ML19289G292
| ML19289G292 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/05/1979 |
| From: | Macmillan J BABCOCK & WILCOX CO., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7908160384 | |
| Download: ML19289G292 (87) | |
Text
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________________________________________x 4
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND ym
x 1
4 DEPOSITION of BABCOCK & WILCOX by JOHN H.
MacMILLAN, held at the offices of Babcock
& Wilcox, Old Forest Road, Lynchburg, Virginia 24505, on the 5th day of July 1979, commencing at 1:30 p.m.,
before Irwin H.
Benjamin, Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public of the State of New York.
pq2 087 BEN.TA.NIIN REPORTING SERVICE CERTIFIED SHORTH AND REPORTERS l'1VE IREEliM AN MTRELT Q(
7 9 0 816 0 3 S't g x=w voint.xEw vonn ico38 Q
[212] 374-1138
1 2
2 3
E96_BAB999E_'_HihE231 4
MCRGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, ESQS.
Attorneys for Babcock & Wilcox 3
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20038 6
BY:
GEORGE L.
EDGAR, ESQ.
7 of Counsel 8
F_ O_ _R_ T_ H_ E _ C O_ M_ M_ _I S _S _I O_ N_ :
9 WINTHROP A.
ROCKWELL, ESQ.
.n
- ~
Associate Chief Counsel 11 12 A_ L_ _S O _ P _RE_ S E N_ T_ :
13 RONALD M.
EYTCHISON 14 CLAUDIA A.
VELLETRI 15 16 ooo 17 18 J O H N H.
M a eM I L L A N having been 19 first duly sworn by Mr. Rockwell, took the stand and testified as follows:
20 MR. ROCKWELL:
Mark this, please.
(Resume of John H.
MacMillan, dated 22 July 3,
1979, was marked MacMillan Deposition 23 Exhibit 63 for identification, this date.)
24 1
92 088 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 3
3 DIRECT EXAMINATION 4
BY MR. ROCKWELL:
Q State your full name, please.
O A
My name is John H.
MacMillan.
7 Q
And your current business address, please?
A Babcock & Wilcox Company, Post Office Box 1260, 8
Lynchburg, Virginia, Zip Code 24505.
9 10 Q
Would you state your current employer?
A The Babcock & Wilcox Company.
g Q
And your current position with the Babcock
& Wilcox Company?
13 A
I am vice-president of the Nuclear Power 14 Generation Division.
15 Q
Mr. MacMillan, have you prepared and
}6 brought with you today a resume which we have marked 17 as MacMillan Deposition Exhibit 63?
I8 A
Yes.
I have such a resume prepared.
19 Q
Have you had a chance to review it?
20 A
Not yet.
Just let me take a minute.
21 Q
Sure.
22 A
Yes.
Q Does it appear to you to be accurate anc 23 complete and up-to-date?
A Yes.
$p92 089 4
23 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 4
3 Q
Mr. MacMillan, is it accurate to state that the design of a pressuri=er surge line and reactor b
vessel is central to the B&W scope of supply in an 6
NSSS system?
7 A
I would like to know what you mean by the word "C'"tr*l 8
9 Q
Is it within the scope of supply?
A The design of the reactor vessel and the pressure 10 surge line are both within the scope of supply of the g
Nuclear Steam Supply System.
Q Is the design of a pressuri=er, as well?
13 A
Yes, sir.
14 Q
And would it be fair to say that the 15 design of all those components originates with Babcock 16
& Wilcox?
17 A
The design of those three components all originate 18 with Babcock & Wilcox.
19 Q
And would it be fair to say that the 20 design of those three components represents B&W's 21 engineering thinking?
as it applies to those 33 A
Yes, I think that's 1P02 090 "Peci'ic c =P
"*a'*-
23 24 Q
That's what I am referring to, those three specific components.
n.O BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 5
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
With respect to those three components, would it be fair to say that Babcock & Wilcox is an a
expert on the theoretical basis for the design?
A Yes, I think that's fair.
7 Q
Would it also be fair to say that Babcock
& Wilcox is an expert on the implications of that 9
design in operation?
10 A
I am not sure I understand, again, what you 11 mean by " implications."
Could you clarify that.
12 Q
Would it be fair to say that Babcock 13
& Wilecx is an expert on how that design functions 14 in the field, as a practical matter?
15 A
I think it would be fair to say that B&W would 16 be an expert in the design of those components and the operational considerations that are a factor in 7
the design of those components.
Q And the operational considerations wou;d yg include how that design would react under various field conditions, is that correct?
21 A
Under various postulated and actual field jQQ} ]Q{
conditions, I think that's correct, yes, n
Q And Babcock & Wilcox would also be an
~
24 expert, would it nor, with respect to how that design 25 should be used in an operating nuclear plant?
BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 6
3 A
Should be used, yes.
4 Q
I take it Sabcock &
Wilcox would also 5
be an expert with respect to how that design should 6
not be used in the field?
P A
I am not sure I can answer that.
I would have i
to say in design equipment of this sort, the design considers the requirements of that equipment and how 9
that equipment should be operated.
10 Q
Okay.
And if it involves the understanding 11 of how that equipment should be operated, presumably 12 it also involves an understanding of how that equipment 13 should not be operated.
14 A
I don't think you can necessarily draw that 15 conclusion.
16 There are clearly some things which could be specified as prec lude d from operation, but I am not y-sure that would be all-inclusive in the sense that a 18 designer sits down and tries to figure out all the 19 things which should not be done with the equipment.
20 The designer sits down and tries to lay out a
'l design and equipment in a way in which that equipment nn should be operated and provides recommendations on that.
~3 Q
Putting aside for the moment the question
'4 of whether B&W sits down to figure out all the ways 25 in which the equipment should not be used, if a BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 7
3 specific example f the use of the equipment were given to B&W, I assume, is it correct to say that 4
B&W could determine whether that is a correct or 3
incorrect use of the equipment?
6 A
B&W could determine whether that event or that i
they actually transpired would sequence of events as 8
have caused damage to the equipment.
9 Q
Or would be an inappropriate use of the 10 equipment with respect to its impact on other elements 11 of the system?
12 A
Could certainly determine the impact of that 13 equipment on other elements of the equipment and could determine whether that had a negative influence or a 74 harmful influence on the other equipment.
la.
Q W uld y u agree, taking as a reference 16 point a particular nuclear pcwer plant, that the other manufacturers and suppliers and participants in that 18 whole process of deeigning, constructing and operating 19 particular nuclear power systems, a particular plant,
'O would inck to Babcock & Wilcox as the ultimate source
~
'l of expertise with respect to the use of and the design 22 of the three components thac I have identified, the
'3 surge line, the pre ssuizer and the reactor vessel?
lR92 093
~
A I think that's a fair statement, yes.
g4 MR. EDGAR:
A clarification.
With respect
,a, B ENJ AMI N REPORTING SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 6
3 to use, do you mean operation?
4 MR. ROCKWELL:
Tnat's correct.
A You are asking me for my perception?
3 Q
That's correct.
6 A
Whether or not I would perceive that the other 7
participants in a broad nuclear project would look 8
to Babcock & Wilcox as the expert on those three 9
components?
10 Q
That's correct.
11 A
And it is my perception that they would.
10 MR. EDGAR:
And you said both operation 13 and design of those three components?
}4 MR. ROCKWELL:
That's correct.
15 Q
Is it possible, Mr. MacMillan, for you 16 t
identify a central safety concern for the designer and supplier of an NSSS system?
g A
I would like a little elaboration on that, if you could.
19 Q
ls there a central safety concern that you can identify which would be paramount in the minds 21 of the designer and supplier of an NSSS systec?
22 A
I could answer that in the broadest sense, that
'3 in the design of a nuclear plant and in the design of
'4 nuclear steam system, the ultimate safety concern a
25 ts the protection and health and safety of the
{ G,'
B ENJ AMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 9
3 general public.
4 Q
Would it also be fair to say that a central afety concern is the protection of the core to see that a
it is adequately cooled?
A I thinkthat is one of several segments of the 7
design, which is in fact d tanded to protect the public, 8
yes.
9 Q
And it is an important aspect of the safety 10 concern of the NSSS supplier, is it not?
11 A
I think that's a fair statement, yes.
12 Q
As a practical matter, Mr. MacMillan, in 13 whose hands does the implementation of the concern for 14 maintaining the react'r core in an appropriately cooled o
15 state rest ulcimately?
16 A
Areyou asking me for an individual, for an or-what is the thrust of your question?
ganization, for 7
Q An organisation first, and then an individual.
19 A
First of all, let me say that that responsibility 20 is the responsibility within Babcock & Wilcox of the "1
Nuclear Power Generation Division.
no Within the division, we have always treated 23 safety as an integral part of the design.
We don't 24 try to segregate safety from the design.
So you would have one group of people looking at the design n-a and another group of people looking at safety qg BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE b
1 2
MacMillan 10 3
within the Nuclear Power Generation Division, 4
the design work and therefore the concern for safety 5
is the responsibility of the Engineering Department.
And within the Engineering Departmenc, there is 6
an organization entitled Plant Design, which I think 7
most people would think of in terms of systems engi-neering; they design the overall nuclear steam system 9
and set certain parameters for the nuclear steam system 10 such as operating pressure, temperature, flow, and 11 they did the analysis work of how the system would 12 perform in various postulated accident conditions.
13 (continued on Page 11.)
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 1R92 096 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 11 ih w
200.1 3
Q once a nuclee steam supply system is 4
installed and operating on a day-to-day basis, whose responsibility is it to en s u r e the safe operatioz. of a
that r.ystem on a day-to-day basis?
o A
The utility.
7 Q
And specifically, within the utility on 8
whose individual shoulders does that responsibility 9
rest?
10 A
That is the license responsibility of the reactor 11 operators.
12 Q
And Mr. MacMillan, where would the reactor 13 perat rs get the information that they need to operate the plant effectively so as to implement the safety concern with respect to maintaining the core in an 15 appropriately cooled position?
16 A
There are a number of sources that the operators 17 have through which they avail themselves of that infor-18 mation.
19 Q
And in your judgment, what are those sources?
20 A
First of all, I think you have to look at the 31 operator's broad experience and what experience he has ii his o w.
personal resume before he approaches the challenge of operating the nuclear plant or applying for and trying to qualify for a reactor operator's 21 license.
His own personal history and experience.
25 1092 097 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVIC E
1 2
MacMillan 12 2&3.2 3
Secondly, for each nuclear plant there is a 4
training program which is developed by the utility, reviewed with the Regulatory Commission for the training a
of operators to qualify them to and ultimately get them 6
licensed by the NRC to run the plant.
7 Those training programs vary in terms somewhat 8
in the content, and they vary broadly depending upon 9
who provides what portions of that training.
