ML19290C392
| ML19290C392 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/28/1978 |
| From: | Angelo J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Fraley R Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-17, REF-GTECI-SY, TASK-A-17, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8001110149 | |
| Download: ML19290C392 (10) | |
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]!!.:hR't;DU.1 FGD; Raymond F. Fraley, Executive Director, Adivsory Cor.nittee on Reactor Safeguards f N1:
Ichn Ingelo, Task Manager 5U'JJ ECT :
STATUS OF TASK A-17, "SYSTElis IflTERACTIO;1 !!! l10 CLEAR POWER PLA::TS" Enclosed is cor report on the status of the task on systems interaction for cc.nsideraticr. by the Cor.vnittee at i LI meeting on August 4,1978.
In ad:li tion to R.11r Younq, J. liorberg and myself ve intend to have repre-sentatives f rwi Sandia Laboratories present at the meeting.
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.lohn Angelo, Tasi.I:anager Generic Task t;o. A-17 Division of Project Itar.39enent i.nclosure:
A c. %ated Distribution
- r Pobert S2ala.'
Central Files M. Chirmal Atenic Industrial Foru1, Inc.
NRC PDR 7101 *.fiscon'.,in Avenue R. L. Wright, Jr.
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20G11 R. C. DeYoung J. Norberg Jaci. 9. Hici.i.an M. Taylor riuclear fuel Cycle Systeus A. R. Buhl Division E412 H. Schierling Sanili.T Laboratories G. Chipman Altuquerque, Heu tiexico 37115 W. C. Burke J. Olshinski tir, l' art disenberg J. Zwolinski Ter.r.csse Valley Authority H. Li 303 Power Buildinq C. Liang w
Chattanoota, lennessee 37401 H. Balukjian t $$&
W. Minners J. Guibert 732 524 D. Wigginton i
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NOTES ON ThE STATUS OF GENERIC TA5K A-17
'5YSTEMS INTERACTION IN NUCLEAR PCWER PLANTS"
- 5) sten.s interaction is cne of forty generic items that the NRC; staff has charactericed as C3tegorf A.
Work began on scoping this task in June 1:-77 at accut the time trat the ACRS was reviewing the operations at the cn Statico.
Ej lovemcer 1977 we had a task action plan that was approved the Technical 2ctivities Steering Committee.
The problems that.se ced in those first few months nere mainlj; (1) define the problem.in d8cn a way as to achieve a manageable scope of work, and (2) define a method of accccplishing the..crk and still retain contrcl by all the dif ferent technical disciplines.
We had to, in effect, create a group to control the t3sk and not suffer fecn the same kind of fracmentation that c3uses a potential syster.s interacticn problem in the first place.
In the next~fe.. mcntns after our plan was approved, we struggled with
' a n e c <.e r t3 get the jcb started.
We facea and still face a general lack ct man?cuer 3rJ 3 speci'ic lack of tne people with the right kind of esperienct
..he could be spared f eca other tasks.
We circumvented this
- retli, 5 ' re..r a t,
b, seeking a contractor with the kir.d of experience reeje: to get tnis jot dcne.
Our search cerced in cn Eandia Laboratories cecause Of th-acek done by this ceganication in areas analogous
.5anci3 1 to syste".5 interacticn.
r.cle se.eral meetings with 0. J. McCloskey and,J. Hickman Ej *13 i T'S
..e r..m of Sandia to cefine an acceptable scope of work and a concept of hcw to get the v.ock acne.
These discussites and cur or.iginal task action plan
.,c ra the basis of. Contr5;t with SanJia that was agreed to by both carties
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ii. ultanens..ith this effsrt we de/ised a plan that would 31ic.. tr.e %: s:3 to reviea and centribute to tne..ork perforced bj 5.= r. d i.
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- 5. T i t : e j o..e re,- i s t.: olan to the Technical Activities eteeri r.
- s ; ; tee.; race it now a..aits final blessing.
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e have.;orked.sitn San.:ia tc evolve a sccte ef wce: tnat is tc.e cone in t..o ohases, eacn phase t..elve acnths Icog, st3rtirg this past "
,o The first phase includes all of the principal ir.vestic d1.e ana nalytical.. ort so that at the conclusion of that phase s t..el.e
.cntns) we.,ill nave cc. pleted our s. Ay and reacned our conclusiors.
The sucend phase iroleqentation, which includes our recommerded changes, i# any, to cor revie., procedures and reccrxended cnanges in design and anal ses orccedures by applicants.
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2 Basically, our idea is to apply a disciplined and formalized methodology to search out and analyze poter.tial systems interactions, and then measure our Standard Review Dlan against the results of this methodology.
The thccologj that Sandia intends to use will be based on fault tree assess-nt tecnniques already develcped and used by Sandi3 and others in appli-
, tiens that are analogous to our search for syster.s interactions.
