ML19305A267
| ML19305A267 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/11/1978 |
| From: | Ahearne J, Bradford P, Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7903080605 | |
| Download: ML19305A267 (35) | |
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v UNITED STATES
t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS;ON WASHINGTON, D. C. 20565 m,
February 26, 1979 COSD1ISSION DETERMINATION REGARDING PUBLIC DISCLOSURE UNDER THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT OF:
Briefing on Safeguards December 11, 1978 Pursuant to the Commission's regulations implementing the Government in the Sunshine Act (10 CFR 9.108(c)), the Commission, on the advice of the General Counsel, determined that the attached portions of the subject transcript should be made available to the public.
The remaining portions of the transcript have been withheld pursuant to 10 CFR 9.104 as noted below:
Page/Line through Page/Line Exemption 32/2 32/4 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) b
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i Samuel J.,
ilk Sedretary of th Commission 7903080666
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- 8 i-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4-BRIEFING ON SAFEGUARDS
~
3 (Closed to Public Attendance) 6 7
8 Chairman's Conference Room 1717 H Street, N.W.
9 Washington, D. C.
10 l
Monday, December 11, 1978 11 12 -
The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 11:10 a.m.,
1 3-p Joseph Hendrie, Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
I 14 I
la_ lll PRESENT:
Chairman Hendrie 6h Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy 7
3 i.
Commissioner Bradford mm ssioner nearne 18
'i l
, 9-ALSO PRESENT:
' 20 !!
L.
Gossick
$i W.
Dircks 21 ','
R.
Burnett T. Carter-22 ",
C.
Fulwiler M.
Howard 23. :.
U M.
Nordlinger B.
Snyder
_,d' J. Cummings 25
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1 PROCEEDINGS
- i
,2 j
CHAIRMAN HENDRIEf Why don't w'e start off.
3 ii j
We are gathered on a briefing on safeguards and 4
I security related matters, notably related to a: forthcoming 5
meeting.
6 e
(Note:
The tape machine at this poin't made a " fail"
' l noise and was restarted by the reporter.)
~ _ 8 i l!
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Jake, I'm glad to see that the machine I
9 j squeals at you, even as it treats me.
1 0 ;!
(Laughter) 11!;
- e My recommendation is one second of fast forward, 12 0
, 13 "j recycle off to on again and see if it -squeals.
And particularly, safeguards and security matters 14 d1 related to im,provements that we think would be a good idea 1 5,j
~
in our relations with the FBI, and at some point along the line, 16 I,'
we are here to kick that off, a meeting with Mr. Webster, which 17 'I would presumably then be followed by further interations of the lE two staffs and so on.
'9 Lee, why don't I turn it.over to you.
20 FUt. GOSSICK: Well, I might just say one word of 2^'
background, you may recall -- Oh, gee, when was it, back early i
22 this spring when we sent you the piece of paper having to do :with the handling of intelligence functions and relationships with 7 '
~4 the intelligencies here in town.
It was pointed out that the FBI responsibility for dealing with all domestic threats and so N
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i e,
- i 3
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l ii 1 j forth, of course is one that we clearly understand, and we I
i l
think everybody in the FBI does as well,, but we thought that 2
3 perhaps it would be useful for a meeting between you and 4
' the Director of the FBI to"take place in orCar to sort of emphasize 5-the fact that we are completely dependent upon them for actually 6
handling the threats against the domestic facilities.
7 So anyway., with that just as a general background, I,
8 gather we prepare here to discuss some of the things that might 9
be a subject of discussion between you and Mr. Webster in order 10 j to ---
i
~
11 !
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
12 !
I guess I triggered this material by saying, "For 13 !
God's sakes, don' t send me down there to talk to Webster without ti 14 pumping me full,".and ethe result was this paper and Commissioners r
Q 15 g indicated an interesti-ag in sitting in on the briefing. So this 16 constitutes at least a formal side of trying to get me. prepared 17[
to face the FBI.
l a
I 1g y,
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: At this particul'ar time.
a 19 ri COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: On this particular subject.
i 20 MR. DIRCKS:
As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, this I
21 I'
is restricted to the safeguards side of the house.
It does not
- j I
22 deal with the relationships that Mr. Cummings may with the FBI
- 23. '
in his investigatory role, nor does it deal with the issues that 24 our Security Division has with the FBI in our personnel clearances-
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and matters such as that.
75
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What we would like to do is have Bob Burnett go through 2 l and make some points and Cynthia Fulwiler, who did most of the I
a 3 '
preparatory work for this meeting and both the. general memoranda.
4
' Cynthia has been in touch -with our counterparts at the FBI and f
will give you some details about what Mr. ; Webster might want to-6 see come out of this meeting also.
7 MR. BURNETT:
Really, Bill, I don't see any reason
.. 8 for me to say anything.
i 9
I Cynthia and Tom Carter,-sitting behind me, have been N
10 ;
working this problem for over a year and so I was just going to 11 !
let Cynthia go right down through the paper and do it informally, 12 l Hopefully between the three of us we can answer any questions i
~
13 that might come up, but Cynthia is very knowledgeable on all of 14
'this, so I don't want to slow it up.
15,!
MS. FULWILER:
Mr. Chairman, we thought it would be 16 I; anpropriate for you to begin your meeting with the Director by going.over some of the ways.that the FBI and NRC have effectively ;
17 ':
12 ' worked out safeguards probl' ems, and so we made a list of suggested' t
19 :l topics that you might want to cover.
u Il.
