ML19308A542
| ML19308A542 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/1979 |
| From: | Creswell J, Kane K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7910310252 | |
| Download: ML19308A542 (175) | |
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............................................x PRESIDENT'S C0hNISSION ON THE ACCIDEi:T.AT THREE MILE ISLAND
x DEPOSITION of NUCLEAR REGULATORY C05NISSION by JAMES S.
CRESWELL, held at the offices of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, 2100 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., on the 12th day of July 1979, commencing at 10:30 a.m., before Stanley Rudbarg, Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public of the State of New York.
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i BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS i
FIVE BEEKMAN STREET NEW YORK. NEW YORK 10038 1
3 7910310 L N
[212] 374-1138 l
1 2
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION:
3 MARK E. CH0PKO 4
C Attorney, Office of General Counsel 5
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 8th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20055 6
7 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THREE MILE ISLAND:
8 9
KEVIN P.
KANE, ESQ.
Deputy Chief Counsel 11 GARY M. SIDELL, ESQ.
12 Associate Counsel 13 ALSO PRESENT:
14 WILLIAM BLAND T
hnical Staff 5
16 17 000 18 19 20 21
=
l 23 24 25 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
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1 3
2 JAMES S.
- CRESWELL, having 3
been duly sworn by Gary M. Sidell, Esq.,
4 was called as a witness and testified as follows:
L 5
DIRECT EXAMINATION 6
BY MR. SIDELL:
7 Q
Would you state your name, spelling it 8
for the record.
9 A
My name is James S.
Creswell.
10 Q
Mr. Creswell, have you had your deposition 11 taken previously?
12 A
No.
13 Q
I will briefly explain, then, the purpose 14 of what we are going to do here.
Your testimony is 15 taken under oath.
Even though we are in a relatively 16 informal setting, it has the same effect and solemnity 17 as though taken in a court of law before a judge or 18 jury.
Therefore, anything that you say, we request 19 it be as precise and accurate as possible.
When we 20 are done, the transcript will be reduced to writing, 21 your deposition will be supplied to you to be read, I.
22 corrected, if at all, then signed.
23 Should you choose, however, to make any corrections, 24 be advised that should we deem the occasion necessary, 25 we will be able to comment on those changes which may SENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 Creswell 4
l 2
adversely affect your credibility, so that it is 3
important to be as accurate and as factually correct 4
as you possibly can be.
5 If there is any instance where you don't accurately 6
understand any question that I ask you, please ask me 7
to explain it, and I will.
Then we will attempt to 8
avoid any misunderstanding about what we are really 9
trying to find out.
10 Have you brought a copy of your resume with you?
11 A
Well, I was requested to provide a brief state-12 ment regarding education and experience, and I brought 13 that.
(Indicating.) I was at the TMI site when I was 14 informed yesterday that I would 'ae appearing today, and 15 I made this brief outline.
If you would like something 16 in more detail, when I arrive back home, I could furnish 17 you with a formal resume.
18 MR. KANE:
I think that would be helpful 19 if you could just do that and mail it to Mr. Chopko, 20 and he will get it on to us.
21 Q
At least as far as the information'provided 22 on this summary of your background, this is accurate 23 information?
24 A
Yes.
25 MR. SIDELL:
We would like to mark this as B ENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 Creswell 5
2 Exhibit No. 1 to the Creswell Deposition.
3 (Resume of James S.
Creswell was ma::ked Creswell. Deposition Exhibit i for identification, 4
5 this date.)
6 Q
Since the reporter is taking this down, it 7
is necessary that you answer questions audibly and 8
try to minimize if not fail to use gestures at all 9
because gestures obviously are.not subject to being 10 transcribed.
Can you give us a general description of 11 how the NRC procedures would work, should someone think 12 there is a potential safety problem at a nuclear facility.
13 A
Normally in my role as a reactor inspector, I 14 would be involved in inspections of facilities, and 15 upon conducting an inspection, I would go back into the 16 regional offices and prepare an inspection report.
17 The material in this inspection report would be 18 discussed and reviewed by my supervisor.
It would be 19 further reviewed up the branch chief level in the l
20 region, and normally in some instances, the report may i
21 go under the signature of the Regional Director.
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22 Q
What specific kinds of instances would 23 those be requiring the director's signature?
24 A
If there was a significant finding on which it was 25 felt that more than the branch chief's signature would B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
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Creswell 6
2 be involved, it would go to the Regional Director.
3 It is my understanding that the Regional Director 4
has instructed that if there is an indication of manage-p-
5 ment control breakdown, this is one type of instance 6
where it would go out under his signature.
l 7
Q What kind of management control breakdown, 8
lack of communication or --
9 A
Lack of communications, lack of following pro-10 cedures in a significant fashion, several instances of 11 failing to follow procedures or a single instance of 12 real significance.
13 Q
Would the same situation apply regarding 14 the director's signature if there was a problem you 15 found at.one plant that may have existed at several 16 others by the same manufacturer?
17 A
That type of item is classified as a generic item, 18 and generic items would normally involve an NRC-wide 19 type of response, and there are methods of handling 20 that.
One way of handling that is to write a memo to 21 headquarters, our headquarters group, identifying that 22 we believe that this is applicable to other sites.
23 Q
When you use the term " generic," how are 24 you referring to that?
25 A
In the sense that you described, that is applied L
B ENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
1 Creswell 7
2 to other facilities.
3 Q
Is it merely more than one facility of a 4
particular manufacturer, or is it all facilities?
~
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5 A
Well, from the perspective of being involved in 6
the region, when you identify an item, what you normally 7
determine is if within that region there is another 8
facility that also has the problem; then this would be 9
identified in the memorandum.
10 It happens that in Region 3, there is only one 11 B4W facility, and that is the Davis-Besse facility.
12 So to determine the generic implications, one doesn't 13 have a standard to go by.
14 Q
Do you have any information in Region 3
15 where your office is advised of potential safety 16 problems that may exist in other regions at B6W plants?
17 A
The NRC distributes to the licensees and to other 18 regions communications called circulars and bulletins.
19 Normally, it is my understanding, those circulars are 20 restricted to information-only type of action, whereas 21 the bulletin would require a specific action on the L
22 part of the licensees and response.
23 Q
So it is essentially an ex post facto 24 situation, rather than be on the lookout for potential 25 problems of this nature?
B ENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE i
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2 A
That is the normal way of handling things.
- Now, 3
sometimes there are communications between, say, project 4
inspectors, telephone-type conversations.
[^
5 Q
Are those merely situations where the 6
inspector might be inquisitive of a particular problem 7
and, on his own, informally call up someone else?
8 A
That is correct.
9 Q
But there are no formal procedures for 10 finding out beforehand, before a problem gets to be 11 labelled " generic," whether they may exist in other 12 areas?
13 A
I am not aware of it.
14 Q
You have worked as an inspector for reactors 15 with NRC.for the past three years, am I correct?
16 A
A little over three y' ears.
Those numbers are 17 approximate.
A little over three years.
18 Q
So that if there were a formal procedure, 19 you would be aware of it?
20 A
Yes.
It is my -- the only ones I am aware of 21 are the circulars and bulletins.
(
22 Q
In 1977 or '78, di.d any particular safety-l 23 related issue concerning the B5W plant come to your 24 attention?
l 25 A
If there was a bulletin or circular issued during l
BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE i
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Creswell 9
2 that period of time, I do not recollect at this point.
3 It could have been, but I don' t recollect one at this 4
time.
(
5 Q
Did you find out about any potential safety 6
problem at a B6W plant by any informal meetings, rather 7
than a formal bulletin or circular?
8 A
Other than the normal course of my inspections at 9
the Davis-Besse facility?
10 Q
Yes.
11 A
I don't recollect that I did.
12 Q
With respect to Davis-Besse, when did you 13 find out that there were possible safety-related 14 problems with the pressurizer level indication?
15 A
The first instance of that was in December of 16 1978, as I recall.
There had been an event on 17 November 29, 1978.
18 Q
Excuse me, of 1978 or '77?
19 A
1977 -- I'm sorry.
We are talking about a time 20 period quite removed.
21 Q
It is at times rather confusing.
Please 22 go ahead.
23 A
During this event, pressuri:er level indication 24 was lost.
25 Q
It was off-scale?
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BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
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A It was off-scale low.
3 Q
How did you first become aware of that 4
situation?
[~
5 A
I was asked by the project inspector.
6 Q
Who is that?
7 A
Mr. Tom Tambling, to tt.,e a look at the data 8
resulting from this transient because the licensee 9
wanted to take benefit for what they perceived to be 10 natural circulation mode that was incurred during the 11 transient.
12 I was asked by the project inspector to evaluate 13 it and see if it would be acceptable as a proof of 14 natural circulation.
15 Q
So being informed of this situation at 16 Davis-Besse in November of 1977 by Mr. Tambling was 17 a somewhat different method for you to find out about 18 investigations than previously, or the usual manner, 19 is that right?
20 A
I don't understand the question.
21 Q
I believe you previously said that you, 22 on investigations in your plant 23 A
Inspections.
There is a difference between 24
" investigations" and " inspections."
My normal duty 25 would be to conduct inspections.
1 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
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Creswell 11 2
Q But you did not conduct an inspection to 3
find out about, in the first instance, this loss of 4
pressurizer level indication problem at Davis-Besse in
\\
5 November '77?
6 A
I am still not clear.
Let me say this.
The 7
way that I got involved with that transient was after 8
the fact at the request of the project ionspector.
I 9
was not there at the facility when the transient 10 occurred.
11 Q
And this was not your usual method of 12 investigating situations, was it, after the fact, on 13 Mr. Tambling's request?
14 A
In a few isolated instances, I have at Mr. Tambling's 15 request looked at some events that occurred, yes.
16 Q
What kind of isolated instances?
17 A
There was another event, and I don't recollect 18 the date, but it was within a month's time of this 19 event that we have been talking about, November 29, 1977, 20 that I looked at an event involving some dropped control 21 rods.
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22 Q
Do you feel there is any minimum level of 23 significance for the kind of matters Mr. Tambling asked 25 you to investigate, or are they merely things that come l
25 up and you are an available investigator?
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BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
1 Creswell 12 2
A Well,-the two main parties involved in the 3
inspection program at that time would have been 4
Mr. Tambling, the project inspector, and myself as test
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5 program inspector.
And it would have been natural for 6
Mr. Tambling, since I would already be conducting an 7
inspection there, during the course of my normal run 8
of my activities to ask me to do those, to look into 9
those matters.
