ML19296C940

Transcript of 800213 Briefing on Turbine Missile,Pp 1-37. Supporting Documentation Encl

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Issue date:	02/13/1980
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U NIT E D STATES N UCLE AR REG UL ATORY COMMISSION in the matter of:

BRIEFING ON TURBINE MISSILE PIace:

Washington, D. C.

Date:

February 13, 1980 Pages:

1 - 37 INTERNATIONAL VERBATIM REPORTERS. INC.

499 SOUTH CAPITOL STREET. S. W. SUITE 107

- WASHINGTON, D. C. 20002 202 484-3550 8002290 04 )

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

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In the Matter of:

1 I

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j; BRIEFING ON TURBINE MISSILE 7

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9 Commission Conference Room i

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Room 1130 10 f

11 1717 H Street, N. W.

12 Washington, D. C.

13 Wednesday, February 13,1980

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15 l

14 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, for i

17 presentation of the above-entitled matter, at 2:00 p.m.

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Victor Gilinsky, presiding.

19 BEFORE:

,0 4

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VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner 1

4 RICHARD T. KENNEDY, Commissioner JOSEPH HENDRIE, Commissioner I

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PETER BRADFORD, Commissioner i

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I TAPE l-1 I

I COW.ISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let's proceed.

i We are here to hear about turbine missiles.

i Cpn'you start by reminding me why?

MR. CASE:

Yes.

Over the past couple of months, 4

rather, two months, we had informed -- the staff.has informed l

the Co==ission individually as we have discoverd the cracks 6

7 in the rotors and of the actions that have been taken in the i

g individual plants, whether these cracks have been discovered.

9 I don't rightly remember the events that has taken P ace, but it is probably six to ten in that range and we l

10 thought we would bring all the information together to you today and to make one presentation and what we are finding g

out and what direction the problem is going.

(

l So, that is why ask you to hear us on this subject.

Darryl?

15 MR. EISENHUT:

Fine.

16 I

If I may have the first slide.

17 This is a simple summary of what we would like 18 to go through today and we will remind you of the safety 19 or non-safety aspects and a discussion of the cracking 20 problems that we thought we would summarize on the experience 21 we have been seeing.

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On the next slide, it basically points out the 5

history of this back in early November, one of the licensees i

21 I

of the Point Beach licensee notified us that they had i

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I potentially this problem.

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They actually the next bulletin we found out right f

after that was in fact the Westinghouse meeting with all I

2 the. licensees operating nueclear plants on October 30th f

when Westinghouse informed all the utility executives that a

5 they may be facing a problem, which may be a major problem I

6 from the standpoint of, for example, down time.

l 7

You will see why in a minute.

This is a pretty a

major operation.

9 There was also an anonymous letter that was sent i

10 l

in on November 17th which stated that they stated there might i

l be safety problems associated with turbine cracking problems in the operating plants.

12 In fact, on November 20th we had sort of a major g

('

step along the way when one of the first plants to come down la s

for an inspection was the Westinghouse turbine division j

confirmed that an overhaul design one low-pressure turbine l

they found some cracking.

17 j

Historically, there has been cracking back of course 18 for a number of years there has been cracking in fossil 19 l

fuel plants, and there was a shippingport turbine failure 20 in 1974 which is the only major turbine failure a US nuclear 21 I

plant, associate with a US nuclear plant, that we are aware 22 of.

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COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

What was the nature of that 24 l

failure?

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L MR. EISENHUT:

I have a slide, if I can hold it

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just a minute I can show you graphically what it looks like.

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COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

That is fair enough.

f 2

l MR. EISENHUT:

One of the early plants also to I

.c show that there was turbine cracking was Surry where they 3

had done an inspection and found turbine cracking in 6

Septe=ber, 1979 and Point Beach, of course in October.

I 7

The next slide is an illustration, actually the 3

next two slides, are just illustrations of what a turbine looks like.

9

)g You will see a cutaway view, this is on a Westinghouse, turbine, you will see a cutaway here on both of these.

3 This is a GE turbine.

You can see the section where the housing has been removed.

This is a low-pressure turbine, a low-pressure stage of the turbine they call them a little different under different turbines, whether they are j

low or intermediate.

14 l

You can see these are the larger sections that 17 j

i we are worried about.

They have a quite large steel disc la l

running in the order of about six feet across?

19 MR. NOONAN:

About six feet.

20 MR. EISENHUT:

With the blades on the outside.

21 Now, the turbine on a -- well, on the next slide 3

again, a little illustration of what that cutaway looks like.

I am sorry back to the one that shows there --

24 j

COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

Darryl, on the Zion inspection,!

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he.v did they get a UTE signal off that bore crack; did they I

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,I ace.ually pull discs?

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MR. EISENHUT:

To really do a good inspection, you l

I have to pull discs.

2 i

COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

Did they at Zion?

MR. EISENHUT:

Yes, they did at Zion.

3 l

S, the concern you have, well, the missing slide 6

and when we locate it we will show you the problem.

What you 7

have to do, is in fact, a lot of the cracking is -- it is good enough.

It is symetrical, I think.

I COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

It makes Commissioners 10 nervous when they can't read the ledger.

11 i

t MR. EISENHUT:

You see that there are different 10 i

discs from either end.

Whether finding -- most of the tLae 13 I

they are finding the cracking on the inner most disc that la is the disc associated from the inside and what they have 13 l

l to do is, these are shrunk onto the shaft, so it is a simple 16 l

l technique of cooling the shaft, heating up the disc and 17 l

sliding it off.

18 l

But to get in to do the inspection on the inner 19 most disc what you have to do is remove the ones on the 20 outside.

To get to it, you have to take the housing off.

• 1 It is a majcr operation, and it is considerable downtime 2

on a nuclear unit.

22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, where are these l

i cracks?

3 MR. EISENHUT:

The cracks -- a good thing you l

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suggested that.

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On the very next slide there is a blow up.

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Excuse me, Commissioner.

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,1 On this slide is a better picture of what the l

2 I

Co=nissioner was going to point to.

5 i

l COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

It is that article and this 6

j is on the bore, the hole, which slides onto the shaft.

7 3

MR. EISENHUT:

And there is two different kinds.

9 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

Normally, there is a key to there and norma 11 you go and look at the keyway because that l

is a sharp-edged thing, you know, a great crevice --

)

l MR. SHAO:

This picture has a keyway.

t.,d COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

But, these are not necessarily keyway cracks.

MR. EISENHUT:

Most of these are, most of them 13 l

l are, but there have been some found away from the keyway.

14 What it is, after you shrink it on to the staff, 17 3

you have three, most of them are cylindrical shafts that go 18 in.

They are little pins and you can see in the upper 19 j

left-hand corner and the keyway goes part way through the 20 l

disc and you can see it on the bcttom and you can see the 21 little markings where the cracks have been found.

2 1

The cracking in the upper right-hand corner is i

l mean't to be one that is away from they keyway.

There are

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some that have been found that are actually located away

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from it.

