ML19308A541
| ML19308A541 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/06/1979 |
| From: | Boger B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7910310248 | |
| Download: ML19308A541 (71) | |
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Transcript of Proceedings l
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PRESIDENT'S CCMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT q
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o DEPOSITION OF:
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i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND 3
f 4
5 6
7 DEPOSITION OF:
BRUCE A. SOGER S
9 10 Room 358 it 7920 Norfolk Avenue 12 Sethesda, Maryland 20014 13
- Monday, b
August 6, 1979 14 3:05 p.m. o' clock 15 16 17 APPEARANCES:
IS O_n Behalf of the Commission:
19 GARY M. SIDELL, Attorney Associate Chief Counsel 20 2100 M Street, N.W.
2:
Washington, D.C.
20037 i
on Behalf of Mr. 3ccer:
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.k PETER CRANE, Attorney 3
Office of the General Counsel j
24 Nuclear Regulatory Com=ission
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1 INDEX 2
tiITNESS EXN4INA* ION 3
Bruce A. Boger 2
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6 EXHIBITS IDENTIFIED IN EVIDENCE s
No. 1 2
2 9
No. 2 8
8 10 11 12
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17 IS 19 20 21 r
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PROCEEDINGS r
2 Whereupon,
3 BRUCE A. BOGER r
4 having been first duly sworn, was called as a witness herein 5
and was examined and testified as follows:
6 EXAMINATION BY MR. SIDELL:
Q Would you state your name, please, for the record, 9'
Mr. Boger?
Io A
Bruce Alan Boger.
11 Q
Ani you provided me with a copy of a resume, which 12 was requested, that you developed for the purpose of this
{
13 deposition.
Is that correct?
14 A
That is correct.
15 Q
Is the information contained in this resume complete 16 and accurate to the best of your knowledge?
17 A
Yes, it is.
18 'I MR. SIDELL:
Let's have this marked as Exhibit One i
19 for identification to the deposition, please.
20 (The document referred to was l
i 21 marked for identificatien as l
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3 evidence. )
i 24 BY MR. SIDELL:
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si Q
I see from your resume, exhibit one to this l
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deposition, that as part of your responsibilities currently 2
with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission you are responsible for 3
administering licensing exams to nuclear plant operators.
Is e
4 that correct?
5 A
That is correct.
6 Q
And that would include operators of PWRs such as TMI-II and Davis-Sesse?
3 A
That is correct.
9 Q
I would like to request that you provide us with to the test results for the operators of TMI-II at your conven-it ience; and I understand from your counsel that there is some 12 concern as to whether or not the information requested is
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13 subject to Privacy Act exclusion.
And after review by your 14 counsel and resolution of the NRC's position in terms of dis-15 closing this information, we would like the information pro-vided to us; and of course we will have to await your conclu-16 t-sion to determine whether or not we are going to get the is information in the first instance or have to get it in the second instance.
19 We will conduct that review expeditiously l 20 MR. CRANE:
l 21 and let you know as soon as possible.
j 3
MR. SIDELL:
Thank you very much.
23 BY MR. SIDELL:
24 Q
Mr. Boger, let me ask you if you have ever had t
L k your deposition taken before, not in this context but in any. f 25 l
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No.
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Q All right.
Let me explain to you then what we are 3
going to do this afternoon in a brief manner.
Your testimony
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obviously is sworn; and as such, even though we are sitting 4
5 in Mr. Collins's office in one of the NRC buildings in e
Bethesda, your testimony still has the same effect as though it were,in a court of law before either a judge or a jury.
3 Therefore, I would emphasi::e that you be as precise 9
and accurate in your responses to my questions as you can be.
10 If you are unsure as to particular question, as me for clari-11 fication, and I will try and explain what I am looking for in te the way of response.
13 Since the reporter is taking down your testimony, 14 it would be advantageous if you would allow me to finish a 15 question before you begin your response even though you may 16 know where the question is going, and I will similarly try and t-restrain my next question before you get finished with your 18 answer.
ig Again, since the reporter is taking down your testi co many, it is necessary that you answer audibly in response to l
l 21 the questions rather than nods of the head or gestures or i
I something otherwise that is not easily subject to transcrip-(.s
- 3 tion.
i 24 At the completion. of the deposition, your testi.x:ny i I
b will be transcribed and eventually will be presented to you l
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i for you to review and correct if you feel necessary and sign.
2 Should you, however, feel that any changes in your testimony 3
are necessary, you will of course be allowed to make changes.
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But in turn, we will be allowed to comment on those changes i
5 should we deem tha changes to be of a substantial nature.
6 And again, therefore the emphasis now in the first instance to be as precise and accurate as you can be in terms s
of your responses to my questions.
3 Do you have any questions?
10 A
No, I don't.
11 Q
All right.
You according to your resume, exhibit 12 one to this deposition, have been employed by the NRC since
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13 approximately October of 1977 and until this point in time.
14 Is that correct?
15 A
That is correct.
16 Q
At some point in time, were you requested by Paul 1-Collins to look into a September 24, 1977, transient occurring 18 at Davis-Besse?
19 A
Yes, I was.
3 Q
Who is Mr. Collins as he may relate to you?
l 21 A
Mr. Collins is the Chief of the operator Licensing Branch, and as such he is my supervisor.
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Q Essentially you report directly to Mr. Collins.
l 23 24 A
I normally report through a Section Leader or Group,
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i 25 Leader to Mr. Collins.
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Q Has Mr. Collins with the exception of this Septemoer-i 3
of '77 incident at Davis-Besse previously requested you to make an investigation of a transient?
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A No, that is the first one.
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5 Do you know whether or not Mr. Collins has requested g
someone else in a similar position to yours to investigate such a transient?
A I can't answer that.
I don't know.
g Q
g 3ased on your experience in investigating the September 1977 Davis-Besse transient, would it appear as to though that were a rather exceptional or unusual situation?
77 A
D 12 y u mean was it an unusual transient?
Q g
No, was the investigation by NRC to the extent that you were involved and possibly others were involved a usual g
situation or are transients of this nature not generally 15 investigated with the thoroughness that the September '77 ene 16 appears to have been investiga.ted?
This was the first transient that I had seen anybody A
18 investigate.
Q
.,9 When did you begin your investigation of this transient?
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I would have to -- I think the date on the note is i
March of '78, when I started --
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You are referring ~~
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Yes, the -- I am sorrf.
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Q Please continue.
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A Yes, the memorandum that I wrote to the file 3
through Mr. Collins was probably started about a week before
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4 it was completed.
5 Q
And you are now referring to a memo dated March 21, I
6 1978, for the Davis-Besse Unit one File from yourself through P. F. Collins, Chief, Operator Licensing Branch, Division of g
Project Management; subject:
Depressurization of RCS g
Incident.
10 Let me show you a two-page memorandum and ask if
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11 this is what you previously referred to.
12 A
Yes, it is.
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13 Q
And based on the March 21, 1978, date of this memor-14 andum, you ;onclude that your investigation began approximately 13 March 14, 19787 16 A
Yes.
t-Q Shortly therefore.
Is A
It didn' t take much longer than that.
19 Q
To your knowledge, was your investigation the first go one of the Davis-Besse transient?
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Do you mean by Operator Licensing Branch?
I Q
Sy the NRC.
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33 A
I have no idea of what other branches undertook an i
24 investigation.
l 25 Q
Did anyone else in your section provide any i
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investigation?
2 A
No, I believe I was the only one that looked at 3
this.
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4 MR. SIDELL:
Let's have the March 21, 1978, memoran-5 dum fer the Davis-Besse file marked as exhibit two to this 6
deporition.
(The document referred to was 3
marked for identification as 9
Exhibit Two and was received in 10 evidence.)
11 SY MR. SIDELL:
12 Q
In exhibit two to -this deposition, the March 21,
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13 1978, memorandum to the file; was prepared by you after an 14 investigation of the September 1977 Davis-Besse transient?
15 A
That is correct.
16 Q
During your investigation -- strike that.
When did I;
you perform this investigation?
is A
I had a copy of an inspection and enforcement report..
I 19 I reviewed that report.
I went to-the document reem and 3
researched the LER, the Licensee Event Report, that was sub-2:
mitted by Davis-Bess.:: or by Toledo Edision for this event.
I 22 Q
3asically the two factors, the I&E report and the k
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LER?
24 A
'" hat was the material I researched, yes.
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Q Did ycu discuss the transient with anyone?
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A I discussed the report with Tom Tambling, who is 2
the, was at that time, Inspection and Enforcement inspector 3
responsible for Davis-Besse.
I Q
Did you speak with anyone else in Region III 4
5 besides Mr. Tambling?
A No.
6 Q
Did you speak with anyone else, for instance, in 3
I&E headquarters?
A No.
I probably -- I talked to someone to get the 9
to resident or the inspector's name.