The first one is the NUMEC investigation, and I'm sure 20 i
21 you are familiar with the briefings bhat Satkowski presented
-l
?
. 22 to the Commission on the investigation.
I thought that was 23 the appropriate point to bring up.
- 4 Second ---
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
There may not be a second.
33 e
O
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3 it bl 3
1 !!
MS. FULWILER:
The second point is the FBI international!
2 symposium.
3 You received a personal invitation to attend that in July and ---
5.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I did?
6 MS. FULWILER:
Yes.
Mr. Burnett was to go in your 7
stand.
I think some budget issues came up, but anyway, several --
8 MR. BURNETT:
You were represented, sir.
9 MS. FULWILER:
-- several NRC staff members attended.
10 l It was a three-day seminar with international speakers from Spain, i
11 i the Netherlands, Japan, Italy and so forth, on terrorism and we 12 appreciated that.
13 -
Another issue you might want.to talk about is the u
14 excellent work the FBI is doing on alleged attempts to sell 15h'enuclear material, especially in the Miami area.
There have
~
16 '
been several incidents in Miami and the FBI has been right on l
17,
top of that doing a very throrough investigation.
l us !!.
Stop me if I'm going too fast.
I i
19 -
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Shoot.
20 if MS. FULWILER:
And the fourth point, the FBI's t
21..
investigation of security violations at NRC facilities, is t
]
specifically the Quid Cities investigation.
It was very I
22
- 23. g
. thoroughly done, they investigated security infractions i-24
' there.. f or. us, and we appreciate. the work'.they are doing.
Top of page 2, the EDO's Office ---
25 e
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4 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: These are the guards who ---
2 i MS. FULWILER:
Leaving doors open to the vital areas 3
and people with pass-keys, unauthorized personnel in vital 4
' areas.
5-CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: This was not the falsification I
6 guard qualification?.
7 MS. FULWILER:
No.jp o-a-
~~8 l
MR. GOSSICK: W ivery d (UKW M '
9 I!
MR. BURNETT:
That's Woo iver, but there are some da
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10 reactor falsifications also.
11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:'
Which was the one where they 12 !
were falsifying the firing ; records?
MR. BURNETT:
Woo river Junction.-
13 14 [!
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Wasn't that also true out in o
15 Illinois?
I 16 MR. BURNETT: Was that the ' firing gun qualifications?
17
- CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Has the FBI been in those things?
i 13 MR. BURNETT:
I'm not aware of it.
I the inspectors l
19 called them in, we have not.
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20 :!
MR. CUMMINGS:
Normally we would send that down to I.
21 !! Justice and John Davis and I happen to get together on those i'
22 Particular referrable matters.
23.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: And then what, Justice would put the 24 Bureau to work if it wanted further ---
MR. CUMMINGS:
Justice has an option to go to the 33 4
s e
j 7
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. Grand Jury or it has an option to defer to the nearest field i
-4 :
office of the FBI for further investigation.
3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I see.
4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: We wouldn't normally refer' 5
so'mething directly to the FBI?
6 MR. CUMMINGS:
We could.
7 Normally we would go through Justice to get kind of a
. 8 blessing from Justice on the. criminality of the thing, whether 9
or not they would want to go ahead with it.- Justice, for instance, in 10.!
would turn around to us and say, you do it, if they wanted to. -
?
11 0 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Okay.
What triggers a O
12 decision to go to Justice in the first place?
1 3,,
MR. CUMMINGS:
I think we are a little afield here of g
14 ;l 'what the things are that Bob is talking about.
We are talking 15 '
about fraud investigation, basically.
So we would look at the 16 facts in a particular case, recognizing them as being Title 18 h
17ll violations and referring it.to Justice.
18 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Do you actually decide if L
19 g there has been a violation or do you just decide it looks as 20 i though there might be, before you refer?
i 21 3 MR. CUMMINGS:
I don't know where that gray area is,
.i 22 but let's put it this way, we would -- if there were a gray area
?
23 we would resolve it in favor of the referral and let Justice make 24 the decision as to whether or not it was a violation or not.
~
25 So I would say we would be super liberal in the referral of cases, s
4
,8 l
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1 5
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1
, At least that would be my posture on that.
l
.2 l
CHAIRMAN HENGRIE: But it requires some assessment on 3 !
our side, that indeed, the activities in question either appear 4
' to or could fall within the broad 5
MR. CUMMINGS:
And most of them are clear-cut situations of. false._ record, misrepresentation of some type.
Those 7
decisions are not difficult.
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Onwards.
9
[
MS. FULWILER:
Okay.
We will skip the first paragraph 10 il on the top of page 2 and continue the points, and we will go back i 11 i to that paragraph.
~
12 Our appreciation of the FBI's response to safeguards 13 ;
incidents.
For example, there was an instrument in a salvage yard, t
14,
in New York and they were right there to investigate it and it l
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. ][>
15 turned not to'be plutopium, but they did~ respond rapidly.
l 16 i The second point on pcge 2',
the FBI has been active 17 y in licensee safeguards contingency planning, getting together
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with the local law enforcem'ent agencies and determining how they 18 i
19 3 would react to a safeguards incident, and specifically, in 1
20 : Columbus and in Pittsburgh.
Those two would be good to highlight.1 ii 21 !!
MR. DIRCKS:
I think this is an area where we would i
n
>i
.22 like to see.them more involved, in this contingency planning 23 effort.
To let the FBI know that they have as 'much of a stake
'oht there as we do in this and invite them into our problem.
24 25 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What triggers their involvement e
9
1 j now?