!"ancia has taken cur action plan and converted it into a more detailed clan that includes tnirteen progra::'. tasks in Phase I.
Tnese program tasks are sho..n in Figure 1.
The first four program tasks are intended to define the scope of aork in detail and establish the criteria for interacti:ns.
The next two tasks (5 and 6) are tne generic logic models that should be applicable to 3 wide range of nuclear power plants.
The next three tasks (7, S, and 9) are more Diant specific because of some point cne can no longer deal witn systems interactions in the generic sense.
The next tasks (13 and 11) are the real essence of our study and
. vill tell us tcw nell systems ir.teractions are presently accounted for.
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selecte; an esemplarj facility (watts Bari, Sancia intends to alsc ase tre kr.ec. ledge it has attained for cther plants so that in the end e 3re nn 3.3 inersed in One specific plant that..e cannot make some general ccr.cla icr.s
- 2. cut other types cf plants.
F'gare 2 s ncw s
- .c.e t i n.e s ;3 '. c 5 for these progr3.? tasks.
There is a consider-atle r curt of OSerlappir.g amcng tnese tasks.
The overlapping is una /cid-able recause 'f the.er) nature of the proble:',
We intend tc make several i'.* e ri:: reocrts i<ailable in spite of this e.<erlapping.
Sancia intends to interis, report 3t tne conclusion ;f :ne first three program tasks, i m.e ao a secer.] retart at the ccnclusion of task 7 c.nich.till also include the status Of task 3. and a third interim repo N at the end of task 11.
A craft fir.ai repce:...ill follu: shortly th2reaf ter.
's'e n e e d to use an actual plant to assist in ;evelopie d>e analytical techniques.
We originally considere.' f;ur plants:
Sequoyah, Cconce, Calvert Cli?'s, and Grand 3ul t.
'e favored Sequoy3h because of the cc.i.pleteness of detalleJ informaticn :c : Sancia has accunulated on :nis plant design.
TVA asked es to u3e.utts u3r rather tnan Sequoyan to mini.nize :nc imaact cn their cons t ruc tion scr.ed.ie.
Since tnese plants are sister plants, we accepted this idea.
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..e.,ili use Watts Bar as the exemplary f acility, e
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Sar. cia has alreadj ccmolete3 a basic outline of its first program task which is to scoce cut the study.
This is shown in Figure 3.
'le intend to concentrate our ef# orts :n single unit light water reactors.
Although pre are significant numbers of t.,o-unit facility desigr.s with shared sjstems socn as contr31 rocrs, fuel hancling and storage, and supporting
$3 stems, tne stan3ardi;ec plants are single-unit designs with the so-called pide alcng concept for handling the multi-unit facility.
In any case, sjstems interactions between the units of a t.so-unit design are minimal anc rore ra3 ail, identified than the interacticns that are possible a. Tong systems of a single unit.
We intend to concentrate most of our efforts on the reactor core as the Tajor source of concern.
'.-le will treat the spent fuel and radwaste as lesser ccncerns.
The spent fuel pool systems and radaaste systems are much less complicated than core control and ccoling systems.
Systems intec3ctions f3r these systems can be more readily searched and analyzed.
Je will :cr. c-trate on oc;.er cperations, including transient oceration from cola st3rtap to pc..er ar.d cack to cold shutdo.n.
.;e will not give much attenti:n, i f a r.y, to the steady-state shutccan conditicn and refueling, again ceca _st the c3nge of potential systeas interacticns and their con-se;.e ces d3 20t ;.sti'j tt e kind of search and analyses that we are ac.ela;ing.
xe'will in:lede rem ire plant condi;icns 3r.: r,cr.nally expected transients.
.e.111 also incl xe cesign casis events and accidents, tut c.e will not n.e as ucn s:prasis to these events and accicents, and we may even
'!e will give ccnsi:ec placing trcse e.cnts eycnd the scope of this task.
li ttle, if an;., attention to such conditicns as sabotage, fire, external forces, ana 3c:icents greater than design basis accidents.
We telieve that tnese e'.ents v ; highlj icpectable and are already Leir.g adequately re v i e..e d.
Je do not t elie se ti.a t, for these inprobable events, our task or syste'.s irteraction can be expected to re.ed an', significant itets that car re.ie<.s Ea.e nct already ijectified 5no adequateij ar.aljzed.
In plan will e :n3 size in; toree essential plant functions of (1) pectect re.utor coelirt prc nure Leandary, (2) act;Tolish reacter shutdown, and (I' re.c'e core dt:ay heat.
Ctner functicr.s are ancillary to these three fanctions.
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- Finally, e will consider spatial and process interactions, and we will consider hardv.are and human failures.
We are not sure now just how extensively.ve will consider the human failures as tne trigger for systems interactien.
