ML19289F712

Summarizes Responses to IE Bulletin 79-06A,Review of Operational Errors & Sys Misalignments Identified During TMI Incident

ML19289F712
Person / Time
Issue date:	05/07/1979
From:	Tam P Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
ACRS-SM-0110, ACRS-SM-110, IEB-79-06A, IEB-79-6A, NUDOCS 7906150442
Download: ML19289F712 (10)

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ACRS Members

'b StI4'MRY OF RESTONSES TO IE BULLETIN,79-0GA (WESTI GIC'JSE REACTORS)

1. ' Raview the Jescription of circuant, aces described in Enclocure 1 of

-1 IE Dulletin 79-05 and the preliminary chronology of the BlI-2 3/28/79 d

accident inc1tdod in Enclosure 1 to IE Bulletin 79-05A.

0]i (1) the extraae mriousness and conscquences of the M.

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'Ihis r evieu should be directed toward understarding:

a.

.- ~. N.

simultaneous blocking of both auxiliar y feedwater

-tr ains at the 'Ihree tiile Island l'ait 2 plant and N..! -

other actions taken during tha carly phacca of the

,'4 3.

,' il accident; (2) the apparent oparational errors which led to the eventual core dar:' age; (3) that the potential ii M

exists, under certain accident or transient conditions,

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to have a wtcr lovel in tha pressurizer simultaneously

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a T, with the reactor vessel not full of water; and (4) tju necessity to systcaatically analym plant corditions

' j and parameters and take appropriate corrective action.

b.

q>crational personnel should be instructed to (1) not over r ido automatic action of enJincered ufety features unless continued operation of engineered safety featut es will result in unsafe plant conditions (cce Section 7a.);

ae f.I and (2) not make oper ational decisions based solely on a

'd single plant parameter indication when one or raore con-

.JJ firmatory indications are available.

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c.

All licensed operators and plant management and supervisors

'q with operational responsibilities chall participate in this revicu nd such rar ticipation diall be documented in plcat mi rccorda.

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4-2230 025~

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.s Responso to this itera is quito uniform. All licenreen indicated that they have been following the 'AMI-2 incident ver y closely, and havo

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been briefed by the lac Staff (usually the Ir incipal Insrector for A

each plant).

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Operating manuals are being clccely scrutinized for instructions that might lead to corditions described in a. and b. above. All licensees have indicated that all personnel with operational responsibilities c,

are being trained according to c.

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2.

Review the actions required by your operating procedures for coping 1

with tr ansients and accidents, with particular attention to:

t a.

Pccognition of the p csibility of forming. voids in the Primary coolant system large enough to canpromise tho m

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core cooling capability, especially natural circulation capability.

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2; b.

Operation action required to prevent the formation of such

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voids.

4 c.

Cperator action required to enhance core coolf ng in.the

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event such voids are formed.

(e.g. rcmote ventirg) ccl 2230 026

.s Responses to this Item are uniform, and can be stramarized as:

D

.. i a.

Void formation dur ing I/X'A is expected except when the i

l IDCA is caused by a stuck open ICRV which closes or is j

isolated befor e the system depressurizes to caturation

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pressure, or then the loss of pr essure is compensated I

for by safety injection at a pr essure above saturation.

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'Ib assist the operator s in recognizing formation of voids,

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1 some plants have pasted steam tables at convenient loca-tions in the cont':01 room, while come ar e considering 1

installing computar readout equipnent to facilitate and expedite information flow to the operators.

b.

Ibr all of these plants, the safegtntds systen was

' j designed to recover and cool the cor e followiry varlou.:

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degrees of primar y coolant system voiding, dep?nding on 1

the break size and location. All licensees admitted j

that for some LOCA cases, no operator action could pr e-vent void formation.

Ib'..uver, imaliate acti?ns (verification of r cactor tiip, ver ification of initiation of ECCS, ver ification of dccreasirq coolant temper atur e,

'.i verification of water.ded to steam generator s, maintenance of pr essor izer level, dissipation of heat, etc.) by the n m r,rnte c-,n r oa rn ne tsrnunnt unia rnemrin, i n m, n 3<

Cases.

