ML19290A038
| ML19290A038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/1979 |
| From: | Helfman S, Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7908290113 | |
| Download: ML19290A038 (85) | |
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PRESIDENT'S CCMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT 4
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0 DEPOST. TION OF:
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From:
Richard S.
Mallory, OGC Enclosed is a copy of the transcript of your deposition before the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island.
Please read through the transcript carefully and correct any errors (other than unimportant punctuation errors) in black pen on this copy.
Correct any errors you can identify in the questions, as well as in your answers.
This copy will not be retyped, but will be reproduced as you have marked it, so your corrections should be dark and legible.
After you have corrected the transcript, please sign and date the certificate at the end, and type your name under your signature.
You may wish to make a copy of the transcript for yourself before returning the original to me.
When you return the transcript, please indicate if you object to making your transcript available to the Commission or to the Ccmmission's investigation of Three Mile Island.
Because of Commissioner interest, we would appreci-ate receiving your corrected copy by c.o.b. Monday, August 13, if possible.
Unless you have an objection, I wil_1 send a copy of your signed, corrected transcript to the President's Commission with the request that they substitute it for any uncorrected copies they msy have.
If you have any questions or problems, do not hesitate to call me or the attorney who represented you at the deposition.
1901 134
Enclosure:
Transcript M
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CERTIFICATE I certify that I have read this transcript and corrected any errors in the transcription that I have been able to identify, except for unimportant punctuation errors.
Date:
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Thomas M. Novak e
1901 135
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA t
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT 2
THREE MILE ISLAND 3
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6 7
DEPOSITION OF:
THOMAS M.
NOVAK 8
9 10 11 Room 1132 New Phillips Building 12 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland t
13 July 30, 19 79 14 10 : 55 o ' clock a.m.
15' 16 APPEARANCES:
17 On Behalf of the Commission:
IS STAN M. HELFMAN, Attorney Associate Chief Counsel 19 2100 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20037 20 On Behalf of the NRC:
21 MARK CHOPKO, ESQ.
22 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20037 23 i901 136 2'
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DIFICT CRCSS FICIFICT
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Thomas M.
Novak 4
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Novak No. 2 82 3
Novak No. 3 33 9
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MR. HELFMAN:
Would you please state for the 2
3 record your full name?
THE WITNESS:
Thomas Michael Novak.
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MR. HELFMAN:
Have you ever had vour deposition a
taken before?
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P.U T-WTm.].TCO.*
.No.
MR. HELFMAN:
Perhaps I should explain a few of the 3
characteristics of the deposition.
9 Your testimony that you are giving todav is sworn, 10 and as a result will receive the~ same force ~and~ ~effect as
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11 if vou had given vour testimony in a court of law.
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At the conclusion of the deposition, the testimony 13 will be reduced to transcript form by the court re*corter, 14 and you will be provided with a copy and afforded an to.
oc.c.ortunity to make any changes which you deem necessarv.
to, However, you should be aware that we would have g
the oc.cortunity to comment on any changes that you make and 13.
i if the changes are substantial, it could reflect adverselv
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'9l i901 138 on your credibial:v.
4 20 '
Therefore, it is important to be as accurate as i
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.vou can, and if you need clarification of a question before l
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vou answer, clease feel free to ask for clarification.
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i For the benefit of the court recorter, it is q-i i
25l necessarv. that veu c.ive audible resc.onses since it is I
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difficult to take down neds od the head or gestures.
You 2
should try to allow te to complete a c.uestien even if icu s.
3 anticipate where it is going, and I will try to allow you f~
4 to complete an answer before I ask my next question because 5
it is difficult for her to take down two people talking at i
the same tir.e.
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It is our practice at the conclusion of a deposition '
3 to continue it rather than to terminate it in the even:
9 there are further questions that we have to ask.
We will to simply reconvene the deposition.
11 Do you have any questions about any of that?
12 THE WITNESS:
No.
13 Nhereupon,
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_THCMAS M.
NOVAK 15 having been duly sworn, was called as a witness herein and 16 testified as follows:
17 DIRECT E mi! NATION
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19 0
You were asked to bring a resume with you.
Did 00 you do so?
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1901 139 i
21 A
Yes, I have one.
i 22 MR. HEL.rMAN :
We would like to have this marked as 23 the firsu exhibit to the deposition.
24 (Nevak Exhibit No. I was I
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O Is this resume an accurate representation of your s.
educational and professional and employment background?
3 A
Yes, it is.
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I suppose the best place to begin is could ycu cive o
us your title with the NRC and describe very briefly what
,o your obliga: ions and responsibilities are?
A My position is Chief of the Reactor Systems 3 ranch 3
in the Division of Systems safety.
g Inthat position, I am responsible for the review 10
~ construction cermit applications and ocerating Ticin5~e-~~ ~~
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v 11 applications for light water reactors.
13 The area of our responsibility focuses on the review 13 of transients and accidents, and for a variety of systems g
designed to cope with these events--the emergencv cooline to.
system, the residual heat removal systems are just examples.
16 Presently I have also been assigned on an interim 1
4 task force related to bulletins and orders which was formed is I
following the Three Mile Island 2 Accifent.
g Q
Do you continue to. erform vour functions as chief 20 of the Reactor Systems Branch, Division of Systems Safetv.?
A No, I don't.
We have, as a consecuence of the interial organization, an alternate branch chief is cresen:1v 23
=erforming that duty.
His name is Atemis Speis.
24 Q
When you were performinc. the ich of chief of the l
1901 140 i
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-O Reactor Systems Branch, what was the Organi:atica of your 2
department?
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A The organization consisted of two sections, one whose supervisor was Mr. Sandy Israel, and the other section 4
whose supervisor was Mr. Gerrf Ma:etis.
5 Their positions were as section leaders.
There was
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i no specific differences in specific.espcnsibiliev differences between sections.
They are comparable sections 3
and they are capable of doing tasks without special:v in a 9
10 sense.
__ __..,ach section ha__s eit.ger C Ar, engineers assigned _ __.
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11 to the section so in total we have about 15 crofessional 12 people and two secretaries and myself.
13 0
Ctuld you describe for the record what occurs, 14 for example, with a construction license application?
Where does it go?
Does it go to you, the team leaders, the 16 engineers?
o it is directed to me for A
The acclication is first, u.
i assignment; depending on the amount of work in either section, 19 I
I will make'an assignment where I feel that the work can
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be most easily acccmolished.
I 21 It is then assigned to, I route it to a section y,
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leader with perhaps a succes icn as needed to the engineer I
3 who I think might be most suitable for it.
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The section leader and myself will discuss that
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assignment.
The forma 11:y of the construction review, of i
O course, takes several steps.
Are you interested in going 4
3 through those?
Q Right now I am just. interested in the flow.
4 A
The materi 2 then, once it is assigned to a section, 3
the distribution would inc1':de then the section leader and 6
myself and a responsible engineer assigned to that review.
8 0
Then the engineer does the actual review?
A Yes.
What will t'rcically happen is the section 9
leader and the engineer will sit down and the section 10 it -
leader wi-ll highlight those aspects of the review that~he~
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thinks and expects the engineer to focus on.
13 13 We have a standard review plan which is our general way of doing the review.
We will utilize previous reviews 14 of similar plants to perhaps highlight a specific area where la.
we want to spend more time learning about a particular 16 aa ect of the design so thev c.enerally will sit down and 1,
outline the review for themselves.
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The engineer himself will have some ideas of where tg he thinks he should be spending his time.
i901 142 20 l
We have as a part o f our revie-process identified I
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1 the periods of time that is available to the engineer, so
,;g in effect he is trying to identify those portions of the l
23 review that both he and :he section leader feel shculd be
., 4 covered.
On occasions, I will insert what I think are areas
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that should be covered.
We may ge: together and discuss G
the review.
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3 0
The three of you?
A The three of us; it depends specifically on the plant 4
5 and any peculiarities of it.
6 Q
When the engineer has completed his review, does it go back to the team leader?
g A
Yes.
Of course, there is several oppcrtunities for discussion.
His first work product is a draft set of 9
10 questions that he works up.
There will be a lot of discussion
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--before~ those have ~ been prepared ^, but the section leader then cencentrates on the review of the first set of questions.
3g He generally turns them back to the reviewer to reflect the review and thev will discuss them.
There is 1,
usually on occasien a question or two that will come up to g
me where thev can get earlier guidance if thev. feel I would I.
have some coinion on it.
It may s.
- help direct it and shorten the review process, but generally I do not see the original 19,
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3l first set of questions.
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engineer doing the review and the section leader.
Q When the section leader is satisfied, dces it 31 i
1901 143 come oack to you?
A Then they are forwarded to me.
The concurrence is 3,s i' i
a little different depending on the stage of questions.
',4 3l This is a preegative of the division, the assistant director I
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of reactor safety.
The first round of questions on a plant j
2 can be sent out through the branch chief's signature.
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C Your signature?
A Yes, my signature: in effect, I concur.
I am the
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highest level of concurrence, so the section leader then would crecare the formal set of questions let's say, and then 6,
I I would concur on them and thev would be then directed to Management.
That is no the 3
us, the Division of Project, first time I see then.
3 What I see for the first time is generally a to cleaned-~up ffrst ~ draft-~of-the questfons, and then I will~
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11 review them, make my comments to the section leader, and the t7 13 engineer at the sametime.
- de go over them, and we iron out any differences that I have.
14 When we agree on them, then they are put back into 15 the formal process of preparing them in final form.
Thev to.
are signed out then by the section leader through me.
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concur in them, and then they are directed to our Division
,3 of Project Management.
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,.0 Q
Are these-questions which are posed to the Division
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1901 144 I
I A
They are actually directed then im the applicant.
22 The Division of Proiect Manacement acts as a funnel, so to i
.a speak.
They receive all the questions from all of the
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I technical areas on the staff and they are the contact within l
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10 the staff between the applicant and the staff.
9 O
Then the applicant I assume has a certain period 3
of time within which to respond?
A Yes.
Generally he may take six to eight weeks to 4
5 respond to the questions.
g Q
Where do those responses go?
A Thev. are directed back to the project.
In other 3
wnrds, the formal chain ps from a branch chief in Projects 9
to a licensing manager let's say representing the utility to of applicant.
___ _.-The~ re spon se, the-formal response ~ then i's ~ back to
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12 the branch chief, and then a distribution of the responses are made to all of the technical divisions so we would then 13 14 receive our response in terms of amendments to the to.
applications or responses to questions.
16 Q
In the event you discover a transient or an accident 1,
which warrants review bv other departments within the NRC, g
in addition to your own, is there some procedure for referring 1
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those concerns to other departments?
Would yce do tha 9i l
through the Civision of Project Management?
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A We =ay.
There are cccasions when in transmitting
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may note some questions and note the relationship those
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i901 145 3
We probably informally have talked to the branches
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involved and T.entioned to them that we are making this 2
ccmment.
3 We also discuss questions directly with other 4
branches where the technical disciplines require that we better understand the commonality of the concern.
5 We mav agree then that a question which has a 0
sc.ecific flavor which ma.y reflect two different discio. lines i{ ould come out of just one of the 3
would be generated, but y
9 technical disciplines, so there is no specific procedure that is followed.
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'The standard review plans identify'thi inter-
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11 relationships between branches, but there is no specific 12 13 form let's say that I would fill out which directs an inquiry or requests an inquiry by another branch, another technical 14 branch.
15 0
But you can tap the knowledge of the technical 16 ex=ertise of carticular branches?
1.
A That's right.
As the question develops where it tg tg i is recogni:ed that it crosses into areas outside of our own specific expertise and for which we do not have we mav r
20 have the primarv responsibil ty, thev may have secondary
.,1 review responsibilities in the sense of supporting our effort,
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1901 146 we will identify our needs.
.J, In some cases, thev may have the crimarv resconsi-34 bility and we may note for their information what we know 25 I
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about the particular issue. -
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It is basically done en an informal basis, but there 3
is generally documentation involved with it--not in every
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4 case, but in the cases of substances both branches generally 5
will use a memo to identify and to formalize the working 6
relationship, what we have agreed to do on a specific 7
problem.
3 0
You indicated in-your resume in the first paragraph 9
on the first page that your responsibilities include the 10 performance of safety reviews and evaluations of 11 applications for nuclear power plant construction permits 12 and operating licenses.
