ML19296C798

Forwards Input to Item 3.2.5,backflow Protection & Item 3.2.11,control Air of Facility Fire Protection Review

ML19296C798
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	02/21/1980
From:	Randy Hall BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY
To:	Ferguson R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8002280528
Download: ML19296C798 (3)

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3144 F eo ru a ry 21, 1980 Mr. Robert L. Ferguson P . ant Systems B ranch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccamission Washi ngton , D .C. 20555 RE: Cal vert Cliffs, Fire Protection Review, Items 3.2.5 ar.d 3.2.11.

Dear Scb:

Enclosed is the Brookhaven National Laboratory input to itcas 3.2.5, Backflow Protection, and 3.2.11, Control Air.

Respectfully yours,

'n' //

/

Robert E. Hall, Group Leader Reactor Engineering Analysis REH:EAM:sd enclosure cc.: R. Cerborie wo/ enc.

W. Kato T. Lee E. MacDougall V. Panciera wo/ enc.

. 8002280 62%

CALVERT CLIFFS Fire Protection Review 3.2.5 - Backflow Protection The SER states that the licensee will provide the results of an analysis, including drawings or sketches of the drain systans as necessary, to demon-strate tnat the design cf existing drain systems can prevent the backflow of combustible liquids to other safety-related areas, or to provide additional uodifications to prevent such pcssibilities.

The licensee responded on November 13, 1979 and stated that drains in safety related areas of the auxiliary building are connected to a coamon drainage system which empties into the miscellaneous waste receiver tank. The drain system consists of stainless steel ficor drain fittings and connecting piping embedded in the floor concrete. Four inch lines are used as connecting head-ers far these drains in the upper elevations. The headers are tied to a six inch gravity drain which leads to the receiver tank at Elevation -10'-0". The piping fran any given floor drain is enbedded at least 12" belcw the floor.

Spillage on Elevation -10'0" and -15'-0" is drained to individual roon sumps and then pumped to the waste receiver tank. Check val ves prevent back flow to other roans. At Elevation 5'-0" and above, spillage of conbustible liquids in any given room will drain by gravity to the receiver tank. Connecting piping is sufficiently below the floor level to preclude transfer of conbustibles to other safety related rooms.

The new fire hazard analysis submitted December 21, 1979 notes the drainage problem in the charging pump roons 105 and 115, but provides no further infor-mation. The new fire hazard analysis does not address the problen of backflow protection in the ECCS roons 101,102,118, and 119; the diesel g'nerator

.70ms 421 and 422 or in the area of hydrogen liquid waste.

Since no drainage prints were received by BNL, several of the statements made by the licensee are not clear. The ECCS roans and charging pump roans provide an acceptable drainage system if each of the 6 rooms involved has a separate check valve to prevent backflow to other roons. We reconmend that this part of item 3.2.5 be accepted by the staff subject to a review of drainage prints for these roans. If there is a conmon drainage connection between any of these roans and any other safety related area we recanmnd that separate check valves be installed in each such drainage line.

For those areas with a floor elevation 5'0" and above such as the diesel generator rooms 421 nd 422, ve recanmend that the staff request the licensee to quantify the stateient that the " connecting piping is sufficiently below the floor level to prelude transfer of combustibles to other safety related roans." If the license can demonstrate this statenent numerically and with prints or sketches we re anmend that this part of iten 3.2.5 be accepted.

3.2.11 - Centrol Ai r The SER states that the less of control air to the salt water systa, valves causes ne sarvice water heat excnanger ano tne com.conent cooling water neat excnanger inlet anc cutlet valves to fail egen. The licensee will provide the results of his stucy to verify that possible over-cooling of service sater and/or canponent cooli ng water .vil1 not have adverse ef fects on the plant safety.

The licensee in his letter of : lover:cer 13, 1979 stated that loss of control air to the salt water systen val ses causes the scr/ ice water heat excnanger and component cooling ater heat ex c.n a n ger i nlet and cutlet val ves to f ail open with a resultant decrease in ser/ ice water and canponent cooling aater temperatures. This f ailure code is consistent aith the pcsitions to alich the valves would automatically be positioned in the event of an Engineering Safaty Features Actuation. Therefore, all equipments serviced by component cooling or service water are designed to accept this reduced teaperature water with no adverse impact on plant safety. This includes the diesel generators ..tlich utilize service water to cool integral jacket cooling, air coolir n, and lube oil cooling heat exchangers. Overcooling of these syste:r.s is pre zented by thermostatically actuated valves 4ich bypass service water around the heat exchangers to maintain jacket cooling water 170-185 F, scavenging air 100-115 F, and lube oil 190-205 F. We find that this answer is satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted by the staf f.