ML19294C147
| ML19294C147 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/29/1980 |
| From: | Smith I Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | Sholly S AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUP REPRESENTING YORK |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003070183 | |
| Download: ML19294C147 (41) | |
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4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ff COCKITED NUCLEAR REGULA'IORY COMMISSION ussp.0 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD F FEB 2 9 EO>
CICod D D MI Ivan W. Smith, Chairman ggfjeg & Emi3 3
Dr. Walter H. Jordan 6
Ear 3qgEIR FEB 2 9 EGC Dr. Linda W.
Little se c
W In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-289 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
(Restart)
)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
FOURTH SPECIAL PREHEARING CONFERENCE ORDER (February 29, 1980)
In this order the board rules on late filed contentions, matters considered at the prehearing conference sessions of February 13, and 21,.1980 and on miscellaneous pending motions.
Late Emergency Planning Contentions During the special prehearing conference the board es-tablished December 19, 1979 as the last date by which inter-venors may file contentions addressing the licensee's revised emergency plans.
Tr. 864.
This date was twice again referred to in the board's First Special Prehearing Conference Order.
1/
pp. 18, 50.
Three intervenors, Mrs. Aamodt, Newberry Intervenors-and ECNP filed revised emergency planning contentions af ter December 19 without leave ai the board.
One intervenor, CEA, filed no revisions to its original emergency planning contentions.
In order to permit the parties to proceed timely with discovery where appropriate, the board issued an Interim Order on Late 1/
Newberry Intervenors also filed timely revised emergency planning contentions.
h 8003070 IN5
, Filed Emergency Planning Contentions on February 15, 1980 admitting some late emergency planning contentions and rejecting others.
The board also dismissed CEA's emergency planning contentions.
We now explain the reasons for these actions.
In general, the bestd has considered the late emergency
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planning contentions on their merits without regard to the f act that, as we rule below, they were, filed without a showing of good cause for late filing.
The licensee's revised plan was served early enough for the intervenors to file timely their revised contentions, and in fact several did so.
The late-filing intervenors correctly point out that the revised plans were cumbersome to handle, new material was not clearly marked, and careful attention was required to understand the system used by licensee.
Even so, we believe that the burden upon the parties was not so great as to relieve them of their responsi-bilities to promptly and diligmatly pursue the emergency issues they seek to litigate.
We have, however, considered these factors in mitigation of the lateness of the filings because, despite their delinquency, their participation may make a contribution to the record.
The issue of emergency planning is a mandatory one and it is very important.
The intervenors with expertise in local conditions have the special capability in
' the forthcoming hearing to test the adequacy of the licensee's Emergency Plan.
In considering the late contentions on their merits and in accepting some, the board is acting within its discretion in order to develop a sound record.
As we explain below, the late intervenors failed to establish their right to litigate their late contentions.
Mrs. Aamodt did not file her revised emergency planning contentions "rti,1 January 15, and it was not until February 2 that she explained their relevance to the licensee's revisions to its Emergency Plan.
Mrs. Aamodt seeks to justify her late filing on the basis that she did not know about the filing date ; she had a severe cold; she was busy with farm, family, a new business and Christmas activities ; and that Mr. Aamodt, not she, repre-sented the family at the conference when the December 19 deadline 2/
was set.- Motion dated January 15, 1980; Response dated both January 31, and February 2, 1980.
The board has discussed with the Aamodt family why this approach to intervention is inadequate
-2/
At the special prehearing conference Mr. Aamodt expressly acknowledged the need to address the udequacy of licensee's Emergency Plan after the revisions to the plan issued.
Tr. 450-51.
s
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and there is no need to belabor the point.
E. g. Tr. 1742-54.
We trust that the experience has been instruc tive.
Mrs. Aamodt 's Contentions 3 through 6 are her emergency planning contentions.
Contention 3 is a general contention alleging that licensee's plans do not call for monitoring and quantifying radioactive substances, and do not define danger to health and safety as a function of distance, direction and
. time.
Contention 3 was impermissably vague and nonspecific when originally filed and it remains so.
It was not modified to address licensee's revised plans.
In Mrs. Aamodt's response of February 2, she simply requests an opportunity to discover on the contentions but does not specify how the licensee's revised plan fails to alleviate her concerns.
Contention 3 is rejected.
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One point not discussed may be of general interest to in-experienced intervenors.
In our Third Special Prehearing Conference Order, January 25, 1980, the board (at pp. 20 &
- 21) chided the licensee for responding to responses to responses to contentions.
Apparently taking our admonition to heart, licensee has not responded to Mrs. Aamodt's response to licensee's response to her late filed emergency planning contentions.
Yet, as we note, it wasn't until Mrs. Aamodt's response of February 2, that she provided any arguable basis for her late contentions.
Thus the licensee has been effectively denied its rightful opportunity to argue its position on the late contentions.
This isn't fair, of course.
The board's discretion in accepting the reasoning in Mrs. Aamodt's response has been greatly strained.
The board urges intervenors to support any future late contentions thoroughly at the time filed.
There may be no opportunity for n second round of argument.
% Mrs. Aamodt's Contention 4 alleges that licensee has not made provisions for the timely dissemination of information in the event of accidental releases of airborne radioactivity.
It was revised by her filing of January 15 to require:
All data and plant operating personnel observa-tions relative to all radioactive releases must be transmitted immediately and simultaneously to the N RC, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, the commissioners of Dauphin, York and Lancaster Counties and the licensee's management.
It is further contended that licensee must pro-vide this capability before restart of TMI-1.
4/
In responding to Mrs. Aamodt's revision-the licensee argued that the revision did not seem to indicate an awareness of Section 4.7.5.2. and Figures 16, 19, and 20. of licensee's Emergency Plan.
The board too, believed that Mrs. Aamodt had failed to discover provisions of the Emergency Plan which would satisfy the thrust of the contention.
But in Mrs. Aamodt's Response of February 2, (p.2) she explains that, by Contention 4 she means that data concerning "all radioactive releases" must be transmitted; i.e.,
she does not limit the information flow to "during an accident."
With thl-explanation the board accepts Contention 4, Mrs. Aamodt's Contention 5 asserts that evacuation plans do not provide for care and/or relocation of livestock.
She did not revise this contention, but in her Response of
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Licensee's Second Supplemental Response to Emergency Planning Contentions, January 25, 1980.
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% February 2, she explained its basis and demonstrated knowledge of the subject matter.
Since the Aamodt family is the only intervenor known to have expertise in farming, the board is accepting the contention as a matter of discretion to aid in developing a complete record.
Contention 6 is a challenge to the 10-mile plume emergency planning zone (FPZ) of the Commission's policy and proposed rule on emergency planning.
It does not specify any local conditions which would jus tify a departure from the 10-mile EPZ.
The board discussed :his standard at great length in its Third Special Prehearing Conference Order (pp. 1-5) of January 25, 1980.
The balance of the contention relating to monitoring is too vague to be accepted as an issue in the hearing.
Contention 6 is rejected.
Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power (ECNP)
In our Memorandum and Order of January 8, we ruled on requests for extensions of time to file emergency planning contentions, and denied ECNP's request for the reasons stated in that order (pp. 1-4).
We also stated that, if ECNP later elected to file emergency planning contentions, the board would consider them as late filings under the standards of 10 CFR 92.714(a)(1).
ECNP's emergency planning contentions dated January 7, 1980 crossed in the mail with the boa rd's order.
