ML19290A024
| ML19290A024 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1979 |
| From: | Helfman S, Israel S, Sidell G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7908290063 | |
| Download: ML19290A024 (68) | |
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IN THE MATTER OF:
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TESTIMONY OF SA2CRD ISPJu:L nw+*www*********w*****
PLACE: Seth33da, Marylar.d DATE:
Thursday, July 26, 1979 4~.
1896 239 a
PAGEs:
1 - 65 Columbia Reporting Company OFFICI AL REPORTERS 300 SEVENTM STREET. S.W.
WASH:NGTON, D.C. 20024 TELEPHONE $54 9050 790829933
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CERTII'ICATE I certify that I have read this transcript and corrected any errors in the transcription that I have been able to identify, c>:cep t for unimportant punctuation errors.
Date:
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_C O N T_ E N T_ _S l
WITNESS DIRECT CROSS REDIRECT RECROSS
. Sanford Israel 3
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E DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NOS.
FOR IDENTIFICATION 1
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PPISIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ACCIDENT AT THPIE MILE ISLAND l
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i
' Deposition of:
SANFORD ISPJ2L
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x Hearing Room 1132 Nucl6ar Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland Thursday, July 26, 1979
,ou O
h The above-entitled Matter convened for hearing, eo b
pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m.
e 5e 2m PRESENT:
a O"
On behalf of the President's Commission on Accident at Three Mile Island:
BY:
STAN M. HELFMAN, Esquire Associate Chief Counsel and BY:
GARY M. SIDELL, Esquire Associate Chief Counsel 2100 M Street, Northwest Suite 714 Washington, D.
C.
20037 On behalf of the Witness:
BY:
MARK E.
CHOPKO, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm,ission office of the General Counsel 1896 242'
4, i
2 -3 i
[EQQQ{EQiNES MR. HELFMAN:
On the record.
Would you raise your right hand, Mr. Israel?
Thereupon, l
SANFORD ISPAEL I
was called as a witness, and ' f ter.having been first duly' a
sworn,- was examined and testified as' follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. EELFMAN:
Q Would you please state your full name for the record?
e h
A Sanford Israel, e
O 5 ____.
Q Have you ever had your deposition taken before?
e A
No, I haven't.
o Q
I think it might be a good idea to go through some u
of the characteristics of a deposition, for your own information.
The testimony you are about to give is sworn, and will have the same force and effect if the testimony had been given in a court of law.
At the conclusion of the deposition the court reporter will reduce the testimony to a transcript, and within several days, you will be getting a copy of it.
You will have the opportunity at that time to make any changes in it which you feel are necessary.
However, you.should be aware that we will have the opportunity to comment on any changes 1895 2'43 I
4 that you make.
And should such changes be substantial, it would reflect adversely on your credibility.
Therefore, it is important, during the course of this deposition, that you ask for clarification of any questions that are asked which you do not feel you understand fully before you answer them.
For the benefit of the court reporter, it is necessary that you give audible responses.
It is difficult for the court reporter to pick up gestures and nods of the head.
6 And since the court reporter can't take down two people o
Cg talking at once, please allow me to finish my question before E
you begin your answer, if you anticipate what my question is e
j going to be, and I will try to remember not to begin my next n
3 question while you are completing your answer.
Ov Do you have any questions about that?
A No.
O Did you bring a resume with you?
A Yes, I did.
Q May I have it, please?
(Examining document)
Does this accurately reflect your educational and professional background and experience, employment background?
A Yes, it does.
MR. HELFMAN:
I would like to have.this marked'as, 1895 244
4 i
5 i
i I
the first exhibit to the deposition.
(Nhereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.)
BY MR. HELFMAN:
Q For the record, could you please tell us what your title is at NRC, and describe generally what your responsibilitie are?
l A
I am section -- things have just changed.
There g
is an interim organization since Three Mile Island occurred.
e 2
I am in this interim organization, which is called Bulletins peog and orders, and we are reviewing interim actions on the e
<s operating plants, sm 8
However, my permanent assignment is section leader U
in Reactor Systems Branch.
I lead a group of about seven people.
It is our responsibility to review certain sections of license applications to assure that they meet the regulations.
O Was the latter your function and title at the time of the Three Mile Island incident?
A That is correct.
O Was that your title and function through the year 1978?
A That is correct.
1896 245 I
6 Q
I would like to relate to you two paragraphs from page 10, section entitled, " Chairman's Testimony, Background Information Booklet', Three Mile Island, Volume 2", which was provided to the President's Commission by the NRC on i
April 19, 1979.
It reads as follows:
"The staff has identified six main factors that caused and increased the severity of the accident.
These are as follows:
"2.
The pressurizer electromatic relief valve, Cz; which opened during the initial pressure surge, failed to eo
' ' ~
g close when the pressure decreased below the actuation level.
nct 5
This failure was not recognized and the relief line closed 0
ao for some time.
"3.
Following rapid depressurization of the pressurizer, the pressurizer level indication may have lead to erroneous inferences of high level in the reactor coolant system.
The pressurizer level indication apparently led the operators to prematurely terminate high pressure injection flow, even though substantial voids existed in the rea,ctor coolant system. "
MR. HELFMAN:
I would like to have these two pages, which contain paragraphs 2 and 3, marked as Exhibit 2 to the deposition.
l89{ 2ff
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y i
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(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.)
MR. CHOPKO:
Let's stipulate this is the testimony of NRC Chairman Hendrie before the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulations of the Senate Committee on Enviornmental Public Works, taken on April 10, 1979.
MR. EELFMAN:
The stipulation is acceptable.
BY MR. HELFMAN:
8 Q
Would you agree, based on your present understanding e=
P of the occurrence at Three Mile Island in March of this year, 8
y that the two factors described by Chairman Hendrie were in j
fact two of the six mdin factors which ciused'.or-increased the 3o severity of the accident?
A Could I see that?
May I have a clarification?
MR. HELFMAN:
Off the record.
(Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.)
MR. HELFMAN:
Back on the record.
THE WITNESS:
Your question was, were those two of the six --
BY MR. HELFMAN:
Q Were these two amongst the main factors in the Three Mile Island event of March of this vear?
T89is 247
s
(
8 O
l A
I guess.
I would definitely say this is probably a
among the main factors. Terminating the RPI led to insufficient cooling of the core.
O That is paragraph 3?
A Right.
If I.could back up a little?
Q Would you agree --
PORV A
The first paragraph, about the 95RV being opened, 6
if the operator had left the EPI running, the plant should have ridden:through,even with the ethopen.
So it is a factor only insofar as it was opened and hre didn't -- and he o
E 5
terminated EPI.
But had he not terminated HPI --
m2 3
Q Speaking in terms of what did happen, we know that 8
the pressurizer relieve valve opened.
A It was not recognized, and there was a lot of coolant--
terminate HPI with a continuing loss of coolant.
3 Q
If we read these two together, paragraphs 2 and G, would you agree they were the main factors?
A Continuing loss of coolant and terminate EPI would be a significant factor.
Q So paragraph 2, when coupled with paragraph 3, you would agree with that?
A P.ight.
1896 248
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9 O
O I would like to show you a two-page memorandum, dated January 10, 1978, bearing the signature of Thomas M.
Novak, Chief, Reactor Systems Branch.
In the lower left-i hand corner of the first page it reads, "Centact:
Sandy Isreal, NRR."
I show you this document and ask you if you had seen it before?
A Yes.
g Q
Did you have anything to do with the preparation e*
of that document?
g co Yes, I prepared the document.
S A
e E
Q The document was prepared by you for Mr. Novak's 13 a
signature?
o A
That is correct.