.ie do expect to observe the sensitivity of systems to human (crce
..here we find verj sensitive areas, then most likely we will qxtena cur searcn and analyses to include these areas.
de recognice that homan errors bj those of us engaged in this project is also a factor.
We have devised a management and technical control system to "lininize tnis f actor.
Our project anagement and Norking arrangement is shown in Figure 4.
Mr. ':orberg fecn the Office of Standards Cevelopment (05D) will be the primary contact tet.seen all cf us and Sandia, and he is responsible for direct contract management.
He will te assisted by several members of OSD wto vill perform technical reviews, assessments, and will make technical contrit t tions to the ef fort.
Tne Of fice ;f Lclear Reactor Regulaticn will be ultimately responsible for tne usk
.4e ha.e organized a group of eight persons from the technical cranches that 5ce rost ir.volved in potential interactions.
This group,
.or': ins.sitn the 'as. "anager, will perform the reviea of the effort by 53nola anc will u.e airect technical contributions in selected areas of espertise.
.e will also seet jt.iaance f rcn the Of fice ;f Maclear Regulatory Pesearch.
..e na.e an informul aerangeaent alth the Probabilistic Analysis Staff who currentle has. ark going on at Sandia.
Tnis.,ork is associated with the
^
Peactor 5afet, St.Jy.
We keep that staff informed cf all our actions, invi te tre to all our seetir.gs, and seek their advice as mucn as pcssiole.
The staf#.as gi. n ;s,al;3ble advice and we hcpe tc tenefit from their e.pertise tnraagnat tnis orc ject.
.ie will also sali:1t i t. rut and critical reviews from all ccgnizant technicel cranches aitnin JE Enat perform technical reviews 3nd management functions for reactor licensirg.
This includes all of the brancnes aithin the Di/isicn of Project :13nagaxnt, Divisico of Operating Peactors, anc Division of Systems Safety, and.rcst af tne branches in the Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis.
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. !Je ncoe to use and benefit from the results of several other projects such as the stuay at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Zion study or. systems interaction, and our contacts witn NSSS vendors, architect-engineers, utility applicants, and the Atomic Industrial Forum.
We have had contact ditn several of these groups already, and we intend to develop further ontacts.
4 East, tut Dy no Teans least, we hoce that we can develop our contacts with the ACRS and its sebccmmittee.
We would like to share the experiences that certain emters have in this area.
At the very least we want to kncw that we are addressing the problets that you have raised in a manner that you believe is proper.
- e also want to keep you informed at a level that will give you a meaningful knoaleage of how we are progressing and a knowledge of tne extent and deotn of our searcn and analyses for systems interaction.
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FIGURE 2. PROGRAM TIMESCALES Months After Receipt of Funding 0
3 6
9 12 Program Tasks PHASEI
- 1. Define Program Scope A
A
- 2. Develop Interaction Descriptions A
A
- 3. Select Exemplary Facility A
A
- 4. Review Stanclard Review Plan anti lecome Familiar with LER s*
A A
- 5. Develop Plant Logic Models A
A
- 6. Develop System Models A
A
- 7. Develop System Identification A
A Technique
- 8. Develop Interaction Identification Algorithm A
A
- 9. Develop Interaction importance Measures A
A
- 10. Verify and Demonstrate Review Procedures A
A N
- 11. Assess Standard Review u
Plan A
A ru
- 12. Prepare Phase i Report A
A d
- 13. Define Phase 11 Program A
A
- Licensee Event Reports
FIGURE 3. PROGRAM SCOPE LESSER EMPHASIS OR C AT EGORY WITHIN SCOPE BE YOND SCOPE Plants Types PWit Others BWR Number of Umts Single Unit Multiple Unit M otieleil Sources of Reactor Core Spent Fuel Pool Ratlicactive Ratlwaste System Material Plant Status Power Operation Shuttlown Refueling Plant Contlitions Routine Sabotage Transient External Forces Design Bases LOCA Greater than Design Bases Accitlents Fire fone location)
Plant Functions RCS Pressure Bounciary Fire Detection and Suppression Reactor Shuttlown Other Plant Functions Decay Heat Removal Containment Integrity Nu interactions Process Other N
Spacial uu Failures Hartlware N
Human
FIGURE 4. TASK ORGANIZATION Office of Standards Development Director R. Minogue I
I Division of
- - - - PRIMARILY ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL Engineering Director PRIMARILY TECHNICAL CONTROL G. Arlotto i
I AD for General TASC Engineering Chairman TASC Standaids Advisory E. G. Case Group W. Morrison L---
M. M od l
L. Crocker NRR W. Minners Engmeering Lead D.Wigginton Methodology Supervisor J. G uibert Branch J. Nniberg
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J. N ort, erg NRR Task Manager Project Manager J. Angela Sandia NRR System Interaction Laboratories Working Group from Selected Technical Branches 1732 333