ML19290G237
| ML19290G237 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/28/1980 |
| From: | Jennifer Davis NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19290G239 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7, TASK-CC, TASK-SE SECY-80-486, NUDOCS 8011140484 | |
| Download: ML19290G237 (22) | |
Text
9 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHIN GTON, D. C. 20555 October 28, 1980 SECY-80-486 CONSENT CALEMDAR ITEM For:
The Commissioners From:
John G. Davis, Director
'3
/4 Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
)
William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations [
Thru:
Subject:
RESOLUTION OF THE PAT-DOWN SEARCH ISSUE AT POWER REACTORS AND STATUS OF RELATED SAFEGUARDS ACTIVITIES
Purpose:
a.
To obtain Commission approval for proposed rule changes to implement search procedures at power reactor protected area entry portals (see Enclosure A).
b.
To extend the current relief from routine pat-down searches of employees from November 1, 1980 until licensees have implemented the revised search requirement of (a) abova (see Enclosure B).
c.
To report on the status of other safeguards measures designed to improve protection against the insider threat.
Catecory:
A matter requiring Commission action.
Discussion:
Backgrourd, In response to SECY 79-598, the Commission decided to defer implementation of routine physical pat-down searches of regular employees at power reactors as well as other complementary and alternative measures for protection against insider sabotage. This defer-ment was for the purpose of allowing NMSS and RES sufficient time to further study the insider threat problem at power reactors and to formulate recommenda-CONTACT:
tions for increasing the protection against the insider Tom R. Allen - SGRI threat (see 44 FR 65969).
The staff wishes to inform the Comission of a series of ongoing and planned actions in 42-74181 this area, and to seek Commission approval to publish regulatory amendments dealing with entry searches at power reactors.
SECY NOTE:
This paper is identical to Advance Copies which were distributed to Commission Offices on Tuesday, A.M., October 28, 1980.
D01114o
- Near Term Regulatory Actions The staff has underway four proposed regulatory changes aimed at addressing various aspects of the insider protec-tion problem.
The actions are:
(1) the proposed adoption of clarified regulatory requirements for search measures to be used in lieu of routine pat-down searches of employees at power reactors (see Enclosure A), (2) the development of a regulation for an industry-administered screening program for power reactor personnel, (3) the proposed adoption of clarified and strengthened requirements for vital area access (which have been out for public comment and are undergoing revision),
and (4) the improved verification of security force employment data.
With regard to search procedures, the staff now believes that a program of equipment-oriented searches, supplemented with pat-down searches in certain instances should be adopted on a permanent basis.
The proposed search requirements work in conjunction with the recent Commission decision to pursue an industry-run screening program for power reactor personnel (see screening program discussion below) to help protect against insiders.
Further rationale for the proposed search procedure is developed in Enclosure C.
The proposed search procedures include:
a.
The processing of all persons through the use of both firearms and explosive detection equipment upon each entry through a protected area portal.
If either firearm detection equipment or explosive detection equipment is inoperable all persons shall be subjected to a physical pat-down search.
b.
The physical pat-down search of all visitors, regardless of the status of the search equipment.
c.
The physical pat-down search of any individual who causes the licensee to have a suspicion that such person is attempting to introduce contraband items into a protected area.
Enclosure A is a proposed Federal Register notice request-ing public comment on amendments to 10 CFR 573.55 that would impose the above search requirements.
Until such time that these amendments are commented on by the public and subsequently finalized, present interim search requirements will continue to be implemented.
A second major activity designed to provide improved insider protection is the screening program for power reactor personnel. As mentioned above, the Commission recently directed the staff to prepare a proposed rule
. to institute an industry-run pre-employment screening program for power reactors that generally follows ANSI Standard 18.17 and the recommendations of the Hearing Board in the Clearance Rule proceeding.
The staff may recomend that such a program include psychological evaluation and behavioral observation techniques.
Work has already commenced on the proposed rule.
A third measure for improving protection against insider sabotage involves tighter access controls over vital areas.
A draft amendment to 10 CFR 873.55 on this subject has been published for public comment (see SECY 79-682). Further potential changes to that amendment now contemplated by the staff include minimization of vital area access authoriza-tion based on a demonstrable need, additional positive controls to assure that only the authorized individual gains access to a vital area on that individual's authoriza-tion, and documented justifications for each non-emergency approved vital area access authorization.