MR. HELFMAN:
I would like to have this marked as Exhibit 3 to the deposition.
(Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 3 was marked for identification.)
BY MR. HELFMAN:
Q I call your attention to the first paragraph, beginning with the fifth line down, which reads, "Under upset conditions, such as prolonged relief valve opening, and accidents where significant voids are fo~med in the primary r
i894 749
10 0
I system, it may be possible to end up with a two-phase mixture in the pressurizer that is not at the highest termperature in the primary system.
Under these circumstances, additional j loss of primary system inventory or shrinkage in the primary system may not be indicated by pressuri=er level.
This situation has already occurred on Davis Besse 1 when a relief valve stuck open."
And I call your attention to paragraph 3, which reads o
"Although the safety analyses do not require termination of oez the makeup system, operators would control makeup flow based 2
E on the pressurizer level as part of their normal procedures.
5 As a result, under certain conditions where the pressurizer 30 could behave as a manometer, the operator could erroneously shut off makeup flow when significant void occurs: elsewhere in the system or loss of inventory is continuing."
My first question with respect to these two paragraphs, did you write them?
A Yes, I did.
Q On January 10 of 1978?
A No, probably not January 10th.
It was probably sometime before that.
My best guess would probably be-over Christmas vacation.
Things were clow.
Q Of 1977?
{gggQ' -
11 till l l A Correct. O With respect to the first paragraph, you indicated i that it may be possible to end up with a two-phase mixture in the pressurizer. When you refer to a two-phase mixture, are you referring to a steam mixture? A Yes, steam and water. Q Would it be fair to say that these two paragraphs 6 in your memo predicted the two concerns addressed by ae y Chairman Hendrie as main factors which caused or increased e
- O the severity of the accident in March of 1979?
e <a A That is my understanding -- I have not gone over 3m o and read what the operator did and why he did certain things. u I am not familiar with the operator's motivations,-why;he did whatever he did. O If we hypothetize that the operator looked at the pressurizer level indicator,. and because of an indication of coolant in the pressurizer, assumed there was abundant coolant in the core, and for that reason terminated EPI, would you then agree that those paragraphs of your memo predicted the two aspects of the TMI incident in March of 1979 addressed by Chairman Hendrie? ' 895 251 A Yes, that would appear to be the case.
3 i 12 I Would it also be correct that in your memorandum Q you indicated that the problems, which you addressed, were And I refer peculiar to B&W designs, Babcock and Wilcox? you to the second sentence of your memorandum. A Yes. But now, we have to put everythine in context. Can I go ahead and explain the context of the situation? Q Yes. N A When I wrote the memo, I was fixating on the fact e that B&W had a loop seal in the pressurizer surge line, 2 me Q g which was different than the other vendors, sn=h as Westinghous e g and Combustion Engineering. That was my fixation. 3 Q Now, the loop seal may not have been the problem with Three Mile Island. At Three Mile Island, the reactor cooling pumps continufed to run, continued to put a fluid-- urith fill the primary system and fleif, a two-phase fluid, so the m nometer effect really probably wasn' t germane to what a was going on. It probably had nothing to do with the loop seal or the m nometer effect. a PORV Similarly, the @ esc was opened, and you were drawing, continuing drawing a mixture into the pressurizer and this,'in itself, could have held water up in the pressurizer. }896 252
i t 13 I I i Q Would you describe such a phenomenon as a Car.ometer effect? A No, it has nothing to do with the manometer effect. Q What do you mean by a manometer effect? A What I was concerning about there -- this is the second paragraph -- if -- Q 3efore you get into that, could you describe what l a manometer effect is? Or what is a manometer? 6 A This whole thing dealt with: having,let's say, steam o C E in the hot leg. I guess I am going to differentiate what s PeSs 2 I call the other RmE and this design. wa Q Let's try to do this as cuickly as possible. s D g What is the relationship between steam or a o two-phase mixture in the pressurizer, and coolant in the pressurizer, in terms of the manometer effect that you are talking about? A The manometer offect that I portrayed here is, if I had a pressure out there in the hot leg, in the loop seal -- Q You are referring to page 2 of your memorandum? A Yes, page 2. -- this would then support a column of water in the pressurizer, provided that the pressure in the pressurizer were below the pressure in the primarv system. 1895 253
14 r i Q So, essentially, what you are saying, would it be correct that the pressure in the het leg would push the level l of the water in the pressurizer above what it would otherwise j be, assuring that the pressure in the pressurizer were less than the pressure in the hot leg? A Yes. But I would have to differentiate that from PwR the other PR5 vendors!which' drop'directly in the hot leg. They don't have a loop seal. 0 You were concerned in your memorandum with the dw B&W design? Aeo A That is correct. In the other designs., if you have 5 g the same situation, if you have a pressure -- and I am not s 3 talking about'a flowing system, but a static system -- a lower 8 Gn the inwur.k6 cm) the g(se hhc pressure here and drops straight in, gravity would then cause the liquid to drop out of the pressurizer, because it wouldn't be held up. O So what you are saying, that the design of the B&W pressurizer system allows the pressure in the. hot leg.to as be trapped under the fluid in the pressurizer pushing level of the coolant up. ;Is that accurate? ] gg g g}4, A I guess we are running into trouble. Because of the loop seal design, we are talking about a static system here. That is all I was referring to, no flow.
f 15 f You could sustain a column of water in the pressurizer, I because of the loop seal, provided that the pressurelin the pressurizer was somewhat less than the pressure. O Would it be accurate to say that where this condition exists, the level of the coolant in the pressurizer would reflect greater pressure in the hot leg as compared to pressure in the pressuriser as opposed to coolant level in the core? b A That is correct. oz 5 0 And that an operator -- o h-- A But this is for static systems, we are talking about. g Q All right. m y And for static systems, you are referring to -- A No flow. Q Through the pressuri=er? i A Into the pressurizer. That was the thrust where I was gcing with my memo. i 89 g; 255 - O Would it be accurate to say that an operator, who is relying on pressurizer level for information concerning core coolant level, would be misled as to the level of coolant in the core, because of pressure in the hot leg increasing the level of coolant in the pressurizer unbeknownst to him? A only if he has cooled off the pressurizer,and only
I l 16 1 l if his training instructions were such that that is the only I ! thing that he was looking at. Q You indicate in the last paragraph of your memorandum of January 10, 1978, that "For OL reviews, procedures should be reviewed to ensure adequate information before the operator terminates makeup flow." In the second to last paragraph, the last sentence, you stated, "As a result, under certain conditions where the o pressurizer could behave as a manometer, the operator uo= j could erroneously shut off makeup flow when significant void 2g occurs elsewhere in the system or loss of inventory is 5 continuing." 3 8 In the first paragraph, the fourth sentence down, you indicated, "However, under upset conditions, such as prolonged relief valve opening, and accidents where significant voids are formed in the primary system, it may be possible to end up with a two-phase mixtcre in the pressurizer that is not at the highest temperature in the primary system." You go on to say, "Under these circumstances, ~ additional loss of primary system inventory or shrinkage in the primary system may not be indicated by pressurizer level. This situation has already occurred at Davis Besse 1, when a relief valve stuck open." i896 256
l l 17 9 i A That question was too long, and I am not sure of it. Q Your comment was, that for the operator to be ' misled, he would have to have had inadequate information or procedures. In your memorandum of January 10, 1978, you point to the loss of coolant due te prolongederelief : valve opening or chrinkage of the coolant, the operator's reliance on pressurizer level for coolant level,and suggest that procedures should be devised to be sure the operator 8 has sufficient information prior to terminating makeup flow. ez A A Let me speak to the general issue, and maybe I eo g will hit the point you are driving at. 5 m3 g Under normal operathom conditions, the operator, 3o of course, looks at the level in the pressurizer and takes care of makeup flow. Under upset conditions, it was my ptr oesception that the operator was sensitive to having voids in the system. When I say upset conditions, where he lost level in the pressurizer, the pressurizer emptied out. And this is what would happen under loss of coolant events, steam line brakes., what have you, you have cooling of the primary system. It was my impression that the operator was sensitive to voids, and that he.was able torhandle,that situation. When I wrote this memo I had fixated on the no-fB95 l!57
