______J 1.2
~ -.,
t; H
b I
I Provide Provide Internal Data External Data H.1 H.2 x
8 4
5 1
i i
Manual Process Automated Process Q
H.X.1 H.X.2 N
3 3
OW I
i i
g Define Establish Establish Method Point Of Mode Of H.X.Y.1 Entry Entry H.X.Y.2 H.X.Y.3 O
O O
O O
-o
,. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _e 2 COMMUNICATE THERESULTS l IN USABLE FORM T0 g
lTHEDECISIONMAKER I
L______
______J 1.5
,g I
l To Control To Aid In Activities Future Flanning
?d I.1 I.2 I
i i
i i
Provide Informa-Compare Ideal Or By By Operations By Technical tion For Action Desired Processes Management Personnel Personnel With Actual I.2.1 I.2.2 1.2.3 I.1.1 Processes I.1.2 i
i i
Systemic Item Fixes Fixes I.1.1.1 1.1.1.2 i
i I
r l
1 i
l l
l APPENDIX B i
l 1
CONTRACTOR SAFETY INFORMATION SYSTEM I
I B-1
CONTRACTOR ORGANIZATIONS The tree, starting on page B-5, indicates the total contractor safety information system as is presently being taught in MORT (Management j
Oversight and Risk Tree).
1.
Total System (Page B-5)
The total contractor safety information system consists basically of three parts:
a.
Information relating to safety relevant events outsidt the contractor's own organization.
b.
Information relating to safety relevant events inside the contractor's organization, c.
Information relating to safety constraints on the contractor's activities (i.e., Codes, Standards, and Regulations).
2.
Gutside Experience (Page B-6)
The "Outside Experience" information sources which we are presently considering are:
a.
Information stores accessible through RECON (Remote Console) type retrieval stations include:
(1) The ERDA/ RECON data banks.
(2) The interagency GIDEP (Government / Industry Data Exchange Program) data banks.
Comment: We would hope that any new data stores would be RECON compatible in access mode and in key wording.
b.
"Information Source Indices" include logical indexing of two types of information sources:
(1) Listings of expert consultants (people and organi-zations) indexed in some logical manner.
(2) Listings of national data banks [ NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration), NSC (National Safety Council), NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board), etc.] indexed in a logical manner (with access information). This should also include speciality data stores, such as the Battelle Northwest radiation damage stores.
B-2
c.
Other local (in-house) data banks would include the con-tractor's own local stores of safety information relating to out-of-contract activities.
(1) ERDA occurrence reports, safety notes, etc., which are generated on an ERDA-wide basis.
(2) Contractors' own collections of out-of-house l,
experiences.
Comment: A standard method of indexing and retrieval should be developed which would permit centralization and data exchange between contractor systems and ERDA central systems. Battelle Northwest, for example, appears to have collected much general transportation accident data which would be very useful to other contractors in their work.
3.
In-house Experience (Page B-7)-
a.
Key Worded Systems These include information collected internally regarding the contractor's own operations, e.g., unusual tccurrence reports, RS0 (reported significant observation) reports,
(
appraisal reports, accident investigation reports. etc.
b.
Information Source Indices (1)
In-house expert consultants.
(2) Other in-house data banks, i.e., reliability data stores, etc.
1 Comment: Again, standardized indexing-retrieval systems should be adopted which would permit data exchange and cross-utilization of data stores by contractors.
One contractor's Reliability people, for example, have collected safety relevant information which might be of use to other contractors.
4.
CS&R (Codes, Standards, and Regulations) Requirements (Page B 8)
This subsystem relates to CS&R requirements and recommendations, as well as to operating manuals which have been created in such a manner as to lead to operational compliance with CS&R requirements.
Comment:
Again, logical indexing is essential in compliance with CS&R. THIS IS, IN LARGE PART, DEPENDENT ON LOGICAL INITIAL DESIGN p
AND INDEXING 0F CS&R REQUIREMENTS.
l U
B-3 1
{
9 In design of the entire information system, we ' feel that:
(a) The entire information system, as described in 1, 2, 3, and 4, above, should be designed as a_ system.
(b) A principal factor in utilization of this type of material lies in the indexing and access systems.
(c) A consistent, logical, key word indexing system should be defined and adopted on an ERDA-wide basis.