13 Once a plant obtains an operating license, does it
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14 fall withcut the jurisdiction of your branch?
15 A
No.
There will be exceptions.
When an operating 16 license is issued at present, there may be a number of 17 residual issues that will be resolved perhaps prior to the is first reviewing of the plant.
This may be 13 months after 19 the plant has received an operating license.
20 In this case, the Division of Project Lanagement 21 in its official transferal of a project, of a completed I
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22 ocerating licensed project to the Division of Cperating Reactorswillinitstransmittalletteridentifythek 23 1901 1
24 residual items.
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25 It will also identify the responsible branches in thei l
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1 Division of Systems Safety who will follow through on h
2 those issues.
Generally this will result in a supplement to 3
a safety evaluation that was written as part of the operating
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4 license reviews.
5 0
And your branch then could be involved in the 6
review of an open item in an operating 11:ense application I
even after the operating license had been granted?
3 A
That is correct.
9 0
There is another possibility that occurs to my 10 mind where you would beccme aware, your branch would 11 become aware et-a transient or an accidenn which warrants 12 additional attention, and yet you have the expertise within 13 your branch to analyze it and so you wouldn't be seeking expertise brom another branch within the ::RC, but might wish 14 15 to call the matter to the attention of. another branch which is would have the ability to do something about it.
17 Have you had the experience of referring a safety 19 concern to another branch or another departmenc in order 19 to alert them to the safety concern rather than to cbtain i
their technical expertise?
i901 148 23 21 A
Yes.
Now you have used two terms.
You have used 22 safety concern, and then you said transients, so to speak.
03 I would consider safety concern to be the broader.
It would 24 include perhaps a new understanding of the transient.
3 On occasion where under"the concept of a safety l
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14 concern, we have in the review of an operating license s
identified t.ome test information that we have required and 2
from it we conclude that that information is of general 3
concern, for example, to operating reactors.
4 5
We would transmit that information to the appropriate c.ecc.le in the Division of Cperatine. Reactors.
We would
-a communicate with them orally.
We would send them a memo if we thought it was necess_ary.
We would talk to them, and 3
9 we would make sure that thev had that understanding.
10 You.have to recognize that we do that when we feel the_re i.._-s a clear relationship between the issue that we are---- -.
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,1 presently working on and a similarity of design in an 12 ocerating plant.
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Q Shsically a generic cencern?
14 A
Yes.
la.
Q Nho in your branch would be responsible for making 16 the decision concerning whether or not such a concern is to g
be routed to operating reactors?
Would that be vou or
,3 6
someone like Gerry Ma:eti: or Sandy Israel or one of the g
engineers under them, or is that vour responsibilley?
,.0 It is not anyone's responsibilitv.
It is everyone's.
A
.,1 I think if a recormendation is made, we would expect an 23 engineer to make it, a section leader, if he recognizes it, 23 or myself, sc I don't have any final say whether this permit 3
is going there or not.
1901 149 3
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.t -a If scmeone thinks it has merit, and generally 1
9 2
people go alone with them, we would forward it, so there is i
3 no formal decision process as to exactly where in the 4
organization that information, to whom it should be provided.
5 There is generally no. hesitation to provide this 6
information to the parties that we think have an interest in it.
7 3
Q So an engineer could make a recommendation to handle a matter in this manner?
9 A
Yes, he could; if he felt it should go to another 10
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division, as~ part~of generating the concern, he also decides--
11 on the distribution.
This is part of the formality of 12 preparing the memo is to make up an initial distribution list.
13 0
Weuld he be responsible for the distribution of 14 the document or the concern or the memorandum, or does that 15 come back to you, or does it come to the team leader?
is A
.There is really no formality to who is responsible 17 for the distribution.
It is a collegial document in a 13 sense.
If it was originated by an engineer, he may sugges:
19 some people that he thinks should be put on the distribution
.,0 list.
Someone else may add to it.
i901 150 21 i
L Generally as you go up higher in the review process l
.,2 the suggestion to broaden it--in other words, I might 23 24 suggest someone in research might have an interest in it because of some other information that I have, so generally 23 Acme Reporting Compony
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what generally happens is the distribution increases as it is considered by higher and higher levels of management.
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It is very rare that we would decide to take someone off of 4
distribution.
That wouldn't be a problem.
We don't have a 5
guide necessarily to keep the distribution list to a minimum, 6
although obviously everyone in the building is not interested in it, but we generally try to suggest that it be made 3
available to the people who-have an interest, have some 9
background in the subject.
10 0
Would you have the authority to decline to 11 distribute a concern like this if an engineer had reccmmended to it?
Cces the decision resida in your hands?
13 A
No.
The organization permits that engineer to send that copy to anyone he deems appropriate.
He can sign it 15 himself in a sense.
He can send a memo, attaching another 16 memo so to speak, and say I thought you would be interested 17 in this.
.a No one else in my branch did, if that is an example l
19 you wish to use.
I
'O Q
Would that also be true of the team leaders?
.u A
Yes.
i901 151 l
Q Such as Mr. Israel and Mr. Ma:etis?
I
-33 A
Yes.
They could if they wish send a memo no someone
'4 else.
Generally, the distribution is intended to give other
.,5 readers an idea of who has it so if there is some discussion, l
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if two people on our distribution list find something that i
they wish to talk about, they know that the other person has.
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the memo and it is a frame of reference.
4 0
Would there be any advantage to an engineer or to 3
one of the team leaders to obtain your signature on a memo 6
expressing such a concern?
I A
Yes.
There would be an advantage because it 3
represents a higher level-of management view on it.
For 9
example, if a memo is written by an engineer and it is 10 provided for general distribution as opposed to the same 11 memo being sent either by a section leader or even a branch I'
chief, I think it just naturally suggests a higher level of 13 importance being attached to that memo.
It is given a little 14 bit more formality.
15 It is not normally a practice for an engineer to 16 write memos on his own because there is an opportunity, of l~
course, that there may be disagreement.
If he just decides li to write a memo, he doesn't discuss it with anyone, there is 19 a chance that his views would not represent those views of i
I 20 the branch, and so we would then have to write a memo which l
i 21 is sent to the same distribution list offering a different j
i 22 viewpeint.
It may be a position of the staff that is I
23 different, so generally an engineer, if he has a point, he.
24 will discuss it first with his own management.
i901 152 25 It may be sugc.ested bv. the section leader that he I
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T' go ahead and prepare a memo for his own signature, making 2
theso facts known.
It may be that, I don't knew if the i
3 section leader would concur.
It would not necessarily be 4
obvious from the transmittal of-the memo itself that there 5
NO is concurrence by a secti.cn leader.
f can send it out 3
6 without it.
He may wish to have the concurrence of the I
section leader, but that wouldn' t be obvious then to the 8
reader of the memo, but it would be on file within the branch 9
whether or not there was concurrence.
This is at the option 10 of the engineer and the section leader.
11 Q
Let me show you a copy of what has become known 1*
as the Novak memorandum which for the record shculd be 13 noted as an exhibit to the deposition of Sandy Israel.
14 Cown at the bottom in the lefthand corner there is 15 a contact reference.
16 What would that indicate to a reader of this l~
memoranden in view of the fact that it bears your signature?
,e A
Generally the contact person is the originator.
19 He authored it, and anyone who has questions rela ad to the n0 memo would be expected to contact him.
That is generally al the way we use the contact in our branch.
A person who led as the contact person.9 01 153~
i dra:ts tne memo is idents:..
43 Q
Could it be assumed from the facu that.Nir.
Israel
'4 is indicated as the contact, and the memorandum bears your 25 signature, that chere was a concurrence between the two I
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of you as to this memcrandum?
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A Yes.
In this case, I received the memo first in ag 3
draft, and if I recall right, I noted something to the 4
extent okay for final, which in effect at least at that level 5
at that time suggested that I supported issuing the memo as 6
is.
7 I do n ' t recall if I made any changes.
If any, it S
would have been on the editerial.
It was then routed back 9
to the secretary for final typing.
It was a hand'ritten w
10 first draft, and I think this memo then went to final very 11 scon thereaf te.: it was typed--concurrence or original, 12 initial concurrence by Israel, and then myself.
13 There is a file copy of the memo which would 14 identify the originator or what you want to call the original 15 contact, and then any higher levels of concurrence.
In 16 this case, I think mine was the highest level of concurrence 17 to the memo.
15 Q
There would be a copy of this in the file which 19 would indicate more information than is contained on :his I
1,901 154 20 coo. v. ?
21 A
Yes, to the extent that the file copy has on the t
I 22 lower portion of the c. ac.e blocks which are basically. initial 23 blocks, the date of the final typing, or let's say when 24 Mr. Israel initialed it, and then I would initial it and 25l sign it at the sametime so I would have initiated it on what j
i Acme Reporting Company
20 we refer to as the yellow coe.v of the memorandum, and there should be a con.v of that in our file.
3 0
Would it be possible to obtain a copy of that 4
copy?
A Nhen we have an opportunity for a break, I will 5
locate it.
6 l
i 1
Q In addition to reviewing the memorandum, prior 3
to initialing your concurrence, did you discuss it with Mr. Israel?
9 A
I don't recall any technical discussions.
It may 10 have been,th.._. dis _c_s_sion may have oniv been to the extent. _ _.
e u
1t that I read your memo and I initiated it for final typing, but 12 I can't swear to that.
13 I*may have mentioned it just to let him know where 14 the memo was in the review process that I had read it, that to-I saw no, I had no comment on it other than to go ahead and 16 issue it, and let it become what is now suggested as a review 1-i901 155 reminder.
As I recall I did add Mr. Cenny Ross to the 19 i
distribution.
He was my immediate supervisor, and in the
- g i
.;t original draft, I do not know if, I cannot recall if I
I Mr. Israel identified Ross.
I think I added lir. Ross on the l
- m..,
distribution, so this was a case where the distribution was l
23 l
i in large based on my review of the memo.
I 3
l There was never any comment about whether the 4
,o.
I Acme Reporting Company I
21 distribution as finally came out was all that was necessarv.
We added Mr. Ross and that's all I recall from the i.
discussion.
3 Q
Who is Mr. Ross?
4 A
At the time, Mr. Ross was my immediate supervisor.
5 He was the Assistant Director for Reactor Safety, and the g
ourpose of av adding him to the distribution was to let him
< know of the area that we intended to _avestigate as part of 3
this review reminder so that he would have some opportunity 9
to comment on it if he saw fit.
10
_Scmetii.fes' there is a question that gefha[s the
~
~
-~
11 area that you are going into is perhaps not specifically 13 ur area of responsibility.
Perhaps it should be reviewed 13 by another-branch.
It is an opportunity for management to 14 note whether the information is going perhaps, the request 15 f r information let's say if the review reminder would is suggest that is going outside of what we would consider Le our standard review clan, so he is offered an cpportunity la-more frcm a management coint of view--I didn ' t ex ect any i
19 l
technical comment from him.-
I didn't really exr.ect anv.
.,9 comment, and I didn' t-receive any comment from him, but it 21 i,
was an opportunity for him to put himself into the process l
g l
if he saw fit.
1901 156
-'3 1
We weren't coine to wait on any concurrence from 24 l
hi"*
25 i
Acme Reporting Company
a se 1
Q Is it normal procedure to CC Mr. Ross with r.emos 2
such as this?
3 A
Well, I make in a. procedure.
I make 1: 3. point to 4
put him on the distribution of anvthing that I am signing 5
out where I have not perhaps discussed it with him or he has 6
not seen any draft, so he has an opportunity to see 1: very 7
early in the process.
3 My recollection _is I did not discuss this review 9
reminder with him prior to my signing it, but only provided to him a copy of it when it was issued to everyone within the 11 branch.
12 Q
What is a review reminder?
13 A
A review reminder is intended to provide 14 information to all of the engineers in the branch of an 15 area that we wished to follow through cn as part of either 16 a CP review or an OL review, so it provides more detail in 17 an area perhaps than what the standard review plan would is suggest.
19.01 157 19 It also ma.v cick up an area that is sc.eci icallv.
j i
l l
00 '
not detailed in the standard review plan, so the standa-d l
I review plan may have been a ' road definition of that area 21 c
l 22 of review and a review reminder would sugcest in more detail I
I 23 the area that should be. pursued by the reviewer in the 24 review, so he is in effect directed, although not forcibly 25 !
directed, but certainly encouraged and expected to follow l
Acme Reporting Company
7~3 1
through on that review reminder in the sense that questions 2
dealing with that specific subject would be an outgrowth ofi 3
his review.