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Now, that is basically what is being found and I

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from a safety standpoint on the next slide it gives you.

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2 This is a picture of the turbine that came apart f

and this shows first you see on the right-hand side you see a

3 the actual blades have come off when the turbine came apart.

6 and --

7 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

This slide is in there for g

me.

9 MR. EISENHUT:

It has something for everybody.

I 10 It gives you an idea that it is a pretty massive thing that comes apart.

g Actually, one of the discs, a big piece of the metal, is one of the discs that actually came apart.

COMMISSIONER RENDRIE:

Does it throw anything 14 through the casing?

MR. NOONAN:

No, sir, it did not.

16 i

MR. EISENHUT:

At Shipping Port, it did not.

17 l

However, it did go through the bottom of the deck.

It went la l

down to the bottom, it did not come to the top, the casing 19 on the top.

But it made considerable damage below the 20 turbine duct.

21 The next slide is a picture of one that actually I

came apart with a -- it shows where the shaft came apart --

22 this was in a fossil fuel plant.

24 You again see the blades which are all sheared off

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on the discs and if the main shaft comes apart you have a s

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i considerable potential for damage, j

COW.ISSIONER GILINSKY:

But, you have not seen j

i the cracks in the shafts have you?

MR. EISENhUT:

Haven' t seen them in the shaf ts.

This l

l 1s just to illustrate that if the turbine comes apart because j

of the massive energies you have, it has the potential for j

a major destruction of the surrounding f acility.

This would I

I in fact, a piece of the disc of the shaft, I forget, a piece actually shot through the roof of the building and then came 9

I back through and put another hole in the building.

10 So, it actually :ame through the casing and through i

11 i

l the roof of the building and hence, that is our concern.

12 i

The next slide simply summarizes the two major 13

(

areas that comes about because of turbine problems.

14 One is the direct release of steam of course; and 13 I

the other aspect is of course missiles.

That is if you 14 have a large billions pounds of energy coming out by way 17 of the missile.

18 Associated with the first part the release on D

a BWR, of course, is the primary coolant.

So, it is in

• 0 fact, there are radiological aspects.

21 On a PWR, it is the secondary loop and therefore, U

the radiological consequences are negligible and what you 22 I

l will-see from simple su= mary of what we have gone though, all 24 I

l of the cracking problems we have seen today have been associated l I

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25 with Westinghouse turbines.

In fact, they are all on s.

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Westinghouse, they are all on PWR's with the exception of i

1 one and we are going to look at that in the very near future.

I We have not seen cracking on any of the GE turbines.

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l We have also not seen the cracking on any GE plant that has i

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l a Westinghouse turbine.

However, they have been looked at.

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l 6

You know, it is a mis-match.

We are really concerned more i

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about the turbine than whether it is GE or whatever.

l l

3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Except insofar as the 9

primary coolant problem rises in a BWR system.

jo MR. EISENHUT:

That is right.

j i

I jj COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

As I recall the doses are 12 not very disturbing --

MR. EISENHUT:

It is a secondary concern --

33

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I COMMISSIONER RENDRIE:

-- you get pretty decent g,

moisture separation in the vessel dryers and you do get g

trace fission product gas activity over there.

It is not l

l up in the range of the Park 100 guidelines it is well below 17 that.

18 l

MR. EISENHUT:

It is certainly a secondary concern.

19 The next page, the next slide --

20 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:' When you say we haven't seen 21 any on GE turbines --

22 MR. EISENHUT:

We haven't seen an inspection on --

S I ma sorry, the other have.

l 24 I

I COMMISSIONER HENDRIE :

Let's talk about the GE l

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turbines with regard to whether there has been an equivalent I

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level of inspection disc bores, et cetera to the inspections i

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that have gone on recently on the Westinghouse sta##

MR. EISENHUT:

There have been three or four plants

--l

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MR. SHAO':

They inspected recently three or four l

3 plants and they have found no cracks.

6 MR. EISENHUT:

There has been an equivalent 7

inspection.

j 3

MR. SHAO:

We may ask them to do more.

9 MR. NOONAN:

In fact, we already have.

We have jo asked for a total of about eight plants to be inspected and 11 they have GE turbines.

COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

Do you have any sense of 12 l

the obviously these things are fabricated in different shops

3 e

and the designs are slightly different.

There will be subtle j

differences in the material and the way the thing is put together.

Do they use about -- the thing I was reaching for l

is the shrink stresses; are they a'cout the same as Westinghouse, 17 that is do you see any qualitative difference there in the 18 l

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probable stress levels?

19 j

MR. NOONAN:

No, we have not seen any real differences 20 l

between the shrink stresses on the Westinghouse turbines and 21 GE turbines.

We have seen a difference in materials and 22 different keyway configurations.

i

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l MR. SHAO:

One is long and one is rectangular.

24 l

l The shape is different and also is very sensitive to the

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material.

The higher the strens the more liable to cracking.

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MR. EISENHUT:

However, the round ones are the i

I ones that were cracking and the square ones --

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COMMISSIONE? HENDRIE:

I had forgotten that some 2

2 1

of tihem were round keyway and I was thinking in terms of --

[

4 MR. NOONAN:

All the Westinghouse have round-type I

6 keyways, there are three of them.

GE had one major rectangular i 7

j keyway.

g COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

Onward.

9 MR. EISENHUT:

This slide points out the various to aspects associated with worrying about missiles and missile g

analyses.

g Most operating plants have not been reviewed for 12 l

turbine missiles because the real concern of turbine missiles 13 and requirements were heard on this analyses came about later la 1

in time.

15

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l 14 I

The big thing that was done, to plants that are i

l coming in operation and down the road a little ways is a real 17 1

indication of the turbine.

18 I

If the nuclear plant is setting in one location 19 you want the turbine oriented literally from so that the 20 l

concern here is the direct shot'off, not the high log shot, 21 but the most likely shot would be a direct shot off the 22 site of the turbine.

Then you want it oriented in such 22 1

l a way that it can hit the containment.

i 24 I think there is only one operating plant that l

I i

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has that has that kind of orientation, all the rest have the I

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I less favorable of where, or else they have dual limits which I

get themselves in trouble.

I 2

l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

You are saying then that 1

a missile might actually have the potential of breaching 4

i J

in the contairment?

6 MR. EISENHUT:

Maybe not so much containment, as 7

other safety related structures.

3 There are structures that a missle could conceivably 9

have --

l 10 MR. SHAO:

Depending on what types of failures 11 there are two types of failures.

One type called design 12 verspeed and the other destructive overspeed.

For design g

overspeed the energies are 20 million pounds and for desetructive 60 million pounds.

For the design overspeed you can go 1s l

through three foot of concrete and that is just by calculation.

For destruction overspeed it can go through eight foot of l

concrete.

17 j

MR. EISENHUT:

It is just simply what you mean 18 l

by the design, it is normally about 120 or 130 percent 19 l

overspeed on ^e turbine is called design overspeed.

20 l

If you let it go faster, and faster, and faster 21 up to about 180%, it is going to come apart.

