ML19290E409

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QA Program Insp Rept 99900064/79-01 on 791210-14.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup on IE Bulletins & Circulars,Reported Deficiencies & Action on Previous Insp Findings
ML19290E409
Person / Time
Issue date: 01/14/1980
From: Brown R, Whitesell D
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML19290E408 List:
References
REF-QA-99900064 99900064-79-1, NUDOCS 8003110096
Download: ML19290E409 (11)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGUI.ATORY COTIISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No. 99900064/79-01 Program No. 51300 Company:

Ingersoil-Rand Company Centre and Green Streets Phillipsburg, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:

December 10-14, 1979 Y Pd Inspector:

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Ross L. Brown, Contractor Inspector Date Component Section I Vendor Inspection Branch Approved b..- s g Q,'J' O

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4 IUD D. E. Whitesell, Chief Date Component Section I Vendor Inspection Branch Summary Inspection on December 10-14, 1979 (99900064/79-01)

Areas Inspected:

Initial management meeting, follow-up on IE Bulletins -

IE Circulars and other reported construction deficiencies, and action on previous inspection findings.

Inspection involved thirty (30) inspection hours on site.

Results:

No deviations from commitment or unresolved items were identified during this inspection.

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2 DETAILS SECTION A.

Persons Contacted J. M. Bartos, Product Manager Marine - Nuclear J. J. Eyen, Nuclear Pump Contracts _ Supervising Product Engineer

  • M. F. Hagerstrom, Manager Quality Assurance C. D. Johnson, QA Engineer
  • R. Suswal, QC Engineer
  • B. M. Swoyer, S'cervisor QC Contracts
  • Attended exit interview.

B.

Initial Management Meeting 1.

Objectives The objectives of this meeting were to accomplish the following:

To meet with the company management and those persons responsible a.

for the administration of the QA program and to establish channels of communications.

b.

To determine the extent of the company's involvement in the in the commercial nuclear business.

To describe the NRC evaluation of the ASME inspection system.

c.

d.

To describe the scope of this inspection relative to the action on previous NRC inspection finding and the construction deficiencies reported to the NRC (these items are covered in detail in Paragraphs C, D, E).

2.

Methods of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by a meeting on December 10, 1979. The following is a summary of the meeting:

a.

The attendees:

M. F. Hagerstrom, Manager Quality Assurance B. M. Swoyer, Supervisor Quality Control Contracts

3 b.

The present VIB organization and its relationship to the NRC Regions and Headquarters component of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement.

c.

The scope and status of the NRC program for evaluation of the ASME inspection system was discussed.

d.

The company's contribution to the commerical nuclear industry was discussed including current and projected activity.

3.

Results The inspector was provided with the following information:

The channels of communication have not changed.

a.

b.

The Ingersoll-Rand Company (IRC) presently has contracts for commercial nuclear pumps scheduled for completion in late 1980.

c '.

IRC-ASME, Nuclear Certificates N-1866 expires on September 27, 1980.

C.

Action on Previous Inspection Findings 1.

(Closed) Deviation A (Report No. 78-01):

The " Internal Corrective Action" form (QCM-462) Exhibit No. 48 of the Quality Assurance Manual (QAM) has been revised to include sections for the cause and corrective actions.

The inspector verified the implementation of the requirements of the exhibit and QAM Section Number N-19 " Corrective Action," by a review of four (4) Internal Corrective Action Reports (CAR).

2.

(Closed) Deviation B (Report No. 78-01):

The Inspector reviewed CAR No. 650, that required:

a.

The casing in question to be reheat treated in accordance with the Post Weld Heat Treatment (PWHT) procedure CHTG-1000, Revision 0 Heat treat chart 1262 verified the heat treatment was accomplished using two (1) thermocouples at 1350 F.

b.

A training session to be held with all involved personnel.

Training Session Report No. 2 stated that the training session was held and identified the attendees and the instructor.

4 c.

That the PWHT procedure be posted in the welding area.

The inspector verified that the procedure is parted in the weld area.

3.

(Closed) Deviation C (Report No. 78-01):

The inspector verified that:

a.

Welding Procedure QWP3-TH8.8-25, Revision 5, dated October 4, 1976, deletes the requirements for the air blast and bare hand technique for the control of interpass temperature.

b.

Internal Request for Corrective Action Report No. 652, (issued as a result of NRC findings) Corrective Action Section states that Digital Heat Prober Thermometers are on order to control interpass temperature (IRC Welding Engineer states this method is more reliable than the past method) and that the welders have been instructed on the proper use of the equipment and procedure. Training Session Report No. 3 verified the training.