It was not until January 21 that ECNP filed a statement in response to the
% board's ruling that the standards of 92.714(a)(1) would apply.
Not only did ECNP's explanntion of its late filing fail to establish good cause for Jte tardiness, but by its repeated references to a request for a "10-day extension," ECNP demonstrated that it did not understand why the board denied 5/
its request in the first instance.~
However, in addition to the general reasons set forth above for considering late emergency planning contentions on their merits, the board also notes that ECNP's contentions were not filed so late as to delay the proceeding, and neither the licensee nor the staff objected to ECNP's contentions on the basis of lateness.
As we explained in our interim order of February 15 on late emergency planning contentions, only the 38 numbered items on pages 7 through 13 of ECNP's emergency planning contentions are drafted in a form suitable to be considered as contentions.
We renumbered these items as ECNP Contentions 2-1 through 2-38 so that they will be consistent with the numbering scheme of ECNP's other contentions.
In order to permit summary rulings and be-cause of their quantity and length, these contentions have been reproduced and attached to this order.
The Board rules as follows:
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ECNP did not request a ten-day extension of time.
It made a late request for an extension of time until certain (un-acceptable) conditions were met plus ten days thereafter.
It then assumed that the request would be granted.
It is of concern to the board that ECNP still does not understand why the board did not permit it to take unilaterally an open-ended extension of time.
Tr. 1756-1761.
ECNP's representa-tives would be well advised to reread the board's memorandum and order of January 8, 1980.
% ECNP Contention No.:
Ruling 2-1 Rejected for lack of basis.
2-2 Accepted, but ECNP will be required to provide more specificity following discovery.
2-3 Rejected.
It is a generalized attack on licensee's credibility, and is too t e oad to be litigable.
2-4 Accepted but ECNP will be required to provide more specificity following discovery.
2-5 Rejected.
It is a sarcastic reference to licensee's management in a form that cannot be litigated.
Licensee's management capability, of course, is a mandatory issue in the proceeding and will be litigated in other contentions.
2-6 Rejected for inadequate bases and bounds.
This contention faults the emergency plan because ECNP is not satisfied with the accident bases.
The board discussed its reasons for rejecting this form of emergency planning contention in its Third Special Prehearing Conference Order (pp. 5-7) with respect to UCS 's Contention 16.
2-7 Accepted, but limited to ECNP's assertion that licensee's plan for informing the public of possible re-leases is inadequate.
2-8 through 2-10 Accepted.
2-11 Accepted.
Although the board indicated in its interim order on emergency planning contentions that this con-tention was rejected, the board has now reconsidered and accepts the contention.
It relates to emergency monitoring equipme nt going off scale, and it is similar to Newberry's Contention 3(d)(3) which the board has accepted.
% ECNP Contention No.:
Ruling 2-12 Rejected as beyond the scope of the pr oc eeding.
2-13 Accepted.
2-14 Omitted.
2-15 Rejected.
Lacks basis and specificity.
2-16 Rejected.
Lacks f actual t sis.
2-17 Rejected.
Lacks fac tual basis and its relevance to the proceeding is not clear.
2-18 Rejected.
The adequacy and status of TID-14844 is not in issue in this proceeding.
2-19 Rejected as lacking in specificity.
However the adequacy of operator training will be litigated as a mandatory issue in the proceeding.
2-20 Accepted.
No objections.
2-21 Rejected.
No basis.
2-22 Rejected.
No basis, argumentative and without specificity.
2-23 Rejected.
The contention assumes that the Emergency Plan must discuss a range of accident scenarios.
This was disposed of in our ruling on UCS's Contention 16 as we stated with respect to Contention 2-6, supra.
2-24 Rejected.
This contention raises the issue of direct public access to in-formation from licensee which can be trusted to be accurate, candid, honest and timely.
ECNP then, without elaboration, alleges that the "... TMI-2 accident illustrated the vast ability of this suspended licensee to distribute inaccurate, incomplete, misleading, wrong, and out-of-date inf orma tion."
We reject this contention for lack of
. ECNP Contention No.:
Ruling basis and specificity, and because the remedy sought by ECNP is not indicated.
However, the Board itself will expect the evidence on emergency planning to address whether or not the information upon which the Emergency Plan depends will be trusted and whether there is reason-able assurance that the affected public will rely and act upon it.
ECNP and other intervenors with emergency planning contentions may participate in this aspect of the proceeding.
2-25 Rejected.
ECNP challenges the assumptions underlying the Pennsylvania Disaster Plan but does not explain why.
2-26 Accepted without obj ec tion.
2-27 Rejected.
Argumentative and without basis.
2-28 Accepted without objection.
2-29 Rejected.
It refers, inter alia to the cancer latency period of genetic damage to members of the armed forces and is beyond the teope of the pro-ceeding.
2-30 Accepted without objection, but con-solidated with Contention 2-20.
2-31 Rejected.
It raises no litigable issue.
2-32 Rejected.
This contention challenges all assumptions of each and every component of the entire Emergency Plan.
It is lacking in specificity and reasonable bounds.
2-33 Accepted without objaction.
2-34 Rejected.
Dose conversion f actors are beyond the scope of the proceeding.
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. ECNP Contention No.:
Ruling 2-35 R0jected.
It does not raise a litigable issue nor is the relevance of the observation apparent.
2-36 Accepted.
2-37 Rejected.
This is an unlimited and unspecified challenge to the entire Emergency Plan.
2-38 Accepted *,ithout objection.
Newberry Intervenors In the memorandum and order of January 8, the board denied Newberry's request for an extension of time to file late emergency planning contentions based on old material but granted an extension until January 14 to file revised emergency contentions based on new material.
Id. pp. 4-7.
On January 11, Newberry filed 13 additional emergency planning contentions, only two of which (30 and 12) were based upon new information.
As to the la te contentions, Newberry's counsel justifies their lateness on the basis that he believed that counsel for licensee did not object to an (unspecified) extension.
No purpose will be served now to explore the basis for counsel's belief, because, as we noted the board will consider all of Newberry's emergency 6/
planning contentions on their merits.-
This is particularly 6,/
For counsel's guidance, however, it would be unusual in an NRC proceeding for counsel for a licensee to agree to an indefinite extension of time; licensing boards would be reluctant to grant such an extension and ; absent very com-pelling circumstances, this board would not grant such a request ex parte as counsel seems to believe.
. appropriate because the Newberry Intervenors, more than any intervening party in this proceeding, are affected by the adequacy of licensee's Emergency Plan and are in a good positica to develop evidence on local conditions.
In the interim order of February 15, the board renumbered Newberry's late emergency contentions as Nos. 3(d)(1) through (13) to be consistent with Newberry's numbering scheme.
The board accepted Contentions 3(d)(1) through (5), (7), and (9) through (12) and we rejected Contentions 3(d)(6), (8) and (13).
Licensee had no objections to 3(d)(10) & (12) and no objection 7/
to the examples in 3(d)(11).-
Staf f did not object to 3(d)(1),
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(2), (3 ), (5), (7), (11), and (12).-
The licensee made no substantive response to Newberry's
- 1. ate emergency planning contentions.
We need only discuss the i
reasons why the rejec ced contentions were inadequate and why we accepted contentions over the staff's objection.
Contention 3(d)(6) is a statement that the TMI-1 security force is inadequate to deal with emergencies.
It is rejected for lack of specificity.
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Licensee Second Supplemental Response To Emergency Planning Contentions, January 25, 1980.
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Staff response dated January 25, 1980.