22 MR. CASE:

They are designed to not let it go 22 over 130%.

But if they fail then you get to destructive 24 overspeed.

I 25 i

MR. SHAO:

But all these are calculations.

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At the end of this month, EPRI is going to perform j

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tests.

They try to put a turbine missle through four foot l

of concrete, whether it will go through or not.

We should know by the end of this month.

4 l

4 l

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Who is doing that?

l 6

MR. SHAO:

EPRI.

i I

7 l

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

EPRI.

3 MR. EISENHUT:

So, our primary concern is for 9

design overspeed because there are design features which to should keep it from going 120 - 130 percent.

11 It is very difficult and there are some transients 12 t

keep it from going up to 120 - 130 percent.

g So, our primary concern on operating plants is to

/

look at them and decide whether, to look at the materials the stresses -- if you would bring out the next slide.

g I think it will help.

I The principle thing we are looking at.

We are 17 l

looking at the materials, the stress, the environment.

18 It is the same thing in the pipe cracking problem 19 that caused stress corrosion cracking and this has been linked 20 to -- most of it has been intergranular stress corrosion 21 cracking and it is the same thing we talked about on pipe l

cracking.

3 l

l So, what we are principally looking at, we are 24 looking at the different parameters that are involved here

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that could contribute to cracking.

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Bcsed on experience, we are looking and calculating, l

3 hased on a particular turbine stress, its toughness, how l

long it is operated.

d 3

We are calculating how big the crack might be in i

6 i

the turbine.

7 Then we are over on the other side looking at a

what the based on the materials properties what the critical 9

crack size would be for that material and when it might come i

10 apart, assuming it got up to 120 - 130 percent.

11 So you really have two numbers that you are comparing 12 and if that number gets big enough, you become concerned.

13 MR. CASE:

The numbert on the left, that is how r

a big a crack can be is based on what you find in the inespections.

g l

MR. EISENHUT:

That is right.

It is simply a thing l

14 I

f1 king for a family of plants and now there has been about g

ten or twelve plants you will see in just a moment, but have been inspected and we are calculating how long they have been operating for two different types of materials, low toughness and high toughness materials and we are calculating on the average how much the crack would have been growing per month looking at its entire range of operation.

22 23 Then you have a curve, you can go to how long it was operating depending if you have two lines on it you 24 can go and you can pick off and you think for this plant and 25 l

w for this materials this cracking might be about so much based l

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i en experience.

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Miraculously, on a semi-low plot the curves lie I

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pretty close to a straight line so you can -- all the data points you are getting you go on and you can pick off and t

you can see for example and in a minute we are going to i

6

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say that a crack in some plant may be as big as so much 7

I deep.

8 Then you need to look at the materials aspect, 9

exactly what the critical depth would be so if you ever got i

i 10 this overspeed condition, the turbine may come apart.

11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

What are the two axies of l

this plot?

12 13 MR. EISENHUT:

One is our operating time and the I

y l

other one is how deep the cracks are that have been found I

g l

of the ten or twelve plants inspected.

I g

l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Does that assume that time zero starts with --

g l

MR. EISENHUT:

Zero.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

zero. Is that true?

19 l

MR. EISENHUT:

Well, of course this kind of 20 l

inspection was not done in time'zero.

We are going to be

,1 4

doing -- Jim, you might make a comment about it one of the things we will be looking at on the Sequoyah Plant 22

(

I believe is asking them to go look at the time zero and 21 i

I the brand new turbine after it has been installed prior i

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I to operation.

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1 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

It has been run presumably i

before it is installed as part of.its own testing before f

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[t ever left the shop.

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MR. EISENHUT:

No, I do not think so.

1 l

i COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

These big units are co big 0

that they essentially do the file.

The parts are all inspected, 7

but the final assembly --

i I

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

But not operational.

9 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

They wheel it as a turbine i

10 for the first time at the station, it is just so big that you 11 might end up --

12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I thought maybe they tested 13 individual sections.

r la l

COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

Well, when those discs come I

u out of the turbine plant, why somebody certainly has scanned 14 the boards on them.

I think it is a fair assumption, you I

17 know, you do not have guarantees, but I think it is a fair 33 assumption that they are crack free at that point.

Now, before they go into operation, they get shrunk 39 on the shaft.

You can't inspect them at that point, unless 3

I you take them back off the shaft.

1 4

So, you know anytime from the first shrink on, you can say well the crack could have started anytime from that shrink operation on and that is about as good --

l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

And it does not really make i

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any difference if you assume it started at point zero?

2 MR. EISENHUT:

Well, it would certainly change the 2

number on the curve.

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d COMMISSIONER RENDRIE.

It changes the growth rate.

3 If you have been running four years and you have a half inch l

6 crack and you assume that --

7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Through the half inch over a

four years instead of one?

9 COMMISSIONER RENDR12-Right.

10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

But, again, does it make 11 any difference if you go very far out in time?

12 MA. SHAO:

Actually, it is very important to i3 calcu' sate the growth rate but other calculated growth rate

(

ve use a lot of data, very convervative, and from that data 9

we calculate.

33 MR. EISENHUT:

In fact on the picture we had earlier.

g I

1,

.I of the Shippingport turbine, I believe they went back and looked and said that the crack at the time of coming apart was a half inch deep crack, just to indicate to you but you do not know whether that half inch grew in the last month 20 I

of operation or over the full life of the plant or in i

21 fact whether a quarter inch was there the day you shrunk it 22 l

down on the shaft.

22 We are assuming, based on what we kr.ve got now, 24 we tried to plot it different ways to o a too it comes out i

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and we are looking at all these differn.nt varLations but right i- = v-=mm.m ic.

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I now we are assuming that it is tied just to the length of time.

i We are not saying how it got there.

Presumably it is linear, that is the essential reason right now.

1 Just going down the slide slightly further.

i Westinghouse has taken their plants and put them J

6 i

into two lists, their double A lists and their single A lists, 7

you will see on the handout there.

Well, let's skip this 8

slide and the next one.

9 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

What are the numbers on 10 the right bep.de the plants?

l 11 MR. EISENHUT:

Just a model number, the slight 12 variations on the turbines --

12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

These are the turbine model

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12 numbers.

13 MR. EISENHUT:

That is right.

Only three or four 14 and this is just there for more for reference than anything else.

17 1

la l

The important thing is.they put them in two groups, they list them first as the double A list which have five

),

l or more years, or they believe might have significant growth involved and in their A list, as they call it.

,1 4

I won't go through those in detail, because you can see those in the handouts.

~

2 On the next slide, I won't try to go through in I

detail on this one and on the next one, tile numbers on I

I..

3

5 i

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me same casm:n. rTwcrt. s. w. surra wr

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1 i

this particular chart.

This is actually the cracking experience 3

l to date.

2 All this data has been accumulated from inspections since the November timeframe, Surry, I guess was September, J

October.

I 6

l All of these have been accumulated in the last 7

few months.

j I

8 The maximum crack found is in the middle colu=n 9

of the first quarter of an inch et cetera on down the line.