10 Speaking specifically about the Three Mile 11 Island 2 operators, there was a training program 13 developed for them, and in the course of that training pr gram, they did spend a period of time in Lynchburg 13 on the simulator, where they were given training in both the normal and emergency operation of the unit.
15 Q
Would it be fair --
16 A
And they got some input from that.
In addition to that, they returned to the site 18 and were involved in the checkout of the equipment 19 during its initial testing, initial operation.
20 They have operating instructions which guide them and direct them in not only the normal, but the emer-gy gency operation of that plant.
That's another-source of information which they have, which would help them 23 to understand the operations required to provide the o.
adequate core cooling.
1892 098
.n.3 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
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MacMillan 13 2&3.3 3
Q You have identified three categories, an 4
operator's own experience, his training, and the operating.nstructions which he relies on, is that a
correct?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
Would it be fair to say that with respect 8
to the latter two categories, training and operating 9
instructions, that one of the prime sourcer of infor-10 mation and expertise which frames and shapes the 11 training and the operating instructions for an operator 12 in the actions that that operator would take to protect the e ling f the core is Babcock & Wilcox?
13 A
I don't think I could accept that as being totally valid.
I think that in the case -- again, looking at Three Mile Island 2,
in the case of Three 16 Mile Island 2,
the simulator training which those 17 operators receive here, I think was important in 18 achieving that objectise of training them to operate 19 in a way that would provide adequate core cooling.
20 I think in the case of Three Mile Island 2,
the 31 operating procedures were an important point of infor-marion for those operators, both for normal and for emergency operations.
Those procedures were derived after, in a combina-24 tion of B&W and the utility's direct involvement, so I 25 iP92 099 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
i 2
MacMillan 14
,~ & J 4 3
don't think I could say that we were the prime s,
e.
4 I think we certainly made a significant contribution.
Q Certainly with respect to the understanding a
of the design and the intended operation of the nuclear F
steam supply system as that is translated into specifics 7
for the operators, Babcock & Wilcox is an important 8
source of expertise?
9 A
I think we are an important source of expertise.
10 g
And as the designer and conceiver of the 11 system, perhaps the most important source of expertise?
12 A
I think I would accept that, yes.
13 Q
Mr. MacMillan, w uld yu agree that the safety of a particular design relates not only to how it is engineered and conceived, but also to the instruc-15 tions and warnings that are given to those who must 16 operate it on a day-to-day basis?
17 A
I think that the -- yes, I believe the safety of 18 a system is a function of the design, its construction, 19 the way in which it is tested and checked out to 20 demonstrate that it has been constructed in conformance with its design and specifications and the way in 31 which the equipment is operated, and to the extent that the operation of the equipment is influenced by the instructions that are given, I would say yes, that's 24 one of the important aspects of protection of reactor
.o -3 iP92 100 B ENJ AMI N REPORTING S ERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 15 2&3.5 3
safety.
4 Q
Would you agree that the best design used by people who do not anderstand it, and who do not use a
it as it is intended can become or can be misused or 6
can become harmful if it is misused?
7 A
I don't know what the best design is.
What is 8
the point you are trying to make?
o Q
Let me restate the question.
10 Woula you agree that no matter how good a 11 design is, even if it is the absolute best design that 12 is available, by whatever standard you want to use, that if it is used by people who do not understand how 13
'to put that design to use on a practical day-to-day basis that it can fail of its purpose?
l a, (Continued on following page.)
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 1P92 101 23 B ENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
SR 4 le 1
2 MacMillan 16 3
THE WITNESS:
May I talk with counsel?
(Witness conferred with counsel.)
4 A
Let me answer the question this way.
I believe a
any design, even if it is, as you have put it, the P
best design, any design can be abused by inappropriate 7
which is what I think you called it or ignorant 8
operation.
Q Q
Mr. MacMillan, when did Babcock & Wilcox 10 first understand er appreciate that void formation 11 could occur in the core of a reactor vessel under 12 certain conditions?
13 A
I have no idea.
That is much too broad a 14 question to answer specifically.
Q Do you know when Babcock & Wilcox first l a.
understood that void formation in the core could hold 16 up the level of water in the pressurizer, so that 17 the level of the water in the pressurizer was not a 18 true indication of the conditions in the core, spe-10 cifically the water inventory in the core?
20 A
I don't know when that was first recognized
'l by Babcock & Wilecx, 22 Q
Mr. MacMillan, when did Babcock & Wilcox 23 first become aware of the Davis-Besse trang1gn wbg h 34 occurred on September 24, 1977?
A I don't know specifically when we became aware
, a_
BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 a
MacMillan 17
~
3 of that.
I do know that shcrtly af ter that occurred, 4
we were contacted by Davis-Besse and that we did 5
evaluate that occurrence.
We made some recommendations
- S" E"*"* "d
- d 6
transient on the equipment to assure that it had not been damaged, so as to preclude continued operation, 8
and that would have been in the matter of a very few Q
days after the incident; I don't know specifically when.
10 Q
When did you personally first become aware of 11 the September 24, 1977 Davis-Besse transient?
12 A
I can't answer that in specifics, e i'. L a r, except 13 to say that following that transient, as I indicated, 14 we did review the source of the problem, a pilot-15 operated relief valve.
We did have an investigation 16 of what the problem was and recommended some modifi-17 cations in the circuitry or recommended that circuitry be made to correspond to the drawings as originally yg recommended.
on subsequent testing of that valve, we made 20 some modifications of the valve itself and reviewed 21 the reactor system component.
It was toward the nn end of that evaluation that I first became aware Jf 23 what action had taken place -- excuse me -- what
'~l events had taken place and what action B&W had taken o92 103
~~
BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 18 3
in the wake of that incident.
4 Q
Would it be fair to say that you probably 5
became aware of that transient in a matter of weeks r at most a couple of months after it occurred?
6 A
I would expect it would have been in October 1977, in approximately that time frame.
I don't 8
know precisely.
9 Q
Do you have an understanding of the key 10 events involved in that September 1977 Davis-Besse 11 transient?
12 A
I have an understanding of the general events.
13 I don't know that I could be detailed.
Il Q
Would you agree that one of those events 15 was a fail open PORV?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
Would you agree that one of those events 18 in that transient was a temporary loss of feed, all feed?
A I can't verify that.
I don't knew.
gg 20 Q
W uld you agree that one of those events was a termination of HPI?
3 A
I can't confirm that, either.
Q Would you know whether one of those
,,0 events, to elaborate on the last point, was viewed as a premature termination of HPI?
25 iPo2 104 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 19 3
A I couldn't confirm thst e it..e r.
4 Q
Would you know whether those events in-5 cluded premature termination of HPI, based upon a 6
pressuriser level that was higher than one would normally expect, in relation to the water inventory in the core?
8 A
I can't confirm that.
O Q
Following the Davis-Besse transient of 10 September 24, 1977, was a concern expressed within 11 the Nuclear Powe r Generation Division of B&W that incarrect operator action might occur again in the 13 future, based on the unusual high level in the 14 pressurizer, as that level related to the water 15 inventory in the core?
16 A
well, let me address that in two staps.
17 At the time that I mentioned earlier when I ig was made aware of the Davis-Besse incident in late 1977, to my knowledge at that time, there was not that g
concern expressed.
20 Q
Did you ever become aware of a concern 3
expressed along those lines?
A Yes, I became aware of that concern in April 23 1979, following the Three Mile Island 2 incident.
24 (Continued on Page 20.)
25 iP92 105 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVIC E
1 2
MacMillan 20 sr/ew 3
g Mr. MacMillan, referring you to what has 5.1 4
previously been marked as Womack Depo'sition Exhibit 24, did you ever see that document before March 28, 1979?
O A
I don't believe I have seen this document.
6 Q
At all?
7 A
I don't believe so.
8 Q
Today is the first time you have seen that 4
document?
10 A
To the best of my recollection.
11 Q
Referring you to what has previcusly been
}g marked as Dunn Deposition Exhibit 35, have you ever seen that document before March 28, 1979?
13 A
I don't believe I have seen that either.
14 Q
Have you seen that before today?
15 A
No, not to the best of my knowledge, no.
16 Q
I understand.
Obviously all questions are 1
directed to the best of your knowledge.
18 A
My recollection is I don't remember seeing that.
19 Q
Mr. MacMillan, referring you to what 20 previously has been marked as Womack Deposition Exhibit gy 23, have you ever seen that document before March 28, 19797 y
A You asked if I have seen this before March 28, 23 1979?
24 Q
Yes.
1oo2 106 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
i 2
MacMillan 21 5.2 3
A No.
4 Q
Have you seen it since?
A Yes.
3 Q
Who brought it to your attention?
O A
I believe this was brought to my attention by 7
Allen Womack, but that is a vague recollection.
8 Q
Do you recall the circumstances under which 9
it was brought to your attention?
10 A
I believe it was brought to my at.tention at the 11 time that we were preparing or I was preparing to 12 testify before the Advisory Committee on reactor safe-9""#d'*
13 Q
Have you had a chance to read that document before today, Mr. MacMillan?
15 A
I read this document in April 1979, yes.
16 Q
Referring to the substance of the document, 17 as opposed to the document itself, had you ever become 18 aware of the concerns or issues raised in the document 19 before March 28, 1979?
20 A
I was not.
31 Q
Referring you to what has previously been marked as Dunn Deposition Exhibit 36, had you ever seen that document before March 28, 1979?
23 A
I believe I saw it at the same time that I saw 25 that Exhibit 25 iP02 107 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 22
.5.3 3
2 23?
A Exhibit 23, yes.
4 Q
Did you have a chance to read both of a
these documents in April of 19797 A
Yes.
7 Q
Did you feel at that time that you needed 8
to talk to anyone to understand more fully what the 9
issues were that were being addressed in those docu-10 ments?
11 A
- did have further discussions on these issues, 12 yes.
Q With whom?
13 A
I discussed the issue with Don Ro7 I discussed 1,,
the issue with Allen Womack.
I believe those are the 15 principals in that discussion.
16 Q
What was the substance of the discussion 17 that you had with Mr. Roy and with Mr. Womack?
10 A
My question to them was, "What actions were taken 19 as a result of these memos".
20 Q
What were you told?
A I was told that this issue had been referred to gy the Service Department, and that subsequently the Service Department had raised some additional questions 23 relative to the concern about the general issue of going 24 1P"2 108 solid in a reactor coolant system.
25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 23 5.4 3
Q And were you told whether and how these 4
issues of concern were resolved?
^
I ""* " **
5 Q
Did you inquire as to how those issues were resolved?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
And what answer did you get?
4 A
The answer I got was that those issues had not 10 been resolved.