~ l 18 l ! flow effect in a loop seal. And I sent it out through Tom's signature to branch members to make them aware of the fact R that this was A little different design -- 0 At this point, I em f ar less concerned what your subjective thoughts were in preparing this memorandum than i I am what the memorandum says on its face. Wouldn't you agree that you indicated in your memorandum that the operator would be misled as to coolant level on the basis of his reading of pressurizer coolant 8 E level, which would not accurately reflect core coolant level, E 5 on account of this manometer effect, pressure in the hot ie leg pushing the level in the pressurizer up. Doesn't it 3 expressly say that in your memorandum? 8 A Yes, but it was put there to -- Q I am not concerned with your subjective motives at this point. Would you agree that that is what your memorandum states? A Certainly, if the operator were only, fixating on the pressurizer level as a basis for determining core } 89 h 2I) environment. Q The memorandun does say that? Do you agree? The operator would be misled ns to the coolant level in the core
5 20 I ensure that the operator is aware of this possible misleading information from pressurizer level. Isn't that your final suggestion? A Correct. O Let me ask you this: What is wrong with shutting off makeup flow when there are voids in the system or significant loss of core coolant? A It has to be continuing less of core coolant. Q Continuing loss of core coolant? e=p A Right. =0 S Q What is the effect that should be avoided? c }m A You would just lose inventory, depending on where -- 3 O you just continue to lose inventory in the primary system. O If the operator has terminated makeup flow, and there is a continuing loss of inventory in the core, what is the inevitable result, which we should seek to avoid? A Core meltdown, obviously. O A meltdown? A Yes, total loss of coolant. Q That would be the result of the total uncovering of the core? A Yes. O flould I be correct in assuming that such an event,
19 I i I l on the basis of his reading of coolant level in the pressurizer? I i A Because of the manometer effect. I i O Is that correct? Do you agree? l A That is right, if that is all he was fixating on. Q But your memorandum does say that. It does say that he would be misled, or could be rdsled as to core coolant level based on his reading of pressurizer coolant level. I refer you again to the end of the first paragraph, g "Under thees circumstances, additional loss of primary system e y inventory or shrinkage in the primary system may not be g g indicated by pressurizer level." e A Of course, that is what the memo says. 32y Q And in the second to last paragraph, "As a result, o under certain conditions where the pressurizer could behave as a manometer, the operator could erroneously shut off makeup flow when significant void occurs elsewhere in the system or loss of inventory is continuing." And the concluding sentence of the last paragraph, "For OL reviews, procedures should be reviewed to ensure adequate information before the operator terminates makeup flow." A Right. The indication here being if that is all he is fixating on. Q You do suggest that procedures should bexreviewed to 1895 260
a 21 meltdown prec 'd by a total core uncovering, would be a l aa class 9 accident? f i A Core meltdown is a class 9 accident. O This result of uncovering, the result of terminatien t i of makeup flow at a time when there is continuing loss of coolant in the core, and that is uncovering and meltdown, is a rather obviously conclusion from the steps you outlined in your memorandum; is it not? o. Substantial void in the system, or continuing loss o j of coolant in the core, the operator obtained misleading A[ information about core inventory on the basis of reading E pressurizer level and terminates makeup flow, believing that g s 3 the core has ample coolant, it is not a very subtle conclusion Ou to draw, that this could result in core uncovering and possible meltdown? A Yes. That is assuming the operator is not paying attention to anything else that is going on. O I am just working on the basis of your memorandum. It is not a very subtle conclusion to draw, that the outcome of such a. sequence of events would be core uncovering and possible meltdown? And I am referring specifically to termination of makeup flow on the basis of misleading information obtained by 1896 261
i l 22 till i pressurizer level indication? A only if one makes the assumption that the operator is not paying attention to anything else going on. i l l Q Or makes the assumption that he needs additional I procedures to ensure that he has adequate information before he terminates makeup flow, as you stated in the last sentence of the last paragraph in your memorandum? I am working solely from your memorandum now. d A I understand. y or in Procedures see trainedg 2 A Co Q But, would you agree that core uncovering and meltdow1 E is a probable consequence of turning cff makeup flow at a es 3 time when there are substantial voids or significant, 8 continual loss of coolant in the core?
- hie, A
Only if it is continuous termination of 44ME. O Assuming he doesn't catch a mistake within a few minutes and turns it back on. A It is possibly more than a few minutes, Q But would you agree that if the operator has misleadisg information from the pressurizer level, concludes that he HPI has adequate coolant, terminates De=t, that,iinifact,-what is going on in th-e--' is a significant, continuous loss of coolant, substantial voids, as you indicated.'in your memorandum, i896 262'
t i ~ l 23 O that the obvious consequence would be core uncovering and possible meltdown? l 1 A Oniv if he fails to correct the situation. ~ I O With that caveat, you would agree? A Certainly. If he turns it off and doesn't pay attention to any other symptoms that may be showing up in the control room, obviously if water runs out of the plant -- Q If he takes the steps discussed in your memorandum e and nothing further, and I am working solely from your ae memorandum now, misleading information frcm the pressurirer E as to level in the core, substantial, continuous loss of e inventory from the core, or substantial voids, yet he E HPT g terminates 94T, is it not an obvious consequence? n9E A Only if 252 were turned off permanently. O Permanently? HPI A That is right. Certainly, if he turned off REE and monitoring other parameters in his plant, he may be led to believe, hey, I still have a significant. event. occurring. i895 263 and turn back on. Q I don't think there is any need to go around on this again, and again, and again. But it is correct that you concluded your memorandum with the snggestion that OL procedures should be
24 i l l reviewed to ensure that adequate information is in the hands l l of the operator before he terminates makeup: flow? I, A That is right. Our branch The c; crater-does not review operator procedures. Q I understand that. We will get to that in a moment. Right now we are just working on the basis of your memorandum. Would it occur to someone who looks at your memorandum, that unless the operator has information or g procedures which would lead him to look for other indications, e h other than pressurizer level indication, that an obvious, 8 HPr b potential consequence of his having turned off FEE, on the e <3 basis of misleading information on the pressurizer, would so result in core uncovering and meltdown? o U A Only if the operator was not paying attention to other symptoms in the plant. If that is the only thing he is fixating on, he is not paying attention to anything else. Q In the second to last paragraph in your memorandum, don't you, in fact, indicate that under certain conditions where the pressurizer could behave as a manometer, the operator could erroneously shut off makeup flow when significant void occurs elsewhere in the system or loss of inventory is continuing? 1895 264 A That is right.
e 25 i I { Q And the operator's action, which you describe in i j that paragraph, you assume would be the result of his having i controlled makeup flow based on the pressurizer level as a part of his normal procedure? i A We are talking about -- 0 Let me ask you if you could answer my question, and then provide an explanation. MR. CHOPKO: I think, if I may, the document speaks d for itself. I think Mr. Israel is indicating there are oo E certain assumptions that underlie this. And the question E y has been asked several times. And I think Mr. Israel e j has indicated on the record that it is possible that s y if the operator ignores everything else, and does o exactly the process laid out in the memorandum, you could have a class 9 meltdown. But to do that he has 1 to ignore everything else that happens around him. I think he answered that severalitimes. And I think it is obvious to me that is going to be his answer, that the memorandum is based on a set of assumptions that has to occur. 'And one of those assumptions, that the opezator has to ignore everything else..s BY MR. EELFMAN: O So we can pass this by and get on to something else,
26 let me ask this: Don't you assume in this memcrandum that the operator will be basing his decision on pressurizer level as I l part of his normal procedure, and a result of his view of l
- pressurizer level, could erroneously shut off makecp?