10 You see Zion had a crack that was 1.22 inches long.

t it MR. NOONAN:

Excuse me, deep, it branched off.

I 12 MR. EISENHUT:

It was 1.22 inches in length.

13 COMMISSIONER RENDRIE:

How long are they?

?

32 MR. NOONAN:

The longest one I think we have found l

3 right now is one and a half inches.

i l

ic l

MR. EISENHUT:

So, these are pretty sizeable cracks

!i in this.

Some of the cracks are very tight together.

One l,e i

or the cracks was actually somewhat outstanding open crack.

P' NOONAN:

There were surface cracks on the disc 19 it opened up we do not have the results of the bore or the 20 I

keyways yet but on the surface of the disc itself there was i

21 significant cracking and they were basically opened up.

22 MR. EISENHUT:

Now, the important thing to note on this slide is that some plants were returned to operation 24 with small cracks in them and the cracks were calculated to

(.

l 15 l

be so small not to be worried about now that based on i

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I Westinghouse's analysis that they would be below the critical I

f crack size and they wouldn't grow to a critical crack size 3

over to a more continuing --

l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Well, what is the critical 2

5 crack size?

f i

I 6

j MR. EISENHUT:

The critical crack size, it varies, 7

of course, from tenths of an inch to a couple of inchee.

i i

a T.. e actual number on any given plant is a 9

Westinghouse proprietary number.

That was the actual 10 calculated number on the turbine based on their material properties and their material analysis.

g COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It is proprietary.

MR. EISENHUT:

We have been negotiating with 33 Westinghouse to try to get that to become a non-proprietary I

number for the last couple of months.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

What is the rational for i

}

that being proprietary?

l,e j

MR. EISENHUT:

Would you like to answer that?

18 MR. SHOMAKER:

Based on the calculations that 19 l

Westinghouse has come up with and their methodology for 20 calculations and we are going to' have a meeting very soon 21 with them on that pattern.

2:

COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

To what extent are the 23 material properties, the proprietary claim to be a proprietary 24 j

matter?

(~

1 2e l

MR. SHAO:

I do not think they are material properties'.

i

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1 MR. NOONAN:

It is not so much material property l

I but material property, material properties on fracture 3

toughness that are involved in the calculations of the critical crack size.

3 So, from that standpoint Westirighouse claims that~

l 6

this would give the competitor advantage knowing what types 7

of materials it could have an indication of what types of 8

material they use in its turbines.

9 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

Sounds to me like the I

to principle advantage would be to guide the competitor some 11 other material.

I suppose that is a commercial.

12 MR. EISENHUT:

We will be making a determination 33 on that very soon because we are taking the position that ga we like to see more of this information made public and we i

33 have been having a number of discussions with them, because

.g l

it is very difficult to talk about it in a specific meaningful i

"7' 17 I should also point out that one of these plants, the appeals board handed out a decision yesterday which asked for a special hearing to be held next week, right Stu --

20 l

i MR. TREBY:

Yes.

21 MR. EISENHUT:

-- on North Anna there will be Jr l

a hearing next week --

2 22 MR. TREBY:

Thursday, to be exact.

24 i

I MR. EISENHUT:

Thursday, and in fact, if necessary I

(

15 j

we are going to go in close session, an in-camera session, so I

tarTtpPpeahCpqAg, VERSATlad NIPQprTEPEL $80C.

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l 1

l that proprietary information will be used in the hearing.

l i

l You remember the case has been pending before the appeals i

f board.

4 i

j COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

I must say, I am amazed that I

I do not pretend to have studied it are turbine missiles 6

of the criteria for proprietary information in great detail 7

I but I

COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

Well, you know how it is, there are all these garage mechanics out there across the 10 land prepared to leep into their back yards and commence 11 producing 18 rpm, 1000 megawatt, 200 foot long shaft turbines 12 in competition with Westinghouse and GE, we really could not U

have that sort of commercial disorder in the country, now 14 could we?

15 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

As to materials, one la I

man's commercial disorder is another's competition but as l

l to the material involved, presumably a competitor can find 17 is a way to analyze a Westinghouse turbine.

19 MR. EISENHUT:

I do not think it is a question --

1 20 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

It is cort of having to 21 derive it from the critical depths of the --

3 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

The turbine business like I

~

some other manufacturing enterprises has a lot of black art 3

in it and has grown up in an atmosphere in which each

(

manufacturer kept his secrets.

Boy, would not let you know k

me scarne C.AprTt:n. ST9tG". L W. surTE te?

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I I

i l

I l

whether he field those keyways with one kind of a file or I

I another kind of a file.

In part, because I suspect because i

2 the owners, proprietors of some of those trade secrets were not'too sure whether they were important or not and thought, 4

3 good, we will keep everything deep and darkened.

6 I can recall similar problems back in the great 7

days of the fuel densification problem when there were a a

number of properties of one of the vendor's fuel fabrication 9

of material properties analysis and so on and it was labeled I

10 proprietary; and I can remember a great meeting in which we i

11 came to an end pass and I then withdrew with the applicants wh were concerned and said, you know, it is up to you we 12 need that data to move ahead and if you want to go in there 13 I

and pry it out of your supplier, why fine, we will continue g

the meeting, otherwise, why don't we all go home, had i

g marvelous results.

COMMISSIONER BR.GFORD:

Let me ask directly the question I was trying to get at in two stages.

The maximum crack deficits at Zion were an 19 q

inch and a quarter.

That seems offhand like a ftirly good 20 size crack.

21 MR. NOONAN:

That was taken out completely.

2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

So, that the notation 22 returned to power that COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

With the offending disc removed, yes.

I t e m Votaanu h.

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ll me scatn. camm:n. rmert. s. w. surre ser

.am e. = :. men en

i I

l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Well, no, the return to l

l 2

l power was with the much smaller --

i l

4 MR. SHAO:

And three one was removed.

4 MR. EISENHUT:

With a large crack and then this j

J was removed.

l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Does that mean that the 6

i 7

crack went from.120 on the 2nd of February to --

g MR. SHAO:

No, three one means stage three --

MR. EISENHUT:

And 2/2 means low LP stage two, 9

disc number two.

10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Okay.

)

MR. EISENHUT:

There in Westinghouse they have l

three low pressures sets of these turbines that we showed g

a picture of, the three stages.

COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

I suspect the critical crack size can be inferred from the range when you got to i

j an inch and a quarter they said, good heavens, take that 17 l

disc out of there and fractions of an inch where they said --

18 l

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Well, what was bothering 19 me was coupling the 1.22 with the notation, return to power 20 l

with that.

21 MR. EISENHUT:

It is certainly not clear, I read 22 it on 22.

23 I

The next slide is just a continuation of it.

l 24 l

I should point out of these 12 plants that you

(

l

+=

~

scen inspections on, the shutdown to do the inspections often I

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runs anywhere from two to four months and they have to ship l

1 2

off the piece and get it repaired and bring it back.

l

)

2 If you have to repair it, but just to shut down l

and inspect it is runn.i.ng --

4 i

l MR. NOONAN:

Indian Point 2 ran us about three 5

l weeks just to shut down and inspect.