11 Q
Did you inquire of whether the issues 12 raised in the Exhibit you have before you, Exhibit 36, and the issues raised in Exhibit 23 hac been communi-13 cated to your utilities before April 28, 1979 March 28, 1979?
correction 15 A
- asked the question and I was told it had not.
16 Q
Referring you now to what has been previ-17 ously marked as Dunn Deposition Exhibit 41, have you IO seen that document before March 28, 1979?
19 A
Excuse me.
would you repeat the question?
20 Q
Have you seen that document before March 31 28, 1979?
A No.
y (Continued on following page.)
24 25 i992 109 B ENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE g
s.
1 2
MacMillan 24 sr/ew 3
Q Have you seen it since that time and before 6.1 4
today?
A Yes, I have seen this in the period since a
6 March 28, 1979.
Q When did you see it?
4 A
I believe this also was brought to my attention 8
at the time that we were preparing for testimony to O
the Advisory Committee on reactor safeguards, which 10 would have been in April of
'79.
11 Q
Do you recall who brought it to your 12 attention?
A I believe this particular document was brought to 13 my attention by Ron Nelson, our -- by Ron Nelson.
Q Referring you to what has previously been l a, marked as Dunn Deposition Exhibit 40, had you seen 16 that document before March 28, 19797 17 A
No, I have not seen this.
1B Q
Have you seen it before today?
19 A
No.
20 Q
Referring you to what has previously been 21 marked as Dunn Deposition Exhibit 37, have you seen that document before March 28, 1979?
A Yes.
Before March 28?
23 Q
Yes.
}hh A
No.
25 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 25
.2 3
Q Have you seen it since then?
4 A
Yes, I have seen it since then.
Q Who brought it to your attention?
O A
This was one of the documents which Mr. Womack 6
brought to my attention at the same time he showed me 7
the earlier-referenced document, Exhibit 23.
8 Q
Referring you to what has been marked as 9
Dunn Deposition Exhibit 38, have you seen that docu-10 ment before March 28, 1979?
11 A
no.
12 Q
Have you seen it before today?
^
13 Q
To your knowledge was Met Edison ever notified of the concerns raised in any of the documents which we have just reviewed?
16 A
Not to my knowledge.
IT Q
Mr. MacMillan, would it be fair to say that 18 the Dunn memorandum which you have seen, Exhibit 23, 19 and which you reviewed in April essentially bogged 20 down in the Nuclear Power Generating Division organi-31 sation between the time it was written in February of 1978 and March 28, 1979?
n, A
Well, I don't know what you mean by " bogged down."
I think it is clear fro = the record of the correspon-21 Taylor's dence that the issue was brought t o'. M r.
.n -O 1892 111 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVIC E
1 2
MacMillan 26 6.3 attention.
There were subsequent discussions about 4
what would represent appropriate instructions for operators.
These instructions were challenged by people
.c in the service organization.
b The ce flict cetween the persons involved was not I
resolved, and to that extent it remained an open or 8
unresolved issue.
If that is what you mean by " bogged 9
down," I would accept that.
10 Q
And it also remained an issue which was 11 not communicated beyond the bounds of the Nuclear Power 12 Generating Division, is that correct?
A T
the best f my knowledge.
13 Q
To the best of your knowledge it is correct?
A To the best o f my knowledge that is correct.
15 Q
Have you conducted an investigation 16 A
Let me qualify that.
Before March 28, 1979?
17 Q
That is correct.
10 A
Yes.
19 Q
Have you conducted an investigation, 20 Mr. MacMillan, or has an investigation been conducted at your behest as to why the information and concerns 3) raised in the Dunn memorandum, which we marked as Deposition Exhibit 23, and the related letters and 23 memoranda which we have gust reviewed, were not commu-24 nicated to your operating utilities before 25 i892 I12 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 27 6.4 3
March 26, 1979?
A I have not instigated nor conducted what may be 4
characterized as an investigation.
I did ask a series a
of questions at the time that these letters were shown 6
to me to try to understand what actions had been taken 7
or what actions had not been taken and satisfied myself 8
that there was an unresolved difference of opinion.
9 I have not pursued it beyond that since March 28th, 10 being pretty well consumed with other activities in 11 the interim period.
(Continued on following page.)
}g 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2 i,I3 23 B E. JAMIN R EPO RTIN G S EPVICE
RZ 7 lc 1
2 MacMillan 28 3
Q So that extent, the extent you have 4
described, you made an inquiry?
A I made an inquiry, yes, a
Q Did you ever speak with Mr. Taylor about 6
the question of how that memorandum that you have 7
before you, Exhibit 23, was handled?
8 A
I don't believe I have.
9 Q
Have you analyzed the Dunn memorandum 10 for its significance in relation to the TMI 2 events?
11 MR. EDGAR:
Read back the question.
12 (Last pending question read.)
13 A
Well, I ought to answer that by saying I haven't conducted what I would consider anything as could
}4 be dignified by the word " analysis" of the Dunn l a-memorandum.
I read the Dunn memorandum, as I said, 16 for preparation for the ACRS testimony, and certainly 17 was struck in the process of reading that by the 18 concern dat was raised on this issue relative to lo
~
preesture interruption of high-pressure injection flow, 20 which I have te's ti fied I felt to be the most important 21 event in the TMI 2 sequence.
22 Q
Would it be fair to say that you have at 23 least reviewed the Dunn memorandum in connection with 4
the TMI 2 events?
6
- 1. 0 0 0 114r
(,
A I think that is fair to say.
n.
.3 EENJAMIN R E PO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 29 3
g I would like Mr. MacMillan to identify 4
the public statements that you have made since the TMI 2 accident.
5 Am I correct that you wrote a letter on May 21, 1979 to Mr. Weaver, who is associated with one of th a i
committees in Congress investigating the TMI 2 8
accident?
9 A
Mr. Weaver did ask certain questions following 10 our testimony before his subcommittee.
A response 11 to those questions was drafted and was forwarded to him.
12 I can't confirm the date specifically.
It would have been in May.
13 14 (Document described below herein marked 15 MacMillan Depositica Exhibit 64 for identifica-tion, this date.)
Q showing you what has been marked as MacMillan Deposition Exhibit 64, which is a letter 18 you wrote to Mr. Weaver dated May 21, 1979, right?
19 A
Yes.
O Q
Did you also prepare an oral statement 21 to the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of 22 the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, g3 dated May 24, 1979, to the best of your recollection?
24 A
To the best of my recollection, we did prepare n-a statement that was entered into the record of the a
e 1892 11a B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERvlC E
1 2
MacMillan 30 3
proceedings at those hearings.
4 (Document described below herein marked as MacMillan Deposition Exhibit 65 for identi-0 fication, this date.)
o Q
Mr. MacMillan, showing you what we have 4
marked as MacMillan Deposition Exhibit 65, is that 8
a copy of the prepared oral testimony which you pre-9 sented on the date indicated on the cover of the 10 exhibit, which I believe is May 24, 19797 11 A
Yes, May 24.
12 Q
For the record, I would advise you that 13 that
.s a copy that I have made some marks on, and I 14 do not have a clean copy.
I will substitute a clean 15 copy, with Mr. Edgar's consent, following this 16 dep sition.
A Your question is, is this my statement?
7 18 Q
Yes, your oral statement.
19 A
Yes, this was the statement that was prepared 20 f r the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment.
2]
(Document described below herein marked 33 MacMillan Deposition Exhibit 66 for identifica-tion, this date.)
Q Showing you what has been marked as MacMillan Deposition Exhibit 66,.is that a copy of
_n -a BENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE i892 i16
1 2
MacMillan 31 3
the statement of the Babcock & Wilcox Company before the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the 4
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, dated a
May 24, 1979?
6 A
Yes.
7 (Document described below herein marked 8
MacMillan Deposition Exhibit 67 for identifica-9 tion, this date.)
10 Q
Showing you what has been marked as 11 MacMillan Deposition Exhibit 67, does that appear to 12 be a transcript of testimony given by you before the 13 United States House of Representatives, the Committee 14 on Interior and Insular Affairs, subcommittee on Energy and the Environment on May 24, 1979, and, Mr. MacMillan, la-because of the time restrictions which we are under, 16 I would ask you to review it generally.
I would be 17 very happy to make it available to you after the 18 deposition to verify that it is in fact complete, but I-tell me generally whether that appears to be a transcript 20 of your testimony on that date before that committee.
'l A
Just glancing through it, it does appear to be,
~
nn yes.
23 g
If you wish to review it later, I would 24 be happy to have you do that.
1892 117 A
Thank you.
.n-a BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 32 3
(Document described below herein marked MacMillan Deposition Exhibit 68 for identifi-4 cation, this date.)
a 6
Q Let me advise yu that it is a transcript that we have had made of the press conference held 7
here in Lynchburg, Virginia at the Nuclear Power Generation Division on I believe it was June 5,
- 1979, 9
and let me further advise you that the transcript was 10 made from tapes provided to us by your office, and 11 again let me ask you if you would look at it generally 12 to see if it appears to be a transcript of a press 13 conference which was held here at the Nuclear Power 14 Generating Didsion on June 5,
and let me also state for the record that I xnow you have not had a cbance to l a-review that, and we herebp offer that if you wish to 16 review the transcript to see that it is accurate, we 17 wo uld be most happy for you to do that and to offer 18 any corr ections which you may have to the transcription.
10 Obviously we are not talking about changes in substance, 20 but questions relating to accuracy of the transcription.
21 A
Yes, we ought to do that.
It appears to be, just from glancing through gg it, the same material that was covered in the press 3
conference.
21 1892 118 s
B ENJ AMIN R E PO RTIN G SERVICE
1 r:
2 MacMillan a3 8.1 3
Q In additi n to the five Exhibits which we have now marked and which are all before you, have you 4
made any other statements publicly since the TMI 2 O
accident on March 28, 1979?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
Could you tell me what those are.
8 A
I made a statement to the Advisory Committee on 9
Reactor S a f e gu a rd s.
10 Q
Could you tell me the date.
11 A
I ought to check that, but I believe it was 73 April 26, 1979.
Q Do you have a copy of either your prepared testimony or a transcript of your actual testimony or 14 both?
15 A
We have a copy of the prepared statement.
16 MR. ROCKWELL:
Could we have a copy of it.
l ~'
MR. EDGAR:
You were already given it, but 18 we could provide another.
19 off the record.
20 (Discussion held off the record.)
Q In addition to the five Exhibits which are g
marked and which are before you, and n adlition to the April 26, 1979 statement which you made to the 23 ACRS, have you made any other public statements since 24 March 28, 1979 in reference to the events at TMI 2?
25 i892 119 B ENJ AMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
1 o
MacMillan 34 8.2 3
A Yes, I made a statement before senator Hart's 4
committee.
5 Q
Do you recall the date of that statement?
