ML19308A366
| ML19308A366 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1979 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Borgmann E CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7907240246 | |
| Download: ML19308A366 (1) | |
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UNITED STATES
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s, ss JUN 7 1979 Docket No. 50-358 Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company ATTN:
hr. Earl A. Borgmann Vice President Engineering Services and Electric Production 139 East 4th Street Cincinnati, OH 45201 Gentlemen:
This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter.
It is expected tnat recipients will review the infor-
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mation for possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is requested at this time.
If further NRC evaluations so indi-cate, an IE Circular, Bulletin, or NRR Generic Lette. will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions.
If you have questions regarding the matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
Sincerely,
[s).
/1JamesG.Keppler Director
Enclosure:
IE Information Notice No. 79-15 cc w/ encl:
Mr. J. R. Schott, Plant Superintendent 73f} Q6j Central Files Director, NRR/DPM Director, NRR/ DOR PDR Local PDR NSIC TIC Harold W. Kohn, Power Siting Commission Citizens Against a Radioactive Environment Helen W. Evans, State of Ohio I
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION III June 7, 1979 IE Information Notice No. 79-15 DEFlCIENT PROCEDURES Summary On June 2, 1979, at Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1, while observing conditions in the control room, an NRC inspector discovered an operational deficiency that could have resulted in the emergency feedwater system remaining isolated during subsequent power operation.
Description of Circumstances On June 2 while Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit I was preparing for startup, an NRC inspector in the control roo= found that during a surveillance test of the main feedwater check valves, the controls of the emergency feed-water system were positioned so that the system could not automatically respond if needed. The NRC inspector found that the test procedure being used by the licensed operators did not include, as it should have, instruc-tiens either to bypass the emergency feedvater system or to return it to normal. The plant operators, without approved procedures covering this aspect of the test, bypassed the controls that would have started the feedwater system automatically. Lacking a procedural requirement to re-turn the system to normal, there was no assurance that emergency feedwater would be provided automatically if needed.
Following the Three Mile Island accident, the NRC required that operators be trained to initiate promptly the emergency feedwater system manually if it does not come en automatically. Thus, while no immediate safety hazard existed at the Arkansas Unit I plant because of the improper action, the NRC staf f is concerned about the potential safety hazard of leaving the emergency feedwater system in the bypassed condition, about the possibility that other procedures at the Arkansas plant may be deficient and about the fact that the operators deviated from procedures in performing the surveillance test.
Arkansas Power and Light Company has returned the plant to cold shutdown.
The June 2, 1979, NRC Order confirmed the requirement for a cold shutdown until the Commission staff is satisfied with the utility's method of con-trolling the development of operating procedures, the adequacy of existing procedures, and until there is assurance that operators will not deviate from those procedures.
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