The fcurth planned measure which will potentially increase protection against insider sabotage involves amendments to Appendix B of Part 73 (General Criteria for Security Personnel),
which clarify the requirement that licensees verify employment data pertinent to applicants for security positions.
Included in this amendment will be the provision that licensees advise applicants for security force positions that falsifica-tion of documents required by NRC regulations is subject to criminal penalties under 18 USC 1001. The Appendix B amendments will be the subject of an upcoming staff paper.
Longer Term Regulatory Actions In the future, the staff plans to cr, sider alternatives such as:
o More stringent criteria for access to vital areas.
o
- Compartmentalization of vital areas to the maximum extent practicable to minimize unnecessary access to vital equipment. The compartmentalization effort will be based in part on the LASL vital area analysis pro-ject.
- Compartmentalization means the construction of physical barriers that subdivide vital areas.
_4_
o Work-rules in various configurations, such as area, team or functional zones may have some application to a residual number of vital areas after maximum practicable compartmentalization has been accomplished.
Recommendation:
That the Commission:
(1) Approve the amendments as set forth in Enclosure "A" and Enclosure "B", which deal with final search pro-cedures for power reactors, for publication in the Federal Register.
(2) Note that a value impact statement concerning the proposed amendments is not needed because the proposed amendments formalize search requirements similar to those already in effect on an interim basis for the past several years.
Most reactor licensees already possess the needed search equipment. The only significant changes between the interim search requirements and those proposed involve procedural factors that would heavily impact the licensee only in the unlikely event that all search equipment of a given type (explosives or firearms detectors) becomes inoperable at the same time.
(3) Note that a public announcement as appears in Enclosure "D" will be issued when the amendments are filed with the Office of the Federal Register.
(4) Note that the appropriate Congressional Committees will be notified of this action.
(5) Note that neither an environmental impact statement nor a negative declaration need be prepared since the proposed amendments are not significant from the standpoint of environmental impact.
Coordination:
The Offices of Standards Development and Nuclear Reactor Regulation concur in the content of this paper.
The Executive Legal Director has no legal objection.
The Office of Inspection and Enforcement concurs in the recommendations regarding the pat-down search rule.
Schedulino:
For affirmation at an early Commission session.
(If the rule is not affirmed by 10-31-80, the current deferment no lenger applies and pat down searches would be reouired according to 10 CFR 73.55.
NMSS will contact Commissioners directly in order to either provide for prompt affirmation or extension of deferment.)
/ John
. Davis, Directo Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Enclosures:
"A" - Proposed Federal Register Notice Proposed Rule "B" - Proposed Federal Register Notice Final Rule - Extension of Pat-Down Scarch Relief "C" - Comparison of Present and Proposed Search Procedures at Nuclear Power Reactor Protected Areas "D" - Public Announcement - NRC Considers Regulations on Searching Individuals Who Enter Nuclear Power Plants DISTRIBUTION Commissioners Commission Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operations ACRS ASLBP ASLAP Socrotariat Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Thursday, October 30, 1980.
Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT October 29, 1980, with an information copy to the office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
This paper is tentatively scheduled for affirmation at an Open Meeting on Friday, October 31, 1980
Title 10 - Energy Chapter I - Nuclear Regulatory Commission Part 73 - Physical Protection of Plants and Materials Requirements for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants Agency:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Action:
Proposed rule.
Summary:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to amend its regulations to clarify requirements for searches of individuals at power reactor facilities protected area entry portals. The amendment requires searches similar to those used on an interim basis at power reactors prior to November 1,1980.
Dates:
Comments must be received within (45 days after publication in the Federal Register.)
Addresses:
Comments in connection with this rulemaking should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555. Attention: Docketing and Service Branch. Copies of comments received may be examined at the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
For Further Information
Contact:
L. J. Evans, Jr., Chief, Regulatory Improvements Branch, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
20555, (301) 427-4181.
Supplementary Information:
The Commission proposes to amend 10 CFR 573.55 to adopt final requirements for searches of individuals at power reactor protected area entry portals.
Enclosure "A"
2_
Since April of 1977, power reactor facilities have generally conformed to interim search procedures which were developed as an alternative to routine 100% pat-down search of all employees. The Commission has deferred implementation of routine pat-down searches of employees, and certain other measures pending its decision on a program to help assure the trustworthiness of individuals at nuclear power plants and the evaluation of possible alterr.ative measures (see 44 FR 65969). The Commission has since directed that an industry administered pre-employment screening program be developed along the lines recommended by the Hearing Board in the Clearance Rule proceeding.