A I d n't recall the date of that; I have to check 6
that.
We did have a prepared statement for that
.t commictee hearing.
MR. EDGAR:
For the record, that is 9
Senator Hart's subcommittee.
10 A
It is a subcommittee on nuclear regulation.
11 MR. ROCKWELL:
I do not believe we have a lo copy of that.
13 MR. EDGAR:
You do not?
14 MR. ROCKWELL:
Off the record.
13 (Discussion held off the record.)
MR. ROCKWELL:
If we do not have a copy, lo, could we have one?
17 MR. EDGAR:
Yes.
18 Q
In addition to what we have already identi-19 fled, were there any other public statements made since o0 the TMI 2 accident?
21 A
Yes, I testified before Representative McCormick's 22 committee in the House of Representatives, and I will have to check specifically the date of that committee 23 meeting, and I don't know the formal title of the committee.
I can get that for you also.
We did have
_o -a
'892 120 SENJAMIN REPORTING SERV CE
1 2
MacMillan 35 8.3 3
a prepared statement which we submitted to that 4
committee also.
MR. ROCKWELL:
Once again, I am not familiar 3
with having seen a copy of that.
I will check, O
and if we do not have it, may we have one from 7
you.
8 MR. EDGAR:
Yes.
9 Q
Are there any other public statements which 10 you have made since the TMI 2 accident?
11 A
Yes, I made a statement before the Nuclear 12 Regulatory Commission.
Again, I will have to get you the specific date.
It was in conjunction with the 13 question of the continued operation of other nuclear units incorporating nuclear steam system designed by 15 Babcock & Wilcox.
There was no prepared statement for 16 that meeting.
17 Q
Have you received a transcript of your 18 remarks?
19 A
I have not.
20 Q
Are there any other public statements?
A Could I go off the record a second.
31 Q
Yes.
(Discussion held off the record.)
23 Q
With respect to the testimony which you 24 indicated you gave before a closed session of the 25 1892 121 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 36 8.4 3
Weaver Task Force, did you have a prepared statement, 4
or have you received transcript?
3 the record.
A L e *- me ask a cuestion off Q
Off the record.
O (Discussion held off the record.)
7 A
At the closed session of the Weaver Task Force, 8
I made a verbal presentation describing the events 9
that took place and our assessment of the significance 10 of those events.
I don't recall whether we had a 11 formal statement drafted for that or not.,
I will have 12 to check it.
13 Q
If y u had a formal statement, or if you used slides or illustrative material, could we have a copy of that?
MR. EDGAR:
Yes.
16 Q
Are there any other public statements that 17 you have made, Mr. MacMillan, other than the ones we 18 have already covered?
19 A
Cn June 6,
we had a meeting of the security 20 analysts here in Lynchburg, and we covered the same 31 material in the form of presentations that we presented to the press conference the day before on June 5 which you have had transcribed in your Exhibit 68.
Q Were there written materials for the 24 June 6 meeting other than those reflected in the press n-
=0 1892 122 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 37 8.5 3
kit which was given to the press conference on the 4
previous day?
A I don't believe so.
a Q
Are there any other public statements that you have made?
7 A
I believe those are all of the public statements 8
I have made.
9 Q
Mr. MacMillan, I realize that there are a 10 fair number of these, and I would ask if, after the 11 deposition, any additional ones come to mind that you 12 notify us through Mr. Edgar.
Would that be agreeable?
13 okay.
A MR. EDGAR:
We will do that.
(Continued on following page.)
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 21 1892 123 25 B ENJ AMf N R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2
Macmillan 38 3
Q Would you describe to me, Mr. MacMillan, 4
the manner in which you prepared yourself for some 5
10 or 12 public statements which you have made with reference to the TMI 2 accident since the accident.
6 F
A Well, that is a broad question.
Clearly, I was personally involved in the events that took place immediately following the Three Mile 9
IsAand incident, and in fact, spent five or six weeks 10 at the site in support of the utility and the recovery 11 operations.
l'
~
In drafting the special material that was 13 presented, I had members of my staff prepare that 14 information which I reviewed and commented on and made 15 modifications on before it was prepared in the final f rm and presented to the various bodies which we 16 have discussed.
18 Q
During the preparation process for any or all of these public statements that you have men-79 tiened, did you request memoranda or working papers 20 other than drafts of yeur public statements from any 21 members of your staff?
__o n
MR. EDGAR:
Other than counsel?
23 MR. ROCKWELL:
That is correct.
21 A
Other than counsel, I don't believe I did.
We 25 1 go? jE24 I
ERVI BENJAMIN REPORTING
1 2
MacMillan 39 3
were dealing with draft material for the presentations.
4 Q
My understanding is correct, then, that there were no background working papers or background a
information papers which were developed as resource 6
P material for the drafting of your public statements other than actual drafts of your public statements?
8 A
I believe that is correct.
9 Q
Did you have briefinso from members of 10 your staff, oral briefings?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
Was there a pattern of having a briefing 13 generally before each of your public appearances, for 14 you to be updated on information?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
Was one of the functions of those oral 17 briefings essentially to block out what you intended
[g to say and how you intended to present it?
A That was one of the purposes.
gg 20 Q
Was there a working group which you gathered for these briefing sessions whose members g
continued from one briefing session to another?
A Some of the members participated in -- like I 23 say, some of the members participated in all of these 24 sessions, and others did not.
1892 125 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
~
MacMillan 40 3
g can you tell me which members pcrticipated in all of these sessions?
4 A
I relied primarily upon Harry Allen of our a
Marketing Department and Byron Nelson to prepare the 6
draft material for the various presentations, and 7
they, I believe, were involved in all of the briefings 8
and prepared materials.
9 Q
Were there others who were involved in 10 all of the briefing sessions?
11 A
I don't know of any others who I can definitely 12 say were involved in all of them.
13 Q
Were there others who were involved in more 14 than one?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
can you tell me who they were?
A Don Roy was involved in more than one Dick Kosiba, Jim Deddens, Nelson Embrey, and I believe Norm 18 Elliott was involved in at least one or perhaps two; 19 Jim Taylor, and I had other legal counsel involved, 20 including Mr. Edgar.
Those are the names that occur al to me as most frequently involved.
., o
~~
Q When was the decision made to call the
'3 June 5 press conference?
24 A
That decision was made in Mr. Ciff's office in 25 SERVive92 126 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G
1 2
MacMillan 41 3
New Orleans, I believe, earlier in May, but I can get a specific date on that.
4 I
5 Q
Were you a participant in that decision?
A Y'5-6 Q
Who else was a participant?
A Mr. Ziff, Mr. Fabrett, Mr. Vannoy.
8 Q
Were there any others?
9 A
I believe Mr. Miracle was also in that meeting.
10 Q
Anyone else?
11 A
And Mr. Dupy.
12 Q
Any others?
13 A
Those are the only ones that I recall.
14 Q
What was the reason for calling the press conference?
16 A
We had made a decision immediately following l-the Three Mile Island incident not to discuss the incident or our response to it in the public press, ig feeling it was our responsibility to support the 79 utility, and that any statements that were made should be made by the utility.
21 Subsequently, the NRC requested that they be the primary source of public statements.
We concurred 23 with that request.
24 We had received substantial pressure.from the i892 i27 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
I 2
MacMillan 42 3
media to indicate to them our assessment of the incident and what we had done in response to it, and therefore, we felt compelled at the appropriate time a
to make a public statement and to respond to those 6
questions that they might have as to what our involve-7 ment was in the Three Mile Island incident, and we 8
felt that it was two months after the incident, and 9
as we had a chance to evaluate the situation, it was 10 appropriate to proceed with that public briefing.
11 Q
WEre there any other factors in calling the 12 press conference that were taken into account?
13 A
Well, any time that you make a decision to have a
press briefing, you clearly discuss the implications 74 of that as it might apply to the company's perceived l a_
response to a situation or the company's financial 16 involvement or the potential for the perception on 17 the part of the general public or stockholders of the 18 actions which were taken by the company, and those 19 issues were also a factor in discussing whether to 20 have a press conference or not.
'l Q
Was there a sense among those who made 22 the decision to call the press conference or partici-23 pate in the decision that it was time for Babcock 34
& Wilcox to stand up and say its piece?
A Well, I don't know that I'd put it in those
.n.a 892 128 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE I
1 MacMillan 43 2
terms.
There were people who felt that it was important 3
for us to make a public statement and to give the 4
press and the media the opportunity to ask questions which they might have, and to put that statement 0
a way that we felt reflected the facts in the in O
case, and indicatr the actions which we had taken I
which we felt were quite responsible in response to 8
that, so there are some who would say it is time to 9
make a public statement and to give the press an 10 opportunity to ask the questions that they might have.
11 Q
Was there any discussion in that meeting 12 that the press conference should be designed so that 13 aabcock & Wilcox could take a public posture that it did not feel that it was intimately involved with the 14 responsiblity for the events at TMI 2?
la_
A I w uldn't want to answer that question directly, 16 but let me state it differently.
g One of the considerations that was discussed at 18 the time of the decision to have a press conference 19 or not was a matter of the kinds of questions which 20 might be raised by the press in such a briefing, and
'l one of the questions which was anticipated that the n,
press would ask was who was to blame, and we did 23 discuss what our response would be to that question.
34 (Continued on Page 44.)
25 1892 129 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVIC E
1 2
MacMillan 44 r:
10.1 3
Q What was the discussion with respect to 4
the response to that hypothetical question?
A We discussed the appropriate answer to that a
question, and concluded that cur answer to that ques-tion should be, if it was asked, that we did not feel 7
that we had a blame in the Three Mile Island incident.
8 Q
Was there one person on your staff who was 9
charged with the preparations for the press confer-10 ence, or generally charged?
11 A
The arrangements for the press conference here 12 in Lynchburg, as it applied to transportation, setting 13 up the. room, getting the hotel reservations for those who needed it, those types of arrangements were handled by Duval Holt, who was our public relations la, representative here in Lynchburg.
16 Q
I take it that substantial effort was made 17 in the arrangements for the press conference?
18 A
Yes, sir.
19 Q
I take it materials were specially printed 20 for the press conference?
31 A
Yes.
Q Did Babcock & Wilcox offer to pay the airplane fares of the press to come to Lynchburg for that press conference?
24 A
I don't know what arrangements were made in terms 25 jERVIfE 130 89 BENJAMIN REPORTING
1 2
MacMillan 45 10.2 3
of transportation, since I was not involved in that 4
aspect of the press conference.
Q Going into the press conference, did a
Mr. Ziff know of the Dunn memorandum?
A I don't know.
7 Q
Did you ever tell him about it before the 8
press conference?
9 A
I don't believe I did.
10 Q
Going into the press conference, did 11 Mr. Fabrett know about the Dunn memorandum?