I 6

7 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

They must have been working g

around the clock.

MR. NOONAN:

They were.

9 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

That is a big operation to g

knock one of those big turbines down and you have to hike that g

whole -- it is al', one shaft, you have got to ease that thing up out of there, oh my God, what an operation.

MR. EISENHUT:

It is instead of dropping the drive 14 trnn in your car, remove the car.

15 i

COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

Well, I am sorry I do not la l

l have a spare disc turbine disc parts business right now.

17 l

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

As a supplier.

18 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

Yes, as a supplier.

19 MR. EISENHUT:

The other interesting thing on this 20 l

slide is that there is only one plant, mainly, Maine Yankee 21 that Westinghouse turbines have inspected and found no cracks.

22 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

There you see.

22 l

~

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Durability, virtue.

24 l

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

You can't win them all.

j I

I 25 l

MR. EISENHUT:

The next slide just summarizes the lMM NM k

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approach we have been taking, basically, in the short term j

l

~

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we have been evaluating the plants as we go on a case-by-case I

$~

hasis.

1 i

Some plants have been shutdown for inspections.

I i

They either repair the cracks by shipping it off and bringing

~

i I

I this back, replace the disc with a new one, or operate with I

small cracks.

7 1

3 We actually have contractors right now evaluating 9

the causing of cracks.

We are actually getting a couple 10 samples of the actual cracking that has occurred, shipping i

11 l

it to Brookhaven and livermore for an independent materials 12 evaluation.

1:i The trouble is that the small few cracks that have la been found usually a licensee that has this cracking problem 13 I

weren't first to part with the piece of the crack that l

14 I

he has until he himself knows what the cause is.

l But, there is enough cracks now that we are going

7 t

be analyzing pieces very soon.

la The next slide actually is sort of a status of 39 today, more than anything else, you can even be sure because so I

that last column is the proprietary list.

,1 4

I was hoping to show this but this is the plants that have not been inspected.

We have gone down the list l

l and are doing studies and I am looking at the phrase, parameters 24 and for the different materials and different temperatures g

l larmena% Vuesanas Rapormes Im:.

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wu==nm. s t um

for different chemistries with different periods of operation, i

I we have been doing calculations putting the number off of l

I l

cur data service, we are projecting how deep the cracks may be in some plants.

I I

f So these are maximum calculated cracks in the 3

i 6

various discs.

I 7

You can see they vary considerably and what you 3

obviously can do on the other side is, you could go down 9

the line and write down next to it what is the maximum 10 critical crack size is -- it is the critical crack size, I

11 that is if you have 120 - 130 percent overspeed, how big 12 would the crack have to be for the turbine to come apart?

It is a little bit of a conservative analysis but at the 13 same time it does give you an indication.

g So, what we are doing --

33 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Is that what the critical g

I

{

size is, the size at which it comes apartl g

1 MR. CASE:

At 130 percent.

If you should have a turbine overspeed.

COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

In particular, it is the 20 l

i size of the initial flaw or crack which at the stress level 21 I

is 130 percent overspeed, you have a reasonable chance of 22 going into a rapid crack propagation load rather than a very i

23 slow growth that has been going on, and things begin to go 24 l

on you and the assumption is you will then get disc failure I

15 1

and throw some parts around and one thing or another.

i i-= v-m. am.mm. =

me 3:3tne CAMT1lA STutIZT. L w. Sufft it7

.- u.

l l

1 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Well, it is not, or is it, l

I synonymous with the crack size of which you would want to I

I i

3 replace the --

i f

d COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

It is bigger than that.

3 If we are the Smith Electric Utility and we are 6

failing, can you imagine what it will cost us if the turbine 7

comes apart, boy, would we want to get it out of there before a

that happens.

9 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

What is the relationship 10 then between the size in which you want to get it out and 11 the critical size?

MR. NOONAN:

We have been looking at the critical 12 crack sizes as supplied by Westinghouse and this really 13 includes a combination of stress, we postulate the size of j,

the flaw, what it looks like and so forth, 33 We then take our data that we have been calculating y

in that maximum postulated crack size and that number is 1,<,,

calculated for example, Cooper, which will have 42 thousand r's on it and is scheduled for refueling in March, so that

}

number is postulated to that point in time.

That number then 20 is compared against the critical crack size --

i 21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

But there is another number.

22 MR. EISENEUT:

The ratio.

When they equal ena 2A you are at the point where you either have a turbine ova.

i speed, you can postulate the turbine coming apart and

z. ghu e

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I me echtne CA88tTtA STutCET. L w, SJrTE usr was>seenctose, g g, m

TAPE l-29 end I

and right now where we are anything above a ratio of something l

l 2

l-1'ke.75 we are greatly concerned and we are going to look i

3 at it, but the number we are calculating in the first colu=n is growing slowly enough that.75 probably gets us there.

4 I

3 l

Up to this point we have worked on all plants with l

6 i

the exception of two that were over that number.

Those two t

I 7

plants we are looking at and they are both going to be shut a

down pretty soon.

If they were not planning on shut down 9

very soon, we would face the question of whether or not to 10 shut them down.

j j

A number of plants have actually after we have i

12 discussed this with them and they themselves have shut down l

to do the inspection.

In fact, that is what happened to 33 most of the 12 plants.

We have only a couple of them to g

shut down really here because they recognize that potential g

i problem.

l 17 18 19 20 i

21 22 24 i

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2 l

1 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Totally aside from the 3

so-called missile problem, is the plant operations probl6m.

l t

l COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

If you get a disc faildre, 5

there is still only a low -- quite a low probability that 6

you will throw pieces of the turbine into places that will 7

be of concern from a reactor safety standpoint, but from 8

the standpoint of damage to the plant and unavailability 9

for an extended period, my God, this -- in a rational world 10 at least, I don't know that we are entirely rational, but in a rational world this ought to be one of those places 12 where the commercial interest is over-ridi6g that we ought I3 not to have a safety problem at all.

I l

l#

The fact that we continue to wor.y about it, l

15 I guess, says something about how rational the world is, i

i 30 MR. CASE:

Or how irrational.

17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

The maximum postulated 18 l

crack size means --that is, well, what does that mean?

19 MR. SHAO:

The calculation based on the stress 20 based on the material probabilities, it is being also based 21 on operation hours, assuming certain crack growths, we 22 figure this plant has certain cracks sizes and this is 23 the crack size.

24 MR. EISENHUT: What we have done very simply is

(

25 we have taken a piece of paper and on the bottom you take twmmArtoMAL Vorsanu Ruonrots. f ac me sourw cAsma. sTMrT. s. w. surTE 'n' WASMW.GTON. O. C. SEMs

I every data point you f ound.

2 It doesn't include stress.

3 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Don't tell me how you 4

did it, tell me what it means.

5 MR. EISENHUT:

This is the easiest way to 6

explain it, because it implicitly includes it, but what 7

you do with it is a function of time.