10 Q
So on Mr. Tambling's request, you investi-11 gated a loss of pressuri:er level indication at Davis-12 Besse?
13 A
I investigated a transient.
I want to make it 14 clear as to what Mr. Tambling told me.
15 He.says, "The licensee wants to use data accumu-16 lated during the transient to prove that they had 17 natural circulation."
That is how I went into it.
18 I looked at the data.
When I looked at the data, 19 I found that there wasn't a plot for pressurizer level, i
20 and that, I thought, was strange.
When I started 21 delving into it, it turned out that the level had gone k
22 off-scale.
l 23 Q
As far as you are aware, this transient i
24 was not induced by the operator, Davis-Besse, was it?
25 A
As I recollect, this transient was induced BEN sAMIN R EPORTIN G SERVICE
1 Creswell 13 2
by erroneous hooking up of what we call a patch panel.
3 This is a panel board with multiple connections on it 4
- hat can be wired to accumulate certain data.
This
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5 panel was inserted incorrectly.
It wasn't inserted 6
incorrectly -- it was wired incorrectly, and when it 7
was inserted, it produced the initiating event for 8
the transient.
9 Q
What else, if anything, did you find in 10 your investigation concerning loss of pressurizer 11 level indication?
12 A
As far as the licensee's using the data as a 13 verification of natural circulation, my position was 14 that because of the abnormal conditions created by the 15 transient, that the data wasn't good enough to justify 16 technically that they had proven natural circulation 17 capability.
18 This was relayed to the project inspector.
We 19 discussed it, and it was decided to refer the matter
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20 to our licensing group for their review.
l 21 Q
Did you make a written report to Mr. Tambling
(.
l 22 about this?
23 A
No.
I believe my position, however, is documented 21 in Inspection Report 5346-7806.
25 i
BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
SR/pw 1
Creswell 14 T2.1 2
Q Was Mr. Tambling satisfied with the investi-3 gation at that point, as far as you know?
4 A
Was he satisfied?
[
5 Q
With your investigation, with your repert.
6 A
What do you mean by " satisfied"?
7 Q
Did he ask you to go back and look at some-8 thing else?
9 A
I don't recollect that he did.
10 Q
So is it fair to say he was satisfied with 11 your report as it was given to him?
12 A From the standpoint of the questions that you 13 just asked me, did he come back and ask me to look at 14 something else, I don't recollect that he asked me to 15 look at anything else.
16 Q
Did he advise you of a similar transient at 17 the Davis-Besse plant in September 1977?
18 A He didn't.
19 Q
Did you at some time become aware of that i
20 transient?
21 A I was aware of that transient in the time period 22 of when it happened.
One of the fellows in our office, 23 one of the inspectors by the name of Terry Harpster 24 accompanied Mr. Tambling over on the revier of that i
25 event, and Mr. Harpster had discussed with me.
I I
BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
6 2.2
,1 Creswell 15 2
Q And that discussion occurred about the 3
time or shortly after the time of that transient?
4 A
Yes.
(
5 Q
What did he explain to you that he found 6
took place?
7 A
As I recall, that the steam generators had went 8
dry, that was one of the more significant things that 9
occurred during the event.
10 Q
Did he mention anything about loss of 11 pressurizer level indication?
12 A
No.
In September 24, 1977 pressurizer level 13 indication was not lost.
14 Q
Well, when you say "not lost," did it 15 exceed or was it rising?
16 A It rose to the upper limit.
17 Q
And what was going on with the pressure in 18 the reactor core at that point, if you know?
19 A It dropped to the saturated condition.
20 Q
Was that a usual or expected result?
21 A No.
(-
22 Q
Was any particular note made of that 23 phenomenon in anyone's report that you know of?
24 A That may have been in the licensee's updated 25 LER.
I don't recall at this point whether it was or BENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
1 2.3 1
Creswell 16 2
not.
3 Q
It is fair to conclude that Mr. Tambling 4
knew about that inconsistency with the pressurizer level
(
5 indication in the September Davis-Besse transient, isn't 6
it?
7 A
Yes.
We haven't progressed on in time, but as 8
I started getting into the November 29, 1977 event, 9
later in 1978 the subject of high pressure injection 10 performance during the event came up, and at that time 11 I pulled out the plot charts of parameters during that 12 event in the computer printouts and studied them some-13 what in detail, and at that point it became apparent 14 to me that there had been the pressuri:er leve1' response 15 that we h. ave been talking about previously.
16 Q
What context led you to investigate the 17 printout of the September '77 transient?
18 A When I loo'ked at -- when you say " printout," you 19 are talking about the process computer printout?
j 20 Q
Yes.
21 A When I looked at the plots of the parameters, I 22 noted that the high pressure injection system had been I
23 disabled during the event, and after it had been 24 disabled, and when I say " disabled," the pumps had been 25 shut off.
SENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE r
3.4~
1 Creswell 17 2
Q Manually shut off?
3 A
Yes.
The flow had been stopped to the reactor 4
coolant system.
That after that period of time there
(,
i 5
was the response that we had discussed earlier with 6
pressurizer level, and there was saturated conditions 7
formed in the reactor core and the off-scale indication 8
of level.
9 Q
So essentially from an operator's perspective, 10 all he knew was that he had gone solid, is that fair 11 to conclude?
12 A
I should make it clear that I did not conduct a 13 series of interviews with the operators about the!
It September 24, 1977 event.
15 Q
But based on the operator manually turning 16 off the HPI system, by viewing the rising or high level 17 in the pressuri:er level indication.
18 A
No, it should be made clear that the high pressure 19 inj ection was shut off prior to the level going up.
It 20 is a different situation than you had at Three Mile 21 Island.
It took more time to develop, and initially 22 the response of the pressurizer level was a sharp 23 decrease.
Then high pressure injection evidently 25 brought the level -- it started recovering.
You could 25 see the level coming back up.
Then after the high l
BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
2.5 1
Creswell 18 2
pressure injection was shut off, the leve7 started 3
decreasing again until saturated conditions were 4
achieved in the reactor coolant system.
Then it went
-~.
5 up.
6 So there are differences in the response in the 7
September 24, 1977 event and the TMI 2 event.
8 Q
It was not then the rising pressurizer 9
level that caused the operator to turn off the HPI 10 system?
11 A
Well, the operator did -- it is my understanding --
12 respond to the increase of level in the pressurizer.
13 That was his justification for shutting off the high 14 pressure injection.
15 The. point I want to make is you didn't have the 16 same response characteristics exactly with TMI 2 and 17 with September 24 Davis-Besse.
18 Q
In the September 24, 1977 event at Davis-19 Besse there was only operation at 9 percent power, wasn't 20 there?
21 A That is correct.
(
22 Q
Which was not the case at TMI?
23 A TMI was approximately 98 percent power.
24 Q
When specifically, if you remember, in 1978 25 did you first learn of the September '77 Davis-Besse BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
2.6 1
Creswell 19-2 transient?
3 A
Well, I had known about it, but I didn't know 4
these details about it.
(.
5 Q
When did you learn the specifics?
6 A
I would say late summer or early fall of 1978 7
I started looking at those, that data in detail.
8 Q
Were you requested by anyone to look at '
9 that information?
10 A
No.
11 Q
What prompted you to investigate it then?
12 A Because of the loss of pressurizer level, it was 13 maintained that high pressure injection could be used 14 to bolster the pressuri:er level during one of the 15 shrinkage-type of events.
16 Q
Essentially the HPI system would be used 17 as a makeup.?
18 A That is correct.
19 Q
Is there any difference between HPI pumps 20 and makeup pumps in a B6W facility?
21 A Well, at Davis-Besse high pressure injection pumps i
(
22 have a shutoff head of 1600 pounds.
Their makeup pumps 23 have a capacity -- I don't recall what the shutoff head 24 is on makeup pumps -- but I believe it is beyond 2500 25 pounds.
I am not positive about that.
B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE L
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At Three Mile Island you have both the makeup 3
pump and the high pressure injection pump -- all have 4
the high capacity.
At Three Mile Island they have the
[
5 capacity to go above 2500 pounds.
6 Q
Are the makeup pumps and HPI pumps two 7
separate pumps or merely one pump with two different 8
functions?
9 A At Three Mile Island you would have one pump 10 devoted to makeup duty and two pumps devoted to high 11 pressure injection.
12 Q
In connection with your investigation of 13 the B5W plant, have you found a correlation between 14 makeup pumps and HPI pumps to be more similar to Three 15 Mile Island or to Davis-Besse?
16 A The only two plants that I have direct knowledge 17 of are Davis-Besse and Three Mile Island Unit 2.
18 When I say "Three Mile Island," I want to be clear 19 that that does not include Three Mile Island No. 1 20 because there are some differences between those two 21 facilities also.
(
22 Q
When you were first investigating the 23 September '77 transient, Davis-Besse, in the summer of 24 ' 78, did you make any report of your conclusions?
i 25 A Yes.
One of my inspection reports -- and I don't S ENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
2.8 1
Creswell 21 2
recall the number on this one -- does document that 3
the high pressure injection pump was shut off during 4
the September 24th event prior to the cause of the LOCA 5
being determined.
When I say "LOCA," that is the MOV.
6 Q
What is "MOV"?
7 A
Electromatic-operated valve.
8 Q
PORV?
9 A
PORV -- sorry -- at Davis-Besse, a power-operated 10 relief valve.
There is documentation of that in one 11 of my inspection reports.
12 Q
Would this possibly be the August 14, 1978 13 report that you forwarded to Mr. Streeter?
14 A
Is that 17-78?
15 Q
Unfortunately, I don't have that report.
16 I was going to ask you to provide a copy of that to us 17 at some time.
My only reference is that it is from you 18 to J. F. Streeter, dated August 14.
19 A
That is a memorandum or report?
20 Q
It is a memo and it is referred to in a 21 December 20, 1978 remo from J. F. Streeter to you, 22 concerning the technical evaluation of Davis-Besse 1, 23 which has previously been marked as Exhibit 3 in a 24 Foster deposition.
I will let you take a look at 25 that.
BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
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2 A
I believe you will find the statement that I was i
3 referring to about the operator disabling the high 4
pressure injection pumps before the cause of the LOCA j'.
t 5
being determined was in an inspection report.
6 MR. KANE:
Would it be possible for you 7
to locate that report?
8 THE WITNESS:
Once I get back to Region 3, 9
if you can arrange that, I would be happy.
