ML19305A970
| ML19305A970 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/13/1980 |
| From: | Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-05-11.A, TASK-5-11.A, TASK-RR LAC-6823, NUDOCS 8003180631 | |
| Download: ML19305A970 (5) | |
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IhtIRYIntND I*0CiEN COOI*EILtTIVE Ba Crone, 0)hconsin 54601 March 13, 1980 In reply, please refer to LAC-6823 DOCKET NO. 50-409 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN:
Mr. Darrell G.
Eisenhut, Acting Director Division of Operating Reactors U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
SUBJECT:
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE LA CROSSE DOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 LWR PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVES
REFERENCE:
(1)
NRC Letter, Eisenhut to All LWR Licensees, Undated (Received February 22, 1980)
Gentlemen:
Your letter, Reference (1), requested information regarding measures that have been or are being taken to assure component integrity and functionality of check valves as a pressure isolation barrier between the Primary Coolant System (PCS) and any low pressure system.
The following information is provided in answer to specific questions of Reference (1).
l.
Describe the valve configuration at yote plant and indicate if an Event V isolation valve configuration exists within the Class I boundary of the high precoure piping connecting PCS piping to 200 pressure system piping; e.g., (t) tuo check valves in series, or (2) too check valves in series with a MOV.
DPC RESPONSE:
The Alternate Core Spray (ACS) System is similar to an Event V isolation valve configuration, but there are several-noteworthy differences.
The LACBWR configuration utilizes two check valves and.a motor-operated valve (MOV) all in series, but the MOV is closed during normal plant operation, (see enclosed Figure 1).
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mans 180
Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Acting Director LAC-6823 Division of Operating Reactors U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 13, 1980 Also, the piping between the two check valves in the containment building and the MOV, which is located outside containment, is rated at full reactor pressure.
Additionally, a relief valve set at 150 psig with a leakoff sight glass in the relief valve dis-charge is utilized to ascertain any leakage through the two series check valves.
Furthermore, upstream of the MOV, which is low pressure piping, there is a relief valve set at 200 psig and a pressure switch set at 200 psig which actuates an alarm in the control room if leakage occurs from the PCS through both the check valves and a MOV.
The LACBWR Low Pressure Core Spray System does not conform to an Event V isolation valve configuration, but is a low pressure system connected to the PCS through a check valve and a power-operated-valve (POV), which is closed during normal plant operation (see enclosed Figure 2).
The low pressure piping upstream of the POV is rated at 150 psig and is protected by a relief valve set at 120 psig.
All of the piping shown on Figure 2 is entirely within the contain-ment building.
2.
If cither of the above Event V configurations c:iat at your facility, indicate whether continuous curveillarwe or periodic tests are being accomplished on auch valves to ensure integrity. Also, indicate uhather valves have been knoun, or found, to lack integrity; and DPC RESPONSE:
In both of the two LACBWR system configurations described above, continuous surveillance of pressure barrier leakage is effected by the relief valve located on the low pressure piping.
The relief valves are ob7erved daily for evidence of lifting.
Testir; :or seat leakage through the ACS check valves is performed annualay by procedure at a test pressure equivalent to the pressure of a DBA.
No leakage has ever been detected as a result of these tests.
No leakage has ever been detected by virtue of either relief valve lifting nor by the alarm from pressure buildup in the ACS low pressure piping.
No seat leakage through the low pressure core spray check valve has ever been detected by virtue of the relief valve lifting on the low pressure core spray piping.
Mr. Darrell G.
Eisenhut, Acting Director Division of Operating Reactors LAC-6823 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 13, 1980 3.
If either of the above Event V configurations crict at your facilit.u, indicate whether plant procedurca should be revised or if plant modifi-catione should be made to increace reliability.
DPC RESPONSE:
There are no changes in either the LACBWR plant operating or testing procedures necessary nor contemplated to ensure any of the subject check valves integrity.
1 Reliability of the subject check valves has been sufficiently I
demonstrated through extensive operating experience; therefore, no modifications are planned.
If there are any questions concerning this response, please contact us.
Very truly yours, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
[
Frank Linder, General Manager FL:IIAT: abs i-
Enclosures:
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