You look at ali 8

the data points, tha t you have --

9 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

No, that is too detailed.

10 It is the Staff's best estimate of how big the 11 crack could be in each of these turbines based on the 12 particulars of the individual turbine including test data 13 if there is any, or service-time.

MR. CASE:

And including cracks found.

4 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE

Now the other thing I want 15 16 to ask is how do you assess these max postulated crack num-bers?

Obviously, this is a calculation with some uncertainty 37 into, do you think these numbers are sort of mid dam, jg that is best estimate of the high side?

39 MR. NOONAN:

We think these are upper bound 20 numbers, in fact, all the data that we have accumulated from g

the inspections, we formulated up what we call upper bound curves, on the materials.

MR. CASE:

But haven't we revised the curve up-ward as we have had more inspections?

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1 MR. SEAO:

Maybe they have been revised down-2 l

ward rather than upward.

Right now we took certain ratio 2

I

'for instance, that ratio be --

l A

ER. EISENEUT.

It envelopes the data.

i 5

I CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Is that an NRC number?

I 6

MR. NOONAN:

Y~es.

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Those are numbers that l

8 you came up with?

9 MR. NOONAN: Calculated, i

10 These are our calculated numbers.

I 11 l

COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

Let's see if I can i

12 enunciate the uncertain situation and you tell me if 13 l

I am wrong, alright?

i 14 I

l In making these maximum. crack estimates thare 13 is obviously a range of uncertainty, and what I think the 14 Staff is saying is that they believe these represent the 17 upper bouW of the uncertainty range.

18 On the other hand, we all have to recognize that 19 there is not any sort of absolute guarantee that it is the 20 upper bcundary and simply that you have a probability 21 distribution for the thing and they have gone out on a 22 couple of one sigma or two sigma or whatever.

23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Maximum probable crack.

24 MR. CASE:

But, the data is few so it is subject

(,

15 to --

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o 32 PAGE No.

l 11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Now, what about these i

2 l

critical crack sizes, are those NRC numbers or NRC checked?

3 Assuming they are not NRC numbers because they 4

are prcprietary but have we checked those numbers, do 3

we agree with the calculation?

I 6

MR. SEAO:

We agree with those calculations.

7 We have the new one now, but we can't show you.

3 MR. NOONAN: 'Ne had people up at Philadelphia 9

sitting there for a number of days, going over the Westing-I 10 10!

house calculations.

We don't have any basic disagreement I

i 11 l

or any way to calculate their critical practices, it was 12 pretty standard technique they use.

13 MR. EISENHUI:

I only have one thing.

It is i

14 this aero thing we said.

The curve that we drew, that 13 we are using, three of the data points are above it, and 14 I

nine are below it.

l 17 MR. NOONAN:

The data scanner was such that i

la j

we set the three data point at the top and we drew a line 19 right threw the data points.

With nine other plants being 20 blowed.

21 21 MR. EISENHUT:

We tried to draw two curves, there 22 is an order of magnitude spread in the data.

23 l

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

What will you make of I

24 l

the 3.10 at Cooper?

l

(

1525 !

MR. EISENHUT:

What we make of that is if in l

s_

4 gwromancriak Votaanu RootTUti 38sc I

age sauTw cAmTc6 sTucrr. t w. merft ist s"-

Zim S. C. 3EEEE

1 fact the model we used, if that plant comes out and 2

actually finds something along the curve, we will find m

3 a crack when we do the inspection in March, that says 4

they have a crack that is 3.1 inches deep.

5 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

Or less.

6 MR. EISENHUT:

That is what I said.

If the model 7

is right, it would be 3.1, but if --

MR. CASE:

And the ratio in the right of the g

9 column is at that point of 3.1 inches would be.75.

That w uld be.75 or less.

10 So, they have a very large critical crack size.

);

f COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

What leads to Cooper g

calculation to get that far out in front?

In terms of 7.

the way the max c rack -- you calculated the max crack?

\\

MR. NOONAN:

This particular plant does not 15 have any reheaters in the wet steam forms on the first disc.

It is very moist wet steam where that first goes.

COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

And that is why it is 18 the number 1 disc instead of 2.

19 MR. NOONAN:

That is right.

20 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

Oh yes.

Fascinating.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

In terms of the way 22 it stated, it is a safe assumption that all numbers in 23 the~ maximum postulated crack size are less than.75 of 24 the critical --

fs lwTrm.eanomas VesATw RuonTtms. lasc.

me schrTM CAP 1Toi. STWUT. 5.W. Surft 907 WA$ediseGTON. EL C. amME

I MR. SHAO:

Two are not.

2 MR. EISENHUT:

In case I say we are working --

I 3

COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

Just one or two more 4

pi ces of information and I think we can put it together.

5 MR. EISENHUT:

There are two plants yet we are 6

working on a high priority basis.

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Skip the affirmations 8

then.

9 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

It's one of those puzzles, 10 you know, three missionaries, each with a turbine gets in 11 a canoe with a stress corrosion cracker.

12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Yes, but some of those 13 riddles where you ask the wrong questions, instead of 14 wanting to know what the number is, I guess, in the case 15 where you don 't know that they are less than one, you don't 16 know whether the plant should still be operated.

37 MR. EISENHUT:

We have called them in and asked 18 them that very question.

We have just found --on the 6ne 39 that is over one, we have just found it.out, I think, yest-erday, so we are raising that question right now, today.

20 MR. NOONAN:

30 to one that is over one has 21 a 36-inch shiela wall around it, in the first place g

We have done a turbine missile analysis and that is another point in our favor.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Could I ask you if the 25

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s.

lNTEJB' SAT 108tAL VCR&Aftw RrponTots. ING det SOWTM CAPf70L STauf. S. w. StJrTC 147 wAsMusGToss. O. C. anat r --

l 35 PAGE No.

o I

turbine is oriented away from the containment, reactor 2

containment, does that pretty well take care of the 3

problems from a safety point of view?

4 MR. EISENHUT:

Most of them from the load 3

dejectory missiles, because they blow out to the sides.

6 COMMISSIONER HENDRIE:

It reduces it by several 7

orders in magnitude, because the missiles will come out g

in the plane of rotation with some angular spread above 9

the plane of rotation.

10 That means if the containment is here and the

);

turbine shaft is this way, the only way you get a missile I

g in is one that comes up like this and is inclined back and then falls 'into the critical areas of the plant.

I And, the probability of numbers for that kind of event are g

very much less than if the plane or the shaft is this way and the plane of rotation is this way and you are just looking at where around the periphery it comes off and 17 i

l goes.

Then, you have a fairly large --

l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

What I am asking is 19 i.

l once the orientation is correct, can we pretty much forget about it from the safety point of view?

MR. EISENHUT:

I think we are sending two to 22 th~ree orders of magnitude less likely to have a problem.

71 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

So, you are really dealing i'

24 with all the plants whose orientation is not --

25 i

l g,,TramTious. Vpaatin Rucsertws. IK l

. mm emTon, sTntry. s. w. surrt io?

