ML19294B116
| ML19294B116 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 01/17/1980 |
| From: | Chrissotimos N, Hueter L, Spessard R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19294B112 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-265-79-27, NUDOCS 8002270163 | |
| Download: ML19294B116 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000265/1979027
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-265/79-27
Docket No. 50-265
License No. DPR-30
Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
P. O. Box 767
Chicago, IL
60690
Facility Name:
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2
Inspection At:
Quad-Cities Site, Cordova, IL
Inspection Conducted:
December 11-14, 1979
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Inspectors:
L. J. Hueter
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N. J. Chrissotimostec
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Approved By:
R. L. S essard, Chief
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Reactor Projects Section 1
Inspection Summary
Inspection on December 11-14, 1979 (Report No. 50-265/79-27)
Areas Inspected:
Special, inspection of unplanned radiological effluent
release.
The inspection involved 39 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC
inspectors.
Results: Three items of noncompliance (infraction-failure to follow a
temporary procedure-Details I, Paragraph 3, infraction-failure to follow
a radiation control procedure-Details II, Paragraph 6, and infraction-
failure to continuously monitor an unplanned radioactive liquid release
from the facility-Details II, Paragaph 6) were identified.
b * o 2 27 0143
.
DETAILS I
1.
Persons Contacted
- N.
Kalivianakis, Superintendent
T. Tamlyn, Assistant Superintendet Operations
- K. Graesser, Assistant Superintendent Administrative
- L. Gerner, Technical Staff Supervisor
- J. Heilman, Quality Assurance Operations
2.
General
This inspection was conducted to examine the operational aspects of
the unplanned radioactive liquid effluent release on December 9, 1979.
3.
Unit 2 is currently in a refueling outage and the service water side
of the RHR Heat Exchanger was to be drained so as to initiate a minor
modification.
Draining of the heat exchanger was estimated to take
approximately 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> and normally would have been to the radwaste
system via the floor drain system.
However, the licensee did not
elect to use this system due to the currently large inventory of
water in the radioactive waste system and due to recent uncyctainty
in disposal of waste generated in processing liquid in the system,
thus Temporary Procedure 1261 was issued to drain to an outside
storm drain. The Procedure was issued in accordance with Station
Procedures QAP 1100-5 and QAP 1100-7.
l
The first shift foreman, who is senior licensed, began imp ementing
this procedure at approximately 4:30 a.m. on Sunday, December 9, 1979.
At this time the drain hose was connected to an instrument manifold.
This manifold has other instrument tap offs to primary system water
which passes thru the manifold on occassion, and is a possible source
of contamination. This connection was contrary to Step F26 of Tempor-
ary Procedure 1261 which states in part " connect a hose to the differ-
ential pressure switch instrument line DPS 2-1001-78A (2-1001-78B)".
This operation continued until approximately 6:30 a.m. at which time
it was ceased pending shift turnover.
At 9:00 a.m., the oncomite equipment attendant was requested to re-
sume draining operations.
Upon arrival at the instrument panel, the
attendant was not sure as to what was to be done. The equipment
attendant then asked the second shift foreman, who is also senior
licensed, for further instructions. The foreman indicated to the
equipment attendant to open the remaining instrument valves on the
manifold. Opening of these valves allowed primary water to be dis-
charged to the storm sewer for approximately 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br />, before the
unit operating engineer discovered it and stopped the discharge.
These actions (opening additional instrument valves) were contrary to
aay of the steps containec in Temporary Procedure 1261.
-2-
.
Temporary Procedure 1261 in the prerequisites states in part "to
extend a hose from the integrated leak rate connector outside of
Unit I reactor building to the storm sewer".
Contrary to this
requirement, the hose connection was not made and effluent was
discharged onto the blacktop pavement and allowed to drain by gra-
vity to the storm drain approximately 30 feet away. This resulted
in contamination of an area of the blacktop pavement.
The preceeding actions, as directed by the two shift foreman, were
contrary to approved Temporary Procedure 1261 and is an item of
noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.2.A. (265/79-27-01)
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DETAILS
.
