ML19295C024
| ML19295C024 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Quad Cities, Zion  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1978 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Brian Lee COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8010150727 | |
| Download: ML19295C024 (1) | |
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Cf/i~iPL F" JUN 12 '978 0-10, 50 '37, 50-249 2
Docket Nos.
50-254, 50-2 295, and 50-304 Commonwealt.h Edison Conpany ATTN: Mr. Byron Lee, Jr.
Vice President Post Office Box 767 Chicar,o, IL 60690 Centlemen:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 78-08 which requires action by you with regard to your power, test or research reactor facilities with an operating license.
Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin o-the actions required of you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, James G. Keppler
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Director
Enclosures:
1.
List of IE Bulletins Issued in 1978 cc w/encls:
Mr. B. B. Stephenson, Station Superintendent Mr. N. Kalivianakis, Station Superintendent Mr. N. Wandke, Station Superintendent
& Central Files Director,NRR/DPH Director, NRR/ DOR PDR
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- U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978-253 818
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4 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION III June 12, 1978 IE Bulletin No. 78-08 EADIATION LEVELS FROM FUEL ELEMENT TRANSFER TUBES Description of. Circumstances:
On April 5, 1978, two radiation protection technicians at Portland General Electric Company's Trojan Nuclear Power Plant received whole body radiation doses of 27.3 and 17.1 rem while performing a ' survey adjacent to an exposed section of ther fuel element transferE ube e t
during the. plant's first refueling outage. The exposures occurred in a shielded space inside the containment building which housed one of two fuel element transfer tube seismic relief bellows.: ' The: ^s~econd bellows: outside of: containment. had: been~ provided with removable shielding and appropriate access controls. The bellows space inside containment was constructed with labyrinth ~-type shielding, however,
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access to the space was not controlled. The technicians were per-forming surveys in an attempt to identify a reported possible source of higher than expected radiation and had scheduled the survey to coincide with the passage of a fuel element through the fuel element transfer tube. The technicians believid that'th'e fuel element transfer tube was buried in the concrete beyond the compartment they occupied ~
and assumed that the structure passing through the co=partment was a ventilation' duct.
The licensee staf f had performed surveys of all areas of the plant during the outage in an attempt to identify intermittent sources o' radiation resulting from refueling activities; however, nothing significant.was identified because of the transient nature of the resulting radiation fields. Subsequent to the exposures, the licensee performed surveys in numerous areas surrounding the general area of the fue;
- ransfer. tube with an irradiated fuel element stopped in the transfer cube. The surveys. identified a number of areas previously unidentified where significant radiation streaming was present. The principal paths of radiation streaming were the narrow seismic relief spaces.between the containment and internal and external structures..
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xs IE Bulletin No. 78-08 June 12, 1978 Action To Be Taken By Licensee,s:
While the exposures above occurred at a pressurized water reactor, similar situations could occur at any reactor facility designed to transfer spent fuel between the reactor refueling canal and a spent fuel storage pool outside of containment by means of a fuel element transfer tube. Accordingly, holders of power, test and research reactor operating license.s where plant design incorporat,es.a fu.el.
ele =ent transfer tube, are to take the following actions.:,,
1 Perform a thorough review of shie'1 ding design of plant _ar as,
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adjacent to the-fuel transfer tube to identify potenti.al h.igh.
n radiation areas, both continuous and transient, as.def.!ned.in 10 CFR 20.202(b).
2 ~. -
Assure that positive control of access exists or is. included in the facility design for entryways'into potential high; radiation areas where a portion'of a fuel transfer tube is accessible.in
'~ an unshielded condition..
3.-
-Assure that points of access to potential high radiation-areas.
- -associated with accessible unshielded portions of a fuel:transfe'r tube are conspicuously posted in accordance with -10 CFR-20.203(c).
4.
If the action from Paragraph I above identifies the potential for radiation streaming from shielded spaces, plan and conduct special radiation surveys during the next refueling to identify and control such areas. It is not necessary to survey in areas where the transfer tube is exposed, but if it is found desirable, extreme care should be exercised to. control and limit-personnel +
exposure. Care should also be taken in planning surveys and fuel
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moveme,nts such that survey requf ements do not. override any.- -
technical limitati_on's on fuel mcvement.
5.
Confirm by written reply to the NRC Reg' ion'a'l Office within 60 days
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that the actions for Items 1-4 above have been or are being taken.
A record, detailing findings, actions taken, and actions to be t'aken, should be retained for review by NRC during subsequent radiological safety inspection.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
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IE Bulletin No. 78-08 June 12, 1978 LISTING OF BULLETINS ISSUED IN 1978 Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
78-01 Flammable Contact -
1/16/78 All Power. Reactor Arm Retainers in G.E.
Faciliti.es.with an CR120A Relays OL or CP 78-02 Terminal Block 1/30/78 AllPowe7 Reactor Qualification Facilities with an OL or CP 78-03 Potential Explosive 2/8/78 All BWR Power Gas Mixture Accumula-Reactor Facilities tions Associated with with an OL or CP BWR Offgas System Operations e a 78-04 Environmental Quali-2/21/78 All Power. Reactor fication of Certain Facilities _vith an Stem Mounted Limit OL or CP Switches Inside Reactor Containment 78-05 Malfunctioning of 4/14/78 All Power ~ Reactor Circuit Breaker Facilities with an Auxiliary Contact OL or CP Mechanism-General Model CR105X 78-06 ' 7+
Defective Cutler-Hac=er S/31/78 All Power Reactor Facilities with an
'" = Ha=mer, Type M Relays OL or C?
4.
with DC Coils
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78 - Proteet'i6n ~af forde'd ca-6/12/78 All Power Reactor by Air-Line Respirators Facilities with en and Supplied-Air Hoods OL, all clasa E and F Research Reactors with an OL, all Fuel Cycle Facilities.with an OL, and all Priority 1 Material Licensees Enclosure Page 1 of 1