. Contrary to the staff's concerns about Contention 3(d)(4),
the board believes that the contention clearly calls for uniform emergency plans.
Contention 3(d)(8) assumes that local firefighters will not be available in emergencies.
It is rejected because the basis for this contention is not sufficient and because Con-tention 3(d)(1), which has been accepted, adequately covers the issue.
Contention 3(d)(9) is accepted.
However the board shares the staff's view that there is inadequate basis for the assertion that local municipalities nre not aware of their responsibilities to develop emergency plans.
Newberry should specify the basis of this statement.
Contention 3(d)(10) is accepted.
The board does not agree with the staff that the purchasing responsibility is not relevant to emergency planning.
Contention 3(d)(13) is a lengthy and generalized discussion of Newberry's concepts of the essential elements of an emergency response plan.
The first portion would require mandatory partici-pation in training programs by local officials and civil defense directors.
Aside from failing to specify a need for mandatory participation, Newberry offers no discussion as to how,under Federal and Commonwealth law, this objective could be accomplished by a private utility.
This portion is rejected on those grounds.
. Another portion of the contention expresses Newberry's dissatisfaction with the fact that the annual training programs do not specify a date.
We see this objection as trivial and irrelevant.
The most important aspect of Contention 3(d)(13) relates to Newberry's concern that the Emergency Plan does not indicate that a practice evacuation of the local population will be attempted.
The board does not understand this aspect of Newberry's Contention 3 (d) (13).
In our Third Prehearing Conference Order the board accepted the same issue as Newberry Contention 3(b) 21.
Id,. p. 11.
The final portion of the contention is a suggestion con-cerning highway marking, and as such is not litigable.
In sum, Contention 3(d)(13) seems to be a summary "wish list" for emergency planning, and doesn't appear to be seriously offered for litigation.
Chesapeake Energy Alliance (CEA)
CEA's contentions 2(a)-(d) and 3 were emergency planning contentions.
The boa rd rejected 2(a) in its First Special Prehearing Conference order.
Contentions 2(b), (c) and (d) were accr pted without objection but consideration of them was de1' erred pending revisions to licensee's Emergency Plan.
9 In our Interim Order of February 15, the board dismissed CEA's contentions 2(b), (c) and (d) for default and other reasons, all of which we now discuss.
The licensee in its Response (February 22) to CEA's Omnibus Motion to the Board points out that our interim order failed to rule on CEA's emergency planning Contention 3.
This is correct.
It was an oversight.
The board had intended to dismiss CEA Contention 3 which contention f ails for the same reasons that 2(b), (c) and (d) failed.
As the board has discussed several times, including above in this order, there was a generally recognized need to re-consider emergency planning contentions in light of the licensee's revised Emergency Plan itich' issued immediately prior
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to the special prehearing conference in November 1979.
The reason for this is obvious.
Emergency planning contentions drafted in September and October 1979 may no longer present litigable issues nor be soundly based in light of the revised Emergency Plan.
CEA's representative was aware of this con-sideration during the debate 2n his emergency planning con-tentions at the special prehearing conference (Tr. 705-11),
and, in the First Special Prehearing Conference Order (p. 47),
the board expressly indicated that it would expect CEA to re-consider its emergency planning contentions in the light of the revised Emergency Plan.
Moreover the board also urged CEA to
. redraf t Contention 2(c) upon " resubmitting this contention."
Ibid.
Ali ot'her intervonors seeking to litigate emergency planning issues have filed revised emergency planning contentions.
CEA did not file revisions to its emergency planning contentions but on February 13, at the prehearing conference, CEA served discovery requests on emergency planning contentions.
This wcs the first indication to the board that CEA intends to pursue these issues.
The licensee and staff, of course, have had no opportunity to address the adequacy of CEA emergency planning contentions as compared with the licensee's revised Emergency Plan.
When questioned about this failure, CEA's representative replied that he was not aware of a need to revise the emergency planning contentions.
Tr. 1730-31.
The board inquired further as to whether CEA's original con-tentions were thought by it to remain valid vis-a-vis licensee's revised Emergency Plan, and we could find no basis to conclude that CEA has given more than scant attention, if any, to the revised plan.
Tr. 1733-40.
Accordingly we concluded that CEA was in default with respect to its Contentions 2(b), (c ), (d) and 3.
Moreover in view of CEA's apparent lack of familiarity with the Emergency Plan we are unable to see how it can make a con-tribution to the record on this issue.
Prior to dismissing the contentions the board reviewed them to determine whether they should nevertheless be made issues in the proceeding to assure a complete record.
Contention 2(b)
. refers to the adequacy of medical facilities in Baltimore.
The importance of this contention was doubtful as originally filed and even morn doubtful in light of the discussion of the availability of medical centers in the Emergency Plan.
Emergency Plan, pp. 5-16.
Contention 2(c) relates to dumping of water into the Susquehanna River at TMI and the economics of the Chesapeake Bay.
It is much too broad for litigation and CEA ignored the board's urging to modify it.
Contention 2(d) relates to con-tingency plans for livestock and is closely related to Mrs. Aamodt's Contention 5 which the board has accepted.
CEA may, if it wishes, assist the Aamodts on this contention if it believes it may be helpful.
Contention 3 is a generalized contention asserting that offsite monitoring is inadequate.
It would have failed for lack of specificity as originally filed, and it is now even more inadequate in that it is obsolete.
Moreover the issue of monitoring is one that the board will pursue on its own.
Other intervenors have diligently pursued the issue.
CEA's Contentions 2(b), (c ), (d) and 3 are dismissed.
. Request for Reconsideration of Aamodt Contention 1 In her filing dated January 15, 1980, Mrs. Aamodt, inter 9/
alia, belatedly ~
sought reconsideration of the denial of her Contention 1 in our December 18, 1979 First Special Prehearing Conference Order, at p. 32.
Mrs. Aamodt's Contention 1 alleges that a program of psychological testing and counseling of operator personnel and management be instituted prior to re-start of TMI-1.
We rejected the contention, with reference to transcript pages 432-39 and 446, as without basis and outside the scope of the proceeding.
To state our reasons in another way, as indicated by the transcript discussion and filings by the parties, there is no basis to support the allegation that psychological problems of personnel contributed to any aspect of the TMI -2 accident.
Accordingly, the contention was ruled outsido the scope of the proceeding in the absence of any nexus to the accident.
This is consistent with our overall discussion of scope in the first special prehearing conference order.
None of Mrs. Aamodt's belatedly presented "new evidence" in support of the contention cures these defects.
9/
Pursuant to the Order itself (at p. 67), objections to the
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special prehearing conference order by parties other than the staff were cue within ten days of its date of service (which would permit an additional five days for service by mail pursuant to 10 CFR 62.710).
. Reconsideration of Aamodt Contention 11.1 In our December 18, 1979 First Special Prehearing Conference Order (at p. 33), we stated that Aamodt Contention 11.1 is essentially an argument that there must be a cost / benefit balancing and an environmental impac t statement.
Accordingly, we deferred ruling as we had on other contentions nalling for an EIS.
Our attention has now again been drawn to this con-tention by Mrs. Aamodt's filing of February 2, 1980.
In that filing, Mrs. Aamodt points out that licensee (at pp. 21-22 of Appendix B to Section 4 of its restart report) presents informa-tion on comparative electricity costs from different energy sources which she considers biased.
Accordingly, Mrs. Aamodt concludes that having introduced the subject itself, licensee should not object to the admission of Aamodt Contention 11.1.
