ML19296C639
| ML19296C639 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000036 |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1979 |
| From: | Eskridge H ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY |
| To: | Stevenson R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19296C642 | List: |
| References | |
| 14352, NUDOCS 8002270012 | |
| Download: ML19296C639 (3) | |
Text
,
u C-E Power Systems
' al. 314/937-4691 l
Combustion Engineenng, Inc.
314/296 564o Route 21 A I
Hematite. Missouri 63047 7.
NIS/79/652 9
- POWER DOCWD
. "15 SYSTEMS
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-D OCT 1 1 1979 s i
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MAIL SECTION DCCKET CLERK N'/
October 3,1979
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Mr. Robert L. Stevenson Uranium Process Licensing Section Uranium Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 20555 Docket 70-36
Dear Mr. Stevenson:
Enclosed is additional information, as requested by your letter dated September 14, 1979, concerning safety of the operation of a new waste incinerator in area 240-3 of the Hematite plant.
Also enclosed is a revised page 2-10 and a new page 2-25 to the SNM-33 License application, indicating that the Radiation Specialist - Windsor may substitute for the Windsor Nuclear Laboratory Radiological Safety Officer on semi-annual inspections.
Very truly yours,
COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.
r W
H. E. Eskridge Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing,
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EECElyED Safety and Accountability C-G[
OCT 91979 3 $
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Response to Questions on Application Dated August 22, 1979, Combustion Engineering, Inc.,
Docket 70-36 i
t question 1.
The mass tini.t for ute incinentor alic:es for possible double batching af a homogeneous system of mode,tated oxide, but does not exptain how Bte uncertainty af ate charge measurenents xLLL be considered.
Please explain how Bte cha1ge uncertainty is l
attowed for in 6te operating cont <:cis, including ute uncertaistty in ble uranium enrichment.
Response
All charges will be gama counted for U-235 content prior to introduction into the incinerator. The passive gamma counting system measures the U-235 directly, and has an upper detection limit of 100 grams U-235. Thus, a single incinerator charge will not exceed 100 grams U-235. The gamma counter is included in the Measurements Control Program, involving frequent calibration measurements of standards which must count within control limits set at the 0.05 level of significance.
The typical incinerator charge will contain about 10 kilograms of combustible waste and only a few grams of U-235. The small size of the incinerator will make it necessary to vacuum out the ash long before the safe mass limit is reached. Operating procedures will require removal of the ash when it reaches a depth of 3 to 4 inches (less than a safe slab configuration).
No significant ash accumulation was observed in the secondary combustion chamber after test runs with non-contaminated charges. Operating procedures, howevar, will require inspection of the secondary chamber each time the ash is removed from the primary chamber. The probability of moderation by water flooding is essentially zero.
The above considerations, including basing the mass limit on the highest licensed enrichment, negate the effect of any charge measurement or enrichment uncertainty.
Question 2: Please justify 6te annu.alinspection frecuency of die auxiliary equipment in te<1ms of possible ha ardous fissile material necumulations in ute equipment during dtat intzrvat.
Response
Heat Exchanger - Flue gas passes through 12 two-inch diameter tubes having a carbined cross-sectional area which is about 50%
of a safe-diameter cross-sectional area. Significant plugging would cause an increase in pressure in the incinerator exhaust stack. The gas distribution plenum will be inspected each time a safe mass input is reached.
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Question 2.
(CoMinued)
Response
Ejector-venturi scrubber - This scrubber and its recycle tank are less than or equal to a safe diameter for 4.1% enrichment (9-3/4 inches). The separator box will be inspected each time a safe mass input is reached. An inspection port is available for this inspection.
Packed tower scrubber - This scrubber is very similar to the scrubber used with the furnaces in area 240-2. Thus, the same control procedures will be used. The scrubber liquor will be sampled weekly and analy::ed for uranium concentration. The scrubber will be drained and f7ushed if the uranium concentration exceeds 1 gram per liter.
Question 3.
Please describe de ma.in stadiation safety conttols dat taill be used 2.0 ensuste de safety af de incine,tato.1 operation, e.g.,
differential pressu.te insbtuments or alarms.
Response
Pressure indicators are located before and after each stage of the system (see PI l-7 on engineering flow diagram).
Operating procedures will require frequent checks of these indicators to assure that the entire system remains under negative pressure.
Routine air samp. ling will be conducted with both fixed and lapel s amplers.
Question 4.
Please confi.tm hat de gas fLting system sciLL be p.tovidsd sein de st.andard fLte safety conttols (e.g., aatomatic cu.t-of f in de event de ffame goes cat).
Response
Both burners are provided with thermocouple controlled valves which close in the event the flame goes out. The valves will not open if the pilot light is out. Gas supply is cut off by HCV-2 if there is an electric power failure.