IRC management stated that Weld Procedure No. OWP-CE8.0-2780 is not used for commercial nuclear work.

4.

(Closed) Deviation D (Report No. 78-01): The inspector verified that QAM Section N-16, Paragraph 3.0, has been revised to delete the requirement of having the Chief Inspector approve and sign Hydrostatic Test Procedures.

5.

(Closed) Deviation E (Report No. 78-01):

The inspector was informed by IRC management that the eye chart in question was destroyed and replaced with a Jaeger No. 1 chart that comforms with SNT-TC-1A; 1975 during the previous NRC inspection September 13, 1978.

Since that date all IRC-NDE personnel have been reexamined using the Jaeger No. 1 Chart with no adverse findings.

The inspector reviewed four (4) NDE personnel qualification files and verified the reexaminations were conducted.

D.

Reported Deep Draft Pump Deficiencies 1.

Background Information On July 11, 1979, IE issued IE Bulletin No. 79-15 concerning Ingersoll Rand Co. deep draft pump deficiencies.

The deficiencies were reported to be:

Loose impeller bolts, loose keeps - keyway fit, excessive pump shaft runout, bearing clearance exceeded specified tolerance, coupling thread galled, wear ring clearance s

5 i

out-of-specification, impeller-to-shaft clearance out-of-specification, and cracks in second and third stage impellers.

2.

Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to determine:

The utility companies that have purchased these type pumps.

a.

b.

Whether IRC notified these companies concerning the reported deficiencies.

Whether IRC has determined the cause of the discrepancies.

c.

d.

Whether IRC has taken actions to correct the discrepancies, and Whether IRC has taken appropriate actions to prevent recurrence e.

of similiar discrepancies.

3.

Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:

Discussions with IRC management personnel.

a.

b.

Review of Technical Manual for Commonwealth Edison Company LaSalle Nos. I and 2 - Low Pressure Core Spray pumps, Customer's Order No. AG-765.

Review of the Manager of Quality Assurance Report, dated c.

August 20, 1979; related to the Lasalle Nos. I and 2 deficiencies reported in IE Bulletin 79-15 (this report was declared by IRC management to include sensitive information) and the report supplement dated September 4, 1979.

d.

Review of the Section No. N-7, Design Control, of the Quality Assurance Manual (QAM).

e.

Review of the list of IRC pumps installed in commercial nuclear power plants dated August 2, 1979.

f.

Review of IRC drawing F-29APKD500X2D.

6 4.

Findings The IRC management personnel furnished the inspector with the following resume of activities related to the deficiencies reported in IE Bulletin 79-15.

The questionable pumps identified by this bulletin, were part a.

of General Electric Company (GE) purchase order for eighty (80) pumps and Westinghouse (W) order for fifteen (15) pumps.

These orders were accepted in 1971.

The purchase orders were for commercial grade pumps with contract unique requirements.

They were not at the time code items.

However, the IRC customers did accept the quality program in use at the time IRC's original ASME certificate was issued on September 14, 1971.

b.

Any deviation from specifications, and/or drawing standards, were reviewed and approved by IRC engineering for its effect on reliability, performance, interchangeability and maintainability (Fit, Form & Function).

The utilization of the specific pumps were identified in c.

the bulletin as being:

six (6) Residual Heat Removal (RHR),

two (2) High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) and two (2) Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS), purchased by GE for Commonwealth Edison Company - LaSalle Nos. I and 2; Westinghouse purchased four (4) LPCS pumps for VEPCO-North Anna Nos. 1 and 2 and two (2) LPCS for Duquesne-Beaver Valley No.

1.

The following information is relative to these pumps.

(1) The LaSalle pumps were in flood water at the construction site.

(a)

IRC requested the utility company to return these pumps to IRC plant to be disassemblied, cleaned, reassemblied and tested following the flood, this request was refused.

(b) The pumps were disassemblied and inspected in the field by the utility company personnel, at this time the noted deficiencies were identified.

(c) Five (5) RHR and two (2) LPCS pumps were returned to IRC for the necessary corrective actions.

7 (d) The pumps were 100% dimensionally inspected and the dimensions recorded, and the utility representative witnessed this inspection.

(e)

IRC Engineering Department reviewed the dimensional inspection report, and determined that each pump should function as intended.

It was also determined and documented that the dimensional deviations had been previously identified, reviewed, and accepted by MRB action.

IRC management determined that the Technical Manuals for all nump types should be revised to specify the acceptable tolerances that will more nearly represent the as built condition.

(f) The original design provided for the pump shaft sections (A276-Type 410) to be joined by a threaded coupling (A276-Type 410), which was found to seize when screwed together.