Section II
Prepared by
L. J. Hueter
W W' [w
Reviewed by
W. L. Fisher, Chief
Fuel Facility Projects and
Radiation Support Section
1.
Persons Contacted
R. Flessner, Rad-Chem Supervisor
M. Whitemore, Chemistry laboratory Foreman
R. Robie, U-2 Operating Engineer
2.
General
This inspection, whict
an ' sut 10:00 a.m. on recember 11, 1979,
was conducted to examins
ensee's compliance with regulatory
requirements in the areas
v.
..,uid radwaste and radiation protec-
tion management programs related to an unplanned radioactive liquid
effluent release while intending to drain only the service water
side of the 2B RHR Heat Exchanger on December 9, 1979.
3.
Cause of Unplanned Radioactive Liquid Release
The draining of the service water side of the 2B RHR Heat Exchanger
to the storm sewer was intended to involve release only of nonradio-
active liquid. Further, the procedure prepared for this operation,
Temporary Procedure 1261
" Draining Unit 2 RHR Service Water Piping,"
first required draining some of the liquid into a container and then
sampling and analyzing this liquid to verify the presence of only
background levels of activity before release to the storm ecom.
This sampling and analysis was conducted before beginning the release
and the analysis identified no activity above background levels.
If
Temporary Procedure 1261 had been followed, the unplanned release of
radioactive liquid would not have occurred.
4.
The Release Pathway
The effluent was pumped through the integrated leak rate connector
to the outside (east side) of the Unit 1 Reactor Building, discharged
onto the blacktop pavement and allowed to flow by gravity to the storm
sewer drain about 30 feet east of the Reactor Building. The storm
sewer carried this effluent south past two additional surface drains.
A fourth surface drain is located where the storm sewer makes a right
angle turn to the west at a location southeast of the Service Building.
A fifth drain is located on this line where the eff. ent (nonradio-
active) from the Waste Water Treatment Plant (kW P) enters the storm
'
sewer by an underground connection.
A sixth drain is located shortly
before the effluent enters the Unit 1 Oil Separator Tank, a 30,000
gallon tank that normally remains full and overflows to the discharge
bay, across from and slightly to the downstream side of the north and
south River Diffusers. The south River Diffuser was partially open
throughout this release to permit balancing the water level in the
cooling system with only one of the two reactor Units in operation.
Of the total 550,000 gpm estimated flow rate in the discharge bay,
the licensee determined that the discharge to the river via the south
River Diffuser was about 180,000 gpm.
Radioactivity not promptly
released from the discharge bay to the south River Diffuser would be
lifted by the two operating lift pumps to the spray canal. Here the
liquid would make a circuit in this approximate 160 million gallon
body of water every seven or eight hours before it, and river make-up
water, perform their cooling function and enter the discharge bay,
where about one third of this cooling water is released to the river
via the south Rive;
J Fme r .
5.
Magnitude of Unplanned Release
The release rate from the instrument manifold system (open to both
primary system water and service system water) was determined by the
licensee to be about 5 gpm. This release continued for a maximum cf
14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> (10:00 a.m. to midnight on December 9, 1979), resulting ir-
about a 4200 gallon release. Of the various samples collected in the
release path following the discovery and termination of the unplanned
radioactive release, the highest activity concentration measured was
2.4E-03 nCi/ml based on gamma isotopic analysis. This was in a small
pool of water in one of the surface drains (manholes) before the in-
fluent (15 gpm) f rom the WrP. This garama isotopic analysis indicat-
ed a slightly higher total activity concentration than the gross
beta gamma analysis.