Contention 11.1 reads as follows:
It is implicit in the enabling legislation which provides that a utility may function as a monopoly, under suitable regulatory constraint and in the public interest, that the utility must make its best effort to provide service at the lowest reason-able cost.
Since electricity derived from nuclear sources is, and always has been, more costly than electricity derived from other available sources, the licensee has violated the conditions under which it is required to operate and should not be allowed to resume its posture of violation.
Upon reexamination, we conclude that our original perception of the contention was erroneous.
The contention does not call for an EIS or a NEPA cost / benefit balancing.
Rather, it alleges that the licensee is violating its public utility charter because
. its proposed use of nuclear plants violates its responsibility to provide electricity at the lowest reasonable cost.
This issue is a matter for the appropriate authorities charged with matters related to the regulation of rates and other economic aspects of electric utilities such as the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.
These concerns are not cognizable under the Atomic Energy Act or NEPA.
Accordingly, we reconsider and 10/
now rejec t Aamodt Contention 11.1.---
Miscellaneous Motions and Scheduling Matters At the session of the prehearing conference held on February 13 and 21, 1980 the board considered the following matters:
Intervenors were relieved of the responsibility to serve other intervenors directly with copies of discovery requests and responses to discovery requests.
It was agreed by all parties that service of these filings upon intervenors by the Secretary would be adequate.
Tr. 1518-22.
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At this stage, we share with Mrs. Aamodt a lack of under-standing of licensee's purpose in presenting its view of comparative costs of generating electricity as part of general public information in the Emergency Plan.
Subject to being persuaded differently in the context of particular rulings, we perceive no relevance to this proceeding at this time.
In the meantime, we do not intend to allow any party to litigate the subject of Mrs. Aamod.'s Contention 11.1 as discussed above.
. The NRC staff agreed to respond to discovery requests as soon as the information needed to respond is available except where objections are made.
This agreement was made in con-sideration of UCS's Motion to Compel but it applies to the discovery requests of all parties.
The agreement becomes the board's order.
Tr. 1617, 1621, 1626, 1627, 1629, 1637.
The staff does not intend to require the parties to follow the pro-cedure of first applying to the board as required by 10 CFR 92.720 (h) (2) (ii).
Tr. 1624-26.
Although the staff believes it cannot waive the "necessary to a proper decision in the proceeding" standard of 92.720 (h) (2) (ii ), it does not intend to insist on that standard.
Tr. 1716-17.
The board denied UCS's motion of February 8, 1980 to reconsider its refusal to certify the question of the admissibility of UCS Contentions 16 and 20 to the Commission.
The board had taken into account the information in SECY 79-594 when it first refused to accept these contentions and when it first declined to certify the issues.
Tr. 1681-84.
The staff agreed to try again to satisfy the board's request that it be informed as to the possible relevance of so-called " Class 9" accidents to this proceeding.
A new report will be filed by March 7, 1980.
This becomes the board's order.
Tr. 1713-14.
TMIA withdrew its motion to adopt Sholly Contention 16 and accepted the. board b recommendation that counsel for TMIA work with Mr. Sholly in pursuing this contention.
Tr. 1720-27.
. The board adopted a revised schedule for initial discovery requests and responses.
This schedule was set forth in our Memorandum of Revised Discove ry Schedule dated February 20, 1980.
We invited recommendations to be served by February 19, 1980 from the parties for a schedule for follow-on discovery.
Tr. 1679.
At the session of the prehearing conference (held without objection of any party) in Bethesda, Maryland on February 21, UCS and the staff settled their remaining differences in UCS's Motion to Compel.
Counsel for UCS, as the prevailing party, will,by April 1, 1980, prepare an order approved by the staff for the board to issue covering this agreement.
Tr. 1764-99.
The board denied CEA's Motion to Permit Oral Argument at the session of Feoruary 21, because it was inconsistent with the board 's commitment to the other parties that only the UCS Motion to Compel would be considered at the session.
Tr. 1764-67.
Follow-on and SER Discovery Schedule and Conditions Recommendations for a follow-on discovery schedule were submitted by licensee, TMIA, and Mr. Sholly.
Each recommenda-tion anticipates a single round of follow-on discovery.
Licensee and TMIA urge standards for follow-on discovery, and Mr. Sholly's recommendation takes the prehearing schedule beyond the discovery period.
. There is not much difference in the three schedules.
We believe that the licenseeb is slightly more practical and we adopt much of it with some paraphrasing and modification:
1.
One round of follow-on discovery is authorized which may take any form including interrogatories, document requests or depositions.
In the case of any discovery responses filed on or before February 25 which occasion the need for follow-on discovery, follow-on requests are due by March 14.
Thereafter, requests should be served not later than ten days from the date of service of a discovery response which occasions the need for follow-on discovery.
2.
Follow-on discovery shall be confined to the need for further discovery based on a given response, shall be clearly tied (by express reference) to such response, and shall not be an opportunity to discover in areas oi on subjects which could have been covered in initial discovery requests.
3.
Responses to follow-on discovery requests shall be filed on a schedule consistent with the periods allowed by the Commission's regulations and the board's rulings, i.e.,
fourteen days for interrogatories, thirty days for document requests and thirty days to complete the taking of noticed depositions.
4.
Original discovery requests may be made with respect to material new information contained in the Safety Evaluation Report (or its equivalent) which is now scheduled for about
. April 15.
These requests shall be made no later than ten days following service of the SER.
Response to these requests (including the scheduling of depositions) shall be made within 15 days following service of the discovery request to which the response is made.
5.
No follow-on discovery is anticipated on the SER, and, as noted above, only one round of general follow-on discovery is provided.
Upon a strong and specific showing of a need to discover materials necessary to a proper decision in the pro-ceeding the board will consider individual motions for additional discovery.
Such motions must be served very promptly, no more than five days following the event demonstrating the need for additional discovery.
Licensee proposes a condition which would limit follow-on discovery to those parties whose original discovery requests demonstrated their desire to be in a position to conduct follow-on discovery, i.e.,
those who have taken timely steps to ensure unir follow-on opportunity based upon the discovery period pro-vided in the board's First Special Prehearing Conference Order.
While the board believes that such a condition would be a just one, it would be difficult to manage.
Some of the more inexperienced intervenors may have been confused by the board's ruling changing the February 16 date for the completion of discovery to February 25 for the filing of original discovery requests.
However, where
. objections to follow-on discovery requests are made on the basis of difficulty, burden, or other bases relating to the time available for response, the board, in considering motions to compel, will take into consideration how prompt and diligent the discovering party has been.
Discovery on Psychological Stress Issues In our Second Prehearing Conference Order, January 11, 1980, the board denied PANE's motion to provide then for a sixty-day discovery period on psychological stress issues.
We stated however that come discovery of unspecified length would be provided followi'.ig a Commission order to hear psychological stress issues.
We also stated that if the board recommends to the Commission that such issues be included in this proceeding, we would provide for an immediate discovery period.
Id. pp.12-13.
In our certification dated February 22, 1980, we recommended to the Commission that psychological stress issues be adjudicated.
Parties who anticipate litigation of these issues may, insofar as this board can authorize it, proceed with discovery.
However, as we noted, until and unless the Commission authorizes the litigation of psychological stress issues we have no authority to enforce discovery on these issues.
Under the pro-visions of 10 CFR 92.718(u) the board has authority to regulate the course of this proceeding, and we believe that this authority
. might reasonably be said to include the power to set rules for voluntary discovery in the interests of avoiding delay.
