ML19305E719
| ML19305E719 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1980 |
| From: | Goodwin C PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19305E716 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8005200308 | |
| Download: ML19305E719 (3) | |
Text
MI 8005200 N
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PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY EUGENE WATER & ELECTRIC BOARD AND PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT Operating License NPF-1 Docket 50-344 License Change Application 59, Revision 1
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This License Change Application is submitted in support of Licensee's request to modify Appendix A of Facility Operating License NPF-1 by addition of a new Technical Specification for the alternate shutdown capability and change Technical Specification 6.2.2.a to reflect the minimum shift crew necessary for safe shutdown.
PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY By
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C. Goodwin, Jr.
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Assistant Vice President Thermal Plant Operation and Maintenance Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of Fby 1980.
h e- /- h wbbd Notary lublic of Qp6gon My Commission Expires:
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LCA 59, Rtvision 1 Pcge 1 of 2 LICENSE CHANGE APPLICATION 1.
The NRC letter of March 25, 1980 requested PGE to submit the neces-sary Technical Specifications for the Alternate Shutdown System (Decouple Switches). New Technical Specifications 3.3.3.8 and 4.3.3.8 are provided in response to this request.
2.
Modify Technical Specification 6.2.2.a. Appendix A to FOL NPF-1, to read as follows (new words are shown in italics):
a)
"Each on duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Table 6.2-1.
The minimum shift crew necessary for safe shutdown is five."
b) Modify Table 6.2-1 to reflect 3 nonlicensed operators for Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.
REASON FOR CHANGE 1.
Add new Technica.1 Specifications 3.3.3.8 (Limiting condition for Operation) and 4.3.3.8 (Surveillance Requirements) as shown in Attachment A for Decouple Switches.
2.
By letter of March 25, 1980, the NRC requested a change to Technical Specification 6.2.2.f that identifies the specific number of oper-ators excluded from the fire brigade in order to safely shutdown the Plant. In lieu of nodifying Technical Specification 6.2.2.f, Technical Specification 6.2.2.a and Table 6.2-1 have been changed.
SAFETY EVALUATION This License Change Application (LCA) has been reviewed, evaluated and determined to not constitute an unreviewed safety question.
No new accidents are created and the probability ar.d consequences of accidents
' I previously considered remained unchanged or are reduced.
No environmental effects or impacts result from this LCA.
Electrical control cables of both redundant divisions are located in the cable spreading room (CSR).
"here is a remote possibility that should a fire occur in this area, if not promptly suppressed, both redundant safety divisions could be affected due to heat generation.
Additionally, the vertical arrangement of some cable trays could increase the burning rate and flame propagation.
Loss of various cables could result in loss of control of safe shutdown equipment.
Since the current sprinkler system is actuated by fusible elements rated at 165'F, a cable fire could smolder and burn for an extended period of time before the temperature of the sprinkler head reaches 165'F.
Also, because of the vertical distance from the lower cable trays in the CSR to the existing sprinkler system, a fire j
of considerable size could develop before system actuation.
To adequately protect the safe shutdown cables in the CSR, an alternate l
shutdown system will be provided.
The alternate shut'down system is
LCA 59, Rivision 1 Page 2 of 2 described in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated March 22, 1978 and consists of decouple switches.
The decouple switches allow the control cables to specific equipment required for safe shutdcwn of the Plant that pass through the CSR to be isolated from the equipment and allow local operation of the equipment.
Certain control room cabinets also contain redundant safe shutdown components.
A fire in one of these cabinets could cause the loss of control of certain safe shutdown equipment.
Fire detectors are already being installed in individual control room cabinets with redundant components.
In addition, the decouple switches will isolate the control room circuits from the specific equipment and allow local operation of the equipment.
Since potential fires will not prevent safe shutdown, that is, the necessary equipment can be operated from outside the control room and CSR, an unreviewed safety question does not exist.
SCHEDULE CONSIDERATIONS A License Amendnent needs to be issued prior to June 15, 1980 to allcw Plant startup on July 1,1980 (current schedule).
AMENDMENT CLAS3 This license change has been determined to be a Class III Amendment in accordance with the criteria of 10 CFR 70.22.
This change involves a single issue with specific NRC positions already existing and met by this amendment. This change has been deemed to not involve a signifi-cant saftey hazard. A fee of $4,000 was submitted for this license change on April 14, 1980.
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