4 He would look at the review reminder.
He would 5
review the design of the plant, and he would generate 6
questions er e..er inquiries as suggested by the review 7
reminder.
5 Q
The reviewers that-you are referring to are the 9
engineers on Mr. Israel's or Mr. Mazetis' staff?
10 A
That is correct.
11 0
Therefore, the concerns of the memorandum would 12 come into play in the review of construction license 13 applications and operating license applications?
14 A
That is c0rrect.
15 Q
As far as you know, was this memorandum routed to 16 the branch or. department that would be concerned with 17 operating reactors that already have their construction 13 permits and their operating license?
i901 158 19 l A
As far as I knew, it was not routed to them.
Let me read to you and then show you a portion 20 Q
21 of Chairman Hendrie's~ identification of what he considered i
I 22 l six main factors that caused and increased the severity M
of the accident at Three Mile Island, and this was part of 24 !
a statement he gave on April 10th, 1979, and I am referring i
25 to Exhibit No. 2 to the Sandy Israel deposition.
1 i
Acme Reporting Company
24 t
On page 10, the conclusion reads, "The staff has identified six main factors that caused and increased the 4
i.
3 severity of the accident as follows."
Paragrao.h 2 reads, "The c.ressurizer electromatic 4
5 relief valve which opened during the initial pressure surge failed to c1cse when the pressure decreased below the 0
actuation level.
This failure was not recognized and the relief line closed for sometime."
3 g
Paragraph 3:
"Following rapid depressurization of 10 the pressurizer, the pressurizer level indication may have-
- led to erroneous ~ inference ~s~o f~ high ~ 1evel~ in~~the reactor 11 13 coolant system.
The pressurizer level indication apparently 13 led the operators to prematurely terminate high pressure injection flow, even though substantial voids existed in the g
reactor coolant system" 15 A
Do you have a question?
16 O
When you are done looking at it..
1 A
I would like to read it.
tg (The witness read the re ferenced document. )
19 THE WITNESS:
I have read it.
20 SY MR. HELEMAN:
21 Q
Would you agree that those two paragraphs describe 33 two of the main f actors in the Three Mile Island transient 23 of March of this year?
3 A
Let me say that these are not necessarily the words 25 l
Acme Reporting Compony l
25 1
that I would chcose to describe the event.
In other words, 2
I don't wish to say that--I have a different way I would
-g 3
express it.
4 In general, I would agree that the failure to 5
recognize that the valve was open was a serious consideracion 6
in the overall accident.
7 I would also agree that the operator, as I 3
understand it, provided makeup sufficient to maintain level 9
that he thought was sufficient to maintain level in the 10 pressurizer, so I would agree with those two statements that 11 they are two important statements.
12 There are some points in here that I would disagree 13 with in the sense of very technical sense.
I am sure that 14 the Chairman was speaking orally.
I don't think this was 15 necessarily a prepared statement.
There are some technical 16 weaknesses.
~
17 For example, the failure was not recognized and 13,
the relief line closed for sometime--obviously not closed i
19 for sometime is what should have been stated in the record.
1901 160' 00 Q
That is a grammatical confusion?
21 A
Yes.
Also there is a statement in here that l
22 following rapid depressuri:ation of the pressurizer--I don't 23 know that, I have not studied the plots of the pressuri:er 24 pressure to agree that there may have been a very early I
24 rapid depressuri:ation, but to say that following rapid l
Acme Reporting Company
26 1
depressurization of the pressurizer, I migh quibble with O
o the term rapid, but that's about it, g.
I 3
Q But generally speakingk you would agree that the 4
failure of the PORV to close and the misleading information 5
provided to the operator as to core coolant level by 6
pressurizer level indication were main facters that cause-d I
or increased the severity of the accident?
3 A
Yes, I would agree that they are important.
I 9
don' t know that they are that separate because as I recall 10 from the accident, once the relief valve was closed, the 11 level dropped very quickly, so in a sense, one led to the 12 other, given the relief valve would have been closed, the 13 operator would have provided for more makeup, but keeping 14 the two separate, in general I would agree that the relief 15 valve being open and the operator, as I understand it from 16 reading some of the material prepared describing the event, 17 maintained makeup primarily as I understar.d it based on 13 l pressurizer water level.
19 Q
In fact, terminated EPI based en pressurizer 20 l level indication?
~
1901 161 4.1 A
Te s, I think that is correct.
i 0
Allow me to refer you first to paragraph 1 of the i
23 Novak memorandum wherein it is stated, "Under upset I
24 conditions, such as prolcnged relief valve cpening and 05 accidents where significant voids are formed in the primary I
l Acme Re artin Com on
27 1
system, it may be possible to end up with a two-phase 9
mixture in the pressurizer that is not at the highest 4
s temc.erature in the c.rimarv. system, Under these circumstances, additional loss of primary system inventory or shrinkage in 4
5 the primary system may not be indicated by pressurizer level.
6l This situation has already cccured at Davis-Besse 1 when a I
i
-=' e: valve stucx oren."
3 Then paragraph 3-,"Although the safety analyses 9
do not require termination of the makeup system, operators would control makeup flow based on the pressurizer level to as part~or their n6rifal proceEufes.
-As a result,~under
~
11 certain conditions where the pressurizer could behave as a 12 manometer, the operator could erroneously shut off makeup
,3 flow when significant void occurs elsewhere in t;.c system 14 r.1 ss of inventory is continuing."
15 Then the last sentence in the final paragraph:
16 "For OL reviews, crocedures should be reviewed to ensure 1
adecuate information before the operator terminates T.akeup
,a, f10"'"
19
}
My question to you-is firsu what are the negative
- 9 consequences which you envision from an operator turning off n
I HPI despite the presence of voids in the system, or thera l
I
.,3 is a continuing loss of inventory based on misleading 23 information obtained from pressurizer level indication?
3 I
A Excuse me.
Can you read back the question' 1
25 l
Acme Reporting Compony
29 t
(The record was read by the reporter.)
9 2
THE WITNEdS:
The negative consecuences I will i
3 judge to mean the potential for core uncovery and core 4
damage.
5 If you just had voids in the core, voids in the 6
reactor coolant system, excuse r.e, and no leak from the reactor coolan: system, I can't define any specific proclem g
with cutting back on makeup flow in that situation.
9 In other words,
- the fact that you have voids in the reactor coolant system would not by themselves lead to 10 core-damage-
~ ~ ~ ~
- - ~ ~ - ~
~
it 12 If, however, you did combine now voids present 13 in the core and a continuing loss of inventory where now the inventory being lost is greater than the amount of makeup 14 being added to the system, the potential there is for them, 15 1g the voids to increase to a point where there would be 1
insufficient wz*.er remaining in the reactor cooling system to g
continue to cool the core in an acceptable way.
l This could lead to a core uncovery as referred to 9
20 in corre damage.
3Y MR. HELFMAN :
i901 163 31 0
Would this be more likely where the operator 3
3 completely turns off makeup flow as opposed to intermittently reducing flow, increasing flow, reducing flow?
24 A
Well, the answer is basically just what we call a 05 Acme Reporting Company
29 I
mass inventory balance.
If you have a certain amount of mass l 2
that you are loosing frca the reactor ecolant system, and i
3 then you decide to turn it off, obviously the deficiency is 4
maximized.
You are losing the maximum amount.
The net amount 5
is maximized.
6 Let me say, however, if you have periedic adding 7
and cutting back of makeup flow, you would still do the 3
same calculation in effect over seme time pericd, take an 9
inventory so to speak of the amount of mass in the reactor 10 coolant system, so depending on how frequently you restored 11 flow, if you had no flow, it is just a mass balance, but la in general it would be better to keep flow on than to take 13 it off.
14 Q
But in any event, this scenario presents the 10 bovious possibility of core uncovery as a consequence, 16 would you agree with that i901 164 1_.
A Yes..
I would agree that if an operator for some
,a reason did no: provide the same amount of mass to the 19 system as was being lost through the system, that the 40 system is capable then of maintaining pressure at some value l
at and what you effectively have is more steam being forward j
,n in the reactor coolant system occupying volumes that U
would normally be occupied bv licuid water.
I I
o4 Q
Would you agree that the concern in this memorandum 25 that was signed by you and drafted by Sandy Israel concerning Acme Reporting Company
30 I
termination of makeup flow on the basis of misleading 2
information from pressurizer level indication is a concern,
3 for potential core uncevery?
Is that the danger addressed?
4 A
Well, I can say looking back at the memo today, that 5
certainly is the case.
6 I would point out, though, that I think it is fair, that the remarks shouldn' t reflect the thought processes 8
that I went through at the time I initiated the memo.
I 9
think that is important.
to I did not focus at the time I concurred in the memo
~-it'
--on issues such'as core uncovery, so at the time that-I' ~ ~ ~ ~
12 signed the memo, I was not in my own mind following through 13 on any of the specific scenarios.
I basically read the memo 14 for the basic substance of the nemo.
I found nothing in 15 there which suggested. to me a reason that we shouldn't go 16 ahead.
I thought we should, and on that basis, I did.
- 7 Now to go back and look at the memo and study it 18 today, yes, in looking at it today,the concern that you would I
19 have is that if an operator did not maintain proper makeup, t
20 and if he did secure makeup, the possibility of core 21 uncovery is a reality.
1901 165 ce Q
When you reviewed the memorandum, then you s
23 confined yourself to a scenario that is described in the 24 memorandum and did act extrapolate from that?
j l
25 A
I cannot even say that I thought a scenario.
I j
Acme Reporting Company j
31 1
read it for the purposes of understanding it.
I did no:
l 2
study it in the sense to constr. t the scenario to either 3
agree to disagree that such a scenario was possible.
4 The purpose of what I did by reading the memo was 5
just to know in effect the thrust of what the memo was trying 6
to pursue.
It seemed like an area that merited to me scme 7
investigation.
As I recall, there was, the investigation 3
was to center on the need.for a loop seal which was just a 9
particular bend in the pipe.
to I did not see any reason why we shouldn't pursue
....... _ - -.11 the need to better understand why these were there, so I 12 would say at this time if that was basically the point, 13 that was all I can recall that I got out of the memo.
14 I'did not particularly spend any time reading the 15 memo at all.
I think I may have glanced at it for ten 16 minutes.
17 Q
Would you consider the concerns raised in the IS memcrand=m regarding misleading information frca the
'9 pressuri:er level upon which the operator could terminate M
makeup flow to raise a sadety concern?
i901 166 21 A
At the time I signed it, no.
Let me explain.
It i
22 is part of our review process, our branch does not review f
23 emergency precedures.
I don't recall making any mental 24 note of the fact that we were discussing emergency procedures 3
and operator actions, so I guess at the time I signed the Acme Reporting Company
32 memo I did not see, I did not recogni:e what the memo was j
1 2
suggesting to the same degree that I see it today.
3 I w nder if I could have thq eustion re-read and I
my answer because I think I lost it scmewheres along the 4
line.
3 (The record was read bv the retorter. )
I e
f THE WITNESS:
Ckay.
3 0
Had the final paragraph of Mr. Israel's memorandum 9
caught your attention where he suggests that procedures be to
.eviewed to ensure ~ adequate information bdfore the operator n
terminates makeup flow, would there have been a way for you 13 to call this to the attention of the people who would be
,3 r
able to re'Jiew the crocedures to ensure that the operator 14 had adequate information before he terminates makeup flow?
g A
I'm sorry.
I am going to have to ask her to g
read it again.
1 13,
(The pending question was read by the reporter.)
THE WITNESS:
Yes.
Let me say that if a need 19 i i
ggl o point this out in the procedure had come to my attention to the point that I wanted to make other pecple aware of it, at that time I would have discussed it with probablv ceoplE~
22 who review, operating license personnel.
Le me explain.
.,a,,
At the time that I wrote the memo, signed the 3
memo, it was my understanding that the only people within the 3
Acme Reporting Company
33 1
staff who reviewed, who had the procedures, were me:hers 9
4 of the Operating License Branch.
It was my understandii.-
(
3 that as part of development of their examinations, they 4
would have access to these procedures.