That was how I got 13 Mr. Tambling.
32 Q
But you didn't speak with anyone else concerning 13 the substance of the transient?
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" 14 A
No.
' 15 Q
Can you recall when you spoke with Mr. Tambling?
16 Would that have been between approximately March 14 and the date of exhibit two, March 21, 1978?
1 A
Yes.
13 Q
Can you recall whether that was a lengthy conversa-19 29 tion or did you have essentially all the facts by then and i
call him for verification?
21 A
I felt I had the facts that I needed, and I called
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As one of those facts, were you aware that the ik 25 September 1977 transient involved termination by the operator l l
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of the HPI system due to his reliance on pressurizer level r
2 indication going off scale high?
3 A
I don't remember that, no.
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4 Q
And on a review of exhibit two, the March 21, 1978, 5
memorandum; there appears to be no reference in your memo 6
dealing with that situation.
Is that correct?
A That is correct.
8 Q
At the time you investigating this problem, was the 9
PORV considered to be a safety related item?
10 A
I wouldn't think so, no.
Not in any plant that I 11 have been to has it been a safety related valve.
12 O
Have you been to more than the Davis-Lasse plant 13 that is also a B&W facility?
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14 A
Yes.
15 Q
Which ether plants?
16 A
I have been to Oconee to give exams.
1; Q
Is that the only other --
18 A
Three Mile Island Unit I and II.
And Davis-Besse.
19 Q
So you visited three B&W facilities.
20 A
Yes, to give exams.
I al Q
Are you aware that as one of the lessons learned, l
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23 suggested to be classified as safety related?
24 A
Yes.
25 Q
Do you know why that suggestion was made?
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A I would imagine it was as a result of Three Mile Island accident.
3 Q
But specifically any individual results of the r
A accident?
4 5
A Well, from the accident, it was apparent that that 6
valve was a very important part of the reactor coolant system
- and heretofore hadn't been addressed as safety related.
So a
now people were taking a harder icok at it.
9 Q
Is it essentially that the consequences of a mal-to function with the PORV were not previously considered as 11 safety related and therefore affecting adversely the primary te system that is now being reconsidered or reevaluated?
13 A
I think that the consequences of that valve being f
14 open were noted by people; that is why it has a block valve 15 associated with it.
People realize that is the valve stayed p
16 open, you could get a depressurization.
That is why they t-provided it with a block valve upstream.
is Q
As part of your background between June 1972 and 19 June 1977, a period of five years, your resume, exhibit one, 20 states that you were employed by Virginia Electric and Power 21 Company at the Surry plant.
Is that correct?
A That is correct.
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Q And as part of your responsibilities as an assistant:
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A That is correct.
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Q Is Unit II of the Surry plant a B&W f acility?
3 A
No.
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4 Q
5 A
It is a Westinghouse, s
Q And a Westinghouse has a similar setup with a PORV as does B&W7 3
A Yes, it does.
g Q
What about the prescurizer setup with Westinghouse to vis-a-vis B&W7 Are they similar, dissimilar?
11 A
The Westinghouse pressuriser is larger.
Other than 12 that, they are similar.
t 13 Q
Is the function of the Westinghouse pressurizer 14 similar to the function of the B&W pressurizer in that it is 15 the main parameter used by an operator to determine what is 16 going on with core inventory?
t-A Pressurizer pressure and pressurizer level are used 18 as they are in B&W plants.
19 Q
In your experience of five plus years with VEPCO, y),
what was the usual operator reliance on pressuriser level 21 indication for determining core inventory?
In other words,
22 is that the first thing an operator looked at to deter..ine i
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operations of the plant?
g A
. Pressurizer level was one of the first indications 3
of a reactor coolant system leak.
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Well, a leak would be an abnormal condition, 5
wouldn't it?
6 A
Not necessarily.
There are a certain amount of leakage which is allowable under the technical specification.
3 Q
Would the Westinghouse pressurizer level indication g
provide any additional guidance to an operator in running the to facility?
11 A
compared to B&W?-
No, it is basically the same; ic gives you the same information.
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13 Q
So that it is a pretty standard parameter relied 3
14 on by an operator to find out what the core inventory level 15 is?
16 A
That is correct.
t-Q At VIPCO, was it used almost to the exclusion of is other parameters, or it was just one of many to be considered?
19 A
There were several indications that an operator was co-supposed to look at with respect to reactor coolant system 21 inventory.
Pressurizer level was one of them.
cc Q
Well, you say that there are several characteristics t.s 23 an operator should look at.
That is by the book, I take it.
24 A
"' hat is correct.
Q Was the book precisely fo11cwed at vz?co?
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A I don't understand.
Maybe you can rephrase that for me.
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Sure.
During your experience at VEPCO for five
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years, were you familiar with the usual or normal course of 4
5 procedures employed by operators as they related to reliance 6
on pressurizer level indication?
A Yes.
3 Q
Would that be the first parameter?
An operator 9
would check to see what is going on in the core inventory?
A Yes.
10 Q
Would he check any other ones?
Whether or not he 11 12 was supposed to check other ones.
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A He would look at the ones that had to do with the 13 n
14 loss of reactor coolant inventory.
Q Which would those be?
15 A
He would look at his pressurizer pressure or reactor 16 1
coolant system pressure; reactor building pressure; reactor 18 building temperature; reactor building sump level.
Q What about quench tank indications like temperature, 19 go pressure and level indication?
on a loss of coolant acciden*'
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Not normally.
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Do you know where in the control room at VEPCO 3
those indicators are located?
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A For the --
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Quench tank.
3 A
Yes.
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Where?
5 A
They were located on the back vertical panel.
6 Q
At VIPCO.
A At VEPCO.
S' Q
Do you know where they are located at TMI?
9 A
Yes, I do.
to Q
Where would they be located at TMI?
11 A
They are behind a vertical panel.
12 Q
Essentially in the same place as VIPCO?
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13 A
No.
They are located behind a panel as opposed to 14 a panel that is in front of an operator.
At VIPCO they are 15 in front of a panel available for the operator to see.
At is TMI the same indicator is behind a panel, not able to be seen 1-from the normal area that the control room operator stays, is Q
So at VIPCO quench tank indications are readily 19 available --
3 A
Yes.
et Q
-- to an operator without having to run around in i
e scme out of tne way location?
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A Yes, they are.
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At VEPCO, are you aware of the methods of contain=ent I
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A Basically, yes.
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How many parameters are keyed to containment isola-3 tion?
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4 A
Automatic actions, two.
5 Q
Which two.
6 A
It would be your safety injection or safeguards actuation signal and a high containment pressure.
Each would 3
initiate various phases of containment isolation.
9 Q
Do you know what the situation for containment 10 isolation is at TMI-II?
11 A
Basically, again.
12 Q
What are they?
13 A
I believe the containment isolation is based
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.fs primarily on the reactor building pressure.
a Q
It is just the unitary parameter -
16 A
Yes.
i t-Q
-- as the triggering device.
18 A
Single.
19 4 Q
In your conversations in the third week of March l
.y 1978 with Mr. Tambling in Region III, did he indicate to you 21 there were, there was any involvement with manual override 1
22 of thc HPI system?
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23 A
No, we didn' t discuss that.
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24 Q
And am I correct in stating that prior to that j
25 i conversation you had with Mr. Tambling, you did not run j
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across whether or not that fact existed during the September 2
1977 transient?
3 A
I don' t recall whether it did or not.
I may well f
have run across it and not looked at it, not raised the ques-4 5
tion in my own mind.
6 Q
Do you consider pramature termination of the HPI 7
system based on erroneous pressurizer level indication reading s
to be a significant potential safety problem?
9 A
Yes.
to Q
Is that response predicated on information that 11 was gained as a result of TMI-II?
12 A
Yes, it is.
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13 Q
So before March 28, 1979, would you have considered 14
=anual premature termination of the HPI system by reliance 15 on pressurizer level indication to be a significant potential 16 safety problem?
t-A If I can rephrase what I think; yes, the operator 13.
relied heavily on pressuri=e level with regard to hir term-19 ination of high pressure injection.
20 -
Q And if the pressurizer level indication provided 2:
ambiguous or less than accurate results or information as to t:
what was going on in the core as regards inventory, would
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23 that have been a potential safety concern if on that basis 24 '
the operator turned off the HPI system pre-TMI?
I 25 A
Prior to Three Mile Island, operators had been i
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trained that when pressurizer level was going up or approaching 2
the solid condition, they were to terminate high pressure 3
injection to prevent over-pressuri=ation of the reactor
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4 coolant system.
5 Q
And what are the evils to be avoided with over-6 pressurization?
A You have over-pressurization concerns on tne fuel s
itself, and you have over-pressurization concerns on..the e
reactor coolant system integrity, the vessel piping.
to Q
What are those concerns regarding the piping?