This concentration in 4200 gallons would indicate a to al activity of
38 millicuries released from the instrument manifold. Howaver, only
about 25 millicuries of this total was released to the discharge bay
and ultimately to the Mississippi River as an unplanned release. The
remainder was isolated in the storm sewer and Oil Separator Tank sys-
tem when input to the storm sewer from the WfP was stopped by plug-
ging the drain line at 11:00 a.m. on December 10, 1979, about 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />
after the initial radioactive release began from the instrument mani-
fold. The contents of the Oil Separator Tank were later released on
a planned batch basis meeting release requirements by performing pre-
requisite sampling and analysis, and pumping through a flow meter to
the South River Diffuser where a compositer sampler was placed in
operation for the planned release.
The contiminated blacktop surface
subsequently was flushed to the storm sewer and the storm sewer in
turn was flushed to the Oil Separator Tank with water from fire hoset
2-
after which a similar planned release was made. Continued flushing
and planned batch release (s) were to continue if concentratior.s were
not dovr. to background levels. The isotopic analysis showed the
activity to be comprised of about 67% cobalt 60, 15% iodine 131, 4%
manatanese 54, and lesser amounts of cobalt 58, cesium 134, cesium
137, technetium 99m, and zinc 65.
Technical Specification 3.8 D.2.a limits the maximum permissible
concentration (MPC) of gross radioactivity (above backgreund), ex-
cluding tritium, in the discharge bay to IE-07 eCi/ml unless the
discharge is controlled on a radionuclide basis in accordance with
Appendix B, Table II, Column 2 of 10 CFR 20 and note 1 thereto. If
one were to make the conservative assumption that the 5 gpm from the
instrument manifold at the maximum measured concentration (before
dilution) of 2.4 E-03 uCi/ml entered the discharge bay directly (with-
out dilution of 15 gpm from the WWTP and dilution in the 30,000 gal-
lon Oil Separator Tank) and was diluted with it's 550,000 gpm, the
maximum concentration in the discharge bay and out the South Diffuser
would have been 2.2E-08 xCi/ml or 22% of the Technical Specification
limit.
If, based on after-the-fact isotopic analysis, this discharge
had been controlled on a radionuclide basis in accordance with 10 CFR
Appendix B, Table II, Column 2 and note 1 thereto, calculation shows
that the concentration was only about 1% of the MPC, using the same
conservative dilution analysis described above. Therefore, it is
concluded that this unplanned release did not exceed any release rate
limits.
6.
Other Findings Associated With Unplanned Release
Technical Specification 6.2.B requires that radiation control pro-
cedures be maintained and adhered to.
Radiation Protection Surveil-
lance Procedure QRS 300-1 titled " Station Liquid Discharge Records"
states in Paragraph E, " Limitations and Actions," " Measurements
shall be made on a representative sample of each batch released and
station records retained of the activity (mci) and concentration
pCi/ml of gross radioactivity and volume (gallons) of each batch of
liquid effluent released and estimates made of the water flow (gpm)
used to dilute the liquid effluent prior to release from the re-
stricted area."
A liquid sample from the 2B RHR Heat Exchanger was collected and
analyzed before initial draining of the heat exchanger began.
This
sample showed no activity above background levels.
No further samp-
les were taken during the release.
Technical Specification 3.8.D.1 states " Radioactive liquid released
from the facility shall be continuously monitored. To accomplish
this, either the radiation monitor on the discharge line or the dis-
charge bay sampler shall be operable or grab samples shall be taken
in the discharge bay during the course of the discharge."
-3-
Contrary to this requirement, the unplanned radioactive liquid re-
lease from the instrument manifold which began about 10:00 a.m. on
December 9, 1979, was not continuously monitored, in that:
(1) the
release path was not via the discharge line on which the radiation
monitor is located; (2) the compositer sampler on the ' south River
Diffuser line (the path from the discharge bay to the river during
this release) was not placed in operation; and (3) grat samples were
not collected from the discharge bay during the discharge.
(265/79-27-02)
Technical Specification 6.2.B requires that radiation control proce-
dures be maintained and adhered to. Radiation Control Prccedure QRP
100-1 titled " Radiation Control Standards" states in Paragraph F.16.
A.2.,
"Except as noted, a Special Work Permit (SWP) will be required
when personnel may or are expected to exceed a daily wholi body dose
of 50 millirem.