10 MR. CH0PK0:
You may also find it in the 11 Public Document Room at NRC.
12 THE WITNESS:
It should be in the PDR.
L3 MR. KANE:
How can we reference that?
14 MR. CHOPK0:
You would probably find it 15 und_er " Davis-Besse Facility Docket Number."
I 16 have no idea what that is.
l 17 THE WITNESS:
It should be 50-346, if my 18 memory is correct.
19 MR. CH0PK0:
You should be able to have 20 access to everything from calendar year'77 '78
(.
21 without any trouble.
22 MR. KANE:
Can we nail down the time?
23 Do you think you can recall a month during the 21 year when that might have been prepared?
25 THE WITNESS:
I would say at this point BENJAMIN R EPORTIN G SERVICE
2.10 1
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that September of '78 would probably be a pretty 3
good date.
4 Q
Who was this September '78 report concerning
(
5 Davis-Besse sent to, if you recall?
6 A
Our reports are normally transmitted to the 7
vice-president of Toledo Edison, Mr. Lowell Rowe.
8 Q
Was Mr. Streeter also provided a copy of 9
your report?
10 A Mr. Streeter would have been at that time the 11 reviewer of my report, the supervisor who would have 12 reviewed that report.
13 Q
Would Mr. Tambling have seen a copy of the 14 report?
15 A He would have concurred with the inspection 16 report prior to it being sent.
17 Q
Do you remember that he did, in fact, concur 18 with this partick11ar report?
19 A
My recollection is that he concurred on all of 20 my inspection reports.
21 Q
Did he make any specific --
22 A
Tf he were present.
Now, in some instances there 23 will be someone appointed as acting in a person's
,4 l
absence, where they would review the report.
But 25 normally Mr. Tambling would have been on distribution i
SENJAMIN R EPORTIN G SERVICE
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for that.
3 Q
Did you make any specific conclusions about 4
the operation of the pressurizer level indication during 5
that September '77 transient at Davis-Besse in your 6
inspection report?
7 A I didn't make a conclusion about the level indica-8 tion itself.
I think probably what you are getting at 9
is did I determine that there could be a trapping effect 10 in the pressuri:er.
I did not.
11 What my concern was was that the coclant to the 12 core was interrupted prior to the determination of what 13 the loss of coolant was and its correction and subsequent 14 recovery.
15 Q
If that situation had occurred at a plant 16 operating at something subtantially greater than 9 percent 17 capacity, could that have posed a problem of uncovering 18 the core?
1
'19 A It is possible, but there are other factors that 20 have to be considered.
21 If the event at Davis-Besse happened after a very 22 short period of out operation, there was only one t
l 23 effective full power day of exposure on the core, that 24 essentially means that that exposure that would be 25 incurred by operating the plant at 100 percent for one B ENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
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Creswell 25 2
day; so the exposure on the core and hence the decay 3
heat would have a bearing on, say, where the fuel 4
damage would occur.
D T3 5
Q So a plant operating at relatively full 6
capacity, let us say 95 to 100 percent, the potential 7
for uncovering the core where pressurizer level indi-8 cation is going high'in a similar situation.to Davis-9 Besse during September '77, could be a relatively 10 serious problem?
11 A
The potential is always there.
I might note at 12 TMI: it took a considerable period of time, on the 13 order of two hours, to allow enough coolant to escape 14 the reactor coolant system to result in core uncovery.
15 It.doesn't appear to be an instantaneous type 16 ci phenomenon, but it requires that you have a leak out 17 of the system for a considerable period of time.
18 There are several factors.
You have to assume 19 that if you get the erroneous pressurizer level 20 indication, that the operator is just going to believe 21 that erroneous -- well, not erroneous -- he is going i_
22 to believe that that high pressuri:er level is going i
23 to indicate the level of coolant in the reactor coolant 24 system.
25 Q
Is that also complicated by the fact that B ENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
I Creswell 26 2
an operator would manually override the HPI system and 3
turn them off?
(
4 A
As I understand it, the concern about the high-h 5
pressure level indication is a fear on the part of the 6
operators about going solid, that is, creating a solid 7
condition in the reactor coolant system that might 8
result in limiting the safety relief valves, of over-9 pressuri::ing the system, or perhaps it could be the 10 consideration that once the safety valves were lifted, 11 they might not reset, and in that situation you don't 12 have a way of isolating the leak.
13 The St0V, as a block valve --
14 Q
When you say "BIOV," is that the same as 15 "PORV"?
16 A
Power-operated relief valve of the Davis-Besse, 17 correct.
18 Q
When that sticks open unnoticed by an 19 operator, and the operator then cuts back HPI, what 20 are the potential problems for uncovering the core then?
21 A
. Well, the valve is going to allow the loss of l
('
l-22 coolant.
The high-pressure injection system is the 23 safety system designed to supply cooling water to the 24 core during this condition, and it is just simply a
25 matter of you are losing more coolant than you are BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 Creswell 27 2
putting in.
3 Q
So over time in that situation, would that 4
in your. opinion be a potential safety problem?
f.
5 A
The failure of a valve open and not supplying 6
high-pressure injection would be a safety concern.
7 Q
Is that also exaggerated by the fact that 8
the operator may have turned off the HPI by misreading 9
or misinterpreting the reading of a pressurizer level 10 indication?
11 A
Could you phrase that again.
12 Q
If the PORV valve stuck open, and as a 13 result of that you are losing coolant throughout the 14 system, and if for some reason the pressurizer level 15 indication is increasing or goes off-scale high, what 16 is an operator's training in that situation?
17 A
I can't speak to how those people are trained at 18 the simulator.
19 Q
Do you know how they operate in practice?
20 A
This is an abnorms.1 condition as far as training 21 is ;oncerned.
I think that has been fairly well 22 established that those people were not trained to deal 23 with this particular casualty transient, so you would 24 be dealing with an area where it is my understanding 25 they would have not been trained to deal with this BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
1 l
1 Creswell 28 2
specific set of circumstances.
3 Q
Are you aware of any other instances besides 4
TMI 2 where the PORV valve stuck open on a B6W plant?
(
5 A
I am aware of an event that happened at Oconee.
6 It is my understanding that Unit 1 at TMI, the MOV 7
stuck open before.
However, I have not looked at data 8
associated with those transients, so that is hearsay 9
type of information.
10 Q
These are just office gossip events, 11 essentially, you heard?
12 A
What I heard during the course of the investigation 13 and talked to people at TMI.
14 Q
But prior to your investigation at TMI 2, 15 you were unaware of a stuck-open PORV at Oconee?
16 A
I have no recollection of knowing about that until 17 I found out about the September 24th event at Davis-18 Besse.
19 Q
So in the summer of '78, when you were 20 investigating the September '77 Davis-Besse transient, 21 you also found out about Oconee?
,(
22 A
No, that was later.
23 Q
After the summer of '78?
24 A
That's right.
i 25 Q
Do you know approximately when?
BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 Creswell 29 2
A
-'m sure I heard about it after I arrived at the 3
TMI site.
That would have been after April '79, to 4
give you a date.
Prior to that, I did not.
(2 5
Q So you first learned of Oconee 3 with the 6
stuck-open PORV after TMI 2 in March '797 7
A Yes, that is my recollection.
8 Q
Oconee 3 is located in which particular 9
region, if you know?
10 A
Region 2.
It is located near Clemson, South l
11 Carolina.
12 Q
Was anything done, to your knowledge, with 13 your investigation report that you filed in late summer 14 of 1978 concerning the loss of pressuri:er level 15 indication?
16 A
Concurrent with my review of that, my reporting 17 of it in the inspection report, I was dealing with the 18 licensee to mod'ify his procedures, such that the high-19 pressure injection system wouldn't be disabled until 20 the cause, the location of a break or a loss of coolant 21 had been determined.
22 Q
So your first conclusion in this inspection 23 report is don't turn off the HPI system mtil you know 24 precisely what the problem is?
25 A
If I recall, I
identified what had happened S ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 1
Creswell 30 2
September 24,
'77, and I believe in the same report it 3
is addressed that we were working with the licensee to 4
get them to modify the procedure.
b 5
Q Did you view that as a safety problem?
6 A
I did.
7 Q
What was the operator's view of that situation?
8 Was it also a safety problem?
9 A
I don't recall discussing the September 24 event 10 with an operator.
11 Q
Excuse me.
When I say " operator," I mean 12 the utility.
13 A
The licensee?
14 Q
Yes.
15 A
I want to come bad to clarify my remark on i
16 training for the opeators.
The utilitr's position was 17 mixed, as I recall.
In talking to one individual with 18 the Power Engineering Department, which is an off-site 19 engineering function for the utility, in the B6W 20 corporate offices in Toledo, he said one of the things 21 that bothered him most about that event was the disabling 22 of the high-pressure injection system.
23 Q
Did he say why that bothered him?
24 A
Well, I don't recall exactly what his statements 25 were along that line, but it would more than likely S ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
I Creswell 31 2
have been because of not providing cooling during the 3
course of the loss of coolant.
4 Q
So his concerns were also safety-related?
(: -
5 A
That is correct.
6 Q
Do you remember the name of the individual 7
you spoke with?
8 A
It is Mr. Fred Miller.
9 Q
Did you speak with anyone else at Toledo 10 Edison about the September 24th loss of pressuri:er 11 level indication?
12 A
This was discussed with the plant superintendent, 13 and this has been quite some while ago, to characteri:;e 14 how these statements were, I might say this, that we 15, encountered some difficulty in getting these procedures 16 modified in a timely manner.
17 Q
When you say " timely manner," what exactly 18 do you mean?
19 A
I would have felt that, say within a month, if 20 the procedure wasn't modified -- if you check those 21 inspection reports in my last statement I would 22 have felt that the procedure should have been modified 23 within a month's period of time.
I don't know whether 24 that is what I said or not.
It was considerably longer 25 than that before it was modified, and I am not so sure BENJAMIN R EPORTIN G SERVICE
1 Creswell 32 2
that it was clearly resolved at the time that I left 3
the region to work on the Three Mile Island 4
investigation.
0 5
Q So you were investigating the September '77 6
Davis-Besse transient, loss of pressuri:er level indi-7 cation, going off-scale high, in late summer of '78.
8 At that time, had Davis-Besse corrected their procedure 9
consistent with your recommendations?
10 A
Summer of '78?
11 Q
Yes.
12 A
No.
13 Q
Do you know when they did correct their 14 procedures?