(d) Simple key word indexing (KWI) is adequate for small volume systems, but KWIC (key-word-index-contextual) systems should be used for massive systems, e.g., KWI (Explosives), KWIC
( Expl o s i ves -Dyn ami te-Tra ns por ta ti on ).
(e) Primary key wording should be based on hardware and materials, with secondary indexing on function, geography, facility, etc.; e.g., Primary entry for incidents relating to reactor pump fail'ures should be on " pumps" rather than on specific reactors experiencing pump failures.
In the same connection, when we, enter the data system, we are ordinarily more con-cerned that a man was injured by, say, a bulldozer than in whether an arm or a leg was broken. Once we are in the system, we can relate nature of injury to our current work involving bulldozers.
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SAFETY INFORMATION SYSTEM j
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I OUTSIDE IN HOUSE CODES, STANDARDS EXPERIENCE EXPERIENCE AND REGULATIONS 7
l REQUIREMENTS 1
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- p. B-5 OUTSIDE ~l l_ EXPERIENCE I l
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RECON. STATIONS INFORMATION OTHER LOCAL SOURCE INDICES DATA BANKS (OUTSIDE EXPERIENCE) i
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ERDA GIDEP ERDA OTHER l
RECON DATA DATA BANKS OCCURRENCE l
BANKS REPORTS l
EXPERT NATIONAL CONSULTANTS DATA BANKS l
INDEX INDEX l
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IN HOUSE EXPERIENCE]
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KEY WORDED INFORMATION SYSTEMS SOURCE INDICES RSO REPORTS EXPERT DATA CONSULTANT BANKS ERDA ACCIDENT UNUSUAL INVESTIGATION OCCURRENCE REPORTS REPORTS
1 P 3-5 l CODES, STANDARDS l I AND REGULATIONS lI
[___ REQUIREMENTS i
OPERATING-SAFETY KEY WORD MANUAL INDEX INDEXED SYSTEMS m
NTAB INDUSTRIAL OTHER CODES, CATALOG SAFETY CODES, STANDARDS AND STANDARDS &
REGULATIONS REGULATIONS (REECO INDEX) h h
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APPENDIX C LAWRENCE LIVERM0RE LABORATORY HIRAC PROGRAM 1
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DEC 171975 Hazards Control Manual Revised Section AD-46
- HIRAC PROGRAM INTRODUCT10ft Hezards Identification, Recording, and Correction (HIRAC) System for use with data processing equipment may be used for organizing the results of inspections, audits, reports, recommendations and other administrative matters. All significant safety recommendations will be entered into the system. Form LL-4609 serves as the primary means by which data is recorded and transmitted. This section describes how this form is used and the entries made. Do not add to or change any of the designations s
given below until approved by the General Safety Division Leader.
CODE Col. 1-6 Identification flumber Prenumbered forms must be used for initial entry.
Unnumbered forms are used to change data (In this case enter digits starting from the right. Arrow on form points to the right).
Col. 7 Transaction Information to ADP equipment i what to do with the data being submitted, il = flew entry under a given ID number M = tiodify an existing entry D = Done--recommendation completed (item with this entry appears once in the next pring-out. At the end of the fiscal year, all "D" items will be summarized on a special print-out).
X = Wipe out - destroy total entri (to be used only to purge an in-
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correctentry)
Col. 8-11 Facility Location Enter digits and letters exactly as assigned to each building, magazine, trailer, van, etc., starting with the left block (Col. 8). Col. 11 in most cases will be blank.
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Hazards Control Manual Revised s'G 1 7 1375 U
Section AD-46 1
Use the following code for those areas or facilities not assigned a " building number".
Description Location (Col. 8-11)
Livermore non-numbered area 100 Site 300 non-numbered area 800 Vehicles VEH Off-site areas OSA Additional identifying information may be given in " Recommendation" field (Col.19-67).
Col. 12 Team Designation i
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1, 2, 3, 4, etc. ).
See Hazards Control Manual, Section AD-31.
O Use only if involves team responsibility.
Col. 13 Responsible Discipline or Group Identification of the organization responsible for the information entered.