11 A
If you had an over-pressurization, then you could 12 cause a failure of the piping.
13 Q
Break a pipe.
14 A
Break a pipe.
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15 Q
And that is as a result of going solid?
16 A
That is correct.
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1-Q Given a choice between core uncovery and going 18 solid, pre-TMI-II, was there an NRC suggested choice an 19 operator should make on a B&W reactor?
If you know, i
20 A
I wouldn't know whether there was a recommended et choice there.
22 Q
Did you have any indications pre-TMI-II as to which
'k 23 the operator should choose, given those two alternatives?
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A Based on my training, the operator would consider i
25 core uncovery; and he would consider his over-pressuri arion.
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would choose.
3 0
When you stated the operator would consider core r
i uncovery, did you mean that he would consider uncovering the 4
5 core as opposed to going solid?
6 A
No, I meant to infer that the operator realizes that the core needs to be covered with water.
8 3.
O So given a choice, he would rather go solid tht.r.
9 uncover the core?
10 A
There are two.
If he thought he was going to 11 uncover his core, he knew that he wasn't going to over-12 pressurize the core so he could add more water.
They are
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13 on different ends of the spectrum, 4
t4 Q
Right, but given the choice in terms of the operator reaction with the HPI system, one instance leaving it on, 15 16 the other instance turning it off, will lead you to the choice t-of either uncovering the core or going solid.
Is that IS correct?
19 A
Not necessarily.
He could -- his choices,- if he go
-thought he had a full pressurizer, he is turning 'it off to 01 avoid over-pressurization rather than uncovering the core i
because he thinks he has a full core.
"' hat is one of the l
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3 24 So I can't say we have ever placed him in that position where he had to make a choice between uncovering the.
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core or over-pressurizing the reactor coolant system.
2 0
Well, in your response, you indicate that with a 3
full pressurizer level indication, the operator would conclude f
4 that he should turn off the HPI system to avoid going solid 5
and therefore risking a small break LCCA.
Correct?
6 A
Prior to Three Mile Island, yes.
Q And if the pressurizer level indication provided g:
inaccurate information in terms of core inventory; by the 9
operator's reliance on that parameter, he could turn off the 10 HPI system therefore avoiding going solid, where in fact he 11 might be running the risk of uncovering the core.
12 A
That is correct.
-13 Q
So you see how we get to the choice of either going
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14 solid or uncovering the core.
15 A
Well, that was -- you gave me, you know, at this 16 time an erroneous level indication.
1; Q
Well, based on your experience with five years at 1
is VEPCO and almost two years now at the NRC, were you under the 19 impression that pressurizer level indication would provide 20-accurate results 100 percent of the time for a reactor?
21 A
Yes.
22 Q
That would include normal as well as abnormal I
23 conditions.
l 24 A
Correct.
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i 25 Q
And since Three Mile Island of March 1979, you l.
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obviously have reached a somewhat different conclusion.
2 A
That is correct.
3 Q
What specifically is that based on?
Is it only
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4 based on the accident' at' Three Mile Island?
5 A
It is based on the accident and the analysis that 6
have since been performed on small break LOCAs.
Q Are you referring to any particular analysis?
8 A
Babcock and Wilcox has performed an analysis.
9 Q
When was that done?
10 A
Around the first part of May of this year.
11 Q
Post-TMI-II.
12 A
Post-TMI analysis.
(
13 Q
Are you aware of any other analysis with the same 14 essential conclusion that 'might have been done pre-TMI-II?
15 A
After the accident, I was made aware of the 16
.Michelson Report.
1-Q Do you know the date the Michelson Report was is originally produced?
19 A
No, I don' t.
20 Q
Have you seen a copy of it?
21 A
I believe so.
22 Q
Handwritten or typed?
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Typed.
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I will represent to you that.the date on the i
25 typed version is January 1978, substantially before TMI-!!.
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1 Did you read that report?
2 A
Yes.
3 0
Were you able to conclude what Mr. Michelson's f
essential concern was?
4 5
A I was reading it in the light of the Three Mile 6
Island accident; and yes, you could read into it that pressurizer level could be erronsous indication on a LOC.A 8
steam space break.
9 Q
As a matter of fact, can you recall a 5pecific 10 section - I believe it is 4.6, the second from the last it section of the report - ' entitled, Pressurizer Level Indica-12 tion, which expressly states that pressurizer level indication 13 :
would produce erroneous or inaccurate information and thereby 14 -
tending to induce erroneous operator reaction based on that 13 level indication to the point where the operator might turn 16 off the HPI system?
t-A I don' t recall that section as you state it.
18 Q
It just so happens -
Let me ask you to take a 19 look at a copy of the typed Michelson report dated January 20
' 78 which is exhibit eight to the.?oster deposition; section 21 4.6, entitled Pressurizer Level Indication.
And if you t
22 would, review or refresh your recollection.
23 (Pause) 24 A
I have read section 4.6.
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And based on my earlier question to you in terms ofi
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the conclusion of that section, would you agree that that was
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2 a relatively accurate restatement of Mr. Michelson's concerns 3
in section 4.6?
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4 A
It is very specific in saying that pressuricer level 5
is not considered a reliable guide to core coolant conditions.
6 Q
And I believe as you previously stated, pressurizar 7.-
level indication, at least from your experience at V5PCO and 3
to a lesser extent in terms of time at the NRC, is that 9
operators rely rather heavily on pressurizer level indication 10 to indicate what is going on with core inventory.
Is that 11 Cor:Sct?
12 A
They have prior to Three Mile Island.
f 13 Q
Yes.
So that were an operator to rely on pressuri-14 er level indication which in fact provided erroneous infor-15 mation and thereby turned off the HPI system, that would be 16 construed as a very important safety problem, would it not?
t; A
Yes.
is Q
In your March 21, 1978, memorandum, you refer to 19 both the I.ER dealing with the September 24th, 1977, Davis-Besse transient as well as a supplement filed on November 14, 20 -
1977.
Ist me show you what has been =arked as exhibit three l 2:
22 ;
to the Tambling deposition, which is dated Nove=ber 14, 1977,
'k i
e 23 entitled, Supplement to Peportable Occurrence, NT-32-77-16, I
24 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit One, date of occurrance,
s 25 September 24, 1977, submitted to Mr. Jares Kappler, Regional 1
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Director, Region !!I, from Terry D. Murray, Station Superin-2
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tendant, Davis-Besse: which includes a 59-page supplemental 3
analysis of the transient and ask you if this is in fact what f-4 you are referring to in your March 21,
'78, memorandum.
5 A
This is a large document and tough to say, but this 6
is apparontly what I used.
This is the supplement to the 7"
LER.
8.:
Q Do you recall seeing this document previously in 9
March of '78 at some time?
10 A
I went to the files and obtained the supplement to l 11 it, and this looks like the same document.
12 Q
And in your March 21, '78, memorandum, paragraph
,f 13 two; you refer to a supplement filed cn November 14, 1977, 14 that describes a transient in great detail.
15 A
This document does, yes.
I6 Q
So the document which is exhibit three,.I believe,
17 to the Tambling deposition is in f act the same one that you 18 referred to in your March 21st memorandum?
19" A
That is correct.
20 e Did you thoroughly review this supplemental responsej Q
21 i
by Davis-Besse prior to writing your memorandum of March 21?
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A It depends on what you consider a thorough review.
23 The thrust of my investigation was to consider the aspects of l 24 i
training and retraining of operators with respect to this j
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And yes, I did review it f=r that information.
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Q Are you aware that on page two of exhibit three to 2
the Tambling deposition there is a statement to the e.ffect 3
that operation was, operator action was timely and proper j
I 4
throughout the sequence of events?
3 A
I see that statement.
Page two.
6 Q
Did you conclude that that in fact was the situation 7
as it occurred in September of 1977 at. Davis-Besse?
3 A
At that time, I felt that the 20-minute delay in 9
closing the valve was a long time, was longer than it should to have been.
11 Q
And which valve are you referring to?
12 A
This was the, in this incident, the power operated 13 relief valve stuck open and remained open for about 20 minutes 14 Q
Or as we are referring to it in shorthand, the 15 PORV7 16 A
PORV.
1; Q
And you felt that 20 minutes of nonrecognition of 13 that problem by the operator was excessive.
19 A
Yes, I thought so.
3 Q
Did you conclude that there should be any modifica-et tions in procedure or changes in equipment as a result of I
that?
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23 A
I concurred that the change that was made was to 1
24 provide a more positive indication of PORV position and so t
05 indicated in the memo.
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Q Let me ask you if at the time of the September '77 2
transient you were aware of whether or not there was any 3
position indication on the PORV at Davis-Besse.
4 A
The only indication that was available was a indi-3 cating light that indicated the demand to the valve to be 6
open.