In this phase of discovery, requests shall be made so that the interim discovery is completed by April 15, 1980.
In the event the Commission rules on the board's certification in the interim, the board will modify this order.
Further Scheduling The board will monitor discovery and other events in this proceeding until about April 15 before setting a definite schedule for the evidentiary hearing.
For the guidance of the parties, however, we report our preliminary thoughts on the forthcoming schedule.
We will remain flexible as to whether there should be an issue-by-issue taking of evidence in intervals, although we do not now favor that approach.
The prehearing conference under 10 CFR 92.752 will be set for about 30 days following the issuance of the SER.
Consistent with the schedule proposed by the Commission, there will be no opportunity for summary dis-position under 10 CFR 92.749.
However, not all of the time thus saved will be gained in the prehearing schedule because the board anticipates that it will require more than the fifteen days before the hearing provided by 10 CFR 92.743(b) to examine the prefiled direct testimony.
. ANGRY's Request for Reconsideration of Portions of Third Special Prehearing Conference Order By its filing of February 4, 1980, ANGRY requests re-consideration of the board's denial of ANGRY's Contentions II(C),
III(A)(a), and III(B)(a) regarding emergency planning.
Third Special Prehearing Conference Order, at pp. 13-14, January 25, 1980.
ANGRY's request is based in part upon its unhappiness with our interpretation and application in this proceeding of the Commission's proposed rule on emergency planning, particularly as related to the 10-mile radius EPZ for evacuation planning.
The rationale for our approach is fully set forth in the pre-hearing conference order (at pp. 1-5), and we decline to modify it.
In that discussion, we emphasized tha t the proposed rule's use or a 10-mile radius plume exposure EPZ would be flexibly applied as envisioned by the proposed rule itself.
The area for which evacuation planning is required is not inflexibly an exact 10-mile radius.
Rather it would be an area of about 10 miles - the exact size would depend upon emergency response considerations as they are affected by local conditions.
Accordingly, in the prehearing conference order (at p.5) we held:
... [W]e will accept emergency planning contentions which specify local circumstances raising questions about the adequacy of the licensee's UPZs, but reject unspecified contentions which cnallenge the basic concept of the 10-mile and 50-mile EPZs.
We will look to the proposed rule and its referenced documents for guidance during this phase of the pro-ceeding.
We will, of course, adjust to changes appearing in the final rule which will probably be in effect before the hearing is concluded.
. In addition to its unhappiness with the above ruling, ANGRY, for the first time on reconsideration, attempts to specify local circumstances which in its view justify litiga-11/
tion of the adequacy of a 10-mile radius plume EPZ.--
There are several problems wi th this.
In the first instance, ANGRY concedes that its request for reconsideration is its first attempt to allege local circumstances which must be con-sidered in adopting the proper EPZ for TMI.
Its earlier re-jected contentions were merely bare assertions, without explanation or elaboration, that a 10-mile EPZ was inadequate.
ANGRY, in that filing, did not discuss the 1( -mile EPZ with reference to its flexibility.
ANGRY thereby ignored the opportunity, which it had, to discuss the reference to the 10-mile emergency zone in the Commission's Order, the policy statement and the proposed rule.
Motions to reconsider will be denied where the motion is not in reality an elaboration or refinement of previously advanced arguments, but, instead, i:2 based,upon a new thesis.
Tennessee Valley Authority Hartsville, Units lA, 2A, IB, and 2B), ALAB-418, 6 NRC 1 (1977).
See also Note 3 of this Order, supra.
In addition, ANGRY's modified contentions suffer the double infirmity of being vague in the specification of local circum-stances, and then tying those vague specifications to the
~~11/
Contention III(A)(a) relates this issue to the licensee's plan, and III(B)(b) relates it to the plans of specified Pennsylvania agencies.
. sudden conclusion that a 20-mile EPZ is required.
This is a relatively much greater distance and area than "about" 10 miles.
We would require better specification of the special local circumstances before triggering an evidentiary inquiry into the adequacy of evacuation for an area so much Iarger.
ANGRY's efforts to expand the 10-mile EPZ to 20 miles is a syllogistic argument that the perimeter of the 10-mile plume EPZ (and the 10-mile emergency zone in the Commission's order) f all just short of the population centers of Harrisburg and York.
These centers, it is argued, extend for about 10 more miles.
Ergo, according to ANGRY, the plume EPZ must extend to a radius of 20 miles.
There are two essential problems with this concept.
First, York and Harrisburg are exactly where they were when the Commission ordered the hearing and referred to the 10-mile distance.
This in itself does not necessarily preclude con-sideration of local conditions in nearby York and Harrisburg.
But the fact that population centers may begin at the 10-mile perimeter does not excuse ANGRY from specifying the local conditions in each population center at about 10 miles as pro-vided in the policy statement, proposed rule and the Commission's 12/
order.--
--12/
Again, there is nothing in the proposed rule that makes 10 miles a sacred cow.
How ever, it is the point of departure.
Where specific local conditions (not a general reference to a population center) are alleged with proper bases, it is certainly possible that "about" 10 miles could vary considerably from exactly 10 miles depending upon specific local conditions.
. While we recognize that ANGRY has now specifically set forth its bases for urging a 20-mile EPZ, albeit belatedly, by naming persons who at one time held that view, the bases still do not support the contention.
These are no more than opinions voiced during the accident, and without specific support.
They are superseded in time and in authority by the Commission's order, policy statement, and proposed rule.
However, we may well have admitted portions of ANGRY's contentions for discovery purposes (subject to rejection absent better specification later on) had ANGRY filed these contentions at the proper time, instead of on reconsideration for the first time.
In so doing, we would have explicitly rejected ANGRY's premise that an inquiry into the adequacy of evacuation planning for a 20-mile EPZ must be triggered on the basis of the cir-cumstances alleged by it to date.
In arriving at our determination, we have considered and balanced competing considerations.
On the one hand, it is our strong view that parties cannot add new information at will in filing upon filing when that information was previously available.13/
13/
Particularly long after the December 19, 1979 deadline for
~~
filing revised emergency planning contentions has passed.
In arriving at our ruling below, we have considered and agree with the well-presented views of the NRC staff on the importance of applying to an inexcusably late filed contention the perhaps dispositive test of whether other parties have raised similar contentions.
Where they have, the contention will be heard and decided in any event, and the tardy party is free to assist informally the timely (footnote continued)
. On the other hand, we are reluctant to cut short the potential valuable assistance of a local group focusing attention on local circumstances which should be considered in choosing the proper geographic covefage of the TMI plume exposure EPZ.
We resolve the problem as follows:
We deny ANGRY's motion for reconsideration as such, but direct ANGRY and Mr. Sholly to consolidate as one party on Mr. Sholly's contention 8(C).
That contention, filed by Mr. Sholly on December 17, 1979, was ad-mitted in our Third Special Prehearing Conference Order (at p.
8) with the proviso that it be made more specific in the course of discovery.
To clarify a potential ambiguity in our prior ruling, if the contention is not better specified it will not be decepted as an issue for evidentiary consideration.
Mr. Sholly's Contention 8(C), while no mere specific than ANGRY's, was timely filed and will be either better specified or rejected.
Our action gives ANGRY the opportunity to contribute on the subject of its concerns, and furthers the movement we have urged towards 14/
consolidation of parties on similar issues.
13/
continued:
party.