5 I was not aware, to my knowledge, that Inspection 6
and Enforcemen also had reviewed the procedures, but perhaps I
reviewed them at the site, so my point of contact as best I 3
could recollect of people who would have at least had 9
access to the procedure would have been the Operating 10 License Branch.
11 It probably would not have ended there since they_
12 do not review the technical acceptability of the procedure, 13 but only review it from the point of view of determining 14 what portion of that procedure do they wish to choose to 15 examine the operator on.
SY MR. HELFMAN:
16 Q
For the operator's examination?
1J A
That is correct, so the answer to your question is S
it would have been possible to follow through, although I l
19 do not now know exactly what chain of actions would have had i
I 20 to have been taken.
-~
i901 168 21 My association with people developing reviewing i
ee procedures was not, I was not familiar with that at that U
time.
24 Q
It sounds like to me that there were no fcrmal i
I 25 procedures.
Would that be an accurate assessment, and that Acme Reporting Company
34 I
you would have had to have found a path?
o A
I would say that that is generally true.
I can i
3 recall o..ly one i> stance where we had an opportunity to 4
discuss even generic procedures.
In one case, in reviewing 5
an emergency core coolant system for a class of plants, we 6:
were concerned with the operator actions, so we used the l
7 procedures as the document from which we could understand 3
exactly what actions he wou-1d have to perform.
9 We were interested then in the number of actions to and whether he would have sufficient time to perform those 11 actions.
That. review culminated in our decision that the-12 operator should have more, should have an automatic backup 13 in the sense that if he failed to perform the action, the 9"4 action would be done automatically for him, but in general, 15 we did not review procedures, and I would c.;ree with the 16 way you phrased the cuestion.
17 Q
Co you recall if that prior experience involved
,a-i a B&W plant?
I.
I i
19 '
A It did not.
It was a Westinghouse standard plant, l
i i
20 and as I recall it had the title of RESAR-2 1901 169 41 There was one other occasion G I iight add when
.w i
there was a concern in the last seve..a1 feexs about a l
number of events where the reactors were over-ptessuri:ed 23 I
I 24 during startups.
Pecple who worked for me informally i
i l
l 1
43 i obtained a copv of a procedura or procedures on hcw plants i
i Acme Re artin Com on l
'l 35 1
were started up, so we did, and I think acain we nav have I
G 2
gene through the Licensing Branch where we asked if they
\\.
3 could obtain for us a copy of the procedure, and I think that is the way the engineers obtained it.
4 O
What was the concern at that time?
O A
The concern at that time, there was a technical 6
concern that during startups because either of operator 3
inattention or failures of certain equipments, the plant was 9
c.ressurized--water reactor clants were.carticularly sensitive 10 to over-pressurization because when the plants were being 11 started up,'they~would be~completelv fill'ed with waEer End ~ ~ -
~
12 unless you were very careful en how you added water and removed water, it was possible there for you to add more 13 water tharl you were removing, and the plant would very 14 quickly promeerize.
g 0
Is that the condition of going solid or being 16 solid?
1 1901 170 A
That is correct.
1g Q
What was the concerm that the pipes could be broken?
tg A
The concern was that if you had a very irradiated
.,0 vessel, and if it should have a crack or a flaw in it, that 21 l
gg ;
there;was a suggestion that with the vessel being cold, it i
- ^8 Of brittle character, 23 and with htgh pressures there was a chance that that flaw would grow and rupture the vessel.,
O Ce vou recall wha: 01 ant this concern was discussed I
._,3 I
i i
Acme Reporting Com on-l
i 36 in the context of?
9 A
We discussed,the concern was broadened to include t 3
all operating PWR's.
As I recall, we may have had 5he 4
procedure for the Canald C.
Ccok Plant, and the Indian Point 5
2 or 3 operating plant.
6 Q
Were any memcranda issued by your branch concerning I
the danger of going solid when the plant was in this state?
3 A
Yes.
Memoranda ~to the point that Mr. Flugge, who Q
~
is not new an employee of the staff, noted the concern.
10 He was reviewing licensing event reports which identified 11 these-kind of E? rents.
He wrote a memo which summarized L'-
these events and initiated the actions that folicwed.
13 Q
Was he an engineer?
'4 A
Yes, he was.
15 Q
Cn whose temn was he?
16 A
Ee worked for Mr. Mazetis.
17 Q
Would it be possible to obtain a ecpy of Ron Flugge's I
ea memorandum?
o01 171 io !
l A
Yes.
t
'o i
- l 0
Co you recall in that episode who determined the i
-31 distribution of the memorandum?
Was :
Mr. Flugge or
~,
Mr. Mazetis or 'vourself?
l i
9-i A
No.
I can't recall who determined it.
No.
I l'
.,4 don't recall who made that distribution.
l
^5 Q
Would there also be a yelicw copy of this nemorandum!
l.
l Am R
C l
~
37 I
in your file?
2 A
- yes, g.
3 Q
Could we obtain a copy of that as well?
4 A
Yes.
5 Q
Getting back to the Novak memorandum of January 6
10th, 1973, with respect to the final paragraph where there 7
is. this discussion concerning a concern that procedures be 3
reviewed to ensure adecuate information to the operator,
?
is what you are saying that that simply didn't catch your 10 eye?
11
...A It didn't catch my eye, and if I were to probably 12 suggest.what we might have done with it, at most it would 13 have been part of an operating license review.
We would
~
14 have pursued whether the procedure for that specific $'a-t, i901 2
15 what it would specifically say.
16 I guess now looking at it, it would only have 17 suggested when we finally got to:.the point where the review 19 was nearly complete because it is only at that time when I
i i
19 I the procedures have been prepared, that we would have nac l
20 l an opportunity to review the procedures and to make sure 21 then that there was consistency between the design and the l
l 22 procedures, but that is speculating because we, as I must 3
point out, we don't as a normal part of our review, we have 24 not combined the review of procedures and the design.
25 When we have obtained procedures, in has cnly been I
Acme Reporting Company I
38 in background to help us have a better understanding of G
what an operator may or may no do or what he is required t6, 9
do.
It gives us better background to understand potentially 4
a weakness in the design.
5 Q
So is what you are saying that operating procedures 3
and design review were separately reviews basically?
I A
That is correct.
3 Q
Had such a course of action occurred and had 9
this paragraph caught your eye, would the procedure 10 that you have outlined have confined this concern to 11 evaluation of operator license permits, applications or lo construction permits?
13 7
If the procedure aspect had really caught my eye, 14 it would have suggested to me a concern to make this note, 15 this information known to the Division of Operating 16 Reactors.
17 I would have looked probably for some generic way 93 to disseminate this information.
I may have tried to calk l
19 strictly then to the Operating License Branch pecple to see 20 if they could have disseminated that information to all 21 operating plants--probably not, but I probably still would w i
-i have discussed it first with the ^perating license 3 ranch
-33 people.
24 We probably then would have concluded that we would l
25 have had to discuss it with the Division of Operating A
R C
l
39 Reactors.
2 Q
Let me call your attentien cc the firs: sentence 3
in the memorandum where the memorandum refers to this 4
problem as being one noted in B&W plante that loop seals 5
in the pressurizer surge lines are used in some plant e
designs noted in 3&W.
Is that a generic reference to the S&W plant design?
3 A
Yes.
9 Q
Did that generic reference catch your eye when you 10 were looking over this memorandum?
A Yes, it probably did.
In other words, it at least 11 1o.
suc.gested to me that B&W designs were the only pressurized 13 water reactor designs that had a loop seal.
~
14 I probably didn't make much of it because the 15 B&W plant. design has a different configuration with regard 16 to, in terms of elevation.
It has what we call lower icop t-designs and raised loop designs, so it would not have 1.a,
suro.rised me that a cenment like a 1:co. seal oni.v Occurs on i
i I
i tg '
S&W, and I may have associated that with just due to the fac
.;o that they have a different elevation arrangement, differen:
than the Westin-house and ccmbustion plant desi ns.
v v
i
_a_o Q
Of course, at the time of the issuance of this I
l 4_3 memorandam there were a number of S&W a_ lants hat alreadv_
G
.s,.
had their operatcrs license and perhaps had gene conmercial.
1 i'
45 Would vou agree with that?
t i901 174 l
Acme Reportin Com an
40 i.
A Yes.
2 Q
The procedure that was followed, that is, providin 3
this memorandum to the engineers on the staffs of your two 4
team leaders, would not have brought this memorandum to 5
bear on 3&W plants that were alreadv operating reactors and 6
already perhaps operatinc commerciallv, is that correct?
A That is correct.
The distribution did not acocunt for it.
I think I did not_ recognize it as something that 3
should be discussed at this time with the Divisica of 9
to Operating Reactors.
It croba v was because I thoucht there was some:... --
11 12 work ysc that we had to do.
In other words, we would h
pursue the review on an operating license review and if 13 14 information came out of that review which we thought added to-to our concern let us say, then I think we orobably would 16 have brought the Division of Operating Reactors into it.
t-I would imagine that my thought process was one of well, we still have to do the work.
We still have to perform,
,a 1
l 19l that part of the review that was a reminder to the reviewers to learn more about the purpose of having pressurized locp ao l
?
seals, and if from our. review we determined something that 21 22 we felt had a safety consideration, then we would bring it 23 up to, or inform the Division of Operating Reactors, so I would have to say it must have been my thoucht at tha: time i
24 l
'S when I signed the memo that it was something that should be
~
i901 175 l
Acme Reporting Company
41 1
kept within the branch because we were just going out, trying o
to now learn more abcut the specific design peculiarity, i
3 and if something would come up out of it, then we would 4
have ancther point in the review process where other people 5
could be brought in to share our information.
6 Q
With respect to the concerns raised regarding I
inaccurate information concerning core level on the basis 3
of pressuri er level, and the possibility that the operater 9
would terminate makeup flow based en the inaccurate 10 information, what further review did you fe<.1 was necessary 11 before this yg.tter was called to the attention of other to departments?
13 A
Well, I did not focus on that point, so I don't 14 think that is a fair characterization.
15 What I would say is as I recall my point was that 16 we were going to investigate why :there was reactor coolant 17 loop seals.
When we understood why they were there, we woulc. procably en.en disse.'inate that in forma.tio n.
19 -
We would, if we fel it was certainiv a safety concern I
i 20 I that was more firm in cur $~inds.
21 I did not a
~ he time we issued that remo recognize j
t l
.,o--
all of the ingredients of the memo to the same level that o"e we can today but it was in my mind somethi.ng that we were 24 going to review to better understand the basis for a specific 25 design configuration.
901 176
~
t Acme Re artin Com n
I
t
,.2 1
Q Would vou agree that the safety concern is rather i
i 1
9 2
apparent on the face of this memorandum?
l s
A In today's light, yes, but I do not believe that 3
4 it would be that ac.c.arent at the time that the memo was
- c. r e o. a r e d.
o 6
For example, there are 15 engineers in the branch.
To my knowledge, no one ever sat down and discussed it with me.
Nobody asked me whether or not we should discuss 3
9 this issue with the Division of Cperating Reactors.
I assume 10 and I am fairly positive that each of the engineers read
--~ the memo.
Ee-'at lea'st wo'uld have fead it to make sure he ~ - ~ ~ '
~
11 at least understocd it.
12 He may have not done anything with it at that
.3 time becau'se he was not reviewing a B&W plant.
As I recall, 14 there was only one or two S&W clants at that time being to-reviewed, so the memo did not ring the bells at the time it 16 was issued that it certainly is suggesting it can ring today.
t-
,3 Q
3etween January 10th, 1978 and March 28th, 1979, was any such review conducted or further exploration of the l
tg 20 problem conducted in your branch?
901 177 l
A It was my understanding--let me say it this way.
-31 I
I I would have ex=.ected that that further review would have
.so I
i
,3 j taken place as part of the review of the Midland operating l
t license review.
Midland 1s a B&W plant of similar design to f
.34 l
the Three Mile Island plant design, so it would have been l
23 h
Acme Re artin Com on
43 logical for the reviewer of that plant to engage in c.uestions dealine with that subject.
Q Do you know who was assigned to review that plant?
A Mr. Scott Newberry was the assigned reviewer, and he was assicned to Mr. Jerry Maretis' section.
5 Q
When did this review occur?