E --- Explosives Safety Group R --- Radiation Safety Division F --- Fire Safety Group S --- Industrial Safety Group G --- General Safety Division T --- Education H --- Industrial Hygiene Group V --- Environmental Evaluations Group 0 --- Operational Support Division P --- Health Physics Group Z --- Other Od C-3 i
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DEC 171975 Hazards Control Manual Revised Section AD-46 Col. 14 Reporting Identification A - FIA-I (Computer survey 1971)
N-B - FSA0 P-C - Improved risk Q-D - FIA-II (Lab-wide survey 1973)
R - ERDA-Hg appraisal E-S - ERDA-SAN appraisal F-T - ERDA-Non-Announced Inspection (OSHA type)
G-H -llazards Control inspections U-I - Employee complaint (llER Form 4638)
V-d-
U-K-
X-L - LLL special audit Y - Other M-Z-
Cols 15 Current Status Gives current status of recommendation. Leave blank if client not notified. When change made in this field, enter new date in Col. 75-80.
C - Client notified P - Corrective action in process D - Recommendation done (enter "D" in Transaction Col. 7 also)
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p Hazards Control Manual Revised DEC 1 7 1975 Section AD-46 Col. 16 Correction Type 1 - Those credible hazards that require correction action through the area supervisor - normal priority.
2 - Those credible hazards that require corrective action on a Laboratory-wide basis and the Hazards Control discipline is res-ponsible for follow-up. fio action is required of the area supervisor.
3 - Those hazards that the safety discipline feel are technical violations of a code or standard but have extrenely low potential for injury or property damage. A request for variance from the code or standard is anticipated. The Hazard Control discipline is responsible for follow-up.
4 - Similar to Type 1 but requiring imediate corrective action. Must use with Priority A, may use with Priority B.
5 - Similar to Type 2 but requiring immediate correction action. ftust use with Priority A, may use with Priority B.
O Col. 17-18 Recommendation Category 8
Used to quickly identify similar type recommendations.
(Eachcolumnis a separate field.)
Col. 17 Use letter designation as shown below.
Col. 18 When necessary, a numeral may be assigned to subclassify.
When none assigned, leave this column blank.
A - General (Signs and labels see J-5) 1 - Attitudes 6 - Emergency Planning 2 - Supervisory Control 7-3 - Admin. Deficiencies 8-4-
9-5 - Training B - Hazards Control Supervisory Control (Reserved for HC Adninistrative entries.)
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-5 Ot.G 1 i ON D - Walking-working surfaces (e.g. ladders, stairs, etc.)
E - Means of egress 3 - Emergency lighting F - Pcwered platfoms, man-lifts and vehicle-mounted work platforms G - Occupational health and environmental controls 1-6 - Ionizfhg radiation and radiation material 2-3 - Air contaminants 7 - Nonionizing radiation
.4 - Veratilation 8 - Lasers 5 - Noise exp.
9-H -Ilazardous materials 1 - Compressed gases 6 - Flammable liquids 2 - Reactive chemicals 7-3 - Metals 8-4-
9 - Explosives 5-I - Personal protective equipment J - General environmental controls 1 - Sanitation 6-2 - Cross connects 7 - Lightning protection 3 - Pest Control 8 - llousekeeping 4-9 - Boilers 5 - Signs, labels, etc.
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-G-X - Medical and first aid (Energency showers and eyewash fountains)
L - Fire protection 1 - Emergency response 5-equipment 2 - Water supply 6 - Standpipe and hose system 3 - Fire alarm system 7 - Portable fire 4_
extinguisner 8 - Automatic sprinkler system 9 - Other fixed ext.
systems 1
M - Compressed gas equipr.ent (Use H1 for compressed gases or their storage)
N
.flaterials handling and storage (Use H1 for compressed gas cylinder storage) 1 - Power industrial 6 - Cranes trucks 7-2-
8-3-
9_
4-5-
0 -Itachinery and machine guarding
(
P - Hand a-d portable tools s
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DEC 171975 9 Q - Welding cutting, and brazing R-S - Electrical (Signs and labels see J-5)
T-U-
i V-W-
X-Y-
Z-l Col.19-67 Recomendations Print description leaving a space between words.
If entry includes multiple itens, state the approximate quantity (e.g. 35 fire extinguishers to be hung). To provide ceneral understanding and clear interpretation, l
give the code or standard violated at the beginning of each description l
using the followina examples as a guide.