+
Q So that showed :nerely that the signal was sent to 8
- the solenoid to energize the PORV, not whether or not the 9
signal was received or whether or not the valve was open or to closed.
i A
That is correct.
1:
Q Essentially another indirect method of determining 13 an operational element of the primary system.
{
14 A
That is correct.
13 Q
Which would be similar to the pressurizer level 16 indication as it relates to co::e inventory as being an t-indirect method of deter =ining a primary parameter of the is'-
primary system.
19 A
Right.
Presscri:er level is a direct indication co " - under certain conditions.
21 Q
Well, when you say it is a direct indication, it is 22 not based on, for instance, thermoccuple readings in the
-k 03 reactor core itself, is it?
24 A
That is correct.
i 23 Q
The water level included in the pressuri:er is j
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essentially an appendage to the primary system or the reactor 2
core itself, is it not?
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3 A
That is correct.
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4 Q
So it really only produces in indirect measurement 5
of what should be in the primary system or the core itself?
6 A
Under normal-conditions, the pressurizer is the
' highest point in the lo'op.
And if the reactor coolant system s
is full, then the pressuri=er would be the highest point and 9
would be indicating the level belCW it.
10 Q
But nevertheless still only an indirect rather than 11 a direct measurement method.
12 A
It is not a direct measurement of water in the
(
13 vessel.
4 0
It is a direct measurement of anything in the is vessel or on2v indirect?
16 A
I would have *a say that it was indirect under 1-certain conditions.
Is Q
Well, your response prompts the question:
Is it 19 something other than indirect and direct under limited
-)
conditions?
3 et A
It is indirect under limited conditions.
e.:
Q Is it direct under any conditions for anything?
23 A
Yes, when the plant is cid and the reactor cociant i 24 system is solid.
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At that point, you are not producing power, though.
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A That is correct.
ngin T2 2
O Did you agree with the conclusion in exhibit three
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3 to the Tambling deposition that operator response or action
'I was timely and proper throughout the sequence of events at 4
5 Davis-Besse in September of 1977?
6 A
As I said before, I thought that the 20-minute time 7,.
frame seemed long to me when I reviewed the incident.
I have a-a diffic ilt time with the definition of timely.
9 Q
So given the situation as it occurred in September 10 1977 at Davis-Besse, you would not necessarily conclude that 11 operator action was of a timely nature in closing the PORV?
12 Is that correct?
r 13 A
I would have to say that I wasn't in the control
>(
when the event took plve, and I can't say that I 14 room 15 understood or had the benefit of all the alarms or indications 16 that were taking place at the time.
From where I sat, it 1-seemed like 20 minutes was a long time.
It may have -- that is may have been a timely response to the operator.
19,
Q But if it was, it was not necessarily timely to you ~
1 j
20 reviewing the occurrence.
l 21 A
That is correct.
2:
Q What bases would an operator have to determine the
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23 PORV was failed open if he had an indicator light that said l
24 everything is fine as he did at Davis-Sesse in September 19777 05 A
The PORV discharges to the quench tank.
The 1
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discharge line has temperature indicators on it.
The quench 2
tank has temperature, pressure and level indicators on it.
3 Q
And would the operator notice that all of those I
4 indicators would increase if there was a problem with a 5
failed open PORV?
6.
A He would notice 'an increase anytime PORV was open.
He would notice a continued increase' if the PORV remained open s.
Q Do you know what the normal operating temperature 9
at the tail pipe is?
to A
For a tight valve, its containment ambient tempera-11 ture.
12 Q
Which is how much.
13 A
At that location would be maybe 120 degrees.
14 Q
Are there tech specs that require 120-degree level.
15 at that point?
16 A
There are tech specs on overall containment tempera-t-
ture but none on that specific line temmerature.
Is Q
What would you consider to be a temperature reading sufficient to alert an operator that there might be a problem 19 20 with the PORY at the tail pipe?
21 A
Well, it would be a temperature above the normal i
l temperature, i
03 Q
Are we talking about 125?
24 A
Probably over 200 degrees.
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Q If you had something around 200 at the tail pipe, i
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i would that merely indicate that for whatever reason the PORV 2
had opened and then closed?
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3 A
It could indicate that, or it could indicate a
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4 continual leaking by on the valve.
5 Q
Issentially weeping by the PORV?
a.
A Weeping.
Q Would 604 degrees at the tail pipe be considered 3
normal temperature?
9 A
No.
10-Q What would that indicate?
11 A
That is the normal T-hot temperature.
I 1:
O And that would be the reactor core itself?
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13 A
Reactor coolant or reactor coolant system outlet 14 temperature.
15 Q
Is the term tail pipe temperature of limited use 16 within the NRC or the industry, or is that generally recog-1-
nized as an easily understood term?
A I think that is a general term.
is o
19 Q
On the order of core?
Everybody knows what the 20 core means?
21 A
Yes.
I t
Q Would you consider it to be a timely and preper i
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23 response for an operator to turn off the EPI system relying 24 primarily en pressuri=er indica-lon level when the reactor i
25 core pressure is drcpping?
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31 1-A No, that is a -- based on the training, that is a --
2 contradiction in what people had been trained to see.
1 3
Q Pre-TIE this is.
(
4 A
Pre-TIC.
5 Q
And if they saw a decrease in reactor pressure, what 6
were they supposed to have done?
Relative to the HPI.
A Well, if the reactor coolant system pressure was a
decreasing, he would normally keep his HPI on.
9 Q
To prevent what evil from occurring?
10 A
Well, that is normally an indication you have a loss it of coolant and you are losing inventory; you need to put more 12 water into the core.
So I would have to say that is a core f
13 covery action.
14 Q
At this p a nt in time as you can recall, Tom 15 Tembling never mentioned manual override of the HPI system.
16 A
Not that I remember, no.
1-Q Well, given the significance of that action from is your perspective and I presume from a general NRC perspective,
t g.,
if it had occurred; should it have been mentioned to you
- o during the course of your investigation?
21 A
I think during the course of my investigation, I 22 was looking more at what happened in the auxiliary feedwater l-L 23 system and.why the course of events took place, PORV sticking 24 open.
And I did not address specifically the operator's actions with respect to HPI.
l 25 8
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Q But if the event occurred as I have represented it 2
to you, should not in your opinion Mr. Ta=bling mentioned 3
something on that order to you, that the operator prematurely
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4 turned off the HPI system; maybe we should tell operators 5
about this in the future.
6 A
I don't know if that was one of the main items that came out of the Davis-Besse event.
I can' t say that he should a
have mentioned it.
I probably didn' t ask him about.that.
9 Q
Is that something you should have been required to 10 ask him in order for him to provide the information to you, i
11 given the significance of that action; particularly where j
1 pressurizer level indication would produce erroneous informa-13 tion?
{
14 A
If I had have been looking into that aspect of the 15 transient, yes.
16 Q
Did --
)
1-A But I wasn' t looking into that aspect of the is transient.
i 19 Q
Did Mr. Collins indicate to you he wanted a rather 20 narrow in scope investigation into the September of 1977 l
21 Davis-Besse transient?
or did he just say find out what 5l happened?
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03 A
He asked me to look into the training that the 24 operators received as a result of this transient.
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25 Q
Which should be geared to rather safety significant !
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i actions or reactions on their part, should it not?
2 A
That would depend on the scope of the training.
3 No=mally the training would address the sequence of events 4
of a transient and why it happened.
5 Q
Well, you would be more concerned in terms of
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6 operator training as a result of the September 1977 Davis-Besse transient.
If the operator prematurely terminated the s
HPI system in reliance on erroneous pressuri=er level indica-l 9
tion, than perhaps if the operator had been drinking a cup of l
l to coffee, would you not?
11 A
Well, it has more significance that that, yes.
12 Q
Substantially.
(
13 A
Yes.
14 Q
And even in an absolute sense, pr waturely turning is off the HPI system, given an inaccurate pressurizer level 16 indication reading, raises the possibility of core uncovery, t-does it not?
)
18 A
The situation where you have low reactor coolant i
19 system pressure and indicating high level in the pressuri=er 1
20 with no HPI; yes, that leads to that.
21 Q
So based on erroneous info. ation provided by 22 pressurizer indication level, the operator could do precisely t
s 03 the wrong thing.
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A
"' hat is correct.
25.
O Such as turning off the HPI system.
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A That is correct.
2 Q
Which should be something that an operator wculd 3
be concerned about in the course of a transient, should he 4
not?
5 A
When to terminate HPI?
6 Q
Yes.
~~
A Yes, he would be concerned with that.
8 0
In the third paragraph, first page of your March 21, 9
1978, memo, you state that Mr. Tambling, quote, " feels that to the reactor operator was not in error since his primary F-11 source of indication of a relief valve failure (valve position 5
12 lights) was not available."
End quote.
l 13 I believe you previously indicated that position is I-indication is not the ex=lusive method by which an operator 14 15 can determine the position of the PORV.