15 A
I am not sure when it was finally corrected; 16 probably as a result of the Three Mile Island event.
17 Q
So to the best of your knowledge, Toledo 18 Edison, operator of Davis-Besse 1, corrected its opera-19 tional procedures concerning loss of pressurizer level 20 indication after March 28, 1979 for the transiant that 21 occurred in September of 1977?
(~
22 A
Well, there could have been some procedural 23 corrections implemented during the time period that I 24 have been talking about, but as to whether they were 25 adequate or not, that would be the question.
B EN ! AMIN R EPORTIN G SERVICE
1 Creswell 33 2
I am not saying that there could not have been 3
a procedure revision, but it would be the adequacy of 4
the revision that would be under question.
5 Q
So to the best of your knowledge, there was 6
no adequate procedure correction taken by Toledo Edison 7
prior to March 28, 1979?
8 A
I would say that is true.
9 Q
Do you know who at Toledo Edison was 10 responsible for implementing those operational changes?
11 A
I would say that the plant superintendent, 12 Mr. Terry Murray, would have some responsibility for 13 overseeing the revision of procedures.
(
14 Q
And you spoke with Mr. Murray after you 15 had filed your summer of '78 inspection report?
16 A
Summer or fall -- we haven't exactly determined 17 that.
During the course of our inspections, we normally 18 exit with the plant superintendent.
The " exit" is a 19 discussion of the findings.
20 Q
Did you have any occasion to mention these 21 problems to anyone at B6W7
- 22 A
There was site personnel assigned to Davis-Besse 23 from B4W, and yes, I did discuss this with an individual 24 there, Mr. Ivan Green.
25 Q
He is a B6W --
BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
i 1
Creswell 34 2
A Representative, 3
Q Assigned full-time to Davis-Besse?
4 A
He was at that time.
{.s 5
Q He is no longer assigned there?
6 A
I believe he has been assigned to the Midland 7
plant.
8 Q
Did he relate to you any similar pressurizer 9
level indication problems experienced at other B6W plants?
10 A
He may have.
I can't recollect whether he did 11 or did not.
12 Q
Do you know whether or not he relayed those 13 comments that you made to him concerning this problem 14 to B6W headquarters in Lynchburg?
15 A
I,do not.
16 Q
Do you believe the problem that you in-17 vestigated about the loss of pressuri:er level indication 18 was of a suffficiently serious nature that he should 19 have notified the B6W headquarters?
20 A
Loss of pressurizer level indication or the 21 behavior during the September 24, '77 event?
When you l
22 say loss of level indication, are you talking about 23 up-scale high?
24 Q
Yes.
25 A
I believe that that subject, that is significant l
B ENJAMIN REPCATING SERVICE
1 Creswell 35 2
enough to be transmitted back to corporate headquarters.
3 Q
Did anyone at Toledo Edison or any repre-4 sentative of B6W at the Davis-Besse plant at about
('.
5 the time you informed them of your findings, indicate 6
that the problems involved might be considered merely 7
an operational inconvenience, rather than a safety 8
problem?
9 A
No; that would have been with the off-scale 10 pressure indication?
11 Q
Yes.
12 A
Off-scale pressuri:er level indication -- that 13 is my recollection that those are -- that they would 14 have characterized these types of problems as operational 15 inconveniences, yes.
16 Q
Do you remember specifically who may have 17 mentioned that to you?
18 A
We are talking about pressuri:er level indications 19 in general, downscale, upscale?
20 Q
Any aberration.
21 A
Right.
No, I,.on't recall.
22 Q
Did you mention your findings to anyone 23 at NRC7 24 A
As I have previously stated, inspection reports 25 a.e reviewed by supervision and management in the region.
BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
I Creswell 36 2
Q Do you know specifically who reviewed 3
this particular inspection report?
4 A
Yes, John Streeter, my supervisor, f
5 Q
Anyone above Mr. Streeter?
6 A
You have to look and see who signed the inspection 7
report at that time.
I don't recall.
We have had,a 8
change in brass chiefs in the last year, and I don't 9
recollect whether Mr. Gastenfeld really was a branch 10 chief at that time.
I believe he was.
I believe at D
that period of time he would have been the person who 12 signed the inspection report.
13 (Continued on Page 37.)
14 15 16 17 18 19 N
21
(
22 23 24 25 BENJAMlN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
T4.1 1
Creswell 37 SR/pw 2
Q Would Mr. Keppler also have seen this?
3 A
That I am not sure of.
4 Q
Would this report have found its way to
(-
5 NRR?
6 A Normally in my contacts with NRR, when I discuss 7
a problem, they are not aware of the contents of the 8
inspection report.
9 Q
Well, you say "No rmally."
Was this a normal 10 situation?
11 A Yes.
I 12 Q
I believe you indicated that Mr. Tambling D was also aware of your findings?
14 A That is correct.
15 Q
For both Davis-Besse transients, September 16 of '77 as well as November of '77?
17 A That is correct.
18 Q
Did 'he hav.e any comments on your findings 19 particularly for the off-scale high situation?
00 A Well, I want to make it clear that my concern vis 21 about the high pressure injection system being disabled
\\
22 during the course of a LOCA.
23 This issue was discussed between Mr. Streeter and l
24 Mr. Tamoling and I.
l 25 Q
Did Mr. Tambling have a meeting about this BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE l
=
4.2 1
Creswell 38 2
problem?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
Do you remember approximately when that was?
b 5
A No, I don't.
Approximately it would have been 6
about the time that it was reported in the inspection 7
report.
8 Q
Was the meeting before the report was filed 9
or after?
10 A
My recollection is it was before.
11 Q
And what did the meeting consist of?
12 A Well, we discussed this issue, and since 13 Mr. Tambling had been originally involved in the review 14 of the event, we discussed this idea of disabling *';e 15 high pressure injection system.
16 He said he reviewed it at the time, and that the 17 pressurizer level had recovered and that he felt that 18 was acceptable.
19 Q
By " acceptable," do you mean not a safety 20 problem?
21 A I don't want to put words in Mr. Tambling's mouth, t.
22 but let us say that it would not have required any 23 corrective action as would be. evidenced by a change of 24 procedures or citation being issued.
l 25 Q
How about design modifications?
Any of BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
4.3 1
Creswell 39 2
those required from Mr. Tambling's point of view that 3
you may know of?
i 4
A Would you rephrase that?
..s 5
Q Sure.
6 Did Mr. Tambling, as far as you know, feel 7
that the problem with the fluctuation in pressurizer 8
level indication could be eliminated by any design 9
modifications to the system?
10 A
There was some discussion about changing the level 11 setpoint on the auxiliary feedwater system to mi tigate 12 the effect of a low pressurizer level problem.
A design 13 modification with regard to the pressurizer level indi-14 cation going off scale high, I recall none.
15 Q
So, as far as you can tell, Mr. Tambling 16 was more interested in loss of pressurizer low than loss 17 of pressurizer level high, is that a fair conclusion?
18 A
That is,more concerned.
I think he was more 19 involved with the low level condition than the high.
20 Q
Do you know whether the considered loss of 21 pressurizer level high is more infrequent or a more on extreme situation?
23 A
I can't recall that we discussed the loss of l _
24 pressurizer level high situation.
U Q
So, as far as Mr. Streeter and Mr. Tambling S tENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE l
4.4 1
Creswell 40 2
were concerned, loss of pressurizer level high just 3
wasn't as pressing a problem as when the level was 4
low?
r-(
5 A
I think that is a fair characterization.
I want 6
to emphasize again my concern was disabling the pump, 7
disabling the high pressure injection system.
8 Let me say this, there is some question that if 9
they had allowed high pressure injection to continue, 10 as to whether they would have gotten the high off the 11 scale reading to begin with.
12 Q
Well, if the pressurizer level indication 13 was going high, rather than low, would operators not 14 have been more likely to turn off the HPI system?
15 A Yes.
16 Q
So that really when the pressurizer level 17 indication was going high, that is potentially more 18 serious in terms of turning off the HPI system than if 19 it is going low?
)
3 A Because of this standpoint, that word going high, 21 that is accompanied by a eak in the system, the valve U
being open, which can result in a loss of inventory 23 sufficient to uncover the core, from that standpoint, 2*
yes.
25 Q
And core uncovery is the primary concern l
BENJAM!N R EPORTING SERVICE
41 4.5 1
Creswell 2
with the operation of a nuclear facility?
3 A
As far as fuel damage is concerned and the subse-4 quent release of activity to the containment and
(~-
5 possibly to the environs, yes.
6 Q
So what you want to try to prevent at all 7
costs is core uncovery, is that accurate?
8 A
Yes, that is correct.
9 Q
A little while ago I believe you mentioned 10 you wanted to make a statement about conversations with 11 the operators.
12 A Well, I did talk to one individual who had 13 previously worked at the Davis-Besse facility, but 14 who had quit and went to work for Detroit Edison at 15 the facil.ity where I was inspecting.
16 He was in the control room during the September 24, 17 1977 event.
I did discuss with him how they determined 18 that the EMOV was open and ultimately shut.
His 19 recollection of that was that they were letting down 20 flow or let down a source of water out of the reactor 21 coolant system, and the level in the pressurizer wasn't 22 responding.
23 So he told this to another individual, a 24 Mr. Derevan and, incidentally, I don't recall what the 25 other individual's name was -- Mr. Mike Derevan -- and BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
4.6 1
Creswell 42 2
it is as if something clicked in Mr. Derevan's mind and 3
he said, "Close the PORY -- power-operated relief valve."
4 Q
Is Mr. Derevan an operator also at Davis-b 5
Besse?
6 A
The last time that I was there he was in the 7
operations group.
I believe his title was operations 8
supervisor, but that might be erroneous.
9 Q
Is he the person now in the Fermi reactor?
10 A That was another gentleman.
I can't recall what 11 his name is.
I think he left a short period of time 12 after the September 24th event.
13 Q
Do you know why he left?
14 A It is my understanding for more money.
15 Q
It was not a problem about the way in which 16 the plant was being operated?
17 A Not that he characterized to me, no.
18 Q
Was there any subsequent feedback concerning 19 your inspection report that was filed in the late summer 20 or fall of '78, and specifically the letters say from 21 the NRC?
t 22 A Well, what do you mean by " feedback"?
23 Q
What happened to your report after it was i
24 sent in.
25 A They are filed after they are sent.
That is BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1,7 1
Creswell 43 2
essentially what happens to them.