12 A
I remember discussing the Dunn memorandum with Mr. Fabrett; I can't tell you whether it was before or 13 after the press conference.
I don't remember the 1 +,
timing involved.
l a, Q
Before the press conference, was there any 16 discussion between you and anyone with respect to how 17 to handle the Dunn memorandum?
18 A
Could you be more specific.
I am not sure I 19 understand what you are asking.
20 Q
Was there any discussion between you and 21 anyone with respect to how to handle questions that might approach the substance of the Dunn memorandum or on whether or not to disclose the Dunn memorandum at the 23 press conference?
24 A
There was no discussion relative to the Dunn n-
=a 1892 131 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 46 10.3 3
=emorandum as it applied to the press conference, nor 4
a speculation as to whether or not a question of that type might be asked.
3 Q
I take it there was no discussion of disclosing the Dunn memorandum at the press conference?
7 A
Not to my knowledge.
8 Q
Referring you now to MacMillan Deposition 9
Exhibit No. 68 which you have before you, Page 4,
10 Mr. ziff states on Page 4 that the period between 11 March 28, 1979 and presently, the time of the press 12 conference, and I quote now, "has allowed a careful and thorough analysis of the events whi'ch took place, 73 and we would like te discuss these events with.you,in detail,today,and let you know the conclusions that we have reached."
16 Did you agree with that statement?
17 A
I think, in general, I agree with that statement, 18 yes.
19 Q
And you agreed with that part of the 20 statement which indicated that B&W intended to discuss the conclusions that it had reached with respect to the 31 events at Three Mile Island?
A In general, yes.
Q Referring you now to Page 23, you identi-24 fied, did you not, Mr. MacMillan, what you perceived 25 1892 132 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 o
MacMillan 47 10.4 3
to be the significant events in the sequence of events 4
of the accident at Three Mile Island, is that correct?
A That is correct.
o Q
You identified as the first significant P
event the auxilliary feed block valves being closed, i
is that correct?
8 A
That is correct.
9 Q
As the second significant event you 10 identified the PORV as having failed to open, is that l}
correct?
12 A
That is correct.
13 Q
As the third significant event you identi-fled the operator concern about high pressurizer water level, is that correct?
15 A
I think the way I stated that was the sol.e 16 attention to high pressure water, not to pressurizer --
17 or the attention to high pressuriser water level alone.
18 Q
Referring you to Page 25, Line 7,
did you 19 states, "The third significant event was the operator 20 being concerned about the high pressurizer water level"?
21 A
That is what it says, yes.
~
Q Did you identify the fourth significant event as the cutting back of high pressure injection, and further identify it as what you perceived to be 24 the most important of the significant events which you 1892 133 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 48 10.5 3
had identified?
4 A
Yes.
Q Referring you to Page 25, Lines 10 through
-a 17, let me read:
O "The fourth significant event, and probably 7
the most important in the whole sequence, was a deci-8 sion on the basis of that information, to cut back on 9
.the high pressure injection pump.
He did that at 10 about four minutes in the accident for the first pump, 11 and 10 minutes into the accident on the second pump.
12 And so now, there is no water supply coming into the 1*"t 8Y8t***"
13 Does that appear to be, to the best of your recollection as you sit here today, an accurate l a, transcription of your remarks?
16 A
Yes, I believe so.
17 Q
Now, let me read to you from Page 32, 18 Line 7,
and I quote:
19 "The third significant factor was the 20 inappropriate emphasis by the operators on pressurizer 31 level indication only.
I mentioned the pressuri=er level starting to go up.
The operator, as it approached the full level, apparently became concerned about that, and then performed the action which is the fourth 24 significant factor, closely allied with that, the i892 134 SENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 o
MacMillan 49 10.6 3
premature shutdown or cutback in high pressure injec-4 tion flow."
,Does that appear, tc the best of your o
recollection as you sit here today, to be an accurate P
transcription of what you said?
7 A
I believe so.
8 Q
Referring you now to Page 33, Line 7,
I 9
quote:
10 "The operating procedures call for leaving 11 the high pressure injection system in operation unless 12 the operator is able to maintain both an adequate 13 pressurizer water level, and a react r e lant system pressure above 1,600 pounds per square inch.
In this case, as I say, the operator -- he cut back on the high la, pressure injection flow, despite the satisfaction of 16 those two conditions, and we believe that's the..." and 17
't h e" i s underlined, "most significant factor in the 18 whole incident.
19 "Had he left the emergency pumps on, and 20 let them do the job that they are designed to do, by ni providing water to the reactor coolant system and keeping the core covered, there would not have been any subsequent core damage nor a substantial corres-ponding radiation release."
24 Does that appear to be an accurate 23 1R92 135 B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
1 n
MacMillan 49-a k0, 3
transcription of what you said?
1 0,.
7 4
A I think that is reasonably accurate.
I don't remember underlining the "the."
o (Continued on following page.)
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 x
22 23 n g 1892 136
.n-O BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
SR 11 lc 1
2 MacMillan 50 3
Q For the record, presumably that was the 4
interpretation of the transcriber, and you are cer-5 tainly n t bound by that.
You did know about the Dunn memorandum when you made those statements, did b
you not?
i A
Yes.
8 Q
You did know that the Dunn memorandum had 9
specifically identified operator error in arottling 10 HPI as a danger, did you not?
11 A
What was that question?
10 Q
You did know that the Dunn memorandum 13 had specifically identified operator error in the 14 premature throttling of HPI as a danger or as a 15 source of significant concern?
16 A
Yes.
Mr. Dunn expressed the concern that the 17 operator might, on the basis of pressuriser level, only cut back on HPI.
g 19 Q
I take it at this time you also knew that unn ad dentified the problem of premature termina-20 tion ef HPI, based on the focus on pressurizer level as a serious concern?
3oo 13 t0/
A Yes.
23 Q
And you Knew that he had identified it
't as a concern " requiring marked attention and correction"?
~
5 A
Yes.
I believe those are the words that he B ENJ AMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 MacMillan 51
_o said in his letter.
4 Q
I re f e r y o'u to the last sentence of the memorandum, a
A Yes.
6 Q
Did you tell anyone at the press con-7 ference about the Dunn memorandum?
8 A
I did not.
9 Q
You did tell them that your factors Nc. 3 10 actually your factor No. 4 was the most and No. 4 11 significant factor, is that correct?
12 A
That is correct.
13 Q
And dut.f actor No. 4 was the cutting
}4 back of HPI~ prematurely, based on focus on pressuriser level alone, is that correct?
l a-A I think I ought to qualify that by saying that 16 I also mentioned that the cutback prematurely on 7
high-pressure injection flow was contrary to what I called operating procedures, emergency procedures 19 which the operator had in the control room.
20 g
And at the time that you told them that, 21 you were aware that Dunn, a member of your own 22 organization, had identified previously, more than 3
a year previous to the TMI 2 accident, a concern o,
+
that operators were not adequately understanding and 25 were erroneously focusing on water level in the S ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 52 3
pressurizer as a criterion for throttling HPI?
A I am aware that Mr. Dunn raised the concern 4
that operators may, in depending upon pressurizer a
level alone, prematurely cut back on high pressure 6
injection, but he also indicated in diere that a recom-i mendation that high pressure injection only be 8
terminated when the pressure had been restored in the 9
I was aware at the time of reactor coolant system 10 the press conference that the emergency procedures 11 for the operation of the Three Mile Island 2 called for continued high-pressure injection until both the 13 level was maintained and pressure was maintained above 1600 pounds, and those conditions were not satisfied 14 at Three Mile Island.
15 Q
But you knew specifically that the pre-16 scription by Mr. Dunn, as offered in his memorandum IT to avoid what he perceived to be the potential for 18 operator error in this kind of situation had never 19 been transmitted to the operating utilities?
20 A
I knew there had been no transmission to the 21 utilities as a result of the first Dunn memo.
nn Q
Did it occur to you, Mr. MacMillan, that 23 your statement with reference to operaror error in 94 the premature throttling of HPI based on pressurizer level alone, was m.isleading in light of your own n_a knowledge of the Dunn memorandum and the contents,oo 3
BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE IU/
1 2
MacMillan 53 3
of the cunn memorandum?
A Could I hear the question again?
4 (Previous question was read back.)
a A
I believe that the statement that I made at 6
the press conference, and which I have made in other 7
public statements, that the premature cutback of 3
high-pressure inj ectio n flow was an inappropriate 9
operator action and probably the most significant 10 action taken by the operators during the-sequence 11 at Three Mile Island, with the full knowledge and 13 in some cases explicit statement that that action was contrary to the emergency procedures on which the plant should be operated.
Q Did it cur t yu that that statement 15 might be misleading in light of the fact that your at least one member of your own own organisation 17 organization -- had specifically identified and 18 raised a concern that the error which had occurred 10 in the September 24, 1977 Davis-Besse accident might 20 be repeated?
21 A
I believe the statement that I made was a s
no valid statement of the circumstances in the Three 1892 1A0
~~
Mile Island 2 incident.
23 24 Q
Did it occur to you that the Dunn memorandum might be relevant to your discussion at n-
.a B ENJ AMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 n
54 MacMillan
~
3 that point with the press.
4 A
I can't say that I felt it was that relevant 5
at the time we were preparing the statement for the 6
press and responding to the questions. I believe that what I tried to do there was to state the facts as s
they evolved and the sequence of events a Three Mile Island and the assessment of those facts as we felt 9
they were important er not.
I think that is exactly 10 what I did.
11 Q
Did it occur to you your statements might 12 be viewed in a considerably different light by he 13 public and the press had the public and the press 14 been aware, at the time you made those statements, 15 that a unit manager in your Engineering Department 16 had raised, as he put it, very serious concern or
" serious concern" about the potential for precisely 77 the kind of operator error that in fact occurred at TMI 2?
19 MR. EDGAR:
You are asking the same question.
20
~
A Yes.
"l MR. EDGAR:
It is rephrased, and no Mr. MacMillan has answered it three times.
23 I would like to note an objection to the con-24 tinued asking of the same question that has "l#**dY D**"
^"S****d'
$092
\\
25 BENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
1 MacMillan 55
_n g
w uld ask Mr. MacMillan to answer the 3
question, and I will proceed.
4 A
May I hear the question again?
5 (Previous question was read back.)
A Let me try to respond in this way.
I think the answer to your question, as I understand it, is 8
it did not occur to me at the time we were preparing it did 9
the infc mation for the press conference not enter my deliberations or my considerations as 10 to what the public reaction might be with awareness of the Dunn memo.
12 I was aware at that time of the Dunn memo and the 13 concerns expressed.
I was also aware at that time 14 that those concerns were covered in the emergency 15 procedures which were the basis for the operation 16 of Three Mile Island 2.