Do we invite them in, the licensees ask them ---
'i 2 i MR. DIRCKS : ~ Correct me if I'm wrong, I guess it i
3 i varies from field office to field office how enthut iastic, if 4
- it is a field office director getting involved.
5 MR. BURNETT:
In the Pittsburgh area the FBI was --
6 they were the ones that were just putting this together.
They 7
' called everything together.
It was at their impetus.
At other
- 8 facilities, we have involved them.
c COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The Pittsburgh area office took 10;j initiative, was this wider than just the nuclear safegua.Os
.i 11 E Problem or was this focused specifically on nuclear safeguards?
~
i'i 12 H MR. BURNETT:
We understood it was just the' nuclear 13 safeguards, all the facilities that were in there, they wanted 14,[.to hav'e a plan to coordinate and to respond to any event at
.i
- i, f any of those ---
_a g
M COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Is NUMEC within that --
_6 q
-7.i Apollo within their jurisdiction by any chance?
i lE It's not very far out of Pittsburgh. !
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
i MR. BURNETT:
You are aware that Apollo itself is
.g in an appraised down mode, we have only a residual license there. l 20 21 ]
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I was just trying to see if I uldn't get a little perspective to wind that off.
This
-22 might be a little more ---
p
__za.
MS. FULWILER:
I think that is the first case the
~ FBI had initiated the liaison.
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10 t
i 1 l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
What is the point, then that 2
Joe should be making here, express appreciation for ttat 3 i office's interest, but is there a larger point that there is 4
'a program that ought to be worked out for doing the same thing 5-all over the country?
6 MR. BURNETT: Field offices outside of this one knew 7
that we were out there and when the Memorandum of Agreement gets
'8 signed, then that will be transmitted.down.
We just thought it 9
would be nice if the Chairman would emphasize this, that we are 10 q interested on a national basis.
11 l All of these points, there are none of them big by 1
12 :
themselves, it is really a shopping list of things we hope you 13 :
can cover.
14 l MR. DIRCKS:
Well, I think on a couple of them I think i
15 ;; here are a couple of points I would like ta) see the.Directdr
~
16 l come out.~of the meeting remembering.
l L
I think getting more positively involved, taking the 17 l
15 ! initiative in at least knaeimg where the facilities are, knowing 19 :
the roads, how to get there, knowing the key people,.' knowing i
1 20,
the weaknesses ---
l 21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What is the point that you want 1
I 22 him to come out of the meeting remembering about in that?
MR. DIRCKS: About NUMEC?
Let me -- '
x3.
^
MR. BURNETT:
Mainly just to thank them.
You know, 74 75 they were called over on three different occasions and they have
H
. 11 i
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i; l "
had to dedicate some manpower, and that was more, at least I I
2 L think that's what it is.
3 li CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay, these are things -- this l
^
4-thing in Pittsburgh ~ and the thing that we would like to see 5
is really a set of continge:1cy plans, so that tney aren't totally 6
blind when they get a wire from us or somebody saying, you know, 7 j we have had a report of an attempt to or a threat or attempted
~8 theft.or a theft.
That's happened.
9 Fm. DIRCY.S:
Getting them out of -just a reactive mode it 10 y and getting them to helping us to prepare.ourselves at the 11 !
facilities deserving contingency plans.
12ll COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Have there been any specific 13 !
field offices which have been unwilling to work with us?
4 i
14 I MR. CARTER:
No.
Not unwilling as such, there have a
e 15 been field of'fices, Knoxville comes to mind with Erwin, where l
I 16l't they have a two-man staff that have a tremendous list of i
h I
17 :!
Priorities and responsibilities and we are not necessarily.very i
.lE
.high.on the list.
But they have been cooperative within those
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19 ll kinds of things.
- 20 iI MR. BURNETT:
So it is just to raise the level of i
21 :. recognition in the field.
),
22 MR. SNYDER:
There is anott.er example that I personally 23 know of at Wood River, which is a very difficult facility to fihd.
I happen to have been there on a trip to see the facility 25 myself at the same time that the two agents from, I think, k
12 il 1
- Newport, Rhode Island were invited there. They got lost and
-2 I
i I got lost trying to find it.
They were'very cooperative, but 3
they indicated at least, they have got another two-man office.
4 In fact, they were both out of the office and the secretary 5
would be handling any emergency that came in to the office.
6 So that is a problem in some of these remote areas where we 7
are not near a major city as opposed to Pittsburgh.
- '8 MR. DIRCKS:
In that case I would imagine if there 'were 9
and incident the FBI could, I guess, jurisdiction, but they ---
10 !
MR. SNYDER:
They could call in other people, 11 i MR. DIRCKS:
Yes.
They should at least know who the I
sheriff may be in the county ---
13 i
MR. SNYDER:
And who the security manager is at the i,
14 ilo ' plant.
31 15 ;i MR. DIRCKS:
-- you know, or the highway patrol captain.
16 lt i
l So I think it is to everyone's advantage to get them in before 17 these things happen so they can at least know the telephone I
18 numbers and the key people to contact.
'19 MR. BURNETT:
Mr. Chairman, could I call your attention 20 " to the response letter that came in from Mr. Webster.
21 "
He did, in paragraph 2, refer to NUMEC.
So I guess i
22 we were just keying it.
It is the very last two pages of the l
23 Tab J, the bottom one that they had called attention to it.
24~
MS. FULWILER: We tried to addess issues that he 2:_
- addressed in his letter to you, of October 18th.
e
13 t
ti
.. l 3I I
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
l 2
MS. FULWILER:
And NUMEC was mentioned.
i 3 }
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, it is reasonable to thank i'
4-him for his cooperation of sending his boys over here on three 5
occasions.