6 A
The review has been in process for probably two years.
Only recently did I have an opportunity to talk to Mr. Newberry, and he noted for me that when we reviewed, started the review of the Midland acclication, it was one
~~
10 of -the olants that we selected-for assistance in review from-11 the EG&G personnel operating the Idaho National Test Laboratory, so they assisted us in preparing some of the la, questions,'in fact preparing most of the questions for our initial round of questions with the applicant.
la, Q
Could you please give me the name again of the laboratory?
A It was the Idaho National Test Laboratory--INEL--
15l 19 l Idaho National Engineering Laboratorv.
190 178 i
Q Do you know if they dealt specifically with concerns.
20 I
raised in the Novak memorandum of January 10th, 19787 A
I did ask that question more recently, and Mr. Newberry informed me that he locked at their questions 23 and it was not there.
It is possible that their questions 24 l
pre-dated the issuance of the review reminder.
05 l l
l i
l
\\
44 1
When we provided information to the people who O
would be assisting us in our reviews, it is my understanding, 4
3 although I did not specifically verify it myself, that we 4
gave them copies of all of the standard review plans for 5
which we have primary responsibility, those that we have 6
secondary responsibility.
I We would have also given him, them copies of all 3
of the existing review reminders, so if it was in existence 9
at the time they initiated the review, they would have had to the benefit of the review reminder.
11 O
Would it be possible to obtain a copy of the la-quastiens they posed so as to ascertain the date that they 13 porad them?
14 A
Yes.
15 Q
Could you provide that to us?
16 A
Yes.
MR. CHOPKO:
Off the record.
1 ~4 (A discussion was held of f the record.)
19 3Y MR. EZI,FMAN :
Co you know if the concerns of the Noda2 01 17 9 20 0
4,
~
memorandum were addressed in the questions finally submitted i
6 nn--
to the applicant in the Midland OL review?
'3 In other words, did Mr. Newberry address those
'4 concerns that the Idaho Naticnal Test Laboratory did not?
i l
i 5
A I only recently asked Mr. Newberry and Mr. Mazecis i
Acme Re artin Com on i
45 1
if there was a c.uestion asked dealine. with if thev had, this h5$hk.
As I recall from our conve sation, their O
n i
first impression was yes, they had picked it up.
- Ecwever, 3
they had not been able to locate the question.
In:iscussing it between themselves, they believe what they now recall is that while it wasn't asked on the e
I
- i s: round, they had intended to ask for it during the second round of the questions, so it may have been when they 8
thought they had asked it, that might have been really what g
the recollection was cominc uo with.
10 11
_. __ _ No,__ it_hadn ' t_.. bee n.a sk.ed_ y.e t,. b ut. Wha t they probably were going to do was ask it on the second round of cuestions.
13
~
Q Has the second round of questions been comp.leted 14 or is that coming uo?
~
15 A
There have been second rounds of questions completed.
I don' t know if we specifically issued our final 1,.
second round questions.
19l My thought is that when we were probably in the i
i
- o. rec.aration of the second round of c.uestions is when the
.,0 Three Mile incident occurred, so now there is a question l
21 i
i in my mind whethar all of our questions got out before the l'
~~
1901 180 2
Three Mile incident.
23 Subsequent to the Three Mile incident, we have had other people assisting us on the staff in performing this i
I j
Acme Reporting. Company
46 1
review, so I am not up to date as to exactly what stage 2
of review the Midland application is at this time.
O Would it be possible to o' tsin frca you a ccov of e
3 the second round of questions if they exist or the draft 4
5 second round questions if thev exist?
A Yes.
g s
I 1
Q Co you believe that had the significance of the 8
safety concerns been raised in the Novak. memorandum of January 10th, 1978 involving misleading information from pressuri er 9
,0 level as to core coolant level and potential operator error
. base.d thereon,. -.. - - - - -. - -.this memorandum would have claved a- - - - - - - - - - -
that 11 13 significant part in preventing the accident at Three Mile Island in Januarv of this vear?
w A
Ir. my own opinion, no; I think the memoranda 14 15 would have beer. judged probably still hypothetical.
It was not clearly in my mind a memorandum which had sufficient 16 technical detail to perha.os suc. gest a change in the design.
t.
I am speculating, but I would guess that it would I
t i
not have been a clear basis for saying had that information j
g-li i
been disseminated, without a doubt it would have precluded
,o I
l the Three Mile Island accident.
i901 181 gt,
i I don't know the answer.
My guess is that the I
i memo could have been reviewed and judged to be stil-23 hypothetical.
There was basis to suggest -hat the operators had had events similar to this.
Acceptable actica had been
.,5 i
. l I
i i
i
47 t
taken, and it may have been argued that the ocerators are s
G alert enough to respend crocerl.v and that there would be no, l
,i 3
need for a design change.
Q Your first point was that a memorandum such as this 4
5 would need a technical workup to really have been useful, is that correct?
6l A
Yes.
I think that we would have had to develop 3
a technical basis to support the need for changes in operating 3
plants.
We would have done it by the accumulaticn of 10 additional operating data from which a technical argument would be~ mad.e to succort the need for a change.
11 12 For example, when we talked about the pressurized 13 water reactor transient, it was through that kind of an argument t. Mat changes in the design of the plant, as well 14 as some of the procedures, cccurred.
The staff was t o.
convinced that these changes were necessary,and on a time 16 basis ac.croc.riate for making these changes required that they 1,
be made.
t3 I think oniv after we could have accumulated a I
,9 e
i technical argument, which would be made cf the data frcm 20 operating plants and a technical evaluation of its significancle, gt l
,,l would changes be suggested.
1901 182
-i i
i i
t 23 I Q
Ead such technical workup been done en this memorandum, do you feel that this memorandum in conjunctica 24 i
with such technical workup could have been a significant 45 l
t i
Acme Re artin Com on I
48 l
1!
f actor in the prevention of TMI 2?
O 2
A I would say that what we would have certainly 3
changed would have been operati g procedures, so the pro-4 cedures would have been modified to reflect the concern.
5 To the degree that the modified operating procedures would 6 i have prevented the accident, yes, but that mill would be a l
i 7
certain degree of speculation on my part.
5 0
At the end of the_first paragraph of the memorandum 9
there is a reference to the Davis-Besse 1 incident where a 10 relief valve stuck open.
-.. -... - -.Were you familiar with that.-
11 transient at the time 12 that you reviewed this memorandum?
I was aware of the transient, yes.
We had studied 13 4
~
14 it several months earlier.
I did not specifically recall 15 any of the review of that incident when I signed this is memorandum.
17 I knew it existed, and I was satisfied that it is was an appropriate reference.
i 19 Q
At the time that you reviewed this me=crandum, i
20 I were you familiar with the Michelson memorandum produced by i901 183 21 Carl Michelson?
~~
22 A
No, I was not.
I did not know of its existence.
I I
I f
23l Q
At the time you reviewed the me=crandum, were you I
I i
24 aware that this memorandum was inspired by a contact between ;
25 Sandy Israel and Jesse Ibersole?
i It I
Acnur Re artin Com on
49 1
A No, I was not.
2 Q
Were you aware that that contact arose out of a i
3 discussicn by the ACRS concerning the Pebble Springs plant?
4 A
No, but let me point out that I was aware that Sandy 5
Israel and Mr. Ebersole had had some discussions.
It was ol my understanding that these fiscussions or as I recall now, 7
my impression wae that these discussions related to perhaps 3
over-flooding of the steam generators.
9 Q
You weren't aware that their discussions concerned 10 the concerns raised in this memorandum of January 10, '78?
11 A
That is correct.
12 Q
Were you aware of the sequence of events of the 13 Davis-Besse September 24th, 1977 incident when you reviewed 14 the memora$dum?
15 A
I was familiar with the Davis-Besse event following 16 the time that events occurred.
I did not specifically, 17 again as I said earlier, refresh my memory as to specifically IS,
what was the Davis-Eesse even: when I signed the memorandum.
I 19 Q
Cc you think that you were aware that the Davis-
'N 3 esse event involved an unexplained cicsure of a feedwater I
21 valve which cut off water to the steam genera cr which in i
~
22 turn resulted in a rise in reactor core pressure and 3
camperature and as a resul: the PCRV cpened and stuck cpen, 24 that ecolant escaped through the open PCR7, flowed into 25 the quench tank to such an extent that the ruptured disc cn l
i l
Acme Reporting Company 1901 184 i
50 the c.uench tank runtured a-d -"=-
t nevertheless the pressurizer level increased to its maximum?
Were you aware of those details?
3 A
I was probably aware of those details shortly after the event.
The branch had an opportunity to send people to 0
the site and we did study the event.
6 i
When I signed the memo, I probably had a recollection of the Davis-Besse event as an event which had a transien:
3 which ended up with a relief valve opening, but most importantly, that the quench tank ruptured and that there wc a. a blowdown-into - containment.
11 Q
Co vou recall the names of the people who were sent
^
12 to investigate that event from your branch?
A At least Mr. Gerald Mazetis.
14 Q
Had those details slipped from your mind bv the 15 time you had reviewed the January 10th, 1973 nemorandum?
A Yes, thev had.
17 Q
Would it be fair to say that the reference in the
, a.
January 10th, ' 79 memcrandum of operator error based on
=isleading information as to core ccciant level based on
.cressurizer level didn't catch vour eve?
l A
That is correct.
When I say didn't catch my eye, let me say that if I read it, technically it made sense to i
23 I
me so I wasn't arguing with 'he technical content of the t
i901 185 statement.
A R
'q Comoony
.s.,
i When I say it didn't catch av. e v. e, it didn't i
i 2
suggest to me anything of the significance of the statement, as we can now look at.
3 4
Going back to the Davis-3 esse incident, we concentrated our reviews on,certainly we were interested in o
what the tower ocerated relief valve, how it performed.
-o We had an intrest because we were c.enerally. looking for a
systems resconse, We were interested in the containment behavior, 3
to specificall.v the amount of debris that was formed in the
... - -. _..so there were areas of our review that we concentrated 11
- sumo, on.
1o.
My recollection was we in the Systems 3 ranch did t o-not specifically look at the operator actions.
It may now 14 la-in hindsight be a weakness or a specialization by which the Branch did its work that it was not able to really put the 16 oc..erator in the systems review process.
t, 0
Neuld it be accurate to say that as a result of the to-review of the Davis-Sesse incident, you were nct aware of the 19 operator action in that incident?
20 A
N We probably were aware of it.
It was difficult 21 for us to incorporate it in a
sense into our review process; 22 Thateferstotheoperatorhavingterminatedl Q
! see.
3 v...e.r o.
34 901 186 3l A
That is correct.
i
52 Q
In the structure of things, is Mr. Centon your superior?
A Mr. Centon is the Cirector of the Office of 3
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Under him, he has a number of d visions, one of which is the Division of Systems safety, o
whose director is Mr. Rocer Mattson.
6
~
Under Mr. Roger Mattson is a number of assistant directorships--one, reactor safety.
g At the time of the Three Mile incident, Mr. Robert g
Tedesco was the assistant director.
I recorted to Mr. Robert 10
~ Tede sco at the time.-- ~~~ ---- ~ ~ ~-
~
' - ~ ~ - ~
11 Q
Mr. Tedesco I assume was not provided with a cocv 12 of the January 10th, 1978 memorandum as a part of distribution?
14 A
Th.c is correct.
He mav have had it in the file 15 that Mr. Ross turned over to him when Mr. Tedesco assumed 16 resconsibility.
I have no idea whether or not that indeed 1,
i occurred.
15 i
l 19l Q
When did Mr. Ross turn over resconsibility to 1
i i
l Mr. Tedesco, if you can recall?
Is that shortly after the
- o,
memorandum was issued?
11 l'
A No.
I don't recall the specific date.
j Q
Would it have been sometime in 1978?
]gQj
)87 A
Yes.
24 I
I Q
What time would this have bea-'
25 l:
I i
Acme Re artin Com an
I 53 i
I A
Well, if Mr. Ross maintained any files, it might 9
have been filed under information related to the Reactor i
3 Systems Branch.
4 0
But not applicable to a specific OL review?
5 A
No.
I would have guessed he would have had it under 6
a file which would have been a file to show the areas cf I
review of various branches.
S Q
Did the Pebble Springs plant ccme before your branch 9
for review?