3 Q
Well, you have previously testified that 4
it was not until after March 28, 1979 that Davis-Besse
/t 5
corrected their procedures adequately to eliminate O
further problems with the HpI system being turned off.
7 A
Well, in the inspection report I think you will 8
find where I was following up on this issue and described 9 what the progress was on getting procedures corrected.
10 Q
Was this part of your normal procedure to 11 periodically issue subsequent reports or is this some-12 thing special with this particular problem?
13 A Every inspection will be accompanied by an 14 inspection report or will be covered by an inspection 15 report.
The progress on that particular issue would 16 have been documented in those inspection reports.
17 Q
So every time you went back out to the 18 Davis-Besse facility --
19 A That I addressed that particular issue, it should 20 be covered in there, unless there has been an omission 21 on my part.
22 Q
Every time you went back subsequently after 23 the September '77 incident, did you mention your concern 28 to Davis-Besse operators?
\\
25 A
I don't know whether every time I went back, that BENJAMIN REPCRTING SERVICE I
4.8 i
Creswell 44 2
was the case.
3 Q
More frequently than not?
4 A
More frequently than not, yes.
,(..
5 Q
What was their response?
6 A
Well, I guess it was in the nature that they 7
needed more time to analyze the situation.
8 You might also note that in my inspection report, 9
subsequent inspection report, I asked them to compare 10 the hi'gh pressure injection flow that they had for the 11 September 24th event versus what was required in the 12 safety analysis report, and I had a lot of difficulty 13 in getting that information.
14 As of the time that I left on the TMI event, I 15 had not s.een that information.
16 Q
So we are talking now about a time period 17 of approximately nine months from the summer of '78 18 to March 28?
19 A Summer or fall.
20 Q
When you first became involved with the 21 September 24, 1977 Davis-Besse incident, and until the 22 time that they adequately corrected their procedures?
23 A When you say " adequately corrected their 24 procedures," there was a bulletin issued by NRC as a 25 result of the events at TMI, and that bulletin directed BEN LAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE l'
4.9 I
Creswell 45 2
that they leave on the high pressure injection system 3
for a certain period of time.
4 Q
That is Bulletin IE-7906-A?
5 A
That one or there was several in that sequence, 6
and I don't recall what the initial one was even.
7 (There was a discussion off the record.)
8 THE WITNESS:
There were instructions given 9
in that bulletin about how long the high pressure 10 injection should be kept on.
11 Q
I am showing you Exhibit No. 6, which is 12 Anderson Deposition, Bulletin 7906-A, issued by the 13 NRC, dated April 14, 1979.
On Page 2, I believe it is, 14 No. 3, is that the specific section or information that 15 you referred to about operators being instructed to 16 leave the HPI system on?
17 A I don't believe this is the specific one that I 18 am referring to.
As I recall, there was directions to 19 leave the high pressure injection on for a time period 20 of approximately 20 minutes, and I might add that when 21 I say that it was adequately, the procedure was adequately 22 changed, I am assuming that the NRC inspectors are the 23 individuals in NRC that were responsible for reviewing 24 the corrective actions were assured that the procedure 25 addressed those particular items.
I, myself, have not BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
i t
4.10 1
Creswell 46 2
personally verified that Davis-Besse did that.
3 Q
Are there investigators also in your 4
office who have been involved with Davis-Besse, who
[~,
5 may have verified that they have complied with the 6
procedures 7 7
A Specifically which only looked at this particular 8
matter, I don't know.
There was a Mr. Jerry Smith 9
who was over there for a while and a Mr. David Reiden 10 and Mr. Tambling.
Those are probably the principal 11 individuals that would have looked at tho e procedures 12 to see that they complied with the bulletin.
13 (Continued on next page.)
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
('
22 23 24 25 SENJAMIN REPORTING SERysce
0 1
Creswell 47 2
Q But this inspection is after March 28, 3
1979, is that correct?
4 A
That would have been performed after the event,
('
5 yes.
6 Q
In I.E. Bulletin 7905-A, dated April 5, 7
1979, there is a reference at No. 4(b)(ii) that the 8
HPI system be kept in operation for 20 minutes.
Would 9
you take a look at that requirement.
10 A
I believe this would be the correct reference, 11 yes.
12 Q
And you believe that that requirement was 13 included primarily on the basis of your inspection of 14 the Davis-Besse facility?
15 A
I believe that that requirement was a result of, 16 although I cannot be sure, of B&W's reviewing the TMI 17 event and coming up with this recommendation.
18 I would tend to think, and I do not know for sure, 19 that this would be more in response to the TMI event 20 than the Davis-Besse event.
21 Q
Well, this is dated one week after the
(
22 TMI 2 incident.
23 A
Right.
24 Q
Presumably B6W has issued corrective 25 procedures to all B6W facilities by way of this?
BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
1 Creswell 48 2
A Normally, corrective procedures, the licensee 3
is responsible for preparing the procedure.
4 B6W would make rer:ommendations that would be
(
5 incorporated in those p.ocedures.
6 Q
All right, to what we have is a situation 7
that within one week of TMI 2, Met Edison has felt it 8
necessary to come up with a new condition to keep the 9
HPI system on for 20 minutes, and that has been for-10 warded to the NRC and issued in bulletin form on 11 April 5, 1979.
12 A
I want to point out I do not have direct knowledge 13 of how those bulletins were formulated, how B4W con-14 tacted NRC or NRC contacted B6W.
What I proposed to 15 you was what my impressions were, but without having 16 direct knowledge.
17 Q
Also attached as an exhibit to I.E.
18 Bulletin 7905 is an excerpt from a memorandum entitled, 19
" Conveying New Information to Licensing," and the next 20 word is obliterated, " Davis-Besse Units 2 and 3, and i
21 Midland Units 1 and 2," dated January 8, 1979 from k
22 J. S. Creswell to J. F. Streeter.
It includes two l
23 paragraphs concerning inspection and Enforcement Report 24 50-346/7806 concerning pressuri::er level indication 25 problems.
Would you take a look at that for a minute, BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 Creswell 49 2
please.
(Handing.)
3 Having read that, Mr. Creswell, does it appear 4
as though the prior reference to the requirement to
?
5 keep the HPI system on for 20 minutes may have been 6
a direct result of your memorandum?
7 A
No.
The inspection report, 50-346/7806 refers 8
to pressuri:er level going off-scale low.
9 This is a result of a shrinkdown in the reactor 10 coolant system due to excessive heat mode through the 11 steam generators.
12 It is pointed out here that it doesn't appear 13 that this is in conformance with the general design 14 criteria 13, which refers to having the capability or 15 the instrumentation to measure parameters over the full 16 range for anticipated operational occurrences, such as 17 loss of feedwater events.
So we come to a point, a 18 distinction between loss of pressurizer level indication 19 low, such as on November 29, 1977, and the loss of l
20 l
pressurizer level indication -- well, I hesitate to 21 call it a loss of prossuri:er level indication.
I l
22 You have an indicated level, but it is not the 23 level within th.: reactor coolant system.
It is not a 24 true level.
05 Q
In other words, the only indication you l
l S ENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
1 Creswell 50 2
have is the entire pressuri:er is full of water?
3 A
It is full.
4 Q
So you can:c tell really where the water C
5 level steps are in the pressuri:er in the first instance?
6 A
Because of the trapping phenomenon in the 7
pressurizer, the level in the reactor coolant system 8
may not be accurately indicated by pressurizer level.
9 Q
Well, in that situation is it more probable 10 than not there would be an inaccurate reading on the i
11 pressurizer level indication as to what was in the core?
12 A
On off-scale high?
13 Q
Yes.
14 A
That would be more probable, yes.
15 Q
I believe you previously testified that as 16 far as you were concerned, it was a greater safety 17 problem related to having an off-scale high situation 18 because an operator might cut off the HPI system.
19 A
I also had concerns about the low level, too.
T Q
For the same problem?
21 A
Yes.
When you say "the same problem" --
l k
22 Q
Turning off the HPI system.
t 23 A
For the low level problem, that would be associated 24 with the complete voiding of the pressuri:er, losing 25 pressure control via the pressuri:er, formation of BENJAMIN R EFORTING SERVICE
1 Creswell 51 l
2 voids in the reactor coolant system, the operation of 3
the reactor coolant pumps -- that scenario.
4 Q
All leading in both instances, nevertheless,
('
5 to possible core uncovery?
6 A
Well,'not core uncovery, but perhaps core damage.
7 Q
Damage due to core uncovery?
8 A
Well, what the level was in the reactor coolant 9
system I am not sure,but there is a possibility with 10 the voiding phenomena, in my mind at least, that there 11 might have been some fuel damage created without neces-12 sarily uncovering the core.
13 Q
As a result of your late summer or early 14 fall inspection report to the NRC concerning the loss 15 of pressuri::er level indication problems, both high 16 and low, was there any NRC followup, to the best of l
l 17 your knowledge?
18 A
By that I' interpret you to mean did eny other 19 individuals in NRC besides myself or my supervisor, 20 were they involved in this issue?
21 Q
Correct.
22 A
To my knowledge, there wasn't.
23 Q
Was there someone in NRC that said, when 24 they saw your inspection report, "This is a potential 25 safety problem, and we should do something about it; BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 Creswell 52 2
we should investigate further, take further action"?
3 A
I don't recall that there was anyone who did 4
that, no.
C 5
Q Do you have any indication as to why that 6
was not done?
Obviously they felt it was sufficiently 7
serious to spend a good proportion of time investigating 8
and reporting it.
9 A
Let me clarify something.
During the year at 10 Davis-Besse, 1978, we had been having discussions with 11 the plant personnel about the loss of pressurizer level 12 low, and during those discussions, we had asked them, 13 "Is there a possibility of completely losing level in 14 the pressurizer?" andttheir response was "No."
15 Q
When you talk about losing level in the 16 pressuri:er, is that merely indication?
17 A
This is completely voiding the pressurizer.
18 Q
Which would be below the indication level?
19 A
Below the indication level, and all the time 20 emptying the surge line over to the hot leg.
We pur-21 sued that issue with them, and in, I believe it was 22 December 22, 1978, there was a conference called, held 23 between members of Licensing, I.E. headquarters, mem-i-
24 l
bers of the Region 3 staff, about ::his particular l
25 phenomenon.
B ENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
1 Creswell 53 2
The subject of that discussion was this evalua tion 3
that had been prepared on loss of pressuri:er level 4
and voiding of the pressurizer.