.. on

c. -

F

l 36 o

j PAGE No.

1 MR. EISENHUT:

Which is over one of the operating

' )

plants.

2 3

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Okay.

4 Well, is there anything else?

3 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

One last question.

6 When were you told that these numbers were proprietary?

I 7

I gather you didn't know it when you ma'e up d

this slide.

g MR. EISENHUT:

Yes, I did know it when we made 9

up the slide.

We just added this line on the back of g

the presentation about an hour ago or two hours ago, because we wanted to be able to show these are the postu-I lated crack sizes and how we are doing it.

13 j

I This list actually is a part of our priority list 14 or our list of the pri6rity plans, there are about 10 plants 15 j

that are most concerned about.

So, I need this list independent of this briefing.

In fact, we have all been at the perameters --

18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Can't we calculate 19 I

our own critical crack sizes?

20 MR. EISENHUT:

Yes, we have the ability.

21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Why can't you produce 22 l

those?

l' 23 MR. NOONAN:

We have not been able to get out 24 l

the shrink stresses on the individual shift.

25 i

i i

Iwromaticuas Vasariu Roomises. f ac.

i me souTw canTot starr7. s, w surrtter wasamatoai. s. c.1 mas

TAPE 2/9 end<

1 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But, you will have I

2 your own numbers which you will be able to display?

i 3

MR. EISENHUT:

That is right.

4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Okay, we will see.

5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Which since you agree 6

with the calculation of methods, it should be rather 7

similar to those which you can't display.

8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

So, the problem may be 9

on its way to solution.

10 MR. NOONAN:

We are articulating with the 11 Westinghouse people now on these proprietary numbers, 12 trying to get that changed.

13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, is there anything else?

ja 15 Thank you very much.

g l

(Whereupon the hearing was adjourned at 3:00 p.m.)

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 twrumario=AL Vasarine Recettes. lac.

[

ase soutw canrot srptrr. t w surre ist WAEMpW3rQN, CL C, 30D1 A

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a Slide 1 I

Introduction to Turbine Cracking Briefing NRC Notification Slide 2 Slide 3

- Westinghouse Turbine General Electric Turbine Slide 4 Westinghouse Rotor and Disc Assembly Slide 5 Description of Disc and Cracking Area Slide 6 II Safety Importance of Turbines Consequences of Turbine Disc Failure Slide 7 Missile Analyses Slide 8 Turbine Missile Review Slide 9 Slide 10 III Discussion of Cracking Slide 11812 AA List and A List Slide 13&l4

- Cracking Experience Slide 15 IV Short and Long Term NRC Actions e

-l 1

TURBINE CRACKING BRIEFING INTRODUCTION l

SAFETY IMPORTANCE OF TURBINES I

NOT NRC REQUIRED STANDARD (CURRENTLY THERE IS NO INDUSTRY WIDE STANDARD)

REGULATORY GUIDE 1,115 -

l TURBINE filSSILE ANALYSIS & SRP CONVENTIONAL PROBLEMS (H2 FIRES, ETC )

ORIENTATION I

DISCUSSION OF RECENT" CRACKING-t NRC ACTIONS SHORT TERM LONG TERM

NRC NOTIFICATION 1

NOVEMBER 5, 1979 NISCONSIN ELECTRIC, IN A MEETING, NOTIFIED THE NRC OCTOBER 30, 1979 WESTINGHOUSE PRESENTATION TO ELECTRIC UTILITY EXECUTIVES ANONYMOUS LETTER TO 18E, NOVEMBER 17, 1979 NOVEMBER 20, 1979 WESTINGHOUSE STD CONFIRM CRACKING DURING AN OVERHAUL OF ZION 1 LP TURBINE t

CRACKING DISCOVERY SHIPPINGPORT TURBINE FAILURE 19711 SURRY 2, SEPTEMBER 1979 POINT BEACH, OCTOBER 1979 i

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TYPICAL WESTINGHOUSE CRACKING EXP!IllERCE

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j END VIEW OF DISC SHAFT BORE CRACK LOCATION a

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+--- STEAM FLOW

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INLET KEYWAY CRACK LOCATIONS

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DISC l!

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i CRISE0lBl S OF TURBIE DISC FAILLPE

= DIRECT EiffEE DE SIFRi fR11 TURBIfE CASING - -

RADIOLOGICAL C0flSEQUBIES fEGLIGIBLE FOR RIR'S o flISSIlFS (TURBIfE DISC FPMBRS) WITri POTBITIAL RR STRIKIflG SAFE 1Y RELATED C0fTUBITS 4

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filSSILE #1ALYSES o TURBIfE ORIB1TATlui - - TO IETERilfE PROBABILIW 0F STRIKIfG SAEW RELAlED SYSTEPS 2

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• S8B INCLUDES PROBABILITY ESTIfMTES OF DAYAE TO SYSTES BASED ON 10 / YEAR ASSifED flISSILE GBERATION PPGABILIU - - IF IW%GE PRTABILITY EXCEEDS 10-6/ YEAR, CDPJECTIVE WASUES ED'D o UQE OPERATIf1G PiMS ME HQI BEER REVIEWED H)H TURBIfE MISSIl FS (LDi PROBABILITY OF TUR3IfE FAllljREASSlMD) l I

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TURBINE MISSILE REVIEW l

l TURBINE ORIENTATION, BLDE. LAYOUT LOCATIONS OF VITAL SYSTEMS (USE EXISTING INFORMATION FROM SECURITY AND FIRE PROTECTION REVIEWS)

ESTABLISH PROBABILITY OF SEVERE DAMAGE TO VITAL SYSTEMS & NEED i

FOR CORRECTIVE MEASURES, IF ANY i

I f

DISfuSS10N OF CRACKlHG 1.

MATERIAL, STRESS, ENVIRONMENT STRESS ~ CORROSION CRACKING INTERGRANULAR (CORROSION OCCURRING PREFERENTIALLY AT GRAIN BOUNDARIES)

TRANSGRANULAR (CRACKING ACROSS THE GRAINS OF METAL) 2.

KEY PARAi1ETERS EVALUATED MATERIAL TOUGHNESS AND STRESS TEMPERATURE OPERATING HOURS CHEMISTRY 3.

PLANTS GROUPED "AA" LIST (AA - NUCLEAR UlTH fl0RE THAN FIVE YEARS IN-SERVIC PERIOD OR SIGNIFICANT CORROSION)

"A" LIST (NUCLEAR WITH LESS THAN FIVE YEARS IN-SERVICE P 4

CRACKLOCATION i

KEYWAY.8 BORE e

S EXPECTED CRACK / CRITICAL CRACK i

CRITICALCRACKCALCULATED r

EXPECTED CRACK CALCULATED' r

CRACKING EXPERIENCE

CATEGORY AA CATEGORY A UTILITY STATION UNIT UTILITY STATION UNIT Florida P&L Turkey Point 3

81 Alabama Power Farfey 1

281 Alabama Power Farley 2

231 Consolidated Ed.

Indian Point 2

81 Baftimore G&L Calvert Cidfs 2

80 PASNY Indian Point 3

81 Carotina P&L Harris 1

281 Arkansas P&L Russellville 1

281 Carolina P&L Harris 2

281 Carolina P&L Harris 3

281 VEPCO Surry 1

81 Carolina P&L Harris 4

281 Carolina P&L Robinson 2

81 Cincinnati GBE Zimmer 1

280 So. Calif. Ed.

San Onofre 1

80 Commonwealth Ed.

Byron 1

380 Commonwealth Ed.

Byron 2

380 Yankee A.P.

Rowe 1

Commonwealth Ed.