To correct this problem, IRC recommends splitting the coupling and replacing it with a new coupling.

To prevent recurrenc2 the design has been modified to a non-threaded coupling.

These pumps were fitted with the new design.

The new designed couplings and installation instruction are available from IRC, and have been offered to all customers for ease of maintenance.

(g) The cracks in the second and third stage impellers were probably caused during the removal of the impellers from the shaft, however, the specification and code requires a visual inspection only and small cracks could have been missed.

(h) The pumps were reassembled and performance tested.

The utility company witnessed the test.

(i)

IRC had not been informed concerning the status of the remaining LaSalle pumps.

8 (2)

IRC management stated that the deficiencies identified in the North Anna Nos. I and 2 and Beaver Valley 1, were apparently caused by the following:

(a) The Suction Barrels (shells) were fabricated and installed by the customer.

These shells were not properly fabricated and/or installed because when the pull-out pumping elements were-installed the specified alignment could not, or at least was not, obtained.

This misalignment would result in excessive shaft whip and vibration.

(b) These pumps are longer than the standard pump, and the shaft bearings spaced at a greater distances, which would magnify the vi.bration caused by misalignment, and result in damage to the pump parts.

IRC management stated that they und been requested by the customer to correct the situation with minimum delay in time.

The corrective action was accomplished by stiffening the units by shortening the Outer Column lengths and installing additional shaft bearings.

(3) The actions taken to preclude recurrence are:

(a)

Continual emphasis on accuracy during final inspection.

(b) Product Engineering will review all customers interface documents (drawings, specification and procedures) in accordance with a prepared checklist to assure conformance with the IRC design requirements.

(c) Revise the Technical Manual for clarifications and to specify the acceptable dimensions.1 tolerances.

(d)

IRC management stated that they believe the remaining Deep Draft Pumps will operate as intended, however, the revised coupling design will facilitate the pump maintenance.

No deviations from commitments or unresolved items were identified in this area of the inspection.

9 E.

Loose Locking Device on Pump Impeller 1.

Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to determine:

The utility companies that have purchased this type pump.

a.

b.

Whether IRC notified their customers / utility company, concerning the problem.

Whether IRC has deternined tie cause of the discrepancy.

c.

d.

Whether IRC has taken appropriate corrective actions.

Whether IRC has taken positive action to preclude recurrence.

e.

2.

Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:

Discussions with IRC management personnel.

a.

b.

Review of the Technical Manual.

c.

Review of Internal Memorandum from Marine-Nuclear Product Engineering to Parts Production Planning dated August 29, 1979.

d.

Review of the list of customers / utilities that have purchased this type pump.

e.

Review of drawing C-39EMTA86X48-G.

3.

Findings The IRC management furnished the inspector with the following information relative to the deficiency reported in IE Circular 79-19.

a.

The pumps in question were assembled and tested by IRC in its plant prior to shipment.

These operations would require the impeller to be in place and the locknut torqued to the specified foot pounds (ft. lbs.).

10 b.

When the pump is in operation the shaft rotation tends to tighten the left-hand locknut, however, it was determined that at some plants the valves on the discharge side of the pump rerzined open after the pump was shut down, which would permit a flow tackward through the pump causing a reverse rotation which could have caused the locknut ta loosen.

IRC has changed the design of the impeller locking arrangement c.

from a straight torqued locknut to a positive mechanical locking device (tab washer etc) held in place with the left-hand locknut tightened to a specified torque value.

d.

IRC has one hundred and seventy (170) of these type (W-WD and WDF) pumps installed in various commercial nuclear power plants.

Approximately 50% of these pumps have been backfit with the new locking arrangement.

e.

All customers have been contacted and offered the backfit kit.

They have been supplied with a revised Technical Manual that describes the installation of new locking arrangement.

f.

All of these type pumps shipped since mid year of 1979, and all future pumps will be fitted with the new locking arrangement.

No deviations or unresolved items were identified during this area of the inspection.

F.

Exit Interview The inspector conducted an exit meeting with Ingersoll-Rand Company management personnel at the conclusion of the inspection.

Those persons indicated by an asterisk in Paragraph A were in attendance.

In addition, the following were present:

W. J. Schmidt, Vice President Operations T. J. Smith, Authorized Nuclear Inspector - Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company The inspector discussed the scope of the inspection.

The inspector stated that the previous inspection findings are considered to be closed.

The NRC method of reporting was discussed, the inspector informed those present that IRC will receive a copy of the inspection report for their review for any proprietary information.

They were also informed how to transmit any proprietary information they wish to have deleted.

11 The company representatives acknowledged the statements by the inspector and their comments were for clarification only.