10 A
Yes, as a construction permit application.
11 Q
When was that approximately, if you can recall?
la A
1977; it had a delayed review because of the 13 potential--of f the record.
14 (A discussion was held off the record, and the 15 witness' response was read back.)
16 THE WITNESS:
For vclcanic eruptions in the t'
vicinity c:_ the plant site.
.a 3Y MR. HELFMAN:
l 19 Q
Eas that plant received an operating license to 20 date?
-31 A
No, it has not.
t On--
Q Did it go through an operating licensing review i
I t
23 stage through your branch?
1901 188
., 4 A
No, it has not.
45 Q
Are you familiar with te cuestions that are i
A R
'o Comoony
4 I
propounded by the ACRS regarding plan applications?
2 A
I am familiar with those questions that the ACRS 3
develops in the area that I have technical ccgnizance over, 4
yes.
5 Q
Co those questions get routed through your branch 6
either to or on the way back, with answers, from the licensee?
7 A
Well, ACRS questions can take a variety of paths.
S Usually the questions come to us from the staff members.
9 They may he questions that a specific committee man has 10 wished to be asked, and we then endeavor to answer it, or 11 we will let it be known to the applicant that this is-a questic.
12 that we have been asked to answer and suggest that he 13 prepare an answer either as an amendment or perhaps at a 14 meeting.
15 Yes, we generally, I would say we always receive 16 the responses to any questions by the applicant.
If they 17 are formalized and if they are at a meeting today, it is IS part of the record, so it is available to us.
i 19 C
Did v.our branch receive the c.uestions that were i
'T propounded bv. the ACRS regardinc. the Pebble So. rine. s a. c. c. lication, ?
. i 21 A
Those questiens are a little, they were a little 22 unique.
They were very detailed, as I recall, and av l
I 13 recollection is that through the Division of Pro ect i
24 Management or something these questions were provided to the 25 applicant, something in the sense of can you have these i, 9, 0 1 1 8 9 i
__oc t
answers to these questions in time for the next subcommittee 2
meeting or something.
\\.
3 As I recall, the staff was just more or less a middleman in getting the questions to the applicant.
They 4
were prepared by somebody on the staff of the ACKS, and they were c.iven to us probably through the Division of Project
-o Manager..ent--some of the people on our staff, in fact.
I think I recall that we had some very limited discussions 9
with regard to the scope of the questions.
It is my recollection that these questions went well 10 beyond what 'ae would traditionally call the bounds of our tt review either in suggesting more failures than what we would 12 13 traditiorally look at, and asking for consequences, but it was of that nature.
14 13 Q
Co you recall who discussed the scope of the 16 questions?
Was that you and some other people on your staff?
A As I recall it, I did have discussions either with t-Mr. Israel or Mr. Mazetis.
I don't recall which person I t3 I
had that with.
l i
19l Q
Was it one or the other rather than both?
20 A
It could have been both.
21 Q
These questions were r0uted fr0m the ACRS eventually
_3._3 4.3 !
to your branch and then vour branch simply passed them to 24 the applicant without further analysis or review of the 25 questions?
i901 190 I
56 t
A No.
Let me see if I can help.
It is my 9
2 recollection that the questions were given to the ac.croc.ria.te s
3 branch in the Division of Prc 'ect Management.
They 4
probably gave us a copy of the questions at the sametime that thev.
ave a coe.v of the questions to the applicant, w
o so that was the way I think we became aware of the c.uestions.,
o i
I We.=robabl.v o
then throu9h the Division of 3
3 Project Management, but they were responsible for seeing g
that these questions were provided to the applicant.
to Q
Then your branch did not act as a conduit?
~~~
~
A That is~my recollection.-
No,~we did not.'
~~
~--
11 t.2 Q
What if anything was done by your branch with respect 13 to the questions?
A We certain1v read the responses.
We were interested 14 15 in the responses to the questions.
We did not, as a formal review, review the adequacy, so the questions were basically 16 develoced b'/ the ACRS.
We reviewed the resc.onses basically t.,
for information and to strengthen our own review of the g
i tgl particular concerns suggested by the questions.
- gf Q
Do you have any recollection of the content of l
l que stion No. 5, which.was proposed by Mr. Ibersole?
I
-, I A
No, I do not.
__ i
.;3 l Q
Do you recall if any of the questions raised specifically the concerns which are addressed in the Januarv
,4 i
l.
10th, 1973 memorandum signed by you?
901 191 25 Acme Reporting Company
.c,/
A No, I do not.
t C
Is there some documentation concerning your i
2 l
t branch's consideration of the Pebble Springs questions 3
that we might be able to see--memoranda, evaluations?
A Let me see if I understand.
What you a.re asking me is after we had received the responses frca the applicant, did we write anythin which described any conments related v
to those resconses?
S
~
My recollection is we did not, but I w-
'ock and if there is anything available, I will make it available to
. yo u...
~
~
Q Is it normal orocedure for you to receive the 12 questions propounded by the ACRS and the respenses propounded by the applicant?
14 A
Yes.
We generally work a little more in the line--
I would suggest that this was a little different.
C-enemlly what happens is we are a stronger, we may play a stronger role in the questions.
In this case--by that let me clarify what I mean by stronger.
We would get a certain question from ACRS.
We may read it, discuss it, and then prepare questions and then ask them of the ac. c. licant, so we may do that kind of werk on behalf of the staff.
23 Then the question comes back.
We review it.
We 24ll t
would discuss the res=onse with the ACRS and the acclicant.
i 23 1901 192 Acme Reporting Compony l
58 In this case, the questiens had, no ny nature were already, vou might say had been crecared.
They were s.
a eas, as I recall, that we would not normal-y ask because 3
in the sense they would be, you might suggest a violation of what we would consider to be our standard review practices.
.o Thev would be outside of what we might call design basis 6
events.
I Q
Your area of specialization?
g A
Not so nuch the area of specialization--as something g
ey n a
e equ e
r ensing; for example, if se to require that an-~a cident be reviewed assuming a single
~
c 11 f ailure, we would not necessarily then ask for accidents that would require two or three single failures to track that scenario, so in the: sense the questions were dealing with perhaps scenarios less likely than what the staff would la, suggest is an adequate basis for licensing.
Q So in that circumstance, your staff really did r.othing with these questions?
,,ei A
That is correct, in the sense that we neither included them in our own safety evaluation--we were kncwledge-20 able that the c.uestions were asked.
We were knowledgeable that I don ' t know if 'al-1 of the cuestions could be answered
+,__
i 1
in enouc.h detail to sav. that all v.ou wanted to know, the a
acclicant was able to orovide vou with.
3, l
It was av. understandinc. and recollection that the i
I i901 193 Acme Reporting Company
59 applicant provided a surprisingly comprehensive answer; i
that might have been because of his need to try to be as responsive as he could to the ccmmittee such that they 3
could complete their review and the process of the 4
e nstruction permit could be brought to a close, 6
O Was your branch responsible for transmitting the O
responses to the ACRS?
A Not to my knowledg.e.
g Q
Do you recall or do you know if the applicant g
esp n e ea o
.e questio.nc
- t. hat aas propounded?
to A
As I said, he may not have answered all of the 11 questions completelv.
Some of his answers may haye been 12
~
we -have not. studied that snecific scenario, but he answered 13 the cuestiens.
14 Also it was mv recollection in discussings with 15 cecole in our branch that we were surprised at the depth to
~
16 which he was able to rescond to those cuestions in a 17
~
relativelv short oeriod of time.
ui I
g I
Q Were you aware of any transients cccurring at 19 20 might have involved !
olants outside of the United States that i
l a PORV failure.
I 21 A
I was not at the time, let's say up until.the time t
001 194 of the Three.'lile Island accident.
i i
23 i
/
i i
Recently we have been made aware of a plan:
24 i I
l transient similar in some respects to the "k-=a v4'e acciden:
31 1
1 I
l Acme Reporting Company
60 1
in that there was a system transient which resulted in the 2
PORV valve remaining. pen, one of two valves remaining i
3 open, and may have been open for a period of 20 minutes 4
after which the operator secured the valve.
5 Q
Was that a Westinghouse plant?
6 A
It was my understanding that this is a Westinghouse 7
designed plant.
S Q.
Located in Europe?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
Do you recall if you personally did any work on the
_Three Mile Island 2_ construction permit ---or operator license 11 12 application?
13 Q
At the time that Three Mile Island 2 application 14 was submitted for a construction permit, I was working 15 in what is now called the Division of Project Management.
16 Mr. Ross was what we at that time called the, he was the 17 project manager for that branch.
19 I don't recall any specific portions of the review i
i 19 that I undertook myself, but I do think that we had i
l 20 discussions in the area of thermal hydraulics with regard l
l 21 to Three Mile Island. -
i901 195 22 I may be recalling Three Mile Island Unit 1.
There
}
23 is that possibility, but I don't recall any specific reviews l
l 24 that I conducted myself of either Three Idle Island 1 or 2.
e i.
M Q
Would it surprise you to learn that you are listed Acme Reporting Company l
61 on the docket for Three Mile Island 2 for approximately 400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br />, if I recall correctly, of time?
\\
3 A
This is prior to the Three Mile Island incident?
4 Q
I am tryf.ng to find out the dates.
0 A
Your question is with regard to the operating license i
or the construcrica cermi:?
I Q
I'm not sure.
I can represent to you that your 5
name appears on the Three Mile Island 2 docket.
9 A
That could be the case because if you go back in 10 time to the Three Mile Island docket, it includes the 11 construction permit for Three Mile Island 1, operating la license for Three Mile Island 1, construction permit for l"'
Three Mile Island 2, and the operating lice..se for Three 14 Mile Island 2.
15 As I recall, I did not perform any engineering 16 reviews of Three Mile Island 2.
I had already taken on my i
present position.
There were periods of time during which I
.,i 3
j did perfomn engineering reviews and it is very possible a
that one of the plants I could have reviewed in let's say O
the re. view cf the emergency core coolant systems or core
., 3--
thermal hydraulics could have been either of the Three Mile
.,'n1 196 Island ones.
I/s
.v.
Q Could you provide us with any documents which
~
' 4 would indicate what dates you worked on Three Mile Island
,3 and what you did in that regard?
A Rp q Co oc y
62 A
I don' t know how I could do that.
I could see if that information is available I am very skeptical 2
i I
that I could cbtain it without a very tedicus review.
3 Q
Can you suggest where we might find such information?
4 A
I would suggest that the Accounting Cepartment may 5
be of some help.
b I Okav..
You mentioned earlier that due to
^
3 specialization or compartmentalization, certain types of g
review fell cutside of your function, and I think we were 10 discussing this in the context of the route that you might it follow to bring the concerns of the January 10th, '73 to memorandum to the attention of other departments within the NRC.
13 Ts it your feeling that such compartmentalization 14 15 or specialization in the M2C was an organizational defect of some sort orior to TMI 2?
16 A
Certai nly I think a certain amount of ccmcartmentall-1.
a,!
=ation or specialization is necessarv.
Nuclear power plan:
I c
19l design envelopes a wide range of specialization, so I would k
9, support specialization as a necessary part of a well-function"I 3
2, !
ing regulatory organization as far as nuclear pcwer plant
- Ogj jOJ 3o.
reviews are concerned.
l/
--l 03l My point is that if there was ;7 error, it was the f ailure to recognize the relationships between the
.,4 l
l i
i procedures, the emergency. operatinc. c.recedures that would 2,
{
l Acme Re artin Comocn i
63 be followed as a consequence of an accifent.
1 We were aware of the procedures, but we did no:
i.
as cart c:.
i 3
our review c:. a system cesign or a system evaluation combine the operator's activity with what he w u d do following procedures, not to say that we didn't 5
know that he had procedures.
Cur reviews did consider how soon in operator might have to take an action, and we would certainly consider that.
g We were careful not to accept designs and scenarios g
r ch operator actions were suggested to be required 10
-- very early~ af ter an accident occ'lrred', so'from the point of
~
our review, we would look at the design to see that the operator had sufficient time to take an action.
g What I mean now--but we did not scrutinize the
-crocedure to see that,all of the implications of what the 15 16 scenario, so from that point of view, I would sense a need to tie those together.
1 8
9D Lcrr.2_nn.
Q Two questions occur as a result'.of,'
t.