This inquiry is pertinent to most, and perhaps all of the five factors against which late filings are weighed pursuant to 10 CFR 92.714 (a ) (1).
See NRC Staff Response to the instant ANGRY motion, dated February 26, 1980 ; and NRC Staff Response to ECNP Intervenors' Revised Contention on Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Response, at pp.3-5, dated January 28, 1980.
14/
The NRC staff's response points out that Sholly Contention 8(C) does not expressly contest the use of a 10-mile EPZ in the State's plans in addition to the licensee's plans.
How-ever, we will permit future specification of Sholly Contention 8(C) to include pertinent emergency plans of governmental entities upon which overall emergency planning in the event of an accident at TMI-l may depend.
. We are unsure of the precise approach we will adopt towards consolidation on an overall basis.
As always, we urge the parties to continue to work on voluntary consolidation proposals.
IIow-ever, we have little hesitancy with respect to the effect upon ANGRY of ordering total consolidation on this one issue.- since we could have denied ANGRY's request for reconsideration without affording it any relief.
We have greater hesitancy with respect to the effect of this consolidation upon Mr. Sholly.
If, after giving it a try, Mr. Sholly feels that our ruling is adversely affecting his rights, he may seek appropriate relief from us.
TIIE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAliD
/$4 Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Bethesda, Maryland February 29, 1980.
7 PREPAREDNESS AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, January 7, 1980.
I ECNP further contends that the Plan, including its various parts and appe'idices, contains a large number of serious deficiencies, incon-sistencies, and inaccuracies, which render the Plan questionable in its utility, purpose, and workability.
These deficiencies are enumerated below.
1.'
The " prime objectives" of the plan are said to be (p.2-1) to provide a.'lmeans for mitigating the consequences of emergencies"?and-to provide " implementing procedures" to ensure prepareducss.1 'Yet no discussion is offered as to the' degree of' cons?quence mitigation offered for protective measures possible aed the. array of accidents from which the public is to be protected.
2.
The TMI Plan is ::4id to e based on a 10 mile radius, (p. 2-5) n and that th; plan is coord' nated with all five counties within that radius (p. 2-7?.
Yet all fiveT.of the counties have emergency plans which are based on S,J10, and 20 miles radii from TMI.
i -
G 3.
The suspendeddicensee states it has developed an " Emergency Public Information Plan."' Yet the suspended licensee has not offered a. single reason why anyone should believe any statements from the suspended licensee.
This problem is obliquely recognized in the Public Infomation Plan, pages 10-11, but neither the cause nor the solution of the problem appears in the Plan.
4.
The Plan provides "a means for classifying; emergency conditions in a manner compatible "with various State 'and County organi-rations (p. 3-1).
Yetc.the-Commonwealth and the five counties use different classification schemes.
,..yir 5.
The Plan coudt's"on " training,' drills, reviews, and audits" (p. 3-2) to result in emergency preparedness.
However, there is no amount of trainin ', etc.,' that cannot be rendered in -
effectual by licensee manaaement, once the license suspension has been lifted.
6.
The accident and conditions listed for the various emergency categories are nothing but a rehash of thetFSAR accidents.
Not only is the TMI-2 accident not listed,'the broader scope of accident analyses recomended in NUREG-0578 (p. A-42-5) is ignored completely a's are the Alternate Event Sequences of the Technical Staff Analyses Report of the President's Commission.
- g 1 ECNP notes here that ECNP has not received Appendix A to the Plan, which is the Implementation Document for the Plan.
ECNP submits that this plan should be made available 'to the parties of this proceeding for their perusal well prior to the start of the TMI-1 Restart Hearings. Only in this way can the proper public scutiny of the complete emergency plan be made.
e 7.
The fractions of the EPA PAGs listed on p. 4-1 of the Plan are illustrative of the utter contempt and disdain felt m
toward the neighbors of TMI by the management of the suspended licensee.
The fractions represent large doses to the thyroids of children and fetuses, and at 50 mR/hr to this gland, represent dose rates to be avoided.
Yet in the " Alert" category, Met. Ed., the suspended licensee, does not even provide for disseminating the news of the current conditions to the public.
8.
The fractions of EPA PAGs listed on p. 4-1 of the Plan, with their associated action levels, do not take into account the total accumulated dose and dose comitment. As a result, the total exposures may exceed by.large margins the listed PAG fractions prior to the advancement to a higher emergency category.
9.
The various emergency categories (p. 4-2 to 4-8) each list a number of triggering events or conditions.
Many of these are questionable indicators.
For instance, on,p. 4-3, " Valid" alams are referred to.
But the*re is no mention of the definition of a " valid" alam, or what would be an invalid alam.
A number of reactor coolant a divities (50, 130, and 300 ci/ml) are referred to, but ra mention is made of how much full damage it takes to produce these readings.
In addition, there is no indication of how or how rapidly these coolant activities will be detemined.
10.
Reliance on " adverse meteorology" (p. 4-5, 4-6), can prove to provide little or no " built-in conservation" (p. 4-7, 4-8) since, for instance, such conditions were not at all uncomon during the nighttime in the nights following the TMI-2 accident (for instance, the night of March 29, from 10 pm to 8 am, March 30; ni<jht of March 31, about 8:00 pm to 8 am, April 1.)
11.
The Plan lists a series of accidents from the FSAR for TMI-l and instrumentation to detect the condition or accident.
However, it does not appear that the radioactive gas monitoring devices are of sufficient range to prevent the condition that prevailed at THI-2, namely, monitors off-scale high.
12.
The " General Emergency" category (p. 4-7) acknowledges that the lower limits of the PAGs (1 rem whole body or 5 rem thyroid exposures, p. 4-1) are likely to be exceeded.
Not only does this represent an outrageously high exposure to those most sensitive individuals of all ages, it does not even represent the total dose received.
As stated on p. 1-4, "The protective action guide does not include the dose that has unavoidably occurred prior to the assessment."
Emphasis added.
ECNP submits that the occurrence of an " unavoidable" dose is due solely to the refusal (or inability) of the suspended licensee to provide the public with timely, accurate, honest and complete infomation concerning the course of the accident.
ECNP submits that this contemptible disregard for the health and safety of the public in and of itself is sufficient grounds to render the entire plan unacceptable.
9 a
13.
ECNP submits that reliable assessments of offsite conditions and dose rates cannot be made from the TMI site without an extensive array of live, real time, offsite radiation detectors.
The Plan admits ~ to the possibility of off-scale monitors with the expectation of using " contingency dose release factors".
Contingency dose release factors are, however, not defined.
This eventuality, along with~ the complexities'of offsite dose projections and estimations from inside the site and the associated errors and opportunities for miscalculation under emergency conditio'ns render offsite detectors'a necessary safety device.
Furthdrmore, live, offsite detectors could have direct output tenninals at various State and County sites, an1 thereby bypass the cumbersome time-con'suming reporting procedures outlined by the suspended licensee.
- 15. The overall Plan suffers from serious defects, including but not limited to:
(a) The Plan offers no understanding of different time factors for unfolding of accidents, changing conditions during accidents, and so,on, (b)
The Plan has no contingencies if all' operations,.
equipment, etc. don't function exactly as planned.
(c)
The Plan is exceedingly cumbersome..with much more attention being paid to Met. Ed.'s."public image" than s
to-the' protection of the health and safety of the public/or even to the refease of accurate, honest, compleg'andtimely nfonnation to the public.