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DEC li 1375 Examples of Entry Standards (Starting in Col.17)
Remarks OSHA Para. 1910.235 0235 OSHA Part 1910 entries begin with 0 OSHA Para. 1910.25 0025 All OSHA entries have 4 digits OSHA Para. 1926.31 6031 OSHA Part 1926 entries begin with 6 H & S fianual Sec. 26.04 HSM26 04 H & S Supplement 32.05 A ilSS32.05A Cal. General Industry S.0.
3273 All GIS0's begin with 3
Cal. Const. Safety Orders 1566 All Const. S0 begin with 1 O
ERDA Manual 0523-38 ERDA 0523-38 Col. 68 Priority Information for Plant Engineering use.
(See also Hazard Control fianual, Section AD-4.) Entered by discipline on those enteries which require Plant Engineering support.
Priorities for Plan Engineering corrective action are defined as follows:
A - These jobs require urgent attention by Plant Engineering because of one of the following.
o High potential for serious injury.
o High potential for serious off-site consequences.
o Credible potential for death, o Credible potential for property damace over $1,000,000'.
(All Priority A items must be classified as Correction Type 4 or 5.
Approval of Group Leader required before assigning this priority.)
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nre, 7 193 B - These jobs require priority attention by Plant Engineering because of one of the following:
o Moderate potential for serious injury.
o Moderate potential for serious off-site consequences.
o High potential for minor off-site consequences.
o Continuing insult to the body through exposure in excess of TLV's, etc.
o Credible potential for property damage over $100,000 but less than $1,000,000.
(Some Priority B items requiring imediate attention may also be classified as Correction Type 4 or 5.)
C - These jobs require regular attention by Plant Engineering because of one of the following:
o Low potential for any injury.
o Low potential for any off-site consequences.
o Credible potential for property damage less than $100,000.
Col. 69-72 Cost Estimate costs for correction to the closest thousands (K) of dollars.
Enter digits from right (Example $18795 is entered as 9 in Col. 72 und 1 Col. 71.) Costs under $500 are entered as an asterisk (*) in Col.
72.
Each asterisk will be reflected as a $200 change in the cost totals.
If there is no cost leave blank.
Col. 73 Fiscal Year of Action Use last digit of fiscal year in which funds will be committed. To prevent confusion never project more than five years beyond the current fiscal year.
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DEC 1719M O Col. 75-80 Current Status Change Date Enter date only when naking initial entry or changing current status, Col. 15. Use numerals for all entries. Start with right digit in month and day boxes.
FORf1 PREPARATI0ft:
New Entry Make all new entries using a form containing a prenumbered entry in Col. I through 6.
Fill in Col. 7 through 63, entering a "ll" in Col. 7 and a "C" in Col.15 if the client has been notified. Written description by team members should be prepared so they may be used later by the Team Leader if he formulates the memo to the client.
Funding information (Col. 69 through 74) is not required, entry may be made if known. The duplicate copy of the HIRAC form is to be retained by the res-ponsible group.
The original copy associated with inspection of a particular building is transmitted to the Support Team Leader for notification of the client, if he is to notify the client. After the client has been notified, enter the date l
in the change date field (Col. 75-80) and fonfard the HIRAC forms for processing to HIRAC, L-517. IIIRAC originals may be sent directly to the HIPAC Coordinator. if Support Tean Leader involvement is not required. Original copies are filed by the g
HIRAC Coordinator by ID number.
To facilitate identification and processing of supplementary reports, include the ID number proceeding each recommendation listed on the memo to the client.
Modification Entries After the new (' initial) entry has been made, modifications (changes) are processed using a llIRAC form that contains no prenumbering in Col.1-6. The appropriate HIRAC number is filled in by the preparer.
Every modification must include this number.
Fill in Col. 7 cn every entry. This provides the ADP equipment with instructions on what to do with the data.
Enter data only in those fields that one desires to change, leave all others blank.
Entering a dash in the initial box of a field causes the field' to be blanked out on the print-out. The " Prepared Date" and the " Preparer's Name" are to be included each time a HIRAC form is prepared.