If however, a Radiation Protection man it in contin-
uous attendance at the job site while a job is in progress, he may
authorize a daily whole body dose of up to 100 millirem per day with-
out requiring an SWP."
A review of daily exposure records for Deceaber 9, 1979, for per-
sonnel involved in the operation in which the unplanned release oc-
curred showed an Equipment Attendant (EA) received a dose of 15 mrem
for the day and the Shift Foreman (SF) received a dose of 130 mron
for the day. The EA received about 15 mrem of his dose at the Rad-
waste Facility and the remaining 60 mrem dose he attributed to work
in the radiation field around the instrument manifold.
The SF in-
dicated he spent very little time near the instrument manifold, but
received nearly all of his 130 mrem in overseeing the draining of a
Reactor Recirculation Pump. The licensee provided no evidence that
either worker was working under an SWP or under continaous H.P. sur-
veillance. Workers exceeding 50 mrem of exposure in a day without
approved authorization is an apparent item of noncompliance.
(265/79-27-03)
As an immediate corrective action for the unplanned release, the
licensee discontinued the release of any RHR draining as nenradio-
active waste and is directing all such drainage be sent to t.he
Radwaste System.
Smearable activity of the blacktop surface, which remains restricted
by rope barricadgs and signs, initially ranged from about 2,000 t
2
11,000 dpm/100cm except for one smear showing about 90,000 dpm/100cm
near the point of release on the blacktop surface. As noted earlier,
the initial flush had been completed during the inspection.
Informa-
tion on reduction of contamination levels by the flushing was not
obtained by the inspector. The licensee had not finalized the decen-
tamination plan for the blacktop surface.
-4-
.
7.
Apparent Leak in the Unit IB RHR Heat Exchanger
The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is normally used for a few
days in the early stages of an outage to cool primary system water.
At other times, surveillance tests of the RHR system are conducted
at specified intervals to demonstrate operability.
Normally the
surveillance tests are conducted monthly, except that daily tests
are required of all remaining components if a component is known to
be out of service.
For a period of about two months in September
and October, 1979, the Unit IB RHR system was surveillance tested
daily while repairing a Service Water Pump. During this testing,
spikes which coincided with initiation of the RHR system began ap-
pearing on the Service Water Monitor Chart. A review of the chart
covering the period September 3 through October 5, 1979, showed the
spikes in early September were on the order of 70 net counts /sec
(cps), but increased with a few spikes in the range of 3000 to 6800
net cps in late September through early October. The three final
spikes on the chart ranged from 350 to 1000 net cps.
The service
water side of the heat exchanger is at a higher pressure than the
primary side when the heat exchanger is operating, but is at a lower
pressure when the Service Water Pump is not operating. The licensee
had not quantified the releases indicated by these spikes or deter-
mined the significance or lack of significance of these spikes. The
heat exchanger leak was being repaired at the time of the inspection,
and during the exit interview the licensee agreed to evaluate the
significance of the leak for review during a future inspection. The
licensee has identified previous leaks and made repairs of RHR heat
exchangers, including this same Unit IB heat exchanger in 1973, the
Unit 2B heat exchanger in 1975, and the Unit 2A heat exchanger in 1977.
However, daily testing during this leak period tends to increase the
significance of the release. Also, the Service Water Monitor has been
moved to a location with lower background radiation. The change in
location may have affected the monitor's sensitivity. This matter is
considered an unresolved item and will be reviewed during a future
inspection. (265/79-27-04)
8.
Unresolved Item
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is requir-
ed in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items
of noncompliance, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during
this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 7.
Exit Interview
The incpectors met with licensee representatives (Denoted in Paragraph 1
of Details 1 and 2) at the conclusion of the inspection on December 14,
1979, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities,
including the items of noncompliance and the unresolved items. The licen-
see acknowledged the inspectors comments and stated that the event occur-
red solely as a result of the failure to follow the apporved Temporary
Procedure.
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