It does take time.
6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: There is another point there, 7
' too, which would not be unique to NUMEC and that is the problem
- '8 of their protecting the integrity of an on-going investigation 9
and our need-to-know as early as possible anything they come-up 10 with in any one investigation that would have implications for 11 l safeguarding or protecting other facilities.
If they know how i
12 something is done at one place, I suppose one would h' ave to t
13!l Pay some attention to how much they could tell.us, but it would 14 d be very useful for us to know that in terms of protecting all the si et 15 h ther facilities.
i MR. DIRCKS:
I think that was a point that I think 16 Cynthia mentioned, top of page 2 where we -- instead of just 17 i
g
,giving us copies of investigative reports, if they could give j
us more finished intelligence analyses, which I guess, up to now,l g
i they have been very hesitant to do it, they are an investigatory l
20 N
ag ncy and they don't want to get in to the broader areas of 2,
,F speculating on paths -- criminal paths and divergent paths. But 12 I
it would be helpful to give us something comparable that we get 23
.from the other side of the house.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Well, the hardest case though, eo e
e e
~
14 e
i U
i l
I 1
isn' t the one where they would be speculating.
The hardest case i
2 l is where there has been a criminal inves,tigation and they know 3
exactly how something is done, but it still may be part of some 4
investigation that may lead to a legal prosecution and it is a 5
situation that can' t be unique to them. They must come across it 6
in a variety of investigations that they do, but how much they 7
can then share back with the agency that is supposed to be the 8
watchdog againt the conduct that they.have since uncovered.
9 MR. DIRCKS:
I think that ties in there.
II 10 j!
MR. CUMMINGS:
They have recently established a new 11 ll rule there which has become a problem in their report writing ~
ii 1 2 !! P r o c e d u r e, and that is, that they used to send interim reports 13 and they have gotten away from the interim reports and they are
!!.getting in to prosecuting summaries at the end of their case.
14
.t 15 And they also' wind up with 6-E problems with the grand juries and i
16, ', it is really becoming a very cumbersome, sometimes relationship.
4 17 I think Bob's point is very well taken. The Director i
.;g has the wherewithal.to brin'g the emphasis on our problems down j
l 9
to the field office level, and I think that's the key element l
20 there, what our problems are and how they, the FBI can help.
I q-21 And Bob's point is the important one, I think in the issue.
i
.22 MR. BURNETT:
We would hope out of this meeting that 23 a memorandum of information to the field might 'be generated from 74 the ' Director's staff, emphasising his interests and supporting the effort.
That is usually what we need, nothing greater than th a,t.
3 15 i
?:
"d,;
1 I!
j' Cynthia, move on.
I 2
MS. FULWILER:
Point 7 on page' two, the Atomic 3
Energy Inservice Training Program.
4 The FBI conducts that at down at Quantico, a one-week 5-seminar on atomic energy, and NRC has been invited to participate 6
7
. for about three hours in the morning and tell the agents who we are., what we do and what we need from them and so forth, and we 8
do appreciate a chance to speak at these seminars.
I thought you might want to bring that up.
~
i 0l Then, the last point then is the communicative t
11 l credibility project that the NRC and DOE are jointly. funding 12 [
and the FBI has been participating with us at all meetings, and 13 suppor, ting this project. They are aware of it and they are behind 14 it.
,_13 i Okay, these then are just introductory remarks 16 and thank you for this and this is how we are getting along.
17 The point of the meeting perhaps would be the Memorandum of i
.l-
- Understanding, which is enclosure 3.
o o
19 t
This is in draft form and we have spoken at the working '
20.! level with FBI, working out a draft and we hope that you would il 21 say a few good words to the Director that this is important to 2^4 NRC, that this is the nuts and bolts of implementing these many 2 3. ' statutes that are on the books, but how is it going to be done, 24 who has responsibilit.ies.
2~3 Do you want to further stress that?
k 1
9
b 16 I:.
S O
d i
y MR. BURNETT:
Well, I was just going to hit one thing 1
,2 that you ran over quickly, and that is this communicative threat 3 !
study.
4 This organization is a full partner. We have contributed 5
about $300,000 over a two-year period.
It is a three-way split, h
and we occupy an equ.al space.
If that comes up you should just 7
have it in your hip pocket that you should know it.
g CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It is an equal participation of g
funding?
MR. BURNETT:
Yes, sir.
I don't have the figures right 10 l 11 to the dollar, but generally, it is about a third.
12 Did you want to get in to anything now as t'o the specific document?
13 I
MR. CARTER:
The document attached is enclosure 3.
j 14 i
. 'l We have about a page and a quarter or about two pages of I
i 13
~6 ;l introductory or background information of how we feel the 1
N 37 y importance of the Memorandum of Understanding is.
It becomes t
/
ducational too4, in my opinion, and information that j
$)1D.
i mr an
'~8 l
the field agents can rely upon.
The Pittsburgh office, 19 g.
g particularly were enthusiastic about a Memorandum of Understanding l 21 -l;l from-the standpoint of what their actions -- how they were sanctioned by the FBI Headquarters.
.22 o
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Just so.
It gets us in to a written-word situation where the FBI agents understand what their superiors have agreed 22
, 17 to and what their limits are and they are more comfortable in 2 !!
'~
j supporting us.
3 s I think basically, that is the main reason for the MOU.
We have gotten good support from the FBI, excellent support from 5-the FBI.