To that extent, I felt that I had been forth-18 right in describ'ing the events that had taken place, 19 and the fact that the operators were in appropriate in the actions they took in cutting back high-20 pressure injection flow, in conflict with the g
procedures which were in place.
Had they followed the procedures, the concern which Mr. Dunn had 1892 142 23 expressed would not have been a factor.
24 (Continued on Page 56.)
.a -3 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 56 sr/ew 3
Q Was it your reading of the Dunn memorandum 12.1 4
that Mr. Dunn was raising the question of whether the operators adequately understood the emergency procedures?
A I don't believe that was ever a factor in 7
Mr. Dunn's letter.
He didn't mention the words.
8 Q
Did you understand that the thrust or Q
implicit assumption of the Dunn memorandum was that 10 even though those emergency procedures existed that 11 the operators were unable to follow them or were not 12 following them in the fashion in which they were i"t*"d*d t
D*
f 11
- d?
13 A
I think that was implicit in what he'said in his letter, based on the observations of th~
Davis-Besso 15 occurrence.
16 Q
Whau is your perception of who has respon-17 sibility for the content of emergency procedures?
18 A
The responsibility for the preparation of the 19 emergency procedures is the utility's responsibility.
20 Q
Does B&W have any responsibility for the 31 content of those emergency proedures in your view?
~
A B&W has a responsibility for informing the utility of the basis on which the equipment they have designed and supplied should be operated, certainly as it 24 applies to emergency procedures and applies to the i892 143 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
I 2
MacMillan 57 12.2 3
equipment that we supply, that we do have a respon-4 sibility there.
Q With respect to the press conference on a
June 5,
1979, clearly Babcock & Wilcox sought out the press, is that correct?
7 A
well, as it applied specifically to the invita-8 tion to attend the June 5th press conference, we Q
invited the press to Lynchburg for the press confer-10 ence, but I must stress that for a period of some 11 eight to 10 weeks prior to that press conference we 12 had repeated inquiries from various members of the media for an opportunity to hear our assessment of the 73 situation and to ask us questions relative to our response to the incident, and we felt that there was l a, an interest in that on the part of the press.
16 Q
You were not required to hold a press 17 conference, were you?
18 A
No.
19 Q
Do you believe that Mr. ciff's reference 20 on Page 4 to a thorough analysis of the events at 31 TMI 2 included your review of the Dunn memorandum?
A I stated earlier I don't know whether Mr. ~iff was aware of the Dunn memorandum or not.
23 Q
In your min 4 would a thorough analysis or 24 careful analysis of events at TMI include a review of 25 i892 i44 BENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 58 12.3 3
the Dunn memorandum?
4 A
I think it would, and I believe that that was a factor involved in the supplementary operating instruc-o tions that were issued shortly after the Three Mile incident.
7 Q
I refer you to Page 40 of the press confer-8 ence transcipt, Line 12:
9 "On Friday, following the incident -- the 10 incident occurred on Wednesday, and Friday following 11 the incident, we were in contact with our other 12 operating utilities, to try to indicate to them tne nature f the problem, and what some of the contributing 13 factors were.
We sent out an initial bulletin to the other operating units on Sunday.
We met with the 15 representatives of the other utilities on Tuesday, and 16 de scribed for them what had happened at "hree Mile 17 Island, to the best of our ability, what the comparison 18 of the design there was to their individual plant 19 design.
We sent out other advisory bulletins, recom-20 mending modifications or clarifications of operating 3}
procedures, we felt were pertinent to the continued safe operation of those units."
Does that appear to be to you a generally accurate transcription?
i892 I4cD 24 A
I think generally, yes.
25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 59 12.4 3
Q Certainly that procedure that you described 4
with respect to your response to TMI 2 was not followed on the day after the Davis-Besse incident in a
September of 1977, was it?
A You lost me there.
7 (Previous question was read back.)
8 A
The sequence of events described on Page 40 and 9
the response we made to Three Mile Island was not 10 followed subsequent to the Davis-Besse incident.
11 Q
If you had followed an advisory and infor-12 mative procedure generally along the lines of the material I have quoted from Page 40, would it,in your 13 opinion,have made any difference potentially to the outcome at TMI 2?
15 A
That is highly speculative.
I don't know how to 16 answer it.
17 Q
Do you have an opinion?
18 A
I simply don't know.
It would depend on what 19 the contents of those bulletins were.
20 We did evaluate the situation at Davis-Besse, 21 determined the cause of the problem of Davis-Besse.
We took corrective measures at Davis-Besse to modify the pilot-operated relief valve.
We asked the question, a
is that problem applicable to other units, and the 24 answer was no, because the pilot-opera;0d relief valve 25 1892 146-BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVIC E
1 2
MacMillan 60 12.4 3
at Davis-Besse was a Crosby valve, and all our other 4
operating units were Dresser valves and, therefore, the judgment was made it was not applicable at other a
units and, therefore, there was no necessity to issue a bulletin to the other operating units.
7 Q
Was the judgment made that the substance 8
and issues addressed by the Dunn memorandum were not 9
applicable to other utilities?
10 A
I am not aware of the process by which that 11 assessment might have been made.
As I indicated 12 earlier, to my knowledge there was a conflict between the technical people in our organization about the 13 type of instructions that should be issued to the other utilities, and that technical difference of 15 opinion remained unresolved prior to March 28, 1979.
16 Q
Directing your attention to Page 45 of the IT transcript, let me-starting on Line 8,
and there 18 are three paragraphs which follow -- try to summarize, 19 if I understand correctly, your perspective on the 20 lessons learned from TMI 2.
Let me try to summarize 31 it, and tell me if I do it accurately.
A You understand this is Mr. Fabrett's statement, not mine?
23 Q
Excuse me.
Yes, it is.
Nonetheless, 24 let me try to summarize those and ask you if you think 25 1892 147 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVIC E
1 MacMillan 61 12.5 3
that is an accurate summary.
4 He indicated that the three immediate lessons were, one, that additional attention could a
usefully be paid to the general subject described as P
man-machine interface; second, that training, partic-7 ularly including the use of the simulator, could 8
enhance operator effectiveness and, third, and the Q
licensing basis for nuclear plants should give 10 greater emphasis and attention to potential transients, 11 Would you say that that is a fair summary 12 of the three points that Mr. Fabrett made?
A Yes, in the very broadest sense, yes.
13
- l.
Q Did you agree with his analysis of the lessons learned from TMI 2?
15 A
I believe those three categories cover most of 16 the lessons learned.
17 Q
Would it be fair to say that another lesson 18 learned, not presanted by Mr. Fabrett, is the question 19 of attention to experience, as to previous operating 20 experience, particularly with respect to the Davis-Besse September 1977 transient?
31 A
Well, let me say that I believe that the impor-tance of evaluating operating experience and feeding that back into the training programs and the procedures 24 for an operating unit is an important lesson learned, o,-
1807 148 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 62 13.6 3
and I would have put that in the general category of 4
operator effectiveness.
Q Referring you to Page 76 of the transcript, o
and I quote now starting at Line 22:
F "We believe it was full of water" referring 7
to the pressurizer. "But it was, what you might call an 8
ambiguous indication, in the sense that, you could not 9
interpret a full pressurizer level indication, as 10 meaning the entire reactor coolant system was full of 11 water."
12 Does that appear to you to be a generally accurate transcription of your remarks on that occa-13 sion?
14 A
I think so, yes.
l a, Q
And I take it you did feel that the pres-16 surizer level was an ambiguous indication?
17 A
I think you have to read the entire sentence.
18 I said it was an ambiguous indication in the sense 19 that you cannot interpret a full pressurizer level 20 indication as meaning the entire reactor coolant syste=
31 was full of water, and the significant parameter there, going on af ter the pertion you read, "And the significant parameter there is the reactor coolant system pressure."
Q Would it be fair to say there wo uldn ' t be 24 any question of the pressurizer level being p
(
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1 2
MacMillan 63 13.7 3
ambiguous indica *.on if operators had not been used to 4
interpreting the condition of the core, the water i
inventory in the core, from pressurizer level indica-o tion?
6 MR. EDGAR:
There is no basis in the I
record that I know of for the last statement.
8 I think we need a foundation for that.
9 Q
Did you use the term " ambiguous indication"?
10 A
well, I guess the reason I used that is because 11 it had been used widely in the industry up until that 12 time to indicate that the level in the pressurizer was ambiguous, and I used that in order to draw a 13 familiarity to previous statements that had been made.
I don't remember whether the person in phrasing l a, this question had used that term or not, but many 16 other people have.
And so I used that in the sense 17 that it had been used in previous situations to indicate 18 that you cannot depend solely upon pressurizer level 19 as an indication of the water inventory in the reactor 20 coolant system. That is consistent through all the 31 presentations that we have made.
s Q
In the text on Pages'76 and 77, is there any qualification made by you that your use of the term " ambiguous indication" was simply an adoption of 24 somebody else's term, rather than your own expression?
25 i892 150 S ENJ AMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 o
MacMillan 64 13.8 3
A I don't believe there is anything in that record 4
that says that, no.
Q Directing your attention to Page 83 of the a
transcript A
Could I just pause a minute.
On Page 74 the question was asked from the audience, starting at Line 9,
8 "Isn't it also correct that the pressurizer level gauge o
failed or gave an inappropriate reading?"
10 I believe the response that you quoted on 11 Page 7.6 was directed toward that line of inquiry.
12 Perhaps I should have said " inappropriate," rather than " ambiguous."
13 Q
Directing your attention to Page 83 of the transcript, Line 24, quoting, "We don't believe that l a, we have a blame in the Three Mile Island accident.
16 We believe the inappropriate operator action was the 17 significant factor which led to the core damage, and 18 the subsequently released radioactivity."
19 Does that appear to be a generally accurate 20 transcription of your remarks?
31 A
Yes.
Q And yo1 said that, I take it, knowing that o
your own staff had predicted precisely that inappro-priate operator action and raised it as a matter of 24 serious concern some 13 months before the TMI 2 accident?
_n -a B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVIC
1 MacMillan 65 13.9 3
A And also in the knowledge that the emergency 4
procedure in force at Three Mile Island at the time of the incident called for continued operation of HPI a
until both level and pressure could.be maintained, P
and that those conditions were not met.
7 Q
Is it your analysis at this time, 8
Mr. MacMillan, that the accident at Three Mile Island 9
is a relatively simple case of operator error?
10 A
I think that is a gross misinterpretation of 11 what has been said in any of the statements or in the 12 press conference.
The words which I have said is that we believe that inappropriate operator action was the 13 significant factor.
Q Directing your attention to Page 84, la_
let me back up.
I will start on Page 83, Line 12 16 Line 24.