- 16. The Offsite Eme'rgency Support Organization (p. 5-10, Fig.'13) offers little substance or assurance to the plan since it suffers from having been put to the test at TMI-2 and found sorely wanting.
There, for example, it was shown that, with regard to the first five " responsibilities" listed on p. 5-10, the Organization was hopelessly incompetent.
- 17. Workers in normal and emergency conditions, including temporary workers, are not given objective or even factual infonnation about the risks of radiation doses to which they may be exposed.
- n
- 18.. The assessment actions f6r the General Emergency are based on whole body and thyroid dose for accidents as specifiea in TID-14844 and assume engineered safety features are operable (p. 6-6).
ECNP submits that TID-14844 is out of date (pubalished in 1962) and must be updated.
In addition, such reliance is inconsistent with the " General, Emergency" conditions, where, as noted on page 4-7, the ponibility.of multiple loss of engineered ~ safety features is implied.
Loss of containment integrity implies loss of other engineered safeguafds previously.
As a result, any relianceonthecurvesinFif.21-&22,andtheassumptions therein (Fig. 23), may lead to a gross underestimation of offsite doses, and, hence, of consequences.
ECNP notes that the fact that the TMI-2 containment structure now reportedly contains 44,000 curies of Kr85, over 50% of the core inventory, demonstrates
10 the inadequacy and inconsistency of the assumptions upon which
- the Plan is based.
- 19. Table 12 does not list the needs for more adequate training of all reactor operators in accident understanding and response, a matter observed as being inadequate in the Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, pp. 49-50.
- 20. The REMP of the Plan is only slightly~ less inadequate than the grossly inadequate REMP prior to the TMI-2 accident.
In par-ticular, the new REMP envirsions only 2 TLDs in each 22.5 compass sector, one at the site boundary and one 4 or 5 miles from the site.
This approach in the Plan implies a dedication to continued use of meteorological models to project doses in situations where such models are known to be inadequate and/or inapplicable (complex topography, long distance-a few miles, and so on.)
- 21. The Plan relies on " drills and exercises" to give the impression of emergency preparedness.
Yet the Plan offers no assurance that just the conducting of drills of. licensee employees and governmental officials, and volunteers once a year or once every five years (p. 8-5 through 8-8) will actually result in real emergency preparedness.
- 22. The " Emergency Public Information Plan," Appendix B to the Plan, reflects the dedication of the suspended licensee to pay for more attention to nurturing its public image than to provide accurate, candid, honest, and timely infomation 'to the public.
This is revealed in the purpose of the "Information Plan," pp. 4-5.
"The stated objective of the plan is prompt, complete, and con-sistent dissemination of infomation,"
(See also, pp.10-11)
Yet the Plan then sets up an elaborate, cumbersome, multi-step, hierarchical information manipulation scheme (see pp. 24-6) with the major emphasis on "a single company voice" (emphasis in plan,
- p. 5). The Plan itself defeats the prompt dissemination of infor-mation, and contains no mention whatsoever of any nee' Or or intent to provide accurate information.
The stated need for "a single company voice," with the time-consuming steps necessary to achieve this goal of questionable value during an accident, outweighs the need for timely and accurate infomation in the priorities of the suspended licensee, and this judgment results in what the suspended licensee refers to as "the dose that has unavoidably occurred"to the public (Plan, p.1-4).
- 23. The abbreviated descriptions of emergency classifications in Appendix B (p 9) mention " actual or iminent core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity."
This result would appear to correspond to that general accident category known as Class 9 accidents which may have resulted from multiple plant failures.
The Plan contains no. discussion of the routes to this end result.
Nor does the Plan discuss the long-tem fate of the components, electrical and mechanical, inside the containment structure in the event of a core meltdown, and the public health and property consequences of a reactor with a melted core. The plan makes no men'. ion of how long contain-ment integrity can be maintained post-accident, or what are the
consequences of containment failure at some future time.
24.
The "Informstion Plan" contains no mechanism whereby a member of the public can obtain directly from the suspended licensee information which he (or she) can be assured will be accurate, candid, honest, and timely.
The TMI-2 accident _ illustrated the vast ability of this suspended licensee to distribute inaccurate, incomplete, misleading, wrong, and out-of-date information.
Appendix B of the Plan remedies none of these demonstrated deficiencies of this suspended licensee or its emergency plan.
25.
ECNP submits that Appendix D of the TMI Plan anii Annex E of the Pennsylvania Disaster Plan (Annex'E) shares many of the inadequacies of'the TMI Plan.
However, in contrast to the TMI. Plan, Annex E does reveal six assumptions upon which it i.s based, but offers no discussion as to thel validity of the assumptions.
26.
Annex E is internally inconsistent.
It assumes there will.be adequate time to implement the provisions of the plan, including evacuation (p. 4) but then admits than notification times "follouing an incident may vary" (p. 7).
Yet.no discussion is offered as to,how much notification time would be available fdr~the range of accidents for which planning must-be based. or.how much time would be required to carry out an evacuation,"or what contingency plan and procedures may be needed.
1 27.
Like'the TMI Plan (with Appendix B), Annex E contains no provisions fortassuring that accurate, candid, complete, and timely information will, or even can, be dissrainated to the public (see Annex E, Appendix.5).
o 28.
Appendix D of the P.lan contains reference to the need for the decon-tamination of radioTogically contaminated individuals (p.16) but does not provide any infomation'as to how many people may be contam-inated, the kind and degree.of contamination expected or to be planned for, or the number of facilities 'and medical per:sonnel appropriately trained in decontamination and radiation injury' treatment techniques which may be necessary.
29.
Appendix D suggests the possibjlity that. members 'of the Anned Forces may be needed for use in the event of an accident.
No assurance is offered that these largely volunteer members will not be exposed to large doses of radiation.
Nor is there any assurance that these troops will be monitored for radiation exposure or that, if they are exposed, their health will continue to be monitored throughout and past the length of the cancer latency period or the period of genetic damage.
5 30.
The'REMP.of the TMI Plan (see #18, above) runs th.e risk of being totally inadequate to measure off-site exposures in the event of a
" puff" or series of " puff" releases.
The small number of dosimeters at the 4-5 mile distance from TMI leaves the vast majority of the region at these distances totally unmonitored, since the width of the " puff" may well be very small compared with the distance between these distance detectors.
As a result, the probability is high that a plume can pass undetected.
As a result, substantial exposures may well occur, but go essentially unrecorded.
The situation is worse yet at further distances, where the level of monitoring is greatly
12 diminished, even though there is need for dosimeters at larger
~~
distances to confirm the applicability of meteorological models.
o
- 31. Appendix D assumes that in the event of another accident at TMI, a. trade-off is to be made between some alleged social. disruption due to evacuation and population exposure mitigation.
Such an assumption blames the process of evacuation itself for the alleged social disruption while ignoring the fact that the c="O Of the need for evacuation, and hence the cause of any associrte., social discotion is the nuclear power plant. This assumption clso assumes that the social disruption due to evacuation in the evem of a nuclear accident is greater than the social disruption in the eunt of a nuclear accident without evacuation.
These assumptions and conclusions are without basis or justification.
32.
Appendix D of the TMI Plan assumes the availability of lead time to effectuate the Plan (p. 4).
However, Appendix 8 of that Plan which is the BRH Plan, assumes the event itself will, among other things, dictate the time available (p. VII-1).
This fundamental inconsistency mandates the need for all assumptions of each and every component of the entire plan to be revealed and to have the validity of each assumption fully assessed.
33.