But that would have
(_
5 been in December that NRR got involved in that 6
particular issue.
7 Q
Was there any discussion during this tele-8 phone conversation you just referred to about loss of 9
pressurizer level high?
10 A
No.
11 Q
Do you know why not?
12 A
Well, the phenomenon being discussed was an 13 overcooling type of transient, and an overcooling type 14 of transient produces a low level in the pressurizer, 15 not a high level.
16 Q
But in terms of severity of potential 17 problem, isn't overcooling less of a problem because 18 it creates LOCA'than would a situation of uncovering 19 th.e core due to insufficient cooling?
20 A
The overcooling transient does not result in a l
'l loss of reactor coolant system, outside the reactor
('
22 coolant system boundary.
It results in a shrinkage 23 of the re' actor coolant system due to cooling.
The l
24 water will contract as it is cooled.
25 In this particular scenario here, it would BENJAMIN REPORTING S ET4VICE
1 Creswell 54 2
contract to the point that pressuri:er would be voided a
3 and voids form in the system.
4 Q
Nevertheless, in terms of severity or
(~
potential problems based on the situation in s
6 September '77 at Davis-Besse --
7 A
That would be the worst case situation where 8
you had a loss of coolant.
9 Q
So there was more concern with the situation 10 that was less than the worst case, is that an accurate 11 conclusion, during this telephone conversation 7 12 A
In this particular telephone conversation, that 13 is correct.
14 (Continued on Page 55.)
15 16 17 18 19 20
(.
21 22 23 24 2s B ENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE t.
T6.1 1
Creswell 55 SR/pw 2
Q And you don't know why there was that 3
concern during the telephone call?
4 A
I don't know why there was what concern?
G 5
Q A concern with the lesser of the two 6 pro.blems, the lesser important of the two problems, 7
loss of pressuri:er low.
8 A This is an issue that I had gotten involved with, 9
the rapid cool-down transient as involved with or 10 associated with the November 29, 1977 event.
11 The action -- and I have already de:cribed this --
12 with regard to September 24 involved myself and my 13 supervisor in trying to get the procedure modified..
14 Q
I would like you to look at something, a 15 letter fr.om Lowell Roe to hir. Robert Reid, Chief of 9
16 the Operating Reactors Branch No.
4, part of NPR, 17 dated December 22, 1978, which appears to memorialize 18 a Decenber 20, 1978 telephone conversation between
~
19 Toledo Edison personnel and Region 3 personnel.
Have l
20 you ever seen the letter or the report attached to the 21 letter?
22 A Yes.
23 Q
When did you first see that?
24 A We received this, and it is my recollection that i
25 this would have been like on Thursday or Friday of that B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
.2 1
Creswell 56 2
week.
3 As I recollect the telephone conversation, it 4
took place on a Saturday.
I may be wrong about it e.
('
5 though.
I first saw this report at Davis-Besse during 6
one of my inspections.
7 Q
Do you remember when that may have been?
8 A
That would have been documented in my inspection 9
report, and it should have been around the week before 10 Christmas.
11 Q
So you would have seen this letter and 12 attached memorandum entitled, " Additional Safety 13 Evaluation of Transient Resulting from Inability of 14 Operator to Control Steam Generator Level at 35 inches"?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
Shortly after the date it was written?
17 A
That is correct.
It would have been probably 18 telefaxed to us'at the site.
As I recall, we received 19 the report on one day, and the telephone conversation 20 was held on the next day; so this would be like a 21 Friday-Saturday.
22 Q
You received the report before the telephone 23 conversation?
24 A That is correct.
25 MR. SIDELL:
Can we have this marked as B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
6.3 1
Creswell 57 2
Exhibit 2 to the Creswell deposition.
3 (Document described below was marked 4
Creswell Deposition Exhibit 2 for identifica-(
5 tion, this date.)
6 Q
Have you reviewed this report that we have 7
now marked Exhibit 2 to this deposition?
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
Do the analyses mentioned in this report 10 appear to satisfy your concerns of the probism at 11 Davis-Besse?
12 A I had basically two concerns after reading the 13 evaluation.
One of them was with regard to the 14 operation of the reactor coolant pumps during saturated 15 conditions in the reactor coolant system and another 16 one was the formation of voiding in the primary system 17 and the possibility of trapping of steam in the hot 18 lakes.
That is the so-called " candy cane" or the loop 19 in the top of the pressurizer.
20 Q
Did you relay those concerns to anyone?
21 A Yes.
During the telephone conversation there
(~
22 were a sequence of telephone calls that took place on 23 Saturday morning.
2%
Q Were you involved in all of them?
25 A No, I wasn't.
BENJAMIN REPORTl* 3 SERVICE
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Q Were you involved in most of them?
3 A
I believe I was only involved in one.
I may 4
be wrong on that, but I believe one was all.
('
5 Q
Do you know how many there were in total?
6 A
Two or three.
I Q
To whom did you relay your concerns about 8
this analysis?
9 A
I raised these questions to everyone that happened 10 to be on the conference call.
11 Q
Were they primarily directed to NRR?
12 A
Yes.
13 Q
So you were only secondarily concerned that 14 Toledo Edison knew of your concerns in this telephone 15 conversation?
16 A
Toledo Edison was a party to that conversation.
17 Q
But you were more interested that NRR know 18 of these concerns than Toledo Edison?
19 l
A Yes.
0 Q
Did they indicate to you -
"they" being
'l NRR -- that they would follow up on these concerns?
l A
Well, when I raised the question on the reactor "3
~
i coolant pumps, the response back was that the performance
'~4 of the pumps would improve, and I didn't carry it any 25 further.
B ENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
.-.--w-
.6.5 1
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Q Do you know who from NRR was involved in 3
that conversation?
4 A
I was trying to remember his name, but I can't.
(-
5 I can't recall.
6 Q
Could it possibly have been Seymour Weiss?
7 A
Sy was on the telephone.
He wasn't the one that 8
responded to me.
9 Q
Brian Grimes?
10 A
Brian Grimes.
11 Q
And he indicated that they would look to 12 your concerns?
13 A No, they didn't.
14 Q
What, if anything, do you remember him 15 stating in response to you?
16 A He stated'what B4W recommended in the report, 17 that the reactor coolant pump performance would improve 18 in saturated con'ditions.
19 Q
And you are referring to IE-7905, is that 20 right?
l 21 A You gave me a document that had the analysis, a 22 portion of the analysis.
23 Q
Exhibit 2 to the deposition (indicating)?
24 A There is a section here on Page 8, which states, 2S "Several questions exist about the transient."
Then BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
B 6.6 1
Creswell 60 2
Item II addresses, "How well will the pumps work?"
3 Q
Did Mr. Grimes in this telephone conversa-4 tion specifically refer to Section II on Page 8 of 5
Exhibit 2 to this deposition?
6 A
As I recollect, he read that section.
7 Q
And he felt that was a sufficient response --
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
to your concerns?
10 A
That was my impression.
11 Q
Do you know whether or not he performed 12 any independent analysis verifying TECO's analysis?
13 A
I do not.
I would doubt that since we h.id 14 received the report it is my recollection on the day 15 before, late in the evening, and the telephone conver-16 sation was had or took place on the next day.
As I 17 recollect that time period, it was something less than 18 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
19 So if an analysis was done, it would have been l
- quick, 20 21 Q
Is it your opinion that it would have been l
22 for all intents and purposes physically impossible to l
23 l
perform an adequate analysis on TECO's analy.;is in i
og i
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />?
25 A
I guess that is a judgment call.
l l
B EN.JAMIN REPORTING SERVICE i
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Creswell 61 2
Q That is what I am asking for.
3 A
Well, I think I would take some longer time.
4 Q
Did Mr. Grimes indicate to you during this 5
telephone conversation or did he indicate to anyone 6
that, based on TECO's submitted analyses of December 20 7
or December 19, whenever it was, there were no further 8
safety concerns or operational concerns at the Davis-9 Besse facility?
10 A
That was my understanding since they were allowed 11 to employ administrative controls over the auxiliary 12
.feedwater system as a result of this.
I would have 13 assumed that they felt it was no unreviewed safety 14 condition and safe operation could proceed.
15 Q
Did the Toledo Edison analysis and Brian 16 Grimes' acceptance of this analysis completely allay 17 any concerns you may still have had about the operational 18 problems at Davis-Besse?
19 A
When you say " operational problems at Davis-Besse,"
20 what do you mean?
21 Q
Concerning the loss of pressurizer level oo indication or turning off the HPI system.
23 A
Well, in regard to the loss of pressurizer level 24 indication low, it did not.
25 Q
You still had concerns?
BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
6.8 1
Creswell 62 2
A I did.
3 Q
About loss of pressurizer level indication 4
low?
('
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
Did you mention those concerns to anyone 7
else?
8 A Yes.
We had a meeting and I am sure they were 9
aware of the Kohler-Anderson-Foster investigation, and 10 after they had returned back from that investigation, l
l 11 the meeting was held, and in attendance was the branch 12 chief, our present branch chief.
13 Q
Who was that?
14 A Bob Heishman.
Dick Knop was present.
He was 15 section chief for Davis-Besse or had been section chief.
16 I think he changed position at that time.
I think 17 Gaston Fiore11i was present, Mr. Fos ter,
Mr. Kohler, 18 and Mr. Streeter.
19 Q
What was the date of this meeting, if you 20 recall?
21 A I don't recall what the date would have been, but 22 it would have been after Mr.
Foster and Mr. Kohler had 23 conducted their investigation.
24 Q
This would have been in March '79, before 25 TMI 27 l
l SENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
e 6.9 1
Creswell 63 2
A It would have been before TMI 2, yes.
You were 3
asking did I still have safety concerns.
- Yes, 4
Mr. Heishman, if anyone still had safety concerns concerning this matter, and I said yes, I still had.
o 6
Q There was another meeting that took place 7
March 15th of this year at, I believe, Region III in 8
the conference room on a second floor?
9 A
There was another meeting held.
10 Q
Was that meeting after the one to which you 11 just referred to?
12 A I believe it was.
At that meeting there was a 13 rough draft handed out.
L4 Q
Let us deal with the first meeting.
Do 15 'you believe that was in early March of this year?
16 A As I said previously, it would have been after 17 the Kohler-Foster investigation.
That is as good a 18 time as I can give you.
19 20 (Continued on next page.)