The Commission's goal in this regard is to increase the assurance that power reactors are adequately protected against sabotage by an insider.
Based on the fact that a screening program is under development, and its experience with the interim search procedures, the Commission is now prepared to adopt final search procedures for power reactor facilities.
The Commission has decided that mandatory equipment-oriented searches augmented by pat-down searcher under cer-tain conditions, are an acceptable alternative to routine pat-down searches of all employees.
The Commission has also decided to eliminate the term "well-grounded" (now found in 10 CFR 73.55) when referring to the suspicion a licensee must have before performing a pat-down search on a suspect individual.
Because of the vagueness of the term it has been found to be impracticable to implement that aspect of the search requirement on a day to day basis.
The Commission is also issuing an immediately effective extension to the current relief from pat-down searches in 10 CFR 573.55 until 60 days after approval of security plan amendments that define how the final search requirements will be met, in order to accommodate the rulemaking procedure for this proposed amendment.
Enclosure "A"
. Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and Section 553 of Title 5 of the United States code, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73, is contemplated.
Part 73 - Physical 'rotection of Plants and Materials 1
Section 73.55(d)(1) of 10 CFR Part 73 is amended to read as follows:
(d) Access requirements.
(1) The licensee shall control ali paints of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area *to ensure that only authorized individuals, vehicles, and materials enter.
Identification and search of all individuals shall be made and authorization shall be checked at such points.
[The-search-function fer-detecti on-of-fi rea rms-- e xpi esi ves-- and-i nc endi a ry - dev i c e s - s h al t be-conducted-either-by-a physical-search-or-by-use-of-equipment-capabie of-detecting such-devices.] Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the search function for detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices shall be accomplished through the use of both firearms and explosive detection equipment capable of detecting such devices.
In addition to the sea'rches set fo-th above, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat-down search on all visitors who reauire access to the protected area. The licensee shall also conduct a
- Comparative text shows changes between proposed rule and current regulations.
Underlined text shows additions and dashed through text shows deletions.
Enclosure "A"
. physical pat-down search on any individual desiring access into the protected area who causes the licensee to have a suspicion that such individual is attempting to introduce firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices into the protected area. Whenever firearms or explosive detection equipment is out of service or not operating satisfactorily, the licensee shall conduct a physical pat-down search of all persons who have not been properly searched by such equipment, prior to their entry into the protected area. The individual responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) shall be isolated within a bullet-resisting structure as described in paragraph (c)(6) of this section to assure [theiF] his ability to respond or to summon assistance.
By (45 days from the effective date of this amendment) each licensee shall submit proposed amendments to his security plan which define how the amended search requirements of this paragraph will te met.
The amended search requirements of this paragraph shall be implemented by the licensee witnin 60 days after Commi-ssion aoproval of the proposed security plan. amendments.
[Sec. 1611, Pub. L.83-703, 68 Stat. 948, Pub. L.93-377, 88 Stat. 475; Sec. 201. Pub. L.93-438, 88 Stat.1242-1423, (42 U.S.C. 2201, 5841)]
Dated at Washington, D.C., this day of
,1980.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Samuel J. Chilk Secretary for the Commission Enclosure "A"
Title 10 - Energy Chapter I - Nuclear Regulatory Commission Part 73 - Physical Protection of Plants and Materials Requirements for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants Agency:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Action:
Final Rule Summary: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is i.xtending its current relief from pat-down searches of regular employees at nuclear power reactors in order to accommodate a rulemakir.; proceeding concerning revisions to its rules in 10 CFR 573.55 intended to finalize requirements for entry searches at such facilities.
Effective Date:
(Date of publication)
For Further Information
Contact:
L. J. Evans, Jr., Chief, Regulatory Improve-ments Branch, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, (301) 427-4181.
Supplementary Information: On July 31, 1979, the Commission changed the date from August 1,19/9, to November 1,1979, when pat-down searches of regular employees of nuclear power plant licensees had to be implemented.
The rationale for this extension was provided in the Federal Register notice on this subject, 44 FR 47758, August 15, 1979. The Commission further extended the implementation date to November 1,1980. The rationale for that extension is contained in 44 FR 65969.