The BRH plan (Appendix 8) relies on the infant thyroid dose (1.5 rem) as the dose from milk ingestion to be avoided (p. IX-4).
This does not take into account the fetus, whose sensitivity may greatly exceed that of the infant. In addition, the value of 1.5 rem to the thyroid from milkingestion does not take into account the' inhalation exposure.
(See #8 and 11, above).
34.
The BRH method of assessing exposures to the infant thyroid by the cow-milk pathway is ultimately based upon the dose conversion factors found in Reg. Guide 1.109.
Reliance upon these dose conversion factors in the event of an emergency at TMI may lead to actual exposures many times larger than obtained by Reg. Guide 1.109 dose conversion factors.
(See ECNP Contention 3, Oct. 5,1979, and the related dis-cussion at the Special Prehearing Conference, November 14, 1979, page unknown, because these Intervenors thus far have not been granted access to transcripts.) Similar considerations apply to the Protective Action Guides for food (p. IX-8).
35.
The BRH plan (Appendix 8) states that "the Governor's Press Secretary will be the single centralized point for release of public infomation to the news media..."
if the State plan is to be activated.
- However, the Lancaster County Plan (April 8, 1979, addition), for example, states that the responsibility for " preparing and issuing all emergency public information within the county..." lies with the Lancaster Emergency Management Department.
36.
ECNP contends that the routing of all information through the Governor's Press Secretary to the public adds unnecessary complexities to the entire plan.
For example, since the Press Secretary of the Governor can reasonably be expected to be a political appointee and not necessarily knowledgeable at all in the area of nuclear. accidents and their con-sequences, or the nature of radiation injury, the designation of the Gov &rnor's Press Secretary as the official and sole spokesperson adds one more pathway for and perhaps impediment to infomation in the cumbersoma and circuitous route between an event or accident at TMI ar.d the public.
There is no need for this extra step.
In addition, this extra step offers one more opportunity for errors and omissions to be introduced into the infomation and only adds further delay.
It is not expected that this extra step will result in the removal
yV a
of errors from the messages.
Furthermore, the possibility exists, with this extra, unnecessary step, for political pressure to be brought to bear to alter, delay, or even withhold crucial information frca the public.
37.
The Dauphin County Plan (Appendix E of the TM: Plan) contains a state-ment by Representative Stephen R.. Reed, Chairman,; Disaster Serveies Comittee, Harrisburg River Rescue, Inc., which states that "It may take $10. or 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> to evacuate the entire city.
It is my uriderstanding that}we will receive at least a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> notification to evacuate."
Here again is a fundamental inconsistency concerning the time available for evacuation (see #24 and 29, above).
ECNP reiterates its contention that until all assumptions behind the entire Plan are revealed and the validity of these assumptions is fully assessed, the Plan in its entirety must be regarded as wholly unacceptable.
- 38. Thefevacuation p,lans for Cumberland, York, and Lebanon Counties are based, at least in part on the assumption that many if not most, evacuees will stay with friends or. relatives o' ts.ide the evacuation u
zone.
This assumption 'i.s hibhly questionable, since during the early days.of the still-ongoing TMI-2 ' accident,-after wcmen and children were r
ordered out of the area within five miles of TMI, many tens of thousands of people outside this area themselves evacuated voluntarily.
In the event of another accident at TMI which causes a twenty mile evacuation, for which each of the five counties expresses orecaredness, the resultant voluntary evacuations of persons.beyond the 20-mile radius might well mean that there will remain no friends and/or relatives for the 20 mile evacuees to reside With tempo"rari.ly. '
t 4 s As a result of the abov.e inaccuracies, inconsistencies and deficiencies, ECNP sut;mitsIiiat no evacuation plan can be devised which will prevent large 1
numbers of the' residents within any given radius of TMI: from receiving unaccepted 2
~
exposures to radiation should the' kinds of. accidents occur at TMI which
" involve actual or inr.linent substantial core degradation or melting...and/or loss of Reactor Building (con'tAinme'nt) integrity." (TMI Plan, p. 4-7, emphasis
~
in the original).
ECNP contends that the nly sure method of ensuring the pro-tection of the health and safety:o'f the,public from a utility that, even after y-r four and one half years of operating TMI-
"did not have sufficient knowledge, expertise, and personnel to operate (TMI-2).and maintain it safely." (Report of the President's Commission on the' Accident at Three Mile; Island, p. 44),,is to permanently suspend the operating license for TMI-1, and to order the complete 2
Here, unacceptable exposures are any abovi the EPA PAGs.
Of course, it is acknowledged that many individuals regard such exposures as totally unacceptable.
o COURTESY NOTIFICATION This is intended solely as a courtesy and convenience to provide extra time to those notified.
Official service will be separate from the courtesy notification and will be made by the Office of the Secretary of the Comission.
I hereby certify that I have today mailed copies of the Board's FOURTH SPECIAL PREHEARING CONFERENCE ORDER, dated this date,'to the persons designated on the attached Courtesy Notifi-cation List.
'L 2t$
'Mr Doris M. Moran Clerk to the Board Bethesda, Maryland February 29, 1980
e
_COUZESY BDITFICATION LIST George F. Trewbridge, Esq.
Dr. Chauncey Kepf rd Shaw, Pittnnn, Potts & Trowbridge Emri2ustal C.aalitica en BMav Pcwr 1800 M Street, N. W.
433 Orlando Avenue Washington, D. C.
20006 State College, Pennsylvania 16801 Counsel for NRC Staff Mr. Mtn. tin I. Leais Office of Executive I2 gal Director 6504 Bradford Terrace U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cem'iesica Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19149 Washington, D. C.
20555 Jordan D. Cunningham, Esq.
Ms. Marjorie M. Aamodt Fox, Farr & Cunningham R. D. #5 2320 North Second Street Coatesville, Pennsylvania 19320 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110' Ps. Holly S. Keck, Iag. Cbnirmn Karin P. Sheldca, Esq.
Anti-Nuclear Greco Representing Sheldon: Harten & Weiss York (ANGRY) 1725 I Street, N. W., Suite 506 245 W. Philadelphia Street Washington, D. C.
20006 York, Pennsylvania 17404 John A. Irvin, Esq.
Mr. Robert Q. Pollard Assistant Counsel Chesapeake Energy Alliance Pennsylvania Public Utility C M csion 609 Pcntpelier Street P. O. Box 3265 Baltinnre, Maryland 21218 Harrisburg, Pernsylvania 17120 Karin W. Carter, Esq.
Mr. Steven C. Sholly Assistant Attorney Ceneral 304 South Market Street 505 Executive House Mechanicsburg, Penncylvania 17055 P. O. Box 2357 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120
'Iheodore A. Adler, Esq.
Widoff Reager Selkuaitz & Arn or, P.C.
Walter W. Cohen, Esq.
P. O. Box 1547 Consumr Advocate Harrisburg, Pe:usylvania 17105 Department of Justice Strawberry Square,14th Floor Ellyn P. Weiss, Esq.
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17127 Sheldon, Hawu & Weiss 1725 I Street, H. W., Suite 506 Mr. Donald Loary Washingten, D. C.
20006 Pennsylvania Comission en the 'DE 303 Agriculture Building Ms. Susan R. Barley 2301 North.rm aron Street 129 Cocoa Avenue Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Hershey, Pennsylvania 17033 Mr. John E. Minnich, Cbnirmm Dauphin County Board of Ccunissioners Dauphin County Courthouse Front and Pariet Streets Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101
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