So we are not really asking for anything more there, 6
7
. but maybe an educational process and an understanding;of what the agents feel are their obligations.
8 I
ll MR. BURNETT:
Many of their agents right now, and I'm o
if;!
sure that you have noticed the papers in the past couple of days, at 1 0 il are reluctant and sometimes confused about what they can tell r-11 l
other agencies, and have been subject to, what I think, is severe g
12 3 y
disciplinary actions, in some cases.
d 1 3 'I COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Were there any major points in 4 !!
1 ll this agreement which were points 'of contention between the FBI 1-U and us, have been difficult to ---
16 ll MR. BURNETT:
I think Cynthia can answer this, but i
7 o; 1
basical3y the document that you have in rough, I'd like her to E
2 hit anythina that has gone up through a working level.
19 MS. FULWILER:
That's a good point, they have only been
- 20 at the working level.
A_nd the only point is that they refuse 21 D to accept responsibility for a threat assessment.
Any time we 22 have said assessment, it has been blotted out in the working-level.'
23
- memorandum that is enclosed and they would put evaluate -- it is 4'
sort of a game of semantics.
To them, they say they are not in
__4:
the business of threat assessments, that they are an investigative I
1
18 l
1
~
9 1
agency, they investigate crimes and they will not assess threat 2
l and they have struck it out every time..
3 MR. DIRCKS:
I think that's a point -- they probably 4
have a great deal of hesitancy and many resons why they don't
~
5 want to get in to the business of assessing threats.
6 I think it would:.be a nice point if we kept urging 7
them to do more in this area, because af ter all, they are the 8
professional law enforcement agency as compared to us in the 9
i Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
If they don't do it we have to h
10jl do it.
11 I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
They accept evaluatione.
l\\
12 !
MR. DIRCKS: They accept evaluation, but who knows what li
'l 13 that means.
It is again, an impetus that maybe the Director 14 f can push down.
n 15q COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I mean, what is it that i
16 ij they don't want to do.
I mean, presumably they play the role i!
17 4 in deciding how seriously you take threats, don't they?
l i
16 d MR. DIRCKS:
Yes, and I will let others speak to this.
19 My own reaction is that they are very cautious about j
20 getting on individual threat cases.
They don't want to get in a
I 21 ;i to providing us advance ---
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: And they also don't want to 23 get in to providing any kind of a recommendati6n of an action.
24
'They feel much more comfortable describing here are the facts 2-
'tiey find, here are the uncertanties that they have. What you do I
O
+
i 19 j
e with it is up to you.
'l 2
MR. BURNETT:
They have mainta'ined that posture 3 I very strongly.
4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Well, of course, they have got 5-to react to it too.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Only if a criminal action has l
7
- I taken place.
8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Yes.
Only if it falls within 9
d 4
their purview and they decide that.
a 1~ 0 ":Ii COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let's see, if it has taken s
i!
11 j
place or it might take place?
Wont't they react if.they hear 2 9 1
y that someone is on his way to Erwin or ---
3 d 1
p:
MR. GOSSICK:
Sure, they have reacted to threats.
O CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
No,'that's not the same.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: To the extent that they do, they
' 6 :;
may contact the local police authorities and alert them that they have learned this through their own intelligence system -- they-i 1
g have. learned a threat exists and pass that' to the local c
authorities, and would enter the matter only if, in fact, the 20 '
local authorities either requested their assistants or for some 21 other reason because of a federal installation or something of l
22 ~
the sort, they judge that it was directly within their purview.
23',
They are very reluctant to step in.to things.
SY MR. BURNETT: That's an important point.
If requested e' s' by the local law enforcement, they might support, but they would r
f
20 0
a 6
n 1,i not order increased security, for instance.
They would give 2 l you the intelligence and if this organization felt it applicable, 3 i then it would be up to us to work with the licensee.
+
~
MR. DIRCKS:
Yes, but when you say, "give us the 5
intelligence," it would be a very narrow interpretation of 76 the intelligence.
Maybe an early warning typ thing.
I think 7
the point we were driving at is -- at least I was -- we are
- 8 getting intelligence out of the intelligence agencies.
We don't S
have any equivalent information coming toc.us from the domestic 10 q safeguards and I think if ---
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Could you make this more 12 specific?
I mean, what is it that we wouldn't be getting?
I
- 13 h They would tell us that somebody called.up or ---
3l 14 j MR. DIRCKS:
Well, it is like combat intelligence, n
15 g They are on their way and you can call the police.
It would 16 0 be nice if we had some generic background studies, ll analyses 17 " of motivations and factors which we don't have.
18 ".
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Wait a minute,~ motivations, 19 just what are we talking about here?
20 ;;
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Isn't that what the Law Enforcement il I
21 ' Assis'tance Agency does now?
~
i
.22 MR. BURNETT: They do some of that, yes.
I 23 MR. DIRCKS:
They do some of that, but we are not --
4 wh'atever we are doing in erecting our own threat analysis here, 25 we are doing much of it on our own.
f e
i!
2 I
~
i
_ ll COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I guess I'm still not clear
~
2 h on what it is we would like to get that we arc not getting.
3 Is it that we would like to know that somebody called up and 4'
we would like to have the FBI say he sounded like a nut or ---
5-CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
No. We would like to have some 6
basis besides your own forces speculations as to whether such 7
calls can be expected and how many, how many are likely to result
~ 8
,1 or be connected with actions and so on.
9 lI
]
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: 'Yes, but they would give you 10 l
statistics, wouldn' t they and I don' t think -- Is that what we 11 i!
are talking about?