(.enmhod A Normally, procedures in normal -- not loss of coolant. 4 That is not a normal procedure. That is an emergency procedure W r 4-a ' yrcedure. O In the first paragraph, don't you specifically 8 address upset conditions, such as prolonged relief valve ezp opening, and accidents where significant voids are in'the e 2g primary system? And then, don't you go on to-say that the }m operator could erroneously terminate makeup flow. 3o And once again, I want to remind you I am referring solely to what you say in your memorandum. A Under the first paragraph I say that loss from the primary system may not be indicated by the pressurizer level. And in the third paragraph I say, under normal procedures he probably controls makeup flow based on precsurizer level. And the next sentence I say, Hey, he could still be possibly doing this under emergency situations. Q Because he could be unaware of significant voids or e loss of inventory in the core? i895 266~ Aren't you assuming that the operator is acting on l
I 27 till l the basis of erroneous information? A No. The operator here is acting on the basis of tunnel vision, that he is only paying attention to the pressurizer level. I Q As a part of his normal procedure? A Well, normal procedure is not emergency conditions. Q Would you consider prolonged relief valve, opening or significant voids in the primary system to be normal 6 cperating condition? oe j A No. With'.a stuck open relief valve, I would guess eo b that would fall under emergency procedures. e Q Would you consider a manometer effect in the 1oy pressurizer a normal procedure or condition? o A No, I wouldn't, because the manometer effect -- in order for the manometer effect to be there, you have to have steam in the hot leg. Here again, we are talking about a (CoolcnD static system; we are not talking about losses through the pressurizer. Q in the first paragraph in your memorandet, don't you refer to prolonged relief valve opening, and don't you also refer to the situation that occurred in the Dav.is Bessie.1, where the relief valve stuck open? )89h 2b7 A Yes, but here again, it was my focus when I wrote
28 I I the memo -- Q Once again, I r.m not concerned with your subjective l intents or feelings when you wrote this. I am concerned solely with what this memorandum would say to anyone who reads this, whether they talked to you about it or knew you or not. A In the first paragraph I am talking about a concern about getting the pressurizer so it is not at the highest tempeeature in the primary sys*.em. 8 Q Aren't you really describing a set of circumstances e= g in the first paragraph? O A Yes, but the circumstances I am describing in the <l first paragraph, how I get to a situation where I don't have -- 3 where I cool off the pressurizer, because I have to cool off o the pressurizer in order for the manometer effect to be there. Q Or at least the pressurizer has to be cooler than the hot leg. A The pressurizer has to be the lower pressure than the rest of the system. And then I j umped in the second paragraph and said, Hey, the manometer effect would occur if I had all steam in the hot leg. I wasn't focusing on a continuous loss of coolant through the pressurizer, as I men'tioned earliers. O Once again, we may get into the question of what you ~ 189fi 268
l 29 t intended to say here. Right new we are concerned only with what you said here. In the first paragraph, you talk about prolonged relief valve opening, or accidents where there are significant voids in the primary system; you refer to misleading information en account of the operator's reading of the pressurizer level as an indication or core coolant level; you go on to indicate, en the basis of this misleading information, 8 the operator could erroneously shut off makeup flow; and ez E finally you suggest that procedures should be reviewed to eo g be sure adequate information be provided to the operator before j he terminates makeup flow. 5o I am not concerned with what your subjective thinking
- was, I am concerned with what your memorandum would say to anyone who reads it.
And the question is: Having read this memorandum, would it occur naturally, to someone, that a potential consequence of this scenario, which you described, is core uncovering and possible meltdown unless something was done? A Here again, only if you make the assumption that the operator is not paying attention to anything else there. O Unless the cperator were to do something about what you described here. 1895 269 i l
I 30 A Right. I j Q After you prepared this memorandum, what did you do with it? i A I wecid guess that I had a draft put in Tom's inbex, and that he probably read it and okayed it for typing. It was typed and signed. O And Tom is Thomas M. Novak, Chief of the Reactor Systems Branch? o A Yes. u C y Q Was he your supervisor or superior at that time? =o b A That is correct. e <a O Would you consider it normal procedure to provide 23 I a memorandul, such as this, to your supervisor or superior o U for approval and further action? A Currect. Q Do you recall if Mr. Novak made any changes in your memorandum before returning it to you for typing? A I don't recall that at all. Q Did he return it to you for typing? A My guess, he would give it right to the secretary. That is usual. O Is it likely or unlikely that Mr. Novak would have changed the memorandum around or made changes in it? iB9fr 270
I I 31 I I l I think if Mr. Novak had concerns or something A bothering him about the memcrandum, he would have gotten in touch with me. O Does it appear to you now, on reviewing the memorandum, l that any of it is the work product of Mr. Novak as opposed to yourself? A It has been too long. Q You don't recall? o A I don't recall. o C E Q After you provided this memorandum to Mr. Novak, E { do you know what Mr. Novak did with it? c A The normal procedure would be, after it is typed, 2 y it would come to'me for concurrence. Then it would go to Tom,. u who would sign it, and'. concur in it, and probably issue it. to the people in the group, Mr. Ross. O Mr. Ross? A Carbon copy. Denwood O Is that Dis:mse Ross? l A That is correct. Q Who would have determined the circulation or the routing of this memorandum? Would that have been Mr. Novak's responsibility? A That is very loose in our organization. I never
32 paid too much attention to where carbon copies went to. O Would it have been your responsibility to determine I i i circulation or routing of the memoraddum? A I haven't done that in the past. Tom would doodle name I of different people to route it to. Q So the decision to send a copy to Mr. Ross was Mr. Novak's decision? A I would guess so. 8 Q It was not your suggestion, as far as you recall? oz A A I don't know one way or the other, eo Q -With respect to normal circulation procedures or E routing procedures of memorandums, would it have been 3 3 Mr. Novak's responsibility or yours to determine who this O memorandum would go to? A It is not clear' cst whose responsibility it is. As I mentioned, I never paid too much attention to routing, unless it was a memo out of the branch, on a particular case. Then I would make sure I picked up the branch chief and the project manager en that particular case. But after that, I didn't pay much attention to it. 1896 272 Sometimes the secretary would put dcwn a standard list of people it went to. O So sometimes you would determine the routing,
33 411> i and sometimes sometimes Mr. Novak would determine the routing, the secretary would determine the routing? l l A They would all add to it, probably. There wasn't any clear responsibility for making sure that the routing l t ! was complete. O Did you or did you not determine that this memorandum should be routed, for example, to the Division of operating Reactors? A As far as I know, I didn't make a conscious decisien e=g one way or the other. =C b Q De vou know if Mr. Novak routed this to the Division ~ = g of Operating Reactors? O o A I don't know whether he did. u Q Or to any other division? A I don't know. Q So far as you do know, to whom did Mr. Novack route your memorandum in 1978? A I know nothing more than what is on the memorandum, Reactor Systems Branch is mentioned and Mr. Ross. Q That is Mr. Novak's own branch? 189 273' A That is correct. Q Would that have included you and the people on your staff?