21 22 23 24 25 S ENJAMIN R EPORTIN G SERVICE
1 Creswell 64 iR 7, Ic 2
Q Well, their investigation appears to have 3
been going on for a period of three months or so, from 4
late December 1978 or early January 1979, respectively?
(
5 A
This would have been after they made the trips.
6 Q
To Lynchburg?
7 A
To Lynchburg.
8 Q
They had a meeting in Lynchburg on 9
February 14th of this year, and they had a meeting 10 with several people in Region 3 on March 16th of this 11 year; so the meeting you are referring to occurred 12 within that four-week time period, is that correct?
13 A
Probably.
14 Q
At this meeting you stated you still had 15 concerns about the operational procedures at Davis-Besse, 16 is that correct?
17 A
I still had concerns about this particular issue 18 here, and that is the loss of pressurizer level indi-19 cation low.
20 Q
Did you have any concerns about loss of i
(.
21 pressurizer level indication high at this time?
22 A
As I stated earlier, we were still going through 23 trying to get the procedure revised.
I probably still 24 had concerns about that, but I don't think they were 25 discussed in that meeting -- I would say that they B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 Creswell-65 2
were not.
3 Q
After you filed your letter in the summer 4
or early fall of 1978, the inspection report about
(
5 the HPI system being turned off, did you have any 6
concerns about loss of pressurizer level indication 7
high?
8 A
Other than involved with getting the procedure 9
changed, no.
10 Q
But you s' ' I had concerns about improving 11 the procedures of loss of pressurizer level indication 12 high?
13 A
I had the concern, and I want to characterize it 14 as this, that they set of the high-pressure injection 15 pumps before they had determined the cause of the LOCA.
16 Q
In the, let us call it, early March 1979 17 meeting with Heishman and Knop and Streeter, was 18 that meeting ca'11ed expressly for the purpose of I
19 your safety concern?
20 A
As I recall the way that meeting was characterized, 21 it was to apprise people of the findings of the inves-(
22 tigation.
23 Q
The Foster and Kohler investigition?
24 A
That's right.
25 Q
Well, at that meeting did you again bring l
B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
I Creswell 66 2
up your concern about the safety problems of turning 3
off the HPI system?
4 A
I did not.
[
5 Q
Who conducted this meeting?
6 A
Mr. Heishman.
7 Q
Did he make a presentation?
8 A
The purpose of the meeting was to, as I said 9
earlier, apprise people of the results of the investi-10 gation, and Mr. Kohler and Mr. Foster made a presentation.
11 Q
Was it both of them jointly, or did one 12 do more presenting than the other?
13 A
I believe that Mr. Foster presented more 14 information.
15 Q
Was there an opportunity for questions 16 in response to their investigation?
17 A
Yes, as I recall there was.
1;8 Q
Did anyone ask any questior.s?
^
19 A
I frankly don't remember what questions were asked.
20 Q
What was your understanding of their 21 investigation?
What were they looking for?
22 A
I had a memo that requested that a Part 21 23 investigation be conducted to determine if BSW or 24 Toledo Edison had reported this possible unreviewed 25 safety question when they had found it out, if it had SENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
.e l
1 Creswell 67 2
been reported promptly under the requirements of Part 21.
3-Q So you were primarily concerned with the 4
timeliness of their investigation and reporting?
(
5 A
That is correct.
6 Q
"They" being Davis-Besse, Toledo Edison?
7 A
And B4W.
~
8 Q
Was the Foster-Kohler investigation 9
limited, however, to the timeliness aspect ot~ this 10 problem?
11 A
They looked at timeliness.
They concurred that, l
12 or concluded that there had been a timely response on 13 this particular issue.
As far as reporting was con-14 cerned, I think that they found some memos to Arkansas 15 Nuclear.that they said had looked at this issue quite 16 some time back, and that it had been suitably identified 17 to NRC.
i 18 Q
Previously in your testimony, you indicated 19 that Davis-Besse did not institute any procedures 20 l
concerning the a:anual override of the HPI system until 21 after the TMI 2 incident of March 28th.
(
22 A
They way you asked the question is whether the 23 changes were adequate.
2%
Q All right.
Did Foster and Kohler in their 25 investigation determine that adequate changes in the BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
1 Creswell 68 2
procedures at Davis-Besse had been made-at the time?
3 A
I don't think they addressed it.
4 Q
So they were concerned merely with the 0
5
. timeliness of the investigation or any changes, whether 6
or not they were adequate?
7 A
Their investigation addressed, as I recollect, 8
whether after November 29, 1977 they had had an event 9
where they had lost pressurizer level indication, 10 whether TECO or B6W had notified the Commission and 11 had proceeded on a reasonable course to resolve the 12 matter.
13 Q
Well, when,you say " resolve the matter,"
14 does that mean resolve the matter so that it is ade-15 quately. corrected?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
Or merely anything is made?
18 A
No, adequately corrected.
19 Q
So they in turn concluded sometime prior j
20 to the TMI 2 incident, March 28, 1979, that adequate 21 changes in operational procedures had been performed 22 by either the B4W or TECO: is that a fair cc telusion?
23 A
Well, at that period of time, NRR haa approved 24 the administrative controls of the feedwater system, 25 so that a change had been made, or that particular BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE l
1 Creswell 69 2
evolution had been approved.
3 It is also my understanding that they felt that 4
the analysis of this problem, the response on B5W's C
5 and TECO's part, was timely.
6 Q
Well, then, is your response to my question 7
whether or not they concluded there were adequate cor-8 rectional changes made, "Yes"?
9 A
It is my understanding that, yes, they concluded 10 that they were adequate.
There were no items in non-11 compliance.
12 Q
Any actions taken as a result, by the time 13 of the meeting in early March of '79, you were still 14 of the opinion that adequate correctional changes 15 had not yet been made by either B6W or Toledo Edison, 16 is that correct?
These changes were not made until 17 after TMI 2, March 28, 1979?
18 A
Again there is a difference between the upscale 19 level phenomena and rae downscale level phenomena.
20 In one of them, downscale, it has to do with auxiliary 21 feedwater system.
The upscale has to do with loss of
(
22 feedwater event, failure of the power-operated relief i
23 valve to open.
These are two different things, and 24 it is important that they be separated.
j l
25 This particular issue was associated with the l
l l
BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
I Creswell 70 2
loss of pressurizer level indication low and the eventual 3
voiding of the pressurizer.
4 Q
Well, did anyone in NRR, in particular, b
5 either Sy Weiss or Brian Grimes, express any concern l
6 about loss of pressurizer level indication high, which 7
you previously testified was a more serious problem?
8 A
I can't recollect that they did, no.
9 Q
Did ycu raise then your concerns about 10 loss of pressurizer --
11 A
Let me say this.
I tried to find out if any NRR 12 individuals were involved in the review of September 24, 13 1977.
14 Q
When did you try and find that out?
15 A
This would have probably been in late 1978.
16 Wait a minute.
I can' t pin it down any more than that.
17 Q
What exactly is it you did in terms of 18 trying to find out?
19 A
I called up the project manager in Licensing.
20 Q
Do you remember who that was, by name?
21 A
There has been a change in those individuals, too.
22 I can't recollect who it was now, but he did go to the 23 site, in addition to a couple of other NRR people.
24 Q
Someone at NRR went to Davis-Besse?
25 A
As a result of the September 24, 1977 event.
B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 Creswell 71 2
I tried to find out what their findings were and was 3
there a trip report, was there any documentation of 4
a review that they did, and I could find no evidence V
that any such documentation existed.
3 6
Q Did you inquire whether or not there was 7
information available to NRR that was not written 8
documentation?
Were there any phone calls made?
Were 9
there conversations held about the problems at Davis-10 Besse in September?
11 A
I think I probably restricted my inquiry to 12 written documentatiort because I wanted to get a copy 13 of it and look at it and see what they had done.
14 Q
And you could find no memoranda at NRR 15 concerning the Septc6er 24, 1977 --
16 A
At my request, no.
17 Q
You don't remember the name of the individual 18 at NRR you spoke with?
19 A
Could I get back to you on that?
20 (There was discussion off the record.)
21 Q
Back on the record.
~("
22 Did you follow up at all with your request for 23 documentation of the September 24, 1977 Davis-Besse 25 transient by sending in any report or memoranda to 25 i
anyone in your office or NRR?
SENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 Creswell 72 2
A No, I did not.
3 Q
Would you conclude that NRR did not con-4 sider the September 24, 1977 Davis-Besse transient l
to c
5 be of such safety significance as you considered 6
it to be?
7 A
I think that would be a fair characterization, yes.
8 Q
Do you think that was a correct charac-9 terization on their part?
10 A
Well, considering what has happened at TMI 2 and 11 the behavior of the pressurizer during that event and t
12 the misinformation that it gave to the operators, plus 13 the Sandy Israel memo to Novak, and the Michaelson 14 Report and those sorts of things, yes, it was a 15 legitimate concern.
16 Q
In other words, had they investigated 17 more thoroughly than they appeared to have investigated 18 the September 24, 1977 Davis-Besse transient, it may 19 have been possible to avoid TMI 2 on March 28, 1979?
20 A
That is possible.
21 Q
Probable?
With all the other information
(
22 that they --
23 A
I cannot help but feel that if that info rmation 24 could have been distributed, it would have improved the j
25 operator's capability to respond to the event in a l
BENJAMIN REPO RTING SERVICE L
1 Cresswell 72a 2
manner that would have avoided core damage.
3 (There was discussion off the record, 4
following which, the morning session recessed 5
at 12:20 p.m.)
6 000 7
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
('
22 23 24 25 BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
3R/pw I
73 08.1 2
AFTERNOON SESSION 3
1:40 p.m.
4 JAMES S.
- CRESWELL, having been 3
previously duly sworn, was examined and testified 6
further as follows:
1 7
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) 8 BY MR. SIDELL:
9 Q
Mr. Creswell, you indicated before the lunch 10 recess that you had previously filed an ISE inspection 11 report in late summer or early fall concerning the 12 September 24, 1977 loss of pressurizer level indication 13 Problem at Davis-Besse 1.
I would like you to take a 14 look at a document, dated October 25, 1978 from Gaston 15 Fiore111, Chief of the Reactor Operations Nuclear 16 Support Branch of the NRC to Toledo Edison, operator 17 of Davis-Besse, and indicate whether or not that is,in 18 fact, the report' you previously mentioned.
19 A That is correct.
In Paragraph 2 of this inspection 20 report, which is entitled, " Review of High Pressure 21 Injection Performance during September 24, 1977," there 22 is a statement regarding the operation of the high pressure 23 inj ection pumps during that event.