19 i
First is would you agree cha: the B&W CTSG design cut far i
20,
greater demand on the. operator in a time sense than either t
I i
.,,, I, the Westinghouse design or the combustion engineering dec gn?
i A
Well, if I take away the Three >1ile Island 2 accident:
3 and evervthing we have most recently reviewed in terms of 24 short times to drying out steam genera: Ors and so forth,
,.a t
I t
j Acme Reporting Company
64 the answer to your question would be no because cur rules 1
2 that we have adopted in terms of required cperater actions n
the event of an accident are the same for Westinghcuse 3
plants or combustion plants or a General Electric plant or 4
a B&W olant, that being no co.erator action is rec.uired 3
let's sav anv. scener than 10 T.inutes, regardless of the s
accident, so the operator resc.ense time is no shorter to these classical accidents that we have reviewed.
S O
When vou indicate that the opera:Or has no required 9
procedure to follow for 10 minutes, is that post-TMI or 10
.. - - -. - -. pre-TMI?
11 A
this is pre-TMI.
This says if there is an accident 12 that cccurs, any action that is required to mitigate that 13 svstem, that accident must be cerformed automatically, that 14 the operator does not have to take an action before 10 15 mi 2tes, so there was no action required by an emergencv 16 crocedure as far as I know.
1
, e, We would not have approved the design had we known that there was an actica required other than verification,
,9,
4 which means you leck but you don't have to perform an action.
.,0 You don't have to turn en a pump or secure a valve er start 3,
a diesel or sc=ething cf that nature, so none of these
{
3 i
actions are required anv scener than 10 minutes, and this I
.,3 l
i901 199 is =re-rM:.
2.
I Q
In the IMI 2 scenario, the opera:Or, c.s i: accurate j
3 i
l Acme Reporting Company l
P 62
,i to state that the crerator en the basis of indica: Ors teck l
ij action?
2 l
A Let me point out one thing and let me first clarify 3
an earlier statement.
4 5
Generally, there is never a requirement for an coerater to take an action before 10 minutes.
On certain l
o clants for an interim pericd of time we have given credit for an operator taking an action let's say in 5 minutes.
g 9
Under those conditions,we call him a dedicathd operator in the sense that given there is a response, his first and 10 only action is to perform that function, so for a period 11 12 of time until,well, obviously until the plant is modified, 13 we have permitted an action by an operator in less than 10 minutes; but traditionally our design requirements are 14 that there is no operator action before 10 minutes.
, a.
16 What might succes: scmething earlier es that after the olant has been built and the plant is operating, somethine 1
is learned of the clant that wasn' t originallv kncwn and i
is-i i
i until certain changes can be made to the clant, as in that i
19 i
sense instead of shutting down the plant until the chances I
.,0
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.,, l can be made, the staff has on occasion determined that a I.
i
'2 dedicat2d operator is an acceptable interim response to the I,
i cencern.
i901 200 23
., 4 New maybe we ought to go back to your second question.
I wanted to clarify that point.
.,5 l
i Acme Reporting Com an
6 e,
.i Q
Let me follow that for a mcment.
This tv.c.e of a,
2 change and the use of an interim opera:Or would result frem, 3
the recognition of a generick problem, would that be accurate?
A It could be generic, or it may be plant specific.
4 5
Q 5ty second question concerned what you have described as a lack of integrating operator precedures in design
-O I
review.
3 What do you feel that is the result of?
Is there 9
some lack of overview in the organization, some structural to or organizational problem that keeps these concerns and reviews unto themselves?
it A
Yes, there must be that.
The organization 12 13 certainly has to set certain charters for itself, and there u
is in the tevelopment of a structure of an organi:ation 15 certain responsibilities that are identified.
16 I would say certainiv. a very unintentional oversight was the need to give the procedures a closer technical 1-review.
3 t
,9 They were reviewed.
They have been reviewed but f
I continue to be reviewed by the Office of Inspection and 1
so
,1 Inforcement, and I would not want to cut nyself as a cerson l
y2 who understands to what depth the of fice of Insc.ection and 901 201 23 Enf 0rcement reviews them.
,4 I do know that, and certainly it can varv. dec. endinc.
l
,s on the people doing the reviews, bu it is mv. understandinc.
l Acme Reporting Company
67 1
I that the Office of Inspecticn performs a review in the 2
sense that it ensures that all of the necessary precedures i 3
are indeed in existence and it may perform a review which 4
checks to see that, for example, the designations given to 5
certain eculpment are indeed correct, for example, that valve 6f designations are proper, but it is my understanding that the suitability of that procedure in the terms of is it the right 3
kind of a precedure to respond to that accident was not 9
specifically under the charter of the Inspection and 10 Enforcement.
11 Similarly, it was not under the charter of-the 12 Office of Operator Licensing Branch.
They were famiEar 13 with the precedures only to the point.that they knew that the proced' Ire was one that could be physically carried out 14 is by an operator,and also whether it served as a base from which is they could construct various tests to determine if the 17 operator was indeed f amiliar with the procedure,
i901 202 IS Q
Are there some chances cr:c. esed in the organization i
i i
19 i of the NRC 00 ensure that issues such as you have mencioned i
20 concerning operator procedures don't fall between the cracks?
21 A
It is my understanding that as part of the long-22 term recommendations of the lessons learned task force, that 23 they will be looking at those areas where the staff should 24 provide higher, put higher emphasis in their reviews and 25 certainly I think it is relatively knowledgeable to many Acme Reporting Compan
68 1
pecple tha: I am fairly confident :ha t this will be one 9
of their recommendatiens.
i 3
0 But they will recommend that certain issues be 4
emphasized or that there will be structural changes in the 5
organization in order to ensure that certain issues are s
covered?
l A
I think I would expect them to identify the need to 3
ensure that these kind of reviews take place.
9 Whether our management decides that oksy, we agree 10 vith the need for those changes and we must
- - - - -.. - - -. - - - - - - - -.make the necessary changes within the present structure of the organization la or whether scme changes to this structure would have to be made would have to be decided at a later time.
'4 O
Your description of the operator proceduras leads 15 me to the conclusion that they don't allow for much discretion 16 on the part of the operator, that an event occurs and he l
follows the steps of a fairly rigid precedure.
14 nould that be accurate?
1901 203 9
l A
I am not familiar wi#'
2' '
-"a: an operator dces l
-'O I
in the sense that the procedure just defines what the Operator, l
u has to do.
It dcesn't suggest what he can' t do cr what he i
- 1
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i might also be able to do, so i' -"a-=
i s a we akne s s that we i
l.
43 have beccme more aware of folicwing the Three Mile :sland y-accident, it is tha: the ocerator perhaps responded and did i
25 more than what he specificall.y was rec.uired to do :.or tne
.i Acme Reporting Company
.o9 I
event.
1 i
2 It is my understanding the operator is not restric ed to cniv those actions required by the emer3encv creratin2 3
procedure, my point being that we only give him credit for 4
performing only those actions dictated by the emergency 5
cperating precedure, and in that sense we review it to see
.e that it is well ordered and that the operator has enough 4
information to perform those actions when recuired.
3 MR. HELFMAN:
Let's go off the record for a minute.
9
( A brie f recess was taken. )
to BY MR.-.. - --..-..HELFMAN:
tt Q
With respect to the precedures which the ocerators 12 are recuired to follow in the event l-a of a transient, is the intention to eliminate the need for the cperator to 14 exercise discretion or make analysis of the transient at 15 the time he is supposed to be cerforming his manipulations?
Io, A
In general, ves; it is my understanding that an 1.,
ocerator is trained to reccenize certain obse-~="'s 13 svmo cms.
t l
In other words, if you have an event, there is information 19 i
displayed in the control recm which he s trained to
',0 recognize, so this is ccmmitted to memory.
If these lights 3,
go on in a sense, he recognizes this, i901 204 3
He then is trained to take certain immediate 23 a c ~.' ~ ~. s wb..' v.>.
.~ a v ~..~. _1 v *~ e. ~a_'_'.'~a..'~.~.,
.=... _.=..~.. =. a d-ae
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a"'e a~'~'
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25
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for examcle, 1
and then he is required then to follow a O
i crocedure in terms of performing any subsequent actions, n
so he doesn't really do any diagnosis other than what he is trained to diagnose and so he is only expected to diagnose a certain variety of events from which he can determine what 5
specific procedure he should follow.
o Q
Such as a procedure which would require him to check his crassurizer level in order to determine core coolant s
level?
9 A
That I don't know that nhat would be the case.
I 10 would say that if he has a procedure, if he ha~s diagnosed ~ ~
-~
that he has had a loss of coolant accident, he then follows the scecific crocedure for a loss of coolant accident, and 13 he follows* all ascects of tha t crocedure.
That is what he 14 is trcined to do, and if the procedure itself would say la, maintain makeuc water or HPI water to that determined 16 for the pressuri:er water level, then he would folicw it only because he has been trained to do it and that is the L5
\\
accepted response, so he is not making a decision in that sense.
i901 205 g
Q Let me give you a hypothetical.
Let's assume that i
21 I
I the ocerator had been trained that cressurizer level
.m_
23 i
indication and cressure indication rose nnd fell in tandem, l
24 l
and he observes that cressurize:r level indication is increasing whereas pressure is decreasing, and he has no:
i
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I
is been previfed with a specific precedure to cover such an i
i 9
2 event, what then does the cr. era:Or do in lic.ht o f the t
3 philosophy that the precedures are set out,he is act 4
required to analy e the transient, he looks for indications and reacts?
-o
-l A
The operater, and here we may be usine the term O
g clural because it is =cs: likely that there would be two
~
operators in the reca, a senior reactor opera:cr and a reacted
-e 9
operator, the senior reactor operator would then have to 10 make a decision if he sees an event that is different than an it event that he has been trnined to respond to, to take what he considers to be a safe course of action.
12 13 0
Is this contingency provided fer, er is this just 14 a necessary observation?
A I would consider it to be, it is an observation.
15 16 What I am saying is we don't, as far as I know, expect him to have to analyze and respond to events that he has not i
13 been previously trained to.
We don't test the.m in that sense bv saving we are cniv coing to teach vou as much, Oniv a 19 l i
i 1
certain level or accidents, and new we are going to spring 29 i
31 sete new ones on you and expect you to decipher these new 4
i ones#Ucrrectiv and take proper action, so the answer to your l
.3o.
i901 206
- 3 question would be no.
l t
I It wculd ius: cccur because we didn't recognize
+-
it to be an event that could occur different than what he
.,a.-
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A R
C
l 72 1
has been trained to respond to.
f 2
Q The operators then are not trained to handle i
3 situations that are not specifically dealt with in their 4
procedures?
5 A
That is my understanding.
6 Q
Are you aware of what the educational level is j
7 of operators?
3 A
It is my understanding that they generally all have 9
a high school, at least a high schcol education.
They will to take a certain numher of courses that may be considered to l1 he college level courses to give them a better understanding 12 of basic nuclear engineering principles.
13 Q
Did your branch have any responsibility for control room desigh. in reviewing operator license applications?
14 15 Not a major design; as I noted earlier in our 16 discussion, there was one time when we did lock at the 17 number of actions that would have to be taken and the ability 13l of the operator to move frcm one locanica Oc another to see i
i 19 that he could do it in the timeframe necessary, but that i
I I
i 29 would have to be in my mind a verv secencarv -a"-=w.
j I
21l is not primary to our review.
M l
Q Would you have reviewed such things as the i
I U!
locations of indicators?
,oni 207 l
24 A
so.
i/v i
25 '
Q For example, the location o: the cuench tank l
l Acme Reporting Company
~
73 1
indicators en the bank of the con:rci panel 2: TMI 2?
2 A
No, we would not have dcne that as par cf cur i
i 3
- review, 4
Q Is there any branch within the NRC that reviews 5
control roca design?
-4 A
Yes.
That branch is the Instrumentation and i
7 Control Systems Branch, and it would be my judgment that they 3
perform the majority of the review of control room layout.
9 Well, of the review that is performed by the staff, I would to suggest that they are the primary reviewer.
11
-__ Q But you. don' t k. now the extent of the review that 12 is perforned?
14 A
That is correct.
14 Q
N'ould yctr branch be responsible for reviewing the 15 adequacy of indirect indications of plant condition such as 16 the indirect position indicator on the PORV?