34 t i A That is correct. i O Were there any other staff leaders other than yourself? } A Yes, Jerry Mazetis. I l 0 Were there any others? i A Jerry Mazetis !s a section leader. We have five i or six people. Maybe 13 to 15 people in the branch. I I i O You and vour team, and Mr. Mazetis and his team? A Right. Q Both teams were within Mr. Novak's branch? e 3 A That is correct. =o b Q So essentially he routed the memorandum internally? c g A Basically. 4 o Q As far as you know, there was no other routing? u A As far as I know. Q Do you recall having a conversation with Mr. Tedesco concerning your memorandum? A Yes. Q Could you describe for the record who he is and what his title is? A At that time he was assistant director, I guess, Reactor Safety. He was Mr. Novak's boss. Q Was this conversation after the incident at Three Mile Island in March of 1979? 7 j{
35 I i l A That is correct. { Q Let me show you this document, and have you take [ a look at it. And I will then ask you if that is an accurate reflection of your conversation with Mr. Tedesco. A I guess so. I couldn't remember the details of the conversation. MR. HELFMAN: I would like to have this marked an exhibit to the deposition, i g (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 4 e=p was marked for identification.) eo ~ ~ MR. HELFMAN: I will note for the record that the b c ,s title is, " Background Information to January 10, 1978 Note to RSB -- Loop Seals in pressurizer Surge Line." oo BY MR. HELFMAN: Q Would it be accurate to say that the first paragraph of this memorandum is essentially a su= mary of your January 10, 1973 memorandum signed by Mr. Novak? A Here again, the manometer effect is only a concern when I would have steam in the hot leg. There may be other situations where I could have hot water in the hot leg and the pressurizer cooled off, and the pressurizer could be filled and I could have voids someplace else in the system. Q_ But that wasca scenario not discusse'd in your '189s 275 i l
Y i j 36 l memorandum, and not discussed here; is that correct? (tkt po/is f44t 'incih*O A That may have been4 you know. The Davis Bessie incident may not have been a manometer effect at all, nothing to do with the manometer effect. And to the extent that it is discussed in my memo - - I didn't mean to indicate that Davis Bessie 1 was a manometer effect. What was the question? Q The question was, is this first paragraph, which summarizes your conversation with Mr. Tedesco, a summary of e 2 l g your memorandum which was signed by Mr. Novak in Jancary of : 2g 19787 s y once again, I am talking about the document-and 3 8 not what subjective,. mental processes you may have had at the time. A I would guess the last sentence is probably too strong in terms of characterizing my memo. "The operator relies on level indication for the control of makeup flow to the plant system." Certainly, under normal circumstances, he would, but under upset conditions, one would expect it would'be more 1895 276 than that. O In the summary of your conversation with Mr. Tedesco, it states, "The operator relies on level indication for the I
l' 37 i l O control of makeup flow to the plant system." And in your memorandum of January 10, 1978, you state, "The operator could erroneously shut off makeup flow when significant void l occurs elsewhere in the system or loss of inventory occurs elsewhere in the system." So the statement in the conversation is stronger than in your memorandum; is that what you are referring to? i A Right. 0 In the summary of your conversation with e! Mr. Tedesco, the problem which concerned you is characterized =o b as a ceneric technical matter. ~ c }m Is that accurate? 3o A Well, I had indicated to Mr. Tedesco that I had -- I was fixating on the manometer effect in the pressurizer surge line, the pressurizer, and this wasn't the result of a specific plant review. It was just something that I was doing on my own. O It was a concern about B&W plant design. A It came out to be a concern about B&W plant design, but I wasn't reviewing B&W plant designs, 30 to speak. It was just a matter of somehow information coming together and the idea popped in my head that this loop seal could behave in this fashion, as a manometer. It wasn't that I 1895 277
38 l i r i l specifically was looking. I wasn't reviewing B&W plant designs with the idea in mind -- as an assignment, so to speak. k It was a matter of pulling together various pieces of I' information, randomly, I might add. It wasn't an assignment, that I was deliberately looking for this item. I guess I am not really expressing myself properly. O In other words, as Mr. Tedesco states in this st= mary, that this problem was not the result of a review of h any specific plant design? ez A A That is correct. e 2g Q It was more a concern.for plant designs notably g the B&W plant design, not a specific license application, 3o but a generic concern? A It was not a specific license application. And I shy away from agreeing with you that it was a B&W concern, because it wasn't. It was not a work assignment that I had. It was just a matter of having read something here and there, in another place,and somehow pulling this together. It turned out to be applicable to the B&W. Q You, in fact, mentioned that in your January 10, 1978 memorandum? A Right. .i896278 Q Would it be accurate to say that after discussing
I 1 39 the matter with you, that Mr. Tedesco concluded it was a l generic technical matter? i A Right. O It also states in the Tedesco summary of your conversation, that it was recognized that the loop seal configuration appears to be unique to B&W plant designs. A Yes, as far as I know. O Would you charac terize that as a generic concern? A All right, e! Q Yes? =o b A Yes. c <g Q And Mr. Tedesco accurately relates that misleading level information would result from the fact that instrumentation o U installed to measure system coolant is installed on the pressurizer. A Under normal operator conditions, an operator would determine the coolant -- would determine he had a full primary system, under normal operation conditions. 11395 279 Q In the final paragraph of the Tedesco summary, it states that " Operating experience available at the time that the memorandum was prepared did not reveal any situation for which the operator could not effect safe plant shutdown; consequently, actions to pursue this matter further at the time
I 40 t I l ' were not taken. This has remained generally true up to now." O In your January 10, 1978 memorandum, signed by i 1 Mr. Novak, you stated that the operator could erroneously i shut off the makeup flow on the basis of misleading information. A That is correct. However, the last paragraph in the Tedesco note g here dealt with, why didn't we pursue it any further. That e j is basically what it came down to. e Q b And my recollection at the time was, I didn't, at c <s the time I wrote the memorandum, I hadn't been aroused sa y sufficiently to think of it as an immediate safety concern. And basically that probably stemmed from the perception I had, that the operators were sensitive to voids in the primary system. So that this--he would be sensitive if he pressurized the level, would drop out of the pressurizer to some cooling situation, the void would then have to appear, would then show up someplace else in the primary system. And my perception that he was sensitive to that -- 1896 280 Q But this information, this perception of yours, does not appear on the face of your memorandum. A It does not appear on the facecof my memorandum,
i i I 41 i till l l, ! because had I had a different perception, I probably would i, ! have -- if I had perceived that the operator really was just i fixating en the pressurizer level, I believe I would have j handled it much differently. O I am not concerned with that question at this point. A But the way the memorandum was written, my fixation was with the manometer effect. And all of our memos, we get into a routine of trying to develop interest in considering g iwhatever these memes
- are, and one of those is to add safety C
j concern. So I probably overstated the safety concern so that eo other pecple would pick it up. c E Basically, at the time, I am pretty sure my 23 3erception was the cperator was sensitive, unless it -- if ou I truely believed what the operator was going to do was fixate on the pressurizer level, I find it hard to believe we would have handled it that way. I hope I would not have handled it insuchacasualmannfer. Q I understand that concern of yours. But once again, I am not interested in your subjective thought processes at the time of the memorandum. I am concerned with what the famorandum says. {89h 2bl ~ You emphasized the" safety concern in the memorandum? A Yes. But the purpose of the memorandum was to get