OP FIC E h DURNAldE M

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All claim that emergency procedetes are either adequate or beiry3 reviewed for adequacy. %e licensee of R.G. Ginna indicated that he is investigating the feasibility of in-J d

stalling rcmote operated valves on the reactor vessel head

..,. - d vent line. % e licensee of Indian Point No. 3 admitted

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that the present operating procedures do not address the

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possiblity of void -formation, and that these procedur es

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are being revised.

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3.

For your facilities that use pressurizer water level coincident with

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pressur izer pressure for automatic initiation of safety injection y,;

into the reactor coolant system, tr ip the low pressurizer level

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setpint bistables such that, when the pr essurizer pressur e reaches

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the low setp int, safety injection vould be initiated regardless T

of the pr essurizer level.

In cddition, instr oct operators to manually initiate safety injection when the pr essur izer pressure indication reaches the actuation setpoint khother or not the level

}. l j indication has dropped to the actuation setpoint.

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Response

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All licensees (except Point Beach) said that they have tripped the

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low pressurizer level setp> int bistables as directed. Some of them

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pointed out that this was done at the expense of reduced reliability I-.,

since safety injection will row be initiated by a 1 out of 3 low

g pressure signal. All licensees have c3 reed to make permanent modi-s

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fications such that safety injection would be initiated by pressur izer i.

low pressure signals (2 out of 3).

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4.

Review the containment i;olation initiation design and procedures, and prepare and implement all changes necessar y to parmit contain-raent isolation whether manual or automatic, of all line; whose isolation does not dc3rado needed safety features or waling capability, upon automatic initiation of safety inject! ore.

2230 027

Response

B Responses to this item varies from plant to plant. %e followina table su;marizes im p rtant aspects of these responses:

Plant

_ Isolation Instr uction Lines to be Isolated Comment

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Indian Itase "A" - SI Signal All lines not needed Done as l}

Point 3 (or manually) for accident opar ation per Item 4

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Ph 'gn " n" - n-n p; o<.<m e o renm n nn P e nn1 i rv3 en 1

(or,aanually)

Icactdr coolent pun y OP PfC E M 1

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.y-i Plant Isolation Instruction Lines to be Isolated Comment Containment vent Containment purge &

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isolational - S1 Signal exhaust system.

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5 Zion 1&2 Phase "A" - SI Signal All non-essential lines Dane as i

per Itcm 4 i

i Phase "B" - H-Il pr essure All remaining process (ar manually) lines except SI, CS ard i

auxiliary feed

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Fhase "A" - SI Signal All non-essential Ibne as l-Robinson (or manually) lines per I'.cm 4 4

Phase "B" - H-Il pressure All renaining process j'

(or manually) lines execpt SI, CS an:5 auxiliary feed il

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Salem Phase "A" - SI Signal All non-essential Dane as

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1&2 process lines per Item 4 3

1 Phase "B" - IHi pr essur e All remaining process j.

lines 4

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5.0 psig from 1 out of 2 Reviev j

Yankee pr essor e channels continuing

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(S1 does not initiate t

1 isolauon) 2230 028 4

't dj Ginna S1 Signal (or manually)

All run-essential lines Review and containment sump continuing lj PP 7

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i Plant Isolation Instruction Lines to be Isolated Comment Reviewed

'. l Ind1,n Point 2 Foin'-

Beach 5.

Ibr facilities for which the auxiliary feedwater systera is not automatically initiated, prepar e and implc:nent inmediately proce-dur es which r equir e the stationing of an individual (with no other

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l assigned concur rent duties and in direct a ' wntinuous corrnunica-tion with the control rooa) to promptly initiate adequate auxiliary feedwater to the steam generator (s) for those transier.ts or acci-dents the consequences of s.hich can be limited by such ac'.fon.

n L-i 6

l Responne test licensces reported that auxiliary feedwater will be automatically l

I initiated. Point Beach has not resporx3cd to this Item as of this date.