Enclosure "B" The Commission plans to issue proposed revisions to 10 CFR 173.55(d)(1) to finalize requirements for personnel searches at protected area entry portals of power reactors.
The extension of the relief from physical pat-down searches of regular employees contained herein is intended to allow sufficient time for public comment on the proposed search requirements and their imple-mentation, if adopted.
Because this rule delays a requirement, and merely continues a temporary situation for another limited period of time, the Commission finds that notice and public procedure are unnecessary and that the change can be made immediately effective without the customary 30 day period of notice required by 5 U.S.C. 553.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganiza-tion Act of 1974, as amended, and sections 552 and 553 of title 5 of the United States Code, the following Amendment to Title 10 Cnapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73 is published as a document subject to codification.
1.
The unnumbered prefatory paragraph of section 73.55 of 10 CFR Part 73 is amended to read as follows:
573.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.
Each licensee who is authorized on February 24, 1977, to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to Part 50 of this Chapter shall comply with the requirements of paragraphs (b), (d), (f), (g), and (h) of this section, Enclosure "B"
. except for any requirement involving construction and instellation of equip-ment not already in place expressed in paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(7), (d)(8k (f)(3) and (h)(4), by May 25, 1977.
The licensee shall submit by May 25, 1977, an amended physical security plan describing how the licensee will comply with all of the requirements of this section including schedules of implementation. The licensee shall implement his plan and comply with all of the provisions of this section as soon as practicable after NRR approval of his plan but no later than February 23, 1979.
Each applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter whose application was submitted prior to February 24, 1977 shall submit by May 25, 1977, an amended physical security plan describing how the applicant plans to comply with the requirements of this section including schedules of implementation.
If such applicant receives an operating license after February 24, 1977 he shall comply with the requirements of paragraphs (b),
(d), (f), (g), and (h) of this section, except for construction and installa-tion not already in place pursuant to paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(7), (d)(8), (f)(3) and (h)(4) of this section by May 25, 1977, or on the date of receipt of the operating license, whichever is later, and implement his plan and comply with all of the requirements of this section by February 23, 1979 or on the date of receipt of the operating license whichever is later.
Each applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to part 50 of this Chapter whose application is submitted after February 24, 1977, shall include in the physical security plan required by 150.34(c) the information identified in paragraphs (a) through (h) of this section and if such applicant receives an operating license, shall comply with the provisions of this section on receipt of the operating license.
Except for individuals for whom the Enclosure "B"
4_
licensee has a well-grounded suspicion that such individuals are carrying firaarms, explosives, or incendiary devices, a licensee need not implement the physical search requirement of paragraph (d)(1) of this section for individuals who are regular employees of the licensee at the site at which the licensee is authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to Part 50 of this Chapter until *[NevembeF-b-1989-URieSs-the-CeRR4SSien d4Fests-etheFwise-pFieF-te-that-date] 60 days following Commission approval of security plan amendments which define how the final search requirements of paragraph (d)(1) of this section will be met.
Until that date [and-pending 4ts-fwFtheF-FeView-ef-thiS-SHbjest,] the Commission has determined that the search requirement of paragraph (d)(1) of this section, implemented using only equipment capable of detecting firearms, explosives and incendiary devices, satisfies the performance requirements of this section as they apply to searches of regular employees of the licensee at the site entering the protected area of the nuclear power reactor.
[Sec. 1611, Pub. L.83-703, 68 Stat. 948, Pub. L.93-377, 88 Stat. 475; Sec. 201. Pub. L.93-438, 88 Stat.1242-1243, (42 U.S.C. 2201, 5841)].
Dated at Washington, D.C., this day of
,1980.
For' the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commissior.
- Comparative text shows changes between current regulations and effective rule.
Underlined text shows additions and dashed through text shows deletions.
Enclosure "B"
COMPARIS0N OF PRESENT AND PROPOSED SEARCH PROCEDURES AT NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR PROTECTED AREAS This enclosure provides description and rationale for the differencas between present interim search procedures ar.d those proposed.
Discussions are keyeu to the lettered columns of Figure 1.
A.
Use of Equipment Searches for Regular Employees and Contractors The staff has, in effect, formalized search procedures similar to those that have been utilized at most reactor facilities prior to November,1980. Under the new <equirements, use of equipment searches for all individuals would be mandatory.
B.