Braidwood 1

380 Commonwealth Ed.

Braidwood 2

380 Wisc. Mich. Pwr.

Point Beach 1

80 Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck 1

81 Consumers Pwr.

Palisades 1

81 Duke Power McGuire 1

281 Commonwealth Ed.

Zion 1 1

281 Duke Power McGuire 2

281 Commonwealth Ed.

Zion 2 2

281 Duquesne Lt.

Shippingport 1

Duquesne Lt.

Beaver Varley 1

281 Florida P&L Turkey Point 4

81 Duquense Lt.

Beaver Valley 2

281 Nebraska PPD Cooper 1

81 Florida Power Corp.

Crystal River 3

281 Wisc. Mich. Pwr.

Point Beach 2

80 Florida Power & Lt.

St. Lucie 1

281 Florida Power & Lt.

St. Lucie 2

281 Maine Yankee Bailey Point 1

81 Houston L&P So. Texas 1

380 Rochester GBE Ginna 1

80 Houston L&P So. Texas 2

380 Northern States Prairie Island 1

80 Louisiana P&L Waterford 3

280 Wisc. P.S.

Kewaunee 1

80 Metropolitan Ed.

Three Mile Island 2

281 Northern States Pwr.

Prairie Island 2

80 Pub. Service E&G Salem 1

81 Pub. Service E&G Salem 2

81 Pacific GBE Diablo Canyon 1

81 Pacific GBE Diablo Canyon 2

81 P.S. Indiana Marble Hill 1

380 P.S. Indiana Marble Hill 4

380

~ ~ ~ ~ ~

_-......:~

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CATEGORY A (Cont.)

CATEGORY B UTILITY STATION UNIT UTILITY STATION UNIT I

Puget Sound I BL Skagit 1

381 Baltimore GBE Wagner 3

80 SMUD Rancho Seco 1

281 Boston Ed.

New Boston 1

81 TVA Sequoyah 1

281 Commonweatth Ed.

Joliet 768 80 TVA Sequoyah 2

281 Commonwealth Ed.

State Line 4

TVA Watts Bar 1

281 Commonwealth Ed.

Waukegan 8

TVA Wacts Bar 2

281 Duke Power Belews Creek 1

281 VEPCO North Anna 1

281 VEPCO North Anna 2

281 Philadelphia Elec. Co.

Eddystone 1

VEPCO

---

North Anna 3 --- - 280 VEPCO North Anna 4

280 Penn. Electric Keystone 1&2 80 VEPCO Surry 2

81 So. Calif. Ed.

Alamitos 566 81 WPPSS Hanford 2

281 So. Calif. Ed.

Redondo 7&B 81 WPPSS WNPS 1

381 WPPSS WNPS 3

380 WPPSS WNPS 4

381 CATEGORY C WPPSS WNPS 5

380 UTILITY STATION UNIT Almaraz Almaraz 1

0281 Almaraz Almaraz 2

0281 Commonwealth Ed.

Ridge!and 162 Commonwealth Ed.

Crawford 8

Assoc. Asco Asco 1

0281 Assoc. Asco Asco 2

0281 Detroit Ed.

Conners Creek 15&16 Detroit Ed.

River Rouge 2

Assoc. Vandellos Vandellos 2

0281 Detroit Ed.

St. Clair 6

Cent. El DeFurnas Angra 1

280 Duke Power River Bend I

lberduero Lemoniz 1

0281 Duquesne Lt.

Reed 1&2 lberduero Lemoniz 2

0281 lberduero Sayaga 1

0281 Los Angeles DWP Harbor 182 Phillipines Bagac 1

281 OVEC Kyger Creek 2.3, 465 Puerto Rico WRA Narco 1

280 P.S. cf No. Illinois Will County 1

Taiwan Power Chin Shan 1

80 Philadelphia Elec. Co.

Richmond 12 Taiwan Power Chin Shan 2

80 Ph:ladelphia Elec. Co.

Chester 1

Taiwan Power Kuosheng 1

381 Philadelphia Elec. Co.

Southwark 1&2 Taiwan Power Kuosheng 2

381 Union Elec.

Meramec 4

Yugoslavia KRSKO 1

0281 q*en.e ee+m-9

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r CRACKING EXPERIENCE MAX.

OPERATION NO.

MAX. CRACK FOUND CRACK PERMITTED CRACKS LP

/ DISC DEPTH WITH CRACKS UNIT FOUND STAGY N0.

(IN.)

YES/N0 COMMENTS POINT BEACH 1 1

1/2 0.250 YES RETURNED TO POWER WITH CRACK 1

PALISADES 1 4

2/2 0.236 YES 0.236 CRACK FOUND IN 2/.2, WILL RETURN TO POWER WITH CRACKS INDIAN'PT. 3 8

1/3 0.378 YES KEYWAY ENLARGED ON BOTH ENDS OF 1/2 TO REMOVE CRACKS.

1/3. DISC REMOVED ON BOTH ENDS.

RETURNED TO POWER WITH CRACKS REMAINING IN 2/2 AND 3/2 INDIAN PT. 2 2

3/3 0.580 NO RETURNED.TO.. POWER WITH

' DISC 3/3 REMOVED ZION 1 3

3/1 1.22 YES RETURNED TO POWER WITH 0.120 CRACK IN 2/2. 3/1 l

REMOVED SURRY 2 2

1/2 0.360 DECISION STEAM GENERATOR MAINTEN-l PENDING ANCE CURRENTLY BEING PERFORMED e

CRACKING EXPERIENCE (CONTINUED)

MAX.

OPERATION N0.

MAX. CRACK FOUND CRACK PERMITTED CRACKS LP AISC DEPTH WITH CRACKS UNIT FOUND STAGY NO.

(IN.)

YES/N0 COMMENTS BEAVER VALLEY l 2

2/2 0.520 DECISION 0.520 INCH CRACK FOllND PENDING IN THE BORE OF 2/2 AFTER DISC WAS REMOVED PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 1

2/3 SMALL YES RETURNED TO POWER INDICATION ARKANSAS 1 NUMEROUS 2/1 UNKNOWN NO RETURNED TO POWER WITH 2/1 BOTH ENDS REMOVED PRAIRIE ISLAND 2*

M A I N E.YAN KE E *

• i TURKEY PT.

3***

CURRENTLY BEING INSPECTED PLANTS INSPECTED WITH NO CRACKS FOUND RETURNED TO POWER WITH REFURBISH ROTORS IN LPl & LP2 I

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