1901 208 7
^
no-3 Q
Is the review that vour branch performs at the I
19!
construction permit stace or at the operator license t
20 application stage confined to safety-related items?
i 21 A
Primarily, yes, but in the review of certain i
22l transients, we do consider what we censider to be the en-I i
23{
safety or control system impact might be on that specific j
i 24,
transient, so we primarily review the transient from the i
25 point of view that if there as an effect that the control i
l 1
l Acme Reporting Company
74 1l system may have to further degrade the system to make the f
2 transient more limiting, then we consider it in the sense i
3 that if the control system, if that was the normal 4
function, we would consider it.
5 We don't review the control systems or non-safety 6l grade systems in terms of determining whether any credit I
7 can be given to these systems.
In general, any mitigation 3
is only permitted by safety-related equipment.
9 Q
When you refer to mitigation, you are concerned with to mitigation of what?
11 A
A transient, an_ expected event or even a serious 12 accident would only be mitigated by equipment designed 3
-or mit.tgation c:-
t.u.ose specific '<1nds or events.
14 Q
As you indicated at the outset, the focus of your 15 review was on transients and accidents and the systems is designed to cope with such events.
17 A
That is correct.
15 Q
So primarily you are concerned with safety-related 19 i items?
00l I
A That is correct.
t t
21li 0
Do you know if there is a branch within the NRC 22 that is concerned primarily with reviewing non-safety related i901 209 23 items?
24 A
No.
The basic point of our review is that we cry l
i 25 to go at
":e review where you postuiate an event which includes I
i Acme Reporting Company l
75 1
in a sense the failure of non-safe v. related equipment.
2 Therefore, the event is not reduced in severity because 3
you have given credit for non-safety grade equipment 4
continuing to perform a function.
5 In terms of developing a serious event, we assume that non-safety grade equipment dces not function to minimize the seriousness of the vent, and then en the recovery side we dc not give credit _for non-safety grade equipment, 3
9 helping to citigate the equipment.
10 Q
Is there a performance in the transient review, however?
11 A
Well, we h. ave thought that it was because we to 13 generally don't give credit for non-safety grade equipment.
14 We have in cur review of certain boiling water reactors 15 recently, we have determined that certain credit has been 16 given to non-safety grade equipment to perform a function that at least the designer feels is a normal function, and t-then these transients are not serious accidents.
They are is,
i 19 transients for which the criteria is there being no fuel
- g damage as a consequence of that event.
j l
21 I would have to say that the staff has been learning i
l' more and more in the last two vears abcut the imoortance of
.,o
.,3 non-safet"2 grade equipment in the consequence of transients i901 210 and accidents.
24 25 C
ie t ' s move on to the subject that we were talking Acme Reporting Company l
/3 t
about earlier about compartmentalization in the ti2C, and 9
ycu indicated that there may be some changes proposed ::
o-i.
3 eliminate scme of the drawbacks of such an organizational structure.
4 What tyn.es of chanc.es organizationally could be made
.-3 to mitigate the compartmentali:ation tha: you have noted?
e A
Let me sav chis.
The term compartmentalization 3
assumes that we all work in boxes and we don' t talk to each other.
9 10 That is not true.
What I am suggesting is that frcm
~ ~ -
- the rev:Lew c: the Three Mile Island accident and everythinc ~~
~
11 to else that we are learning, it would suggest to me the need 13 to, for example, integrate the review of the procedures along 14 with the design of the plant. to recognize that the 15 operator is going to olav an important role in how a specific scenario evolves, and so from that point of view, I am saying 16 that erobably what reccmmendations would come, er at least 1,
,3 it is mv. coinion that there is a need to consider c.uttine.
I tg together in a closer way than it presently exists the l
l y) need to study the operator respense to events and the
.31l ecuipment that is designed to mitigate these events, and our I
i, i
I 3o.
understanding of how these events would cccur.
l 1on1 "711l You would orchablv still have specializatidn's w
.a
~
in the sense that you would have, for example, a set of
.;4 23 pecple who are cencentrating let's say :r inderstanding all t
Acme Reporting Company
i 77 t
about loss of coolant accidents which includes how cperat rs G
l l
o_.
are trained to resc.end to loss of coolant accidents, how 3
the procedures are develcped, what ecuipment is necessary, but that dces not mean that you need the same people review-4 5
ing some other transient.
6 It could be ancther c.rou. of necc.le reviewinc another transien, but reviewing it in the same breath, 3
so there would still be specializations, but it may be 9
specializations of the kind you talked about.
10 Ne may have a group that specializes in reviewing 11 all aspects ~cHE a~1oss c: coolant'ac5ident,~~ and another
~
12 group that maybe specializes in accidents which perhaps are 13 all secondary side induced transients in pressurized water reactors..That is an example.
14 15 Q
These overviews,would they be envisioned as 16 coordinating the efforts of more specialized or more l,
ccmpartmentalized groups, or do they provide an overview or what?
13 A
It would be mv ocinion that this group would have I
19
.,0 the c.rimary res=onsibility for the complete review.
It 21 would reduce the necessity to go outside of a branch, so ::
l l
4__
sneak, so in my mind, a branch that has resc.onsibility for i
l 23 the complete review of a loss of coolant accident would i
34 include understanding the training that the cperator is given,I:
understand the c. recedure s that are develoc. ed, understand
.,.a 1901 212 Acme Reporting Company
78 the design and that would be in the sense of an inclusive G
c.ortion of hcw an accident = a v. deve lcc..
s.
3 Q
Are there people on the staff that already have 4
this more general or broader view of interrelationship between 3
design and precedures and so forth?
6 A
Well, I would have to admit since the TMI 2 accident, and I think a lot of people have broadened their 3
understanding of the relationship between procedures and 9
the design, the importance I think has become clearly to obviously.
.......- - - - -Do you envision any structural changes in the 11 Q
13 organization to ensure that this review cn a broader basis is conducted as a matter of routine?
e 10 l
A If the orcanization as it is presently constructed
,4 15 can' t provide that functicn, then it would be obvious that it would be modified.
16 I think if it is a cuestion of giving a specific 1-3 branch a new charter, a s s ic.ninc. a different se t c f c. ecc. le tg now to that branch to perform that charter, then indeed it
.,0 has been acccmplished within the same basic structure sc you l,
.31 move cecple around and vou =cdifv the charter.
That is one I
5 o.n.
w a v. of achieving it.
l i
a.3 It nav be necessary to restructure the Organi:aticn I
4.4,
because it is jus: more efficient to do it that way.
Tha I
i l
25l is also a possibility.
1901 213 I
i I
I Acme Reporting Company
79 i
Q I have two final questiens, and one is do you see 9
2 any safety related ccacerns about locating two reactors at,,
3 the same site?
+
A No.
Let me point out that has always been part of 5
our review when we do look at dual sites where necessary.
4l We see complete separation, so the fact that there are twc i
7 units on the same site and the relationship between them 3
has been part of the normal. review process, basically that 9
an event to one unit shouldn't have a feedback effect from 10 another unit, and/or call upon or need systems from another 11 unit.
They basically are reviewed as two separate units in 12 the areas that I am responsible for.
13 Q
Were TMI 1 and TMI 2 connected in such a way that 14 TMI 1 was needed to help bring TMI 2 to a ccid shutdown or 15 to maintain it in that condition?
p 16 A
It is my understanding that there was scme use cf 17 Three Mile Island l's chemistry lab and so forth because of
- 3 the activity level lat's say in the Unit 2 lab, but as far i
19l as the systems that were used, to my knowledge there was nc 20 i, TMI 1 systems.
21 They may have, for example, used some of the l
22 storage facilities at TMI 1.
Those are areas that I am non
'001 214 23 !
s=. e cificall.v a s=ecialist in.
- j 24 Q
Let me ask you if you recall receiving from i
i I
3 25 -
Mr. Earley. Silver, project manager at TMI 2, a dccument i
1 Acme Reporting Com an
30 1
concerning an April 23rd, 1973 ::ansient a: IMI 2, une 2
details of which involved five safety grade vales f ailing
\\.
3 to close with a loss of pressurizer level indication on the low side?
4 A
May I see the document?
Yes, I recall this document.
5 It is av recollection that Mr. Silver and I had a discussion o
about the evcat, and I asked him if he couldn't provide me with a document.
3 g
As I recall, I thought the document I was going to 10
- get, expecting to see was something prepared by the Office 11
- of--Inspection ~and ~ Enforcement.
~
The document vou show me is one that was prepared 12 13 by the Metrocolitan Edison Comcany.
It doesn't make anv difference, but we had a discussion.
He did send me the 14 document that you now have shown me, and I see on the cover 15 of it a notation that I did make to Mr. Israel.
16 I forwarded it'to him for information, and having, 1.
time perrdtting someone in his section look into this
,a.;
document for what we could learn about the event.
19 i
Q Co you know if there were any such followup and i
20 this was dene?
21 100 6 /V l
.,o A
I do not know.
I do not recall ever s=ecifically l
23l having any discussions with Mr. Israel about anything we 1
24 may have learned from the review of the document.
O De vou recall whether you saw the LIR that was 3o I
e l
Acme Reporting Company l
2 _1 l
prepared on this transient?
l 2
A I do not recall.
i, 4
Q Co you recall whether this document which ccmes 4
from Met Ed suggested a review of plant operating procedures?
5 A
I do not recall.
I do recall not spending much 6
time icoking at the document.
The substance of my 7
recollection deals with the conversation I had w th Mr. Silver 3
and his description of the event suggested an interest to me 9
and I asked him if he could obtain a copy for me.
He did that,
10 and when I had an opportunity to look at the magnitude of 11
_ the report, the size of the report,. -
I did not want to take 12 any time to look at it myself, and I assigned it to Mr. Sandy 13 Israel.
I gave it to him, routed it to him, and suggested 14 that he might wan: to havs someone look at it for inflow.
15 This to me then suggested that if he could assign 16 someone to it, we ought to at scmetime review it to see what 17 we could learn from the event.
13 O
As far as you know, ncthing subsequent to your l
I 19 i assiwning this to or sendine. it to Mr. Israel for his i
I
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l i
M' information was done by wav of review?
O
]\\
l'
/
l 21 A
As far as I know, I have had no discussions related l
i
.M to him, with him on it until very recently w. ten t his i
3 document was shown to me earlier in the 1.st day or two.
24 -
I did ask him if he had seen
- or recalled I
25 and he had no knowledge of recollection, but outside of that l
Acme Reporing Company l
3 G2 few minute discussion, there was nothine that I can recall O
,t in terr.s of discussion related to that document.
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Q That was, cst-IMI 2?
A That was post-TMI 2.
4 5
MR. HELFMAN:
Let's go off the record for a =ccent.
l 3
(A discussion was held of" the record.)
I I
MR. HELFMAN:
Let's mark this package of material g
which consists of a memo route slip on the top from Earley 9
Silver, refers to a conversation.ofz it looks like 7/5/78, 10 as the notation frem Mr. Novak to Sandy, and this is
-Sandy-Israel?- --
-~ ~ ~~ ~ -'
12 THE WITNESS:
Yes.
13 MR. HELIMAN: "Please have someone glance at for info," and.it is followed by 33 pages of material relating
,4 13 to a trip, ES incident of 4/23/78 at the TMI 2.
16 (Novak Exhibit No. 2 was marked 1-for identification. )
MR. HELF EN:
With rescect to the documents that
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have been requested during the course of the depositien, j
I 20,
counsel have agreed that the dccuments will be provided covered bv. a letter from the NRC and that the cover letter 22 and the documents may jointly be referred to as Exhibit 3 f
l to this deposition.
.on 217 i
23 k/v i
MR. CHCPKO:
We so stipulate.
l 24 l
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Acme Reporting Company l
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(Novak Exhici: No. 3 was narxec 1
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3 MR. HILFMAN:
As we stated at the beginning of 4
the deposition, it is our practice to adjourn the deposition 5
rather than terminate it in the event we have further 6
questions for you, and so at this eine, 2nless Mr. Chopko 7
has further questions--
3 MR. CHOPKO:
No questions.
9 MR. HILFMAN:
The deposition will be adjourned.
10 Thank you.
11 (Whereucon, at 1:47 c.m.,-._the decosition of 12 Mr. Novak was adjourned.)
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