I 42 i 4 I 1 the reviewers to take a look at this situation, on plants that would be coming in at that time. We did not have any -- f l at that time we weren't actively reviewing any B&W plants. I ! And I didn't want to forget about it, so this was a mechanism. O That is the reason you expressed the safety in the memorandum? I A That is correct. That is the reason I added the last couple of paragraphs, was to maintain some interest on the d part of the reviewers. Oe j O The question I have, concerning the Tedesco summary 8 6 of your conversati~en with him, is his statemenh~that e <a operating experience at the time of the January, 1978 s3g memorandum did not reveal a situation for which the operator u could not affect safe plant shutdown? A Why, that was the Davis Bessie situation, and that was probably the only one I was familiar with. They did shut the plant down. Q Now, referring back to your Tanuary 10, 1978 memorandum, isn't it the concern which appears on the face of the memorandum that the operator be given adequate,-accurate information, so that he would take the necessary steps to ensure a safe plant shutdown? L895 282 A As I mentioned, we have not been involved in l
l: 43 i i I i l jreviewingoperatingprocedures. I may have had this perception that the operator was sensitive to voids in the system, and he would do things to bring it to a safe shutdown. I guess I was looking for feedback here as to what I it was that he was looking at, or how he would handle the situation. I Q Once again, I am concerned with what it says on the face of ycur manerandum. I am drawing a distinction between 8 that and what your subjective thoughts were at the time. ezp Cn the face of your January 10, 1978 memorandum, eo g are you not -- do you not express a concern that procedures ~~ ~ g be reviewed to ensure that operators have the accurate oa .information so that they would be able to effect a safe plant o shutdown? A No, the rationale there was for the reviewers to get a better understanding of what it was the operator was trained, or by procedures were doing to bring the plant" to a safe shutdown in a situation. }8$h 283 In other words, I was trying to get more information in an area that I thought was already there. It was'already ny perception that the operators might have known how to bring the plant to a safe shutdown under these situations. There vas nothing that we had, that we'were reviewing, in this area,
44 I h I l and I was trying to generate interest in reviewers to pick this up and go into this area a little bit. And I put procedures -- we don't review precedures. l And usually what happens in the situation, we wouldn't review i l the crocedures, but put a cuestion on the docket "What would li operators do under the situation?" and get back some sort of su= mary what the procedures say. i Q Once again, I understand you may have had additional I g subjective thoughts at the time of this preparation of this e memorandum, which are not expressed in this memorandum. I am 5 i concerned-solely with what the memorandum says, and I am e E trying to compare Mr. Tedesco's summary with your original E3o memorandum. v Mr. Tedesco states that operating experience did not reveal' any situation for which the operator could not effect a safe plant shutdown. On the face of your memorandt.t, isn't there a concern expressed that the operator have the accurate information necessary to effect a safe plant shutdown? And I refer to the last sentence of the last paragraph of igg 5 284 your memorandum. A You are fixating on accurate information? Q Yes. A And I am not sure accurate information is what I am
i 45 I. I looking for herE And I guess maybe you better explain what you mean l by accurate information. O All right. I will read it to you, out of your memorandum. This is the second to last paragraph. "As a result, under certain conditions where the pressurizer could behave as a mancmeter, the operator could erroneously shut off makeup fl w when significant void occurs elsewhere in the system d O of loss of inventory is continuing." e 0 A Okay. E g Q The operator could erroneously shut off makeup E 3 flow. Previously, in your memorandum, you talked of the ou operator relying on pressurizer level, under certain situations that would be a misleading or inaccurate indication of core coolant level. Isn't it ture that in order to effect a safe plant s hutdo.m, the operator would have to have accurate information about core enolant inventory? 895 285 A No. This is where, I guess, it is a matter of semantics. Let's take a large break'loca. You never have a Tecovery of level up into the pressuri=er. It is all -- the Lnference I am getting from your cuestion, he should have an
i 46 I i l accurate measurement of level, and that is not really necessary, l l based on more recent work. We find the operator should be interested in i subcooline in other ascects to indicate if he she ad terminate i #I ~ i,tBE. These are secondary parameters on the indicator level. It indicates you have a saturated condition or voids someplace else in the core. But it is not a direct level. And we talk about accurate. If a temperature is e off 2 or 3 degrees, so accurate -- Ue y Q This new learning, what you refer to, is post eo b January, 1978? e l }m A Yes. I mentic' led earlier that I had this perception 3 that somehow the operator knew how to diagnose his plant when o U he got into some situation. I did not specifically know what he would be doing. Q Apart from your subjective feelings, I am talking about what appears on the face of your menorandum, and I am trying to compare the statementin Mr. Tedesco's summary that there was no situation revealed by operating experience for which the operator could not effect safe plant shutdown. f895 286' And I emphasize the words "could not". In your January 10, 1978 memorandum, the concern is expressed, is it not, that the operator be provided with
47 I t accurate information concerning core coolant level in the face of his reliance on pressurizer level as an indicator of core coolant level? i A No. No, no. We are talking about accurate. No. You are fixating on pressurizer level, or core coolant level, and that isn't what my last sentence refers to. "To ensure adecuate information in other words--to go back to my subjective view, and I have to take it into context of N what my understanding was, what my feeling was--that the oz g operator would look for other parameters
- .o determine if he '.
- OA h
e had other voids in t e system, whether the system was solid, }m and only had a bubble in the pressurizer. 2 o And in the Tedesco memo, hey, there wasn't any U situation where the operator didn't bring the plant to a safe shutdown. The Davis Bessie, what I was referring to -- 0 In other words, the prior experience, and Davis Bessie for example, the plant was brought to a safe. shutdown. A That is right. 11395 287 Q Doesn't Mr. Tedesco's statement assume that the operator has the necessary information to bring the plant to a safe shutdown? Isn't that an implicit assumption? A Yes, that the operator has the information, whatever i
48 j i that information is. O Whatever it is. And going back to your January 10, 1978 memorandum, isn't there a concern expressed on the face of the memorandum, i } irrespective of your subjective feelings, that the operator I could be misled by pressurizer level indication as an indicator of core coolant level? A Yes, but that was put in there to ' elicit the reviewer's dilligence in looking at this matter. e h O Were you satisfied with the dilligence with which e Q the reviewers' looked at this matter? e E A None of my people have looked at a B&W plant, s3 o actively reviewed it, since that time. u Q When you refer to reviewer, you are talking about the people on your staff; not reviewers of your staff? A correct. Q Would you anticipate that having stressed the safety concern in order to alert your reviewers to the problem would also have alerted Mr. Novak to the problem? A The problem of a loop seal manometer effect, I would think so, sure. }89h 200 Q Would it have alerted -- it should havn. alerted Mr. Novak, as ::ou intended to alert yo,ur reviewers; is that a
j 49 i i fair statement? l A Alerted them, maybe, we should look at the loop seal, yes, i O 3ecause of its potential consequences, as outlined i in your memorandum? A Yes. Q And the safety concerns, which you expressed? A Correct. 8 O Do you know if to date your safety concerns have C 2 g been addressed by reviewers?- And.by-use of that term, I oay don't mean the people on your staff, but Mr. Novak and his 5 g superiors and so forth. 3 8 A My discussions with Mr. Mazetis indicates that one of his reviewers was pursuing this matter, Midland plant. Q That is a particular license applica' tion review? I896 289 A That is correct. O My question was directed to -- and I am using the the term reviewer differently. Mr. Novak, who reviews your work or supervises your work, and perhaps the people who supervise his work, do you know if to date the concerns you expressed in your memorandum has been reviewed by the hierarchy of NRC, as opposed to the reviewers on your staff? A As of today?
