ML19290B844

Forwards Response to IE Bulletin 79-14, Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Sys. Insp Results for All safety-related Sys Not Addressed in Previous Responses Encl

ML19290B844
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	10/30/1979
From:	Pilant J NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 7912140233
Download: ML19290B844 (3)

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October 30, 1979 Mr. Karl V. Seyfrit, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011

Subject:

IE Bulletin 79-14 " Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems"

Dear Mr. Seyfrit:

Enclosed please find the 120 day response requested in Item No. 3 of the subject bulletin. The enclosure is a description of the results of the inspection of all safety-related systems not addressed in our previous responses to IE Bulletin 79-14. No nonconformances have been discovered which would prevent a safety-related piping system from performing its intended function.

If you have any questions relative to the enclosed response, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely, N

a, A. Pilant Director of Licensing and Quality Assurance JDW/cmk Enclosure cc: Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Director of the Division of Operating Reactors Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 1574 027 7912140 2U

NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT COOPER NUCLEAR STATION IE BULLETIN 79-14 RESPONSE TO ITEM #3 For portions of systems which are normally accessible, all the loops have been inspected in all redundant systems and all non-redundant systems have been inspected for conformance to the scismic analysis input set-forth in design documents.

For portions of systems which are normally inaccess'ible, one (1) RHR isometric, 2510-5, which includes four (4) hangers, is the only portion of the redundant and non-redundant systems which has not been inspected for conformance to the seismic analysis input setforth in design documents.

In order to inspect this isometric the drywell head must be removed. In light of the results summarized in the following paragraphs which were obtained by inspecting all other safety-related systems at Cooper Nuclear Station, this RilR isometric will be inspected during the next refueling outage commencing approximately mid March 1980.

Parameters included in the inspection were: pipe run geometry, support and restraint design, locations, function and clearance, pipe attachment and valve and valve operator location. All embedments are being verified as part of IE Bulletin 79-02. Valve weights were obtained from field verification performed under this inspection or from information recently verified under the Engineering Data File Program.

Results of the inspection program to date are as follows:

(1) Pipe run geometry agrees with the as-built isometric drawings.

(2) Of the approximately 1500 pipe hangers verified under this bulletin, one (1) pipe hanger on a 3" service water line was found to have not been installed during construction of the plant. Our architect-engineer concluded that the absence of this hanger did not jeopardize the safety-related function of the system and this hanger has since been installed. The reoccurrence of this type of non-conformance resulting from future modifications has been precluded by approved design change procedures put into effect since the time of plant construction. All other pipe hangers and seismic supports have been accounted for and minor discrepancies (i.e. base plate thickness, number of anchor bolts, etc.) are expeditiously being resolved. A summary report will be provided in the final response to IE Bulletin 79-02 " Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts."

(3) Hanger function types were verified and no discrepancies were identified.

(4) Valves are in the location shown on the' as-built isometric drawings.

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(5) As outlinad in IE Bulletin 79-14 Supplement 2 section titled "Nonconformances", all marked up system configurations have been submitted to our architect-engineer for comparison by the analyst to the seismic analysis input. This includes valve weights, exact hanger and seismic locations, hanger and seismic restraint dimen-sions, valve operator location and weights. To date it has been concluded by the architect-engineer that within engineering judgement, the safety-related function of the core spray system is not in jeopardy. Our architect-engineer is currently reviewing the remaining systems, but as discussed with the ISE Staff, the industry shortage of pipe stress analysts necessitates that approximately six (6) months will be required to complete the detailed analysis on all systems covered under this inspection.

If any non-conformance is found, it will be evaluated under IE Bulletin 79-14 requirements.

/s usual, the detailed rese'.ts of these inspections discussed above are available at Cooper Nuclear Station for NRC review.

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