Duplicate copies of IIIRAC forms may be destroyed upon return of the originals.
l The discipline or group responsible for making the initial entry is also responsible for keeping.the llIRAC reports updated. Inferration observed by others concerning HIRAC l
Items should be forwdrded to this group for processing.
Keep HIRAC data' current.
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C-ll Ot.C 171975 Reports Copies of the following reports are distributed by the llIRAC Coordinator.
Report flo.
Sorted By 451-101 Input deck listing.
451-102 HIRAC number.
451-103 Discipline, Facility, and Current Status.
451-104 Team, Facility, and Current Status.
451-105 Discipline, Priority and Correction Type.
451-106 Priority, Correction Type and Facility.
451-107 HIRAC number (Itens completed this fiscal year).
Each Discipline Leader or Responsible Group will receive a copy of Report 102, 103 and 105 and 'each Support Team Leader will receive a copy of Report 102 and 104. Copies of the other reports are available on request.
Special reports can be prepared on request.
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,,i sV HAZARDS HIRAC PROGRAM CONTROL Resp. Disc.
Current Corr.
Recomm.
Trans.
Facility Team or Group Report St_atus Type Cat _eg.
ID No. -+-
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9 to it i2 i3 14 is to 17 to Recommendations E
FY Fund Current Status Priority Co g O Action Type Change Date f~Z yy 73 74 y$ ys yy yg y9 gg 48 49 MMD0YY DESCRIPTION
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(OSHA 19 _ _.
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Standards Abbreviation ID No.
ID No.
ADMINISTRATIVE COMMENTS ADP Completed
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P AZ ARCS CCNT RCL-HIR AC SYSTEM REPCRT NO. 1 PERICO ENCEC 1/31/74 BY JOE NO.
EE-353C6 ICENTIFICATIch NC.
PAGE NO.
1 f.0.
CURR.
CPRR.
PECOM (Kit FY FUNO STATUS N;* DER TRANE FACIL TEAM CISC RPT STATUS TYPE
!.1.
RECOMMENDATICNS PRIOR CCST ACTN TYPE CHAAGE 1
M 10C F
0 C
2 L2 ADDITIONAL 14 WATER SUPPLY LINE FRCP SAACIA TK 1 S
35E G 09/17/73 2
P 10C F
0 3
2 CHEOK VALVES S ANDI A TKS 14 TO LAB SLPPLY 2EA 2
2 G 09/17/73 3
r 130 F
3 2
L2 FIRE HYORANT 3 PACING 3
09/17/73 5
P 295 4
F 3
3.
L2 AUTO CONT 4GL ZCNE 7 FIRE PUPPS SA 25 09/17/73 7
F 295 4
F 0
2 L2 LOC < SEAL FLEL Tak< ZONE 7 PU"P SC 2
P 09/17/73 29E 4
F 0
2 L2 SCREEN IN 27 FULL FILL LIhE 53 2
P 39/17/73 3
9 r
29E 4
F 3
2 L2 Ev7CNO TANK VENT LINE ZCNE 7 SE 2
P 09/17/73 13 M
295 4
F G
2 L2 FLEX PunD CRI/E CCNNECTOR METALIC SA C 2
P 39/17/73 11 29E 4
F C
2 L2 CCOLIh; baTER SIG9T GLASS ZCNE7 SG C 2
P 09/17/73 295 4
F D
2 L2 SEAL VALV:S N3RPAL FOSITIOP 20NE 7 SH 2
P 09/17/73 12 F
3 2
L2 STR=INER AN3 PRESSJRE GAGi 5I C 2
P 09/17/73 13 M
295 1*
M 295 r
3 2
L2 PU"P SPEE 0 A DJUSTPE r.TS FULL START SJ 2
P 09/17/73 15 M
1]O 2
F 0
5 L2 SITE WICE-VALJE St ERVISICN WATER SYSTEP L I '/
6 3
25 5
N 09/17/73 17 M
93C 5
F D
2 L2 SITE WICE VALJE SLPERVISICN W ATER SYSTEM S300 8A C 25 G 09/17/73 15 P
30C 5
F 0
P 2
L2 AUTO TAN < WELL FILL CONTROLS 89 3 15 G 11/2(/73
- cC 5
F 3
2 L2 PCRTABLE PCaER TO PUMGS 80 C e4 G 09/17/73 23 21 M
=24 2
F 3