24 MR. SIDELL-Let us mark this as Exhibit 3 25 to the Creswell deposition.
i l
SENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
~
8.2 1
Creswell 74 2
(The above-described document was marked 3
~Creswell Deposition Exhibit 3 for identification, 4
this date.)
(
5 Q
You previously referred to Paragraph 2 on 6
Page 2 of Exhibit No. 3, entitled, " Review of High 7
pressure Injection Performance During September 24, 1977 8
Event."
That paragraph concerns itself with the high 9
pressure injection system.
Dees this inspection report 10 fully list your concerns about the potential safety 11 problem involved with the premature termination of 12 HPI?
13 A
As you will note in reviewing this section, the 14 statement is made that the blocking of high pressure 15 injection occurred prior to turning off the high pressure 16 injection pumps and the discovery of the cause of the II loss of reactor coolant.
It further states, "The 18 licensee is reviewing the operator actions of blocking 19 the SFAS logic and securing high pressure injection to 20 determine if different actions would be advisable in 21 the future should a similar set of conditions arise.
t, 22 This matter is unresolved."
23 This information you will note states that the 94 matter was unresolved, and subsequent inspection reports 25 will address or did address those actions taken by the BENJAMIN R EPORTIN G SERVICE
i S.3 1
Creswell 75 2
licensee.
3 Q
Those are subsequent reports filed by you?
4 A
That is correct.
(
5 Q
In any of the subsequently filed reports 6
did you feel that the matter was sufficiently resolved 7
to be considered closed?
8 A
As I stated, I believe, earlier to you, I would 9
like to have the other inspection reports, which I 10 understand are on the way here, to look at those, and 11 we can discuss that matter, if you want to put it off 12 until they arrive.
We can discuss that then in detail.
13 I would prefer to have those, rather than rely on my 14 memory.
15 Q
Well, we will await the arrival of the 16 subsequently filed inspection reports.
Let us go back 17 a minute to your conversation with NRR in the fall of 18 1978 concerning the September 24, 1977 Davis-Besse 19 incident with loss of pressurizer level indication high.
20 Do you recall at this time the name of the individual 21 at NRR with whom you spoke?
22 A I believe that was Mr. Leon Engel that I talked with.
23 There has been a licensing project manager change.
I 24 believe that was Mr. Engel that I spoke to.
25 Q
What specifically did you inform Mr. Engel of?
S ENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
8.4 1
Creswell 2
A Well, I asked him whether there was documentation 3
about the review that took place when certain NRR 4
individuals went to the site after the event and
(
5 reviewed the event.
6 Q
Do you remember the names of any individuals 7
at Davis-Besse from NRR7 8 A I believe Mr. Engel was present.
9 Q
At the inspection shortly after the 10 September 24th incident?
11 A That is correct.
12 Q
Do you remember any other names?
13 A I believe Andy Zukevich was present at that 15 meeting, and I believe there was another individual, 15 but I don't recollect what his name was.
16 Q
You were not present during this inspection 17 at Davis-Besse?
18 A
No, I was not.
19 Q
Did you speak with either Mr. Zukevich or 20 the third individual, whose name you can't recall?
21 A
No, not about this matter.
22 Q
You only spoke with Mr. Engel?
23 A
That is my recollection.
24 Q
ilhat information did Mr. Engel relay to 5 you about what happened?
BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE L
8.5 1
Creswell 77 2
A Well, what I asked for was was there any documenta-
.3 tion, a trip report or anything like that, about the 4
results of the review, and I was told that nothing
(
5 existed.
6 Q
That there were no documents prepared by 7
NRR as a result of this on-site inspection?
8 A
To my knowledge, no.
9 Q
How many times did you contact Mr. Engel 10 to determine whether or not there was any documentation 11 of this inspection?
12 A
I can only recollect one time.
13 Q
That is late fall or early winter of 19787 14 A
Yes.
15 Q
Did you contact anyone else at NRR about 16 this same problem?
17 A I don't believe I did.
18 Q
When you spoke with Mr. Engel, did you 19 express your concern about the potential safety problems 20 involved of turning off the HPI prematurely?
21 A Frankly, I can't recollect whether I discussed 22 that with him or not.
It may well have been.
I just 23 can't recollect that I did.
2%
l Q
At this time that you spoke with Mr. Engel, l
25 you were still of the opinion that there was an l
BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE L
i
s
- 8. 6.
1 Creswell 78 2
unresolved safety issue with premature HPI termination 3
at Davis-Besse?
4 A
Well, I wouldn't characterize it that there was
() -
5 an unresolved safety issue.
I would characterize 6
it as there was operator error at the facility in 7
performing that or shutting off high pressure injection 8
pumps.
9 Q
Do you know why the operator would have 10 turned off the HPI pumps in that situation?
11 A
It is my understanding that he felt pressurizer 12 level had recovered, and from that standpoint turned 13 the pumps off.
14 Q
So by viewing the pressurizer level indica-15 tion, and based on the operator's training, the proper 16 procedure was to turn off the HPI pumps?
17 A I did not review the operator's training in regard 18 to what he was instructed to do.
My approach to the 19 matter was to get the procedure changed, such that if 20 a similar occurrence happened again that the proper 21 action would be taken.
(
22 Q
And the proper action being not turning 23 off the HPI?
l 24 A
That is correct.
25 Q
So as a general procedure though, when an SENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
8.7 1
Creswell 79 i
2 operator viewed pressurizer level indication within 3
the proper range, he would then turn off the HPI 4
pumps?
('..
5 A
Are you saying would he be instructed to do that 6
by the procedure?
7 Q
Would that be part of the general procedures 8
applicable to this?
9 A
As I recollect the procedure, that would have been 10 allowable the way the procedure was written.
11 Q
So it was discretionary with ehe operator 12 whether or not to turn it off?
13 A
It was an allowable action that he could take.
14 It was, as I recollect it, not prohibited by the 15 procedure.
16 Q
And your proposal was to, in fact, prohibit 17 turning off the HPI pumps?
18 A At least u'ntil the cause of the loss of coolant 19 had been determined.
20 Q
Which would be determined by something 21 more than merely viewing the pressuris./
level indica-22 tion?
23 A Absolutely.
There are all sorts of break condi-24 tions that you could have, for instance, on the 25 pressurizer, and your way of detecting these would be BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
S.8 1
Creswell 80 2
different.
3 Q
Would there e a similar method of deter-4 mining where breaks were that would be the same for (c
5 all B6W plants?
6 A
Well, as I have stated earlier, the only other 7
experience that I have as far as B4W facilities are 8
concerned is the TMI 2 facility.
The arrangements 9
there are similar.
The temperature downstream of 10 the valves is an indication of the valves being open.
11 If one had a break upstream of one of the valves, you 12 would probably have to rely on containment pressure to 13 detect the leak.
14 Q
But, in any event, containment pressure is 15 one of the more reliable indications as to what the 16 level of inventory is in the core, is not true?
17 A Containing pressure?
I don't think that would 18 be a good parameter to use.
You have cooling in the 19 containment that can affect the pressure.
I would 20 prefer some other parameter, rather than that.
21 Q
What other parameters?
22 A Well, the pressure in the sysc am is going to 23 indicate that you have a break somewhere.
As to whether 25 it is on the pressurizer or not, that is problematic.
l 25 What the licensing was directing the procedure revisions BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
a 8.9 1
Creswell 81 2
to was detecting EMOV failure or failure of a valve.
3 In going over these revisions with them, I brought 4
up the instance where you could have a break somewhere
(,
5 else that you couldn't use the temperature detectors 6
downstream of the valves to detect that you have a leak 7
or opening valve.
So what one needed to do was, or I 8
felt was, develop instructions to the operator to help 9
him in determining where the leak was.
10 Q
In view of the fact that there was an PORV 11 problem with Davis-Besse, and you stated that the Davis-l 12 Besse plant and TMI 2 are set up similarly, would it 13 have been helpful if the operator at TMI 2 would have 14 known about the PORV problem at Davis-Besse?
15 A
I think I already answered a question along those 16 lines earlier, and that, in my opinion, yes, it would 17 have increased in my mind the'probabil_ ties that he 18 would have been able to take better action or more 19 acceptable action.
20 Q
Such as not turning off the HPI system?
21 A
Such as not turning off the HPI system.
22 23 (Continued on next page.)
i 24 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
9/1 1
Creswell 82 LW 2
Q After your conversation with Mr. Engel 3
at NRR in the fall or early winter of '78, did you 4
have any subsequent occasions to renew your concern
(
5 about the problem of turning off the HPI system, 6
where there was a problem with the pressurizer level 7
indication?
8 A
In what manner?
9 Q
Were there any subsequent reports you filed?
10 How did you follow up with your concern about the 11 safety problem?
12 A
Well, as I said earlier, there is some followup B
information on the inspection reports, but I would 14 like to have those present.
15 Q
Were there any other meetings that you i
16 attended or that were called as a result of your 17 concerns?
18 A
Approximately a week before the TMI-2 event, 19 because of concerns I had about the Davis-Besse l
20 facility, not restricted to this particular issue, I 21 met with Commissioners Bradford and Ahearne.
(,
l 22 Q
Those are Commissiones of the NRC?
23 A
That is correct.
24 Q
Let's hold off on that for just a moment.
25 I believe there was a meeting in March of this year, B ENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
i 1
Creswell 83 1
2 March 16, 1979, in which Foster and Kohler presented 3
findings of their investigation into at least the l
4 timeliness matter?
~
(
5 A
Would you excuse me.
Your question is restricted 6
to the September 24, 1977 event and the occurrences 7
related to that or are you now discussing the November 8
29, 1977?
9 Q
I want to find out the general information 10 that went on in the March 16, 1979 meeting.
I 11 believe present were Foster, Kohler, Spessard, Norelius, 12 Tambling and yourself.
Is that substantially correct?
l l
13 A
That is my recollection.
14 Q
Where did this meeting take place?
15 A
That took place in a conference room on the 16 second floor of the Region 3 offices.
17 Q
In Chicago?
18 A
In Chicago.
19 Q
What was the purpose, as you know it, of 20 this meeting?
21 A
The purpose was to go over the results of the
's 22 investigation and to decide on areas of non-compliance 23 associated with it.
24 Q
At this time, did you still feel that 25 the matters that Foster and Kohler were investigating B ENJAMIN R EPC RTING SERVICE
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