17 "We don't believe that we have a blame in 18 the Three Mile Island accident.
We believe the inappro-19 priate operator action was the significant factor -- "
20 A
That is exactly what I just said.
We believe 21 that the inappropriate operator action was the signi-s ficant factor.
That is not what you stated in your cuestion.
23 MR. EDGAR:
Could we have a break.
24 (A brief recess was taken.)
2' i892 152 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
SR 14 le 1
2 Macmillan 66 3
g Ar. MacMillan, you have indicated that the Dunn memorandum remained within the organization 4
and was not communicated to the outside world because a
of a process of addressing or attempting to resolve some conflict in technical analysis relating to the prescription of the Dunn memorandum.
Is that 8
accurate?
Q A
That is my understanding, yes.
10 Q
To your knowledge, from August 3rd of 11 19'8, the date of the Hallman memorandum which ycu 12 now have before you, which is marked as Deposition 13 Exhibit 37, was anything done within the c_ganizatien in the seven and a half to eight months from August 3,
14 1978 until March 28, 1979 toward resolving those la-differences?
16 A
I have no knowledge of whetner they were or g
were not.
18 Q
Have you inquired of your organization?
gg A
I have not.
20 Q
Referring you to the press conference g
transcript, Page 84, Line 23, "I
think the significant point in the Three Mile Island incident, is that when 23 when we conducted that training prior to Three Mile 24 Island, we made the presumption in the training that 25 1892 153 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN:3 S ERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 67 3
the erergency equipment would perform as designed."
4 Isn't that exactly the point that was being raised
/
5 by Mr. Junn in his memorandum, that perhaps the emergency 6
equipment, or to put it more broadly, the emergency process would not perform as designed?
t A
What do you mean by " emergency process"?
Q The ability of operators to react appro-g priately in an emergency situation.
A I think if you broaden it to incorporate 11 emergency process as you define it, I would agree 12 that was the intent of the Dunn memo.
13 I don't believe that the intent of the Dunn memo 14 was that emergency equipment would specifically not 15 perform.
16 Q
Referring you to Page 85, Line 17, "The significant thing here is that we did not train them at 18 that time -- we have subsequently modified it -- we 19 did not train them at that time, in the assumption 20 that, in addition to the initial equipment fault, other equipment would be precluded from doing its gy job, because of inappropriate operator action."
Does that appear to you to be a generally 23 accurate transcription of your remarks?
24 A
I woulu say yes.
1892 154 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 3
MacMillan 68 3
Q would it be fair to say that inappropriate 4
operator action was precisely the issue being addressed by the Dunn memorandum in February of 1978?
o A
I thi.k that would be fair, yes.
6 Q
Referring you to Page 101 of the transcript, i
Line 21, I an picking up in the second paragraph of a question that was addressed to you.
"There has been 9
mention made of an incident, I believe in 1977, at the 10 Davis-Besse plant, that has some bearing on, mavbe 11 some of the things that happened at Three Mile 12 Island, and a report by a man for the TVA named 13 Carlisle Michaelson, who rendered this report on it."
14 Obviously, for the record, it is not Carlisle 15 Michaelson.
But do you recall a question being 16 addressed to you with regard to the Dcvis-Besse transient in 1977?
7 A
Yes.
18 Q
In your response to that question, which gg begins at Page 102, Line 8,
and continues to Page 105, Line 8,
did you ever make reference to the concerns 21 made by Mr. Dunn?
m nn
~~
A I don't believe so.
a Q
Referring you to Page 31 of the transcript,
'-l Line 3,
I believe the transcript at that point is 25 referring to the PORV, is that correct?
1892 15e3 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
I 2
MacMillan 69 3
A Yes.
4 Q
Beginning at Line 3,
"The failure of this valve is the only mechanical failure that oc-O curred in the course of the accident."
Was there 6
not also a failure associa ted with the indication I
relating to the position of the PORV that was displayed 8
to the operators in the control room?
O A
As far as I know, the position indicator on 10 the PORV indicated what it was supposed to indicate, 11 and that is whether or not the solenoid on the PORV was energized or de-energized.
}g 13 Q
And is my understanding correct that
}4 the solenoid indication indicated that it was ener-gized, whi h an operator would interpret to mean that 15 the valve was closed?
16 MR. EDGAR:
There are two questions.
y-
}g MR. ROCKWELL:
I am asking two questions?
A The indicator, as I understand it, on the gg control panel, after the initial increase in pressure, which opened the pilot-operated relief 21 valve, when that pressure decreased and the solenoid 22 was de-energized, a lignt on the control panel indi-3 cated that the solenoid was de-energized, which,
' l if taken as the sole indication of the position of 25 199,7.. i56 o
BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2
MacMillan 70 o
the pilot-operated 'alve, would say the valve is 4
closed.
But in fact that indicator only shows 5
whether or not the actuating solenoid is energi=ed 6
or not.
7 Q
Have you given any attention since the g
accident to the question of whether it would be valuable for an operator to have an actual indication 9
of the position of the PORV, as opposed simply to an indication of whether the solenoid was energized 11 or not energized?
12 A
Yes.
13 Q
What is your conclusion in that regard?
14 A
We have worked on a number of means by which 15 the actual position excuse me -- we have worked 16 on a number of means which would indicate whether 17 or not the pilot-operated relief valve was open or
}g shut, including such things as pressure drop and acoustical indicators, and we have developed and 79 tested those and are prepared to offer those as addi-tions, improvements, in the instrumentation of tha 21
,8g}J newer planes. x \\ __n n Q Had B&W considered before TMI 2 the use 23 of a gauge or instrument for the PORV which would 24 indicate actual position, as opposed to simply the-n ~ energizing or not energizing of the solenoid? BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVIC E
1 2 MacMillan 71 3 A I really can't answer that, other than to say that we recognize that relief valves of this type have 4 a history of failing to completely close, and we did a recommend the installation of thermocouples in the 6 piping downstream of these valves and the safety 7 valves, and pressure, temperature and level indi-8 cators and alarms in the quench tank, into which 9 these valves discharge, so that the operator had 10 a means of determining whether or not the valve had 11 completely re-seated. 13 (Continued on Page 71.) 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 1892 158 2* 25 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 MacMillan 72 sr/ew 3 Q Knowing the history of FORV failures to 15.1 4 close, was it considered by B&W that a direct indica-t tion of PORV position might be a considerably easier 3 measure for an operator in an emergency setting to know the condition of his plant? 7 A I simply don't know what the broad B&W Company 8 had or had not done in that area. I think I can say 9 that we felt that we had provided instrumentation 10 which would give him the diagnostic capability of 11 determining whether the valves had seated or not. 12 Q Putting that question in terms of man-ma hine interface, in an emergency setting do you know 13 whether B&W ever considered whether the relatively more involved procedure for determining PORV position might make emergency response by an operator in a 16 plant more difficult? 17 A I simply don't know whether that would have been 18 considered or not. I would want to point out that 19 this condition is not unique to the PORV. Similar 20 conditions prevail for safety valves, not only on the 31 pressurizer, but on the steam lines. So the provision that he made of thermocouples on the downstream piping and of pressure, temperature and level indicators on quench tank were equally 24 applicable to safety valves, which have similar 25 1892 159 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 MacMillan 73 15.2 3 operational history. 4 Q Do I correctly understand that during the TMI 2 sequence of events on the 28th that the computer O in the control room either broke down or stopped functioning or in some manner stopped providing for t the operators information that it was intended to 8 provide? 9 A You are getting into an area where I have rather 10 limited knowledge. As I recall from what I have read 11 in the transcript of the interviews of the operators 10 and in some of the s equen ce of events, the alarm 13 sequence printer paper jammed, causing it to fall behind in its recordings, and if that is what you mean by the computer failing, I would have to say, yes, la, that was a factor. 16 Q Is the computer that is used in the TMI 2 17 control room a Bail'ey computer? 18 A Yes. 19 Q Is the Bailey computer manufactured by a 20 subsidiary of Babcock & Wilcox? 21 A The Bailey computer is supplied by the Bailey Controls Company, which is a subsidiary of B&W. Q Is the alarm printer a part of the Bailey computer? 24 A I believe the answer to th a~ t is yes. I would
- 392 160 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
1 2 MacMillan 74 15.3 3 want to confirm that though. 4 Q Referring you to Page 79 of the transcript, / Line 14. 3 "Let me step back, first, in time, and let's recognize that that reactor control room was 7 laid out and designed by Burns & Roe back in the late 8 1960's. And so certainly, right now, it represents at 9 least a 10-year old design. 10 arte s a design and type of configuration 11 which evolved out of the utility practice in the design 10 of control rooms for regular boilers, and was adapted and adjusted t reflect the unique requirements of a 13 nuclear plant." Did Babcock & Wilcox have any role in the 15 design of tne control room at TMI 2? 16 A Yes, I believe that we recommended an arrange-17 ment of the instrumentation that is used to monitor 10 and control the nuclear steam system, and that recom-19 mendation was then incorporated in the total control 20 room arrangement designed by Burns & Roe, and subse-21 quently through a process involving Burns & Roe and GPU there was arrived at a final configuration which GPU approved. Q Do I understand correctly that Babcock & 24 Wilcox played some role in the formulation of the 25 1897 161 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 o MacMillan 75 15.4 3 final control room design? 4 A As it applied to that portion which is required to supply the nuclear steam system. O Q Mr. MacMillan, we spoke about Mr. Kosiba yesterday. Mr. Kosiba indicated that he had assumed 7 his job as the manager of the then Nuclear Service, 8 now Customer Service Department within B&W, in 9 February of 1979. He further indicated that at the 10 time of his assumption of those duties, he had a 11 conversation with you in which you charged him with 12 reviewing, analyzing and potentially restructuring the Customer Service Department within the company. What 13 . was your reason for asking Mr. Kosiba'to undertake that review and evaluation? First of all, is my la, characterization of his testimony accurate with respect 16 to your recollection of the conversation? 17 A I don't know what he testified. I can tell you 18 that when he did take over the Customer Service or what 19 is now the Customer Service organization, I did ask him 20 to evaluate the structure of that organization and the 31 basis on which we maintain and interface with our utilities who have operating units, and to that extent what you are saying certainly sounds familiar. (Continued on following page.) 24 1gop i67 / 'v ma BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
R 16 1c 1 2 MacMillan 76 3 Q
- would like to quote from Mr. Kosiba's and 4