Random Pat-Down of Non-Site Employees The staff feels that the current guideline of 5% random pat-down search of non-site employees can be deleted.
(All licensee employees and centractor personnel will be subjected to equipment searches.)
C.
Routine Pat-Down of Site Employees The proposed search procedures sustain an exempt. ion of regular employees from rcutine pat-down searches when they are subjected to both firearms and explosive detection equipment prior to protected area entry. The staff believes that such exemption is appropriate in view of the experience gained with the interim search procedures. This policy will also recognize the credit that can be given to employees who may be subjected to a future screening program.
D.
Pat-Down of Visitors Proposed search procedures require the continuatica of routine pat-down search of visitors and equipment searches of such persons. The staff feels that both physical and equipment searches of visitors are prudent because of uncertainties concerning their trustworthiness.
E.,F.,G.
Pat-Down When Detection Equipment Fails or Is Not In Place Present interim search procedures require certain percentage random pat-down searches for non-regular employees whenever detection equip-ment fails to operate or is not in place. The staff believes that in order to achieve a consistent level of protection, all persons should be subject to pat-down searches if all available explosive detection or firearms detection equipment is inoperable.
Because many licensees possess multiple detection units of each type, the likelihood of frequent pat-down searches of all employees at a given site is low.
Enclosure "C"
.. -.. ~ _ -. - _
........ +. ~,........ -..... >....
SEARCH MEASURES A
B C
D E
F G
H Pat-Down of Employees When Both Explo-Pat-Down of Employees Pat-Down of Employ-sive andFirearms Use of Equipment When Exnlosive ees Uhen Firearms Detection Equip-Searches for Regular Random Pat-Down Routine Detection Lquipment Detection Equip-ment Falls or Employees and of Non-Site Pat-Down of Pat-Down of Falls or Not In ment Fails or Not Not In Contractors Employees Site Employees Visitors Place
- s. Place Place Suspicion e
h3 Present
!!ast sites presently 5%
None All 10% random 20% random 20% random All (Interim) use equipment for of non-regular of non-regular of non-regular (Well-Grounded) j searches of all employees e nployees employees individuals including regular employees and contractors Proposed All persons must (Requirement None All All All All All be subjected to deleted - All Persons Persons Persons equipment searches employees will be treated alike)
T C,
3 FIGURE 1 4
4
. H.
Suspicion The proposed search procedures slightly modify requirements contained in present interim procedures for pat-down searches to be conducted for a suspicion that attempts are being made to smuggle contraband items through a protected area portal. The term "well-grounded" was dropped when referring to the suspicion a licensee must have before perfoming a pat-down search on a suspect individual due to the difficulty in determining whether a suspicion is well-grounded.
Enclosure "C"
NRC CONSIDERS REGULATIONS ON SEARCHING INDIVIDUALS WHO ENTER NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering changing its regulations to finalize requirements for searching individuals who enter controlled areas at nuclear power plants.
The proposed search requirements are similar to current interim search procedures used by NRC licensees and are aimed at preventing the introduction of firearms, explosives and incenM.ary des ces into controlled or " protected" areas i
of nuclear facilities.
The search regulations are part of the Commission's broader requirements for the physical protection of nuclear power plants against sabotage.
Licensees are required to establish physical security systems according to NRC-approved security plans.
" Vital equipment"
-- which includes any equipment or systems whose failure could result in endangering the public health and safety by radiation exposure -- must be contained in a " vital area," which in turn must be contained in a protected area surrounded by a physical barrier such as a fence or wall.
Under the proposed regulations, licensees would be required to use appropriate firearm and explosive detection equipment to search all individt>1s--including employees--
who enter a protected area.
In addition, licensees would be Enclosure "D"
- required to conduct a physical pat-down search of all visitors who enter the area.
In cases where licensees have a suspicion that an employee is attempting to introduce firearms, explosives or incendiary devices into the pro-tected area, tne licensee would also be required to perform a pat-down search on the suspect employee.
If firearm or explosive detection equipment is out of service or not operating satisfactorily, the licensee would be required to conduct a physical pat-down search of all persons--including employees--who wish to enter the protected area.
Interested persons are invited to submit written com-ments on the proposed amendments, which are to Part 73 of the Commission's regulations, to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
20555, Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch, by (45 days after publication of the proposed amendments in the Federal Register on
).
Enclosure "D"