1 2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: They don'.t give predictive 13 It s tatis. tics.
4 !I l
1 9
MR. SNYDER:
l a. !!
I guess that is something you are likely e
i to get from CIA, in the international scene.
Is that what
- )
i 1 6 I
you are asking, something analogous to that?
I 1 7" MR. DIRCKS:
Well, I guess I'm asking more than Ghat i
i
-,, ['wearegetting.
We are getting copies of investigative reports,
~. c
~
we are getting copies of incidents that have happened, we are l
' 20 '
I getting copies of material like that.
I guess when we start 21 our record on threat levels, I'd like to have more than our t
22 own input, is it 1 and 2, 2 and 5, 15 and 10, are they legitimate I
23 numbers or are we way off base or.does the FBI know more about 2'
this than we do.
We are not getting this.
23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I guess I'm still not clear.
k O
22 1
Are you asking them for an overall judgment of kind of the
- i 2
terrorist temperature or do we have an idea of what-it is we et
-J "
want?
4 MR. SNYDER:
It.would seem to me what we are lacking 5-area of a common thing is something analogous of what we get 6
in the way of a more generic type thing.
We will use the-7 '"
current situation like we do get in the international side of
~
~ 8 it.
We don't see those reports on domestic ---
.l, 9
fj COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Does anybody know, is this 10 [j something that we are not getting,. and:does..the FBI do that for
- t 1 1 li anybody?
Do you know?
t' 12;!
FR. BURNETT:
No, they do not do that for anybody.
.i
- 1 3,j That has been my relationship, and I'm sure Mr. Cummings, our 14 ] relationship over tens of years, that they have never provided 15 that function.
16N MR. DIRCKS:
As I' recall, I dumk that at a hearing last ei b
17 spring we got hit over the head because we should be doing -more 15 to get more intelligence, working closer with intelligence i
15 agencies and we can say, sure, we are doing a lot with the CIA, i
i 20 we are getting that information.
Maybe the answer is we don't havp 21 '
any of this stuff on the domestic side.
t
.22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Are there any sets of questions 23, that we have asked them that they haven't come 'back to us that 24 they are not going to answer and you have the impression that they 25 weren' t answering not because they didn' t have the information, but O
23
.i I
.i i
just didn't want to give it to us.
2 MR. CARTER:
I've never had th,e impression that on any 3
questions we have asked them that they are withholding anything.
4'
' Sometimes they just honestly say or say sir.cerely that we don't 5
ha~ve the information.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But are we clear on what 7
questions that we want to ask them if they would do it?
~ 8 MR. BURNETT:
To this point, I don't believe we have 9
ever asked them to assess threat.
I think that is what i
10 I Bill is asking at this point.
i 11 8 MR. DIRCKS:
I think, looking at the capabilities of i
12 [
their nuclear office, and I think you can count them on.what, 13 !.
three people over there.
What do they have on their energy desk?
14 l MR. CARTER:
One person.
15 y MR.' DIRCKS:
One person.
Naturally they ami't do much
- i 16 {i because they don' t have the' resources over there even if they 1 7 '.
wanted to do it.
a t
i 15 :.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Do you mean a sense.of threat I
i 19.i like these. levels we talk about, what we ought to be protecting?
i 20 ;l MR. DIRCKS:
Well, I would like to see more support for '
!I I
21 :!
some of those levels.
22 COMMISSIO ER GILINSKY: Okay, you don't mean a 23,[
communative threat?
MR. DIRCKS: No, no.
I'm talking about whatever we 24 25 put in our regulatory requirements and that's car job, to set up dtandards and impose licensing conditions.
We are doing that i
i 24
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. i,
..i i
i I
i
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^
l-now and that is the basis of a lot of studies that we have 2
done.
I would imagine the FBI would be ' interested in this too.
3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Now, do we get these kinds of --
I mean this kind of advice from the CIA?
5-MR. DIRCKS:
Not on the domestic side, but we do get 6
finished intelligence products from the CIA.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Bill, why wouldn't that kind-8 of advice come better from that threat assessment operation in 9
DOE that exists to respond to specific types of threats.
Are st 10 !}
they also unwilling to ---
11 MR. DIRCKS:
I'm not quite sure.
You get in to a 1 2 'Ij funny box, I'm sure, accepting a DOE threat assessment.
13 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Not accept, but what you are n
14 3 'looking for is ---
15 ;l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: They are an intelligence agency, it 16 ;! and they are a member. of the Foreign Intelligence Board on the i
17 N National Intelligence Board.'
}
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, you are_looking for some I
19 other points of view.
20 d 1
MR. DIRCKS:
!I We are looking outside of a relatively 21 ~
I pro systera.
22 Maybe I'm just gropping for something that isn't there, 23 but like most people, I would like more information to come in 24 and support ---
25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
But certainly, it would be worth 4
4 e
25 o
.g 1
exploring with Mr. Webster, to what extent the Bureau could, 2
I in fact, extend its effort, broaden it to provide some sort of I
3 qualitative, that's what you are really looking for, qualitative 4-judgment about the information that they already have.
5.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
In a way, aren' t we asking their 6
advice on whether or not we have enough protection here or whether 7
we ought to have more protection?
8 j
CHAIRMEN HENDRIE:.Yes, in part.
9 I
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: ' And I would think that isn' t so unreasonable.
I would think the3 might give this kind of 11 advice to banks or someone or other.