2 L8 Sp(R PREACTICN Cq rIRE WALL RCOF 9
9 5
G 09/17/73 22
- 24 2
F 0
2 L8 PCO OET ACTUATE SF<R STS 10 0
15 G 09/17/73 26 F
LQ1 2
F D
2 J9 BOILER CCNTeCLS 14A 9 50 N C9/17/73 ji 27 F
431 2
F D
2 J9 BOILER CChT4CLS 146 E 50 N J 9/17/ 7 3
-s 23 M
431 2
F D
2 J9 90!LER C CNT aCLS 14C G 39/17/73 431 2
F 0
1 F6 EELCCATE C;LM STC4 AGE 15 8
P 09/17/73 35 29
=
30 P
315 5
F D
2 J9 BCILER CCNTACLS 16 5
2 N 09/17/73 31 M
E22 2
F 0
2 J9 SCILER CChT;0.5 17A 3 10 N 09/17/73 32 h
622 2
F 0
P 2
J9 00ILER CCNTRO S 178 2 10 0
N 09/17/73 33 N
(22 2
F 0
1 BOILER CCNTRCLS 17C 3 3*
M E22 2
F 0
2 J9 BOILER CCNT4CLS 173 8 N 09/17/73 35 M
622 2
F C
2 J9 BOILER CChTRC.S 17E 8 N
09/17/73 36 F
297 4
F 0
3 CCMP AIR FIPE INTERNAL CLEANING 20 P 09/17/73 35 M
31!
2 F
0 3
FIRE WALL R1031C A10 BOILER RM 22 3
09/17/73 39 e
312 2
F C
3 9ATTEAY E"
2HR FIFE WALL 23 2
09/17/73 40 r
313 2
F 3
1 JS HOUSExEEFIN3 RErowE CCMSUSTIBLES 24 6
09/17/73 41 M
313 2
F 0
1 0
-STUP SQL3CRIN; OEN;H CPERATICN 41 09/17/73 43 M
130 F
0 2
9 INSPECTICh FCRM FCLLOW UP CCPvPROCECURE 274 4
09/17/73 4*
M 100 F
0 2
8 INSP ENFHASIS FIri3 PROTECTION 270 09/17/73 45 M
1]C F
3 2
8 C O NT RO L VALJE IC ENT IF IC A T ION LCCEIhG 27C 39/17/73 46 M
99c F
D 2
9 REPJRT ALL DIFICIt%CIES 26 09/17/73 47 M
130 F
0 2
B INSPECTICN FC;0VEh0V 29 09/17/73 4$
P 2CC F
0 2
8 INSPECTICN TRAININ3 30 09/17/73 49 M
100 F
3 2
SYSTEM TEST ALAR
- 1CNTHLY 31A 09/17/73 50 r
13C F
C 3
FIRE PUMF TEST hEt<LY 319 09/17/73 51 M
100 F
3 2
SP<R MAIN CRAIN TEST MONTHLY 31C 09/17/73 52 P
13C F
0 2
FIRE DCOR DAM 3ER TEST YEAELY 310 39/17/73 G
O 9
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.l APPENDIX D INFORMATION SOURCES FOR SAFETY ANALYSES l
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O The following is a list of a few organizations who can provide valuable data in performing safety analysis:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
National Safety Council (NSC)
Government / Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) - Failure Rates Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
Department of Transportation (D0T)
Department of Labor (DOL)
National Refarral Center (NRC)
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
Factory Mutual (other insurance companies)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Research Institutes Professional Societies The following documents have also proven valuable:
Accident Facts (NSC)
World Almanac and Book of Facts U.S. Statistical Abstract (DOL)
' County and City Data Book (00L) 9 O
D-2
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GTHER SSDC PUBLICATIONS IN THIS SERIES i
I SSDC-1 Occupancy-Use Readiness Manual SSDC-2 Human Factors in Design O
SSDC-3 A Contractor Guide to Advance Preparation for Accident Investigation SSDC-4 MORT User's Manual SSDC-5 Reported Significant Observation (RS0) Studies i'
SSDC-6 Training as Related to Behavioral Change SSDC-7 ERDA Guide to the Classification of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses SSDC-8 Standardization Guide for Construction and Use of MORT-Type Analytic Trees 3
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