l 50 i till i l l l 0 Yes. l A ch, yes. But not because of my memo. Because of I i Three Mile Island. In other words, we had an extensive review I Wi f_ l of procedures when ?WE should be terminated. Q Do you know which particular branches have reviewed the problem addressed in your memorandum, in light of the-I
- TMI-2 experience?
l A The Analysis Branch. The focus is not on loop HPE seals; the focus is when you should terminate SSE. ezp Q What other branches,besides the Analysis Branch, =0 b that you are aware of? e E A Well, this is part of the team that was established sm y very quickly post TMI, the Orders group, that we were looking at other B&W reactors; .and mainly, in the Rostoc=y section; and the Operating License Branch; and also.the Reactor Systems 1895 290 Branch. Q Are you aware of what has been happening with the memorandum and the concerns raised in there? Has it been sent to technical people to review, or has it gone down the organization structure? A No, it has been superceded by the Three Mile Island event, which indicated one of the concerns was, hey, a guy HP[ turned off the 4WC. And that is what is coming out. So this
i' i 51 i till 1 ! memorandum probably isn't being reviewed at all. It has been eclipsed by Three Mile Island. l Q When you say your memorandum is not being reviewed at all, do you mean that it is not part of the review that is j ongoing concerning the TMI-2 incident at all? i A This memorandum had to do with loop seals, *ad one of the problems with loop seals, they may give you a 1-vel ' indication in the pressuri=er which may not be an indicator. o. of other voids in the system. o The issue that is being pursued, because of. Ae Three Mile Island-2, is the pressurizer level indication may o wc g lnot be an -adequate indication of level inventory in the primary-e i 2 3 system. ou Q Or accurate indicator? A What was the word I used? 'O Adequate. A I guess it is a matter of semantics. I am not sure bhy you choose accurate. Q In your use of the term " adequate" and my suggestion af the term " accurate", I am attempting to draw a distinction aetween accurate, but inadequate, and inaccurate indication. Would it be correct that in your January 10, 1978 memorandum, you expressed a concern that pressurizer level
i 52 i 1 indication, under certain circumstances, could be an inaccurate indicator or core coolant invratory? And I refer you to the second to the-last sentence ! of the first paragraph,which begins with the word "under",..and reads, "Under these circumstances, additional loss of primary system inventory or shrinkage in the primary system may not be indicated by pressurizer level." Is the second to last paragraph of your memorandum in which you indicate that operators base their makeup flow ez of control on pressurizer level as part of normal procedures 5 S and that,Jas.a result;;under certain conditions, the operator e g could erroneously shut off makeup flow where significant 5 voids have occurred elsewhere in the system, where loss of o U inventory is continuing. Does that describe the situation where the pressurizer level would be giving an inaccurate indication of core coolant level? A I could say inadequate also, i895 292'. Q When you say " inadequate", do you mean inaccurate? A We are into semantics, and I don't know where it is coming out. You definitely have something in mind when you say accurate. Q I have nothing in mind other than clarifying your use of the term " inadequate". My reading of your memorandum 4
I 53 I til> I j indicates that the operator, if he relies on pressurizer l level indication, could, under certain circumstances, be i relying on inaccurate information. The pressurizer level would he indicating more coolant in the core than actually exists in the core. A No, it is more inadequate, than inaccurate. Even -- it is not sufficient by itself. Q Why not? d i A In order to make sure that the system -- you only v m SL e 4 want the void in the pressurizer, steam bubbl>ag pressurizer. = C 2 So you are going to hve a level, there has to be a level w e 5 indication of the pressurizer, but that is inadequata by =3 3 itself under these situations to define that you have nc c U voids someplace else. But, you see, after all is said and done, you still need a level in the pressurizer. So when I say inadequate, it is not sufficient by itself to be a true indicator.of something which failed in the primary system. } 89h '293 0 If the operator were relying on pressurizer level indication, would he be receiving accurate information about core coolant inventory under the circumstances you describe in your January,.1978 memorandum? 9 A He would need other information, because --
54 i till i I Q My question is -- A You see, it is inadequate. Indeed, he could have a filled system. i Q But under the circumstances you described in your memorandum, where you have prolonged relief. valve opening, voids elsewhere in the primary system, additional loss of primary system inventory, or shrinkage in the primary system, all of which may not be indicated by the pressurizer level -- d I am quoting your memorandum -- that if the operator relies oez en pressurizer level indication, he would be receiving -=0 inaccurate information about the level of coolant in the core. w c 5 Under this scenario that you set out in your m2m memorandum, doesn't the pressurizer level give an inaccurate a O U indication of core coolant level? Isn't that why the.cperator has to look -- 1895 294 A No, it is inadequate. Q It is accurate but inadequate? Would you characterize it as an accurate indicator in this scenario of core coolant level? A It does not indicate, under these conditions where you have higher terperature voids elsewhere, it does not indicate what the plant -- let me back up. By itself, going through these types of scenarios,
l 55 e it may be an inadequate indication by itself. O As a result of that, wouldn't the pressurizer level i, j indicate greater coolant in the core than actually exists? A If the operator is sensitive to voids in the system, i i he would recognize that he can't rely en the pressurizer level to indicate the inventory in the primary system. O If he was relying on pressurizer level -- A If that is all he is doing, saying, hey, if I have 6 a level in my indicator, or his training, his experience, e i O E his background, whatever, tells him that is all he needs -=0 to determine that his primary-system is filled, then he has c <g an erroneous conclusion. 2my Q Ee is operating on the basis of inaccurate o information*, erroneous information? igg 6 295 A The erroneous information is that it is his understanding that is all he needs. Q In this scenario, is the pressurizer level indication an accurate indication of core coolant inventory? A This scenario says, hey, if that is all he is fixating on, he could erroneously turn off -- it would be erroneous, because he could have voids elsewhere in the system, and he could take action based on that erroneous conclusion ( that he has drawn.
J 56 j O 3ecause he is relying on inaccurate information of Q core cociant inventory; is that correct? I i j A Inadecuate indication. MR. HELFMAN: Off the record. 1 (Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.) MR. HELFMAN: Back on the record. BY-MR. HELFMAN: O In the scenario which you have described here, is 6 pressurizer level a necessary but not completely sufficient c 2_ indicator'of core coolant level? Would you go that far? eo 3 A Under these conditions, it is a necessary indication e but not sufficient -- in order to know that you have a filled 2oy primary system, you would have to have a level in the o pressurizer. 1895 296 Q All right. LSSL A The obvtome'is not true -- the reverse is not true. Under these conditions, if he has a level in his pressurizer, and concludes the system is filled, that is not true, because he could have voids elsewhere in the system. It is not sufficient by itself, under these conditions, to know that you have a filled system. You see, I stress filled system, because under some of these events, the system may not refill --
57 i l i l 0 What you are saying, under these circumstances described in your January 10, 1978 memorandum, there could I be voids in the core, there would be a loss of coolant level i in the core, and at the same time, the pressurizer could j indicate sufficient coolant in the core? I A There would be voids in the primary system. Q And the pressurizer would indicate -- A If the pressurizer was cooled off, etc., whatever 6 I described, it would 'ct as a manometer. It would not a u E reflect that you had a -- EeC Q -- loss of coolant in the core? m e 5 A In the primary system. ms 3 Q Excuse me. OU A Right. Q Is that an accurate statement? A But the manometer effect is already after you have steam in the hot leg to below the surge line. There may be other conditions where -- Q So you would already have loss of coolant or a void in the primary system, and ;under the circumstances you described in your memorandem, the pressurizer level would indicate ample coolant in the primary system? A The pressuriser would indicate there is fluid in
,i 58 i l l the pressurizer. The operator is the one that has to draw he the inference that it has ample inventory. t l 0 And therefore, as you state in your memorandum, i l cuote, "As a result, under certain conditions where the pressurizer could behave as a manometer, the operator could erroneously shut off makeup flow when significant void occurs elsewhere in the system or loss of inventory is continuing." d A What is missing, if that is the only thing that e y he is paying attention to, and he disregards other systems, eo b that is right. c E MR. HELFMAN: Let's take a five minute break. 2D (Whereupon, a five minute recess was-taken.) o U MR.HELFMAN: Back on the record. 1895 298 BY MR. HELFMAN: Q You mentioned in your January 10, 1978 memorandum that the situation which you are describing has already occurred in Davis Bessie 1, when a relief valve was stuck open. Were you relying on the September 24, 1977 transien't at Davis Besse 17 A Yes, I believe that was the date, the one in September.