12 MR. CUMMINGS:
No, it is kind of like if you look back 13 to the history of bombings and the FBI will be very willing to 1 4ha come to you and say, we got a call and here's what we know about 1 5 !!
it and give you everything they have.
But it is now your a
1 6 il nickel to decide whether you are going to evacuate that building 17 or not.
i Now, in many cases when you get down to the field level,1 h
19 ]
out n the street where the bomb is ticking, the special agent 4
- 20 !! in charge of that particular office may go a little bit beyond t
I 21 what his policy guidance is, on a real live basis, but technically; a
22 they have no authority.
Now, they have done all sorts of things 23 on data bank and put all this information in and tried to come 2'
up with some numbers, but I don't think, Bob, it has ever come outi
~
25 to that.
The kind of thing that Bill is looking for, an overview I
o e
26 0
ii 3
1 of are we doing it right, I don't think they have the people to l
2 do it.
3 l MR. DIRCKS:
I don't think they have, and I think 4
there is probably a hesitancy to get in to this.
This is 5-domestic intelligence collection ---
6 MR. CUMMINGS: They would be very very. reluctant to get 7
into that ---
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: They have had their knuckles rapped 9
very heavily for that kind of thing and they are not going to --
11 10ll are anxious to do it again.
t 11 6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But there is a differonce between 12 the domestic intelligence and doing what Dick suggested, and 13 I agree with Dick on it.
Asking him what kind of assessment 14
. capability can they provide, what kind of assistance can they 11 15 y provide in reviewing whether our plans are adequate or do they ---
I-16 l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Also, o'.e might ask Mr. Webster 17 l, the extent to which they are doing any try to find another.
i 18 !: word than " assessment," because they can always say we don't do y
'19.: assessments.
They just won' t even discuss the word.
Find a l
20 word, whatever it would be, assessments.
But they are doing i
21 :, for tihe Cabinet Committee or whatever it is now called, on
'i 22 terrorism, which does -have a function of analyzing threats, and 23 it was created, since I was there at the instarit of creation, 2.;
I'know why it was created.
It was created particularly for.this
~
25 reason -- no two reasons.
One, there wasn't anybody doing that
I 27 j
I
- l t
~
kind of assessment in domestic sense, and two, there wasn't 2
any real coordination between the domest,ic intelligence 3 !
collection in these areas and the foreign collection and assessmenu 4-that was going on.
And the purpose of that exercise was to bring al-1ofthattogether,focusitatthehighestlevek.ofthe 5
6 government, and now just exactly what has happened, I don' t know.
7 We see that book every once in a while, but there was a time
'8 when there was a regular weekly ---
9 MR. BURNETT: There still is, sir.
~
10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
-- publication which was a 11 ]
series of threat assessments.
12 MR. BURNETT:
That still goes on, and I am this 1 3 'i agency's representative on that.
U
'I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: They do publish threat assessments) 14 i
i 15,; describing in'dividuals and their capabilities.
16}
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:'What is the name of that ccnference V.
17 li these days ---
g MR. BURNETT:
That is Ambassador Smith and it is the 19 Subc:mmittee to Combat Terrorism.
Is that the name of it?
{
- 20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: It is the National Security
.i i
21 '!
Council Committee or something.
l 22 MR. BURNE'fT :
But we discussed at one of those 23 f meetings that type of threat when we had trouble with Lbfthansa Airlines about a year ago.
And we were also employing 34 33 Lufthansa to transport special nuclear material, as you remember, e
e o
b i
I:
Q 9
1 3 and special precuations were looked at and discussed.
T;I COMMISSIONER' KENNEDY: To the extent that the Bureau Q h '2 i
3 l is providing them with any kind of service beyond s%ight raw
.4
- intelligence, it would be useful to find out what that is and 5
see if that sort of help might be useful to us, if they filled d
that part.
7 MR. BURNETT:
Could I just make one clarification on 8
something Mr. Gilinsky said.
I cwant_to make sure that the g
Commission does understand this.
10 He said something about establishing numbers of 11 [
adversaries internationally, and we have not gotten that service 12 '
from the international community.
We have gotten'information
~
13,
Pertaining to the characteristics and capabilities, training, 14 0.and a 'little bit on motivation of the foreign terrorists, but 15.[;
they have never presented us with:
here's a more quantitative' 16 ; view f that adversary.
So even in their arena, they are 11 l
17.i somewhat hesitant to do that.
MR. DIRCKS:
Well, I think in the letter 'that we 3_
-. o 9
signed to Mr. Webster, he did say he would'like to see our staffs focus on tWo broad areas.
First is information exchange.
g ll "To allow the'NRC to develop regulatory requirements A
i hg i
that are current and effective
-Wt! need information regarding j
the types of legal and adversary actions against which licensed g
i,.
. facilities should:be prepared to defend.
What are the tactics, motivations, equipment, strengths of individuals or groups who z..
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may pose a danger."
l 2 h
- l We are receiving copies of investigative reports from
'l l
the Bureau, but the.re m.ay be ways by which the Bureau could
~
s 4
routinely provide us with a more finished intelligence 5
analyses to help us refine -- to confine the potential threat 6
l in more concrete terms.
I 7 I think we are just looking for: more
{
information.
One man sitting on the atomic energy desk probably doesn' t have the time, even if he had the permission 9
l' to do more.
If he had the permission and more resources, he it 1 0:1l; might, if anything just rifle through all of the incident si
-it 11 g
reports and do some sort of a generic analysis of what is. going 2 9 1
I think that's the main point here.
It is difficult to on.
