ML19290E616

Second Set of Interrogatories Directed to Nrc.Requests Analysis of Certain TMI-2 Related Accident Sequences for Inclusions in TMI-1 DBA Analysis

ML19290E616
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	02/25/1980
From:	Bowers J ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUP REPRESENTING YORK
To:	NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
Shared Package
ML19290E615	List: ML19290E613 ML19290E616 ML19290E617 ML19290E618 ML19290E623
References
NUDOCS 8003140291
Download: ML19290E616 (2)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,,,

s? ) A l l 1. ' ' ' HETROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289 (Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart) Station, Unit One) ) ) ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUP REPRESENTING YORK INTERROGATORIES TO NRC STAFF (SECOND SET) Intervenor Anti-Nuclear Group Representing York (ANGRY) hereby propounds its - second set of interrogatories to the NRC Staff pursuant to 10 CFR 2.740b and

2. 720 (h) (2) (ii) . These interrogatories are deer :d to be continuing, and shall be supplemented in accordance with 10 CFR 2.740(e).

6. Does the Staff agree or disagree with the conclusion of the NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group that "the design bases of TMI's radwaste system were exceeded" during the accident (Vol. 2, Pt. 2, p. 70). Explain fully the reasons for any disagreement.

a. If there is agreement, identify precisely each component of TMI's radwaste system fo. which the quoted conclusion applies, state the precise extent to which the design basis of every such component was exceeded, and describe the modifications, if any, being made to the TMI-l radwaste system to take account of such unforseen demand.

7. Identify by nace and agency affiliation each cember of the Regional Advisory Committee that will review Pennsylvania state and local emergency reppense plans for thMr conformance to NRC concurrence standards,

n. What is the present timetable for such review.

8. Analyze the following TMI-2 related accident sequences with respect to the need for their inclusion in TMI-l's design basis accident analysis:

a. Assume failure to close PORV block valve at 142 minutes into the accident causing production of increased quantities of non-condensible hydrogen gas and corresponding increased difficulty in establishing adequate core cooling both through natural circulation or through operation cf reactor coolant pumps,

b. Assume exhaustion of borated water storage tank water supply due to heavy opera-tion of cake-up/let-down system, resultant use o'f highly contaminated water from containment sump in said system, and further resultant impaircent of containment spray system due to inadequate radiation shielding. Such impairment may be considered to be caused either by direct effect of water contamination or by high-radiation-level caused inaccessibility precluding repair of other malfunction.

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c. Assume increase of PORV set-point to 2450 psig. Assume further loss of main and auliliary feeduater. Finally assume operator failure to manually open FORV to lower primary pressure and allow acuation of3EEI system.

Such operator failure may be considered to have been caused by either misleading pressurizer level indication, inadequate or confusing procedures, or inability to properly diagnose plant status. Respectfully submitted, Anti-Nucle r Creup, Representing York By: ' k Ch/4V John Bowers 245 W. Philadelphia St. York, Pa. 17402 DATE: February 25, 1980