59 t till l l But, here again, as I mentioned, that may not have anything to do with -- the manometer effect may not have l l anyrhing to do with the Davis Bessie 1. The only reason that I l was injected in the memo was that voids elsewhere cesta did not show up in the pressuricer level. I Q That is the scenario at Davis Besse 1; is that not correct? A As far as I know, yes. That is the one, yes. o. O And that was also the transient in 1977, in which u there was an unexplained closure of a feed water valve which e resulted in a rise of reactor coolant system' temperature, and c 5 pressure resulting in the pressurizer power relief valve to es 3 open, and this valve stuck open, coolant escaped through the ou PERV and filled in the quench tank to such an extent that the ruptured, the dis'c ruptured. Nevertheless, the pressurizer level indication increased to its maximum.a-Is that your-understanding of that transient? A I don't recall the details of the transient. Q Let me show you a document, which is entitled " Davis-Besse Unit One Nuclear Power Station, Supplemental Information for LER NP-32-77-16," and the four paragraphs which are entitled, " Description of occurrence." Is that the transient that you were referring to in
l 60 O your memorandum? A Let me state this: That there was a transient, and I presume that is the one that was in September. l 0 Yes. i i A And there was an internal meeting, to go over the details of the transient, and I happened to be at the meeting. That really was my only involvement. Somehow I came away with the impression there were voids in the system and the pres sur) r \\t vl\\ was high. I don't recall the details of what duez the transient was, w C 2 Q You don't recall the details at this time? E j A That is right, nor was I involved in the review of 2 3 the event. O r U Q You were not offically assigned to review the Davis-Besse event? A That is correct. i895 300 MR..HELFMAN: Let's mark, as an exhibit to the deposition, this previously referred to Supplemental Information for the LER NP-32-77-16, at the top of which is the date of the event, which is indicated as September 24, 1977. The facility is Davis-Besse Unit 1. THE WITNESS:
- am not sure I even saw the LER at the meeting.
There were some traces of things that
61 i t i were happening. MR. EELFMAN: You are not sure you saw this particular i document, that is going to be marked as an exhibit? l I THE WITNESS: I cculdn't swear to it. l (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit No. 5 l l was marked for identification.) i i MR. HELFMAN: We should indicate for the record that f i this is a three-page supplemental information. My i question referred to page 1. The supplemental information e h is covered by a document entitled, " Licensee Event = C b Report, Exhibit A", which is covered by a letter dated c E October 7, 1977, signed by Jack Evans, Station ~. o Superintendent, Davis-Besse Neclear Power Station, u addressed to a Mr. Keppler, Regional Director of Region III. T895 301 The whole document is marked as Exhibit 5. We should also note for the record that the memorandum of January 10, 1978, signed by Thomas Novak, and prepared by Sandy Israel, has already been marked for identification as Exhibit No. 5 to the deposition of Mr. Foster of' July 6, 1979. BY MR. EELFMAN: O Were you aware at the time that you prepared your I i
s. 62 i l 11 11 f, memorandum that a region inspector by the name of James i l Creswell had discovered that the operator had manually I HP[ terminated 9us during this incident at Davis-Besse? j I l A Nas - I aware of what? I Q At the time you prepared your memorandum for Mr. Movak's signa'ure, were you aware that a regional inspector by the name of James Creswell had discovered that the plant HPE operator had manually terminated PSE? d A Not to mv knowledge. U l C Q Are you aware of that now? 8 1896 302 b A You just told me. e <a O Since the incident at TMI, had you become apprised s2 of Mr. Creswell's findings? ov A I knew there was a Creswell memorandum, and I had started into a review group of B&W reactors. This Creswell memorandum, that was one of the things we were supposed to 90 over, and I probably had it -- this is post TMI I am talking about. I probably had it in my hand, but I think I gave it to other people in the group to review it. I don't recall reading it, physically. I may have had it in my hand, but I don't recall reading the Creswell memorandum, post TMI, because that was something that came up post -- in review of B&W plants in general.
w. I 63 l i O Prior to your preparation of the January 10, 1978 I ! memorandum, which was signed by Mrr Novak, had you been l l provided with a copy of a report known as the Michaelsen i l report? A I had what I called the Ebersole draft, which turned ' out to be a draft of the Michaelson report. Q A handwritten draft? l A That is correct. Q You received it from Mr. Ebersole? e l A Yes. =0 \\896 303 Q Who is he? = 5 ( A Jessie Ebersole is a member of ACRS. s3 o Q How did Mr. Ebersole come to give you this memorandum? u f A I had attended severa1 AC 6 meetings over the previously -- I don't know, two or three years, what have you. And Mr. Ebersole brought up concerns about natural circulation with small breaks in non-condensibles,and I believe that after some meeting,a ACRS meeting, I had a discussion with Jessie, and in effect he said he would like to send me a report to look at. Q Who is Mr. Michaelson, or who was he at that time? A I did not know Mr. Michaelson. From what I read, or from I read, he was working for Jessie. I don't know.
ss i 64 Q Would it be accurate to say that Mr. Ebersole provided you with a copy of the Michaelson memorandum? I A That is right. It was informal. 6 l Would you describe this as a formal procedure for O routing memorandum within NRC7 A I had, I received other information informally, but not very much, one or two pieces, from consultants at
- ACRS. It wasn't anything unusual in my mind.
g Q Would you describe that as an official routing e=p procedure for NRC? e O i A No. e E When you characterize it as NRC, he is an individual say and he provided me with a document. It wasn't what I call an u official NRC transmittal. Offical transmittals usually come in at a higher level. jggg }Q4 Q Higher than the ACRS? A ACRS is one branch, one orgenization within NRC. When things are sent over officially, they usually come from Mr. Fraley, or whoever happens to be chairman of ACRS, comes over to a manager here at NRC, probably a division director or higher. I am not really totally familiar how official correspondence gets into the train. Q But this informaly transmittal essentially bypassed
., ~ N 65 N' i l till L all cf the formal tra smittal_ structure? Would that be an n i ! accurate conclusion? l' A Yes, I guess. i f Q Do you recall how long before you prepared your memorandum Mr. Ebersole provided you with the Michaelson memorandum? l A I don't have a date as to when I received it. Q Could you estimate months, weeks, years? A I would put it in the fall of 1977. 6 U l E MR. HELFMAN: Let's take a two minute break. E -y (Whereupon, a short recess was taken.) x j MR. HELFMAN: Back on the record. 23g We have no further questions at this time. u MR. SIDELL: What we have been doing previously is recessing rather than adjouring, so if in the future there may occur occasions for us to speak to you under oath on the record, we will do so. So, rather than terminating or adjouring the deposition, we will merely recess it. Probably, in all likelihood, to be adjourned, but if it should be necessary, continued. Off the record. (Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the deposition.of. SANFORD ISRAEL was' recessed.)
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