deposition, Page 11, Line 5, "He charged me" ! believe he is referring to you, Mr. MacMillan, when a "He charged me to look at it he uses the word "he" 6 afresh and see if by a rearranging and refocusing we 's could do a better job of assisting operating plants 8 and giving it the emphasis, so that there was no 9 connotation that the support of operating plants was 10 a, let me say, second fiddle to supplying NSSS's." 11 MR. EDGAR: Would you read the entire 12 page and get the total context of the 13 question. 14 A Now what was your question? 15 Q Referring to the material I quoted, do 16 you have this in mind? A Yes. 1_. Q Is that your recollection of the charge or part of the charge that you gave to Mr..Kosiba? 19 A I think, taking it in the total context of 20 his answer, starting on Line 18 on Page 10 and 'l carrying through the portion that you quoted, I would s s 22 agree with the general thrust of that, yes. '3 Q Had you been concerned t'T a t the then 24 Nuclear Service, now Customer Service Department, 892 163 25 needed to be upgraded? BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 2 MacMillan 77 3 A Let me step back and answer the question I 4 think you were asking earlier about why did I ask 5 him to look at this. 6 The Nuclear Power Generation Division started 7 out with the prime business of supplying original g equipment and nuclear steam systems and nuclear fuel. 9 The major portion of our operation, or the major thrust of our operation, the largest volume of sales 10 for us, was in that category. As more units got into operation, the oppor-13 tunity for support of those in the servicing of these g units increased, and we are in a business situation 14 today in the nuclear business, which I am sure you 15 are familiar with, where there is essentielly no new 16 business, no new original equipment business being sold. 18 There is ongoing fuel business and the supporting 19 of the continuing operation of our nuclear plants. 20 I felt and continue to feel that there is a good 21 business opportunity for us to strengthen, focus and concentrate our technical capabilities as a divisi n n the operation of our operating units and 3 the support of our utilities that have operating units, in order to generate favorable financial 25 1892 164 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERvtCE
1 2 MacMillan 78 3 performance. That was certainly one factor. The second factor was we had in various parts of the 4 f company service organizations. We had one group that a was doing spare parts. We had another group doing 6 in-service inspection, and another group doing 7 field service, and one that had a training function. 8 There was a special products function which was not 0 really highlighted and given the kind of resources 10 it ought to have. 11 So a second factor in the reorganization was 12 to try to bring all that together into one organiza-13 tion that would be stronger and could give broader 74 support and make an attraccive business situation for the company. l a. That was part of the charge that I was giving 16 Mr. Kosiba, is in some way to structure and organize and put resources into this operation which will make 18 it more effective in supporting the customer, which 19 has to be our ultimate service objective, and at the 20 same time, an attractive business opportunity for us. 21 Q Had you had cny expressions of concern or complaints from outside the company with respect 3 to the performance or the ability of the Nuclear 24 Service Department, which was at least a factor in 25 the charge which you gave to Mr. Kosiba? Ro? 165 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 MacMillan 79 3 A I don't recall any specific complaints, as you would say, coming from outside the company relative 4 to the support that we were giving in our operating 5 unit, and I think our fellows had been doing, in 6 the eyes of our customers, had been doing a good job there. 8 But my interest in this approach was to get a 4 stronger interne.1 organization, which would allow 10 us to do that job even better, and give the customer 11 even more support than he had been asking us to 13 provide in the operation of his equipment. (Continued on Page 80.) 3 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2' i892 166 25 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2 MacMillan 80 sr/ew 3 Q I believe in my question I used alterna-17.1 4 tively the concepts either of complaint or an expres-t Jion of concern. Having those two phrases in mind, a would,that change your answer at all? 6 A I don't think so. We weren't motivated in the 7 structuring of the service here by either complaints 8 or expressions of concern outside. We were motivated 9 by trying to do a better job for the customer and at 10 the same time develop a stronger service business. 11 Q Mr. MacMillan, apart from the public state-12 ments which we have identified previously in this dep siti n, and I think something on the order of 10 3 or a dozen that you have made since the Three Mile Island accident, have you made any other statements 15 since March 28, 1979, and by " statements" I mean 16 either a statement of your own knowledge of TMI 2, 17 which you wrote, or a transcribed interview taken by 18 anyone? 19 A Well, let me answer the second part. I don't 20 believe I have had any transcribed interviews. gy Q The NRC has not interviewed you? A No. y Q Have you made any statements or have you written anything which you have not used in a public 24 forum, but which nonetheless refers to or summarizes 25 }hh BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 2 MacMillan 81 17.2 3 or analyzes or explains your understanding of the 4 events surrounding Three Mile Island? A Well, let me say, first of all, clearly I have o had a lot of discussions in many different f o ru r.s about 6 Three Mile Island and what were the lessons to be 7 learned from that, what should we as an industry be 8 doing differently in the future. 9 Q I am not referring to discussions. I am 10 referring to something which ultimately gets reduced 11 to paper. 12 A I don't believe so. I don't recall that any of that has been reduced to paper. Maybe I ought to check 13 that just to make sure. But most of the interface I have had, the interchange I've had, has been verbal. l a, Q If you find that you have reduced a state-16 ment or an interview or something else to paper which 17 we have not covered here, could,you please advise us 18 through Mr. Edgar? 19 A certainly. 20 Q I would include in that any reports that 31 you may have submitted up the line in Babcock & Wilcox relating to the TMI accident. A I really ought to go back and look for my files. MR. EDGAR: One other point for the record. 24 We have run a check, and there does not appear 25 1892 168 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 3 MacMillan 82 17.3 3 to be a prepared written statement of the Weaver 4 Task Force. It was apparently a view graph presentation. We are trying to locate the view a graph, if we can, but there was no separate statement per se. 7 Q Mr. MacMillan, would you refer please to 8 Page 75 of the press conference transcript. First let 9 us turn back to Page 74 for a moment. When we listened 10 to the tape that we were provided, we were confused 11 because there was an interruption beginning with the 12 very last word on Page 74, and the next on Page 75 13 through to Line 9 of Page 76, which did not appear to be part of the press conference. It appeared to be something separate in terms of the tone and what we 15 could hear on the tape. We raised this question with 16 Mr. Edgar last night, and we have since reviewed the 17 videotape of that press conference, and it appears that 18 the comments that you were making, that. you were in the 19 midst of making at Page 74, contLnue uninterruptedly 20 from the text at the bottC-ec 3 age 74 to the text 21 beginning on Lines 10 and '1 ci Jage 76. The language from the top of Page 75 to Line 9 on Page 76 is not on the videotape. It appears to have found its way into the tapes by some other means, and it appears to 24 me in looking at that language and looking at what is 25 1892 \\69 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 MacMillan 83 o 17.4 3 written down on Page 75 and through Line 9 on Page 76, 4 it may have been a preparation session between you and some of your advisors in which you were reviewing -a how you would handle the press conference and what O approach you would take for certain questions or how you would structure your comments. 8 A Yes, it certainly looks like that. 9 Q Do you recall that a preparation session 10 was taped? 11 A Oh, sure. 12 MR. ROCKWELL: We would ask for a copy of the tape of that preparation session, if it is 13 s t i.' l in existence. THE WITNESS: That I don't know. 15 Q Do you know whether any other strategy 16 sessions that you had in preparing your testimony or in l~ analyring the TMI 2 sequence of events were taped? 18 Is that a common procedure? 19 A Not to my knowledge. I believe what we did is 20 we went through a dress rehearsal for the press presen-21 tation, and part of the dress rehearsal was to give the audiovisual people >m the company a chance to n, try out their cameras and try out the audio equipment. For that reason I believe it was taped. It was not ."4 d intended to be kept as any kind of permanent recor,2 1,/ 0 189 23 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 MacMillan 84 17.5 3 We did intend to get a videotape and an audiotape 4 of the actual press conference. The dress rehearsal \\ was taped merely as a convenience to the technicians. 0 Q-Do you know whether there were any other meetings or sessions that you were involved with in i terms of discussing matters relating to the TMI 2 8 were taped? 9 A I am not aware of any. 10 Q But if the tape, of which the text on 11 Page 75 and 76 appear to be an excerpt, is in exis-12 tence, we would appreciate receiving a copy of it, the audio portion,that is. Is that agreeable? 13 MR. EDGAR: Yes. MR. ROCKWELL: Mr. MacMillan, we will recess your deposition at this time. This is a standard 16 procedure we have been following with all deposi-17 tions, leaving you subject to recall for further 18 testimony thould it appear to be necessary. We 19 do not have any present plans to ask you to 20 testify again, but it is possible that we would 21 (Continued on following page.) 23 24 25 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE jgO} ]7j
1 2 MacMillan 85 3 need to at some future date and, therefore, we are recessing at this time. Thank you very 4 much. O (The deposition adjourned at 3:30 p.m.) 6 7 John H. MacMillan g 9 Subscribed and sworn to 10 before me this_________ 11 d'Y f_________________ 12 1979 13 14 Notary Public 15 16 17 18 19 000 20 21 22 23 1892 172 ,3 BENJAMIN R EPO RT;N G SERVICE
1 2 jN D E X 86 3 ti;;NgSS dirge; 4 John H. MacMillan 3 5 6 7 E_ X_ H_ _I B I T_ _S 8 MacMillan Deposition 9 IEE_Idensifisasies Eese 10 63 Resume of John H. MacMillan 2 dated July 3, 1979 11 64 Letter of May 21, 1979 to 29 Mr. Weaver as head of sub-in ~ committee on Energy and the Environment, prepared by. 13 Mr. MacMillan. 14 65 Document of prepared oral 30 testimony by Mr. MacMillan 15 before the Weaver Subcommittee dated May 24, 1979 16 66 Copy of Babcock & Wilcox 30 prepared statement before Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment dated May 24, 18 1979. 19 67 Transcript of testimony by 31 Mr. MacMillan before the 20 Subcommittee en Energy and the Environment, dated 21 May 24, 1979 m 68 Transcript of a press con-32 ao ~~ ference held June 5, 1979 in Lynchburg 24 1892 173 25 x B ENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 \\ 2 87 3 C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E 4 STATE OF NEW YORK ) ) ss: COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) a We, IRWIN H. BENJAMIN, STANLEY RUCEARG, Certified Shorthand Reporters and Notaries Public of i the State of New York, and ROBERT ZERKIN, Notary Public 8 of the State of New York, do hereby certify that the 9 foregoing deposition of JOHN H. MacMILLAN was taken 10 before us on the 5th day of July, 1979. 11 The said witness was duly sworn before the 12 commencement of his testimony; that the said testimony was taken stenographically by ourselves and then 13 transcribed. The within transcript is a true record of , a, s the said deposition. 16 We are not related by blood or marriage 1-to any of the said parties, nor interested directly 18 or indirectly in the matter in controversy, nor are we 19 in the employ of any of the counsel. 20 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set 21 our hands this 5th day of July, 1979. l 1 no I ___r:Let _ ____________ BE\\JAMIN, CSR IRWIN H. 23 _57b_ 4,_<2 w __ ? 24 STANLEY.RUDBARG, CSR /, h
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