Connecticut Yankee ins manual initiation cnd thus operator s are trained F

to be constantly awar e of transients involving the condensate /feedwater system. Has not a]rced to station an operator as r equested, stating that ample time (12 minutes) would be available for the operator to react j

pr oper1y.

6.

Ibr your facilitics, prepar e and ingleacnt immediately procedures j

2230 029 s

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Identify those plant indications (such as valve discharge a.

piping temperature, valve psition indication, or valve dischargo r eliof tank temper atur e or pr cssure indication) n r tor s may utilize to deterraine that pres-which plant o

sur izer powr operated relief valve (s) ar e open, arxl b.

Dir ect the plant oper ators to manually close the pwer oper ated relief block valve (s) when reactor coolant system lerssure is r edtced to below the set point for rntraal autornatic closur e of the prawr oper ated relief valve (s) j and the valve (s) r emain nttek open.

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Response

a.

discharge temperature, rclief tank temperature, Ginna pressurizer heater pot.cr consumption, PORV and 2

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block valve position indication, etc.

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b.

Gange in procedure effected.

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relief valve position indicators, discharge piping k'

Salca 1&2 b.l pressure, relicf tank prescure, control room I

C alarns, etc.

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Procedure exist to assure plant per sonnel are E.

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aware of position of PORV.

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a.

Psition indication, dischange temper atur e dispicy

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b.

procedure will be revised to reflect requir onent.

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position indication, discharge temperatur e display Zion 1&2 and alarn, etc.

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Isolated during normal operation.

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high tempar ature alarm ard other plant indications.

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i b.

procedure exists to direct operator to close valves.

a.

p3sition indicators, discharge temperatur e, relief Conn. Yankee h-tank conditions, etc.

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b.

Procedure exists.

1 a.

position indication, discharge tempar atur e, r elief 4

Indian Point 2

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tank conditions, etc.

2230 030 h-b.

Proccdur e exists.

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7.

Review the action directed by the operating procedures and training f,

Instructions to ensure that:

p(.1 Cherator s do not overt ide automatic actions of engineered l:

a.

C.

safety featur es, unless continued oper ation of enjineered

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safety features will result in unsafe plant conditions. For example, if continued opor ation of engineer ed safety features

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would threaten reactor vessel inteJrity then the IDI should 1-be secured (as noted in b(2) below).

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b.

Operating procedures currently, or are revised to, specify M-that if the high pressure injection (liPI) system has been 1;

automatically actuated because of low pressure condition, it (5,.

rau.3t renain in operation until either:

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(1)

Both lou pressure injection (LPI) pumpo are in

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operation and flowing for 20 minutes or longer; at a rate which would assure stable plant beluvior; OT V..f..

(2) 'Ihe HPI system has been in operation for 20 rainutes, p

and all tot and cold leg tempratures are at least j.

50 degt ces belcw the saturation temperature for the 3

li existing RCS pressure. If 50 degrees subcoolirn cannot be maintained after HPI cutoff, the HPI shall

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be reactivated. 'Ihe degree of subcooliro beyond 50 degrees F and the length of time HPI is in operation

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shall be limited by the pr essur e/ temperature considera--

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tions for the vessel integrity.

O Op2 rating procedures currently, or are revised to, specify that in f

c.

i4 the event of HPI initiation with reactor coolant pumps (RCP) opera-( ;~ -

ting, at least one DCP chall renain oporating for tw loop plants y,'

and at least tw RCP's shall renain operating for 3 or 4 loop plants as long as the pump (s) is providing forecd flow.

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d.

Operator s ar e provided aJditional information and instructions to i

tr;t rely upon pr essurizer level indication alone, but to also examine pressurizer pi essure and other plant prameter indications in evalu-

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j-ating plant con 3itions, e.g., water inventory in the reactor primary L

system.