16 A
That is correct.
1-Q Did you have a response to Mr. Tambling's statement is that he concluded the operator was not in error based on his 19% reliance only on the position indication light for the PORV?
20 '
A I felt that Mr. Tambling had been to the site, had 21 spoken to the individuals concerned, and reached that conclu 22 sien based ucon his interviews.
23 Q
So in your opinion, Tambling's investiga. ion was 24l accurate, adequate in resolving the operator reliance on this
.i 25 !
particular light?
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A Yes.
2 Q
Did you have any discussion with Mr. Tambling about 3
the quench tank indications in determining whether or not t'
4 the PORV was open or closed?
5 A
We spoke about that, whether they were available.
s Q
Did he indicate to you that they were in fact
'available?
8 A
I don't recall whether he addressed that specifically.
9 My concern would have been that there were other indications to available;.did they use them.
And I am not sure what his l1 response was to that.
12 Q
By the inclusion of the sentence I previously read
_(
13 to you from the third paragraph of your March 21,
'78, memor-14 andum to file; would you have indicated or included that 15 sentence if you had agreed with Mr. Tambling's assessment of 16 the way the operator functioned by relying only on the posi-1-
tion actuation light for the PORV?
18 A
I think you better rephrase that one for me.
T 19 Q
Would the inclusion of the sentence I read frem
~
20 your March 21, 1978, memorandum earlier be indicative on 21 your part of some disagreement with Mr. Tambling as to his t
22 conclusion of proper operator action based exclusively on the position indication for the PORV?
23 04 A'
I don' t think we are talking about preper action:
I I
05 but maybe timely action.
And -
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Q Is not timely action proper action and untimely 2
action i= proper?
3 A
In my --
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4 Q
Or at least subject to change?
5 A
In my mind, the proper action is performing the 6
sequence of steps; timely action is performing those sequence of steps at the time that they are needed to be performed.
a Q
Or alternatively performing them properly.
In a 9
timely manner.
to A
Okay.
11 Q
So based on the purpose for your investigation, to 12 provide adequate operator training on the causes and solutions
(
113 of the September of 1977 Davis-Besse transient; you were
't4 interested in finding out that the operator reacted to the
~15 PORV failing coen in a timely and proper manner.
16 A
Yes.
1-Q And you can' t recall the precise response that is Mr. Tambling offerred you when you raised the subject of 19 ' " what else the operator may have relied on during the transient, m
to determine if the PORV was open or closed.
21 A
I don' t recall what he may have said.
22 Q
Well, did you concur with Mr. Tambling's conclusion
~%
r that the operator was not in error based on his primary i
i 24 indication being the position indication light for the PORY
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was unavailable?
25 l
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A I felt that the operator shouldn't rely on the 2
single indication.
3 Q
Did you say should not?
/
4 A
Should not have relied on a single indicator since 5
he had other indicators available.
6 Q
Did you recommend for the operator training as a
' result of this transient that operators specifically check-8 quench tank indicators prior to terminating the EPI, for 9
instance?
10 A
No.
11 Q
Did Mr. Tambling indicate to you whether or not 12 there was going to be any training for operators to the effect r
13 that they were going to be told to check quench tank indica-l 14 tors to determine if the PORV was open or closed?---.
15 A
I can't recall.
I can' t say whether he did or not.
16 Q
Based on the second from the last sentence in the t-first paragraph of your memorandum, quote, "The primary is
" reason fo the belated block valve closure was attributed to 19 the fact that no relief valve position indication was avail-
^
20 able in the control room although the continued relief could 21 have been inferred from available related information (quench 22 tank pressure, level and temperature)."
End quote.
23 Does the inclusion of that sentence in your March 24 21 report, exhibit two to this deposition, indicate that you I
25 and Mr. Tambling were at least a little bit at odds over your I
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resolution of what the operator should rely on to detevine 2
the position of the PORV7 3
A No, it doesn't.
't 4
0 You felt that was sufficient. information; that if 5
the operator checked, he could have determined sooner than 6
20 minutes what the problem was with the PORV.
A The word " belated" related to the fact that it a
' took 20 minutes to ascertain what was causing the depressuri-9 zation.
10 Q
So for the word " belated" in the fifth line from 11 the bottom of de first paragraph of exhibit two, the March 12 21, 1978, memo; could be substituted for --
13 A
Delayed.
{
14 0
-- untimely?
15 A
I would say delayed.
16 Q
How about improper?
1-A It was a proper ac' don.
^
18 Q
Just nou taken as early as it could have been.
19 "
A That is correct.
20 "
Q Can you remember whether or not you made any 21 response to Mr. Tambling's conclusien that the operator did 22 not er: by his reliance on the position indicator for the
(
23 PORV7 For instance, "That is kind of peculiar: I never i
24 heard of that before," or "He shouldn't do that; he should l '
25 check something else."
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39 A
He was aware of the other indicators that were 2
available to the operator to make that deter =ination,. that 3
the PORV was open.
I didn' t tell him anything new.
4 0
Was this a situation where the two of you more or 5
less implicitly understood that quench tank indicators were 6
available as an alternative to a position indication for the 1'.
PORV7 s
A When we talked about it, I am sure that we discussed 9
those things, and it was no surprise to either of us that to these other indications are available to tell you whether or 11 not PORV is stuck open.
ic Q
Wa= this something that might have been so obvious 13 to the both of yet it didn't bear expre'ss statement?
14 A
No, I believe we brought it up, or I brought it up.
15 Q
And you can' t recall any response by Mr. Tambling.
16 A
Not a specific response, no.
1; Q
Do you have a general recognition of whar he stated?l 18 A
Well, that he was aware that these indications 19 existed.
20 Q
With an indirect position indicator such as 21 existed at Davis-Besse in September 1977 for the PORV, would 20 not the quench tank indicators have been the primarf source l
23 of indication for the position of the PORV rather than the 24 indirect position indicator?
l l
25 A
It is another inferred parameter.
You can infer i
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position indication from the indicator that they had, or you 2
could infer the PORV position from the quench tank parameters.
3 0
Well, you have temperature of the quench tank, first I
of all, correct?
4 5
A Yes.
6 Q
And you have pressure of the quench tank to the extent that the ruptured disk has not blown.
8 A
Pressure would increase until you popped the 9
ruptured disk.
to Q
And you also have quench tank level indication, 11 correct?
12 A
That is correct.
i3 Q
So you assentially have three related but somewhat 14 independent indicators at the quench tank to determiT.e where 15 the PORV is, correct?
l 16 A
That is correct.
i 1-Q But you only have one indication in the indirect is position indication light.
19 A
That is correct again.
zF Q
Which is either a yes or a no, an on or an off 21 situation.
I 22 A
That is correct.
23 Q
Whereas the quench tank indications are variations 24 or degrees of indication.
Is that correct?
25 A
Quench tank -- all these parameters, the level, the i
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pressure and the temperature would go up any time there is a discharge to the tank.
Indeed the continued increase of 1
3 these parameters,that would indicate that a valve had
(
4 remained open.
5 Q
Would it be only the continued increase or would 6
it be the increase or position above a certain maximum
~ threshold?
- /
8 A
It would depend on the actual design of the quench 9
tank.
Quench tanks are designed to take say -- I can't to remember the exact numbers -- maybe a 10 percent load increase 11 where you would dump the equivalent of 10 percent power into ig-the quench tank which would cause the temperature and
~
13' pressure to go up but not to the point where you would blow
(
14 a rupture disk.
15' Q
Well, if the operator determined that on the basis 16 of quench tank pressure he had blown the rupture disk, would 1;
that not automatically tell him the PORV was failed open?
18 A
That -- he could infer that from there.
i 19 Q
Would that not be a very easy inference for him to
?
20 make?
1 i
i 21 A
Yes.
1 l
22 Q
Much more accurate than merely position indication 23 of the PORV itself.
24 A
More accurate than the indication they had, yes, i
k 25 Q
Yet Mr. Tambling evidentally stated to you that l
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there was no reactor operator error based on the fact that 2
his primary source of indication was the indirect indication 3
for the PORV as you report in your March 21,
'78, memo to i
4 file, exhibit two to this deposition.
Correct?
5 A
That is correct.
6 Q
Do you think that is a correct conclusion on the part of Mr. Tambling?
In view of our discussion about the e-'
availability of quench tank indicators?
9 A
From -- I can' t answer your question directly.
I 10 would have to say that as part of my job as a examiner, one 11 of the questions that we routinely ask is, "How do you kn'w o
12 that the PCRV is open?"
And we would expect the response that f
13 the temperature and the pressure and the level of the quench
~~~ ~
14 tank would go up.
15 So in my, based on my job, I am used to asking that 16 type of question, and I look for that type of answer.
1; Q
New when you say with the examinations you give to is operators, you expect a certain answer.
