ML19303C000

Submits List of Discrepancies Between Design Depicted in Layout Drawings & in SAR for Westinghouse Advanced PWR RESAR-SP/90.Layout Drawing Quality Too Poor for Further Use in Evaluations

ML19303C000
Person / Time
Site:	05000601
Issue date:	03/12/1984
From:	Houston R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Miraglia F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19277F284	List: ML19277F283 ML19277F288 ML19303C000 ML20102A467
References
FOIA-84-335 TAC-668, NUDOCS 8404030597
Download: ML19303C000 (3)

Text

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t MAR.1 2 1984 HEHORANDUM FOR:

Frank Miraglia, Assistant' Director for Safety Assessment Division of Licensing FROM:

R. Wayne Houston, Assistant Director for Reactor Safety Division of Systems Integration

SUBJECT:

WAPWR REVIEW, PRETENDERING MODULE NO. 11, PLANT LAYOUT Plant Name:

Westinghouse Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor, RESAR-SP/90 Docket Number:

None Licensing Stage:

Pre-PDA TAC No.:

668 Responsible Branch:

SSPB Project Manager:

K. Eccleston DSI Branch Involved:

RSB We recently received tne Subject document as one of the items pertinent to the ongoing review of the Westinghouse RESAR-SP/90. Our review of the plant layout has revealed a number of significant discrepancies -

between the design depicted in the layout drawings and the design de-scribed in the Primary Side Safeguards System Reference Safety Analysis Report. These include:

1.

Preliminary module information received from Westinghouse showed the SI systems to be separated and located either within contain-ment or in individual compartments which communicated with contain-ment-(pumphouses). This is consistent with the SAR, which states.

"The ISS consists of four identical and totally separated mechanical subsystems...." The Subject documentation shows two SI j

systems on one side of containment with communication between the systems via an open hallway, and the other two systems _180* away in-an identical arrangement. This is contradictory to the-SAR. The layout also violates the SAR statement:. "It is proposed that_ the four pumping modules be housed in Containment Pressure Enclosures

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s (CPE's) in_ order to encompass all piping and components associated

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with any post accident recirculation of highly radioactive fluid 9 @6 (p d

within a containment boundary."

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F. Miraglia MAR 1 2 1984

' 2.

The SAR contains a' discussion referencing either two or four emergency electrical power trains. The drawings clearly show only two, with no mention or provision for four.

3.

The SAR (p. 6.3-26), for the loss of offsite power and one elec-trical train, states:

...for a two electrical train system only two of the four (ECC) subsystems would be operating....". This, in conjunction with the item 1 discussion, may mean a single failure in the pump compartment could disable two pumps..The locstion of the diesels may mean that one train is connected to the closest of the two of four ECC systems. One diesel failure could disable the two remaining ECC subsystems. The previous layout ofg separated SI pumps would prevent this occurrence.

1,

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The iack of consistency in the information being received indicates there may be a quality assurance problem at Westinghouse. Moreovt.c.

i discrepancies of this nagnitude and nature lead us to question whether

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we will be able to continue our review.

Please request that Westinghouse address what steps they intend to take

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l to assure that in the future, information submitted will be consistent g

with submitted licensing documents, and that changes which occur in the design process are clearly identified and justified.

Our review of Module 11 also indicates that the passive steam condenser

. system, which was described in pretending Module ?_ and which potentially

' offered significant safety improvement over present designs, appears to have been eliminated. Please ask Westinghouse to provide background for.

this design change.

.i We also note all charging pumps are located in a comon area. Flooding -

of this area could cause loss of all three pumps, with corresponding loss of RCP seal injection and attendant problems. Please ask Westing-house to address this problem.

The layout drawing quality and legibility _is too poor for use in further.

evaluations. Please ask Westinghouse to resubmit a legible set of layout drawings.

0(nin:1 Signed By II.Wayajinuston R. Wayne Houston, Assista!nt Director f

for Reactor Safety 3

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Division of Systems Integration Enclosure

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MAR 12 1984 -

i F. Miraglia 3

cc:

R. !1attson-David H. 'lioran, SSPB K. Eccleston, DL Nick Fioravante, ASB Chief, AEB, DSI Joseph P. Joyce, ICSB i

Chief, ASB, DSI T. Dunning. ICSB l

Chief CSB, DSI C. G. Tinkler, CSB Chief, ICSB, DSI

-Glenn Kelly, CSB:

Chief, CPB, DSI D. R. Lasher, RRAB' l

Chief, RRAB DST Jacques Read, AEB Chief, HEB, DE

'Jocelyn Mitchell, AEB

- Chief, SGEB DE H. L. Brammer, MEB Chief, GIB, DST S. P. Chan, SGEB Chief, PSRB, DHFS T. N. Su, GIB Cecil 0. Thomas, DL F. Liederbach, PSRB

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