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D~ ntr11 m r.. h ~rl r. l i c e>n enc nrmat al l v _ c. tarn t-hn t-rhn"n r ecoi r ment c o'em geared to the 'P4I-2 typa of acciden't.

done claim t hat any changi

""" *~ 1 I"their"prer;e1 t"c7ergency p occdot cs"chmrrdTiot."brmah unt-il"nf ter-t l

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- May 7, 1979 s

extensive safety analysis. Miat is good for one type of transient may not be good for others.

Specific responses to this Item are gralitative and var ies widely. Cencr ally, there is a lack of enthusiasa to make immediate charges.

.. -a Pcview all safety-related valve positions, positioning requir ements 8.

and positive controls to assur e that valves remain positi,ned (open n

to ensur e the proper operation of engineered or closed) in a nanner Also review related pr ocedur es, such as those for safety features.

maintenance, testing, plant and system star t-up, and supervisory periodic (e.g. daily / shift checks) surveillance to ensure that such valves ar e returned to their cort cet positions followirn necessary manipulations and are maintained in their propar positions during all operational modes.

Response

..s All indicate that this requirenent was respanded to.

Ib response on this froa Point Beach as of this date.

1 noview your operating rodes and procedures for all systcas designed 9.

to transfer potentially radioactive gases and liquids out of the pr imary containment to assure that undesir ed ptrapirg, venting, or ji other relcanes of radioactive liquids ard gases will rot occur g

inadver tently.

In Initicular, ensure that such an occurr ence would not be caused by the remtting of engineered safety featur es instrunentation.

i.

List.all such systems and indicater 3

i Miether interlocks exist to pr event transfer when high l

a.

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radiation indication exists.

I b.

Ehether such systems are isolated by the containment isolation signal.

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'Ihe basis on t.hich continued operability of the a!xwe

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features is assur ed.

'l 2230 032 I

1l s ponse l

Ibst licensees said tint radioactive gases and liquids transfer lines t

ar e interlocked with containment isolation and/or high r adiation signals. D2 tails are also provided in responma to Item 4.

tbst cited tech wcn and ranveillane e an the

""mn.,nce of continmd or2: ability.

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.! May 7, 1979

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Review and modify as necessary your maintenance and test procedur es to ensur e that they require:

Ver ification,'by test or inspection, of the operability of a.

h redundant safety-related systems prior to the r enoval of L.

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any safety-related system from service.

1 b.

Verification of the operability of all safety-related x '

systems when they ar e retur ned to service followiry3 raain-3 tenance or t.esting.

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Explicit rntification of involved scactor oper ational

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per sonnel v.henever a safety-r elated system is r enoved c.

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from and returned to service.

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Response

lI All have conaitted as requested. Point Beach has not res;nrded as i

of this date.

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11.

Review your pronpt repor ting pr ocedures for tac notification to assur e that ISC is notified within one hour of the tirae the reactor is not in a controlled or expected cortlition of operatio.:. Fur ther,,

at that tirae an open contintnus communication channe) chall be k

established and raaintained with IEC.

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Response

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All have caraitted except Ibint Beach.

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3 12.

Review oper ating r.udes and pr ocedures to deal with significant amounts

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of hydrogen gas that nay be generated during a transient or other

,1 accident that muld either ranain inside the primty system or be N

released to the contairvaent.

1 J

Response

1 All claim that procedur es exist to remove hydrogen frota different regions of D}

the prImasy coolant system. 'Ihese incitrie:

)

(1)

If RCP is oper ating, hydrogen can be str ipped to pr essur izer

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vapor space and releasal throtrjh r elief valve.

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(2) Throtrjh letdown system arv3 str ippx1 in the voltrae control tank-20 W j

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In a aajor IOCA, hbirujen m uld

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. i May 7, 1979 e

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=g' On' licensee (Ginna) pr opused to evaluate feasibility of installiryg remote operated valves on the reactor vessel head for direct release

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of hydrogen.

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13.

Propose changes, as required, to those technical specifications which

j nust be modified as a result of your implanentiry3 the above itan.

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Response

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e o-All said will subnit chr.nges later.

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Peter Tan

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Staff Engineer e

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-1 cc: ICRS Technical Staff H. Vorcss o

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