Are these oral exams 19 or written exams?
20 A
Tt is an oral exam.
21 Q
And you grade --
20 A
It could show up on a written exam as well.
I 23 0
When you grade the oral exa=, first of all, do you I
have a maximum number of points available for each individual !
24
'(
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A On an oral exam?
n.
Q Yes.
A We don't grade by points.
3 Q
Is it pass / fail?
4 A
It is satisfactory and unsatisfactory or marginal.
5 6
0 Well, if I were an operator and you asked me the question about what indicators, what are the primary indica-g tors, for position of the PORV and I said the position indica-g tion light on my control panel; would I get a satisfactory, to unsatisfactory or a marginal evaluation for'that response?
31 A
If you told me that was the only indication, you 13 would get an unsatisfactory response, or I would mark it
(-
13 unsatisfactory.
14 Q
And if I told you it as the only indica' tors' I had 15 quench tank indicators, temperature, pressure and level indication as my only response; alternatively not mentioning 16 1-the position indication light on the control panel, how would 13 you grade that response?
19 A
I would consider that unsatisfactory also.
2o Q
In other words, you have to get them both to get 2
a satisfactory?
l 22 A
Yes.
23 Q
On the written exam, would you ask the same question?
l A
Yes.
25 Q
And for each individual questien, are there certain Acme Reporting Company l
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number of available points?
2 A
That is correct.
3 Q
How many' for let's say a question on this nature,
4 107 5
A on this type of question, it would be say roughly e
a one-point question; and the question would be worded:
What four indications do you have that a PORV is open?
So s
he would know to give us four responses.
9 Q
Do you get a quarter point for each response?
to A
Quarter point for each response.
11 Q
So if I said quench tank temperature, pressure,
12 level indication; I got three-quarters of a point, right?
13 A
That is correct.
{
14 Q
So based on that, would you conclude that quench 15 tank indicators are three times as important as indirect is position indication for PORV7 1;
A Not three times as important, no.
16 Q
Even though you give three times the number of 19 points.
m A
Yes.
21 Q
okay.
So it appears that based on our discussion that you and Mr. Tambling are somewhat at odds in terms of 03 the importance of how you deterrd.ne the position of the 24 PORV, at least at Davis-Sesse in September 1977.
Is that a --l
<(
i 25 A
! wouldn't say at cdds.
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Q IIe thinks the primary indicator is the position 2
indication for the PORV, a light.
Do you think that is the 3
case?
4 A
That should be the primarf indication.
5 Q
Provided you have an actual position indicator 6
A If you have the proper indication attached to the valve, yes.
s Q
We1.'., would you classify indirect position indicator 9
as proper or improper indication?
10 A
It is not absolute.
"It Q
It is not so good.
T2 A
Not as good as a direct indicator.
{
i3 Q
Okay, well based on what they had evidentally at 14 Davis-Besse in September 1977, that was an indirect-position
' Y5 indicator..
16 A
That is correct.
1-0 And would you consider that as the primary source 18 ^ of indication for determining the position of the PORV?
19 A
At that time,.yes.
20 Q
Mot quench tank indicators?
21 A
The position of the valve or the demand to the valve' 22 was the first thing that they would icok at.
23 Q
3ecause it was the easiest to ascertain?
24 A
That is correct.
25 Q
But not necessarily t% most reliable that was I
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available.
2 A
That is correct again.
3 Q
so if we are using the term primary in terms of 4
level of importance as the primary source of indication for 5
an operator trying to find out what particular position his 6:.
PORV is in, would you conclude that quench tank indicators or 7
indirect position indication as existed in September of ' 77 s'
at Davis-Besse was the primary source of indication?
9 A
I would say that the indications received from the to quench tank were the best indicators.
11 Q
Although those might not be the ones that the 12 operator would run to in the first instance?
g3 A
That is correct.
g4 Q
The last sentence of the third paragraph 6n lpage 15 one of exhibit two to this deposition, your March 21, 1978, 16 memorandum, states, quote:
"It should be noted that this i;
indication will be installed in the. future."
End quote.
13 -
Referring to what?
19 A
The installation of a better indicator of valve 3
position.
21 Q
Essentially a direct position indicator?
e A
Not direct again.
Q Are you familiar with the manufacturer of the PORV
- 23 i
24 at Davis-Besse?
At least the type of PORV?
23 A
I am familiar with the type of valve.
i i
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Q What type is that?
A It is a pilot actuated relief valve.
3 Q
Are you familiar with the type of manufacturer of.
/
4 that particular valve?
In other words, who makes the valve?
5 A
No, I am not.
6 Q
Do you know whether er not the manufacturer of the Davis-Sessa PORV is the same as for other B&W reactors?
8 1:
A I don't know that.
9 Q
So you were not informed by Mr. Tambling or anyone to else for that matter during the course of your investigation is ti in March of 1978 that it might be easier to put a direct
i l2 position actuation indicator on the Davis-Besse PORV than it 13 might be for any other B&W PORV7 1 14 A
We didn' t address the possibility of putting such l
u.15 an indicator on any other valve other than the one at Davis-16 Be s se.
1; Q
Were you aware at the time you made your investiga-is tion into the September 1977 transient at Davis-Besse that 19 a direct position indicator light and mechanism had been.
3) installed in October of 1977?
gi A
Had been installed at Davis-Besse?
Q Davis-Besse.
=
23 A
I don' t know when it was installed.
I was just 24 aware that it was going to be installed in the future.
I was i'
I 3;
not aware that it was installed in October of that year.
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Q How were you aware that it was going to be installed 2
sometime in the future?
3 A
Nor= ally when a licensee makes a cormitment to 4
install something, the Inspection and Enforcement people make 5
note of that and check up on it at a later date to veryify that 6
it has been done.
Q Did Mr. Tambling indicate to you they were going to a
put a light in or direct position indication or more direct.
g position indication in sometime in the future?
to A
Yes, he did.
11 Q
So he didn't mention to you that essentially this 12 had already been done, some seven months before or six months 13 before the date of your memorandum?
{
14 A
I can't say that.
I can' t explain the dffference l
15 between this memorandum and the date of the actual installa-16 tion.
1; Q
Well, let me ask you this.
If Mr. Tambling had is known there was a direct position indication for the PORV at
. Davis-Besse installed in October 1977, six months before your tg 20 investigation, do you think that is something he might have 21 indicated to you in the course of your conversation?
22 A
Yes, he may have.
3 Q
Can you recall whether or not he did?
i 24 A
No.
i' 3
Q Is it possible he may have and it just slipped your I
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I mind?
2 A
Yes, it is very possible.
3 Q
The event we are discussing occurred some six to 4
seven months preceding your investigation and report.
Do you 4
5 consider that a timely response to install a direct or more 6
direct position indication for the PORV7 A
Are you asking me whether it should take six m nths 8
to install such a device?
9 Q
Yes.
to A
I can't say that it is an abnormal amount of time it considering that often this is a primary system valve, and it 12 may not be available for maintenance until the next scheduled 13 shutdown.
And it takes some time for design of a part, 14 delivery of a part; so it well could have been deIayed until
'15 the next convenient shutdown, which would take it six months.
16 Q
If this were classified at the time as a safety t-related element of the primary system, would six months have tg been a proper time to correct the problem?
A For a safety related' piece of equipment, it would 19 00 not have been allowed to go along that long.
21 Q
So essentially they would have had to shut the plant down prior to refueling to solve the problem.
Is that 3
correct?
3 A
Yes.
l l'
05 Q
Are you aware of the fact that evidentally there l
l i
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50 was a missing part in the relay for the PORV at Davis-Besse, 2
and that was the cause of the problem with the valve?
3 A
That is what I read, yes.
4 Q
Do you know why that part was missing in the first 5
place?
6-A I can't explain why it was not installed.
O Was that part of your investigation, to determine p
what happened to the part?
9 A
No.
10 Q
Did Mr. Tambling offer any ideas on what happened 11' with that?
g A
I. don't believe so.
(
13 Q
I take it that you are aware of the fact that other 14 B&W reactors also have PORVs.
-~~ ~
f5 A-Yes.
16 Q
As well as Westinghouse reactors.
t-A Yes, I am.
is ?
Q None at the time apparently were considered safety ign related equipment?
l 20
?
A Not to my knowledge.
l Q
At the time of this investigation, were you aware 21 22 as to the type of position indication other reactors had for t
l 23 their PORVs?
24 A
Yes.
I t
s e
i 25 Q
And what was that?
I i
Acme Reporting Company us,
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t A
Westinghouse had a direct position incicated on i
2 their valve.
3 Q
That indicated the actual position of the PORV7 4
A That is correct.
5 Q
What about B&W reactors?
6 A
Most B&W racctors had only the demand indicator
- .like at Davis-Besse.
g Q
W' ra there any others that you know of that had e
9 actual position indicators?
to A
I can't say that I investigated all of them at that 11 time to find out what they had.
