ML19296B546
| ML19296B546 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07002623 |
| Issue date: | 02/08/1980 |
| From: | Lantz E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19296B538 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002210032 | |
| Download: ML19296B546 (7) | |
Text
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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DUKE POWER COMPAllY (Amendment to Material License SNM-1773 for Oconee Nuclear Station
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Docket No. 70-2623 Spent Fuel Transportation and
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Storage at McGuire Nuclear Station *,
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AFFIDAVIT OF EDWARD LANTZ I, Edward Lantz, being duly sworn, to depose and state:
1.
I am employed by the Dividion of Operating Reactors, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
2.
My professional qualifications were briefly described at Tr. 4434-35. A more complete description of my professional qualifications is attached to this affidavit.
3.
This affidavit addresses questions (Tr. 4027;4432-47) concerning whether fuel stored in the McGuire Unit 1 spent fuel pool would remain subcritical if a 25-ton truck cask fell onto spent '.
stored in the McGuire Unit 1 pool while being transferred to the McGuire cast nioading pit.
4.
My attached analysis shows that the spent fuel in the McGuire spent fuel pool will remain subcritical for the postulated situation of a 25-ton spent fuel cask falling into the McGuire Unit 1 spent fuel pool containing Oconee spent fuel, McGuire spent fuel, and McGuire fresh fuel, if at least 2000 ppm of
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. boron concentration is maintained in the spent fuel pool water during the spent fuel cask transfer operation.
My analysis was based on an enrichment value of 3.1 percent uranium - 235 by weight.
5.
The attached analysis of the postulated 25-ton spent fuel cask drop into the McGuire Unit 1 spent fuel pool is adopted as part of my affidavit and is attached as Appendix A.
I hereby certify that the above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
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','d,, A!./s Edward Lantz/ -
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this s'~l.iday of February,1930.
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Notary Public My Commission expires: July 1,1982.
APPENDIX A SUPPLEMENTAL CRITICALITY ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF SPENT FUEL FROM OCONEE TO MCGUIRE I.
INTRODUCTION This testimony is on the likelihood of attaining criticality in the fissile fuel in the Oconee or McGuire Unit 1 spent fuel pools during or after a postulated accident involving the 25-ton truck cask, which is to be used for the proposed transfer of 300 spent fuel assemblies from the Oconee Nuclear Station to the McGuire Unit 1 spent fuel pool.
NRC analyses have shown that in the McGuire fuel storace pool the fuel that has the greatest potential for attaining a critical condition is new, unirradiated fuel.
Fuel assemblies that have produced power for the full three-year cycle no longer have the potential for creating a criticality.
II. OPERATIONS AT McGUIRE The racks for the fuel assemblies in the McGuire Unit 1 pool are made up of open, square cross-section containers with an inside dimension of about nine inches. These containers are fabricated from one-quarter inch thick angles of stainless steel which are 2.5 inches wide. There is one of these open containers for each of the 500 fuel assemblies that can be stored in the pool.
Page 9.1-7 (Revision 6) of the McGuire FSAR states that the lower limit of the boron concentration in the fuel pool water is 2000 ppm.
None of the 300 Oconee spent fuel assemblies that the Duke Power Company is proposing to send to McGuire will be new fuel assemblies.
- Thus, if n
- there is new fuel in the McGuire pool at the time this shipping cask is being handled near the pool, it will be McGuire fuel.
If, out of the present storage capacity of 500 assemblies, space is reserved for 300 spent fuel assemblies from Oconee, there would still be room for a full-core complement of 193 McGuire Unit 1 new fuel assemblies.
Since the Duke Power Company is expecting to have McGuire Unit i ready for operation sometime in 1980, there could be some new or relatively new McGuire fuel assemblies from the first core in the pool when the 25-ton cask used to transport Oconee spent fuel is being handled near the McGuire pool.
The characteristics of these new fuel assemblies are given in the McGuire FSAR.
Table 4.1-1 shows that the maximum enrichment of uranium-235 in this first core will be 3.1 weight percent.1/ This will be for one-third of the core, i.e., the 65 fuel assemblies of Region 3.
,verage enrichment for the whole core will be 2.6 weight percent
- ium-235.
Table 4.3.2-1 of the FSAR states that in this first core there will be 1518 burnable poison rods which will decrease the core reactivity about 5.5 percent when it is in the cold condition. Table 4.3.2-2 of the FSAR states that the neutron multiplication factor in this core will be 0.99 with the control rods removed if there is 1435 ppm boron in the water.
1/ Duke Power Company's FSAR shows a maximum enrichment of uranium-235 of 3.1 percent by weight, although a maximum enrichment to 3.5 percent uranium-235 by weight is allowable.
. After any compaction accident, the structural stainless steel angle material will continue to be present between fuel assemblies. The neutron multiplication factor in the McGuire spent fuel pool will be <0.99 during any cask handling accident if the minimum concentration of boron dissolved in the spent fuel pool water is 2000 ppm.
If it is further postulated that during this accident the stainless steel liner gets torn and the resulting leakage necessitates that make-up water be supplied, borated make-up water can be supplied to the fuel pool from the refueling water storage tank, as stated on page 9.1-7 of the FSAR.
Credit can be taken for the burnable poison that is in the fuel assemblies.
This will be about 5.5 percent in reactivity in the McGuire pool for the maximum uranium-235 enrichment of 3.1 percent by weight of fresh McGuire fuel now in the pool. The burnable poison would have to be increased to meet the technical specifications for reactor operation, if sometime in the future the uranium-235 enrichment were to be increased to the maximum allowable of 3.5% by weight.
Realistic initial conditions may be assumed when analyzing postulated accidents in a spent fuel pool. Thus, uranium-235 enrichment bj weight of 3.1 percent may be used for the cask drop analysis since the maximum enrichment to be used, as stated in the FSAR will be 3.1 percent by weight.
_4-III. CONCLUSION The maximum neutron multiplication factor (keff) in the McGuire pool with The the refueling concent.itions present will be approximately 0.97.
maximum keff will be less than 0.99, if approximately 2 percent is used as an uncertainty factor. From the above considerations, I conclude that it is highly unlikely that any cask handling accident at the McGuire spent fuel pool during the proposed shipment of 300 spent fuel assemblies-would result in a criticality.
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- s EDWARD LANTZ DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTORS U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS As an Engineering Systems Analyst in the Plant Systems Branch I am responsible 'or technical reviews and evaluations of component and system designs and operating characteristics of licensed nuclear power reactors.
I have a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering Physics from the Case Irstitute of Technology and a Masters of Science degree in Physics from Union College and a total of 28 years of professional experience, with over 20 years in the nuclear field.
My experience includes work on reactor transients and safeguards analysis, nuclear reactor analysis and design, research and development on nuclear reactor and reactor control concepts and investigations of their operational and safety aspects.
I have held my present position with the Commission since December 1975.
My previous position, which I held for about two and one half years, was Project Manager in the Gas Cooled Reactors Branch, Division of Reactor Licensing, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, where I was responsible for the technical review, analysis, and evaluation of the nuclear safety aspects of applications for construction and operation of nuclear power plants.
For about ten years prior to that I was Head of the Nuclear Reactor Section in NASA.
My section was responsible for the development and verification of nuclear reactor analysis computer programs, conceptual design engineering, and development engineering contracting.
Prior to my employment with NASA, I was a nuclear engineer at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory for about six years, where I worked on the safeguards and nuclear design of the S3G reactors and the initial development of the nuclear design of the 55G reactors. Previous experience includes system engineering and electrical engineering with the General Electric Company and electronic development engineering with the Victoreen Instrument Company.
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