13l:
fight a war if you don' t have any. knowledge of what may be on a
14
'the other side of the ---
15 d CORHISSIONER AHEARNE:
Do you have a sense that there 16 is a war going on?
17 !
MR. DIRCKS:
Well, if there isn't a war that would be i
'18 nice ~ to know too, but we may be gearing up. to fight an unexisting d
erny.
20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That would be useful to know.
!i 21 "
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
On page 8 of the draft, it is 22 under FBI responsibilities there, they have -- I guess we had eJ.
proposed they provide intelligence. information of interest, 14 the security of nuclear facilities and they have struck "of '
~
25 interest" and put in "concerning possible criminal acts
,?
3
- t it relative."
Is that in order to conform to their legal charter 2 l of what they are suppose to be doing, or' is there more 3
substance to it?
4 MS. FULWILER:
I think they were trying to be 5-restrictive in that we couldn't come up with anything and say 6
this is of interest to the NRC, we haven't seen this informa' tion.
7 I think that was too broad a statement.
8 MR. DIRCKS:
I think they have probably focused it 9
back to giving us advance warning when the bank robbers are on i
il 10 'I the way, more than giving us a ge~neral description of the i
11 tactics and motivations and equipment the bank robbers may be 12 -
l using these days.
13 !
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, doesn't that lead to il 14 l' a problem and doesn't that change more narrowly. define it, t
=
and 15 !! would begin to define a way which we are trying to get at.
!l 16
- c MR. DIRCKS:
I think they are tying to focus it down.
17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Other comments?
~
{
1 18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
My other comment, I notice i.
o 9j that they dislike the word " assess." so much that they even 0' struck it from our respo.nsibilities.
20 1
j 1
21 '
(Laughter) f 22 N MR. BURNETT:
You might tell him about your contact, 23 ' how the meeting might be done and that the monkey is on our back, '
24 so to speak, at this point.
3 MS. FULWILER:
Okay, I talked to Bob Satkowski this
~
i 9
i 31 l
1 i
~
morning and just asked him how the Director runs'his meetings, 2 !
l what he is expecting.
3 i He said that he would probably ask what the Commission g
was all about, and how the' NRC interfaces with NEST.
The 5-information that has been provided to the Director by his staff.
6 has been.
The Atomic Energy Act ---
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
How we interface witi who?
~8 MS. FULWILER:
NEST.
O t
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Which is?
10 F j
MS. FULWILER:
Nuclear '?_elonal -- what is it?
11 h
MR. BURNETT:
Nuclear En.ergency Search Team,.
12 0 j
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: They have an outfit out here at 13 '
Andrews.
t 14 i
MR. BURNETT: Yes, sir, and this organization has 0
15j!
identified individuals that can call up and request NEST 6f support.
1 o
17 l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: That's the airplane?
, -.C " -
MR. BURNETT: It's everything.
It is search, just a 19 3 whole bag.
i a
20 0 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Onward.
!i 21 4 MS. FULWILER:
The Director has briefed on the Atomic l
'22 Energy Act and the responsibilities of the FBI under these
--4J-statutes.
24 He has been told about howithe: FBI can draw on the NRC 25 for expertise should there be a safeguards incident.
He has been e
'32 s;
.i
.i
- ;; briefed on the nuclear extortion cases that have' been handled
-2 t
l ji by the FBI, 3 i a
4-
.5 As far as the numbers, his genera 5 procedure is[to'have~
his immediate staff with him.
If you want just a one-on-one.
7 meeting that is possible, but if you bring your entire staff,
- 8 then he will respond likewise.
I 9
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: The question is, do we have more il 1 0 13y people musterable in the immediate headquarters area.
I o
11iln suspect, you know, if we get into a power struggle like that 12 l he will start pulling in ringers from the Justice Department 13 i and there is no way we.can match that.
i.
~
1 ' it We had both better have immediate staff on hand.
If 9
1 5 ;; it is just the two of us we will both have to write down more
!I 16 ll things than we want to write down.
'M
.17 ;
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
You might even make some ~
18 ' decisions.
19 ?
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Tell him to bring his fellow 20 : commissioners.
i 21{
MR. BURNETT: If that is your decision, your immediate it
- 22 ' staff would be?
23, CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
See what they Chink is -- I don' t 2'
have_any reason to go alone, and --.
~
~
25 MS. FULWILER:
I asked that.
D k
e
9 33 9..l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I see, they didn't want to suggest 2 [
a number.
l i
3 I don't know, I would think -- when.I say immediate 4-
- staf f I don' t -- I'm not talking about my office, but I think 5
three or four people from NMSS ought to come along.
Three to
[
five.
7 MR. GOSSICK:' I might mention that there was one 8
meeting, kind of, of this sort back in early '75, I think it g
was with Kelley and Giller and Bill Anders_and I went over there
!?
10 y and I think Anders sort of -- I'm sorry.
There weren't any
- i. l 11 j Commissioners.
But anyway, it was an aftermath of that ~ Boston 12 ]
event, remember, where there was that --
Ul COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: That was a joint ERDA/NRC ---
13 U
MR. GOSSICK: That's right.
But it had to do with 14 t!
very much sort of the same kind of thing, interaction between
. o (g t_he agencies on threats of that nature.
16
'l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay.
Anything else?
7
.io Thank you very much.
At this time we haven' t settled on a day.
g 20 q MR. BURNET.T :
In the communications they have asked i!
you to coordinate with a Ms. Devine as to setting up a mutual 2.
i i
meeting, so it is up with us.
i 22 (Whereupon the meeting was concluded at' 11:55 a.m.)
i,-
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