12 Q
So as far as you know, you could say with some 13 degree of confidence that all of the SdW reacters with the 14 exception of Davis-Besse at the time of your March -1978 15 investigation had either the same or similar PORV indication tg setups?
t- '
A As far as I know, yes.
Q 3ased on your conclusion that the 20 minutes 18 19 : involved for the operator to find the problem with the failed 3) open PORV at Davis-Besse in September 1977, did you censider it necessary to inform other B&W reactors of the potential 21 22 for operator action based on inaccurate information with the I
23 primary system to find the failed open PORV?
s 2;
A I didn't.
I thought that the 20 minutes was an
(
25,
isolated case.
I thought tha-i' ** hancened acain, it would i i
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be noted earlier than that.
2 Q
At Davis-Besse?
Or at any other --
3 A
Especially at Davis-Besse.
4 Q
Well, did you make any report that was distributed 5
to other B&W reactors as a result of the Davis-Besse transient?
6-A No, I didn't.
Q Do you know if there was a report that was made 8y dealing with the PORV failing open and being unnoticed for 9
20 minutes?
10 A
A report issued by the NRC7 11 Q
Anyone.
12 A
I can't recall having seen anything other than the
(
13 LERs.
14 Q
And there are several hundrei if not several-
-15 thousand Leas that float across ever p ne's desk every so 16 often.
17 A
There are a great number of them.
18 -i Q
And there is generally no indication that screams 19 - - off the face of an LER that says, "I an a problem dealing with 20 -.a PORV failing open and no operator action for 20 mimutes"?
21 A
That is correct.
I 22 Q
What leads you to conclude that if a PORV failed 23 open, for instance, at OMI-II an operator there would be able l 24 to solve the problem any more quickly than that at Davis-Besse?
(
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What led me to think that he should have done it l
Acme Reporting Company l
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sooner?
2 Q
That he would do it soone-3 A
I feel that the operator at Three Mile Island was i
hampered by not having as much indication as Davis-Besse had.
4 5
Q I am not specifically referring now to the accident. --
A Okay.
6 m
Q
-- at TMI.
I believe earlier that you indicated a - that you were relatively convinced that an operator
.t another 9
B&W plant would notice the PORV being failed open in less than 10 20 minutes.
Is that correct?
11 A
That is what I thought, yes.
12 0
And my question is:
Why did you come to that
(
13 cor.clusion?
- t4 A
Because at most of the plants that I had-teen to,
.t3 the information available on the quench tank was available to is the operator in the control room where he could see it.
I t-felt that he would, based on his training, see those indica-18
. tions and respond accordingly and shut the block valve.
Q Did you conclude at the time during your investiga-19
- tion in March 1978 that other B&W facilities should also 20 6
et include or should also install direct position indicators on 3
their PORVs as opposed to the indirect methods?
4
'u 23 A
I may have felt that that was a good idea.
1 24 0
Did you relay that concern to anyone?
C 3
A No.
i Acme Reporting Company l
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1 Q
Why not?
~
2 A
I would imagine that is not my normal duty.
Normal 3
duties, you see many power stations with different designs,
4 and in the past we haven't ccmmented on those designs although 5
they are different from facility to facility.
6 Q
So essentially you were primarily concerned with
~
administering exams to operators and with the one exception g
of this investigation requested by Mr. Collins, not concerned 9
with the design changes or modifications for reactors.
Is 10 that correct?
11 A
That is correct.
12 Q
And that is on the basis of your interpretation of 13 C.
your job responsibilities.
A That, and I was willing to accept a reactor vendor's 15 design.
16 sagin T3 Q
You just referred to a reactor vendor's design.
1~
What particularly does that involve in this case?
Is that 18 the installation, for instance, of the. direct position 19 indicator at Davis-Besse?
A There are many aspects of the reactor designs that 01 are different between Babcock and. Wilcox and Westinghouse and 22 Cumbustien Engineering.
And I was just referring to any of I
23 l
those differences between the plants.
l 24 l7 Q
So that based on the particular plant's idiosycracies
! (
3 you concluded that it was unnecessary to suggest that they Acme ' Rep ortin g Company
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55 1
install a more direct position indicator for the PORVs at 2
other B&W plants?
3 A
That is correct.
4 Q
Are you aware that eight days after your report 5
was filed, March 21, 1978, TMI-II experienced a failed open 6
relief valve which was unnoticed by the operator since there was no indication light available?
8 i
A No.
3 Q
Are you aware of that fact at this point in time to other'than my just informing you of it?
11 A
No.
I may be aware of other aspects of that, that 12 transient and not note it as a depressurization due to the 13 PORV.
14 Q
If you had known about that earlier TMI-II-PORV 15 failure which occurred some seven months after the Davis-Besse is incident and approximately one week after your reporu was t-completed in March of 1978, would that have indicated to you is a possible generic problem for the PORVs?
r 19 A
It may have.
1 m
Q If that had been the case, what action would you i
et have suggested?
t i
22 A
I don' t knew what I would have done.
-\\
23 !
Q Is there an organizational procedure for you to e4 relay your concerns about generic problems to someone for t i I
n their resolution.before an accident?
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A I would relay them through my normal chain of 2
command, and I am sure that it would be taken over to the 3
Division of Operating Reactors who perform analyses on 4
transients or generic problems.
5 Q
Wou3d it have had any effect in terms of your functions relative to operator training or changing operator 6
reaction to various transients if you had known of a possible g
generic problem of failing open PORVs?
9 A
Well, the subject of opening PORVs and how to deter-to mine that they are open have been the subject of exams for it many years.
It may have served to cause us to ask that 12 particular question more often.
13 Q
When you were at VEPCO's Surry plant, you state in 14 your resume that you trained for senior reactor ope'rator 15 license.
Did you take the exam for a senior reactor operator 16 license?
t-A Yes.
- s Q
Did you pass it?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
Was there a question dealing with failed open PORV7 21 A
I can't recall.
i 1
ec Q
If you were aware around the time of your March 1978' memo, exhibit two to this deposition, of generic PORY problems, 23 l
24 ' without a final risolution that in fact there was a generic problem at all 3&W reactors with PORVs; would you have 25 I
Acme Reporting Company m, n......
57 i
suggested a change in training procedures specifically to 2
make operators aware of quench tank indicators as a primary 3
source of reference rather than in indirect indication light
(
4 as a pri: nary reference source?
5 A
At the time I felt that the operators had been 6
trained not to rely on a single piece of information and that 7
their emergency procedures did in fact tell them that when a
they had an open PORV, that certain parameters would change.
9 Q
Well, operators were trained not to rely on single 10 pieces of equipment.
Did they follow that training with 11 reference to the pressurizer level indica'.1on?
e A
Did they?
13 Q
Yes.
'{
t4 A
Yes.
They are also taught to believe t'he'ir" 15 instrumentation.
i 16 Q
Kind of like a Catch-22.
t-A Yes.
is Q
Are you aware of anyone at the NRC at the time of 19 your March 1978 investigation into September of'1977'at 20 Davis-Besse who considered the generi'c ' consequences of a 21 failing open PORV7 22 A
I am not aware of anyone.
.s i
23 Q
Looking back, do you think it should have been con-l 24 sidered generic at that ti;ne, essentially a year before f
i 25 TMI-II?
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A Looking back?
Yes.
2 Q
Are you aware of section 15.6.1 of the Standard 3
Review Plan?
4 A
No.
5 Q
Do you have any involvement with determining whether 6
or not there has been adequate analysis or testing done by a licensee relative to what the Standard Review Plan requires?
3 A
In section 157 No.
We review section 13.
13.2 and g
13.5.
to Q
What do those sections deal with?
11 A.
They have to do with training and procedures.
12 Q
Is there a specific training -- pre-TMI now --
13 dealing with operator termination of the HPI system?
(
s 14 A
Would you rephrase that, please?
15 Q
Pre-TMI-II of this year, were there specific 16 procedures dealing with when the operator should turn off the 1-HPI system?
Or alternatively when he should not turn it off?
18 <
A I can't say that they were specifically spelled out 19 in the procedures.
Most procedures had a precaution not to go v over-pressurize the reactor coolant-system.
And whether that 21 showed up as a specific step telling him to terminate EPI; ec there were steps saying that 11 pressuriser level was main-S' tained or increasing, to go ahead and throttle or terminate 23 24 HPI.
(
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Q Was there any explicit information provided to Acme Reporting Company
.2*2' 426 4488
59 1
operators dealing with uncovering the core as there was for 2
going solid?
Or was that just something so obvious, it 3
didn't bear explicit reference?
4 A
I would agree that it was explicit in maintaining 5
the core cooling and safeguards actuation equipment.
s.
Q Can you recall any NRC reference saying,. "You don't l want to uncover your core" or something to that effect?
s A
Well nothing as specific as that.
I think that was 9
just part of the system's design.
to Q
Well, pre-TMI-II, did it appear then frcm your it perspective that there was more apparent concern with going g
12 solid than uncovering the core, based on relatively greater 13 emphasis in terms of instructions not to go solid?
14 A
I have never been in the position where -I-had to 15 compare the two or seen anyone have to compare the two.
i 16 Q
Well, looking back now and knowing the amount of t-the information available from the NRC to operators, on the one hand specific instructions saying don' t go solid, turn is 19 '
off the HPI before you do; and on the other hand, dealing co-a - with core uncovering; if any similar notices were provided 21 to operators.
Can you conclude that there was greater 22 emphasis on the part of the NRC with going solid than uncover-1 I
- ^
23 ing the core?
i i
24 A
I can't say that there was any difference in the 25 amount of emphasis.
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Q So it coulf have been equal.
2 A
Could hav.e been equal.
3 Q
Which essentially would have been improper, given 4
the relative importance of the two choices.
5 A
liot necessarily.
You could postulate the case 6
where an over-pressurization event could give you core uncovery.
s Q
Large break LOCA?
9 A
Break in the vessel.
to Q
The vessel itself.
11 A
Right.
12 Q
Do you know if that has ever happened?
13 A
No.
14 Q
You don't know that it has ever happened', or you 15 know that it has not ever happened?
16 A
Know that it has never happened, t-Q All right.
Do you know what the design requirements e are for the vessel in terms of its capability of withstanding is tg e over-pressurization?
~
20.:t A
Basically at least one and a half ' times null operat-21 ing pressure, m
Q So you are going to break something else before you
(*
23 break the vessel in the primary system.
24 A
I can't say.
They are all tested to the same 25 pressure during start-up testing.
Acme Reporting Company i
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you sent to investigate TMI-II?
After the --
Q Werra 2
A The accident?
Yes.
~
3 Q
When was that?
4 A
Friday after the accident.
5 Q
That would have been March 30th?
6 A
March 30th.
I Q
And how did ic come about that you were chosen to 8
go investigate?
Do you know?
8 A
I don't know.
I can' t say why they selected me.
10 Q
Do you have any indication?
11 A
I normally give exams on Babco.k and Wilcox reactors, 12
.so I was familiar with their systems.,
(
Q Do you think it might have in any way been in part 13 due to your investigation of the September 1977 Da Es-Besse 14 15 transient?
18 A
No.
I had also been to Three Mile Island the week II before the accident.
So I was familiar with the plant.
18 0
Was that to give exams to operators?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
Who did you give exams to the week' before the 21 accident?
'S A
You are asking me to recall several names, and I 23 don't knew if I can recall all of them.
24 Q
Give me your best shot.
05 A
Jack Garrison.
Chuck Mell.
I am drawing a blank Acme Reporting Company 7
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on -- I believe there were two others.
2 Q
Zewe?
3 A
No.
4 Q
Faist?
A No.
6 Q
Frederick?
A No.
s Q
Logan?
Is there a Logan there?
9 A
Not on this trip, no.
There is a Logan, but he 10 wasn't examined this last trip.
11 Q
Did they all pasa?
12 A
Yes.
13 MR. SIDELL:
Why don't we take a recess for a C
14 couple of minutes.
15 (Brief recess) 16 BY MR. SIDELL:
1-t Q
At this point, Mr. Boger, I have no further ques-tions; and what we have been doing as a matter of policy in 18 19 our earlier depositions is to rather than adjourn the deposi-20 tion now, we will recess it in the event that-we come up with 21 further questions we would need answers for.
I would represent to you that to date we have not
,s 23 done this although we are planning on recalling a handfull of 24 witnesses for further deposition.
I would expect that in l
your case, that would not be necessary although I can't make 25 m
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I guarantees.
2 After testifying for approximately two hours, you 3
have had time to reflect on what you have stated.
At this 4
point in time, do you have any changes you wish to make to 5
your testimony?
6 A
No.
O You will, of course, be provided with a transcribed S-copy of the deposition for your review and any changes you 9
may find which I would expect might be limited to typographi-10 cal errors or adding words that were left out.
11 So this, of course, does not preclude you from 12 making any further changes in the deposition.
('
13 Do you have any questions?
14 In view of the fact that we have exhausted every-15 thing for the time being, we will recess the deposition and 16 we thank you for your patience and candid responses.
17 (Whereupon, at 4 :5 3 o' clock p.m., the hearing was 18 '-
recessed.)
19 "
I have read theforegoing pages, 1 20~
through 63, and they are a true and accurate record of my testimony
~'
21 therein recorded.
22 t
3RUCI A. 3CGER l
.s Zl l Schscribed and sworn Oc before me 24 this day of 1979
~
$5 Notary Public i
My Cc=missien Expires:
l l
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CERTIFICATE I certify.that I have read this transcript and corrected any errors in the transcription that I have been able to identify, except for unimportant' punctuation errors.
Date:
^
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3; 9Z2CR*?*'~-- "? R* -? ~ CA"?
s 4
5 DCL.u? NUM3ER:
6 CASE TITLE:
DEPOSITION OF BRUCI A. 30GER 7
EEA.cNG DATE:
August 6, 1979 3
LOCATION:
Bethesda, Maryland 9
10 I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence 11 herein are contained fully and accurately in the notes 12 taken by =e at the hearing in the above case before the
(
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE 13 ISLAND
'4 and, chat this is a true and correct transcript o f " Ee ~
15 sa=e.
16 17 18 Date: August 7, 1979 19 20 f.!
h bcl4 U
-21 1 Cfficial Reporter Ac=e Reporting Cc=pany, Inc.i O
1411 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20005 23,
i 24 6
3 i
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A PROFESSICNAL BACKGRCUST BRUCE A. BCGER June 1971 Received BSNE - University of Virginia June 1972 Received MENE - University of Virginia June 1972 to June 1977 Virginia Electric and Power Company Surry Nuclear Power Station Assistant Engineer - Performed startup testing on Uni: No. 2.
Associate Engineer - Reviewed facility design modifications.
Engineer - Assisted the Supervisor-Engineering Services and trained for Senior Reactor Operator License.
Supervisor - Engineering Services - Directed the activities of the on-site engineering staff.
June 1977 to
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September 1977 Virginia Electric and Power Company
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Richmond, Virginia Supervisor - Nuclear Engineering Services - Directed the activities of the off-site engineering staff in support of Surry Power Station.
October 1977 to Present U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bethesda, Maryland Reactor Engineer in the Operator Licensing Branch - Administer licensing exams to nuclear power plant and research reactor personnel.
Registered Professional Engineer - State of Virginia
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UNITED STATES
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March 21, 1978 e
lE CRANDCM FOR: Davis-Besse Uni: One File FROM:
- 3. A. Boger, Operator Licensing Branch, Division of Project Management THKU:
?. F. Collins, Chief, Operator Licensing Branch, Division of Project Management SU3 JECT:
DE?RISSURIZATION OF RCS INCIDENI On September 24, 1977, with Davis-Besse Uni: one at a power level of approximately 9I, a spurious trip signal in the Steam Feedwater Rupture Control Systen (STRCS) initiated a sequence of events that resulted in the loss of feedveter supply to the No. 2 stesa generator. The loss of this heat sink caused the RCS pressure to increase to the point of electromatic pressurizer relief valve actuation.
However, due to com-ponent malfunctions, the relief valve stuck in the open position, causing the RCS to depressurize for approximately 20 minutes, until the failed relief valve block valve was closed.
The primary reason r
for the bela:ed block valve closure was attributed to the fact that
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no relief valve position indication was available in the control room, although the continuud relief could have been inferred from ava'ilable related information (Quench tank pressure, level and temperature).
The closure of the block valve terminated the transient.
Region III conducted the investigation of the incident and deter =ined the nature of the follow-up action. The thrust of the follow-up action was directed at an analysis of the transient and :he retraining of personnel. The LER submitted on October 7,1977 and the supplanent filed on November 14, 1977 describe the transient in great detail.
The retraining consisted of a four hour session involving a descrip-tion and analysis of the event and a second four hour session covering a detailed description of the SFRCS. This training *7as completed on October 22, 1977.
A discussion with the principle I&E inspector for the facility, T. N.
Tambling, revealed that Region III is satisfied with the submittals and retraining and therefore considers the incident closed, pending NRR analysis of the transien eff ects on RCS components. Also, Region III feels that :he reactor operator was not in error since his pri: nary source of indica: ion of a relief valve failure (valve posizion lights) was not available.
It should be noted that this indica:1on vill be installed in the future.
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Davis-Basse Unit One File i I
Hence, it appears that all follow-up action has been complaced.
Bruce A. Boger, erator Licensing Branch Division of Proj ect Management k
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